+1 312 56 68 949 Chat now Sign

RESEARCH PAPER
EssayEmpire How it Works Inquiry Prices Orde

WHAT IS A RESEARCH PAPER HOW TO WRITE A RESEARCH PAPER

RESEARCH PAPER TOPICS RESEARCH

Search the site
! Home PAPER EXAMPLES
/ Examples Economics CUSTOM
ResearchRESEARCH PAPER /
Paper Examples
"
Economics and Corporate Social Responsibility Research Paper

Economics and Corporate Social

Research Paper Examples Responsibility Research Paper
Anthropology Research Paper This sample Economics and Corporate Social Responsibility
Examples Research Paper is published for educational and informational
purposes only. Free research papers are not written by our
Argumentative Research Paper
Examples writers, they are contributed by users, so we are not responsible
for the content of this free sample paper. If you want to buy a
Child Abuse Research Paper
Examples high quality research paper on any topic at aordable price
please use custom research paper writing services.
Communication Research Paper
Examples
Criminal Justice Research Paper Calculate Your Price
Examples
Domestic Violence Research Price for this order:
Essay
Paper Examples
Economics Research Paper
Examples
Undergraduate
$10
Education Research Paper 14 days
Examples Proceed to
Elder Abuse Research Paper Order
Number of pages: 1 Word count 275
Examples
History Research Paper Calculate Your Price
Examples
Management Research Paper
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) constitutes an economic
Examples
phenomenon of signicant importance. Today, rms largely
Political Science Research Paper
determine welfare through producing goods and services for
Examples
consumers, interest for investors, income for employees, and
Psychology Research Paper
social and environmental externalities or public goods aecting
Examples
broader subsets of society. Stakeholders often take account of
Sociology Research Paper
 Examples
Popular Research Papers
ADHD Research Paper
Alcoholism Research Paper
Alzheimers Disease Research
Paper
Anxiety Research Paper
Articial Intelligence Research
Paper
Autism Research Paper
Child Abuse Research Paper
Communication Research Paper
Criminal Justice Research Paper
Depression Research Paper
Domestic Violence Research
Paper
Drug Addiction Research Paper
Eating Disorders Research Paper
Elder Abuse Research Paper
Leadership Research Paper
Motivation Research Paper
Political Science Research Paper
PTSD Research Paper
Psychology Research Paper
Schizophrenia Research Paper
Sociology Research Paper
Stress Research Paper
Suicide Research Paper
ethical, social, and environmental rm performance, thereby
changing the nature of strategic interaction between prot-
maximizing rms, on one hand, and utility-maximizing
individuals, on the other hand.
Hence, CSR is referred to as one of the social pressures rms
have absorbed (John Ruggy, qtd. in The Economist, January 17,
2008, special report on CSR) and considered to have become a
mainstream activity of rms (The Economist, January 17, 2008;
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005). Many (inter)national rms
strive to achieve voluntary social and environmental standards
(e.g., IS014001), and the number of related certications in
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries as well as in emerging market economies is
constantly growing. Broad access to the Internet as well as
comprehensive media coverage allow the public to monitor
corporate involvement with social ills, environmental
degradation, or nancial contagion independent of geographical
distance. A 2005 U.S. survey by Fleishman-Hillard and the
National Consumers League (Rethinking Corporate Social
Responsibility) concludes that technology is changing the
landscape in which consumers gather and communicate
information about CSR and that Internet access has created a
more informed, more empowered consumer searching for an
unltered view of news and information.
In light of (a) such empowered market participants able to
discipline rms according to their preferences and (b) the public
good nature of business by-products, policy makers must
reevaluate the border between public and corporate social
responsibility. In this context, Scherer and Palazzo (2008) note
that paradoxically, today, business rms are not just considered
the bad guys, causing environmental disasters, nancial
scandals, and social ills. They are at the same time considered
the solution of global regulation and public goods problems (p.
414). In sum, CSR opens up a wide array of economic questions
and puzzles regarding rm incentives behind voluntary and
costly provision of public goods as well as the potential welfare
trade-o between their market and government provision. While
economic research had initially addressed the question of
whether CSR possesses any economic justication at all, it has
recently shifted to how it aects the economy, stressing the need
of analytical machinery to better understand the mechanisms
underlying CSR as well as its interaction with classical public
policy. Therefore, the objective of this research paper is to
identify, structure, and discuss essential economic aspects of
CSR.

At rst sight, CSR appears to be at odds with the neoclassical

assumption of prot maximization underlying strategic rm
behavior. Corporate social performance often means provision
of public goods or reduction of negative externalities (social or
environmental) related to business conduct. As public goods and
externalities entail market failure in the form of free riding or
collective action problems, government provision through direct
production or regulation may be most ecient, a concept
generally known as Friedmans classical dichotomy. If rms still
decide to engage in costly social behavior beyond regulatory
levels (i.e., CSR), then why would they voluntarily incur these
costs, and is this behavior overall economically ecient?

The attempt to answer these questions leads to the rms

objectivemaximizing shareholder valueand its dependence
on the nature of shareholders and stakeholders preferences.
Shareholders and investors can be prot oriented and/or have
social and environmental preferences. The same is true for
consumers, while workers may be extrinsically and/or
intrinsically motivated. This heterogeneity in preferences (i.e., the
presence of nonpecuniary preferences alongside classical
monetary ones) is able to shed light on CSR within standard
economic theory.

Another important issue intrinsically related to CSR concerns

information asymmetries between rms and stakeholders.
Reputation and information are important determinants of
consumer, investor, employee, or activist behavior and,
therefore, rm prots. Hence, many rms proactively report on
their CSR activities and consult governments, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
private auditors to earn credibility. In short, rms seek to build
and maintain social or environmental reputation in markets
characterized by information asymmetry and socially or
environmentally conscious agents.

While information economics, contract, and organization theory

provide a suitable framework to analyze the motivations and
strategies beneath CSR, public economics and industrial
organization may enhance the understanding of how the
underlying social pressures might aect market structure,
competition, and total welfare. The remainder of this research
paper is organized as follows: The second section denes CSR
and discusses the classical dichotomy between the public and
private sectors in light of CSR. The third section outlines the
crucial role of preferences in explaining and conceptualizing CSR.
The fourth section gives a structured overview of distinctive
theoretic explanations of strategic CSR in light of some empirical
evidence. The fth section concludes.

What Is CSR? From Definition to

Analysis
Before entering economic analysis, the stage has to be set by
dening corporate social responsibility. In practice, a variety of
denitions of CSR exists. The European Commission (2009)
denes corporate social responsibility as a concept whereby
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their
business operations and in their interaction with their
stakeholders on a voluntary basis. The World Bank (n.d.) states,

# CSR is the commitment of businesses to

behave ethically and to contribute to
sustainable economic development by
working with all relevant stakeholders to
improve their lives in ways that are good
for business, the sustainable development
agenda, and society at large.

A notion similar to voluntary behavior can be found in

denitions that refer to either beyond compliance, such as
those used by Vogel (2005) or McWilliams and Siegel (2001), who
characterize CSR as the fulllment of responsibilities beyond
those dictated by markets or laws, or to self-regulation, as
suggested by Calveras, Ganuza, and Llobet (2007), among others.
These attempts to dene CSR reveal two basic conceptual
features: First, CSR manifests itself in some observable and
measurable behavior or output. The literature frequently refers
to this dimension as corporate social or environmental
performance (CSP or CEP). Second, the social or environmental
performance or output of rms exceeds obligatory, legally
enforced thresholds. In essence, CSR is corporate social or
environmental behavior beyond levels required by law or
regulation. This denition is independent of any conjecture
about the motivations underlying CSR and constitutes a strong
fundament for economic theory to investigate incentives and
mechanisms beneath CSR. Note that, while Baron (2001) takes
the normative view that both motivation and performance are
required for actions to receive the CSR label,' it is proposed here
that linking a particular motivation to the respective performance
is required for the action to receive the correct CSR label (e.g.,
strategic or altruistic). From an economic point of view, the
interesting and most relevant form of CSR is strategic (i.e., CSR
as a result of classical market forces), while McWilliams and
Siegels (2001) denition would reduce CSR only to altruistic
behavior.

The logical next step is to build the bridge from denition to

economic analysis. CSR often realizes as a public good or the
reduction of a public bad. Hence, revisiting the classical
dichotomy between state and market appears to be important.
Relevant works that relate CSR with public good provision include
Bagnoli and Watts (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2007), who
explicitly dene CSR as the corporate provision of public goods
or curtailment of public bads. Firms may produce a public good
or an externality jointly with private goods, either in connection
with the production process of private goods (e.g., less polluting
technology such as in Kotchen [2006], or safe/healthy working
conditions) or linked to the private good/service itself (e.g., less
polluting cars or energy-saving light bulbs). This perspective on
CSR relates directly to earlier work by J. M. Buchanan (1999), who
referred to such joint provision of a public and private good as
an impure public good, and relevant insights such as those
derived by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) in their seminal
paper on the private provision of public goods, which can be
readily translated into the CSR framework. For example,
Bergstrom et al. focused on the interaction between public and
private (individual) provision of the public good and the eect on
overall levels of provision and concluded that public provision
crowds out its private counterpart almost perfectly. Along these
lines, Kotchen (2006) compares joint corporate provision of
private and public goods in green markets (where the private
good is produced with an environmentally friendly production
technology) and separate provision of either, leading to the
similar conclusion that the very same crowding out takes place
between corporate provision and individual provision and may
even lead to an overall reduction in the level of the public good.
More precisely, Besley and Ghatak (2001) notice that public
goods provision has dramatically shifted from public to mixed or
complete private ownership in recent years, while Rose-
Ackerman (1996) phrases the problem as the blurring of the
analytically motivated division between for-prot, nonprot and
public sectors in reality. To explain these observations, Besley
and Ghatak suggest that in the presence of incomplete contracts,
optimal ownership is not a question of public versus private
provision but simply should involve the party that values the
created benets most. Another interesting rationale provided by
Besley and Ghatak (2007) identies economies of scope (i.e.,
natural complementarities between private and public goods
production, leading to cost asymmetries/advantages on the rm
side) to be the decisive variable in determining the eciency of
impure public goods. The conclusion states that if economies of
scope are absent, tasks should be segregated into specialized
organizations (i.e., governments provide public goods and rms
private ones). Otherwise, CSR might very well be optimal if
governments or not-for-prot providers are unable to match CSR
levels of public good provision due to opportunism, cost
disadvantages (= economies of scope argument), or
distributional preferences. All these ndings are of immediate
importance to those authorities involved in the mechanism
design of public good provision.

Assuming that private and public good production is naturally

bundled, the major trade-o between government regulation
and CSR can be summarized as follows: While government
regulation of rms may entail the production of optimal or
excessive levels of public goods, the allocation of costs and
benets may be suboptimal due to the uniformity of public policy
tools (i.e., rms have to charge higher prices and cannot sell to
those consumers without sucient willingness to pay for the
impure public good anymore; this also denies those consumers
the acquisition of the pure private good under consideration). On
the other hand, CSR may achieve second best levels of the public
good combined with distributional optimality inherent in the
working of markets. Under special circumstances (e.g., if a
government foregoes regulation because an absolute majority of
voters does not have preferences for the public good), CSR can
even Pareto improve total welfare by serving the minority of
caring consumers (Besley & Ghatak, 2007). In sum, policy
makers should take into account the systemic constraints of both
public and corporate provision of public goods.

While analyzing CSR through a public economics lens oers

important insights into welfare implications, eciency, and
comparative and normative questions regarding CSR and public
policy, it does not shed sucient light on the motivations behind
CSR. Therefore, the next section develops a categorization of CSR
along motivational lines and across theoretical frameworks. In
short, CSR can be subclassied as either strategic, market-driven
CSR, which is perfectly compatible with prot maximization and
Milton Friedmans view of the socially responsible rm, or as not-
for-prot CSR that comes at a net monetary cost for share-
holders. However, foregone prots (note that Reinhardt, Stavins,
& Vietor [2008] dene CSR in this spirit as sacricing prots in the
social interest) due to costly CSR need not be at odds with the
principle of shareholder value maximization and do not
automatically constitute moral hazard by managers if
shareholders have respective intrinsic (social or environmental)
preferences that substitute for utility derived from extrinsic
(monetary) sources. Hence, any microeconomic explanation of
CSR builds upon the recent advancement of new concepts of
individual behavior in economics and the related departure from
the classical homo oeconomicus assumption. In other words, the
economic rationalization of CSR is closely linked to the extension
of traditional individual rational choice theory toward a broader
set of attitudes, preferences, and calculations.

From Whether to Why: Economics and

the Evolutionary Understanding of CSR
Initial research into CSR was dominated by the question of
whether rms do have any social responsibility other than
employing people, producing goods or services, and maximizing
prots. However, rms increasingly engaged in CSR activities
that, at rst sight, seemed to be outside its original, neoclassical
boundaries. Hence, research shifted focus to why rms actually
do CSR. Both questions, whether and why CSR, are intimately
related and will be jointly addressed in this section.

Should rms engage in CSR? And if so, why (not)? In this respect,
Milton Friedman (1970) examined the doctrine of the social
responsibility of business and concluded that the only
responsibility of business is to maximize prots (i.e., shareholder
value), while goods or curtailment of bads based on public
preferences or social objectives should be provided by
governments endowed with democratic legitimation and the
power to correct market ineciencies (such as free riding or
collective action problems). Based on the assumption of perfect
government, this view suggested that CSR was a manifestation of
moral hazard by managers (rm decision makers) toward
shareholders and not only inecient but also inconsistent with
the neoclassical rms prot orientation. But rather than putting
the discussion about CSR to a halt, Friedmans thoughts
provoked the search for an economic justication of CSR in line
with neoclassical economics. The breakthrough came with the
idea that CSR may actually be a necessary part of strategy for a
prot-maximizing rm. In other words, prot maximization can
be a motivation for CSR.

But how may CSR be integrated into the objective function of the
prot-maximizing rm? The answer to this question builds upon
the existence of preferences that are beyond those of the
classical homo oeconomicus. Stakeholders as well as
shareholders often are socially or, in general, intrinsically
motivated, a fact that prot-maximizing rms cannot ignore as it
directly aects demand in product markets and/or supply in
labor markets. Furthermore, such preferences may induce
governments to intervene in the market via regulation or
taxation while shing for votes (as stakeholders are at the same
time voters and thereby determining who stays in
power/government). In sum, social stakeholder preferences
translate into some sort of action or behavior relevant to
corporate prots. Therefore, CSR qualies as part of a prot-
maximizing strategy. CSR induced by demand side pressures or
as a hedge against the risk of future regulation has been termed
strategic CSR by Baron (2001), while McWilliams and Siegel (2001)
refer to the same underlying prot orientation of CSR as a theory
of the rm perspective.

If shareholders have preferences allowing them to derive

intrinsic utility equivalent to extrinsic, monetary utility, any
resulting social or environmental corporate performance will
constitute a nonstrategic form of CSR that is equally consistent
with Friedmans (1970) view of the rm. Here, the objective of the
rm reects the preferences of its owner(s) and therefore might
involve a reduc-tion of prots or even net losses without
breaking the rule of shareholder value maximization. So
Friedmans concept of CSR being equal to prot maximization
has been conrmed and enriched by taking account of a new set
of stakeholder and shareholder preferences. The result is a
bipolar conception of CSR being either strategic or not for prot
with varying implications for the nancial performance of a rm.
Figure 77.1 summarizes the four basic combinations of
stakeholder and shareholder preferences and their implications
for CSR. If shareholders are purely prot oriented, the rm
should act strategically, maximize prots, and engage in CSR
eorts only if stakeholders demand it. On the other hand, if
shareholders care about corporate environmental and social
conduct, CSR will always act as a corporate channel of
contributing to public goods independent of stakeholder
preferences. In this case, prot maximization is not the target,
and nonstrategic rms may forego prots or incur losses to be
borne by shareholders. The size of these losses depends,
however, on stakeholders willingness to pay for and general
attitude toward CSR.

At this point, a general discussion of the crucial role of individual

preferences in the economic analysis of CSR is in order.

It was again Friedman (1970) who explicitly pointed out that to

understand any form of social responsibility, it is essential to
notice that society is a collection of individuals and of the various
groups they voluntarily form (i.e., incentives, preferences, and
motivations of individual share- and stakeholders determine
organizational behavior). Stiglitz (1993, 2002) talks about new
concepts to be taken into account when modeling individual
behavior. Becker (1993) proposes an Economic Way of Looking
at Behavior, stressing the importance of a richer class of
attitudes, preferences, and calculations for individual choice
theory. What Friedman, Stiglitz, and Becker have in mind is a new
class of psychological and sociological ideas that recently entered
microeconomic theory in general and the individual agents utility
function in particular. Standard motivational assumptions have
been expanded, and a literature on intrinsic (nonpecuniary)
aspects of motivation has emerged. As the behavioral economics
literature is rather extensive, only a few selected contributions
that are believed to improve the understanding of CSR will be
reviewed.

Figure 77.1 Typology of CSR SOURCE: Kitzmueller (2008).

Three general determinants of individual utility can be

distinguished. Contributions by Benabou and Tirole (2003, 2006)
as well as Besley and Ghatak (2005) identify (1) extrinsic
(monetary) preferences and (2) intrinsic (non-monetary)
preferences as two main categories driving individual behavior
via utility maximization. The intrinsic part of utility can be further
divided into a (2.1) direct, non-monetary component determined
independently of how others perceive the action or payo and
(2.2) an indirect component determined by others perception of
respective action. (2.2) is frequently referred to as reputation.
Assuming that individuals do derive utility from these three
sources, economic theory can contribute to the analysis of
strategic rm behavior such as CSR.

A rst important insight is that intrinsic motivation can act as a

substitute for extrinsic monetary incentives. Depending on the
degree of substitutability, this aects both pricing through a
potential increase in consumers willingness to pay as well as
incentive design in employment contracting (subject to
asymmetric information). In sum, when pricing products, rms
may be able to exploit intrinsic valuation of certain
characteristics by charging higher prices, while salaries might be
lower than usual if employees compensate this decrease in
earnings by enjoying a social or environmentally friendly
workplace, rm conduct, or reputation in line with their
expectations and personal preferences. Relevant theoretic works
include Benabou and Tirole (2006), who nd that extrinsic
incentives can crowd out prosocial behavior via a feedback loop
to reputational signaling concerns (2.2 above). This concern
reects the possibility that increased monetary incentives might
negatively aect the agents utility as observers are tempted to
conclude greediness rather than social responsibility when
observing prosocial actions. Here the signal extraction problem
arises because agents are heterogeneous in their valuation of
social good and reputation, and this information is strictly
private. Such considerations could inuence not only employees,
consumers, and private donors but also social entrepreneurs.
Social entrepreneurs are individuals ready to give up prots or
incur losses by setting up and running a CSR rm. (The opposite
would be the private entrepreneur, who creates a rm if and only
if its market value exceeds the capital required to create it.) CSR
here expands the social individuals opportunity set to do
good by the option to create a CSR rm. Summing up, agents
are motivated by a mixture of extrinsic and intrinsic factors, and
therefore potential nonintended eects due to crowding
between extrinsic and intrinsic motivators should be taken into
account when designing optimal incentives (salaries, bonus
payments, taxes, etc.).

So stakeholders demand CSR in line with their intrinsic

motivation, and the key question that follows, this time with
respect to alternative private ways of doing social good, asks why
this corporate channel of fullling ones need to do public good is
used at all if there are alternatives such as direct social
contribution (e.g., charitable donations or voluntary community
work). From a welfare perspective, there should be some
comparative advantage of CSR, something that makes it more
ecient than other options. In an important paper, Andreoni
(1989) compares dierent ways to contribute to social good and
asks whether they constitute perfect or rather imperfect
substitutes. Although the initial version compares public and
private provision of public goods, the same analysis can be
extended to compare various ways of private provision such as
corporate and individual social responsibility. The answer then is
straightforward. If warm glow eects (Andreoni, 1990) of
individual (direct) altruistic giving exist, then investment into a
CSR rm, government provision of public goods, and direct
donations will be imperfect substitutes in utility and therefore
imperfectly crowd out each other. In other words, a socially
responsible consumer might not derive the same utility from
buying an ethical product and from donating (the same amount
of) money to charitable organizations directly. However, this
analysis is unable to explain in more detail why individuals
allocate a share of their endowment to do social good to CSR. A
reasonable conjecture might be that people must or want to
consume certain private goods but derive intrinsic disutility (e.g.,
bad conscience) from being connected to any socially
stigmatized, unethical behavior or direct negative externality
related to their purchase, seller, and/or use of the good or
service. Furthermore, one should notice that social or
environmental goods do not always directly or physically aect
consumers but rather are feeding through to individual utility
indirectly via intrinsic, reputational concerns (e.g., Nikes
connection to child labor in Asian sweatshops). However, these
conjectures have yet to be suciently tested empirically.

A nal economic puzzle worth thinking about is the one of

causality between preferences and CSRthat is, opposite to the
above assumed causality from preferences to rm behavior, CSR
often has been connected with advertisement or public relations
of rms, thereby suggesting that CSR eventually could determine
or change preferences and ultimately individual behavior over
time. While the management literature has approached these
issues via the concept of corporate social marketing (Kotler &
Lee, 2004), economists have been more cautious when it comes
to endogenous preferences. As far as preference formation is
concerned, Becker (1993) concluded that attitudes and values of
adults are inuenced by their childhood experiences. Bowles
(1998) builds the bridge from Beckers family environment to
markets and other economic institutions inuencing the
evolution of values, preferences, and motivations. Simon (1991)
was among the rst to argue that agency problems may be best
overcome by attempting to change and ideally align preferences
of workers and principals. The following real-world example shall
illustrate the key issue here. Empirical evidence from the 1991
General Social Survey (outlined in Akerlof & Kranton, 2005, p. 22)
suggests that workers strongly identify with their organization
(i.e., employers preferences). In theory, this nding can be a
result of matching (selection), reducing cognitive dissonance
(psychology), or induced convergence of preferences
(endogenous preferences). Given these alternatives, CSR could
be either interpreted as a signal leading to matching of rms and
individuals with similar preferences or alternatively used to align
agents preferences over time. While the latter suggestion lacks
theoretic or empirical treatment, the former potential matching
role of CSR has been analyzed and will be outlined below.

It can be seen that a lot of open questions need to be answered

when it comes to the mechanics of intrinsic motivation and social
preferences within the human mind. Hence, further discussion of
CSR focuses on strategic interaction between rms and
stakeholders and treats the existence of intrinsic preferences as
exogenously given.

Six Strategies Behind Strategic CSR

Six relevant economic frameworks within which strategic CSR can
arise are discussed and linked to empirical evidence at hand: (1)
labor markets, (2) product markets, (3) nancial markets, (4)
private activism, (5) public policy, and (6) isomorphism.

Labor Economics of CSR

CSR may alter classical labor market outcomes. Bowles, Gintis,
and Osborne (2001) address the role of preferences in an
employer-employee (principal-agent) relationship. The main idea
is that employees might have general preferences such as sense
of personal ecacy that are able to compensate for monetary
incentives and therefore allow the employer to induce eort at
lower monetary cost. Besley and Ghatak (2005) establish a
theoretic framework to analyze the interaction of monetary and
nonmonetary incentives in labor contracts within the nonprot
sector. They refer to not-for-prot organizations as being mission
oriented and conjecture that such organizations (e.g., hospitals
or universities) frequently are staed by intrinsically motivated
agents (think of a doctor or professor who has a nonpecuniary
interest in the hospitals or universitys success, i.e., saving lives
or educating students). The main conclusion from their moral
hazard model with heterogeneous principals and agents is that
pecuniary, extrinsic incentives such as bonus payments and the
agents intrinsic motivation can act as substitutes. In other words,
a match between a mission-oriented principal and an intrinsically
motivated agent reduces agency costs and shirking (i.e., putting
lower eort when the principal cannot observe the work eort
given by the agent but only the outcome of the work) and allows
for lower incentive payment. As today many rms adopt
missions (such as CSR activities) in their quest to maximize
prots, this analysis may directly carry over to the private sector.

As opposed to Friedmans (1970) concern that CSR is a general

form of moral hazard (here moral hazard refers to managers or
employees not acting in the best interest of shareholders or rm
owners), Brekke and Nyborg (2004), based on Brekke, Kverndokk,
and Nyborg (2003), show that CSR can actually reduce moral
hazard in the labor market context. More precisely, CSR can
serve as a screening device for rms that want to attract morally
motivated agents. This view on CSR as a device to attract workers
willing to act in the best interest of the principal is again based
on the same substitutability of motivation due to CSR and related
rm characteristics valued by the employees and high-powered
incentives such as bonus payments.

Another labor market context that involves CSR and corporate

governance is explored by Cespa and Cestone (2007). They
conjecture that inecient managers can and will use CSR (i.e.,
the execution of stakeholder protection and relations) as an
eective entrenchment strategy to protect their jobs. CEOs and
managers engage in CSR behavior in face of a takeover or
replacement threat in order to then use such personal ties with
stakeholders to bolster their positions within the rm (in other
words, such managers establish themselves as key nodes linking
the rm with strategic stakeholders, thereby gaining value
independent of their true managerial capacity and performance).
This discussion of the eect of corporate governance institutions
on rm value leads to the conclusion that institutionalized
stakeholder relations (as opposed to managers discretion) close
this insurance channel for inecient managers and increase
managerial turnover and rm value. This nding clearly provides
a rationale for the existence of special institutions such as ethical
indices or social auditors and increased interaction between
social activists and institutional shareholders in general. A similar
approach to CSR is taken by Baron (2008), who links managerial
incentives and ability with the existence of socially responsible
consumers. He concludes that, given that consumers value CSR,
when times are good, a positive correlation emerges between
CSR and nancial performance via the fact that high-ability
managers tend to contribute more to CSR than low-ability ones,
and the level of both, CSR and prots, is increasing in managers
ability. In bad times, however, shareholders are not supporting
social expenditure (for prots) anymore, high-ability managers
become less likely to spend money on CSR as compared to low-
ability ones, and the correlation between CSR and prots
becomes negative. Barons work gives a rst idea of the
importance of consumer preferences in the determination of
CSR eorts, which will be the subject of the following subsection.

CSR and Product Markets (Socially

Responsible Consumption)
With regard to whether consumers really care about CSR, there is
substantial empirical evidence supporting this assumption.
Consumer surveys such as the Millennium Poll on Corporate
Social Responsibility (Environics International Ltd., 1999) or MORI
(http://www.ipsos-mori.com/ about/index.shtml) reveal that
consumers assessment of rms and products as well as their
nal consumption decisions and willingness to pay depend on
rms CSR records. In this respect, Trudel and Cotte (2009) nd
the equivalent to loss aversion in consumers willingness to pay
for ethical products. According to their ndings, consumers are
willing to pay a premium for ethical products and buy unethical
goods at a comparatively steeper discount. So there exists a
channel from preferences and demand to CSR and/ or vice versa.

Consumer preferences may translate into demand for CSR and

alter the competitive environment of rms as CSR can either act
as product dierentiation or even trigger competition with
respect to the level of CSR itself. Bagnoli and Watts (2003)
analyze competitive product markets with homogeneous, socially
responsible consumers and nd that CSR emerges as a by-
product and at levels that vary inversely with the degree of
competitiveness in the private goods market (competitiveness is
reected through both number of rms and rm entry). Bertrand
(price) as opposed to Cournot (quantity) competition forces rms
to reduce markups and hence limits their ability to use prots to
increase CSR. This leads to reduced competitiveness in terms of
product dierentiation via CSR and hence to reduced overall CSR
activity. In sum, there exists a trade-o between ecient
provision of the private good and public good (i.e., Bertrand
competition entails lower prices and lower levels of CSR than
Cournot competition).

A more general framework is provided by Besley and Ghatak

(2007), who nd that Bertrand (price) competition in markets
with heterogeneous demand for CSR leads to zero protsthat
is, prices equal marginal costs and second best (suboptimal)
levels of public good provision equivalent to results obtained in
models of private provision (e.g., Bergstrom et al., 1986). Their
analysis further allows validation of a whole array of standard
results from the screening and public goods literature, among
which, (a) the maximum sustainable level of CSR (under
imperfect monitoring by consumers) is achieved when the rms
incentive compatibility constraint bindsthat is, at such a public
good level the prots from doing CSR and charging a price
premium are equivalent to prots from not producing the public
good and still charging a price premium (cheating), given any
probability (between 0 and 1) of being caught cheating and
severely punished. (b) An exogenous increase of public good
supply (e.g., by a government through regulation or direct
production) perfectly crowds out competitive provision of CSR. (c)
In the absence of government failure, governments are able to
implement the rst best Lindahl-Samuelson level of public good
(i.e., the Pareto optimal amount, which is clearly above the levels
markets can provide via CSR).

(d) However, when governments fail (e.g., due to corruption,

capture, relative production ineciencies, or distributional bias),
CSR might generate a Pareto improvement vis--vis no
production or government production of public good, while CSR
and provision by nonprots (e.g., NGOs) are identical unless one
or the other has a technological (cost) advantage in producing
the public good.

(e) Finally, a small uniform regulation in the form of a minimum

standard (on public good levels) would leave the level of CSR
unchanged and redistribute contributions from social to neutral
consumers, while large regulatory intervention can raise supply
of the public good to or above its rst best level given that
neutral consumers are willing to pay higher (than marginal cost)
prices for the private good. These results highly depend on
respective consumer preferences and their related willingness to
pay for the private and public good (CSR) characteristics of the
consumption good.

Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) model CSR as rm self-

regulation (i.e., voluntary overcompliance with environmental
regulation) and assume that although consumers all value
environmental quality, they vary in their willingness to pay a
price premium for CSR, which is positively dependent on their
income levels. Firms dierentiate by catering to dierent sets of
consumers; here choice of green technology acts as product
positioning similar to the choice of product quality, and CSR is
positively correlated with the income levels of either all
consumer segments or the lowest income segment. If a
minimum standard is imposed into a duopoly, it will actually bind
on the less green rm while the other rm will overmeet the
standard. CSR subsidies can have the same eect as standards,
while ad valorem taxes (i.e., taxes on prots) always reduce
output and CSR eorts by all rms.

An example of empirical work in this subeld is provided by

Siegel and Vitaliano (2007), who test and conrm the hypothesis
that rms selling experience or credence goodsthat is, the
goods quality can only be observed after consumption (by
experience, e.g., a movie) or is never fully revealed (credence,
e.g., medical treatment or education)are more likely to be
socially responsible than rms selling search goods (i.e., goods
where characteristics such as quality are easily veried ex ante).
This lends support to the conjecture that consumers consider
CSR as a signal about attributes and general quality when
product characteristics are dicult to observe. From the rm
perspective, CSR then can be used to dierentiate a product,
advertise it, and build brand loyalty. The advertising dimension
of CSR is especially strong when social eorts are unrelated to
business conduct. In Navarro (1988), corporate donations to
charity are identied as advertisement, and CSR is meant to
transmit a positive signal about rm quality/type. However,
according to BeckerOlsen and Hill (2005), this signal might not
necessarily be positive, as consumers are able to identify low-t
CSR as advertisement and tend to negatively perceive such CSR
eorts as greediness of rms rather than genuine interest in
social or environmental concerns.
CSR and Financial Markets (Socially
Responsible Investment)
Investors also care about CSR, and rms competing for equity
investment in stock markets will have to take that into account.
Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2005) put forward strong evidence
of the increasing importance of CSR in nancial markets. A new
form of investment, so-called socially responsible investment
(SRI), has come into being. SRI is dened by the Social Investment
Forum (SIF, 2009) as an investment process that considers the
social and environmental consequences of investments, both
positive and negative, within the context of rigorous nancial
analysis. Social investors today include both private and
institutional ones. More precisely, the U.S. Social Investment
Forum (gures are taken from SIF, 2006) reports 10.8% of total
investment under professional management in 2007 to be
socially responsible (i.e., using one or more of the three core
socially responsible investing strategies: screening, shareholder
advocacy, and community investing). In Europe, the European
Sustainable and Responsible Investment Forum (EuroSIF)
identies 336 billion euros in assets to be SRI. The trend points
upward in most nancial markets (e.g., in the United States,
where SRI assets grew 4% faster than total assets and more than
258% in absolute terms between 1995 and 2005).

Recalling the typology of CSR (Figure 77.1), we know that

investors either have or do not have social preferences. Neutral
investors just have their monetary return on investment in mind
and hence just care about rm prots. It follows that such
investors will use SRI as an investment strategy only if SRI
actually translates into higher returns on investment. So, SRI by
neutral investors signals a comparative advantage in corporate
nancial performance (CFP). This conjecture and the related
question of correlation and causality have attracted a lot of
attention in the scarce empirical literature on CSR. A
comprehensive survey is provided by Margolis and Walsh (2003).
Taking into account 127 published empirical studies between
1972 and 2002, they nd that a majority of these studies exhibit
a statistically signicant and positive correlation between CSR
and CFP in both directions (i.e., causality is running from CFP to
CSR and vice versa). However, there exist sampling problems,
concerns about the validity of CSR and CFP measures and
instruments, omitted variable bias, and the ultimate (and still
unanswered) question of causality between CSR and CFP. A rst
attempt to address inconsistency and misspecication is the
work by McWilliams and Siegel (2000), who regress rm nancial
performance on CSR and control for R&D investment. It follows
that the upwards bias of the nancial impact of CSR disappears
and a neutral correlation emerges. In sum, further studies will
have to clarify whether neutral investors should put their money
into SRI and the underlying CSR eort qualies as strategic.

Alternatively, SRI can be a way for social investors to enforce

their preferences through a demand channel similar to the one
consumers use. The group of social investors, however, can
again be heterogeneous in the sense that there might be those
for whom corporate giving is a close substitute for personal
giving and those for whom it is a poor substitute (Baron, 2005).
Small and Zivin (2005) enrich this setup by deriving a Modigliani-
Miller theory of CSR, where the fraction of investors that prefers
corporate philanthropy over private charitable giving drives CSR
by rms attempting to maximize their valuation. A share
constitutes a charity investment bundle matching social and
monetary preferences of investors with those of the rms
management. The main conclusion is that if all investors consider
CSR and private charity as perfect substitutes, share prices and
the aggregate level of philanthropy are unaected by CSR. If they
are imperfect substitutes and a suciently large fraction of
investors prefers CSR over private charity (e.g., to avoid
corporate taxation), a strictly positive level of CSR maximizes
share prices and hence the value of a corporation.

CSR and Private Politics (Social Activism)

The existence and impact of social or environmental activists is
intimately related with information asymmetries between
companies and the outside world. The rationale of social activism
is that the threat of negative publicity (revelation of negative
information) due to actions by an unsatised activist motivates
CSR. As soon as the activist is credible and has the ability to
damage a rms reputation or cause substantial costs to the rm,
the existence of such an activist is sucient to integrate CSR as
part of corporate strategy. The logic is comparable to the one of
hedging against future risk in nancial markets, but here the
rm insures itself against a potential campaign by an activist.
Baron (2001) explicitly adds this threat by an activist, who is
empowered with considerable support by the public, to the set
of motivations for strategic CSR. CSR is referred to as corporate
redistribution to social causes motivated by (1) prot
maximization, (2) altruism, or (3) threats by an activist. However,
it can be argued that the existence of activism qualies CSR as an
integral part of prot maximization (i.e., motivation 3 fuses into
1).

The main insights from the analysis of CSR and social activism
can be summarized as follows: First, CSR and private politics
entail a direct cost eect depending on the competitive
environment (i.e., the degree of competition is positively
correlated with the power of an activist boycott and strengthens
the ex ante bargaining position of the activist). On the other
hand, CSR can have a strategic eect that alters the competitive
position of a rm. What is meant here is that CSR can act as
product dierentiation (lower competition), take the wind out of
the sails of any potential activist, and reduce the likelihood of
being targeted in the future. This result roots in the assumption
that the activist also acts strategically and chooses projects that
promise to be successful (i.e., weaker rms are easier targets).
Finally, the existence of spillover eects from one rm to other
rms or even the whole industry can act as an amplier to
activist power, on one hand, and motivation for concerted
nonmarket action by rms in the same industry, on the other
(e.g., voluntary industry standards).

Baron (2009) assumes that citizens prefer not-for-prot (morally

motivated) over strategic CSR. If signaling is possible, morally
motivated rms achieve a reputational advantage, and social
pressure will be directed toward strategic rms. If citizens are not
distinguishing, morally motivated rms are more likely targeted
as they are softer targets in the sense that an activist is more
likely to reach a favorable (i.e., successful from activist
objectives point of view) bargain with such a rm. However, the
distinction between strategic and not-for-prot CSR can be
extremely dicult, subtle, and based on perception rather than
facts. Recent work by marketing scholars lends support to this
proposition. Becker-Olsen and Hill (2005) nd that consumers
form their beliefs about CSR based on perceived t and timing of
related eorts (i.e., a high t between CSR and the rms
business area as well as proactive rather than reactive social
initiatives tend to align consumers beliefs, attitudes, and
intentions with those of the strategic rm). Finally, if activists
dier in ability, Baron shows that high-quality activists attract
greater contributions and then are more likely to identify and
target strategic rms, while the opposite holds for low-quality
activists.

CSR and Public Politics (Regulation)

CSR is dened as corporate social or environmental eort
beyond legal requirements. Then how can public politics and
laws actually stimulate CSR? This time, it is the threat of future
laws and regulations and the adjustment costs and competitive
disadvantage they could entail that act as an incentive to hedge
against such an event and build a strategic buer zone via CSR.
Again, by doing CSR, rms not only are safe in the event of
regulation but also might discourage government intervention.
This last point has been addressed under the label of crowding
out. The analysis here focuses on whether market provision of
public goods and public provision are substitutes or
complements and how they might interact (Bergstrom et al.,
1986). From a policy perspective, it seems to be important not
only to understand interaction between public provision and CSR
but also to consider CSR itself as a potential target for novel
policies aiming to stimulate corporate provision of public goods.

Calveras et al. (2007) study the interplay between activism,

regulation, and CSR and nd that private (activism) and public
(regulatory) politics are imperfect substitutes. It is emphasized
that when society free rides on a small group of activist
consumers, loose formal regulation (voted for by the majority of
nonactivists) might lead to an ineciently high externality level,
where activist consumers bear the related cost via high prices for
socially responsible goods. This conclusion draws attention to
another relevant correlationnamely, between regulation and
political orientation. Consumers are also voters, and not only
rms but also governments want to signal their type (i.e.,
whether they value environmental or social public goods). As
governments signal their future intentions and policy stances
through legislation or regulation and rms through CSR, the
potential competition and related interaction between regulation
and CSR constitute an important subject of further investigation.

Empirically, Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton (2003) address

the eect of regulation on corporate environmental behavior.
They nd that regulation cannot fully explain dierences in
environmental performance across rms. However, social
license pressures (induced by local communities and activists) as
well as dierent corporate environmental management styles
signicantly add explanatory power. In sum, regulation matters,
but variation in CSR is also subject to the antagonism between
social pressure and economic feasibility.

Isomorphism
Here, the incentive to do CSR roots in isomorphic pressures
within geographic communities or functional entities such as
industries. Community isomorphism refers to the degree of
conformity of corporate social performance in focus, form, and
level within a community. It is the institutional environment and
commonly (locally) accepted norms, views, and values that might
discipline rms into certain social behavior. Institutional factors
that are potentially shaping the nature and level of CSR in a
community include cultural-cognitive forces, social-normative
factors, and regulative factors. Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007)
use an institutional theoretic setting and identify community
isomorphism as a potential explanatory variable for empirical
observations concerning CSR. Isomorphic pressures may also
arise within industries and may lead to industry-wide self-
regulatory activities.

Conclusion
From an economic point of view, a fundamental understanding
of CSR is emerging. Based on a new set of social or
environmental stakeholder preferences, CSR can be fully
consistent with a prot- and/or shareholder value-maximizing
corporate strategy. It qualies as strategic behavior if consumers,
investors, or employees have relevant social or environmental
preferences and if these preferences translate into action with
direct or indirect monetary eects for the rm. Direct
consequences include the rms ability to charge price premia on
CSR comparable to premia on product quality, as well as the
potential lowering of wages for motivated employees, who
substitute the utility they gain from working for and within a
responsible rm/environment for monetary losses due to lower
salaries. Firms prots may be indirectly aected by CSR in the
sense that CSR can help avoid competitive disadvantages or
reputation loss arising in situations where stakeholder action
(consumption or activism) depends on social or environmental
corporate conduct. Empirical evidence lends support to most of
these incentives for strategic CSR; however, rigorous statistical
analysis is still in an infant state and subject to various problems,
including measurement error, endogeneity, and misspecication.

References:

1. Akerlof, G. E., & Kranton R. E. (2005). Identity and the

economics of organization. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
19, 9-32.
2. Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with impure altruism: Applications
to charity and Ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political
Economy, 97, 1447-1458.
3. Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public
goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. The Economic Journal,
100, 464-477.
4. Arora, S., & Gangopadhyay, S. (1995). Toward a theoretical
model of voluntary overcompliance. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 28, 289-309.
5. Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G. (2003). Selling to socially
responsible consumers: Competition and the private provision
of public goods. Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 12, 419-445.
6. Baron, D. P. (2001). Private politics, corporate social
responsibility, and integrated strategy. Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, 10, 7-45.
7. Baron, D. P. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and social
entrepreneurship (Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1916).
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
8. Baron, D. P. (2008). Managerial contracting and CSR. Journal
of Public Economics, 92(1-2), 268-288.
9. Baron, D. P. (2009). A positive theory of moral management,
social pressure and corporate social performance. Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 18, 7-43.
10. Becker, G. S. (1993). Nobel lecture: The economic way of
looking at behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 101, 385-409.
11. Becker-Olsen, K. L., & Hill, R. P. (2005). The impact of
perceived corporate social responsibility on consumer
behavior. Journal of Business Research, 59, 46-53.
12. Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 489-520.
13. Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and pro-social
behavior. American Economic Review, 96, 1652-1678.
14. Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., & Varian, H. R. (1986). On the
private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics,
29, 25-49.
15. Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2001). Government versus private
ownership of public goods. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
116, 1343-1372.
16. Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2005). Competition and incentives
with motivated agents. American Economic Review, 95, 616-
636.

17. Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2007). Retailing public goods: The
economics of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Public
Economics, 91, 1645-1663.
18. Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous pReferences: The cultural
consequences of markets and other economic institutions.
Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 75-111.
19. Bowles, S., Gintis, H., & Osborne, M. (2001). Incentive-
enhancing pReferences: Personality, behavior and earnings.
American Economic Review, 91(2), 155-158.
20. Brekke, K. A., Kverndokk, S., & Nyborg, K. (2003). An
economic model of moral motivation. Journal of Public
Economics, 87, 1967-1983.
21. Brekke, K. A., & Nyborg, K. (2004). Moral hazard and moral
motivation: Corporate social responsibility as labor market
screening (Memorandum N025). Oslo, Norway: Department of
Economics, University of Oslo.
22. Buchanan J. M. (1999). The demand and supply of public
goods. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Retrieved from
http://www .econlib.org/Library/Buchanan/buchCv5c1.html
23. Calveras, A., Ganuza, J. J., & Llobet, G. (2007). Regulation,
corporate social responsibility, and activism. Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 16, 719-740.
24. Cespa, G., & Cestone, G. (2007). Corporate social
responsibility and managerial entrenchment. Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 16, 741-771.
25. Economist Intelligence Unit. (2005, January). The
importance of corporate responsibility (White paper).
Retrieved from
http://graphics.eiu.com/les/ad_pdfs/eiuOracle_Corporate
Responsibility_WP.pdf
26. Environics International Ltd. (1999, September). Millennium
poll on corporate responsibility, in cooperation with The Prince
of Wales Trust.
27. European Commission. (2009). Corporate social
responsibility (CSR). Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/ sustainable-business
28. Fleishman-Hillard & the National Consumers League.
(2005). Rethinking corporate social responsibility. Retrieved
from http://www.csrresults.com/FINAL_Full_Report.pdf
29. Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The social
responsibility of business is to increase its prots. The New
York Times, pp. 32-33, 122, 126.
30. Geczy, C., Stambaugh, R., & Levin, D. (2005). Investing in
socially responsible mutual funds (Working paper).
Philadelphia: Wharton School of Finance.
31. Kagan, R. A., Gunningham, N., & Thornton, D. (2003).
Explaining corporate environmental performance: How does
regulation matter? Law and Society Review, 37, 51-90.
32. Kitzmueller, M. (2008). Economics and corporate social
responsibility (EUI ECO Working Paper 2008-37). Available at
http://cadmus.eui.eu
33. Kotchen, M. J. (2006). Green markets and private provision
of public goods. Journal of Political Economy, 114, 816-845.
34. Kotler, P., & Lee, N. (2004, Spring). Best of breed. Stanford
Social Innovation Review, pp. 14-23.
35. Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. (2003). Misery loves companies:
Rethinking social initiatives by business. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 48, 268-305.
36. Marquis, C., Glynn, M. A., & Davis, G. F. (2007). Community
isomorphism and corporate social action. Academy of
Management Review, 32, 925-945.
37. McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. S. (2000). Corporate social
responsibility and nancial performance: Correlation or
misspecication? Strategic Management Journal, 21, 603-609.
38. McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. S. (2001). Corporate social
responsibility: A theory of the rm perspective. Academy of
Management Review, 26, 117-127.
39. Navarro, P. (1988). Why do corporations give to charity?
Journal of Business, 61, 65-93.
40. Reinhardt, F. L., Stavins, R. N., & Vietor, R. H. K. (2008).
Corporate social responsibility through an economic lens
(NBER Working Paper 13989). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau
of Economic Research.
41. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996). Altruism, nonprots and
economic theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 701-728.
42. Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2008). Globalization and
corporate social responsibility. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D.
Matten, J. Moon, & D. Siegel (Eds.), Oxford handbook of
corporate social responsibility (pp. 413-431). Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
43. Siegel, D. S., & Vitaliano, D. F. (2007). An empirical analysis
of the strategic use of corporate social responsibility. Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 16, 773-792.
44. Simon, H. A. (1991). Organizations and markets. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 25-44.
45. Small, A., & Zivin, J. (2005). A Modigliani-Miller theory of
altruistic corporate social responsibility. Topics in Economic
Analysis and Policy, 5(1), Article 10.
46. Social Investment Forum. (2006). 2005 report on socially
responsible investing trends in the United States. Retrieved
from
http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/research/Trends/2005%20
Trends%20Report.pdf
47. Social Investment Forum. (2009). The mission in the
marketplace: How responsible investing can strengthen the
duciary oversight of foundation endowments and enhance
philanthropic missions. Available at
http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/pubs
48. Stiglitz, J. E. (1993). Post Walrasian and post Marxian
economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, 109-114.
49. Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the change in the
paradigm in economics. American Economic Review, 92, 460-
501.
50. Trudel, R., & Cotte, J. (2009). Is it really worth it? Consumer
response to ethical and unethical practices. MIT/Sloan
Management Review, 50(2), 61-68.
51. Vogel, D. (2005). The market for virtue: The potential and
limits of corporate social responsibility. Washington, DC:
 Brookings Institution Press.
52. World Bank. (n.d.). Financial and private sector
development. Retrieved from
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/content/ csr-intropage

See also:

Economics Research Paper Topics

Economics Research Paper Examples

Free research papers are not written to satisfy your specic

instructions. You can use our professional writing services to
order a custom research paper on any topic and get your high
quality paper at aordable price.

Need a Custom Research Paper?

ORDER NOW

Share 1 Like 1 Tweet 1

StumbleUpon

Related Posts
Economics of Forensic
Crime Research Economics
Paper Research Paper
0 0

0Role Of Labor Unions in Neuroeconomics

Labor Markets Research Paper Research Paper

How it Works Why Trust Us

Terms of Use Our Extras

 Privacy Policy Money Back Guarantee

Revision Policy Quality Evaluation Policy

Cookie Policy Authorization

$
Research Paper Copyright 2017.