You are on page 1of 20

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40527 June 30, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
HERMOGENES MARIANO and HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, respondents.

MUOZ PALMA, J:

This petition for certiorari postulates a ruling on the question of whether or not civil courts and military
commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods valued at not more than six
thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a civilian. 1

On December 18, 1974, the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information (Criminal Case No.
SM-649) accusing private respondent herein Hermogenes Mariano of estafa alleged to have been committed
as follows:

That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8, 1971, in the municipality of
San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Hermogenes Mariano, being then appointed as Liaison
Officer by the then incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf
of the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and authorized to receive and be
receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said municipality,
received from the said USAID/NEC the following items, to wit:

150 ft. electric cable valued

at $15 or P100.50

525 ft. cable power valued at

$577-50 or P3,859.35

250 ft. electric cable at

$125.00 or P837.50

with a total value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of making delivery of said items
to the said Municipal Mayor, but the said accused Hermogenes Mariano once in possession
of the said items and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation and in spite of repeated
demands, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of
confidence and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use
and benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to the said
USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said sum of $717,50 or
P4,797.35. (pp. rollo).

CRIMPRO No. 1 1
On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his counsel Filed a motion to quash the Information on the
following grounds:

1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense charged or of the person
of the defendant;

2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

3. That it contains averments which , if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification.
(p. 19, rollo)

In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information
against him were the same items for which Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco of San Jose del Monte, province
of Bulacan, was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of malversation of public property, and
for which Mayor Nolasco had been found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for ten (10)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months with perpetual disqualification plus a fine
of P19,646.15 (see pp. 23-24, rollo), and that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already
been decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the
case against him. (pp. 19-20, Ibid)

On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction reasoning as follows:

Considering that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation
case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction
with this Court, the case involving the subject properties had already been heard and
decided by a competent tribunal, the Military Commission, and as such this Court is without
jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis supplied)

Respondent Judge did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the motion to quash.

The people now seeks a review of the aforesaid Order and presents the sole issue of jurisdiction of
respondent Court over the estafa case filed against respondent Mariano.

"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. 2 The word "jurisdiction" is derived from two
Latin words "juris" and "dico" "I speak by the law" which means fundamentally the power or capacity
given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. 3 Bouvier's own
definition of the term "jurisdiction" has found judicial acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to
pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before him, acquired through due process of law;" it is
"the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases." 4

In Herrera vs. Barretto, September 10, 1913, 25 Phil. 245, 251, this Court, in the words of Justice Moreland,
invoking American jurisprudence, defined "jurisdiction" simply as the authority to hear and determine a cause
the right to act in a case. "Jurisdiction" has also been aptly described as the right to put the wheels of justice
in notion and to proceed to the final determination of a cause upon the pleadings and evidence. 5

"Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the
punishment for it. 6

The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the constitution and
statutes of the forum. Thus, the question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance over the case
filed before it is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. That,
We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided:

CRIMPRO No. 1 2
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months,or a fine of more than two hundred pesos, (emphasis supplied)

The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. 7 By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls
under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he claims in his Order is that his court
exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the military commission and because the latter tribunal was the first to
take cognizance of the subject matter, respondent court lost jurisdiction over it .That statement of respondent
court is incorrect.

In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
categorically reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. 8 In the case at bar, it is rightly contended by the Solicitor
General that at the time Criminal Case No. SM-649 was filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that
was December 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of 1948,
the particular provision of which was not affected one way or the other by any Presidential issuances under
Martial Law. General Order No. 49 dated October 4, 1974, which repeals General Order No. 12 and the
latter's amendments and related General Orders inconsistent with the former, redefines the jurisdiction of
military tribunals over certain offense, and estafa and malversation are not among those enumerated
therein. 9 In other words the Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. 9*

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against
respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military
Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us
the accused in one is different from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that We do not
have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as
to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction
thereof exclusive of the other. 10 The Military Commission as stated earlier is without power or authority to
hear and determine the particular offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no
concurrent jurisdiction between it and respondent court to speak of. Estafa as described in the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. SM-649 falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Order dated March 14, 1975, is set aside and respondent Judge is
directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. SM- 649 without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

CRIMPRO No. 1 3
People vs. Mariano
G.R. No. L-40527, 71 SCRA 600, June 30, 1976

FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan because of
misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and electric cables being the person in
authority to receive the same in behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent Mariano then
moved to quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the items were the same
items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military commission for Malversation of public property to
which mayor Nolasco were found guilty, hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.

RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos Section 44, paragraph E,
Judiciary reorganization act of 1948. The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from
four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed
which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused,
now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against
respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military
Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us
the accused in one is different from the accused in the other.

Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose
the punishment for it.

CRIMPRO No. 1 4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5278 February 17, 1953

SUY SUI, petitioner,


vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PARAS, C.J.:

The petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of Executive Order No.
331 in relation to Republic Act No. 509, in the following information:

That on or about the 17th day of July, 1950, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and offer for sale to the public at 312 Quezon
Boulevard, in the said city, one bag of refined sugar, 10 lbs. at P2, which price is in excess of P0.20
than that authorized by law as the maximum ceiling price of said commodity, to wit P1.80.

After trial the court found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P5,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to be barred from engaging in the wholesale and retail business in
the Philippines for a period of five years, with a recommendation to the President for the immediate
deportation of the petitioner. From this judgment the petitioner appealed, but the same was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The case is now before us on certiorari from the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, the owner of a grocery store located at Quezon Boulevard, Manila, was found by the Court of
Appeals to have sold on July 17, 1950 a 10-pound bag of refined sugar to Faustino Caraan for the price of
P2, allegedly in excess by twenty centavos of the ceiling price fixed in Executive Order No. 331.

In his first assignment of error, the petitioner contends that the classification of refined sugar into two groups
contained in Executive Order No. 331 is ambiguous, as may be seen from the following, an ambiguity
which should be resolved in favor of the petitioner:

Sugar Unit Importer's or Wholesale Retail


producer's price ceiling
price price

Refined, P16.00/100 P17.20/100 P0.40/k


packed in
cellophane

Refined, 5.25/15k 6.00/15k 0.45/k


packed in
cellophane

CRIMPRO No. 1 5
In other words, the petitioner claims that, for the same refined sugar, two ceiling prices for one kilo are fixed,
namely, P0.40 and P0.45, with the result that, if P0.45 is adopted as criterion, 10 pounds of sugar would cost
approximately P2.02, or P0.02 less than the amount for which the petitioner sold the 10 pounds bags of
refined sugar to Faustino Caraan. Petitioner's contention is tenable considering that penal statutes are to be
construed strictly.

It is, however, argued on the part of the respondent that the petitioner failed to raise the point not only in the
Court of First Instance by a motion to quash but also in the Court of Appeals, as consequence of which he
must be deemed to have waived the objection. In the first place, under section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of
Court, failure to move to quash amounts to a waiver of all objections which are grounds for a motion to
squash except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. It is apparent that the point now raised by the petitioner is in effect that the
information does not charge an offense. In the second place, as an appeal in criminal proceedings throws the
whole case open for review, it should have been the duty of the Court of Appeals to correct such errors as
might be found in the appealed judgment, whether they are assigned or not. (People vs. Borbano, 1 43 Off.
Gaz., 478.) On the other hand, in Villareal vs. People,2 (47 Off. Gaz., 191),we held that notwithstanding the
absence of assignments of error, the appellate court will review the record and reverse or modify the
appealed judgment, not only on grounds that the court had no jurisdiction or that the acts proved do not
constitute the offense charged, but also on prejudicial error to the right of accused which are plain,
fundamental, vital, or serious, or on errors which go to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict; although the
rule doing away with formal assignments of errors does not dispense with the necessity of pointing out
technical and non-fundamental errors which do not affect the substantial rights of an accused to a fair trial,
and are not patent.

It becomes unnecessary for us to discuss the petitioner's other assignments of error regarding the alleged
unconstitutionally of section 12 of Republic Act No. 509.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the petitioner is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So
ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TUASON, J., concurring:

I concur and may state as additional ground for reversing and appealed judgment the elementary principle
that no one can be convicted for an act which is not punishable by law, whether a motion to quash has or has
not been filed, or whether the point has or has not been raised on appeal. In fact, even with the defendant's
express consent, he cannot be fined or sent to jail for a supposed criminal offense that does not exist. The
appealed decision was absolutely void and unexecutable.

CRIMPRO No. 1 6
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23654 March 28, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
VICENTE MARQUEZ, defendant-appellee.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal by the People from the order of the Court of First Instance of Albay in its Criminal Case No. 3544,
granting the motion to dismiss filed by the appellee, Vicente Marquez.

On November 12, 1962, a complaint for frustrated homicide was filed with the then Justice of the Peace
Court of Camalig, Albay, against appellee Vicente Marquez. The said complaint was signed by one
Consolacion Musa Solano, mother of the offended party, Wenceslao Solano, who was then confined in the
Albay Provincial Hospital, in consequence of the crime charged. A warrant of arrest was issued, but this was
not carried out because the accused had filed a bail bond in the amount of P12,000.00. When the case was
later called for purposes of conducting the second stage of the preliminary investigation, the accused, thru
counsel, waived his right thereto; accordingly, the record of the case was remanded to the court a quo; and
on July 9, 1963, the Provincial Fiscal of Albay filed the corresponding information with the said court.

Upon being arraigned on August 22, 1964, appellee entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.

On the day of the trial on September 25, 1964, without asking for leave to withdraw his previously-entered
plea, appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Albay based on the complaint signed by Consolacion Musa Solano in behalf of her victim-son or offended
party was null and void and the court had no jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the case.

Resolving the grounds raised in said motion to dismiss as well as those in the oppositions thereto,
separately filed by the private prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Albay, on October 1, 1964, the
court dismissed the case, with costs de oficio, and ordered the cancellation of the bail bond of appellee. The
Assistant Provincial Fiscal concerned has appealed from the dismissal aforesaid directly to this Court.

The People's appeal is premised on the following assignment of errors:

I. The lower court erred in dismissing the case after the appellee had already pleaded to the
information.

II. The lower court erred in holding that it did not acquire jurisdiction to try the case.

On the other hand, as herein earlier intimated, the main point of appellee which was sustained by the trial
court is that the complaint signed by the mother of the offended party which initiated the proceedings in the
justice of the peace court was invalid because under Section 2 of Rule 110, a complaint may be subscribed
and sworn to only by "the offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the government or

CRIMPRO No. 1 7
governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the law violated" and, consequently, the
information based on the said complaint filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Albay, without said fiscal having
conducted another preliminary investigation, did not grant jurisdiction to the court.

The People's appeal should be sustained.

We do not hesitate to agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court's questioned order of dismissal is
erroneous, being based, as it is, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over this case because the initial
complaint filed with the justice of the peace court was not signed by the offended party and was, therefore,
invalid. It may be conceded that, as appellee argues, apart from what is provided in the Rule cited, there are
precedents to the effect that, except as to the government officers authorized by said Rule, the filing of a
complaint is personal to the offended party. 1 This is not, however, the only principle involved under the
complete factual setting of this case. It must be remembered that appellee did not attack the said complaint
while his case was still in the justice of the peace court, where, on the contrary, he waived the preliminary
investigation proper; he allowed the case to be remanded to the court of first instance and folded his arms
when the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information; and, he did not object to his being arraigned,
instead he merely entered a plea of not guilty at said arraignment. In this circumstances, We hold that the
initial complaint has lost his importance and the case can be viewed only in the light of the information
subsequently filed by the provincial fiscal, as suggested by the Solicitor General.

We do not lose sight of the fact that in the truth the fiscal did not conduct any preliminary investigation of his
own and, as a matter of fact, the information filed by him with the court a quo did not carry with it the sworn
certification of the fiscal, required by section 14 of Rule 112, that the appellee was "given a chance to appear
in person or by counsel at said examination and investigation." Neither are We overlooking precedents to the
effect that absence of a preliminary investigation is a grave irregularity which nullifies the proceedings
because it violates the right to due process. 2 We perceive, however, that the situations involved in those
precedents cannot be equated with the circumstances obtaining here, for while there, the objections to the
procedure followed were opportunately raised before here, appellee sought the dismissal of this case long
after he had already entered his plea of not guilty to the information filed by the fiscal.

Therefore, the question to determine in this case is, what was the effect of appellee's failure to object to the
information before or at the time he entered his plea of not guilty. Assuming that said information was
defective because it did not contain the requisite certification regarding the fiscal's having held a preliminary
investigation where the accused was given an opportunity to be present personally or thru counsel, such an
omission is not necessarily fatal. It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as
nothing more than "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and
filed with the court." Thus, it is obvious that such certification is not an essential part of the information itself
and its absence cannot vitiate it as such. True, as already stated, section 14 of Rule 112 enjoin that "no
information ... shall be filed, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary
investigation," but, as can be seen, the injunction refers to the non-holding of the preliminary investigation,
not the absence of the certification. In other words, what is not allowed is, the filing of the information without
a preliminary investigation having been previously conducted, and the injunction that there should be a
certification is only a consequence of the requirement that a preliminary investigation should first be
conducted. Logically, therefore, inasmuch as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that the right to the
preliminary investigation petition itself must be asserted or invoked before the plea, otherwise, it is deemed
waived, 3 it stands to reason, that the absence of the certification in question is also waived by failure to
allege it before the plea. After all, such certification is nothing but evidence of a fact and if the ommision of
the fact itself to be certified is waived, if not properly raised before the accused enters his plea, why should
the omission merely of the certification be given more importance than the absence of the fact itself to be
certified to? Is it to be sustained that if in a given case, there were such a certification although in fact no
preliminary investigation has been held, this Court is going to hold that the requirement of a preliminary
investigation has been complied with? To ask the question is to immediately expose the absurdity of the
affirmative answer to it.

CRIMPRO No. 1 8
To be sure, the situation of appellee may be compared with another case where the fiscal, for one reason or
another, files an information without holding any preliminary investigation and without any such preliminary
investigation having been conducted by the municipal court concerned. After all, under the Rules, a criminal
action may also be initiated by the fiscal filing an information with the proper court. (section 3, Rule 110) On
the other hand, as already stated, this Court hag consistently held that the defense of absence of a
preliminary investigation must be raised before the entry of the plea, otherwise, it is waived. Accordingly,
even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the complainant in the justice of the peace court was void, as
contended by appellee, on the other hand, the filing of the information in question with the court a quo made
the issue of validity of said complaint already academic, considering that the said complaint held already
been superseded by the said information. And since the said information is sufficient in form and substance,
and the absence of a preliminary investigation may only be raised before the accused enters his plea,
otherwise, it is waived, it follows that appellee forfeited his right to question both the complaint and the
information under discussion by entering his plea of not guilty and otherwise submitting to the jurisdiction of
the court for trial.lwphi1.et

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and this case is hereby remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings, with costs against appellee.

CRIMPRO No. 1 9
137 Phil. 219
BARREDO, J.:

Appeal by the People from the order of the Court of First Instance of Albay in its Criminal Case No. 3544,
granting the motion to dismiss filed by the appellee, Vicente Marquez.
On November 12, 1962, a complaint for frustrated homicide was filed with the then Justice of the Peace
Court of Camalig, Albay, against appellee Vicente Marquez. The said complaint was signed by
one Consolacion Musa Solano, mother of the offended party, WenceslaoSolano, who was then confined in
the Albay Provincial Hospital, in consequence of the crime charged. A warrant of arrest was issued, but this
was not carried out because the accused had filed a bail bond in the amount of P12,000.00. When the case
was later called for purposes of conducting the second stage of the preliminary investigation, the accused,
thru counsel, waived his right thereto; accordingly, the record of the case was remanded to the court a quo;
and on July 9, 1963, the Provincial Fiscal of Albay filed the corresponding information with the said court.
Upon being arraigned on August 22, 1964, appellee entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.
On the day of the trial on September 25, 1964, without asking for leave to withdraw his previously-entered
plea, appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Albay - based on the complaint signed by Consolacion MusaSolano in behalf of her victim-son or offended
party - was null and void and the court had no jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the case.
Resolving the grounds raised in said motion to dismiss as well as those in the oppositions thereto, separately
filed by the private prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Albay, on October 1, 1964, the court
dismissed the case, with costs de oficio, and ordered the cancellation of the bail bond of appellee. The
Assistant Provincial Fiscal concerned has appealed from the dismissal aforesaid directly to this Court.
The People's appeal is premised on the following assignment of errors:
"I. The lower court erred in dismissing the case after the appellee had already pleaded to the information.

"II. The lower court erred in holding that it did not acquire jurisdiction to try the case."

On the other hand, as herein earlier intimated, the main point of appellee which was sustained by the trial
court is that the complaint signed by the mother of the offended party which initiated the proceedings in the
justice of the peace court was invalid because under Section 2 of Rule 110, a complaint may be sub scribed
and sworn to only by "the offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the government or
governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the law violated" and, consequently, the
information based on the said complaint filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Albay, without said fiscal having
conducted another preliminary investigation, did not grant jurisdiction to the court.
The People's appeal should be sustained.
We do not hesitate to agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court's questioned order of dismissal is
erroneous, being based, as it is, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over this case be cause the initial
complaint filed with the justice of the peace court was not signed by the offended party and was, therefore,
invalid. It may be conceded that, as appellee argues, apart from what is provided in the Rule cited, there are
precedents to the effect that, except as to the government officers authorized by said Rule, the filing of a
complaint is personal to the offended party. [1] This is not, however, the only principle involved under the
complete factual setting of this case. It must be remembered that appellee did not attack the said complaint
while his case was still in the justice of the peace court, where, on the contrary, he waived the preliminary
investigation proper; he allowed the case to be remanded to the court of first instance and folded his arms
when the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information; and, he did not object to his being arraigned,
instead he merely entered a plea of not guilty at said arraignment. In these circumstances, We hold that the
initial complaint has lost its importance and the case can be viewed only in the light of the information
subsequently filed by the provincial fiscal, as suggested by the Solicitor General.

CRIMPRO No. 1 10
We do not lose sight of the fact that in truth the fiscal did not conduct any preliminary investigation of his own
and, as a matter of fact, the information filed by him with the court a quo did not carry with it the sworn
certification of the fiscal, required by section 14 of Rule 112, that the appellee was "given a chance to appear
in person or by counsel at said examination and investigation." Neither are We overlooking precedents to the
effect that absence of a preliminary investigation is a grave irregularity which nullifies the proceedings
because it violates the right to due process. [2] We perceive, however, that the situations involved in those
precedents cannot be equated with the circumstances obtaining here, for while there, the objections to the
procedure followed were opportunely raised before the accused entered their pleas, here, appellee sought
the dismissal of this case long after he had already entered his plea of not guilty to the information filed by
the fiscal.
Therefore, the question to determine in this case is, what was the effect of appellee's failure to object to the
information before or at the time he entered his plea of not guilty. Assuming that said information was
defective because it did not contain the requisite certification regarding the fiscal's having held a preliminary
investigation where the accused was given an opportunity to be present personally or thru counsel, such an
omission is not necessarily fatal. It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as
nothing more than "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and
filed with the court." Thus, it is obvious that such certification is not an essential part of the information itself
and its absence cannot vitiate it as such. True, as already stated, section 14 of Rule 112 enjoin that "no
information . . . shall be filed, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investiga -
tion", but, as can be seen, the injunction refers to the non-holding of the preliminary investigation, not the
absence of the certification. In other words, what is not allowed is the filing of the information without a
preliminary investigation having been previously conducted, and the injunction that there should be a
certification is only a consequence of the requirement that a preliminary investigation should first be
conducted. Logically, therefore, inasmuch as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that the right to the
preliminary investigation itself must be asserted or invoked before the plea, otherwise, it is deemed waived,
[3]
it stands to reason, that the absence of the certification in question is also waived by failure to allege it
before the plea. After all, such certification is nothing but evidence of a fact, and if the omission of the fact
itself to be certified is waived, if not properly raised before the accused enters his plea, why should the
omission merely of the certification be given more importance than the absence of the fact itself to be
certified to? Is it to be sustained that if in a given case, there were such a certification although in fact no
preliminary investigation has been held, this Court is going to hold that the requirement of a preliminary
investigation has been complied with? To ask the question is to immediately expose the absurdity of the
affirmative answer to it.
To be sure, the situation of appellee may be compared with another case where the fiscal, for one reason or
another, files an informationwithout holding any preliminary investigation and without any such preliminary
investigation having been conducted, by the municipal court concerned. After all, under the Rules, a criminal
action may also be initiated by the fiscal filing an in formation with the proper court. (section 3, Rule 110) On
the other hand, as already stated, this Court has consistently held that the defense of absence of a prelimi -
nary investigation must be raised before the entry of the plea, otherwise, it is waived. Accordingly, even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the complaint in the justice of the peace court was void, as
contended by appellee, on the other hand, the filing of the information in question with the court a quo made
the issue of validity of said complaint already academic, considering that the said complaint had already
been superseded by the said information. And since the said information is sufficient in form and substance,
and the absence of a preliminary investigation may only be raised before the accused enters his plea,
otherwise, it is waived, it follows thatappellee forfeited his right to question both the complaint and the
information under discussion by entering his plea of not guilty and otherwise submitting to the jurisdiction of
the court for trial.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and this case is hereby remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings, with costs against appellee.

CRIMPRO No. 1 11
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989

SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial)
Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders
of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to
Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds (a) the
court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.

It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact
and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private
respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report
and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent
located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a
shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-
22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as
the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in
his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also
denied.

These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of petitioner that
the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the
funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.

Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the fact that
private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated
amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action.

The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to
dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the
subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate
the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).

CRIMPRO No. 1 12
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it would be
unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.

Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of this
criminal case for estafa.

It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted
and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v.
Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).

In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to determine
the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of
the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People
v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).

The information in the case at reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:

That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the
Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw,
Ermita, in said City, in the following manner, to wit. the said having been
authorized to act as insurance agent of said corporation, among whose
duties were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to account
for and turn over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or
immediately upon demand, collected and received the amount of
P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from
customers, but herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so and with
intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P358,850.00
to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00
Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)

Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or
any of the essential elements thereof took place.

The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982
inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)

Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.

CRIMPRO No. 1 13
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where
any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or
prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at
Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage
and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that
evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CRIMPRO No. 1 14
Buaya vs. Polo
G.R. No. L-75079 ; January 26, 1989

Facts:
Solemnidad Buaya is an insurance agent of private complainant of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.
Privaterespondent Buaya, was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the
correspondingpremiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency
agreement, the petitioner isrequired to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit
premium collections to the principaloffice of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an
audit was conducted on petitioner's accountwhich showed a shortage. She was charged with estafa before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Regional
Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction overthe offense since the collection was done in Cebu City and the
offense complained of is purely civil in nature. TheRTC denied the motion to dismiss.

Issues:
1) Whether or not RTC Manila has jurisdiction over the case.
2) Whether of not the offense complained is purely civil in nature, hence warrants the dismissal of the
criminal case.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reiterated that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried. Thus, in order to determine the jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the
facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the
complaint is filed.The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information, and notby the findings the court may make after the trial.Further, Section 14(a), Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminalprosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements
thereof took place.The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980
to June 15, 1982 inclusive
in the City of Manila, Philippines.

. . ."Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction.Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the
place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is
damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and
office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused
damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.As to the second issue, the contention that the subject
matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.

CRIMPRO No. 1 15
Buaya vs. PoloG.R. No. 75079 January 26, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and
was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of the
transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of Buayas
account showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with
estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the Regional
Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but the same was denied by
respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner
Buaya

HELD:
The allegations in the complaint or information determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal
cases. 14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
elements took place. The subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980
to June15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has no
jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without merit.

Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the respondents principal place of business is in Manila and
Buayas failure to remit the premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in manila.Besides, estafa
is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at anyplace where any of the essential elements of the
crime took place.Petition is DISMISSED.

CRIMPRO No. 1 16
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988

RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner,


vs.
Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Involving as it does a purely legal question, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus was certified to
this Court by the then Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30, 1983.

On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the
Intelligence and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men, received a
mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and
apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. In compliance with said mission
order, Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of
said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted arrest. The soldiers left the place but they brought with
them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of
the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back to the
PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the
scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.

On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao, in an
information filed by the Provincial Fiscal. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40080.

While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the
President of the Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed
by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties.

Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties,
Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military
authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The motion was denied. Hence, the present petition.

At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 40080.

One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire
proceedings are null and void.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. [Silvestre v. Military Commission, L-48366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; People v. Romualdo, 90
Phil. 739 (1952); Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799 (1967), 21 SCRA 717.] And once jurisdiction is vested in

CRIMPRO No. 1 17
the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. [Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, (1929); Phil. Land-Air-
Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. CIR, 93 Phil. 747 (1953); Tuvera v. De Guzman, 121 Phil. 706 (1965),13
SCRA 729; Rilloraza v. Arciaga, supra: Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 123
Phil. 766 (1966),16 SCRA908).

In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General Order No.
59, dated June 24, 1977, published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages 6373-1 to 6373-3. (July
11, 1977), military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll
offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of
their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty;
Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of
official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate
issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by
the President. . . " (Section 1.) As no amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette between the
time G.R. No. 59 was published until the information in Criminal Case No. 40080 was filed on August 2,1979,
then said General Order No. 59 remained in force on said date.

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, petitioner Dela
Cruz was a member of the Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of the deceased Cabilto was
committed while petitioner was executing the Mission Order.

But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate to be issued by the Secretary of National
Defense?

The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense is conclusive for
the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty, or
arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. It does not in any way preclude the
courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make the certificate a
condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over
offenses committed by members of the AFP.

In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was presented in
court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta, directing
Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao to verify and apprehend
persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the prosecution presented in court
likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. These undisputed
facts compel this Court to declare that respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case against
petitioner Dela Cruz.

The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822
and 1822-A which vest in the courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP in
the performance of their duties were not yet in effect, the same having been promulgated only in 1981.

Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar. However, General Order No. 59 cited above
applies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The in Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void but
without prejudice to the filing of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for appropriate action.

CRIMPRO No. 1 18
Dela Cruz vs. Moya G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838

Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to
the Intelligence and Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an order mission to
proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending person
who are allegedly engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission,they caught in
flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the place but brought
with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting,
including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the Headquarters. Fighting
ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and
1822-A were promulgated by the President on January 16, 1981, vesting in courtmartial jurisdiction over
crimes committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in the performance
of their duty.

CRIMPRO No. 1 19
PEOPLE VS MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7 2004 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to
indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General
assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision
in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
death.

RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed
on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not
necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal
or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of
unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from
the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the
occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual
matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of
Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

CRIMPRO No. 1 20

You might also like