Good Luck, Jonathan

The Problem With Democracy in Nigeria

By John Campbell
JANUARY 27, 2015

A campaign banner in support of President Goodluck Jonathan next to a banner in support of

opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari and his running mate Yemi Osinbajo, Lagos January
21, 2015. (Akintunde Akinleye / Courtesy Reuters)

A mericans tend to think of elections as the apex of democracy. But in some cases they are the

opposite. In countries with weak democratic cultures and lax rule of law, elections can be destabilizing.
They can promote violence and undermine good governance.
Nigeria is a case in point. The success of democracy in the country, which has a population
of 177 million and is home to Africas largest economy, matters for the whole content. Yet
with national elections scheduled for February 14, anxiety is high. The recent global
collapse of oil prices hit the country hard, since oil contributes more than 70 percent of the
governments revenue and more than 90 percent of its foreign exchange. The Lagos stock
exchange is in the doldrums, and between October 2014 and the end of January, the
Nigerian naira has fallen from 155 to the U.S. dollar to 191.30. The bad news keeps
coming: the radical Islamist insurgency group Boko Haram appears to be gaining strength,
the countrys political class is badly fragmented, and popular confidence in the
governments ability to provide security is eroding.

It is no wonder that some in Nigeria are feeling a distinct nostalgia for 2011, when sitting
President Goodluck Jonathan defeated Muhammadu Buharia retired general who took
power in a 1983 coup and ruled until 1985at the polls. (Elected vice president in 2007,
Jonathan initially became president in 2010 upon the death of President Umaru YarAdua.)
At the time, international observers proclaimed the 2011 elections a dramatic improvement
over Nigerias 2007 elections (a low bar) and were notably optimistic about the countrys
future. If they had been paying close attention to the vote, though, they might not have
been. In many ways, the 2011 elections set the stage for the current national crisis.

Since Nigerias independence in 1960, with each vote power has alternated between the
predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south, a strategy adopted to
forestall the political polarization among the religiously distinct (but not religiously
uniform) regions. Yet power alternation was a matter of practice, not of law.

No matter which candidate is declared victorious, there are plenty of reasons for the loser
to reject the results.

In 2011, it was the Muslim norths turn to hold the presidency. But Jonathan, a Christian
from the south, ran anyway, despite private assurances that he would wait until 2015
because it was still the norths turn. On both sides, the subsequent electoral campaigns
were marred by ethnic and religious appeals. Jonathan received support from parts of the
traditional Islamic establishment, including the sultan of Sokoto, the then emir of Kano,
and the emir of Zaria, but many people in the north suspected that these figures had been
bribed. Despite Jonathans support from these and a few other traditional Islamic rulers,
the Muslim Buhari won all of the predominately Muslim states in the federation. Jonathan
carried the rest of the vote (with one exception, which supported a third candidate), in some
cases by margins of more than 90 percent.
Many in the north called foul. Blatant rigging has long been a characteristic of Nigerian
elections. But, in 2011, it was less obvious. Polling was better than it had ever been, with
more polling stations open on time and supplied with ballots than ever before. However,
ballot box stuffing remained. Rigging primarily happened at collating stations, which often
operated after dark without international election observers present. The rigging was aimed
at ensuring that Jonathan fulfilled the two constitutional requirements to claim electoral
victory: win 50 percent plus one of the total ballots cast, and win a quarter of the vote in
two-thirds of the states. (The requirement for the former is more ambiguous than the latter
in Nigerias very long and complex constitution.)

There was no attempt to rig Jonathan into victory in majority-Muslim states in the north.
Instead, the rigging there appears to have been designed to ensure that he received a quarter
of the vote. In those areas where Jonathan was strongly supported, rigging was designed to
pile up an enormous margin of victory in order to foreclose any possibility of a runoff.
When Jonathans victory was announced after the count, rioting in the north followed,
resulting in the greatest bloodshed since the 196770 civil war. The violence initially
appeared to be directed against those in the Islamic establishment and the ruling party who
supported the Jonathan candidacy, but later degenerated into widespread ethnic and
religious killings. In the end, even after the violence subsided, Nigeria was split between a
Muslim north and a Christian south, an outcome that Nigerians had long sought to avoid.
The stage was set for a 2015 electoral contest along regional and religious lines.

The upcoming presidential election in February is a rematch between the Christian

Jonathan against the Muslim Buhari. There is anecdotal evidence that, once again, the
campaigns are appealing to ethnic and religious identities. However, unlike 2011, the
results of 2015 are not preordained. This time, pressured by the governments inability to
defeat Boko Haram, falling oil prices, and a perception that the Jonathan administration is
weak, the political class is more fractured across the nation, making election rigging more
difficult.

In that sense, the 2015 elections are real in a way that elections have not previously been.
Wild cards include how elections will occur in the three states that are under a state of
emergency and whether the estimated one million internally displaced persons and refugees
will be able to vote, as Nigerian law requires that voters cast their ballots in their own
specified local government area. In the past, these populations supported Buhari, but if they
cant vote, Jonathan will have an advantage. On the other hand, Buhari seems to have
widespread support in areas outside his traditional political base in the north.

An incumbent Nigerian president has significant advantages: he is at the center of extensive

patronage networks that are dependent on him; he has access to the governments oil
revenue; and he largely controls the election and ballot counting. No matter the
depredations of Boko Haram, a declining economy, and little public confidence in his
administration, in other words, Jonathan is likely, if not certain, to win.

No matter which candidate is declared victorious, though, there are plenty of reasons for
the loser to reject the results. Buhari ran for the presidency in 2003, 2007, and 2011. Each
election was disputed, and Buhari turned to the courts for recourse. In every case, the courts
found for the victorious candidate. Following the judiciarys decision in 2011, Buhari
vowed never again to go to the bench to resolve a disputed election. More recently, the
secretary general of the chief opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, said that if
the Independent National Elections Commission declares Jonathan victorious in elections
that are not credible, his party will establish a parallel government. On the other hand,
some of the militants in Nigerias oil patch who are close to Jonathan have threatened
mayhem if their candidate loses. No matter who is declared the victor, then, Boko Haram
will likely try to take advantage of the likely political uncertainty.

Bearing all of this in mind, anxiety about Nigerias upcoming elections is not misplaced.
Come February 14, it is likely that democracy in Africa will take a step backward.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142821/john-campbell/good-luck-jonathan