You are on page 1of 173

Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
J-LAMAT REVIEWER

INTRODUCTION

I. Concept/definition of administrative law

The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government
and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to
individual remedies for the violations of his rights.

II. Scope of administrative law

Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to


control, the administrative operations of the government.

III. Classification of administrative law


A. That body of statutes setting up or creating administrative agencies
and endowing them with power and duties;
B. That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations and orders
promulgated in the exercise of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions;
C. That body of legal principles governing the acts of public agents which
conflict with private rights;
D. That body of determinations, decisions and orders of administrative
bodies made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular
fields.

IV. Origin and development of administrative law

V. Advantages of the administrative process

NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

I. Concept

A. Definition of administrative agency - An administrative agency


is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and
implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation
commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any

1|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

department, independent establishment, commission, administration,


authority, board or bureau x x x ."

Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226


(Ma. Lourdes C. Genio)

Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank


questioned the decision of the CA which dismissed the petition of the former on
the ground of lack of capacity to sue.

Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted
to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?

RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof?
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as government body
charged with the administering and implementing particular legislation
examples are workers compensation commissions and the like. The term
agency includes any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority or bureau.

B. Test for determining administrative nature

1. Mandatory statutory requirement intended for the protection of the


citizens and by a disregard of which their rights are injuriously affected;

2. Directory if no substantial right depend on it and no injury can


result from ignoring it and purpose of legislature can be accomplished in
a manner other than that prescribed and substantially, the same results
attained.

C. Administrative function, defined - Administrative functions are


those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules
and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

2|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: Its a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept the
appointment by executive order by the governor of ilocos sur Rodolfo farinas as
the member of ilocos norte provincial committee on justice created pursuant to
presidential order. That his membership in committee will not in any way
amount to an abandonment to his present position as executive judge of
branch xix, RTC, first judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue: What is an administrative agency?

Ruling: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence

The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members


of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.)

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning


and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any
administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving
the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is
where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive


machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or
control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence "we can readily see that membership in the
Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee

3|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative


functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any
study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the
group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the
expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the
power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their
implementation.

D. Public office, defined in relation to administrative law

Fernandez vs Sto. Tomas 248 SCRA 194


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia
M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service
Commission and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the
Office of the Personnel Relations, both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so
serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of
the Commission, was issued .

Issues :

(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career
Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit]
and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and
Development Office]; and

(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners' constitutional


right to security of tenure.

Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public (radlapsbip)

4|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS,


OPERA and ORR, and as well each of the other Offices, consist of aggregations
of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each
Section, Division and Office comprises groups of positions within the agency
called the Civil Service Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or
less definable function or functions these functions are related to one another,
each of them being embraced by a common or general subject matter. These
offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710


were described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the
organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery
of service." These changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by,
on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's
functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-
five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end
that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the
government employees that they are mandated to serve.

N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission
are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to
particular positions or ranks. Thus a person may be appointed to the position
of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or
to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the
instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV,
without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with
respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of
the Commission.

E. Reasons for creation of administrative agencies -

Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987

Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets,
the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes
on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.

Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989

5|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling: As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has


become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the
regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned
to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.

Reyes vs Caneba

Ruling: "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative


jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must
allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts
of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a
court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence."
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988

Ruling: The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them.
They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power
which is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations. This
argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution
provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporation
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. x x x (d) such
nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from
or through the Government which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity." (Italics
supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that
private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be
examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.

E. Types of administrative agencies

1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government is offering


some gratuity, grant, or special privilege; (SSS, GSIS,PAO)
2. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to
carry on certain functions of government; (BIR, LRA, BoC, BI)

6|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

3. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing


some business service for the public; (Bureau of Posts, PNR, MWS)
4. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to
regulate business affected with public interest; (LTFRB, ERB, HLURB)
5. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking
under the police power to regulate private business and individuals;
(MTRCB, GAB, DDB)
6. Those agencies to set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social
policy involved. (NLRC, ECC, DAR, COA)

F. Relation between administrative agencies and courts

Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers which allows


them to interpret and apply rules and regulations. Findings of these
administrative agencies are rendered conclusive on the courts.

G. Administrative framework of the Philippines (Executive Order No.


292)

Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538

1. Definition of Government of the Republic of the Phils. - refers


to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions
of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms
of local government.

2. Definition of Agency of the government - refers to any of the


various units of the Government, including a department, bureau,
office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

3. Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the


National Government, not integrated within the department
framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through

7|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered


institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

4. Definition of Administration -

US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332


(Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with the crime
of libel together with Eduard OBrian.

The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the
complaint, and each was sentenced to six months imprisonment at hard labor
and a fine of $1,000, United States currency. From this judgment the
defendants have appealed to this court.

During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants
asking that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111,
section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and under the sixth
amendment to the Constitution, which motion was denied by the court, and an
exception was also taken to this ruling.

Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the Constitution


of the United States relating to trials by jury are in force in the Philippine
Islands.

Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the


reins of government are for the time being.

1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been
acquired by and belongs to the United States, there is a difference between
such territory and the territories which are a part-of the United States with
reference to the Constitution of the United States.

2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of
Paris, under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the
treaty the status of the ceded territory was to be determined by Congress.

3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not
extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general
principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in
the Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and
the general spirit of the Constitution, and except those express provisions of

8|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their


contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the
Constitution relating to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions,
and, consequently, the right to trial by jury has not been extended here by the
mere act of the cession of the territory.

4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the
Constitution relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the
Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession, for trials by jury, and
consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling the defendants
in this case to such trial; that the Court of First Instance committed no error in
overruling their application for a trial by jury

The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled An Act temporarily to provide for
the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands,
and for other purposes, in section 5 extends to the Philippine Islands nearly
all of the provisions of the Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. But there
was excepted from it the provisions of the Constitution relating to jury trials
contained in section 2, Article 111, and in the sixth amendment.

The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body
expressly recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to
pass laws, and has the power to pass the libel law under which the defendants
where convicted.

II. Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative agencies

A. Creation of administrative agencies

Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research


Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a
CESO rank, On August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September
15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board. All was not to turn well for petitioner. On
October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed Resolution No.
934359. The resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner
as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive service
board.

9|Page
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the
creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the
legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it
is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable,
necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary
to create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to
determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties
shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office
created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may
prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the
incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."

B. Abolition of administrative agencies

Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified pre-


war toll collector, classified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, but
was laid off due to the destruction of the bridge caused by flood. When the
bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the
respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his
duties, but he was refused reinstatement.

Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the position
of toll collector.

Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or
less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of
the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the
incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except
for cause.

De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary


Reorganization Act of 1980 by imputing the lack of good faith in its enactment
and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the president
his authority to fix compensation and allowance of the justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization

10 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

shall be deemed completed. On the other hand, the solicitor general interposed
a defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa.

Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith.
Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from
the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to
the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise
thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.

Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil
College of Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives,
organizational structure and functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.

Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former
PCC into what is now the PUP.

Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution not in its corporate life.

When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization


and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.

Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about the abolition of an educational
institution and the creation of a new one only an express declaration to that
effect by the lawmaking authority will.

Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to
the PUP as the new name of the institution.

But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and
to create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a
school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.

11 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

C. Reorganization of administrative agencies

1. Reorganization, defined

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221 SCRA 145
(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws


graduate and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register
of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to
Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner
was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was
for two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect
on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner
Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October
1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar.
She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner
Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On
October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending
decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a
Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of
Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy
Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said
Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the
subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn
referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).

Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the qualification


requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of
Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied
only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the
LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation
of the abovesaid Executive Order.

12 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling: If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional
functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office
different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the
duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the
creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished
and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office.

Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet
the changing circumstances and new development of the times. Private
respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds
II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key
position in the NILTDRA. The additional qualification was not intended to
remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a
valid reorganization measure.

III. Power of control, supervision and investigation by the President

A. Executive power, defined

Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668


(Lourdes Genio)

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,
pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article
VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the
marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

13 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due


process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security
over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution,
to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scopes of
presidential power and its limits.

Executive power

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does
not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it
touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-
chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the
power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the
power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the


President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the
breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and
what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius."

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

14 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty
of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such
does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential
functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing
action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles,
among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it
does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power
to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-
in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the
power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the
power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. (more than the sum of the
powers enumerated)

15 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

B. Power of control, defined power of the president to nullify,


modify, alter or set aside the decisions of a subordinate.

Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 6975 otherwise


known as the PNP Organic law placing the Philippine National Police under the
reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government in pursuant to the
provision of the constitution that the state shall establish and maintain one
police force which is national in scope and civilian in character. The petitioner
alleged that the said law limits only the power of the National Police
Commission into an administrative control over the PNP, thus, control
remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the PNP and
NAPOLCOM were placed.

Issue
Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to the
Department Secretary of the DILG.

Ruling
The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the power of the
President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former with that of the latter. This Presidential power of control over the
executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet
Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in short, the
Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of
the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569


(Tristan A. Reyes)

16 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised


Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating
municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as
a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the
Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges
that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been
impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power

Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power.

Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially


legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation
of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.
With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its
officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance
which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby
violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor.
Neither may he veto, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council
within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be.
He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.

Araneta vs Gatmaitan 101 Phil 238


(Aileen Angue)

17 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting the
banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging the same as null and
void.

Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.

Held: Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban trawl
fishing, the President, in the exercise of his power of control, can take over
from him such authority and issue the executive order to exercise it. The
Presidents power of control means that if a cabinet secretary or a head of a
bureau or agency can issue rules and regulations, as authorized by law, the
President has the power not only to modify or amend the same but can also
supplant the rules by another set entirely different from those issued by his
subordinate.

C. Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined alter ego doctrine;

Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47


(Lourdes Genio)

Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various land titles
(Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were
amended on the basis of supposed corrective resurveys, by increasing the
respective areas covered by said titles. The corresponding certifications of the
verifications of these resurveys were issued by the Land Registration Office,
headed then by petitioner Noblejas, and subsequently approved by the court,
in instances where the subdivision plans were complex, the action of the office
being sufficient where the subdivision plans were simple. Allegedly, however, it
turned out that the increases in said various amendments were far in excess of
the respective corresponding real areas of the lands involve, so much so that
even vast portions of lands and waters of the public domain not capable of
appropriation by any private person or entity have been included within the
expanded titles.

Noblejas contention: That the State is stopped to prosecute the accused


because it used him as a prosecution witness in cases similar to this case and
because Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino, with the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, exonerated the defendant from any criminal complicity in resurveys
with expanded areas.

18 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

As a matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code places him


under the 'general supervision and control' of the Department of Justice
together with other prosecuting officers and under Section 74 of the same
Code, the Secretary of Justice as 'Department Secretary shall assume the
burden and responsibility of all activities of the Government under his control
and supervision. Consequently, the constitutional power of the President of
control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices (sec. 10, Art. VII,
Constitution of the Philippines) should be considered as embracing his office.

Issue: Can the agent act for and in behalf of the principal.

Ruling: The power of control . . . . implies the right of the President (and
naturally of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may
be vested by law in the officers of the national government, as well as to act in
lieu of such officers. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same
shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who
shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or
revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.
Accordingly, the law confers upon the Secretary only 'general supervision and
control' may not be construed as limiting or in any way diminishing the
pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control which is constitutionally
based, since he acts also as alter ego of the President. Acts of the (alter ego)
secretary is presumed to be that of the president.

D. Limitations on the power of control

Does not include:

1. the abolition or creation of an executive office;


2. the suspension or removal of career executive officials or employees
without due process of law;
3. the setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasi-
judicial agencies, including the office of the President, on contested cases
to have become final pursuant to law or to rules and regulations
promulgated to implement the law;

E. Power of supervision

Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143


(Angel Pascual)

19 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion
Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad
Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other
than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary
indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner
appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was
served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with the
provincial board. On the same day, the provincial, governor issued
Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter,
the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the
petitioner over his objection.

The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to


enjoin the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the
administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of
suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without
legal effect.

Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction

Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and,
offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under
his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and
does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article
VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an
official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation
would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of
the Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.

20 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The power to oversee that the officials concerned performs their duty and if
they later fail or neglect to fulfill them, to take such action or steps as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: An original action of certiorari instituted in the Supreme Court by the


Provincial Governor and the members of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan to
nullify the disapproval of the Secretary of Finance of their Resolution
abolishing the positions of three special counsel in the province, to prohibit the
provincial treasurer and the district from paying the salaries if three special
counsel and to prevent the latter from continuing to occupy and exercise the
functions incident to their positions.

Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of the Secretary
of Finance.

Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of Finance has the
power to revise their budget, local governments should be given a large degree
of freedom in determining for themselves the propriety and wisdom of the
expenses that they make provided that the expenses contemplated are within
their financial capacity. The supervisory authority of the President over local
governments is limited by the phrase as provided by law and where there is
no law in accordance with which said authority is to be exercised, it must be
exercised in accord with general principles of law. The Secretary of Finance is
an official of the central government, not of provincial governments, which are
distinct and separate. The power of general supervision granted to the
President over local governments, in the absence of any express provision of
law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that hem or his alter ego the
Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials
shall perform or comply with their duties. Further, the court ruled that the act
of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of three special counsel not
being contrary to law, nor an act of maladministration, nor an act of abuse, the
same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting as a
representative of he President by virtue of the latters power of general
supervision over local governments.

21 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of


Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of
five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election
Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President-
Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of
several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.

Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers


of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to
be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of
Region V of the Department of Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied
by respondent Secretary.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an


election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming that the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to
entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations
as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.

Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the


exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the President
through the Secretary of Local Government.

F. Power of review of other executive officers, defined

Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 146 SCRA 294

Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to


correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be
done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the

22 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio


corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official
exercising the power of supervision and review over him.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

I. Doctrine of separation of powers

A. Distribution of powers of government:

1. Legislative power is the power to propose, enact, amend


and repeal laws.
2. Executive power is the power to execute and implement the
laws.
3. Judicial power is the power of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving legal rights which are demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, though not mentioned anywhere by such


name in the 1987 Constitution, can be inferred from its provisions. The heart
of the doctrine is that the basic powers of the government must be kept
separate from each other, each power being under the principal control of a
branch of government. The legislative power is granted to the Congress, the
executive power to the President, and the judicial power to the Judiciary. The
President as Chief Executive exercises control over agencies and offices which
perform rule-making or adjudicatory functions. If the agency is created by
Congress, consider the law that created it. If the law is silent as to the control
which the President may exercise, the President can only supervise, i.e., to see
to it that the laws are faithfully executed.

B. Purpose of doctrine

So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in one


department (one person or group of persons) that would lead to abuse.

C. Blending of powers though each department has their own duties


and functions, they nevertheless exercise the same in concert that they
can work with other departments and conduct checks and balances
regarding the actions of each.

23 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Basis for blending of powers:

1. No function is capable of exact definition. Description is only


a generalization concerning its principal but not all of its
characteristics;
2. The Constitution allocated to the several departments
specific powers which in their nature did not ordinarily pertain to
them.
3. Practical necessity of exercising powers incidental to those
that are express or are appropriate to it, even if such incidental
powers should fall within the category of functions pertaining to
another department.

II. Doctrine of non-delegation of powers - what has been


delegated cannot be delegated.

A. General rule

US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327

Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.

B. Exception to the general rule

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726


(Mark Boado)

Facts: Calalang, in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of


Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the
recommendation of the Director of Public Works and the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in
Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time.

The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with
the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws
relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner
contended that such act is invalid delegation of legislative power.

24 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in


connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.

Issue: WON the said constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation
of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official
to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.
C. Prohibition against re-delegation; exceptions

KMU vs Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386


(Ma. Lourdes C. Genio)

Facts: Petitioner KMU question the constitutionality of the memoranda no. 92-
009 issued by the DOTC and LTFRB which, among others, to authorize
provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed
transportation fares without application there for with the LTFRB and without
hearing and approval thereof by said agency and other matters.

Issue: WON the Memoranda issued is constitutional?

Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009 invalid.
Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory
body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202

25 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB
"to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust reasonable
fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land
transportation services provided by motorized vehicles."

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in


order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for
governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the
laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the
task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-
making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted
with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an
administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB may implement broad policies
laid down in a statute by neither filling in" the details which the Legislature
may neither have time nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under the
aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike,
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or
other public service.

The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to art undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata
non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing and its far-
reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish
this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the
industry.

American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-26803 Oct. 14, 1975
(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus with
preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who have pending interference and
cancellation proceedings, questions the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised
Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as
amended which authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official of said office to hear inter partes proceedings. Moreover, the rule also
provided that judgment on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared
by the Director and signed by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment
made by the Director on the Rule vesting hearing officers authority to hear
their cases was illegal and void because under the law, it is the Director who
should personally hear the cases of petitioners.

26 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions.

Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative
agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such
regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry
out its purpose and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to
delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by
implication it has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law
and RA 165 and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the designation
of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the power and authority
entrusted to the Director suggests that the aforementioned laws should be
construed so as to give aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary
for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of
said laws. Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by him since that the
parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process of law nor the
requirements of fair hearing require the actual taking of testimony before the
same officer who will make the decision.

III. Powers of administrative agencies, in general

A. Sources of powers of an administrative agency

1. Constitution is the body of rules and principles by which


the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited
and defined.
2. Statutes rules and regulations promulgated by the
legislature.

B. Limitations to the powers of an administrative agency

Matienzon vs Abellera 162 SCRA 1


(Angel Pascual)

Facts : Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators. Private


respondents filed their petitions with the respondent board for the legalization
of their unauthorized taxicab units citing PD 101 in order to eradicate the
harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing
them to become legitimate and responsible operators. Petitioners contend that
the BOT does not have jurisdiction over the case since the law provided a
period of six (6) months which limited the time period to legitimize such
clandestine operations by certain taxicab operators.

27 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issues : Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal taxicab
operators under PD 101 even after the lapse of six (6) months.

Ruling : There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of such powers
granted to the BOT, six (6) months after its promulgation. It is a settled
principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a
certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of
the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary
to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being
germane to the law.

Heirs of Santiago Pastral vs Secretary of Public Works 162 SCRA 619


(Aileen Angue)

Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a case


against herein petitioner with the Department of Public Works and
Communications for the reason that latter were encroaching a part of the river
with their fishpond. The petitioner countered that they were given permission
by the Bureau of Fisheries. The secretary of public works designated the City
Engineer to conduct hearings on the same and eventually ordered the same be
removed. Petitioners went to the Court of First Instance to assail the decision of
the secretary and obtain an injunction which were ruled in their favor. The
secretary appealed the lower courts decision.

Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an investigation
and order the removal of the encroachment made on the river.

Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or


provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building
of dams, dikes x x x which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream,
coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways x x x shall
be ordered removed as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein
provided x x x. The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit was
issued in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the
Secretary's more specific authority to remove dikes constructed in fishponds
whenever they obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river or
stream or would cause inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic
Act 2056) takes precedence. Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public
Works to investigate and clear public streams from unauthorized
encroachments and obstructions was granted as early as Act 3708 of the old
Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this Court in the cases of

28 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v. Commonwealth (69


Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supra) Santos etc.,
et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (19 SCRA 637).

C. Nature of the powers of administrative agencies

Quasi legislative consists of issuance of rules and regulations; general


applicability; and prospective in application;

Quasi Judicial refers to orders, rewards or decision; applies to a


specific situation; and determination of rights, privileges,etc. (fact finding
investigate)

Depends on the enabling statute

D. Express and implied powers

Villegas vs Subido 30 SCRA 498


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum which


provided for the procedure of removal and suspension of policemen. Petitioner
herein contends that the Civil Service Act impliedly repealed RA 557 which
provides, among others, that charges against policemen shall be referred by the
mayor and investigated by the city or municipal council.

Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA


409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive and original
jurisdiction to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the
City of Manila in competitive service.

Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not


inconsistent with the power of the City Council under Republic Act 557 to
decide cases against policemen and the power of the City Mayor of Manila
under Section 22 of Republic Act 409 to remove city employees in the classified
service.

Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal,
suspension or separation effected by said City Council or City Mayor, can be
passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Nonetheless, the
Commissioner's "final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension" of classified service employees presupposes, rather than negates,
the power vested in another official to originally or initially decide the removal,

29 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

separation or suspension which the Commissioner is thereunder empowered to


pass upon.

Such power, furthermore, is subject to an express limitation contained in


Section 16(i), namely, the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law."
Accordingly, it does not obtain at all in those instances where the power of
removal is by law conferred on another body alone, with no appeal therefrom,
as in the case provided for in Section 14 of Republic Act 296.

LLDA v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292

Ruling : LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the laguna lake region from the deleterious effect of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding area.
It has the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA 4850
and its amendatory laws. Moreover, the power to make, alter, or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also impliedly bestowed upon LLDA
by EO 927.

Necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers


It is a fundamental power rule that an administrative agency has only such
power as are expressly granted to it by law, likewise an administrative agency
has also such power as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express
powers.

Polloso vs Gangan 335 SCRA 750


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts : Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter of
explanation and appeal from the notice of disallowance issued by the COA. The
case stemmed from the hiring of a private lawyer, Atty. Satorre, who was
compensated by virtue of a contract entered by the NPC and the former. The
COA held several persons liable for payment of the amount due to said lawyer
which included herein petitioner. Petitioner contends the nature of services
that was contracted with the lawyer. Respondent contends that there was a
memorandum prohibiting the hiring of private lawyers without following the
necessary procedures required by the COA.

Issue : Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in this case?

Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government
agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers

30 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

to render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed
for the payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer,
there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the
circular is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public
funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the government. This is in line
with the Commission on Audits constitutional mandate to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Blaquera vs Alcala 295 SCRA 411


(Angel Pascual)

Facts : Petitioners are officials and employees of several government


departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V 2
of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President
Ramos") issued Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of
Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of productivity
incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29
directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of
CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized
under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the
return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen
(15) days after the issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads
of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To
prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or
allowances, the petitioners have come before the Supreme Court to seek relief.

Issues : Whether or not the issued Administrative Orders are valid.

Ruling : In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by


the Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is
authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary
recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by
their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal

31 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of


government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or
services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official
employment." (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V).

Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who


is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary
recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not
the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such function
belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.

RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 GRN 93237

Buenaseda vs Flavier 226 SCRA 645


(Angel Pascual)

Facts : The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners for violations of graft and corruption.

Issues : Whether or not the ombudsman has power to suspend government


officials and employees pending investigation of administrative complaints.

Ruling : The Ombudsman is vested with authority to preventively suspend


officers as contained in sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act.

E. Discretionary powers vs. ministerial duty

Carino vs Capulong 222 SCRA 593


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the
respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof.
AMA Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational
Institution without the required authorization that must be secured first before
the DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure
of the said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two
governmental agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC
Davao to enjoin DECS from implementing the said closure pending the
approval of the request to operate of the said school. The said request was
denied by the DECS for not complying the requirements prescribed by the
Department. The said case was dismissed, undaunted the private respondent

32 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

appeal before the CA which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
private respondent then filed a petition before the RTC of Makati with the same
cause of action now using the organization of the parents of their students. The
said court presided by the respondent Judge issued the preliminary injunction
sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. The private respondent
contended that the same should be permitted to operate because DECS is only
performing a ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS on the other
hand contended that it exercises a discretionary power in pursuant to the
provisions of law with respect to educational institutions.

Issues : Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial or


discretionary function.

Ruling : The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power
with respect to the issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution.
The Court further distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A
purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.

Accordingly, the granting of license to operate is vested upon the judgment of


the DECS in securing the quality education that an educational institution
should provide pursuant to the constitutional provision on education and the
organic law authorizing said department to issue rules and regulations
pertinent thereto.

Mateo vs CA 196 SCRA 280


(Aileen Angue)

Facts : Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. RTC ruled
in favor the petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for private respondent.
Petitioner filed relief from judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from
judgment. Petitioner filed mandamus.

Issues : Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from judgment is
ministerial?

33 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling : Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging on the


appeal is discretionary.

1. Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an officer or


tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment (remedy
mandamus)

2. Discretionary power, defined - If the law imposes a duty


upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed (remedy certiorari)

3. Importance of knowing distinction to determine the


remedies available

4. Delegation of ministerial and discretionary power

Binamira vs Garrucho 188 SCRA 154


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts : Petitioner herein filed a quo warranto seeking reinstatement to the


Office of General Manager in the Department of Tourism. In 1986, petitioner
was designated by then Minister Gonzales as General Manager of the PTA. The
Minister sought the approval of the president which was favored by the latter.
In 1990, respondent was the new Secretary of Tourism and asked for the
resignation of the petitioner. The president issued a memorandum to Garrucho
designating him as General Manager for the reason that petitioner was not
appointed by the President as required by PD 564 but only by the Secretary of
Tourism which was invalid. Petitioner contends that he was validly appointed
to the position since that the act of then Minister Gonzales was also the act of
the president which presumes that the act of the department heads were the
act of the president.

Issue : Whether or not petitioner was validly appointed to his position.

Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager
of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the
Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking,
it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that
discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of

34 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be
validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a
member of the Cabinet.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the


presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his
duties to another.

F. Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory duties and


powers

Article 5 Civil Code

Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws


shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

1. Mandatory/prohibitory statute, defined and effect

Sarina vs CFI of Bukidnon 24 SCRA 715

Ruling: A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively that


something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that
something be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter
except to obey.

2. Permissive/directory statute, defined and effect

Meralco Securities Corp. vs Savellano 117 SCRA 804


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued by
Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay and
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former the
amount of 51M by way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus
interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of
the total amount collectible as informers reward.

Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.

35 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with
the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes
has after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no
tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now
Minister of Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such
decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official
duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A contrary
view, whereby any stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp and control
the official functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create
disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total disruption of the operations of
the government.

Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or discretionary in


nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can
result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner
other that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained.

G. Error in the exercise of powers

1. Doctrine of non-suability of the state inapplicable the


state cannot be sued without its consent.

Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713


(Mark Boado)

Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school
(navy based) which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case
against the military officials concerned because of discrimination. The military
invoked the non-suability of the state.

Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.

Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is
questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office
by virtue of their official capacity.

2. Estoppel inapplicable

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA 234 SCRA 348


(Aileen Angue)

36 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction of


administrative agency cannot bind the government, therefore estoppels does
not apply.

3. Presumption of regularity

Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority
and established a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11
but reduced to 7. Thereafter, respondent chairman of the coconut authority
initiated a special coconut end-user companies which included the petitioner.
The chairman directed to collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply
the same to settlement of short levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to
release the subsidy provided they post a bond equal to the amount of the
disputed claim. Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that the COA
Chairman and Auditor had no jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the
subsidy case endorsed to the court.

Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and
decision had became moot.

Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed;
and it is 'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with
powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement
of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or
promotion of which requires a technical or special training, 'aside from a good
knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields,
containing in the nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying our
Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact
of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in
support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently
insubstantial.

Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.

IV. Investigatory Powers

A. Scope and extent of powers

37 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

De Leon : Investigatory or inquisitorial powers include the power to inspect,


secure, require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records,
reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise. They are conferred on practically all administrative agencies. In fact,
the investigatory powers of administrative agencies, or their power and facilities
to investigate, initiate action, and control the range of investigation, is one of
the distinctive functions which sets them apart from the court.

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) and alliance of


concerned teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as mass concerted
actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been bought to the latters attention. As a result of the said action, the DECS
secretary dismissed from the service one of the private respondents and the
other nine were suspended.

Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of cases. 2. Won
the CHR can try and decide cases as court of justice even quasi-judicial bodies
do?

Ruling : The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of


controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in controversy may be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions.

Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power over certain
specific type of cases like alleged human rights violation involving civil or
political rights.

The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication power is
that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make findings of facts as
regard claimed human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not


judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritively, finally and definitely, subject to
such appeals or modes or review as may be provided by law.

38 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to adjudicate.

Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to investigate?


Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to investigate
depending on the law granting such power.

Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or without quasi-


legislative or quasi-judicial power? Yes. For the reason that some agencies
are formed for the sole purpose of investigation only (fact finding, etc.)

Concerned Officials of MWSS vs Vasquez 240 SCRA 502


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project in order
to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in
the Metropolitan area. The project was financed by funds loaned by the
Overseas Economic Coop Fund of Japan to the National Government.

MWSS caused the publication or an invitation for pre-qualification and bids.


The major factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants financial
condition, technical qualification and experience to undertake the project.
Private Respondent Phil. Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers
Association sent letters offering suggestions on the technical specifications.

Thereafter 3 lowest bidders for the project were known PBAC-CSTE


recommended F.F Cruz and Inc. but other members both disagreed and opted
for a rebidding bating the contract to be awarded to Joint Venture. But MWSS
Board Committee on construction Management and Board Committee on
Engineering that contract be awarded to F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. being the
lowest complying bidder.

PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the Ombudsman a
letter-complaint protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS to favor
suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation there on.

Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power, functions and


duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS was diverted to set aside
the recommendation of MWSS to award contract.

Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that respondent
Ombudsman acted beyond the jurisdiction notwithstanding that Section 20 of

39 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

the Ombudsman Act, which enumerated the administrative act, or omission


that may not be the subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts
the same by his office.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of


PLDPPMAs complaint and to correspondingly issue its challenged orders
directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to se aside the recommendation of
the PBAC-CTSE.

Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory power and
public assistance duties that can be found in the first and second part of
Sec.13, Art. XI of the Constitution. While the broad authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which xxx appears illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede
however, that the constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to
confer upon it veto or provisory power over an exercise of judgment or
discretion is lawfully vested.

While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, other than those specifically excepted under the
Constitution and Republic Acts No. 6770, which appears illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient, is broad, the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did
not intend to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of
whether to accept or reject a bid and award contract vested by law in a
government agency, which involves the exercise of discretion, the Ombudsman
has exceeded his power by reviewing the award and granting it to another
bidder.

Deloso vs Domingo 191 SCRA 545


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts : An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor Delloso who was
charged before the Special Prosecutor with multiple murder. Governor Delloso
questioned the said referral to the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no
jurisdiction over the case for being irrelevant of the crime he committed to his official
function as governor.

Issue : Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the people, the office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in

40 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

any form or manner against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of
any public officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. Ombudsman is also empowered to direct the officer concerned, in this case
the Special Prosecutor, to take appropriate action against a public official and to
recommend his prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not required that
the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of
official duty.

B. Requirement of notice and hearing when the law is silent,


notice and hearing may be dispensed with, which depends upon the
stage of the proceedings. (substantial right can be given notice and
hearing)

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: A request for extradition was filed against Mark Jimenez for alleged
violation of many criminal laws in the US. The DOJ formed a panel of lawyers
to review and study the request. Pending the review, MJ requested copies of all
documents and papers relative to the request that the proceedings be
suspended for the meantime. The DOJ denied the request, hence MJ filed a
petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the DOJ to furnish
him the documents. The RTC of Manila issued a TRO to maintain a status quo
ante, hence the DOJ filed an appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not MJ is entitled to notice and hearing during the
preliminary or the evaluation stage of the extradition treaty against him.

Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the
extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of
extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extradite. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these
rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts : GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the decision of the
court of appeals consolidated with GR No. 101666 for certiorari and prohibition
to review the decision of the executive secretary.

41 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State University who was
dismissed by the President of the Philippines from his position after
investigation of a committee on several charges against him. Petitioner
undertook to ask for a reconsideration on the same which respondent Drilon,
as executive secretary denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for TRO which granted the latter prayer. After eight
days, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for TRO. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground
that the petition was not meritorious and a case of forum shopping. The SC
dispensed with the comment of the Solicitor General for the public respondents
it being that the pleadings and papers already filed were already adequate for
them to act on said petition.

Issue : Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
assailed administrative orders. / Was the petitioner entitled to be informed of
the findings of an investigative committee created to inquire into charges
against him?

Ruling : Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and


recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that
is based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity
to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him
during the hearings of the investigating committees.

Pefianco vs Moral 322 SCRA 439


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction
before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who was later replaced by
Secretary Pefianco, praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from
enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.
Moral was ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did not
appeal the judgement .

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of
action but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals on certiorari which sustained the trial court.

42 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for
Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the motion to dismiss.

Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed


of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during
the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been
accorded these rights.

C. Right to counsel in administrative investigations a counsel may


or may not assist a person under investigation. (Remolona v. CSC)

D. Importance of administrative investigations

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that
preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena
in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the


Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580
of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses
by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation.

Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

Ruling : Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of


future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
unwise.

43 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

E. Executive power to investigate, source

Section 64c Revised Administrative Code

Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct
of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted.

Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code

Residual Powers unless congress provides otherwise, the President


shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President
which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law.

Larin vs Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise tax service
of the BIR being appointed by then President Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a
decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave
misconduct. Acting on a report by then acting Finance Secretary Leong, the
President, through its executive secretary, issued a memorandum creating an
executive committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted a position paper as required by the committee.
Consequently, the president issued a memorandum which streamlined the
operations of the BIR abolishing some of the offices which included the office of
excise tax and another memorandum dismissing herein petitioner from office
as a result of the investigation. Petitioner contends that he is a Career
Executive Service officer and he cannot be removed. On the other hand,
respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls
under the disciplining authority of the president.

Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president have
the power to order an investigation against herein petitioner?

Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career
Executive Service under the law which is appointed by the president. As a

44 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he


comes under the direct disciplining authority of the president in line with the
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
conferred by the Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president
which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against
petitioner was pursuant to the power of removal by the president. However, the
power of removal is not absolute since the petitioner herein is a career service
officer who has in his favor the security of tenure who may only be removed
through a cause enumerated by law.

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that
preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena
in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the


Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580
of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses
by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation.

Issue : Whether or not PARGO has the power to issue subpoenas

Ruling : The subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent


Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to
issue.

Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of


investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not
probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.

Requirements in issuing a subpoena:

1. Within the authority of the agency


2. Information is reasonably relevant

45 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

3. Demand is not indefinite

V. Quasi-legislative /Rule-Making Powers

Remolona vs CSC 362 SCRA 304


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in
Infanta, Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS inquired from the Civil
Service Commission as to the status of the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs.
Remolona who got a rating of 81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the
National Board for Teachers. After an investigation, Remolonas name is not in
the list of passing and failing examinees. Remolona admitted that he was
responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no
knowledge and that he did it because he wanted them to be together.

A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona and
Atty. Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and
dishonesty. CSS found Estelito Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery
Remolona was absolved from legibility. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition
and therefore a review by the SC.

Issue : Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite of the fact
that the offense committed was not done in the performance of his official duty.

Ruling : If the government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of


oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.

Rule making power - the power to issue rules and regulations.

A. Nature of power, definition Administrative agencies are endowed


with powers legislative in nature or quasi-legislative, and in practical
effect, with the power to make law. However, the essential legislative
functions may not be delegated to administrative agencies and in this
sense, it is said that administrative agencies have no legislative power
and are precluded from legislating in the strict sense.

People vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing
electro fishing in fresh water.

46 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84 penalizing


electro fishing.

Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare
what act constitute a criminal offense. Electro fishing is now punishable by
virtue of PD 704. Thus, an administrative regulation must be in harmony with
law; it must not amend an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for violation
of an administrative order it must clearly appear that the order falls within the
scope of the authority conferred by law.

1. Ordinance power of the President/Delegation to the


President

- The president has the power to issue rules and regulations (executive
orders, proclamations, etc.)

Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution

Section 23. 2. - In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin. Code

Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a


general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

47 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to


particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a


status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which
the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of


administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only
concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in
memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to


internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of
all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government,
for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in


his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
shall be issued as general or special orders.

Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting and
banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging that the same is null
and void.

Issue : Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was valid.

Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed
thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard
or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without
requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the
performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.

EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies
functions.

48 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Olsen & Co. vs Aldanese, 43 Phil. 259


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Walter Olsen, a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in the


manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the Philippines
assailed the constitutionality of Act 2613, allegedly depriving them of their
right of exporting cigars to the United States due to the refusal of the Collector
of Internal Revenue to issue certificate of origin and that the cigars were not
manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the province of
Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Viscaya.

Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make


rules and regulations which are not within the scope of Act 2613.

Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal Revenue was that
a proper standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined and
that all of these who produce tobacco of the same standard would have equal
rights and opportunities. Such delegated power the rules and regulations
promulgated should be confined to and limited by the power conferred by the
legislative act.

The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to makes rules and


regulations is specified and defined to the making of rules and regulations for
the classification, marking and packing of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good
quality and the handling of it under sanitary conditions.

2. Delegation to the Supreme Court

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional


rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

49 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto to amend certificate of recognition by


changing scope of its reg product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic stiles.
Mariwasa oppose filed motion for reconsideration. Mariwasa filed petition for
review with respondent CA. it is temporarily restrained BOI from implementing
decision, 20 days lapsed without respondent court issuing preliminary
injunction. Lepanto filed motion to dismiss, court appellate. Jurisdiction over
BOI vested with SC.

Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply
deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue of
its cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so
far as the manner of appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes
allowed to be filed with SC, are brought to CA.

3. Delegation to LGUs

Sections 5 and 9, Article X, Constitution

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.

Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral


representation as may be prescribed by law.

Sections 54, 55, 56, 57, Republic Act No. 7160

SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the


Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan
shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the
case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall
affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed

50 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the
local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making
the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.

(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to
the Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10)
days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be
deemed approved as if he had signed it.

(c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon approval by


the majority of all its members, be signed by the Punong Barangay.

SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief
executive may veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra
vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.

(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have the power
to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an
ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public
investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or
creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items
which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless
the Sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise,
the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year
corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.

(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The
Sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by
two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective
even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.

SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or


Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days
after approval, the secretary to the Sanggunian Panlungsod or Sangguniang
bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of
approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development
plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development
councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial

51 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing of his comments
or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution


is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution
invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action
in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities
of the action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty
(30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall
be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang


Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its
enactment, the Sangguniang Barangay shall furnish copies of all Barangay
ordinances to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned
for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or
municipal ordinances.

(b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be,
fails to take action on Barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be,
finds the Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal
ordinances, the Sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to
the Sangguniang Barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or
modification; in which case, the effectivity of the Barangay ordinance is
suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.

B. Rationale for the delegation of quasi-legislative power

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No.


8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation

52 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

of the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638


which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to
encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in
all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4)
years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of
the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of
appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the
Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the
imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the
subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide
a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.

Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED.
No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running not. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegates who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our


constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power
has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of
government. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite
tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The

53 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate
is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines
for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered
pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent;
herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.

The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on


paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a
higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.

Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional

Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority


has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce
the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088,
the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed.

Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: Pangasinan Transportation Co. has been engaged in transporting


passengers in Pangasinan and Tarlac to Nueva Ecija and Zambales by means
of TPU buses for 20 years. It filed with Public Service Commission to be
authorized to operate ten additional new Brockway Trucks on the ground that
they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its current
certificates. As a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The
Public Service Commission denied it. Motion for Reconsideration denied.
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the Public Service
Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 454 constitute a complete
and total abdication of the Legislatures functions and thus unconstitutional
and void.
(2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority.

Held:

54 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional. Section 8 of Art. XIII
of the Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be for a longer period
than fifty years and when it was ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that the Public Service
Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate. That
it shall be valid only for a period of time it has been declared that the period
shall not be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that has been delegated to the
commission is the admin function\, including the use of discretion, to carry
out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion
of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and towards the approval of the
practice by the courts.
(2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon
the police power, applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in
operation.

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of


Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works and the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in
Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time.

The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with
the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws
relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner
contended that such act is an invalid delegation of legislative power.

The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in


connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.

Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative
power.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation
of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they

55 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine


what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official
to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.

C. Limitations on the rule-making power

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone


Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,
Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and
Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners
allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines;
that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the
prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of

56 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence,
they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in
invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the
law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed,
the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs NLRC 106 SCRA 444


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Ruling : By virtue of such rule-making authority, the Secretary of Labor issued


on May 1, 1977 a set of rules which exempts not only distressed employers but
also "those who have granted in addition to the allowance under P.D. 525, at
least P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after January 1, 1977, provided that
those who paid less than this amount shall pay the difference (paragraph k of
said rules).

Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority


granted to the Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore void. The
recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
administration of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment. It is of elementary knowledge that an act of Congress
cannot be amended by a rule promulgated by an administrative agency. "It

57 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

seems too clear for serious argument that an administrative officer cannot
change a law enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an
interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous
becomes a nullity."

D. Requisites for valid delegation of quasi-legislative power

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330


(Ma.Lourdes C. Genio)

Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No.


8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation
of the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638
which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to
encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in
all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4)
years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of
the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of
appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the
Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the
imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the
subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide
a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.

Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED.
No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call
therefore should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that
conforms to the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking

58 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost
losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the
tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More
worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is
the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. When
confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to
strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that
grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The
Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's
political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the
economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them
for they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with the
esoteric of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so
long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people
especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's
economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.

1. Completeness test the law must be complete in all its items


and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing they will have to do is enforce
it (Eastern
Shipping vs. POEA)

What cannot be delegated are those which are purely legislative in


nature. He cannot determine what the law shall be.

US vs Ang Tang Ho L-4288 20 Nov 1952

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines
for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered
pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent;
herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on
paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a
higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.

59 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional

Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority


has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce
the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088,
the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed.

People vs Vera 65 Phil 56


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936,


before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record
and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila,
Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the
Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937.
Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding,
set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the
City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng.
The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging,
among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the
Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards
with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to
the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The
City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with
respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On
28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that
Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands
convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition
for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for
reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed
by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion
for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set
for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of
counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as

60 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court.
On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial
court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in
said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said
judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties
including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the
court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in
preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon
objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the
hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for
execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under
which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and
submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this
juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary
legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable
proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this
Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because
of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final
judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The
scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the
issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August
1937.

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General


and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of
its own laws.

61 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

2. Sufficient standard test to map out the boundaries of the


delegates authority by defining legislative policy and indicating
circumstances under which it is pursued.

Serve to canalize the banks of the river from overflowing.

Chiongbian vs Orbos 245 SCRA 253


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: Petitioners challenged the validity of a provision of R.A 6734,


authorizing the President of the Philippines to merge by administrative
determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the
Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President
pursuant to such authority, Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative
Regions in Mindanano. Four provinces includes, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted in favor of creating an autonomous region, thus
became ARMM. After the plebiscite, E.O 429 as amended by E.O 439 was
issued by the Chief Executive providing for the Reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao. The contentions of the Petitioners
contends that R.A 6734 is unconstitutional because 1.) it unduly delegates the
legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge the existing
regions. 2.) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

Issue: Whether the Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted.
Whether the grant of power to the President is included in the subject
expressed in the title of the law.

Ruling: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be


gathered or implied, nor it be found in the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged
legislation.

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title. The title is not required to be an index of the content
of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are
pertinent to that subject. The Reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is pertinent to the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

62 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or


implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged
legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions,
the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the
President in the law.

Cervantes vs Auditor General L-4043 26 May 1952


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers Corporation. Its
board of directors granted quarter allowances to petitioner. Submitted to the
control of the government enterprise council created in EO 93 in pursuance to
RA 51 for approval, the resolution was disapproved on recommendation by
auditor general. 1. That quarter allowance constituted additional compensation
prohibited by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition of NAFCO.

Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by certiorari/

Issue: that EO 93 is invalid as based on the law that is unconstitutional being


an undue delegation of legislative power to executive.

Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative lays down policy and a standard
is established by the statute there is no undue delegation. RA 51 is authorizes
the president to make reforms and changes in the government controlled
corporation for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in
their operations. This lays down a standard and policy. pursuant to this
authority, the president promulgate EO 93 creating government enterprises
council with power to pass upon the program of activities and yearly budget of
member corporations. Petition is dismissed.

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised


Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating
municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as
a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the
Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges
that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been

63 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of


legislative power

Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power.

Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially


legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation
of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable

Ynot vs IAC 148 SCRA 659


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order issued by
the President of the Philippines prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age.
Obviously, the petitioner was affected to the said order with the contention that
the said order is an invalid delegation of power and unduly oppressive to the
industry. The Solicitor General contended that the said law is a proper
delegation of legislative power to the President of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of power.

Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation of power.
The court further ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of
the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, the court declared
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

64 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

3. Exceptions to the requirement of sufficient legislative


standards

1. power which is not directly or exclusively a legislative


one and has no relation whatsoever to personal or property
rights;
2. power to regulate a mere matter of privilege

E. Issues on validity of legislation


1. Against the delegating statute itself --- whether or not the
requisites of valid delegation are present;
2. Against the exercise of the delegated power --- whether or
not the rule or regulation conforms with what the statute provides
and whether the same is reasonable.

Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license
pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P.
Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own
Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates
of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with
the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum.

Issue: WON Memorandum/ordinance of MMA is valid.

Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all
law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and
confiscating driver's licenses for traffic violations within the said area.

Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged


enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or


not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply
delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan
Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to

65 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver's licenses as well for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.

An ordinance to be valid:
Must not be in contravention of the constitution
Must not be oppressive
Must not be discriminatory
Must not regulate or prohibit trade
Must not be against a statute

F. Rule and rule-making, defined

Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987

"Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or


interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice
requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes
memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or
management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to,
the public.

Section 4, Book VII, Admin Code of 1987

"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or


repeal of a rule.

Eslao vs COA 236 SCRA 161


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State University


asked the SC to set aside the COA decision which denied honoraria and per
diems claimed under the National Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain
PSU personnel including petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are valid.

Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any
applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of
which it does not agree at least not before such law or regulation was set aside
by authorized agency of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void.

66 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to


interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.

Supplementary legislation A statute which leaves to the executive the


power to fill in the technical details in view of the latters expertise is a
recognized delegation of legislative power.

Must be in compliance with the enabling law and not

1. Classification of rules and regulations


a. Those issued by an administrative superior and directed
exclusively to the subordinates --- rules and regulations of
internal administration to be observed by subordinate
officials for the prompt and efficient dispatch of government
business and to facilitate the transactions of the general
public with the government;
b. Those directed not only to the inferior officers but also
and primarily to private individuals, fixing the manner by
which the terms of a statute are to be complied with.
2. Types of rule-making powers
2.1. Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of
authority (supplementary or detailed legislation)--- refers to
the power to issue rules and regulations which have the
force and effect of law;
2.2. Rule-making by the construction and interpretation of
a statute being administered (interpretative legislation)---
refers to the power to interpret and construe the statutes
entrusted to them for implementation;
2.3. The ascertainment of facts which will form the basis
for the enforcement of a statute (contingent legislation or
determination).

G. Supplementary/detailed legislation

1. Source enabling law;

2. Requisites for validity:

Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

67 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the
decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural
Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their
rights over their mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or
encroachment between two mining claims.

Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private
respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim
over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict
between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.

Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the
law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates
compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims,
such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree.
Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.

Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and
(2) should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they
committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring
petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction. Petitioners


had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the
Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims
[Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 4631.
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural
Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to
issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rulemaking
power.

Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis


for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by
the Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers.
Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does
it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a
procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does
not amend or extend the provisions of the statute

68 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to


administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.

4 requisites of the valid supplementary delegation


must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
conform to the standards that the law prescribes
must be reasonable
must be related to carrying in to effect the general provisions of law

UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its income as
an educational institution was taxable. Later on UST submitted a
memorandum before the Sec. of Finance disputing the decision of the latter as
regard the taxability of the formers income from tuition fees.
The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in accordance with the
rules romulgated by said Board under E.O. No. 401-A, whereby the petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of respondent to take cognizance of the petition for
review.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity for the reason
that it deprives the CFIs of their jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases
involving recovery of taxes.

Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which, as an
instrumentality of the Dept of Finance may properly come within the purview
of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as depriving the CFIs of their jurisdiction to act
on internal evenue cases, a matter which is foreign to it and which comes
within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do,
nor can that power be delegated by Congress alone has the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various department.

Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329


(Mark Roy Boado)

69 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the supplementary regulation


issued by the Department of Labor and Employment Secretary regarding the
application and implementation of 13 th month pay law. The Department order
included commission as part of the computation of determining the 13 th month
pay of the employees. Upon inspection, the petitioners were found to be
violators of the law for not including the commission on its employees in the
computation of the 13th month pay. The petitioner contended that the Secretary
Drilon is acting in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the same. The Secretary however contended that the
said order was just a supplementary to the law which the same tried to erase
the cloud thereof.

Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative regulation.

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court further ruled that
the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree
851 is even more emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations
which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation
of the l3th-month pay.
"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all
remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is
dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and
Regulations which categorically exclude from the definitions of basic salary
earnings and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A cursory
perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the
subject of a broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The
Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former
rules to include all remunerations and earnings within the definition of basic
salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations' which are
deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for
sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for works performed on rest days
and special holidays, pays for regular holidays and right differentials. As such
they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered i the
computation of the 13th month pay. If they were not excluded it is hard to find
any 'earnings and other remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation
of the 13-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle
and with no purpose.

GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79


(Angel Pascual)

70 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of
the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en
bane, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.

Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body

Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority
vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a
case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner
Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does
not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man
body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in
every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to
the jurisdiction of the NTC.

Toledo vs CSC 264 SCRA 19

Grego vs COMELEC 274 SCRA 481


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of manila of
serious misconduct and dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local
government, its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCC.

Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In the 1992
election he run again and this time his victory not without unchallenged.

A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second time
petitioner Grego a registered voted file a petition with comelec for
disqualification and suspension of his proclamation. Basco was proclaimed and
assume office; petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking to annul a hasty and
illegal proclamation.

71 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?

Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that
the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the
Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case. Basco was NOT
subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from
office on or after January 1, 1992.

"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to


promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations
relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.'

Conte vs COA 264 SCRA 19

China Banking Corp vs HDMF 307 SCRA 44

Romulo, Mabanta vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan
providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption
from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as
amended.

Issue: WON the amendments are valid

Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require that an
employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan
superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or
suspension of the Fund coverage.

Nasipit Lumber Co. vs NWPC 289 SCRA 667

72 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

3. Requirement of reasonableness

a. Bears a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to


be accomplished;
b. Supported by good reasons;
c. Free from constitutional infirmities or charge of
arbitrariness

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend any review
class, briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any
handouts, review material or any tip from school or any review center during
the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the
examination day.

Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.

Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of administrative


law administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued,
then they must be held invalid.

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the


implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to carrying into effect what is
provided in the legislative enactment.

H. Interpretative legislation

1. Distinction between rule and interpretation

Victorias Milling Co vs Social Security Commission 114 Phil 555

Ratio : When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, in


the exercise of its rule making power delegated to it by the legislature, it makes
a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. When it renders an opinion,

73 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law, hence,


merely advisory.

2. Types of executive construction/interpretation

a. Construction by an executive officer directly called to


implement the law. It may be express (embodied in a
circular, directive or regulation) or implied (practice or mode
of enforcement of not applying the statute to certain
situations; by usage or practice);
b. Construction by the Secretary of Justice as chief legal
adviser of the government. May be reversed by President in
the exercise of the power to modify, alter or reverse;
c. Interpretation handed down in an adversary
proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer
exercising quasi-judicial power.

2. Weight accorded to administrative constructions

Asturias Sugar Central vs Commissioner of Customs 29 SCRA 617


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued an Administrative Order in the silence of


the Tariff and Customs Code which extends the period of exportation of a
specific containers in which the petitioner was directly affected. The petitioner
questioned the said order alleging that the construction of a specific statute by
an administrative body must not be observed.

Issue: What weight should the court observes in administrative construction.

Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not previously
interpreted the stature, the rule is that the courts will give considerations to
construction by administrative or executive departments of the state. The
construction of the office charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight.

Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution without complying
with the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10,

74 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14, Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18,


all of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay


Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. After the
counting of the votes, petitioner (Concepcion) was proclaimed as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997, private respondent (Melendres)
filed an election protest against petitioner (Concepcion) with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, contesting therein the results of the election in all
forty-seven (47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch
68.

On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was
shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the protestant therein, which
payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6.
Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to
comply with this requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of
filing or docket fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not
jurisdictional.

Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the
payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and counter-
protest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at the outset
will not operate to deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law
and acquired pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the
instant petition is hereby denied.

When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of


policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the court that finally determine what
the law means.

Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425

United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of
commissioner in dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the absence of
express provision in Social Security act, vesting in the commission the power to

75 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

condone penalties. Petitioners contention that they had under the impression
that international organization, they were not cover under SSC. They paid their
premiums and ask for condonation, which was denied by commissioner.

ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under
SSC to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premiums.

RULING: No error in the commissioners action. The provision on the SSC


precisely enumerates the power of the commission, nowhere from the said
powers may it shown that the commissioner is granted expressly or by
implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the act.

3. Construction of administrative rules and regulations

Ollada vs Secretary of Finance 109 Phil 1072

Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules and
such interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be
erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such interpretation is entitled to
recognition and respect from the courts, as no one is better qualified to
interpret the intent of the regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus, its
interpretation that the rule it issued is not retroactive, not being unreasonable,
should be followed.

I. Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts

Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234


People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557

J. Penal rules and regulations

1. Requisites for validity of penal rules and regulations

Marcos vs CA 278 SCRA 843

US v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province of
Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals

76 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

suffering from dangerous diseases known as rinderpest. The conviction was


grounded on illegal and voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting
and ordering the carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the
quarantines against the same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein
defendant interposed a defense that the acts complained of did not constitute a
crime.

Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime.

Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar do
not fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said
finding does not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of a violation
of an article of the revised penal code.

People v. Exconde 101 Phil 1125


People v. Maceren 79 SCRA 450

2. Imposition of penalties by administrative authorities

K. Rate-fixing power

Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218


(Aileen Angue)

Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set
aside an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
NTC, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged
by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by 15% with the
reservation to make further reduction later, for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a
denial or procedural, as well as substantial due process of law. The said
provisional reduction is allegedly under the contemplation of E.O. 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers; and E.O.
196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC.

Issue: Whether or not the order in issue is constitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged order, particularly on the
issue of rates provided therein, being violative of due process clause is void and
should be nullified . Thus, temporary rate-fixing order is not exempt from the
procedural requirement of notice and hearing. Moreover the temporary rate-

77 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

fixing becomes final legislative act as to the period during which it has to
remain in force pending the final determination of the case.

In case of delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the


legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the admin authority is
that the rate reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied. The fixing of rate is quasi-legislative when the rules or the rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines, in
which case, notice and hearing are not required for their validity.

L. Effectivity of administrative rules and regulations

1. Publication requirement

Section 2, Civil Code

Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following their completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless
otherwise provided.

Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

Chapter 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS

Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall
carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

78 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and
shall be open to public inspection.

Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided


by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen
(15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is
fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public
health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures
to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.

Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law


Center shall:

(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it
during the preceding quarter; and

(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining
in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables.

Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law
Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication
would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies
of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted
it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of
the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.

(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to


law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be
published in full text.

Sec. 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the


Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the
bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President,
Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the
codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or
agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient
to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

Sec. 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified
copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.

79 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency


shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation
at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446


(Angel Pascual)

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern


(Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F.
Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera
(in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la
Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S.
Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates

Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those


cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New
Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the

80 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the people
have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates
and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. The publication of all presidential issuances
"of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply
only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is
a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior
to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to


inform the public of its contents.

2. Notice and hearing requirement

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders vs DOF 238 SCRA 63

3. Application, general rule that the issuance of rules and


regulations to implement the law does not require that there be
prior notice and hearing conducted by the administrative agencies.
However, if the statute making the delegation requires such
hearing, then one must be conducted before such rules and
regulations are issued. On the other hand, if the statute is silent
on the matter, a public hearing, if practicable, may be conducted.

81 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

VI. Adjudicatory Powers

a. Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined

Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine questions of


fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law.

Quasi-judicial body an organ of government other than a court and other


than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making power.

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone


Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,
Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and
Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners
allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines;
that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the
prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of
prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence,
they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in
invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts

82 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a


specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the
law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed,
the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of
the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an


administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers
or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for
their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school.
As the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of
Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school
for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With
the school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro
C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's
graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days
before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his
mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking
of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in

83 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, committee members along with the
District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.

Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION


"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of
teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to a real grave
abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission
of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of
certiorari.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not


impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and
there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection
with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari, it is clear, however, that it is
the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body
which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a
judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings
should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is
used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi
judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision,
whatever may be their public character. . ..'

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative dudes, and the performance of administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be
said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the
law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.

Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease


and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum

84 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and


superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and registered with the OIC.

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B.


Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of
gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to
respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters
forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the
contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written
notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease
and Dealer Agreement."

Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC
persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has
jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare
Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right because
the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also
allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within
which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case.
Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.

Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual
disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

Held: The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed reading of the


entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon
respondent OIC the power to hear and decide contractual disputes between a
gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of course a well-settled principle of
administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies
like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.

As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):


" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative
boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in so
doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave
no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are
to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection with, the performance
of administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over
a matter exclusively vested in the courts."

b. Distinguished from judicial power

85 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Judicial Power is the power to courts of justice to settle actual case of


controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion.

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises
on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from
the Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed
the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5)
days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety
(90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An
investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807."

Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory


powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or
political rights.

Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any

86 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it


may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy
as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect
to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB)


and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an
arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the
original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our
present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or

87 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders."6 Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of
a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from
the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

c. Distinguished from administrative function

Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature as such are devoled upon the admin agency by the organic law of
existence.

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the
President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting"
activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants against certain
companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the
1973 Constitution?

Held: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule making." The most common types of
such bodies have been listed as follows:

(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the


government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege,
like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for
Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to carry on certain government functions,
like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil
Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.

88 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the


government is performing some business service for the public, like
the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to regulate business affected with public
interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent
office, office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking under the police power to regulate private
business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange
Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for
Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social
policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the
Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor,
the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and
Minors Bureau.

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims


and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to
the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become
executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic
act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise
quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its
judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar
salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked
alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing
more.

Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute


all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above
directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study
of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy
funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino,
the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the
recovery of illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former

89 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

President, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates


but also in the investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the
President may assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent a
repetition of the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary
investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating
petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the
PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the
power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption
cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other
respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority
to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3)
provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and
receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the
sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification.
Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and
regulations promulgated by the PCGG.

The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be


divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the
criminal investigation stage is the factfinding inquiring which is usually
conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and
interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find
sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation.
The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It
is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient
evidence to bring a person to trial.

It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at
the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law
enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted
if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation
of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as

90 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this


nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.

Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas
and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of
the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of
Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of his father
constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was afterwards
interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war, but again
reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention
is, is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that they made
application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet with the opposition of
Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted the two Sarenas the
right, in preference to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero Bangad.
Sideco then took the proceedings to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of
Sideco and confirming the decision of the administrative authorities, with the
costs against the plaintiff.

The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness of
the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.

Issue: WON

Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of


waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be
submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications through the
Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary thereon is final
"unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty days after
the date of the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of such
appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See. 4.)
A more extensive method is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral
system, which makes it the duty of the Director of Public Works to make a
technical examination of streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the
performance of this work, the Director of Public Works or any official especially
authorized by him, may examine witnesses under oath, and can issue for this
purpose subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates
signed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications are then granted
each appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director

91 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce and


Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the
property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of the
date of the publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)

DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL


RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications, containing as it does the
technical findings of officers especially qualified in irrigation engineering,
should invariably be made a part of the judicial record because (1) the
determination of these officials would be most useful to the courts, and (2) the
exact date of the decision is of moment since it decides whether the appeal was
taken in time.

Ocampo vs US 234 US 91

d. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as


part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions:

"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day. Any examinee violating this
instruction shall be subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed in their own
behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a
complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

92 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is
not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving
them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious
days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have
learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological
make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get
ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find
out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or
personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or
swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners
should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be
suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent
commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means
the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to
prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

e. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-judicial


power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development


Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren
Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon
demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When
neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against
them for specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T.
Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending
that the competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court
contending that it had jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real
estate trade and business.

93 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the
National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its
decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the
agency as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real


estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided
for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by


subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory


obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is


justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and
competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

f. Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found
to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.
Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board.
The Board found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without formal
charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer,
and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary
proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By
Resolution, the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed
illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a
modification that it eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome
of the investigation and reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two

94 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

had died. The heirs of the deceased sought execution of the order from the CSC
which was granted. GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending
that the CSC does not have any power to execute its resolution or judgment.

Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.

Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil
service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to
it on appeal.

The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting,


approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on
administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority
granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are
analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the
Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the
Commission. In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the
power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or
orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It
would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.
Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority
to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include
the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders,
unless the law otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of
disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then
pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding
force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it
makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to
payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree
a useless exercise.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance

95 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of
said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Commission.

Issue : Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate


rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138,
139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must
be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members


against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on
December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the
initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time
the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature,
confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to
be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the
returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to
all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member is
not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such
member.

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463


(Aileen Rose Angue)

96 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts : Petitioner PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine


corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its
plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state
policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation,
Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a
set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood
and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International
Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia,
which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from
Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that
"there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match
industry at reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of
Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and
the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC
moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban
under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive
realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the
ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the


legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering
with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . .


the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered
(Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932,
941 [1954].).

97 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion,
has become well nigh indispensable . . .

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the
match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of
mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the
Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or
to enjoin such act which is with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise of
its authority it clearly abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench,
we have no occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion as
excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Baez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto


F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private
respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00,
which would form part of the consideration in case they reach a final
agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner
should the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee,
the respondent corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which
resulted in the demand of the petitioner for the return of his reservation fee.
Respondent refused to return the same and petitioner brought suit with the
RTC for a collection of sum of money. Respondents herein filed a motion to
dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the case. The same was
denied and respondents appealed to the CA who decided in their favor.
Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale
between the parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.

Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.

Ratio : Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a

98 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc.
There is no such qualification in said provision of law that makes a distinction
between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer"
in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for
money. Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much
a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said powers
have since been transferred to the HLRB.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein


provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund
filed against project owners, developers, and dealers, among others.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions,


all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization
are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency
or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for
refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot
obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Cario vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as
it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has
no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying
on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and
regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by
the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be
imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers

99 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

g. Classification of adjudicatory powers

2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers of


public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and awards
under;
3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or
authorization;
1. Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or relax a
general prohibition, or authority to relieve from affirmative duty.
The licensing power sets or assumes a standard, while the
dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a standard;
2. Summary powers. To designate administrative power to
apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate
a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such
action;
3. Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having power
to determine the law upon a particular state of facts has the right
to and must consider and make proper application of the rules of
equity.

VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836

Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which


required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic was
surprised for she was not aware of any case filed against her. When she
appeared at the date, time and place stated in the subpoena, she was berated
by the respondent and demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount of
the life insurance policy of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued
upon request by Generosa Sandagan who sought the help of respondent

100 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

because she could not get a share of the proceeds of the life insurance policy of
her dead husband whose beneficiary was Caamic.

Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.

Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section
1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking
of his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to
be in a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued
in connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court
nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by
direction of this Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz.,
administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way connected with or
related to some of his administrative duties because he knew from the
beginning that it was for a confrontation with the complainant as solicited by
Generosa. Sandagan for the latter to get a share in the death benefits of
Edgardo Sandagan which was received by the complainant. Generosa had not
filed any action in respondent's court for her claim; neither is there any case in
respondent's court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was
for respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and
absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to his
official functions and duties, accommodating the request and using his official
functions and office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.

In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the


questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his
full rights of redress.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition
in the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of some of private
respondents witnesses, they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum
as regards to the books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the
subpoena on the ground that it can only be regarded as a fishing bill to
discover evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable in a
case for unfair competition. The trial court denied the same.

101 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case for
unfair competition.

Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and
damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a
trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of
defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a
part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition.
In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for
and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which charges as
trustee with the profits acquired by the wrongful use of the property of the
cestui que trust, and defendant's profits are regarded as an equitable measure
of the compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by him.

In order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it


must appear. By clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document
sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue
before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing
such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. A
"subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed upon
motion if the issuance therof is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy
of the books. documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose
behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of
production thereof.

In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena
duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint of private
respondent for unfair competition.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with
several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes
without the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution.
After appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished for
contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and
imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.

Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.

102 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to
try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection
with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot
be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution
(Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision of law come under its jurisdiction.

When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the


power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in
nature.

". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did


not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise
the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently,
in the, administration of justice.

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident
and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the
exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid.

VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt

People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570

Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies,
unless said contempt is [clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt
of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of the revised administrative
code. The refusal to comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division is
neither contempt nor a penalized offense.

103 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX. Power to impose penalties

Scotys Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department


Store situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned and operated by
Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b)
of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice
against her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because
of her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her
separation, said employers had been questioning their employees regarding
their membership in said union and had interfered with their right to organize
under the law.

The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect
to the management and her co employees so much so that several criminal
charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after
investigation, filed the corresponding informations against her and the same
are now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.

Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the
penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in
ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding
the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence,
the decision of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon
petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.

The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial


Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those
constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among other
things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act
that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing

104 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law,
or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound solely
by the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other
means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of well-
informed persons which results must be made a part of the record". All-this
means that an accused may be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses
face to face" and may be convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and
not beyond reasonable doubt.

This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be


contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial
Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the
requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending
the law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our
Government.

CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524

X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction

A. Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed
an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal
liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to
said petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal
Code and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he
concluded that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot
extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not
section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among
those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the
accused with the offended party.

105 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that
the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should
extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape
and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or
attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability
for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for
a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse against
chastity is not denominated rape, it is only for the lack of the intention to lie,
both crimes being identical in every other respect, though of different degrees
of gravity. We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is
included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773 and,
consequently, the marriage of the accused with the offended party in the
present case has extinguished his criminal liability.

B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing quasi-


judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of


Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of
five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election
Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President-
Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo
Sales. Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter
to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting
the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of
several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Respondent
Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC
in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of
Region V of the Department of Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied
by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner
seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain


an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the respondent Secretary has

106 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?

Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to


entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations
as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules
and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies,
functions, plans, programs and projects;"

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly


empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers.19 The
jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the
provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon
themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations."

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by


necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the
power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the constitutional limitation on the
power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold
that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent
Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution
grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will
permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed
at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so
that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.

II. Procedure to be followed

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

107 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received
the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified.

Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in
behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down
the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted
to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where
a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also included. The
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30

C. Technical rules not applicable

108 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of


employment of publics respondents. The arbitrations decision is appealed to
the NLRC. Public respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of the
NLRCs decision on the ground that the NLRC erroneously, patently and
unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration
Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1)
there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and
Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the
hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the
decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on
unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.

Issue: WON publics respondents claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process,
be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are
precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and
inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is
remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further
proceedings.

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by


technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable."
(Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative
policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative
purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said

109 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of
the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI,
which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48
dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then
Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said
respondent to his former position as policeman of the same municipality with
back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual
reinstatement.

Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent
Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police
Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic
notes taken of the proceedings of the case.

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short


of the legal requirements of due process, because it decided the subject
administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not taken by the
Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No.
4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of
record," and as such it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks and
stenographers who may be employed to take note of the proceedings of the
board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in
character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure
should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court
hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, provided that
the parties are heard and gven the opportunity to adduce their respective
evidence.

110 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its
powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer
agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside
the decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the
certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and
CUALOPING.

Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory
and adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may
pass upon applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and
hearing), certificates of registration of corporations, partnerships and
associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor
unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and
impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as
well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be
warranted.

The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly
replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the
names of the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative
jurisdiction. The stockholders who have been deprived of their certificates of
stock or the persons to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been
transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an
appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as can occasion
an exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right
by a proper party against another who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties
that can bring the controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who are
adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of stock. Any
peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having initiated,
would be precipitat.

The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000
fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This
time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC,

111 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

the latter, in its instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party
but a real party in interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.

Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code


Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Intl Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
F. Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
G. Hearing
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H. Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2. Clear and convincing evidence
Blacks Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3. Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4. Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I. Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1. Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

112 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

2. Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3. Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5. Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963
Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
J. Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673
K. Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235

III. Due process of law in administrative adjudication

A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined


DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, affecting ones person or property. It is designed to

113 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to


formality. For substance must prevail over form.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS


Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
By procedural due process is meant a law which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial
The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
and property without due process of law, which clause optimizes the
principle of justice which hears before it condemns which upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial.

Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of War 96 and
97. He was arraigned though without summons and subpoena afforded to him.
From the proven facts and the admission likewise of the respondents, the court
martial which tried his case was not properly convened. There was no special
order published by the headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or
directing the General Court Martial composed of the respondents to arraign
and try however was already an existing court trying another case.

The validity of the court martial proceeding was challenged by the


petitioner at the regular court on the ground of due process.

Issue: WON failure to comply with law on conveying a valid court martial
amount to denial of due process

Held: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE LAW A DENIAL OF


PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.- The failure to comply with the dictates of the
applicable law insofar as convening a valid court martial is concerned,
amounts to a denial of due process. There is such a denial not only under the
broad standard which delimits the scope and reach of the due process
requirement, but also under one of the specific elements of procedural due
process.

LACK OF AUTHORITY OF COURT-MARTIAL TO TRY PETITIONER.- Nor is such


a reliance on the broad reach of due process the sole ground on which the lack
of jurisdiction of die court-martial convened in this case could be predicated.
Recently, stress was laid anew by us on the first requirement of procedural due

114 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with judicial, or
quasi-judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. This is a
requirement that goes back to Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, a decision
rendered half a century ago. There is the express admission in the statement of
facts that respondents, as a court martial, were not convened to try petitioner
but someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a
desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence
of a competent court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial
of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed authority to try petitioner. The
writ of certiorari and prohibition should have been granted and the lower court,
to repeat, ought not to have dismissed his petition summarily. The significance
of such an insistence on a faithful compliance with the regular

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The
Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the
mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to
enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for
rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties. The Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from
the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers. Petitioner refused because it
is not included in the procedure of the RP-US Treaty.

Issue: WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the
answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the
due process clause in the Constitution?

Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish


private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers,

115 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of
the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of
extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these
rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and


evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved
(De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan
vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as
examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial
authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows
the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate
the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27),
or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing


evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's
performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably,
investigation is indispensable to prosecution.

Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of
contract. Albert died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert, his
estate's administrator, was substituted. Finally, defendant's liability was
determined by this Court in L-15275. Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with
legal interest from judicial demand.

From the inception of the suit below up to the time the judgment in L-
15275 was to be executed, the corporate existence of University Publishing
Company, Inc. appears to have been taken for granted, and was not then put
in issue. However, when the Court of First Instance of Manila issued on July
22, 1961 an order of execution against University Publishing Company, Inc., a
new problem cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the
Sheriff of the City of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the

116 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

contract with plaintiff on behalf and as President of University Publishing


Company, Inc. They then discovered that no such entity exists. A verification
made at the Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. On July
31, 1961, said Commission issued a certification "that the records of this
Commission do not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO.,
INC., either as a corporation or partnership."2 This triggered a verified petition
in the court below on August 10, 1961 for the issuance of a writ of execution
ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the judgment against
the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the case.

All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the
University Publishing Company, Inc. Instead of informing the lower court that
it had in its possession copies of its certificate of registration, its article of
incorporation, its by-laws and all other papers material to its disputed
corporate existence, University Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain
silent. On August 11, 1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel
Aruego, Mamaril and Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid)
merely countered plaintiff's petition for execution as against Aruego with an
unsworn manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this
case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.

Issue: WON Aruego is a party to this case

Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as


representative of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract
sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the benefits resulting from it, so
much so that partial payment of the consideration were made by him; that he
violated its terms, thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the
litigation he was the real defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice,
responsibility under the judgment falls on him.

"By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. . . .' (4
Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581); or, as this Court has said, 'Due process of law'
contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
affecting one's person or property.' (Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23,
32).' (Sicat vs. Reyes, 100 Phil., 505; 54 Off. Gaz. [17]4945.) And it may not be
amiss to mention here also that the 'due process' clause of the Constitution is
designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue
homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite,
but none the less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16
Phil. 315, 321-322: 'A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one,
more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position,

117 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and
then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form
and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits.
Laws uits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There
should he no vested rights in technicalities.

B. Cardinal primary requirements of due process

1. The right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case
and submit evidence
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing
6. The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
7. The board or body should in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involves and reason for the decision rendered
8. The officer or tribunal conducting the investigation must be vested
with competent jurisdiction
A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings renders any judgment or order issued
therein null and void and can be attacked in any appropriate
proceeding

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for
the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The
petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the
motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Uuion, Inc.

118 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue: What are the cardinal primary rights?

Held: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.-There are cardinal primary rights which


must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these
rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented . While the duty to
deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial . The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing , or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of
Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know Lin: various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are


specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is
more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of
the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).

Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256

119 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: The petitioner herein, successor in-interest in the case of the former
DECS Secretary against the public school teachers who were illegally dismissed
for staging a mass action and failure to heed to the return-to-work order, filed
a petition for the judgment of the trial court holding that said public school
teachers were denied of due process in the proceedings. It was held that the
proceedings contravened RA 4670 which required that administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding school superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who at least have the rank of a supervisor, where the teachers
belong, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teachers organization and supervisor of the
Division, the last 2 to be designated by the Director of Public Schools.

Petitioner argued that DECS complied with RA 4670 because all the
teachers who were members of the various committee are members of either
the QC Teachers Federation or the QC Elementary teachers Federation and are
deemed representatives of teachers organization.

Issue: WON there was denial of due process

Held: The Court held that there was indeed a denial of due process. Mere
membership of said teachers in their respective organizations does not ipso
facto make them authorized representatives of the organizations. Under the
law, the teachers organization possess the right to indicate its choice of
representatives. Such right cannot be usurped by the Secretary of Education or
the Director of Public Schools or their underlings. The teachers appointed by
the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its representatives in said committee.

Hence the failure to comply with the requirement vested no jurisdiction


to the committee to hear the case. Respondent teachers were denied of due
process.

Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: PAL's proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had been referred
to a hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called

120 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

consolidated schedule of flights that included the same Mercury night flights
and this was allowed by Board Resolution No. 139(68). The Board's action was
impelled by the authorizations of certain flight schedules previously allowed
but were incorporated were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule
had to be approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to were
not to be suspended. In short, the temporary permit was issued to prevent the
stoppage or cessation of services in the affected areas.

The Board, considering the report of the hearing examiner, passed


Resolution No. 190 (68) approving, for a period of 30 days starting 31 July
1968, only three or four frequencies of the seven proposed new flights. There is
no proof, not even allegation, that in all those hearings petitioner was not
notified or give opportunity to adduce evidence in support of its opposition.

Issue: WON PAL violated the requisites of administrative due process

Held: YES. It was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the DTS-35 for
which no previous approval has been granted by the Board, are hereby referred
to a hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its economic justification."

It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from
the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as
the due process requirements in investigations and trials (Asprec vs. Itchon. 16
SCRA 921). And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the
right to notice*, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a person s legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity
to appear and defend his rights*, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in
his favor: (c) a tribunal so constituted* as to give him reasonable assurance of
honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction. and (d) a finding
or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence* presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties
affected

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

C. Necessity for notice and hearing

In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into
the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with
certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.

121 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R.


No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers solely on
the basis of an ocular inspection.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on
the basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full evidence to determine
the cause or motive of such a lay off

Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo merely
acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of
the respondent company was incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot
be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when
conducted at the request of the interested.

Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabubay) is a corporation


engaged in the garments and textile import business for the last twenty-seven
years. Among the government requirements for engaging in this type of
business are the export quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments
and Textile Export Board.

Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations for 1983 to the
petitioner. These export quotas have been granted annually to the Petitioner
since 1976. They are automatically renewed every year provided the grantee
has utilized its quotas during the previous years.

On March 2, 1983, the petitioner received a letter from the Board informing it
that its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked effective February 1983.
Furthermore, its major stockholders and officers were also distinguished from
engaging in business activities involving garment and textile exports.

Issue: WON the revocation of the quota is valid

Held: "The summary revocation of the export quotas and export authorizations
issued in favor of the petitioner without hearing violates not only the above-
mentioned provisions of the Raise and Regulations of the respondent board but
also the 'due proem of law' clause of the Constitution of the Philippines to the

122 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

effect that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws.'(Article TV, Sec. 1. New Constitution). According to Daniel Webster in the
Dartmouth College case. due proem is the equivalent of the law; a law which
hears before it condemns. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which
govern society.' (cited in Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 168 by Neptali
Gonzales, 1975 ed.)

"Administrative due process requires that there be an impartial tribunal


constituted to determine the right involved; that due notice and opportunity to
be heard be given; that the procedure at the hearing be consistent with the
essentials of a fair trial; and that the proceedings be conducted in such a way
that there will be opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable
rules of low and procedure were observed.' (42 Arm Jur. p. 451, cited by
Neptali Gonzales, p. 183, Philippine Constitutional Law). "

Privileges that had long been enjoyed transforms and becomes in the character
of ones property.

Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: This special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision of the
NAPOLCOM: The fact that the Jai alai bookies were operating in the house
being occupied by herein respondent-appellant, the apprehension of his wife
and brother in two (2) successive raids effected by law enforcement authority
and his intercession for the dismissal of the case filed in consequence thereof,
are tangible proofs that he was, indeed, an accessory - if not a principal - in
said gambling operation.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written charges and
informed of the nature of such charges; that no hearing had actually been held
by the summary dismissal board: and that at any rate he was not heard.

Issue: WON the contention of petitioner is with merit

Held: YES. We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and
that not even the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of
his guilt is - in the opinion of his superiors - strong can compensate for the
procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases
such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the

123 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or, through
blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.

BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; OBSERVANCE THEREOF REQUIRED


IN SUMMARY DISMISSAL.- Petitioner's case was decided under P.D. No. 971,
as amended by P.D. No. 1707. While Sec. 8-A of the Decree authorizes
summary dismissals "without the necessity of a formal investigation" of
members of the INP "when the charge is serious and the evidence is strong,"
the Decree and the implementing rules nonetheless give the respondent the
right to be furnished a copy of the complaint and to file an answer within three
(3) days. The filing of charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity to
respondent to answer the charges constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. In summary dismissal proceedings it is mandatory that charges be
specified in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the
complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence against the
respondent can be brought to his knowledge. The formal investigation, which is
dispensed with, refers to the presentation of witnesses by their direct
examination and not to the requirement that the respondent be notified of the
charges and given the chance to defend himself.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD;


BASIS OF DECISION, NOT PROPER.- What the summary dismissal board
appears to have done in this case was simply to receive the report on two raids
allegedly conducted on petitioner's house in the course of which what were
believed were gambling paraphernalia were allegedly found and two witnesses
allegedly admitted they were collectors of petitioner and his brother Lolito Go.
But the report is not in the record of this case which the NAPOLCOM
transmitted to the Court. Nor does the decision of the summary dismissal
board disclose on what the supposed report was based. This is in violation of
the rule that in administrative proceedings " the decision must be rendered
on the evidence contained in the record and disclosed to the party
affected." In all probability, said report was not in writing and the supposed
testimonies of the two witnesses were not taken down. This is evident from the
decision of the board which refers to the result of an -investigation.- The facts
found by the board were not the result of any investigation conducted by it but
by some other group.

D. Cold neutrality of a judge

A reviewing official or body tasked to resolve an appeal must refrain from


participating in reviewing any decision rendered or concurred by him in

124 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

another official capacity. The reviewing officer must be other than the officer
whose decision is under review, otherwise there would be no different views or
there could be no real review of the case, in violation of due process of law.

Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he


dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite
Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to
be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining
claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence, Director Gozon found that the petitioners
did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in
accordance with law.

The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending. Director Gozon was
appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting
himself, he decided the appeal, as if he was adjudicating the case for the first
time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which
he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the
appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial
judge and appellate judge in the same case.

We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing
his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of
Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.The Mining Law, Commonwealth
Act No. 137, provides:
"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be
submitted to the Director of Mines for decision:

"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from
the date of its receipt.

Issue: WON Petitioners-appellant were deprived of due process when Gozon


reviewed his own decision

125 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Held: Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning


fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as
Director of Mines.

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due


process

In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into
the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with
certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.

Essential elements of due process:


a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial
d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that there will be
opportunity for the court to determine whether the applicable rules of
law and procedure
e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial evidence

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include


the following
a. The right to actual or constructive notice
b. A real opportunity to be heard
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence

Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34


(Aileen Rose Angue)

126 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit issued by the City Engineer to
contrcust a funeral parlor. Following adverse judgment to the court in his suit
to enjoin the construction of the funeral parlor, Veneracion, instead of
appealing the judgment, lodged a complaint with the HSCR on substantially
the same ground litigated in the action relative parlors distance from
hospitals whether public or private. Villa received a telegram from the HSRC
through Commissioner Dizon requesting transmittal of proof of location
clearance granted by this Office. Villa sent a reply telegram reading:
Locational Clearance based on certification of City Planning and Development
Coordinator and Human Settlement Officer, copies mail. Subsequently, Villa
received from Dizon an Order to Present Proof of Locational Clearance. Since
she had already sent the required locational clearance, Villa made no response.
Then Villa received a show cause Order, requiring her to show cause why a
fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and desist order issued against
her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. In spite of her
communication that she had already mailed all required documents, she
received an Order imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring her to cease
operations, and later, a writ of execution in implementation of the order. A
motion for reconsideration to which she attached copies of the Commission
Proper was also denied on account of the finality of the Order. An appeal to the
office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, and so was the motion for
reconsideration.
Noteworthy are the following: neither Veneracion nor the Commision,
ever made known the complaint of Veneracion to Villa until much later, after
the Commission has rendered several adverse rulings against her; the orders of
the Commission made no reference whatever to the documents Villa had
already sent by registered mail; and the resolutions of the Presidential
Assistant Lazaro likewise omitted to refer to the telegrams and documents sent
by Veneracion

Issue: WON Villa was denied due process against which the defense of failure
of Villa to take timely appeal will not avail.

Held: Yes. These facts present a picture of official incompetence or gross


negligence and abdication of duty, if not active bias and partiality that is most
reprehensible. The result has been to subvert and put to naught the judgment
rendered in a suit regularly tried and decided by a court of justice, to deprive
one party of rights confirmed and secured thereby and to accord her adversary,
by resorting to the prescribed practice of forum-shopping, the relief he had
sought and had been denied in said case.
The mischief done by the commissioner Dizons baffling failure even to
acknowledge the existence of the documents furnished by petitioner was

127 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

perpetuated by the Commissioner proper and respondent Lazaro, who threw


out petitioners appeals with no reference that would have been decisive.
There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out as an
administrative proceeding against Villa without informing her of the complaint
which initiated the case; for conducting that inquiry in the most informal
manner by means only of communication requiring submission of certain
documents, which left the impression that compliance was all that was
expected of her and with which directives she promptly and religiously
complied.
The court finds no merit in the proposition that relief is foreclosed to
Villa because her motion for reconsideration of Nov. 22, 1982 was filed out of
time. The very informal character of the so-called administrative proceedings,
an informality for which Com. Dizon himself was responsible and which he
never sought to rectify, militates against imposing strict observance of the
limiting periods applicable to proceedings otherwise properly initiated and
regularly conducted.

RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts PLDTCO entered into an agreement with the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, wherein both companies agreed to establish telephone
services between the Philippines and the United States. As it lacked the
necessary equipment and facilities, PLDTCO on the same date entered into
another agreement with RCA whereby the latter constituted itself a carrier of
PLDTCO's telephone messages to and from the United States. The term of the
agreement was for five years and "shall thereafter continue in force until
terminated by either party giving the other 24 calendar months previous notice
in writing."

On January 3, 1956, PLDTCO sent RCA a notice of termination of its


arrangements with the latter, the same to be effective not later than February
2, 1958, and three months later, filed an application with the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, through the Radio Control Board, for
authority to construct and operate a radio-telephonic station of its own at
Marilao, Bulacan, and for the assignment to It of appropriate radio frequencies.

RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First Instance of
Manila to prevent the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the
Radio Control Board from proceeding further on PLDTCO's pending
application. The complaint alleged that the approval by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications of the construction permit in favor of PLDTCO

128 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

without previous hearing and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to present evidence


in support of its opposition was without due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity present
case.

Held: No, that in administrative proceedings, hearing is only necessary in those


cases where the statute so requires. A cursory reading of the Radio Control
Law (Act No. 3846, as amended) shows that, unlike in other proceedings or
instances specified in section 3, paragraphs d and 1, of the said law, no,
hearing is required in the consideration by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications of any application for the installation, establishment, or
operation of a radio station (paragraph k). At any rate, even assuming that a
hearing is required, RCA must be considered to have waived its right thereto,
its counsel having addressed a letter to the Radio Control Board saying that
"little would be gained by arguing the matter both before yourselves and before
the Public Service Commission."

Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts: Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. information was


filed against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion
skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
Act No. 3019).

That he and others wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase contract with
REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain
office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17"
at a unit prim of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-
Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item
was only Fifty-Five Pews (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five
Hundred Pews (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in
the total amount of Forty-NineThousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00)
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of
"not guilty."

129 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved
for petitioner's suspension, citing see. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which
provides in part:

Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.-Any incumbent public officer


against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under Title 7, Book 11 of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

Petitioner opposed the motion alleging that preventive suspension should


therefore be ordered only when the legislative purpose is achieved, that is,
when "the suspension order x x x prevent(s) the accused from using his office
to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the legislative
purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should not be
decreed

Issue: Whether or not preventive suspension was proper.

Held: Yes, It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it
mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom
a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised
Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property is filed.5 The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused
from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unIess the
accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts
of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant fur the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to
determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of
the court.

F. Notice and hearing, when dispensed with

130 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

1. Where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the


summary abatement of a nuisance per se, the preventive
suspension of public servant facing administrative charges;

Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts: Monetary Board (MB)issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of
Triumph Savings Bank (TSB), forbidding it from doing business in the
Philippines, placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as
receiver. TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596,
with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of
Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as 'The Central Bank Act," as amended,
insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a banking institution
even if it is not charged with violation of any few or regulation, much less found
guilty thereof.

The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the application of
TSB for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings under the receivership of the
officials of the Central Bank was done without prior hearing, that is, without
first hearing the side of the bank. They further admit that said resolution can
be the subject of judicial review and may be set aside should it be found that
the same was issued with arbitrariness and in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and a
denial of "due process.

Held:
Ruling: No, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a
bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. When
par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case
within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it
is unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case.
Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice
and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to
annul it on the basis of absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v Arca [1965],17

It was held that a hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the
constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the.
Monetary Board' s resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be

131 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

first adjudged before making the resolution effective, It is enough that a


subsequent judicial review be provided.

Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin
San, surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where
the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989.
The permittee was using the Quonset (hut) for the storage of copra.

Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified


Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning
Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated
structure; and. stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and
unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard. Since the notifications
remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial


process, order the demolition of petitioner's Quonset building.

Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building
by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga)
when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property
was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a
tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a
nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It
follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela,
Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset
building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of
law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently
heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the
demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to
demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action; where


the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice
and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person
affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of

132 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

a delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a temporary


appointee;

Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of


Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed,
to file a criminal charge of attempted rape to the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe,
Rogelio Ilustrisimo as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and
maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the
Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against
them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman and were placed under preventive
suspension. It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on
the basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been
committed.

Issues:
1. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for
attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
2. Whether or not the preventive suspension is invalid as it denied them
opportunity to refute the charges against them

Ruling:
1. Yes, The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from,
the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape,
when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
2. No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being
a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

As held in Nera v. Garcia:

133 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file


his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension
is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in
suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the
opportunity to prove his innocence.

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the
right to exercise them had not been claimed.

Where the law is silent on prior notice and hearing as a


requirement before an agency action, which refers to the whole or
part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its
equivalent or denial thereof, can be done, compliance with the
requirement of prior notice and hearing depends upon the nature
of the power to be exercised or the end to be achieved.

Prior notice and hearing is not required in the exercise of police


power

Prior notice and hearing is not required in granting provisional


reliefs

Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts: Respondent Jacinto Hernandez lodged with the Board of Examiners for
Surveyors administrative complaint2 for unprofessional conduct against
petitioner Cleto Asprec. He requested Asprec to undertake survey on his lot in
Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur. That no survey was conducted and that
it was a mere copy of one Damian Alham. that Asprec was guilty of deceit and
thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous decision
of October 27, 1959 revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's certificate of
registration as a private land surveyor. A complaint was but was absent in the
hearing.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to present his case.

134 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself
before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated d
ate of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw th
e Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against
the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this be
cause without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client ha
ve chosen to shy away from the trial. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner co
ncedes, is not always of the essence of due process. Really, all that the law req
uires to satisfy adherence to this constitutional precept is that the parties be gi
ven notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the t
rial of May 11th. More than this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously
agreed upon by the parties and their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge tha
t he received less-than-a-fair-treatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard i
n his defense.6
Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-criminal
in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no valid trial coul
d proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not see eye to eye with
this view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinion of the court below, t
hus The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where
the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for th
e hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not depr
ived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the
support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be he
ard

Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767

G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing

As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be


heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a
public service commission

Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

135 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: Republic Act No. 316, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company,
Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light heat
and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat
and/or power, for sale within the limits of several Municipalities of the province
of Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged


letter-petition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of
Vigan, Ilocos, Sur", charging the following:
The sale of 2,000 ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric
Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal and also report that
the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in bad
faith and they register excessive rates much more than the actual
consumption.

The finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net operating
profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we
believe that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess
revenue be put into effect immediately.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter
rates for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June,
1962

Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order
of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not furnished the former a
"copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others.
Respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving
copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding
informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the
reduction of its rates. That petitioner had not even been served a copy of the
auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based, that such order
had been issued without notice and hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner
had been denied due process.

Issue: WON the twin notice of hearing is required in rate fixing?

Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order
complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that,
having been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly
violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void.

136 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public service


commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional
provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing,
prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of
such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand,
legislative and rule-making in character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS, ON DUE PROCESS), or are, on the other hand,
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial (IN ALL INSTANCES, DUE
PROCESS IS REQUIRED), affecting the rights and property of private or
specific persons.

As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be


heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a
public service commission.

H. Motion for reconsideration as a cure

The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party cures
the defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude the party from
claiming denial of due process assumes that the other requirements of due
process have been complied with. However such opportunity is nothing and he
is still denied due process, where the decision against him has nothing to
support itself, one of the cardinal requirements of due process being that the
decision or ruling of an administrative body must be supported by substantial
evidence.

Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Petitioner Medenilla is a contractual employee of DPWH as Public Officer


II. Later on, she was detailed as Technical Assistant in the office of the
assistant secretary for the admin. and manpower management. On Jan. 2,
1989, petitioner was appointed to the contested position of Supervising
Human Resource Development Officer. Respondents {being the next-in-rank-
employees} jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force re-organization
contesting the appointment of petitioner. The task force dismissed the protest
of the respondents thereby appealing before the Civil Service Commission. The
Commission disapproved the appointment of the petitioner reversing the
ruling of task force. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the
CSC but to no avail, hence , the petition then was filed before the Supreme
Court.

137 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Issue: WON CSC is correct in disapproving the appointment of petitioner and


that WON the petitioner was denied of due process of law in the absence of
notice?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that CSC is incorrect in disapproving the
appointment of petitioner. The CSC is limited only to determine whether the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and not whether
another is more qualified than the petitioner. Petitioner was not notified of the
appeal before the Commission. The essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but
the absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Any defect may be
cured by the filing of motion of reconsideration.

i. Right to counsel, not a due process requirement

There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-


criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that,
without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings

Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of


Agrarian Reform - Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President
Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19,
1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
questioning such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR


Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the
Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November
16, 1989,1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official
documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at
least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts.

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered


a report dated July 31, 1992, finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges
against him.

138 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

The investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal


from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges
against him.

This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October
22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued
by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbingit prays for the
"payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased
Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the
period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19,
1994.

ISSUE: WON the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by
counsel during an administrative inquiry?

RULING: While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at


times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing
laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself and no duty rests in such a body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel,28 In an administrative proceeding
such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued)
has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.

Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of hearings attended by


Lumigued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted he
represent himself.

The hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a


criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when,
after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a
criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents
in its report and recommendation.

IV. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

A. Definition and objective

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should first seek
relief in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even

139 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

though the matter is properly presented to the court, which is within its
jurisdiction. The court will not determine a controversy:

1. Where the question demands administrative determination requiring


special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal
2. Where the question requires determination of technical and intricate
issues of fact
3. Where uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of
the regulatory statute administered.

Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone


Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,
Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and
Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners
allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines;
that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the
prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of
prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence,
they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in
invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the

140 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed,
the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative


remedies

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES applies where


a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency; judicial
intervention is withheld until the administrative process has run its course.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the


courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its views

Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220

C. Effect of doctrine

Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327


(Aileen Rose Angue)

FACT: This is petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal by the trial court of
Petitioner Vicente Villaflor complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit
Lumber Co., Inc.

Villaflor in a Lease Agreement leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel of


land. Villaflor claimed having discovered that after the execution of the lease
agreement, that Nasipit Lumber 'in bad faith surreptitiously grabbed and
occupied a big portion of plaintiff's property.

141 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a 'Deed of Relinquishment of


Rights, in favor of Nasipit Lumber.

The Director of Lands issued an 'Order of Award in favor of Nasipit Lumber


Company, Inc.

Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales Application of
Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as
provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights.

The Director of Lands found that the payment of the amount of P5,000.00 in
the Deed xxx and the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven,
and ordered the dismissal of Villaflor's protest and gave due course to the Sales
Application of Nasipit Lumber.

ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands and Finality of


Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of
primary Jurisdiction; courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving
a question which is within the Jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application


in this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the
factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application
require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative
agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues
preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside
even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of
the primary Jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners
Lope Machete and 11 others. The complaint alleged that the parties entered

142 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

into a leasehold agreement with respect to Villanons landholdings at Poblacion


Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which Machete et al. were to pay private
respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite
repeated demands and with no valid reason, Machete et al. failed to pay their
respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered
to pay him back rentals and damages.

Machete et al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of


jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended that the
case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject
matter of the complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under the
Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and later denied the motion for
reconsideration. On appeal, the petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of
action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that
respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an
agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The
laws governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parries
thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, R.A. 66577 and other pertinent agrarian
laws. Considering that the application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of said laws are matters which have been vested in the DAR, this
case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA found the petition to
be impressed with merit. E.O. 2298 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform except those failing under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with law, hence, this case.

Issue: WON the CAs decision is correct.

Ruling: There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is


exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back
rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue
which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, respondent
appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this
case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of

143 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v.


Court o Appeals,the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the
parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the
department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to
the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a
just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. The decision of respondent Court
of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22
August and 28 September 1989 are REINSTATED.

Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463


(Aileen Rose Angue)

Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine


corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its
plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state
policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation,
Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a
set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood
and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International
Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia,
which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from
Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that
"there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match
industry at reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of
Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and
the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC
moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban
under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive
realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the
ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

144 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the


legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering
with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . .


the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered
(Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932,
941 [1954].).

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion,
has become well nigh indispensable . . .

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the
match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of
mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the
Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or
to enjoin such act which is with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise of
its authority it claerly abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench,
we have no occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion as
excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.

Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao,
which are covered by Transfer Certificates. The lands were taken by the
Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the
valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and

145 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner


filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property.
The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao,
which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. Since this
case was filed only on January 26, 1994, the fifteen-day period provided for
under Section 51 of Republic Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law within which to appeal, already lapsed. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the decision was affirmed. It was held that: Jurisdiction over land
valuation cases is lodged in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was
likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the


just compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of
just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided
from the decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other hand, respondents
argue that actions for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the
appropriate courts within 15 days from receipt of the decision of the DAR
adjudicator, otherwise such decision becomes final and executory, pursuant to
51 of R.A. No. 6657.

Issue: Which contention is meritorious?

Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657 provides: The DAR
is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .The Special
Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.

D. When doctrine does not apply

146 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine does not
apply. It does not apply in any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts : This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages
which was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for
closing a logging road without authority.

From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a vessel. Private
respondent EastCoast ordered the closure of the road, a national highway,
through their security force, to prevent passage of the trucks hauling the logs
for the Japanese vessel. Private respondent claim that they were the only
authorized timber licensee to use the road. Petitioners filed a case before the
trial court, which was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo holding
that the issue is within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry which should have
heard the case before filing t case in court.

Issue : WON the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry applies.

Held : The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the
regular courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the
respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry
Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal
before an action for damages can be instituted.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vast
any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not
the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination
a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the
complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was
illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter
to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be
threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of
the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a
passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such
closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forest Development.

147 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

V. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

A. Definition and purpose

As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the
remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.

Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344

Ruling : Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse


through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies
have been exhausted at the administrative level.

When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the
government, but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the
same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the
courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of
the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court."

Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process, obviously to
show that their case falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Such contention is however untenable, because in the first place, they were
made to avail in the same administrative agency, the opportunity or right to
oppose, which in fact they did, when they filed a motion for reconsideration
and later when the motion was denied, they appealed to the Secretary of
Education and Culture.

Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in character on the


issue of alleged denial of due process.

Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was appointed
Principal of the Lambunao High School established in the municipality of
Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High School was later converted into a Regional

148 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Vocational High School under the name of Iloilo Vocational High School.
Gonzales then received a letter from the Secretary of Education appointing him
as Head of the Related Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public School. He
also received a copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools addressed to
respondent Alfredo Pineda, at the time Principal of the Samar Trade School,
appointing him as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School. When Pineda came
to assume the office of Principal of the latter school, Gonzales refused to yield
the same to him, and sent a written protest against Pineda's appointment as
well as against his own appointment as Head of the Related Subjects
Department, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and
Trades, who forwarded it without undue delay to the Director of Public Schools
by a second indorsement. Without waiting for any action on his protest-in fact
even before said protest could be forwarded and submitted to the Director of
Public Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to restrain the
Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from giving effect to
the appointment of Alfredo Pineda as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School,
and to recover damages. After due trial, the lower court rendered the appealed
judgment. Appellants claimed that the lower court erred in not holding that the
present action was instituted prematurely.

Issue: WON the appellee initiated the appropriate administrative proceeding.

Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated appropriate
administrative procedures to obtain relief from the orders that he considered
prejudicial to his rights by means of his first, addressed to the Superintendent
of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter
to the Director of Public Schools, but even before this date appellee instituted
the present action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior
officers any opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before seeking
judicial intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate remedies before
resorting to the courts to seek relief appears to be of stronger application to the
present case where, according to the record, appellant Pineda and the superior
officers of appellee did not appear to have exerted any undue pressure upon
him to compel him to yield and give up the position in question. The decision
appealed from is reserved, with the result that the present action is dismissed.

Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts: Private respondent Pontejos was issued a permanent appointment as


Labor Arbitration Associate by herein petitioner Carale who is the NLRC

149 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Chairman. Carale, pursuant to his exercise of admin. authority and


supervision over all NLRC officials , issued an admin. Order detailing and re-
assigning private respondent to NLRC 4th division in Cebu. In this regard,
private respondent filed a case before the RTC of Cebu against petitioner for
Illegal Transfer tantamount to removal without cause in violation of the
security of tenure under the Constitution. Petitioner moved for a motion to
dismiss the case but RTC denied the petitioner. Petitioner questioned the
courts jurisdiction to try the case without first resorting to exhaustion of
administrative remedy to the Civil Service Commission.

Issue: WON private respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies


available to him?

Ruling: Private respondent did not exhaust the administrative remedies


available to him. Respondent Pontejos is subject to civil service laws and
regulations pursuant to the Constitution as Labor Arbitration Associate.

Respondents grievances must be first raised before the Civil Service


Commission before resorting to judicial intervention. Therefore the instant case
is premature and that respondent should exhaust all the available remedies to
his grievances before resorting to courts.

The petition was granted and that respondent court {RTC} was ordered to
dismiss the case filed by Pontejos.

The exceptions under the Doctrine of Exahaustion of Administrative


Remedies mentioned in this case are the following ;

1) where the question is purely legal,


(2) where judicial intervention is urgent,
(3) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
(4) where the controverted acts violate due process,
(5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the
matter, and
(6) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.

B. Effect of failure to exhaust remedies

It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance
with the rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action ,
which is ground for a motion to dismiss. Non-exhaustion of administrative

150 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

remedies is a ground for motion to dismiss or is a defense which may be raised


in the answer.

De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224


(Ma. Lourdes C. Genio)

Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Basilan
City dismissing a petition for mandamus to compel Limbaga, the engineer of
that city, to authorize de los Santos to construct a residential house on the
land described in the petition. It is alleged the respondent without any lawful
cause refused to grant said permit; and that in view of this refusal, petitioner
suffered damages.

In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of Basilan, denied
the allegations of the petition and interposed the following affirmative defenses:
that after a fire which occurred in Lamitan that raged down a major portion of
the market site therein, the city government approved the purchase of an
additional area to enlarge the said site and that, incidentally, the lot claimed by
the petitioner was included in the area; that by virtue thereof, expropriation
proceedings had been instituted thereon, hence, the denial of the permit
applied for by petitioner. The city fiscal moved to dismiss the petition on the
following grounds: that mandamus will not lie since the issuance of the permit
applied for was a discretionary and not a ministerial duty on the part of the
city engineer to which the trial court agreed.

Issue: WON the case will prosper and WON there is compliance with the DEAR.

Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple reason that, as
the record shows, the land in question is already the subject matter of
expropriation proceeding instituted by Basilan City pursuant to a resolution
approved by the City Council, which proceeding is now pending in the Court of
First Instance of Basilan. Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him. Petitioner should have first brought
the matter to the Director of Public Works who, under the law, exercise
supervision and control over city engineers of chartered cities (see
Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not satisfied with the Director's
decision he should have appealed to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.

The principle is fundamental that a party aggrieved by a decision of an


administrative official should. before coming to court, apply for review of such
decision by higher administrative authority. This principle rests on the

151 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

presumption that the administrative agency if afforded a complete chance


to pass upon the matter.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438

Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530

C. When applied

The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where


the agency exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function. It does not apply in the
exercise of its rule-making power or legislative power.

Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The petitioner, a duly registered partnership of Manila, alleges in


substance (1) that it had placed orders for textiles amounting to about
P340,000 with foreign suppliers which orders were accepted before July 31,
1949; (2) that in November 1950 it requested the respondent to allow
importation of the textiles against its quota for 1949 pursuant to circular No.
12 and (3) but that respondent with grave abuse of authority and discretion
has denied the request and instead ordered that said orders of Ang Tuan Kai &
Co., be charged against the firm's 1951 quota and exchange allocations in
pursuant to the order issued previously by the same board. Hence this case.

Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case before the
court.

Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the Import
Control Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain and adequate
remedy by an appeal to the President. Certiorari or mandamus against
administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative
officers can grant relief. Thus, the petition is denied.

D. Exceptions to the doctrine

When there is a violation of due process


When the issue involved is purely a legal question
When the administrative agency is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction

152 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

When there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency


concerned
When there is irreparable inquiry
When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President hears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter
When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable
When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
When the subject matter is private land in land cases proceedings
When the rule does not provide a plain speedy and adequate remedy
There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention (Paat vs. CA)

Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA),


authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area
covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of
ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.

On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the
TLA, on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private
respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court
had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted
administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited
by Section I of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987,1
and the motion for reconsideration on February 15,1988.2 The petitioner then
elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the

153 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988,3 and in its resolution of September
27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly applied the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: The lower court erred in misapplying the doctrine. One of the reasons
for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon
the Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other
departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that
errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their
superiors if given a chance to do so. The argument that the questions raised in
the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents
have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagethan City, that the petitioner has
violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws
and regulations.21 The charge involves factual issues calling for the
presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by
the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to
exercise their powers of review. here is no question that Civil Case No. 2732
comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the
wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the
unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to
determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had
indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is
the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The
application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the
issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still
necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.

Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802


(Ma. Lourdes Genio)

Facts : Respondent executive secretary authorized the importation of several


tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice
procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein for the
implementation of said proposed importation.
Petitioner is the president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
engaged in the production of rice and corn, filed the petition herein, averring

154 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the


aforementioned respondents "are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends
Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by
"the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency; that
petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; and that a prelinainary injunction is necessary for the
preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency of this case and to
prevent the judgment therein from becoming ineffectual. Respondent, among
others, countered that the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court.

Issue : WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable


in this case.

Ruling : The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative


remedies is not applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one,
or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him,
or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to
the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.

Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the
truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan
from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents
for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner thereof fifteen, (15) days within which to submit an explanation
why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to
submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive
Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No.of temporary restraining order of petitioners was
granted by this court. Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

155 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the
suit for replevin because the buck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of
this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they
were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was
unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized
in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by
petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Ruling: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for
lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice
for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as
to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Thus, while the administration grapples with
the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies." To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the
instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore
stated.

156 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special Assistant


to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, he was charged in an
administrative case, for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty
and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc., preferred against him
by employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board
of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The
committee was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil
Service and the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer of
the respondent therein, the committee heard the case, receiving testimonies of
witnesses on both sides. On May 5, 1959, the committee submitted its Final
Report, the pertinent conclusion and recommendation therein reading as
follows: "(1) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis
upon which to recommend disciplinary action against respondent and therefore
respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated." Unable to agree
with the committee report, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957 on
July 20, 1959 which considered "the respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned
as of the date of his suspension." The pertinent portion of the resolution reads
thus:
"After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the report of the aforesaid fact
finding committee, in conjunction with the entire records of the case and
representations of both complainants and respondent, through their respective
counsel; and, further, after a thorough review of the service record of the
respondent, particularly the various cases presented against him, object of
Monetary Board Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involves
fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent, and moreover, upon formal statement of
the Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant
to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department (such position being
primarily confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board
finds that the continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank
would be prejudicial to be best interests of the Central Bank, and, therefore, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers
the respondent, Mr. R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the .date of his
suspension."

Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995, dated July
23, 1959, approving the appointment of herein respondent Mario Marcos to the
position involved in place of petitioner R. Marino Corpus. The lower court was
of the opinion that petitionerappellant should have exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him, such as an appeal to the

157 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Commissioner of Civil Service, under Republic Act 2260, or the President of the
Philippines who under the Constitution and the law is the head of all the
executive departments of the government including its agencies and
instrumentalities. This is the main issue disputed in this appeal.

Ruling: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the
President or the Civil Service Commission. However, it is our opinion that a
resort to these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case. (1) There is no law requiring an appeal
to the President in a case like the one at bar. The fact that the President had,
in two instances cited in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from
decisions of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded
as precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of condescension on the part
of the Chief Executive. (2) While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law
regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service
Board of Appeals, We believe the petitioner is not bound to observe them,
considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank. In Castillo vs,.
Bayona, et al., 106 Phil., 1121, We said that Section 14, Republic Act 265,
creating the Central Bank of the Philippines, particularly paragraph (c) thereof,
"is sufficiently broad to vest the Monetary Board with the power of investigation
and removal of its officials, except the Governor thereof. In other words, the
Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the investigation, suspension
or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a special provision
of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of
employees of the Central Bank-, though they may be subject to the Civil
Service Law and Regulations in other respects."

In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered petitioner resigned


from the office to which he has been legally appointed as of the date of his
suspension, after he has been duly indicted and tried before a committee
created by the Board for the purpose. An appeal to the Civil Service
Commission would thereby be an act of supererogation, requiring the
presentation of practically the same witnesses and documents produced in the
investigation conducted at the instance of the Monetary Board. Moreover,
Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Law provides that "except as otherwise
provided by law," the Commissioner of Civil Service shall have "final authority
to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officials
and employees in the competetive or classified service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officials and
employees; * * *." Considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central
Bank provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to the
investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the Governor,
coupled with the fact that Petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the non-

158 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

competetive or unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to


the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and
voluntary. "The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative
remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as
said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public
office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the
courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As
emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 621, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 82
Phil., 828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683, public interest requires that the right to a public
office should be determined as speedily as practicable."

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003


(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone


Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,
Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and
Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners
allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines;
that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the
prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of
prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence,
they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in

159 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the
law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed,
the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works


8 SCRA 179
(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: It appears from the allegations of the petition that the petitioner was
denounced before the Port and Harbor Board, Manila for making certain
constructions near the mouth of Calat-an Creek in Sipalay, Negros Occidental;
that on September 11, 1958, petitioner was served with copy of the charges
filed against it by two investigators of respondent Secretary of Public Works
and Communications who conducted an investigation of said charges; that on
the basis of this investigation, respondent Secretary rendered a decision dated
January 16, 1959 ordering the petitioner herein to remove the causeway
illegally constructed at the mouth of the Calat-an River and restore the bed of
said river to its original condition within thirty days from receipt of copy of the
decision, otherwise, the removal shall be effected by the government at the
expense of herein petitioner. Without appealing the decision of the respondent
Secretary to the President, herein petitioner has filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari seeking that the decision of respondent be
annulled."

Ruling: Nowhere in the foregoing provisions, or in any other part of Republic


Act No. 2056, is it required that appeal to the President should precede

160 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

recourse to the courts. The silence of the statute, to be sure, does not mean
that the President may not review the action of the Secretary. His power to do
so is implicit in his constitutional power of control of all the executive
departments (Section 10, Works and Communications par. 1, Art. VII of the
Constitution). This, however, does not resolve the issue, which is not whether
petitioner could have appealed to the President but whether he should have
done so before seeking judicial relief. The answer depends, in turn, upon
whether an appeal to the President would have been sufficiently effective,
adequate and expeditious, a negative finding in this respect being the basis on
which the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as prayed for by petitioner, may be
issued. The absence of an express provision in Republic Act No. 2056 for an
appeal to the President from the decision of the Secretary, considered together
with the peremptory character of the periods therein prescribed, shows that
such an appeal-assuming that it may be taken in view of the President's
constitutional power of executive control-would not affect the inexorable
requirement that those periods be observe& the only exception being in favor of
Works and Communications the Secretary, if there is justifiable or valid reason
for his failure or delay to terminate and decide a case or effect the removal of
the illegal construction such as, for Instance, an injunction issued by a court.
We are of the opinion that an appeal to the President from the order of
respondent Secretary would not have been expeditious enough for
petitioner's purposes and hence the latter did not have to resort to it
before seeking judicial relief . In any event, we believe the facts of this case
place it within the rule enunciated in Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil.,
237, as follows: "Such failure (to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President) cannot preclude the
plaintiffs from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a
Department is merely an alter-ego of the President; the assumption is that the
action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President, unless the
same is disapproved by the latter."

Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: On April 29, 1958, Pedro B. Patanao commenced Special Civil Case No.
48 with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, against Valeriano, C. Bueno and
one Juanito Merin, for injunction and damages. In his amended petition,
Patanao alleged that on March 10, 1958 the respondents therein disturbed him
in his, possession of his timber concession by illegally entering the same and
cutting and hauling logs therein; that when he went to the area to stop said
respondents and their laborers, truckers and loggers from cutting and hauling
logs "he was met with riot guns, pistols and other firearms"; and that

161 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

defendants were able to cut no less than one million board feet of exportable
logs worth not less than $64,000.00 and would be able to cut and haul even a
bigger amount in the space of one month as they had allegedly concentrated all
their logging machineries and equipment with the apparent intention of
illegally denuding the forest area covered by his license. Patanao thus urged
the court below to issue a writ of preliminary injunction so as to enjoin the
respondents, their agents, laborers and lawyers, from entering the area and
cutting and hauling logs therein pending trial and, after trial, to make the
injunction final and permanent, and to condemn said respondents liable in an
amount of not less than P175,000. 00 as actual and moral damages, attorney's
fees and costs.

Ruling: At first glance, petitioner's argument appears to be tenable. True, the


common boundary of the parties was verified by the Bureau of Forestry way
back in March 1955. It seems, however, that while petitioner Bueno had
endeavored to respect the verification report, respondent Patanao had refused
to conform thereto, so much so that the conflict was brought anew to the
attention of the Director of Forestry who has formally taken a hand therein. On
or about April 8, 1958, before Patanao instituted Civil Case No. 48 with the
respondent court, he was officially requested to designate a representative to
accompany Forestry officials in the verification of the common boundary line
between him and petitioner (Exhibit 8, letter addressed to Patanao by
Anastacio G. Sison, officer-incharge, Esperanza Forest Station, Agusan, p. 5;
Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction, dated,
July 23, 1958.) That said boundary dispute is still pending in the Bureau of
Forestry at the filing of this petition is shown by the letter of the District
Forester of Agusan, now in the record as Annex A-Opposition. The record also
discloses that Patanao's application for renewal and consolidation of his timber
licenses for 1957-58 had not yet been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. Its renewal depends upon the consideration of the
Director of Forestry. The granting of timber licenses, their renewal or
cancellation, and the determination of conflicting claims or boundary lines
involving forest zones, such as those presently occupied by the parties hereto,
are all vested by law primarily upon the Director of Forestry and ultimately
upon his Department head.

Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151


(Tristan A. Reyes)

Facts: In his complaint before the NLRC, herein private respondent Rodito
Nasayao claimed that sometime in May 1974, he was appointed plant manager
of the petitioner corporation, with an alleged compensation of P3,000.00, a

162 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

month, or 25% of the monthly net income of the company, whichever is


greater, and when the company failed to pay his salary for the months of May,
June, and July 1974, Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Commission, Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid salaries. The
case was docketed therein as NLRC Case No. LR6151. Answering, the herein
petitioners denied that Rodito Nasayao was employed in the company as plant
manager with a fixed monthly salary of P3,000.00. They claimed that the
undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a joint venture, a sort of
partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good
working condition and, in return, he would get the contracts from end-users
for the installation of marble products, in which the company would not
interfere. In addition, private respondent Nasayao was to receive an amount
equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would
realize, should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no
profits during said period, private respondent was not entitled to any amount.
The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected the
herein respondent Jose T. Collado as voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the
proceedings, however, the herein petitioners challenged the arbitrator's
capacity to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to
desist from farther hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. In
due time, or on 29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor of the
complainant, ordering the herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao the amount
of P9,000.00, within 10 days from notice. Upon receipt of the decision, the
herein petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission on
grounds that the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to
hear and decide the case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist
therefrom: and that the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. On 18
March 1976, Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is final, appealable, and
immediately executory;3 and, on 23 March 1976, he filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution. Acting on the motions, the respondent
Commission, in a resolution dated 7 May 1976, dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the decision appealed from is final, unappealable and immediately
executory, and ordered the herein petitioners to comply with the decision of the
voluntary arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of the resolution.5
The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As prayed for, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining herein respondents
from enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned decision and resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that the
petitioner failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies is
tenable.

163 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Ruling: The contention is without merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of


administrative remedies cannot be invoked in this case, as contended. In the
recent case of John Clement Consultants, Inc. versus National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court said: "As is well known, no law provides for an appeal
from decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission; hence, there can
be no review and reversal on appeal by higher authority of its factual or legal
conclusions. When, however, it decides a case without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, the party thereby adversely
affected may obtain a review and nullification of that decision by this Court
through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Since, in this case, it appears that
the Commission has indeed acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of a belated appeal sought to be taken from a
decision of Labor Arbiter and thereafter reversing it, the writ of certiorari will
issue to undo those acts, and do justice to the aggrieved party."

Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa


(hereinafter, Municipality), Metro Manila, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos,
Jr., entered into a contract with the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG
MCA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLLUPA, INC.
(KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's
management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The contract
provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985,
renewable for a like period, unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by
mutual agreement of the parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5)
days of each month which shall, however, be increased by ten percent (10%)
each year during the first five (5) years only. Following his assumption into
office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner Ignacio
Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of
the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of
the aforesaid contract.3 He sought opinions from both the Commission on
Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the in
strument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps
be taken towards its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even
granted the Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the
cancellation. rescission of the above cited contract and make representations
with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the possession,
management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal

164 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Government of Muntinlupa." Consequently, upon representations made by


Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988
Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution,
Bunye, together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Capital Command
of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the public
market and announced to the general public and the stallholders thereat that
the Municipality was taking over the management and operation of the facility,
and that the stallholders should thenceforth pay their market fees to the
Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to follow the
doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies.

Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled


that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.69 This doctrine of
qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most
needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the
President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the
instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is
correct.

Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention
of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer
Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in
Tobaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office
filed an investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be
petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the
necessary action, petitioner reiterated her application sometime in 1979-1985
alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her
landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the Ming of the said application
and, that the latter had distributed his landholding to his children. A
reinvestigation was conducted this time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October
31, 1985 filed his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's

165 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

CLT. Said report was elevated to the MAR. In an endorsement dated November
25, 1985, Regional Director Salvador Pejo manifested his concurrence with the
report of Atty. Evasco holding that the properties of the petitioner consist of
4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 27167,
27168 and 27344 and hence not covered by the Operation Land Transfer
Program. Juanito L. Lorena, the Officer-in-Charge of MAR likewise concurred
therewith. However, in the order dated February 13, 1986, then Minister
Conrado Estrella denied petitioner's application for retention. On April 17,
1986, petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The
case was entitled Hilda Ralla Almine vs. MAR and docketed as AC-G.R. SP No.
08550. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. However, it was
denied in an order dated May 28, 1986. A motion for reconsideration thereof
was likewise denied. After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision dated June 29, 19871 dismissing the appeal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to whether a
landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land holdings, if
administratively decided by the Minister of Agrarian Reform, are appealable
and could be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the
Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.2 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated October 22,
1987.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the CA is tenable.

Ruling: A perusal of the provision above cited reveals that questions as to


whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his
landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of
Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President
and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from
those cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There is no
appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said decision may be
reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over
the petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the
Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and
in holding that this is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian
Reform. The Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and
the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The failure to appeal to the Office of the
President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is

166 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the


latter is the alter ego of the President.

Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Ramon Tapales was duly appointed Director of the Conservatory Music
in UP as recommended by the President of the University of the Philippines
after compliance of the required qualifications under the Charter of the same.
Consequently, the Board of Regents of the said University issued a resolution
fixing the terms of the office of the Dean and Directors thereof allegedly in
pursuant to same charter. Thereafter, the University President issued a
memorandum reminding the Deans and Directors whose terms are about to
expire that unless they are recommended by the same for reappointment, their
assumption to their respective office is deemed terminated. Tapales was injured
by the said resolution and memorandum as such filed before the court a
question on the validity of the said resolution and memorandum. The
respondent on the other hand alleged that the petitioner failed to exhaust the
required administrative remedies available.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

Ruling: It is contended in this connection, that the appellee failed to exhaust


his administrative remedies by not asking the Board of Regents to reconsider
the challenged resolution before bringing the matter to court. An
administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief
against a statute or ordinance which is claimed to be unconstitutional
and void (73 C.J.S. 357), or where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done (73 C.J.S.
354). Here, appellee impugned the constitutionality and validity of the
Resolution of October 2, 1959, and appellee's objection thereto is a purely legal
one.

Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210


(Mark Roy Boado)

167 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Facts: Quintos is the legitimate owner of a racehorse which was duly and
officially registered with NSF and for which he is issued a certificate of
registration, thereby entitling it to participate in horse races and sweepstakes
draws in legally authorized racing clubs or tracks. In line with the SOP and
usual racing practices for horse owners, Quintos applied for inclusion of his
horse in a particular race 3 days before the date of the race which application
was duly approved by Phil Racing Club, Inc. On the very day when Quintos
race-horse was scheduled to participate in race no. 15, the PRC announced
thru the PA system before the start of race no. 13 that his horse was being
excluded from taking part in race no. 15. It was then alleged that the
cancellation of the certificate of registration of his horse was arbitrary and
oppressive, due process being denied him in the absence of a formal
investigation or inquiry prior thereto. The trial court dismissed the complaint
primarily on the ground of lack of EAR that the admin remedy of Quintos was
to ask the Board of Trustees of NSF to reconsider its resolution cancelling the
certificate of registration, and in case of denial of appeal to the Games and
Amusement Board or to the Office of the President. The CA certified the case to
the SC since it found that a purely legal question was involved, to wit: WON the
trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

Issue: Does Quintos have a valid cause for complaint?

Ruling: None. Quintos prematurely instituted a suit for damages. The reason
for this short-circuiting of administrative processes is not explained by
Quintos. His gives no reason for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Indeed, there is none. The order of dismissal, therefore, certainly cannot be
considered as being in derogation of the due process guarantee. The judicial
forum sought by Quintos was in effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept
of primary jurisdiction. In the traditional language of administrative law, the
stage of ripeness for judicial review had not been reached. Quintos ignored
factors not predetermined by formula but by seasoned balancing for and
against the assumption of jurisdiction. All that had been said so far would
seem to indicate that under such a test, the lower courts insistence of the
fundamental requirement of exhausting administrative remedies is more than
justified.

Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: This is MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.


P-672 COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD. FRANCISCA SOTO.
Specifically, the change sought is in the civil status of the registered owner,

168 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

whom the petitioner wants to be described in the certificate of title as married


to her rather than as a widower.

The said registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in January
1933 to the petitioner. In 1939, he filed an application for a homestead patent,
describing himself as "married to Francisca Soto," but in 1953, when the
original certificate over the homestead was issued, it was in favor of "Sergio
Serfino, widower." Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter the petitioner filed
a motion with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental praying that his
description as a "widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two
daughters of the couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their
parents were married in 1933, the oppositors nonetheless pointed out that
their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man. Later,
they said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom she
begot eleven children. According to these oppositors, it was their father himself
who had described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had not heard
from the petitioner since 1942.
Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being considered
conjugal and therefore equally owned by the spouses.
The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed
for, but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to
act on the matter. Its reason was that there was no observance of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction to order an amendment of a


certificate of title without previous exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Held: Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies


does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in
a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that
it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a
motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed
waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable to private lands, as also settled in a number of decisions rendered
by this Court. Once registered, the homestead granted to Sergio Serfino ceased
to have the character of public land and so was removed from the operation of
the said doctrine. But notwithstanding the above principles, the petition will
still have to be dismissed because the change sought is not authorized under
Section 112 of Act 496, as interpreted by this Court.

169 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD Computer
Services and Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment of certain benefits.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision sustaining the petitioners' position. The
labor arbiter, then, upon motion of the petitioners, issued a writ of execution to
enforce said decision. The following day, the sheriff served a notice of
garnishment to the Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount of
P15,031.85 was garnished. This amount has already been turned over to the
petitioners.
A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the respondents'
office premises. ACD Group Inc., an American firm based in California, U.S.A.,
through its Chairman, Dulay filed a third-party claim in the NLRC case on the
ground that it is the real owner of the computers levied upon and scheduled for
auction. This third-party claim was denied.
ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition for relief
from judgment in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with prayer for the issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The NLRC then
issued the questioned resolutions incidental to Injunction Case. The petitioners
filed before the NLRC a motion to dismiss and/or answer to the petition on the
ground that a petition for relief is not a remedy granted under the Labor Code
and NLRC Rules.
Without waiting for the NLRC's resolution on their motion to dismiss, the
petitioners filed the present petition. This petition seeks to annul the three
NLRC resolutions, to prohibit the NLRC from taking further proceedings in
Injunction Case and to direct the NLRC to dismiss said injunction case and to
order the full execution of the decision.
The Solicitor General recommends that the petition be dismissed for being
premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. He
further stressed the jurisdiction of the NLRC and its exercise of sound
discretion.

Issue: WON the Soc Gens position is tenable.

Ruling: The Court gave due course to this petition on a finding, among others,
that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an inflexible rule. In
fact, it yields to many accepted exceptions. As we have noted in a number of
cases, exhaustion is not necessary where inter alia there is estoppel on the part

170 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

of the party invoking the doctrine; where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; where there is unreasonable
delay or official action that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant: where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided anyway by the courts of justice.
At least two of these exceptions are present in the instant case on exhaustion
of administrative remedies. There had been no action on the challenge to the
petition for relief from judgment for almost a year. This is considerably long
considering that the labor arbiter's decision had already become final and in
fact has been partially executed. The main case had been filed as early as June
20, 1986.
Moreover, this case involving the propriety of a remedy and the suspension of
an execution would only be further delayed if we remand it to the NLRC, only
to have any decision raised again before this Court.

Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Petitioner Sabello, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and
also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division
of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the
fact that the students could hardly pay for their monthly tuition few. Since at
that time also, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaigning
was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council
through proper resolutions alloted the amount of P840.00 to cover up for the
salaries of the high school teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the
barrio high school was a barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to
its share of the RICD fund in question. The only part that the herein petitioner
played was his being authorized by the said barrio council to withdraw the
above amount and which was subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's
Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. That was a grave error on
the part of the herein petitioner as it involves the very intricacies in the
disbursement of government funds and of its technicalities. Thus, the herein
petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were charged of the violation of
Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year
and disqualification to hold public office. The herein petitioner appealed his
case to the Court of Appeals, Manila. The Court of Appeals modified the
decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner,
being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the
highest court of the land.

171 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the


Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full civil and political rights. With
this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the
government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School
Principal I.

Issue: WON petitioner Sabello should be reappointed to his position.

Ruling: The question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his


former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under
the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of
what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving
justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
cannot be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged
grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering
this a suit against the officials of this government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a nonlawyer, who claims
that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, the Court set aside the
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct
to the merits of the petition.
The petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized representative is hereby
directed to appoint petitioner to the position of Elementary School Principal I or
its equivalent

Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490


(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Montes was charged with negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge
No. 6 under him bad sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not
pump out while under his care). the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated
him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board
of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory
negligence in not pumping, the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be
considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to
reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Montes then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review
the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss,

172 | P a g e
Administrative Law JRU LAW SCHOOL

JRU
By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative
remedies before he instituted the action.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 598, which provides: The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the
power and authority to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before
it on appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or
modified by the President of the Philippines.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in applying Sec 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
598 in the instant case.

Ruling: There is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision has been
rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the President, and
that the tendency of courts has been not to subject the decision of the
President to judicial review. It is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor
General may be appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board of
Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse may be
had to the courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President,
his action should be final and not reviewable by the courts because such a
course of action would be derogatory to the high office of the President. The
judgment appealed from is thus affirmed.

173 | P a g e