File No.

________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

B E T W E E N:

ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Applicant
(Respondent)
- and -

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA, LLC, PTG NEVADA,
LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC, GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L.
OF LUXEMBOURG, GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC and FATHERS &
DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC

Respondents
(Appellants)

APPLICATION RECORD – APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
(Rogers Communications Inc., Applicant)
(Pursuant to s. 40 of the Supreme Court Act and
Rule 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

Torys LLP Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP
79 Wellington Street West, Suite 3000 55 Metcalfe Street
Box 270, TD Centre Suite 1300
Toronto, Ontario M5K 1N2 Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5
Fax: 416.865.7380 Fax: 613.230.6423

Andrew Bernstein Yael Wexler
Tel: 416.865.7678 Tel: 613.696.6860
Email: abernstein@torys.com Email: ywexler@fasken.com
Agent for Counsel for the Applicant,
James Gotowiec Rogers Communications Inc.
Tel: 416.865.7981
Email: jgotowiec@torys.com

Counsel for the Applicant,
Rogers Communications Inc.
-2-

ORIGINAL THE REGISTRAR
TO: Supreme Court of Canada
301 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON K1A 0J1

COPIES TO: Aird & Berlis LLP
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 754
Toronto, ON M5J 2T9
Fax : 416.863.1515

Kenneth R. Clark
Tel: 416.865.4736
Email: kclark@airdberlis.com

Paul V. McCallen
Tel: 416.865.7728
Email: pmccallen@airdberlis.com

Patrick Copeland
Tel: 416.865.3969
Email: pcopeland@airdberlis.com

Counsel for the Respondents
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tab Document Page No.

1. Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal 1

2. Reasons for Order and Order of the Federal Court dated July 28, 2016 6

3. Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal 43
dated May 9, 2017

4. Memorandum of Argument 72

Documents Relied Upon

5. Letter from the Honourable James Moore and the Honourable Shelly 98
Glover (2013)

6. Email dated April 28, 2016 from Ken Clark to Rogers 103

7. Affidavit of Kristi Jackson sworn June 10, 2016 105

8. Affidavit of Diane Zimmerman sworn August 2, 2017 112

9. Affidavit of Dana Drake sworn August 4, 2017 123
001

File No. ________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

B E T W E E N:

ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Applicant
(Respondent)
- and -

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA, LLC, PTG NEVADA,
LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC, GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L.
OF LUXEMBOURG, GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC and FATHERS &
DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC

Respondents
(Appellants)

NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
(Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

TAKE NOTICE that Rogers Communications Inc. applies for leave to appeal to the
Court, under section 40 of the Supreme Court Act, from the judgment of the Federal Court of
Appeal, File No. A-278-16, made May 9, 2017, and for any further or other order that the Court
may deem appropriate.

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that this application for leave is made on the following
grounds:

1. This case – the first to interpret key provisions of the Copyright Act that came into force
in January 2015 – raises questions of national and public importance relating to the
“notice and notice” system, a unique model developed by Canadian internet service
providers to discourage online copyright infringement. It impacts all internet-using
Canadians, including the vast majority who do not engage in online infringement.

23812832
002

2. Notice and notice began as a voluntary system created by Canadian ISPs as an alternative
to American “notice and take-down,” which has been criticized for preferring the rights
of copyright owners over users.

3. In 2012, Parliament made notice and notice mandatory, by enacting sections 41.25 and
41.26 of the Copyright Act (the “Notice and Notice Provisions”).

4. The Notice and Notice Provisions provide copyright owners with options if they become
aware of online infringement. Copyright owners can send a notice to ISPs that one of
their subscribers has infringed copyright. ISPs are required to forward that notice to the
subscriber and retain (for six months) records allowing the identity of the subscriber to be
determined. Under the Notice and Notice Provisions, ISPs are not currently permitted to
charge fees for their section 41.26 obligations of transmitting a notice to a subscriber and
retaining records (which they never did under the voluntary system in any event).

5. The Notice and Notice Provisions are silent on how a copyright owner can obtain
disclosure of the subscriber’s identity from ISPs. However, there is a long-standing
common law remedy – the Norwich order – which enables copyright owners to obtain an
alleged infringer’s identity by asking a court for an order for third party discovery.

6. Because they are directed at innocent information-holders, courts require the party
seeking a Norwich order to reimburse third parties for any costs of compliance that they
incur. Prior to the enactment of the Notice and Notice Provisions, this was a required
aspect of any such order.

7. The respondents in this application (collectively “Voltage”) asked the courts below to
relieve them of the obligation to reimburse ISPs for their costs of compliance with
Norwich orders. Voltage argued that the Notice and Notice Provisions impose broad
obligations which ISPs must discharge without reimbursement, so reimbursement should
not be permitted when a Norwich order is granted.

8. This application asks the Court to consider the scope of ISPs’ obligations under the
Notice and Notice Provisions.

2
003

9. The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal disagreed with each other on this issue.

10. The Federal Court found that the Notice and Notice Provisions required two things: (1)
forwarding the notice and (2) retaining records. As a result, it concluded that the common
law of Norwich orders had not been modified, and innocent third party ISPs retained the
right to recover the costs they incurred in responding to such orders.

11. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the Notice and Notice Provisions imposed
seven discrete obligations on ISPs (both express and implied), including the form in
which records must be kept and (potentially) the required timeline for disclosure.
Therefore ISPs could not recover the large majority of their costs in responding to those
requests. It suggested that ISPs pass those costs along to their subscribers, i.e., Canadians
with an internet subscription.

12. ISPs play a crucial role in facilitating internet access and therefore the digital economy.
While this Court has been clear that the consequences of disputes between copyright
owners and users should not be “visited on the heads of ISPs,” the Court of Appeal’s
decision does precisely that. If upheld, the decision imposes costs and burdens on ISPs
that are not contemplated by the legislative scheme, and that will require innocent users
to bear compliance costs that should be borne by infringers.

13. Rogers therefore seeks leave to appeal so the Court can provide guidance on the
following issues:

1. What are the obligations imposed on Canadian ISPs by the Notice and Notice
Provisions?

2. Do those obligations supplant ordinary principles related to third-party discovery
orders, and in particular, the principle that a third party should be reimbursed for the
costs it incurs?

3
004

Dated at Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, this 4th day of August, 2017.

Torys LLP Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP
79 Wellington Street West, Suite 3000 55 Metcalfe Street
Box 270, TD Centre Suite 1300
Toronto, Ontario M5K 1N2 Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5
Fax: 416.865.7380 Fax: 613.230.6423

Andrew Bernstein Yael Wexler
Tel: 416.865.7678 Tel: 613.696.6860
Email: abernstein@torys.com Email: ywexler@fasken.com
Agent for Counsel for the Applicant,
James Gotowiec Rogers Communications Inc.
Tel: 416.865.7981
Email: jgotowiec@torys.com

Counsel for the Applicant,
Rogers Communications Inc.

4
005

ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR
Supreme Court of Canada
201 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON K1A 0J1

COPIES TO:

Aird & Berlis LLP
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 754
Toronto, ON M5J 2T9
Fax : 416.863.1515

Kenneth R. Clark
Tel: 416.865.4736
Email: kclark@airdberlis.com

Paul V. McCallen
Tel: 416.865.7728
Email: pmccallen@airdberlis.com

Patrick Copeland
Tel: 416.865.3969
Email: pcopeland@airdberlis.com

Counsel for the Respondents

NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENTS: A respondent may serve and file a memorandum in
response to this application for leave to appeal within 30 days after the day on which a file
is opened by the Court following the filing of this application for leave to appeal or, if a file
has already been opened, within 30 days after the service of this application for leave to
appeal. If no response is filed within that time, the Registrar will submit this application
for leave to appeal to the Court for consideration under section 43 of the Supreme Court
Act.

5
006

Date: 20160728

Docket: T-662-16

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
Citation: 2016 FC 881

Ottawa, Ontario, July 28, 2016

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Boswell

PROPOSED CLASS PROCEEDING

BETWEEN:

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC,
COBBLER NEVADA, LLC,
PTG NEVADA, LLC,
CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC,
GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L.
OF LUXEMBOURG,
GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC, AND
FATHERS & DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC

Applicants

And

JOHN DOE #1, PROPOSED
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF A CLASS OF RESPONDENTS

Respondent

And

ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

Non-Party Respondent
(Applicants’ Disclosure Motion Only)
007
Page: 2

And

SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC
INTEREST CLINIC

Intervener

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
ORDER AND REASONS

[1] The Applicants have initiated a proposed class proceeding claiming, amongst other

things, declaratory and injunctive relief against the Respondent whose identity is presently

unknown to them. It is alleged that the Respondent (and others like him or her) has engaged in

illegal file sharing over the Internet, and thereby infringed the Applicants’ copyrights in several

films.

[2] The Applicants wish to have this matter certified as a so-called “reverse” class action,

and towards that end they have made a motion for an order compelling Rogers Communications

Inc. [Rogers] to disclose any and all contact and personal information of a Rogers customer [the

Subscriber] associated with an identified Internet protocol address at the various times and dates

as set out in Schedule A to their motion. They request such an order “in accordance with”

sections 41.25 and 41.26 of the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42. The Applicants also request,

as part of an order requiring Rogers to disclose the identity of the Subscriber, a further order that

there shall be no fees or disbursements payable by them to Rogers in complying with the order

for disclosure.
008
Page: 3

[3] Rogers takes no position on whether the Applicants have met the applicable requirements

for obtaining a disclosure order. It does, however, oppose the Applicants’ request to deny Rogers

reasonable compensation and costs in complying with any order requiring it to disclose the

Subscriber’s contact and personal information.

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
[4] For its part, the Intervener says the Court needs to closely examine the evidence to

determine whether any disclosure should be ordered. Its role in the Applicants’ motion for

disclosure was limited to providing the Court with submissions as to the type and quantity of

identification data to be provided by Rogers, the limits that may be imposed on the use of such

data, and the form of notice that may be required to be provided to the Respondent when served

with the Notice of Application.

[5] For the reasons that follow, I have determined that Rogers must disclose to the

Applicants only the Subscriber’s name and address as recorded in its records. Rogers should not

be compelled to disclose any other personal information about the Subscriber it may have in its

records, such as his or her email address or telephone number. I have further determined that

Rogers is entitled to be compensated for providing such disclosure to the Applicants and also

should be awarded its costs in respect of this motion in a lump sum amount of $500 (inclusive of

any taxes or disbursements).
009
Page: 4

I. Issues

[6] This motion raises three main issues:

1. Should Rogers be ordered to disclose any and all contact and personal information

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
about the Subscriber?

2. If so, what information about the Subscriber should be disclosed to the

Applicants?

3. Is Rogers entitled to be compensated for providing such disclosure to the

Applicants, including an award of costs in respect of this motion?

II. Analysis

A. Should Rogers be ordered to disclose any and all contact and personal information about
the Subscriber?

[7] The Applicants request a disclosure order “in accordance with” sections 41.25 and 41.26

of the Copyright Act. These sections provide as follows:

Provisions Respecting Providers of Network Services or
Information Location Tools

Notice of claimed infringement

41.25 (1) An owner of the copyright in a work or other subject-
matter may send a notice of claimed infringement to a person who
provides

(a) the means, in the course of providing services related to the
operation of the Internet or another digital network, of
telecommunication through which the electronic location that is the
010
Page: 5

subject of the claim of infringement is connected to the Internet or
another digital network;

(b) for the purpose set out in subsection 31.1(4), the digital
memory that is used for the electronic location to which the claim
of infringement relates; or

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
(c) an information location tool as defined in subsection 41.27(5).

Form and content of notice

(2) A notice of claimed infringement shall be in writing in the
form, if any, prescribed by regulation and shall

(a) state the claimant’s name and address and any other particulars
prescribed by regulation that enable communication with the
claimant;

(b) identify the work or other subject-matter to which the claimed
infringement relates;

(c) state the claimant’s interest or right with respect to the
copyright in the work or other subject-matter;

(d) specify the location data for the electronic location to which the
claimed infringement relates;

(e) specify the infringement that is claimed;

(f) specify the date and time of the commission of the claimed
infringement; and

(g) contain any other information that may be prescribed by
regulation.

Obligations related to notice

41.26 (1) A person described in paragraph 41.25(1)(a) or (b) who
receives a notice of claimed infringement that complies with
subsection 41.25(2) shall, on being paid any fee that the person has
lawfully charged for doing so,

(a) as soon as feasible forward the notice electronically to the
person to whom the electronic location identified by the location
data specified in the notice belongs and inform the claimant of its
forwarding or, if applicable, of the reason why it was not possible
to forward it; and
011
Page: 6

(b) retain records that will allow the identity of the person to whom
the electronic location belongs to be determined, and do so for six
months beginning on the day on which the notice of claimed
infringement is received or, if the claimant commences
proceedings relating to the claimed infringement and so notifies
the person before the end of those six months, for one year after
the day on which the person receives the notice of claimed

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
infringement.

Fees related to notices

(2) The Minister may, by regulation, fix the maximum fee that a
person may charge for performing his or her obligations under
subsection (1). If no maximum is fixed by regulation, the person
may not charge any amount under that subsection.

Damages related to notices

(3) A claimant’s only remedy against a person who fails to perform
his or her obligations under subsection (1) is statutory damages in
an amount that the court considers just, but not less than $5,000
and not more than $10,000.

Regulations — change of amounts

(4) The Governor in Council may, by regulation, increase or
decrease the minimum or maximum amount of statutory damages
set out in subsection (3).

[8] The Applicants contend that these two provisions of the Copyright Act, referred to as the

so-called “notice and notice” regime, ground the basis for a disclosure order in this case and,

moreover, must be interpreted to deny Rogers any compensation for compliance with such an

order because, as the parties acknowledge, no fee has been fixed by regulation pursuant to

subsection 41.26(2). The Applicants’ submissions in this regard are without merit. Their request

for a disclosure order “in accordance with” sections 41.25 and 41.26 is misguided. Nowhere in

these provisions is it explicitly stated that there can or must be an application or motion for a

disclosure order in respect of the information required to be recorded and retained pursuant to
012
Page: 7

paragraph 41.26(1)(b). Moreover, nowhere in these provisions is it explicitly stated that a fee or

compensation is prohibited or cannot be paid in complying with a disclosure order made in

respect of that information.

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
[9] It is true, as the Applicants point out, that the request for submissions sent to Internet

service providers [ISP] such as Rogers in 2013, prior to these provisions coming into force in

January 2015, did state that a subscriber’s identity “may be released to the copyright owner with

a court order.” However, nowhere in these legislative provisions is there any reference to

disclosure of a subscriber’s identity by an ISP whether by court order or otherwise. In this

regard, it is apt to note the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Parry Sound (District) Social

Services Administration Board v OPSEU, Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, [2003] 2 SCR 157, where

Justice Iacobucci stated for the majority of the Court as follows:

39 To begin with, I think it useful to stress the presumption
that the legislature does not intend to change existing law or to
depart from established principles, policies or practices. In
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada v. T. Eaton Co., [1956]
S.C.R. 610, at p. 614, for example, Fauteux J. (as he then was)
wrote that “a Legislature is not presumed to depart from the
general system of the law without expressing its intentions to do so
with irresistible clearness, failing which the law remains
undisturbed”. In Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 1038, at p. 1077, Lamer J. (as he then was) wrote that “in
the absence of a clear provision to the contrary, the legislator
should not be assumed to have intended to alter the pre-existing
ordinary rules of common law”.

[10] Furthermore, the following comments of Justice Stone for the Federal Court of Appeal in

Glaxo Wellcome PLC v Minister of National Revenue, [1998] 4 FCR 439, [1998] FCJ No 874
013
Page: 8

[Glaxo Wellcome], also serve to undermine the Applicants’ over-broad interpretation of the

“notice and notice” regime provisions:

36 … Cory J. emphasized in Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 70 (S.C.C.) at page 90 that as a general principle, the
legislature "is presumed not to depart from prevailing law 'without

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
expressing its intentions to do so with irresistible clearness'".
However, the case law indicates that this presumption may be
rebutted if it is clear that the legislature intended to modify existing
common law or equitable rights by providing a comprehensive
regulation of the matter at issue: Driedger, supra, at pages 307 and
309.

[11] The “notice and notice” regime does not provide any detailed or comprehensive

mechanism for copyright owners such as the Applicants to enforce their rights as against alleged

infringers. At best, it provides a mechanism for copyright owners to send a notice of claimed

infringement via an ISP to an alleged infringer with the knowledge that there will be records

available at some later date to determine the identity of such infringer if necessary. An ISP such

as Rogers is only obligated under section 41.26(1) to do two things: (1) forward the copyright

owner’s notice of claimed infringement electronically to the pertinent Internet protocol address;

and (2) retain records to allow the subscriber’s identity to be determined for specified periods of

time depending on whether the copyright owner has or has not commenced proceedings relating

to the claimed infringement. The fact that no regulation has been made to fix the maximum fee

that an ISP may charge for performing these obligations speaks, not to whether no fee or

compensation can be paid to comply with a disclosure order but, rather, to the current policy

under the “notice and notice” regime that the costs of complying with these obligations is, at

least for the time being, to be borne by the ISP.
014
Page: 9

[12] Contrary to the Applicants’ arguments, Parliament’s intention in enacting sections 41.25

and 41.26 was not one of “irresistible clearness” to abrogate and depart from established law and

principles with respect to so-called Norwich disclosure orders emanating from the decision in

Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs & Excise Commissioners (1973), [1974] A.C. 133 (UK HL).

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
The availability of such orders in the Federal Court was first recognized by the Federal Court of

Appeal in Glaxo Wellcome, and in BMG Canada Inc v Doe, 2005 FCA 193, [2005] 4 FCR 81

[BMG], the Court of Appeal recognized that:

[41] Modern technology such as the Internet … must not be
allowed to obliterate those personal property rights which society
has deemed important. Although privacy concerns must also be
considered, it seems to me that they must yield to public concerns
for the protection of intellectual property rights in situations where
infringement threatens to erode those rights.

[42] Thus, in my view, in cases where plaintiffs show that they
have a bona fide claim that unknown persons are infringing their
copyright, they have a right to have the identity revealed for the
purpose of bringing action. However, caution must be exercised by
the courts in ordering such disclosure, to make sure that privacy
rights are invaded in the most minimal way.

[13] The principles emanating from BMG that should be considered when making a Norwich

order may be summarized as follows:

1. The applicant for a Norwich order must have a bona fide case;

2. The party against whom such an order is to be issued must have information on an

issue in the proceeding;

3. An order of the Court is the only reasonable means by which the information can be

obtained;
015
Page: 10

4. Fairness dictates that the information be provided prior to discovery or trial or, in

the circumstances of this case, prior to certification of the proposed class

proceeding; and

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
5. Any order made will not cause undue delay, inconvenience, or expense to the party

against whom such an order is to be issued or others.

[14] I am satisfied that the Applicants have adduced sufficient evidence, notably in the

Affidavit of Daniel Macek, to show that they have a bona fide claim that unknown persons are

infringing the copyright in their films. Consequently, they have a right to have the identity of the

Subscriber revealed and disclosed for the purpose of pursuing their proposed class proceeding.

This right flows from established case law such as that noted above; it does not flow from and is

not grounded in any way by the “notice and notice” provisions of the Copyright Act.

[15] I am also satisfied that the other principles emanating from BMG dictate that an order

should be made requiring Rogers to disclose information about the Subscriber.

B. What information about the Subscriber should be disclosed to the Applicants?

[16] In addressing this issue, I note (as did the Court of Appeal in BMG) that “caution must be

exercised” in ordering disclosure of information about the Subscriber “to make sure that privacy

rights are invaded in the most minimal way.” I further note the Court’s approach to disclosure in

Voltage Pictures LLC v John Doe, 2014 FC 161 [Voltage], where the email address of the ISP’s

customer was not ordered to be disclosed, as well as the Intervener’s argument that the
016
Page: 11

information to be disclosed by Rogers to the Applicants should not exceed the Subscriber’s name

and address associated with the Internet protocol address alleged to be associated with the

infringing activity identified by the Applicants.

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
[17] In my view, the Applicants are entitled to disclosure by Rogers of only the Subscriber’s

name and address as recorded in Rogers’ records. The release of this information by Rogers shall

remain confidential and not be disclosed to any other parties without further order of the Court

and shall only be used by the Applicants in connection with their proposed class proceeding.

Furthermore, the Applicants shall not be permitted to disclose to the general public by making or

issuing any statement to the media with respect to the information obtained from Rogers.

C. Is Rogers entitled to be compensated for providing disclosure of information about the
Subscriber to the Applicants, including an award of costs in respect of this motion?

[18] The record shows that Rogers was prepared to disclose information about the Subscriber

upon the Applicants submitting a proposed form of order and prior payment of a fee of $100 per

hour plus HST to cover its costs associated with compiling such information. The Applicants

refused to do so because of their view that the “notice and notice” provisions of the Copyright

Act preclude Rogers from imposing or collecting any such fee. For the reasons stated above, that

view is misguided.

[19] In any event, the Applicants contend that even if Rogers is entitled to a fee for disclosing

information about the Subscriber, that fee is at best minimal and should be at most 50 cents per

subscriber because most of the information has already been collected and assembled by Rogers
017
Page: 12

in complying with its obligations under subsection 41.26(1) of the Copyright Act. Moreover, the

Applicants assert that the fee of $100 per hour is unreasonable and contrary to certain evidence

in the record which suggests that the fee was only $5 or $10 per subscriber name a few years

ago. For its part, Rogers has offered evidence as to how the $100 per hour fee was established

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
and why it is reasonable.

[20] The case law suggests that consideration should be given to the costs incurred by Rogers

in assembling the information about its Subscriber and complying with a disclosure order (see

BMG at para 35 and also Voltage at paras 46 and 138). In Voltage, for example, it was ordered

that “all reasonable legal costs, administrative costs and disbursements incurred” by the ISP in

abiding by the disclosure order were to be paid by the plaintiff to the ISP prior to release of the

customer information.

[21] The Applicants’ argument as to the unreasonableness and the amount of Rogers’ hourly

fee is not persuasive. The fee is what it is, and if the Applicants want information about the

Subscriber they must pay the hourly fee. The record suggests that no more than about an hour

will be necessary for Rogers to assemble, verify and forward the Subscriber information to the

Applicants, so the total cost would be approximately $113.

[22] In addition, Rogers is entitled to its costs on this motion which I fix and award in the

amount of $500 (inclusive of any taxes or disbursements). These costs shall be payable forthwith

and, in any event, within 20 days from the date of this order.
018
Page: 13

III. Conclusion

[23] The Applicants provided the Court with a draft form of order, including a form of letter

to be sent to John Doe, on the day this motion was heard via teleconference. Not all terms of this

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
draft had been agreed to by the parties at the time of the hearing, and the Intervener also

submitted a draft form of order.

[24] Accordingly, the Court directs the parties to agree upon the terms of the letter to be sent

to John Doe within 10 days of the date of this order and to provide the Court with a final,

signature-ready copy of such letter for the Court’s approval prior to such letter being sent. In the

event the parties are unable to so agree, the Court will review and finalize such letter based upon

the draft form previously provided by the Applicants.
019
Page: 14

ORDER

THIS COURT ORDERS, for the reasons stated above, that:

1. The Non-Party Respondent, Rogers Communications Inc., shall disclose to the

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
Applicants, within ten days of the date of this order, the name and address of the Rogers

subscriber [the Subscriber] associated with the IP address 174.112.37.227 at the

following dates and times (UTC):

a. 2016-03-24, 05:25:15

b. 2016-01-14, 08:14:55

c. 2016-02-18, 03:45:27

d. 2016-03-10, 02:23:04

e. 2016-01-26, 01:06:07

2. The Applicants shall pay to Rogers Communications Inc. an hourly fee of $100, plus

HST, for the time spent and incurred by Rogers Communications Inc. in assembling and

providing the Subscriber information to the Applicants, such fee to be paid in full prior to

the release of the information to the Applicants.

3. The Applicants shall include a copy of this Order in any correspondence sent with the

Notice of Application to the Subscriber.

4. The Subscriber may request a full copy of the reasons for this Order from the Applicants

and the Applicants shall provide a copy at no charge to the Subscriber requesting the

copy.
020
Page: 15

5. Correspondence sent by the Applicants to the Subscriber with the Notice of Application

shall clearly state in bold type that:

a. the Applicants currently are seeking to make the Subscriber serve as the

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
Representative Respondent in a class proceeding they seek to certify by way of

application under Part 5-1 – Class Proceedings of the Federal Court Rules,

SOR/98-106;

b. no Court has yet made a determination of fact or law that such Subscriber may be

forced to serve as the Representative Respondent to the class proceeding;

c. no Court has yet made a determination of fact or law certifying the Applicants’

proceeding as a class proceeding;

d. no Court has yet made a determination of fact or law that such Subscriber is the

party responsible for the allegedly infringing activity identified by the Applicants;

and

e. no Court has yet made a determination of fact or law that such Subscriber has

infringed or is liable in any way for payment of damages.

6. The Court directs the parties to agree upon the terms of the correspondence to be sent to

John Doe within 10 days of the date of this order and to provide the Court with a final,

signature-ready copy of such correspondence for the Court’s approval prior to it being

sent.

7. The information released by Rogers Communications Inc. shall only be used by the

Applicants in connection with the claims in this proceeding.
021
Page: 16

8. Without further order of the Court, the information obtained from Rogers

Communications Inc. shall remain confidential and shall not be disclosed to any other

parties or to the general public, by making or issuing a statement to the media or

otherwise, until such time as the Subscriber’s identity becomes part of the public record

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
of the proceeding.

9. Any further amendments or additions to this Order shall be within the discretion of the

Case Management Judge for this proceeding.

10. The Applicants shall pay to Rogers Communications Inc. its costs on this motion in the

lump sum amount of $500 (inclusive of any taxes or disbursements). Such costs shall be

payable forthwith and, in any event, within 20 days from the date of this Order.

"Keith M. Boswell"
Judge
022

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET: T-662-16

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
STYLE OF CAUSE: VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA,
LLC, PTG NEVADA, LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA,
LLC, GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L. OF
LUXEMBOURG, GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC, AND
FATHERS & DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC v JOHN
DOE #1, PROPOSED REPRESENTATIVE
RESPONDENT ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF
RESPONDENTS v ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.
v SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET
POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC

MOTION HELD VIA TELECONFERENCE ON JUNE 28, 2016 FROM TORONTO,
ONTARIO AND OTTAWA, ONTARIO

ORDER AND REASONS: BOSWELL J.

DATED: JULY 28, 2016

WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:

Kenneth R. Clark FOR THE APPLICANTS
Patrick Copeland
Not Represented FOR THE RESPONDENT

Andrew Bernstein FOR THE NON-PARTY RESPONDENT
James Gotowiec (APPLICANTS’ DISCLOSURE MOTION ONLY)

David Fewer FOR THE INTERVENER
023
Page: 2

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Aird & Berlis LLP FOR THE APPLICANTS
Barristers and Solicitors
Toronto, ON

2016 FC 881 (CanLII)
Not Represented FOR THE RESPONDENT

Torys LLP FOR THE NON-PARTY RESPONDENT
Barristers and Solicitors (APPLICANTS’ DISCLOSURE MOTION ONLY)
Toronto, ON

Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet FOR THE PROPOSED INTERVENER
Policy and Public Interest Clinic
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law,
Common Law Section
Ottawa, ON
024

Date : 20160728

Dossier : T-662-16

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
Référence : 2016 CF 881

[TRADUCTION FRANÇAISE]

Ottawa (Ontario), le 28 juillet 2016

En présence de monsieur le juge Boswell

RECOURS COLLECTIF ENVISAGÉ

ENTRE :

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC,
COBBLER NEVADA, LLC,
PTG NEVADA, LLC,
CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC,
GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L.
DU LUXEMBOURG,
GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC, ET
FATHERS & DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC

demanderesses

et

JOHN DOE NO 1, REPRÉSENTANT
DÉFENDEUR PROPOSÉ, AU NOM DES
DÉFENDEURS D’UN RECOURS COLLECTIF

défendeur

et

ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

défenderesse non-partie
(requête en divulgation des demanderesses seulement)
025
Page : 2

et

SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC
INTEREST CLINIC

intervenante

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
ORDONNANCE ET MOTIFS

[1] Les demanderesses ont déposé une déclaration en vue d’un éventuel recours collectif,

demandant entre autres un jugement déclaratoire et une injonction contre le défendeur, dont

l’identité leur est actuellement inconnue. Il est allégué que le défendeur (et d’autres comme lui)

a communiqué illégalement des dossiers sur Internet et a ainsi enfreint les droits d’auteur que

les demanderesses détenaient à l’égard de plusieurs films.

[2] Les demanderesses souhaitent faire autoriser cette action comme soi-disant recours

collectif « inversé » et, à cette fin, elles ont présenté une requête en ordonnance obligeant

Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers) à divulguer toutes les coordonnées et tous les

renseignements personnels d’un client de Rogers (l’abonné) associé à une certaine adresse de

protocole Internet à divers moments et à diverses dates, tel qu’il est énoncé à l’Annexe A de

leur requête. Elles demandent une telle ordonnance « conformément » aux articles 41.25 et

41.26 de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur, L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-42. Les demanderesses veulent

également obtenir, dans le cadre d’une ordonnance obligeant Rogers à divulguer l’identité de

l’abonné, une autre ordonnance stipulant qu’elles n’ont aucun droit à payer à Rogers pour

l’exécution de l’ordonnance de divulgation.
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[3] Rogers ne prend aucune position quant à la question de savoir si les demanderesses ont

respecté les exigences applicables pour obtenir une ordonnance de divulgation. Elle s’oppose

toutefois à la requête des demanderesses de lui refuser une indemnité et des dépens raisonnables

pour exécuter l’ordonnance l’obligeant à divulguer les coordonnées et les renseignements

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
personnels de l’abonné.

[4] Pour sa part, l’intervenante indique que la Cour doit examiner attentivement la preuve

afin de déterminer s’il y a lieu d’ordonner une divulgation. Son rôle dans la requête en

divulgation des demanderesses se limitait à fournir des observations à la Cour quant au type et à

la quantité de données d’identification à fournir par Rogers, aux limites pouvant être imposées

relativement à l’utilisation de ces données et à la forme d’avis qu’il pourrait être nécessaire de

remettre au défendeur au moment de signifier l’avis de requête.

[5] Pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclus que Rogers doit divulguer aux demanderesses

uniquement le nom et l’adresse de l’abonné, tels qu’ils figurent dans ses dossiers. Rogers ne

devrait pas être tenue de divulguer d’autres renseignements personnels de l’abonné qu’elle est

susceptible de détenir dans ses dossiers, comme son adresse électronique ou son numéro de

téléphone. Je conclus également que Rogers a le droit à une indemnité pour une telle

divulgation aux demanderesses et devrait se voir accorder des dépens à l’égard de cette requête,

d’un montant de 500 $ (taxes et débours compris).
027
Page : 4

I. Questions en litige

[6] Cette requête soulève trois questions principales :

1. Devrait-on ordonner à Rogers de divulguer toutes les coordonnées et tous les

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
renseignements personnels de l’abonné?

2. Dans l’affirmative, quels renseignements sur l’abonné devraient être divulgués

aux demanderesses?

3. Rogers a-t-elle le droit à une indemnité pour faire une telle divulgation aux

demanderesses, y compris à des dépens à l’égard de cette requête?

II. Analyse

A. Devrait-on ordonner à Rogers de divulguer toutes les coordonnées et tous les
renseignements personnels de l’abonné?

[7] Les demanderesses veulent obtenir une ordonnance de divulgation « conformément » aux

articles 41.25 et 41.26 de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur. Ces articles stipulent ce qui suit :

Dispositions concernant les fournisseurs de services réseau et
d’outils de repérage

Avis de prétendue violation

41.25 (1) Le titulaire d’un droit d’auteur sur une œuvre ou tout
autre objet du droit d’auteur peut envoyer un avis de prétendue
violation à la personne qui fournit, selon le cas :

a) dans le cadre de la prestation de services liés à l’exploitation
d’Internet ou d’un autre réseau numérique, les moyens de
télécommunication par lesquels l’emplacement électronique qui
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Page : 5

fait l’objet de la prétendue violation est connecté à Internet ou à
tout autre réseau numérique;

b) en vue du stockage visé au paragraphe 31.1(4), la mémoire
numérique qui est utilisée pour l’emplacement électronique en
cause;

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
c) un outil de repérage au sens du paragraphe 41.27(5).

Forme de l’avis

(2) L’avis de prétendue violation est établi par écrit, en la forme
éventuellement prévue par règlement, et, en outre :

a) précise les nom et adresse du demandeur et contient tout autre
renseignement prévu par règlement qui permet la communication
avec lui;

b) identifie l’œuvre ou l’autre objet du droit d’auteur auquel la
prétendue violation se rapporte;

c) déclare les intérêts ou droits du demandeur à l’égard de l’œuvre
ou de l’autre objet visé;

d) précise les données de localisation de l’emplacement
électronique qui fait l’objet de la prétendue violation;

e) précise la prétendue violation;

f) précise la date et l’heure de la commission de la prétendue
violation;

g) contient, le cas échéant, tout autre renseignement prévu par
règlement.

Obligations

41.26 (1) La personne visée aux alinéas 41.25(1)a) ou b) qui reçoit
un avis conforme au paragraphe 41.25(2) a l’obligation
d’accomplir les actes ci-après, moyennant paiement des droits
qu’elle peut exiger :

a) transmettre dès que possible par voie électronique une copie de
l’avis à la personne à qui appartient l’emplacement électronique
identifié par les données de localisation qui sont précisées dans
l’avis et informer dès que possible le demandeur de cette
transmission ou, le cas échéant, des raisons pour lesquelles elle n’a
pas pu l’effectuer;
029
Page : 6

b) conserver, pour une période de six mois à compter de la date de
réception de l’avis de prétendue violation, un registre permettant
d’identifier la personne à qui appartient l’emplacement
électronique et, dans le cas où, avant la fin de cette période, une
procédure est engagée par le titulaire du droit d’auteur à l’égard de
la prétendue violation et qu’elle en a reçu avis, conserver le
registre pour une période d’un an suivant la date de la réception de

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
l’avis de prétendue violation.

Droits

(2) Le ministre peut, par règlement, fixer le montant maximal des
droits qui peuvent être exigés pour les actes prévus au paragraphe
(1). À défaut de règlement à cet effet, le montant de ces droits est
nul.

Dommages-intérêts

(3) Le seul recours dont dispose le demandeur contre la personne
qui n’exécute pas les obligations que lui impose le paragraphe (1)
est le recouvrement des dommages-intérêts préétablis dont le
montant est, selon ce que le tribunal estime équitable en
l’occurrence, d’au moins 5 000 $ et d’au plus 10 000 $.

Règlement

(4) Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement, changer les
montants minimal et maximal des dommages-intérêts préétablis
visés au paragraphe (3).

[8] Les demanderesses soutiennent que ces deux dispositions de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur,

communément appelées régime « d’avis et avis », servent de base à une ordonnance de

divulgation en l’espèce et, en outre, doivent être interprétées de manière à refuser à Rogers toute

indemnité pour l’exécution d’une telle ordonnance, car, comme les parties le reconnaissent,

aucun montant n’a été fixé par règlement conformément au paragraphe 41.26(2). Les

observations des demanderesses à cet égard n’ont aucun bien-fondé. Leur requête en divulgation

« conformément » aux articles 41.25 et 41.26 est erronée. Nulle part dans ces dispositions est-il

indiqué explicitement qu’une demande ou une requête visant à obtenir une ordonnance
030
Page : 7

concernant les renseignements qui doivent être consignés et conservés conformément à

l’alinéa 41.26(1)b) peut ou doit être présentée. En outre, nulle part dans ces dispositions est-il

stipulé explicitement qu’il est interdit ou impossible de verser un montant ou une indemnité

pour l’exécution d’une ordonnance de divulgation rendue à l’égard de ces renseignements.

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
[9] Il est vrai, comme les demanderesses le soulignent, que la demande de soumissions

envoyée aux fournisseurs de services Internet (FSI) comme Rogers en 2013, avant l’entrée en

vigueur de ces dispositions en janvier 2015, mentionnait que l’identité d’un abonné

[TRADUCTION] « pouvait être divulguée au titulaire du droit d’auteur par l’entremise d’une

ordonnance ». Cependant, nulle part dans ces dispositions législatives est-il fait mention de la

divulgation de l’identité d’un abonné par un FSI, que ce soit par ordonnance judiciaire ou

autrement. À cet égard, il est juste de noter que la décision rendue par la Cour suprême du

Canada dans l’arrêt Parry Sound (District), Conseil d’administration des services sociaux c.

S.E.E.F.P.O., section locale 324, 2003 CSC 42, [2003] 2 RCS 157, où le juge Iacobucci a

déclaré ce qui suit, au nom de la majorité :

[39] Tout d’abord, je pense qu’il est utile d’insister sur la
présomption que le législateur n’a pas l’intention de modifier le
droit existant ni de s’écarter des principes, politiques ou pratiques
établis. Dans Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada c. T. Eaton
Co., [1956] R.C.S. 610, p. 614, par exemple, le juge Fauteux (plus
tard Juge en chef) écrit : [TRADUCTION] « le législateur n’est pas
censé s’écarter du régime juridique général sans exprimer de façon
incontestablement claire son intention de le faire, sinon la loi reste
inchangée ». Dans Slaight Communications Inc. c. Davidson,
[1989] 1 R.C.S. 1038, p. 1077, le juge Lamer (plus tard Juge en
chef) écrit que « le législateur n’est pas censé, à défaut de
disposition claire au contraire, avoir l’intention de modifier les
règles de droit commun pré-existantes ».
031
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[10] Par ailleurs, les commentaires suivants du juge Stone de la Cour d’appel fédérale dans

Glaxo Wellcome PLC c. M.R.N., [1998] 4 RCF 439, [1998] A.C.F. no 874 [Glaxo Wellcome],

servent également à contrecarrer l’interprétation trop large que font les demanderesses des

dispositions du régime « d’avis et avis » :

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
[36] Dans l’arrêt Rawluk c. Rawluk, [1990] 1 R.C.S. 70, à la
page 90, le juge Cory a souligné que, selon un principe général, le
législateur “est présumé ne pas s’écarter du droit existant
[TRADUCTION ] “sans exprimer de façon incontestablement claire
son intention de le faire”“. Toutefois, la jurisprudence montre que
cette présomption peut être réfutée s’il est clair que le législateur
avait l’intention de modifier la common law existante ou les droits
en equity en réglementant d’une façon exhaustive la question en
litige: Driedger, précité, aux pages 307 et 309

[11] Le régime « d’avis et avis » ne fournit aucun mécanisme détaillé ou complet permettant

aux titulaires d’un droit d’auteur comme les demanderesses d’exercer leurs droits contre les

présumés contrevenants. Au mieux, il fournit un mécanisme permettant aux titulaires d’un droit

d’auteur d’envoyer un avis de prétendue violation par l’intermédiaire d’un FSI à un présumé

contrevenant, sachant que des dossiers seront disponibles à une date ultérieure pour trouver

l’identité de ce contrevenant au besoin. Un FSI comme Rogers est seulement tenu de faire deux

choses conformément au paragraphe 41.26 : (1) transmettre par voie électronique une copie de

l’avis de prétendue violation du titulaire du droit d’auteur à l’adresse de protocole Internet

pertinente; (2) conserver un registre permettant d’identifier l’abonné pendant des périodes

précises selon que le titulaire du droit d’auteur a intenté ou non une procédure relativement à la

prétendue violation. Le fait qu’aucun règlement n’ait été pris pour fixer le montant maximal

qu’un FSI peut facturer pour réaliser ces obligations ne dit pas si aucun droit ni aucune

indemnité ne peuvent être payés pour l’exécution d’une ordonnance de divulgation, mais décrit
032
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plutôt la politique actuelle, dans le cadre du régime « d’avis et avis », selon laquelle les coûts

découlant de ces obligations doivent, du moins pour l’instant, être assumés par le FSI.

[12] Contrairement aux arguments des demanderesses, l’intention du Parlement lorsqu’il a

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
adopté les articles 41.25 et 41.26 n’était pas, de façon incontestablement claire, d’abroger le

droit et les principes établis concernant les soi-disant ordonnances de divulgation de type

Norwich découlant de la décision Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs & Excise Commissioners

(1973), [1974] A.C. 133 (Chambre des Lords du R.-U.), ni de s’en écarter. La disponibilité de

ces ordonnances à la Cour fédérale a été reconnue pour la première fois par la Cour d’appel

fédérale dans Glaxo Wellcome, et dans l’affaire BMG Canada Inc c. Doe, 2005 CAF 193,

[2005] 4 RCF 81 [BMG], la Cour d’appel a reconnu ce qui suit :

[41] On ne doit pas permettre que [la technologie moderne
comme l’Internet] oblitère les droits en matière de biens personnels
que la société considère importants. Bien que les questions se
rapportant au respect de la vie privée doivent également être prises
en compte, il me semble qu’elles doivent céder le pas aux
préoccupations publiques quant à la protection des droits de
propriété intellectuelle dans des situations où la violation menace
de diminuer ces droits.

[42] Par conséquent, selon moi, dans les cas où les demandeurs
démontrent la légitimité de leur prétention selon laquelle des
personnes inconnues violent leur droit d’auteur, ils ont le droit
d’exiger que l’identité de ces personnes leur soit révélée afin d’être
en mesure d’intenter une action. Toutefois, les cours de justice
doivent faire preuve de prudence lorsqu’elles ordonnent une telle
divulgation pour s’assurer que l’on empiète le moins possible sur
le droit à la vie privée.
033
Page : 10

[13] Les principes émanant de BMG devant être pris en considération lorsque l’on rend une

ordonnance de type Norwich peuvent être résumés ainsi :

1. La prétention de la partie qui demande une ordonnance de type Norwich doit être

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
légitime;

2. La partie contre laquelle une telle ordonnance sera rendue doit posséder des

renseignements sur une question litigieuse soulevée dans l’action;

3. Une ordonnance de la Cour est le seul moyen raisonnable permettant d’obtenir les

renseignements;

4. L’équité exige que les renseignements soient fournis avant l’interrogatoire préalable

ou le procès ou, dans les circonstances de la présente affaire, avant l’autorisation du

recours collectif envisagé;

5. L’ordonnance ne doit pas occasionner de retards, d’inconvénients ou de frais

déraisonnables à la partie à l’égard de laquelle l’ordonnance sera rendue, ni aux

autres parties.

[14] Je suis convaincu que les demanderesses ont présenté une preuve suffisante, notamment

dans l’affidavit de Daniel Macek, pour démontrer la légitimité de leur prétention selon laquelle

des personnes inconnues violent leur droit d’auteur à l’égard des films. En conséquence, elles

ont le droit d’obtenir l’identité de l’abonné afin de poursuivre leur recours collectif envisagé. Ce

droit découle de la jurisprudence établie, notamment celle précitée; il ne découle pas des
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dispositions du régime « d’avis et avis » de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur et n’est fondé d’aucune

façon sur celles-ci.

[15] Je suis également convaincu que les autres principes émanant de l’arrêt BMG exigent

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
qu’une ordonnance soit rendue pour obliger Rogers à divulguer des renseignements sur

l’abonné.

B. Quels renseignements sur l’abonné devraient être divulgués aux demanderesses?

[16] Pour examiner cette question, je précise (comme l’a fait la Cour d’appel dans BMG) qu’il

faut « faire preuve de prudence » lorsque l’on ordonne la divulgation de renseignements sur un

abonné « pour s’assurer que l’on empiète le moins possible sur le droit à la vie privée ». Je note

également l’approche utilisée par la Cour pour divulguer les renseignements dans l’affaire

Voltage Pictures LLC c. John Doe, 2014 CF 161 [Voltage], où la divulgation de l’adresse

électronique du client du FSI n’a pas été ordonnée, ainsi que l’argument de l’intervenante selon

lequel Rogers ne devrait divulguer aux demanderesses que le nom et l’adresse de l’abonné qui

sont associés à l’adresse de protocole Internet allégué être liée à la violation prétendue par les

demanderesses.

[17] À mon avis, les demanderesses ont le droit d’obtenir auprès de Rogers uniquement le

nom et l’adresse de l’abonné, tels qu’ils figurent dans les dossiers de Rogers. La divulgation de

ces renseignements par Rogers doit demeurer confidentielle et les renseignements ne doivent

pas être divulgués à d’autres parties sans une autre ordonnance de la Cour. Ils ne peuvent être

utilisés que par les demanderesses dans le cadre de leur recours collectif envisagé. Par ailleurs,
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les demanderesses n’ont pas le droit de divulguer ces renseignements au grand public en faisant

ou en publiant une déclaration aux médias concernant les renseignements obtenus auprès de

Rogers.

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
C. Rogers a-t-elle le droit à une indemnité pour divulguer des renseignements sur l’abonné
aux demanderesses, y compris à des dépens à l’égard de cette requête?

[18] Selon le dossier, Rogers était prêt à divulguer les renseignements sur l’abonné si les

demanderesses fournissaient un projet d’ordonnance et un paiement préalable d’un montant de

100 $ de l’heure, plus TVH, pour assumer les coûts associés à la compilation de ces

renseignements. Les demanderesses ont refusé de le faire, car, selon elles, les dispositions du

régime « d’avis et avis » de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur empêchaient Rogers d’imposer ou de

percevoir de tels droits. Pour les motifs énoncés précédemment, cet avis est erroné.

[19] En tous les cas, les demanderesses prétendent que même si Rogers était autorisé à exiger

des droits pour la divulgation des renseignements sur l’abonné, ces droits devraient être, au

mieux, minimes et ne devraient pas dépasser 50 cents par abonné, car Roger avait déjà recueilli

et compilé la plupart des renseignements pour se conformer au paragraphe 41.26(1) de la Loi

sur le droit d’auteur. En outre, les demanderesses soutiennent que les droits de 100 $ l’heure

sont déraisonnables et vont à l’encontre de certains éléments de preuve au dossier qui laissent

entendre que les droits n’étaient que de 5 $ ou 10 $ par abonné il y a quelques années. Pour sa

part, Rogers a présenté une preuve sur la façon dont les droits de 100 $ l’heure ont été fixés et

sur leur caractère raisonnable.
036
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[20] La jurisprudence donne à penser qu’il faudrait que l’on tienne compte des débours

encourus par Rogers pour réunir les renseignements sur son abonné et pour se conformer à une

ordonnance de divulgation (voir BMG, au paragraphe 35 et Voltage, aux paragraphes 46 et 138).

Dans Voltage, par exemple, il a été ordonné que « tous les frais juridiques et administratifs et les

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
débours raisonnables engagés » par le FSI pour se conformer à l’ordonnance de divulgation

soient payés par la demanderesse avant la divulgation des renseignements sur le client.

[21] L’argument des demanderesses concernant le caractère déraisonnable et le montant du

tarif horaire de Rogers n’est pas persuasif. Les droits sont ce qu’ils sont, et si les demanderesses

veulent de l’information sur l’abonné, elles doivent payer le tarif horaire. Le dossier donne à

penser que Roger aura besoin d’au plus une heure pour assembler, vérifier et transmettre les

renseignements sur l’abonné aux demanderesses; le coût total serait donc d’approximativement

113 $.

[22] De plus, Rogers a le droit à des dépens à l’égard de cette requête, que j’octroie et je fixe à

500 $ (taxes et débours compris). Ces dépens seront payables sans délai et, dans tous les cas,

dans les 20 jours suivant la date de la présente ordonnance.

III. Conclusion

[23] Les demanderesses ont remis à la Cour un projet d’ordonnance ainsi qu’une proposition

de lettre à envoyer à John Doe le jour où cette requête a été instruite par téléconférence. Les

parties n’ont pas accepté toutes les conditions de cette proposition au moment de l’audience, et

l’intervenante a elle aussi soumis un projet d’ordonnance.
037
Page : 14

[24] Par conséquent, la Cour ordonne aux parties de s’entendre sur les conditions énoncées

dans la lettre à envoyer à John Doe dans les 10 jours suivant la date de la présente ordonnance

et de fournir à la Cour une copie finale prête à signer afin qu’elle l’approuve avant l’envoi. Si

les parties sont incapables de s’entendre, la Cour examinera et achèvera la lettre en se fondant

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
sur la version provisoire préalablement fournie par les demanderesses.
038
Page : 15

ORDONNANCE

LA COUR ORDONNE, pour les motifs énoncés, ce qui suit :

1. La défenderesse non-partie, Rogers Communications Inc., doit divulguer aux

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
demanderesses, dans les dix jours suivant la date de la présente ordonnance, le nom et

l’adresse de l’abonné de Rogers (l’abonné) associé à l’adresse IP 174.112.37.227 aux

dates et heures suivantes (UTC) :

a. 2016-03-24, 05:25:15

b. 2016-01-14, 08:14:55

c. 2016-02-18, 03:45:27

d. 2016-03-10, 02:23:04

e. 2016-01-26, 01:06:07

2. Les demanderesses doivent payer à Rogers Communications Inc. un tarif horaire de

100 $, plus TVH, pour le temps passé par Rogers Communications Inc. à assembler et à

transmettre les renseignements sur l’abonné aux demanderesses, ces droits devant être

payés en entièreté avant la divulgation des renseignements aux demanderesses.

3. Les demanderesses doivent inclure une copie de la présente ordonnance dans toute

correspondance envoyée avec l’avis de requête à l’abonné.

4. L’abonné peut demander une copie complète des motifs de cette ordonnance aux

demanderesses, auquel cas celles-ci doivent lui fournir une copie, sans frais.

5. La correspondance envoyée par les demanderesses à l’abonné avec l’avis de requête doit

clairement indiquer, en caractères gras, que :
039
Page : 16

a. les demanderesses veulent que l’abonné agisse comme représentant défendeur

dans un recours collectif qu’elles souhaitent faire approuver en présentant une

demande en vertu de la partie 5.1 – Recours collectif des Règles des Cours

fédérales, DORS/98-106;

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
b. aucune Cour n’a encore tiré de conclusion de fait ou de droit voulant que l’abonné

soit forcé d’agir comme représentant défendeur dans un recours collectif;

c. aucune Cour n’a encore tiré de conclusion de fait ou de droit autorisant l’action

des demanderesses à titre de recours collectif;

d. aucune Cour n’a encore tiré de conclusion de fait ou de droit voulant que l’abonné

soit la partie responsable de la prétendue violation alléguée par les

demanderesses;

e. aucune Cour n’a encore tiré de conclusion de fait ou de droit voulant que l’abonné

ait commis une violation ou soit responsable de quelque façon que ce soit de

payer des dommages-intérêts.

6. La Cour ordonne aux parties de s’entendre sur les conditions énoncées dans la lettre à

envoyer à John Doe dans les 10 jours suivant la date de la présente ordonnance et de

fournir à la Cour une copie finale prête à signer de la correspondance afin qu’elle

l’approuve avant l’envoi.

7. Les renseignements divulgués par Rogers Communications Inc. ne doivent être utilisés

que par les demanderesses en lien avec les demandes faites dans la présente instance.
040
Page : 17

8. En l’absence d’ordonnance ultérieure de la Cour, les renseignements obtenus de Rogers

Communications Inc. doivent demeurer confidentiels et ne doivent pas être divulgués à

d’autres parties ni au grand public dans le cadre d’une déclaration aux médias ou

autrement, jusqu’à ce que l’identité de l’abonné soit versée au dossier public de

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
l’instance.

9. Toute modification ou tout ajout ultérieur à cette ordonnance relève du pouvoir

discrétionnaire du juge chargé de la gestion de l’instance.

10. Les demanderesses doivent payer à Rogers Communications Inc. des dépens à l’égard de

cette requête, d’un montant forfaitaire de 500 $ (taxes et débours compris). Ces dépens

seront payables sans délai et, dans tous les cas, dans les 20 jours suivant la date de la

présente ordonnance.

« Keith M. Boswell »
Juge
041

COUR FÉDÉRALE

AVOCATS INSCRITS AU DOSSIER

DOSSIER : T-662-16

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
INTITULÉ : VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA,
LLC, PTG NEVADA, LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA,
LLC, GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L. DU
LUXEMBOURG, GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC, ET
FATHERS & DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC c. JOHN
DOE NO 1, REPRÉSENTANT DÉFENDEUR PROPOSÉ
AU NOM DES DÉFENDEURS D’UN RECOURS
COLLECTIF c. ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC. c.
SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET
POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC

REQUÊTE TENUE PAR TÉLÉCONFÉRENCE LE 28 JUIN 2016 À TORONTO
(ONTARIO) ET À OTTAWA (ONTARIO).

ORDONNANCE ET MOTIFS : LE JUGE BOSWELL

DATE DES MOTIFS : LE 28 JUILLET 2016

OBSERVATIONS ÉCRITES :

Kenneth R. Clark POUR LES DEMANDERESSES
Patrick Copeland
Non représenté POUR LE DÉFENDEUR

Andrew Bernstein POUR LA DÉFENDERESSE NON-PARTIE
James Gotowiec (REQUÊTE EN DIVULGATION DES
DEMANDERESSES SEULEMENT)

David Fewer POUR L’INTERVENANTE
042
Page : 2

AVOCATS INSCRITS AU DOSSIER :

Aird & Berlis LLP POUR LES DEMANDERESSES
Avocats
Toronto (Ontario)

2016 CF 881 (CanLII)
Non représenté POUR LE DÉFENDEUR

Torys LLP POUR LA DÉFENDERESSE NON-PARTIE
Avocats (REQUÊTE EN DIVULGATION DES
Toronto (Ontario) DEMANDERESSES SEULEMENT)

Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet POUR L’INTERVENANTE PROPOSÉE
Policy and Public Interest Clinic
Université d’Ottawa, Faculté de droit
Section de common law
Ottawa (Ontario)
043

Date: 20170509

Docket: A-278-16

Ottawa, Ontario, May 9, 2017

CORAM: STRATAS J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
WOODS J.A.

BETWEEN:

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA, LLC,
PTG NEVADA, LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC,
GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L. OF
LUXEMBOURG, GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC and FATHERS
& DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC
Appellants

and

JOHN DOE #1, PROPOSED REPRESENTATIVE
RESPONDENT ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF
RESPONDENTS and ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Respondents

JUDGMENT

The appeal is allowed with costs here and below payable by the respondent, Rogers

Communications Inc. Paragraphs 2 and 10 of the Federal Court’s order dated July 28, 2016 in

file T-662-16 are set aside.

"David Stratas"
J.A.
044

Date: 20170509

Docket: A-278-16

Citation: 2017 FCA 97

CORAM: STRATAS J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
WOODS J.A.

BETWEEN:

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA, LLC,
PTG NEVADA, LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC,
GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L. OF LUXEMBOURG,
GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC and FATHERS & DAUGHTERS
NEVADA, LLC

Appellants

and

JOHN DOE #1, PROPOSED REPRESENTATIVE
RESPONDENT ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF
RESPONDENTS and ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

Respondents

Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on January 11, 2017.

Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 9, 2017.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: STRATAS J.A.

CONCURRED IN BY: GLEASON J.A.
WOODS J.A.
045

Date: 20170509

Docket: A-278-16

Citation: 2017 FCA 97

CORAM: STRATAS J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
WOODS J.A.

BETWEEN:

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA, LLC,
PTG NEVADA, LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC,
GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L. OF LUXEMBOURG,
GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC and FATHERS & DAUGHTERS
NEVADA, LLC

Appellants

and

JOHN DOE #1, PROPOSED REPRESENTATIVE
RESPONDENT ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF
RESPONDENTS and ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STRATAS J.A.

[1] Under the cloak of anonymity on the internet, some can illegally copy, download, and

distribute the intellectual property of others, such as movies, songs and writings. Unless the
046
Page: 2

cloak is lifted and identities are revealed, the illegal conduct can continue, unchecked and

unpunished.

[2] The appellants say this has been happening to them. They are movie producers. They

have launched proceedings—a proposed reverse class action—against those they say have been

downloading their movies illegally. But the appellants face an obstacle: without knowing the

identities of the persons they believe have been infringing their copyrights—persons I shall call

“suspected infringers”—they cannot advance their proceedings any further.

[3] Parliament has intervened to assist those in the position of the appellants. Under a

relatively new legislative regime, Parliament has allowed copyright owners, like the appellants,

to seek information from internet service providers to lift the cloak of anonymity and reveal the

identity of the suspected infringers so the copyright owners can act to protect their rights:

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, sections 41.25 to 41.27 (added by the Copyright

Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 47). The legislative regime regulates a number of matters,

including the fee that an internet service provider may charge for the work it does.

[4] Using the legislative regime, the appellants sought information identifying a suspected

infringer, the respondent, John Doe #1, from an internet service provider, Rogers

Communications Inc. Rogers has now assembled the identifying information.

[5] The appellants moved for an order in the Federal Court requiring the identifying

information to be disclosed to them. Rogers was prepared to disclose it, but only if the appellants
047
Page: 3

paid a fee. The appellants contested the fee, alleging that the legislative regime precluded Rogers

from charging anything and that in any event it was far too high and, thus, unreasonable.

[6] The Federal Court (per Boswell J.) interpreted the legislative regime and, in the end,

agreed with Rogers: 2016 FC 881. It ordered that the identifying information concerning John

Doe #1 be disclosed to the appellants but only after they paid Rogers’ fee.

[7] The appellants appeal to this Court. At first glance, the fee Rogers proposes—$100 per

hour of work plus HST—might strike some as not much of an obstacle for movie producers to

pay. But the appellants say there are tens of thousands of suspected infringers whose identifying

information can now only be had at the same fee. They see Rogers’ fee and the Federal Court’s

approval of it as a multi-million dollar barrier between them and the starting gate for their legal

proceedings—proceedings they consider necessary to protect and vindicate their rights in the

movies they make.

[8] The appellants submit that Rogers’ fee cannot stand. In their view, the Federal Court

erred in law in interpreting the legislative regime.

[9] For the following reasons, I agree with the appellants. The appeal must be allowed with

costs.
048
Page: 4

A. Interpreting the legislative regime

[10] The outcome of this appeal turns on how we interpret this legislative regime. It must be

interpreted in accordance with the text of the legislative provisions, their context, the purposes of

the legislative regime and, more broadly, the purposes of the Copyright Act: see Bell ExpressVu

Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),

[1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193; Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC

54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601. We must also regard this legislative regime as “remedial” and give it

“such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its

objects”: Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, section 12.

[11] As mentioned above, the legislative regime consists of sections 41.25, 41.26 and 41.27 of

the Copyright Act. Section 41.27 provides for injunctive relief against a provider of an

information location tool that is found to have infringed copyright. As this part of the legislative

regime is not in issue in this appeal and as it sheds light on neither the issues before us nor the

proper interpretation of this legislative regime, it shall not be discussed further.

B. Legislative text

[12] Sections 41.25 and 41.26 of the Copyright Act provide as follows:

41.25. (1) An owner of the copyright 41.25. (1) Le titulaire d’un droit
in a work or other subject-matter may d’auteur sur une oeuvre ou tout autre
send a notice of claimed infringement objet du droit d’auteur peut envoyer
to a person who provides un avis de prétendue violation à la
personne qui fournit, selon le cas :
049
Page: 5

(a) the means, in the course of a) dans le cadre de la prestation de
providing services related to the services liés à l’exploitation
operation of the Internet or another d’Internet ou d’un autre réseau
digital network, of numérique, les moyens de
telecommunication through which télécommunication par lesquels
the electronic location that is the l’emplacement électronique qui fait
subject of the claim of l’objet de la prétendue violation est
infringement is connected to the connecté à Internet ou à tout autre
Internet or another digital network; réseau numérique;

(b) for the purpose set out in b) en vue du stockage visé au
subsection 31.1(4), the digital paragraphe 31.1(4), la mémoire
memory that is used for the numérique qui est utilisée pour
electronic location to which the l’emplacement électronique en
claim of infringement relates; or cause;

(c) an information location tool as c) un outil de repérage au sens du
defined in subsection 41.27(5). paragraphe 41.27(5).

(2) A notice of claimed infringement (2) L’avis de prétendue violation est
shall be in writing in the form, if any, établi par écrit, en la forme
prescribed by regulation and shall éventuellement prévue par règlement,
et, en outre :

(a) state the claimant’s name and a) précise les nom et adresse du
address and any other particulars demandeur et contient tout autre
prescribed by regulation that renseignement prévu par règlement
enable communication with the qui permet la communication avec
claimant; lui;

(b) identify the work or other b) identifie l’oeuvre ou l’autre
subject-matter to which the objet du droit d’auteur auquel la
claimed infringement relates; prétendue violation se rapporte;

(c) state the claimant’s interest or c) déclare les intérêts ou droits du
right with respect to the copyright demandeur à l’égard de l’oeuvre ou
in the work or other subject- de l’autre objet visé;
matter;

(d) specify the location data for the d) précise les données de
electronic location to which the localisation de l’emplacement
claimed infringement relates; électronique qui fait l’objet de la
prétendue violation;
050
Page: 6

(e) specify the infringement that is e) précise la prétendue violation;
claimed;

(f) specify the date and time of the f) précise la date et l’heure de la
commission of the claimed commission de la prétendue
infringement; and violation;

(g) contain any other information g) contient, le cas échéant, tout
that may be prescribed by autre renseignement prévu par
regulation. règlement

41.26. (1) A person described in 41.26. (1) La personne visée aux
paragraph 41.25(1)(a) or (b) who alinéas 41.25(1)a) ou b) qui reçoit un
receives a notice of claimed avis conforme au paragraphe 41.25(2)
infringement that complies with a l’obligation d’accomplir les actes ci-
subsection 41.25(2) shall, on being après, moyennant paiement des droits
paid any fee that the person has qu’elle peut exiger :
lawfully charged for doing so,

(a) as soon as feasible forward the a) transmettre dès que possible par
notice electronically to the person voie électronique une copie de
to whom the electronic location l’avis à la personne à qui appartient
identified by the location data l’emplacement électronique
specified in the notice belongs and identifié par les données de
inform the claimant of its localisation qui sont précisées dans
forwarding or, if applicable, of the l’avis et informer dès que possible
reason why it was not possible to le demandeur de cette transmission
forward it; and ou, le cas échéant, des raisons pour
lesquelles elle n’a pas pu
l’effectuer;

(b) retain records that will allow b) conserver, pour une période de
the identity of the person to whom six mois à compter de la date de
the electronic location belongs to réception de l’avis de prétendue
be determined, and do so for six violation, un registre permettant
months beginning on the day on d’identifier la personne à qui
which the notice of claimed appartient l’emplacement
infringement is received or, if the électronique et, dans le cas où,
claimant commences proceedings avant la fin de cette période, une
relating to the claimed procédure est engagée par le
infringement and so notifies the titulaire du droit d’auteur à l’égard
person before the end of those six de la prétendue violation et qu’elle
months, for one year after the day en a reçu avis, conserver le registre
on which the person receives the pour une période d’un an suivant la
051
Page: 7

notice of claimed infringement. date de la réception de l’avis de
prétendue violation.

(2) The Minister may, by regulation, (2) Le ministre peut, par règlement,
fix the maximum fee that a person fixer le montant maximal des droits
may charge for performing his or her qui peuvent être exigés pour les actes
obligations under subsection (1). If no prévus au paragraphe (1). À défaut de
maximum is fixed by regulation, the règlement à cet effet, le montant de
person may not charge any amount ces droits est nul.
under that subsection.

(3) A claimant’s only remedy against (3) Le seul recours dont dispose le
a person who fails to perform his or demandeur contre la personne qui
her obligations under subsection (1) is n’exécute pas les obligations que lui
statutory damages in an amount that impose le paragraphe (1) est le
the court considers just, but not less recouvrement des dommages-intérêts
than $5,000 and not more than préétablis dont le montant est, selon ce
$10,000. que le tribunal estime équitable en
l’occurrence, d’au moins 5 000 $ et
d’au plus 10 000 $.

(4) The Governor in Council may, by (4) Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par
regulation, increase or decrease the règlement, changer les montants
minimum or maximum amount of minimal et maximal des dommages-
statutory damages set out in intérêts préétablis visés au paragraphe
subsection (3). (3).

C. The state of the law before the legislative regime was enacted

[13] The earlier state of the law sheds much light on the purposes of the legislative regime.

The legislative scheme was aimed at reducing the complexity and cumbersomeness under the

earlier law so that copyright owners could better protect and vindicate their rights.

[14] We start with the problem mentioned at the start of these reasons. Copyright owners need

information concerning the identities of suspected copyright infringers and internet service
052
Page: 8

providers hold that information. But internet service providers are understandably reluctant to

disclose their customers’ information.

[15] The same sort of problem happens in other contexts. Sometimes persons are wronged and

intend to bring legal proceedings for the wrong but cannot: they do not know the identity of their

wrongdoers. However, a third party does know or has the means of knowing.

[16] Over four decades ago, courts found a solution to this problem: the equitable bill of

discovery. A party can use this mechanism to obtain a pre-litigation order against a third party

compelling disclosure of identifying information and documents. Today, such an order is often

called a Norwich order, named after the House of Lords decision that fashioned it: Norwich

Pharmacal Co. v. Customs & Excise Commissioners, [1973] UKHL 6, [1974] A.C. 133.

[17] In the Federal Courts system, Norwich orders can be obtained under Rule 233 of the

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, 2005 FCA 193, [2005] 4 F.C.R.

81.

[18] Norwich orders are by no means sure things to get. One must show a valid, bona fide or

reasonable claim, the involvement of a third party in the impugned acts, necessity in the sense

that the third party is the only practical source of the information, and desirability in the sense

that the interests of justice favour the obtaining of disclosure from the third party.
053
Page: 9

[19] And that is not all. The court must balance the benefit to the applicant against the

prejudice to the alleged wrongdoer in releasing the information. Factoring into the equation is the

nature of the information sought, the degree of confidentiality associated with the information by

the party against whom the order is sought, and the degree to which the requested order curtails

the use to which the information can be put. Finally, the person from whom discovery is sought

can be reasonably compensated for the expenses arising out of compliance with the discovery

order. See generally BMG Canada Inc., above; Straka v. Humber River Regional Hospital

(2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 1; 193 D.L.R. (4th) 680 (C.A.); 1654776 Ontario Limited v. Stewart, 2013

ONCA 184, 114 O.R. (3d) 745.

[20] In seeking a Norwich order, complications can arise. What sort of information and

documents is the moving party entitled to receive? Does notice have to be sent to the suspected

wrongdoers? If so, what is the content of the notice? What sort of compensation is the holder of

information and documents entitled to receive? How long must that party retain the information

and records? Many other questions can arise.

D. The purpose of the legislative regime

[21] The legislative regime is designed to reduce the complications and answer many of the

questions that can arise when a Norwich order is sought. In this way, it makes the process more

administrative in nature, more predictable, simpler and faster, to the benefit of all involved—but

most of all to copyright owners who need to protect and vindicate their rights.
054
Page: 10

[22] As we shall see, the legislative regime protects and vindicates the rights of copyright

owners in other ways, such as by putting suspected infringers on notice so that they may cease

any further infringing conduct.

[23] The protection and vindication of the rights of copyright owners is no small thing. That is

a central feature of the Copyright Act. It is also a central feature of the Copyright Modernization

Act, the statute that added the legislative regime to the Copyright Act. These statutes don’t just

identify the purpose of protecting and vindicating the rights of copyright owners; they also tell us

why this purpose matters.

[24] The preamble to the Copyright Modernization Act tells us, among other things, that it is

to “update the rights and protections of copyright owners” and to “enhanc[e] the protection of

copyright works or other subject-matter” in order to promote “culture and innovation,

competition and investment in the Canadian economy.” Economic growth creates wealth and

employment. The Copyright Modernization Act is needed because of “advancements

in…information and communications technologies that…present…challenges that are global in

scope.” Further, “the challenges and opportunities of the Internet” need to be addressed. The

preamble to the Copyright Modernization Act also reminds us that the Copyright Act is “an

important marketplace framework law and cultural policy instrument that, through clear,

predictable and fair rules, supports creativity and innovation and affects many sectors of the

knowledge economy.”
055
Page: 11

[25] The Copyright Act itself aims at “a balance between promoting the public interest in the

encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward

for the creator”: Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34, 2 S.C.R. 336

at para. 30. Or as the Supreme Court also put it, “to prevent someone other than the creator from

appropriating whatever benefits may be generated”: ibid.; see also CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law

Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, 1 S.C.R. 339 at para. 23.

[26] The overall aim, then, is to ensure that in the age of the internet, the balance between

legitimate access to works and a just reward for creators is maintained. The internet must not

become a collection of safe houses from which pirates, with impunity, can pilfer the products of

others’ dedication, creativity and industry. Allow that, and the incentive to create works would

decline or the price for proper users to access works would increase, or both. Parliament’s

objectives would crumble. All the laudable aims of the Copyright Act—protecting creators’ and

makers’ rights, fostering the fair dissemination of ideas and legitimate access to those ideas,

promoting learning, advancing culture, encouraging innovation, competitiveness and investment,

and enhancing the economy, wealth and employment—would be nullified.

[27] Thus, to the extent it can, the legislative regime must be interpreted to allow copyright

owners to protect and vindicate their rights as quickly, easily and efficiently as possible while

ensuring fair treatment of all.
056
Page: 12

E. Analyzing the legislative regime

[28] The holders of records who are subject to this legislative regime are defined with

particularity under subsection 41.25(1). But for simplicity I shall refer to them in these reasons as

internet service providers.

[29] The legislative regime imposes certain obligations upon internet service providers that

have identifying information. The legislative regime also regulates the fee that internet service

providers can seek from copyright owners for their efforts.

[30] Here’s how the legislative regime works. Under section 41.25 of the Act, the owner of a

copyright in a work or other subject-matter, such as the appellants, sends a notice of infringed

copyright to an internet service provider like Rogers. The notice sets out certain information that

allows the internet service provider to review its records and identify the suspected infringer: see

subsection 41.25(2) of the Act.

[31] Subsection 41.26(1) of the Act sets out the obligations of the internet service provider

upon receiving the notice of infringed copyright and upon the payment of any fee that can be

“lawfully charged.”

[32] The internet service provider has two sets of obligations: one set in paragraph 41.26(1)(a)

and another set in paragraph 41.26(1)(b). Some obligations are express and are evident in the

literal wording of these paragraphs. Other obligations are necessarily incidental to, implied from
057
Page: 13

or bound up in the express obligations. These other obligations must also exist—otherwise, the

purposes underlying the legislative regime will be unfulfilled or, worse, frustrated.

(1) The obligations under paragraph 41.26(1)(a)

[33] The internet service provider must forward the notice of claimed infringement to “the

person to whom the electronic location identified by the location data specified in the notice

belongs,” namely the suspected infringer. This furthers the objective of fairness to suspected

infringers online: among other things, they may be able to oppose any later disclosure order

concerning their information and forestall trouble by contacting the copyright owners and

offering any apologies, explanations or settlement proposals. They may also cease their

infringing activities, capping both the damage to the copyright owner and their own potential

liability.

[34] These objectives, the overall purposes of this legislative regime, and the broader purposes

of the Copyright Act can only be met if the internet service provider maintains its records in a

manner and form that allow it to identify suspected infringers quickly and efficiently, it has

searched for and has located the relevant records, and it has done enough work analyzing the

records to satisfy itself that it has identified the suspected infringers accurately.

[35] For the legislative regime to work, accuracy must be assured. Thus, to the extent the

internet service provider must conduct verification activities to ensure accuracy, the verification

activities must be part and parcel of the paragraph 41.26(1)(a) obligations.
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[36] Finally, the internet service provider must notify the copyright owner that it has sent

notices to the suspected infringers or must explain why it was not able to send them.

(2) The obligations under paragraph 41.26(1)(b)

[37] The internet service provider must “retain records” that “will allow the identity of the

person to whom the electronic location belongs to be determined” by those who will use the

records. The “records” are those the internet service provider has located and maintains in a

manner and form usable by it to identify suspected infringers in accordance with its paragraph

41.26(1)(a) obligations. But the records may not be in a manner and form usable by those

seeking to determine the identity of the suspected infringers. Who might those persons be? No

doubt the copyright owner needs to know the identity of the suspected infringers so it can

determine its options. And ultimately a court will need to know the identity of the suspected

infringers so it can determine the issues of copyright infringement and remedy.

[38] Thus, bearing in mind the purposes of the legislative scheme and the broader purposes of

the Copyright Act, Parliament must have intended that the records be in a manner and form that

can be used by the copyright owner to determine its options and, ultimately, by the court to

determine issues of copyright infringement and remedy.

[39] To the extent that the records are in a manner and form usable by the internet service

provider to identify suspected infringers but are not in a manner and form usable by copyright

owners and courts—in other words, to the extent they must be translated or modified in some
059
Page: 15

way—the internet service provider must perform that work as part of its 41.26(1)(b) obligations.

An indecipherable jumble of randomly arranged records that copyright owners and courts cannot

figure out will not, in the words of paragraph 41.26(1)(b), “allow [copyright holders and courts

to determine] the identity of the person to whom the electronic location belongs.” The records

must also be retained in a manner that can be disclosed promptly. Only the prompt provision of

helpful, usable records to copyright owners and ultimately to the courts fulfils the purposes of the

legislative regime and the broader purposes of the Copyright Act.

(3) A summary of the internet service provider’s obligations under subsection 41.26(1)

[40] Overall, putting the two sets of subsection 41.26(1) obligations together, the internet

service provider must maintain records in a manner and form that allows it to identify suspected

infringers, to locate the relevant records, to identify the suspected infringers, to verify the

identification work it has done (if necessary), to send the notices to the suspected infringers and

the copyright owner, to translate the records (if necessary) into a manner and form that allows

them both to be disclosed promptly and to be used by copyright owners and later the courts to

determine the identity of the suspected infringers, and, finally, to keep the records ready for

prompt disclosure.

[41] These obligations arise only upon the internet service provider being paid a “lawfully

charged” fee: see the opening words of subsection 41.26(1); see also subsection 41.26(2), which

regulates the amount of the fee. What fee can an internet service provider charge? In this case,

what fee can Rogers charge?
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(4) The fee that the internet service provider can charge

[42] Under subsection 41.26(2), the responsible Minister, the Minister of Industry, may, by

regulation, fix the maximum fee that an internet service provider like Rogers can charge for

performing the subsection 41.26(1) obligations. But if no maximum fee is fixed by regulation,

the internet service provider may not charge anything for performing the subsection 41.26(1)

obligations.

[43] At present, no regulation has been passed. Thus, internet service providers such as Rogers

cannot charge a fee for the discharge of their subsection 41.26(1) obligations, as significant as

they are.

[44] In the abstract, some may query the policy wisdom of this. But when the text, context and

purpose of the legislative regime and the broader purposes of the Copyright Act are kept front of

mind and when a little bit of legislative history is taken into account, the query is answered.

[45] Before the enactment of this legislative regime, internet service providers were consulted

on the issue of the fee and a number of other matters: see the explanatory note to the order that

brought sections 41.25 and 41.26 into force (P.C. 2014-675): Canada Gazette, Part II, v. 148, no.

14, pp. 2121-2122. This gave internet service providers an opportunity to weigh in and express

concerns about whether the obligations to be imposed on them were too onerous, impractical or

expensive.
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[46] Looking at the version of the legislative regime that was enacted after the consultations

ended, one may surmise that uncertainty remained on the issue of the fee. Rather than specifying

a particular amount or a particular formula by which a fee could be calculated, Parliament

adopted a more flexible posture.

[47] Another way of putting this is that subsection 41.26(2) has been drafted in a way that

makes “no fee” for the subsection 41.26(1) obligations the default position. Depending on

everyone’s experience concerning the operation of the legislative regime, the Minister of

Industry might later make a regulation setting a maximum fee. When in force, that regulation

would displace the default position.

[48] The default position of “no regulation and, thus, no fee” for the 41.26(1) obligations is a

legislative choice that, at least for the time being, prioritizes considerations of access to

identifying information to allow copyright owners the ability to protect and vindicate their rights

over the economic interests of internet service providers. This is no surprise given the purposes

the legislative regime serves and the broader purposes of the Copyright Act.

[49] Inherent in this legislative choice is the view that leaving the cost of the subsection

41.26(1) obligations with internet service providers, at least for the time being, is not unfair.

After all, depending on the elasticity of demand, the costs can be passed on to the subscribers of

the products of internet service providers, some of whom are the suspected infringers.
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[50] If subsection 41.26(2) were drafted differently and internet service providers were

allowed to charge without restriction, the purposes behind this legislative regime and the larger

purposes of the Copyright Act would be frustrated. Internet service providers could potentially

charge a fee so large that copyright owners would be dissuaded from obtaining the information

they need to protect and vindicate their rights. Parliament’s aims of protecting the rights of

copyright owners, fostering the wide dissemination of ideas and legitimate access to those ideas,

promoting learning, advancing culture, encouraging innovation, competitiveness and investment,

and enhancing the economy, wealth and employment would be thwarted. But the pirates’ safe

houses would thrive.

[51] Throughout the hearing before us, Rogers submitted that it ought to receive reasonable

compensation for what it does and that it should not be forced to provide services for free. This

may be so in a political, commercial or moral sense. But, as the foregoing analysis of this

remedial legislative regime suggests, this is not so in a legal sense.

[52] At present, if the absence of a regulation and the attendant prohibition against charging a

fee for the discharge of the subsection 41.26(1) obligations causes economic hardship for internet

service providers like Rogers, one immediate recourse is to limit their costs of compliance with

their obligations. For example, they can apply their advanced technological expertise to their

systems to make their compliance with subsection 41.26(1) more automatic, more efficient and

less expensive.
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[53] Indeed, this was foreseen and was encouraged. Internet service providers were given six

month’s advance notice of the entry into force of the legislative regime so that they could

“implement or modify their systems”: see the explanatory note, above, published in the Canada

Gazette, above at p. 2122.

[54] And now of course, with the benefit of experience under this new legislative regime and

also with the benefit of this Court’s interpretation of the legislative regime, the internet service

providers can plead their economic case to the Minister and ask for a regulation that would allow

them to charge a fee for their work in discharging their subsection 41.26(1) obligations.

F. What the legislative regime does not regulate

[55] After the internet service provider has performed its subsection 41.26(1) activities, it is

holding records that are in a manner and form that can be disclosed promptly to copyright

owners and that can be used by copyright owners and courts to determine the identity of

suspected infringers. All that is left is the actual act of disclosure to the copyright owner. The

legislative regime does not regulate this.

[56] As mentioned above, the legislative regime was enacted against the backdrop of the

Norwich order process, a process that includes the act of disclosure. But by not regulating the act

of disclosure, the legislative regime does not displace the Norwich order process entirely. The

Norwich order process remains to govern disclosure.
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[57] Thus, it appears that Parliament elected to keep the courts in charge of deciding whether

disclosure should be made and, if so, on what conditions. Again, Parliament seems to have

sought flexibility: to ensure that at the end of the process the courts can deal with any unfairness

arising under this new legislative regime.

[58] Unless an internet service provider is willing to hand over the retained records

voluntarily, the copyright owner must seek an order for disclosure. It is reasonable for an internet

service provider to insist that a disclosure order be sought. The order can protect it against

aggrieved customers whose information is being disclosed.

[59] What criteria govern the granting of that order? It must be recalled that Norwich orders

emanate from the equitable bill of discovery and so all of the discretionary considerations that

can affect equitable relief are live. Further, as BMG Canada Inc. tells us, Norwich orders can be

sought in the Federal Courts system under Rule 233. And under Rule 53(1), the Federal Courts

“may impose such conditions and give such directions as [they consider] just.”

[60] However, the court’s power to impose conditions and make directions is restricted in one

major way. A court is bound by the law on the books, in this case sections 41.25 and 41.26 of the

Copyright Act. As we have seen, in the absence of a regulation, subsection 41.26(2) forbids the

charging of a fee for the internet service providers’ discharge of their obligations under

subsection 41.26(1). A court cannot authorize the charging of fees that Parliament says cannot be

charged.
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G. The charging of a fee for the act of disclosure

[61] The internet service provider can charge a fee for the actual, reasonable and necessary

costs associated with the act of disclosure. The act of disclosure does not fall within subsection

41.26(1) and, thus, is not subject to the “no regulation and, thus, no fee” default rule in

subsection 41.26(2).

[62] What do we mean by the act of disclosure? It will be recalled that after the internet

service provider has performed its subsection 41.26(1) activities, it is holding records that are in

a manner and form that allows them to be used by copyright owners and courts to determine the

identity of suspected infringers and in a manner and form that allows prompt disclosure. All that

is left is the delivery or electronic transmission of these records by the internet service provider

to the copyright owner and the internet service provider’s participation in the obtaining of a

disclosure order from the Court.

[63] The actual, reasonable and necessary costs of delivery or electronic transmission of the

records by the internet service provider are likely to be negligible.

[64] Similarly, the costs associated with a motion for a disclosure order are likely to be

minimal. A single disclosure order can authorize the release of the identifying information of

many suspected infringers, perhaps even thousands. Except in extraordinary cases, the motion

for a disclosure order would proceed as a Rule 369 motion in writing on consent or unopposed,

with standard material and a standard draft order placed before the Court. That standard draft
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Page: 22

order could include a standard amount, likely nominal, to compensate the internet service

provider for its disclosure activities, and nothing else.

H. Analysis of the Federal Court’s decision

[65] In the case before us, the Federal Court made an order requiring Rogers to disclose the

records it had retained. It was also minded to allow Rogers to charge a fee for its efforts. The

issue before us is whether, in light of the principles discussed above, the Federal Court erred in

setting the fee.

[66] In the Federal Court, Rogers was prepared to disclose the records if the appellants

submitted a proposed form of order and paid a fee of $100 per hour plus HST “to cover its costs

associated with compiling such information”: Federal Court’s reasons at para. 18.

[67] As best as can be determined, Rogers completed its work to satisfy its subsection

41.26(1) obligations. But in response to the appellants’ request for disclosure, Rogers re-did

some of its work, reviewing the information in its computer system to identify the suspected

infringer. To do this, it used a completely different system, one used for law enforcement

requests. Rogers says that it needed to do this additional work in order to verify its earlier work

and ensure accuracy. Rogers’ $100 per hour fee is based mainly on the cost of this additional

work.
067
Page: 23

[68] The Federal Court approved the fee. According to the Federal Court, “the fee is what it

is” and if the appellants want the information “they must pay the hourly fee”: Federal Court’s

reasons at para. 21. The fee is to compensate Rogers for the work necessary to “assemble, verify

and forward the Subscriber information to the [appellants]”: Federal Court’s reasons at para. 21.

[69] The Federal Court’s reasoning appears to have been that the legislative regime does not

provide for disclosure of the information and it does not say that a fee cannot be charged for

“complying with a disclosure order made in respect of that information” (at para. 8).

Accordingly, in its view, the usual requirement of a Norwich order—that the copyright owner

reimburse the internet service provider for its reasonable costs—remains unaffected by the

legislation. As a result, the Federal Court concluded that it could allow a fee to be paid to Rogers

to cover its costs of discharging the subsection 41.26(1) obligations.

[70] In my view, this holding was vitiated by legal error. Under the legislative regime,

described and analyzed above, an internet service provider cannot charge a fee for the costs of

discharging its subsection 41.26(1) obligations, enumerated and described in paragraph 40,

above. Allowing an internet service provider at the point of disclosure to charge a fee for these

costs would be an end run around the legislative decision that these activities should not be

remunerated at this time.

[71] The additional work Rogers did was identification and verification work. Rogers should

have completed this work as part of its subsection 41.26(1) obligations—matters for which it

cannot charge a fee at this time. If an internet service provider like Rogers has discharged its
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subsection 41.26(1) obligations properly, there should be no need to re-do the work. As

mentioned above, the legislative regime contemplates that an internet service provider will

discharge its subsection 41.26(1) obligations fully and accurately so that notices are sent only to

the correct people and so the correct records can be used by copyright owners and courts if

proceedings are later started.

[72] The appellants submit that the Federal Court also erred in saying that the “fee is what it

is.” They submit that the Federal Court must always ensure that a fee is reasonable in the

circumstances. I agree that the Federal Court did not assess the reasonableness of the fee and

should have. While the Federal Court noted (at paragraph 19) that “Rogers has offered evidence

as to how the $100 per hour fee was established and why it is reasonable,” the Federal Court

never explicitly assessed its reasonableness.

[73] For these reasons, paragraph 2 of the Federal Court’s order, which requires the appellants

to pay Rogers a fee of $100 per hour plus HST for its services, must be set aside.

I. What should this Court do in this case?

[74] It is open to us to examine the evidence and to make the order the Federal Court should

have made: Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, para. 52(b)(i).

[75] As mentioned above, on a motion for a disclosure order, the Court may attach a condition

to the order, allowing for compensation to be paid to the internet service provider provided this is
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consistent with the legislation. It is for the internet service provider to adduce the evidence

necessary to prove its actual, reasonable and necessary costs that can and should be

compensated—in this case the costs associated with the act of disclosure. Rogers failed to

adduce sufficient evidence on this. It has not satisfied its burden.

[76] The only evidence in the record suggests that Rogers’ cost of disclosure in 2012 was, at

most, $0.50 per IP address: cross-examination of Ms. Jackson, QQ. 261-295; appeal book at pp.

118-121. But this evidence is not precise enough to be relied upon. The words “at most” mean

that the cost in 2012 could have been less than $0.50 per IP address, perhaps significantly less.

As well, evidence from 2012 does not tell us much about the present cost of disclosure: as we

have seen, the entry into force of the legislative regime was delayed in order for internet service

providers to improve their systems. This may have happened and so the cost now may be less.

We simply do not know.

[77] Rogers has incurred legal costs in relation to the disclosure order both in the Federal

Court and this Court. However, in the circumstances of this case, costs must follow the event,

and it will be Rogers that pays the appellants’ costs, not vice versa. In any event, granting a

condition on a disclosure order allowing for compensation is a matter of discretion, at least in

part guided by equitable considerations. In light of the position taken by Rogers in this litigation,

I would exercise my discretion against any compensation for its legal costs.
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[78] None of the foregoing prevents Rogers in future cases from charging a fee, likely

nominal, compensating it for the actual, reasonable and necessary costs associated with the act of

disclosure as defined in paragraph 62 above.

[79] Again, if Rogers and other internet service providers consider this level of compensation

for their work to be unfair, they can ask the Minister to pass a regulation setting a maximum fee.

As explained, this would permit them to charge a fee not just for the act of delivery, but also for

the discharge of their subsection 41.26(1) obligations.

J. Proposed disposition

[80] For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the appeal. I would set aside paragraph 2 of the

Federal Court’s order dated July 28, 2016 in file T-662-16. I would set aside the award of costs

in paragraph 10 of that order and award the appellants their costs here and below payable by the

respondent, Rogers Communications Inc.

“David Stratas”
J.A.
“I agree
Mary J.L. Gleason J.A.”

“I agree
Judith Woods J.A.”
071

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET: A-278-16

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BOSWELL
DATED JULY 28, 2016, NO. T-662-16

STYLE OF CAUSE: VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC et al.
v. JOHN DOE #1, PROPOSED
REPRESENTATIVE
RESPONDENT ON BEHALF OF A
CLASS OF RESPONDENTS AND
ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS
INC.

PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO

DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 11, 2017

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: STRATAS J.A.

CONCURRED IN BY: GLEASON J.A.
WOODS J.A.

DATED: MAY 9, 2017

APPEARANCES:

Kenneth R. Clark FOR THE APPELLANTS
Patrick Copeland

Andrew Bernstein FOR THE RESPONDENT,
James Gotowiec ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS
INC.

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Aird & Berlis LLP FOR THE APPELLANTS
Toronto, Ontario

Torys LLP FOR THE RESPONDENT,
Toronto, Ontario ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS
INC.
072

File No. ________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

B E T W E E N:

ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Applicant
(Respondent)
- and -

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC, COBBLER NEVADA, LLC, PTG NEVADA,
LLC, CLEAR SKIES NEVADA, LLC, GLACIER ENTERTAINMENT S.A.R.L.
OF LUXEMBOURG, GLACIER FILMS 1, LLC and FATHERS &
DAUGHTERS NEVADA, LLC

Respondents
(Appellants)

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE APPLICANT
(Pursuant Rule 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

Torys LLP Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP
79 Wellington Street West, Suite 3000 55 Metcalfe Street
Box 270, TD Centre Suite 1300
Toronto, Ontario M5K 1N2 Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5
Fax: 416.865.7380 Fax: 613.230.6423

Andrew Bernstein Yael Wexler
Tel: 416.865.7678 Tel: 613.696.6860
Email: abernstein@torys.com Email: ywexler@fasken.com
Agent for Counsel for the Applicant,
James Gotowiec
Rogers Communications Inc.
Tel: 416.865.7981
Email: jgotowiec@torys.com

Counsel for the Applicant,
Rogers Communications Inc.

i
073

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE APPLICANT
ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

PART I – OVERVIEW OF POSITION AND FACTS
Overview

1. This case is about who should bear the costs of enforcing copyright on the internet. This
Court has expressly confirmed that the burden of copyright disputes between creators and users
should not be “visited on the heads of the Internet intermediaries.” But this is precisely the effect
of the decision below.

2. At issue in this application are the obligations imposed on internet service providers (or
ISPs) by 2012 amendments to the Copyright Act, which enacted a “notice and notice” system to
facilitate enforcing copyright online. Notice and notice is a made-in-Canada solution, intended to
balance the rights of copyright owners with the rights of internet users. This case provides this
Court with the opportunity to consider questions of national and public importance relating to the
notice and notice system. Its outcome will affect every Canadian with an internet subscription.

3. Notice and notice is a voluntary system created by Canadian ISPs to avoid some of the
abuses associated with the “notice and take-down” system in the U.S. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). Notice and take-down under the DMCA requires ISPs who receive a
notice that material infringes copyright to remove it from the internet. This system of mandatory
take-down tilted the playing field heavily towards copyright owners and away from users. Notice
and notice was designed to avoid this problem. It requires ISPs to forward a notice of
infringement to the alleged infringer. The question of take-down – and the associated
enforcement costs – are left to the owner, the user and the courts. ISPs are intentionally left out
of it. This was thought to provide greater balance between copyright owners and internet users.

4. Although notice and notice was initially voluntary, in 2012 Parliament formalized it into
sections 41.25 and 41.26 of the Copyright Act (the “Notice and Notice Provisions”), as part of a
broader package of reforms called the Copyright Modernization Act. The Notice and Notice
Provisions came into force in January 2015. All Canadian ISPs, which together service more
than 12 million residential subscribers, are now required to comply with the Act’s notice and
notice requirements.

1
074

5. At the heart of the notice and notice system is a balance between the rights of copyright
owners, ISPs and internet users. Copyright owners can monitor the internet and send notices to
ISPs when they become aware of potential infringement. ISPs process the millions of notices
they receive each year and pass them along to their customers. Internet users receive the notices
and can decide whether to remove the impugned content, or to keep it online and risk a lawsuit.

6. Prior to enactment of the Notice and Notice Provisions, all of this was done on a
voluntary basis without charge by most ISPs, who invested in the technology and personnel to
enable the forwarding of notices to their subscribers to be wholly automated. However, if a
copyright owner wanted to go beyond notification and obtain an order requiring the ISP to
identify its subscriber, the ISP would need to use a multi-step manual process in order to protect
its customers’ privacy. Under long-standing principles articulated by Canadian courts governing
Norwich orders for third party discovery, the copyright owner was obliged to reimburse the ISP
for its reasonable costs.

7. The carefully crafted notice and notice system was balanced and consistent with this
Court’s view that internet intermediaries should not be drawn into copyright disputes between
creators and users. However, the decision of the Court of Appeal – imposing numerous
obligations on ISPs while excusing copyright owners from reimbursing them for their reasonable
costs – is inconsistent with these principles, and dramatically upsets the careful balance between
different stakeholders.

8. At first instance, the Federal Court found that the Notice and Notice Provisions did not
modify the common law Norwich rules, and that innocent third party ISPs retained the right to
recover the costs they incurred in responding to third-party discovery requests. However, the
Court of Appeal reversed and held that the Notice and Notice Provisions imposed seven discrete
and mostly unwritten obligations on ISPs. It effectively treated most elements of the Norwich
order process as having been subsumed within the notice and notice regime, despite clear
evidence that Parliament intended the Norwich order regime to be unaffected by the 2012
amendments to the Copyright Act. Because of these newfound obligations, the Court of Appeal
concluded that ISPs could not recover the vast majority of their costs in responding to Norwich
requests. In a dramatic deviation from the principles articulated by this Court, the Court of

2
075

Appeal concluded that, instead of requiring the copyright owner to pay these costs, they should
be visited on the heads of ISPs and passed along to their subscribers – i.e., every Canadian with
an internet connection.

9. The Court of Appeal’s interpretation was informed by a misunderstanding of the purpose
of the Copyright Act. While this Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Act must be
interpreted to balance the rights of copyright owners against the rights and interests of users, the
Court of Appeal interpreted it as prioritizing only owners’ rights. It therefore interpreted the
Notice and Notice Provisions “to allow copyright owners to protect and vindicate their rights as
quickly, easily and efficiently as possible.”

10. The interpretation of the Notice and Notice Provisions will govern the industry for years
into the future. Copyright holders are already relying on portions of the Court of Appeal’s
decision to demand that Rogers and other ISPs respond to their disclosure requests on an
accelerated basis, in priority to even disclosure requests from law enforcement. This case affords
the Court an opportunity to provide critical guidance on what is and what is not required of
Canadian ISPs under these new sections of the Copyright Act. Rogers asks this Court to grant
leave and ensure that the principle of balance between ISPs, copyright holders and users is front
and centre in interpreting the Notice and Notice Provisions.

ISPs and IP Addresses

11. Rogers acts as an Internet Service Provider, or ISP. This means that it provides
subscribers with access to the internet.

12. Any device that is connected to the internet is assigned a unique identifier, called an
internet protocol (or IP) address, by its ISP. The IP address enables data to be properly routed to
the device making the request. IP addresses can be permanently assigned to a specific device (a
“static IP address”), or assigned to a device for a period of time before being reassigned to a
different device (a “dynamic IP address”). The overwhelming majority of Rogers’ customers
have dynamic IP addresses.1

1
Affidavit of Kristi Jackson, sworn June 10, 2016, (Jackson Affidavit) paras. 5-7, Leave
Application (“LA”), Tab 8
3
076

Notice and Take-down

13. Under the U.S. DMCA, 2 ISPs are protected from copyright liability for content made
available by their subscribers. However, they lose that protection if they fail to comply with the
DMCA’s “notice and take-down” requirements. These requirements require an ISP to take down
content if it receives a notice that the hosted content infringes copyright.3

14. While the notice and take-down system is convenient for copyright holders, it has been
harshly criticized for ignoring users’ rights. 4 It gives relief tantamount to an interlocutory
injunction but without the safeguards associated with that remedy, such as the need to establish
irreparable harm, or give an undertaking as to damages. American commentators have also
pointed out that it acts as a prior restraint on speech and also takes little account of fair use.5

Voluntary Notice and Notice System

15. Notice and notice was fashioned as an alternative to notice and take-down. The intention
was to create a made-in-Canada solution that addresses the legitimate concerns of copyright
owners, but balances them with the rights and interests of users.

16. Notice and notice began as a voluntary system created by Canadian ISPs. Instead of
automatically removing any content, Canadian ISPs agreed that if they received a notice
indicating that copyright infringement was occurring at a particular IP address at a particular
time, they would forward the notice to the subscriber associated with that address. The ISPs did
not provide any of the subscriber’s identifying information to the copyright owner. If the owner
wanted to obtain that information, legitimate privacy concerns required the owner to obtain a
Norwich order for third party discovery directed to the ISP.6

2
112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (U.S.A.)
3
Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, “Notice and Takedown in Everyday
Practice” (March 22, 2017). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2755628, p. 15
4
See, e.g., Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation before the U.S. Copyright Office, In
the Matter of Section 512 Study, April 1, 2016, pp. 9-12
5
Wendy Seltzer, “Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the
DMCA on the First Amendment” (2010) 24 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 171
6
Email from Ken Clark to Rogers, April 28, 2016, LA, Tab 7

4
077

17. The volume of notices increased sharply over the years, requiring investment in
infrastructure and personnel to ensure that notices were promptly processed and forwarded. By
the time of the motion in this case, Rogers’ notice and notice system was receiving over two
million notices each year. However, even when the system was voluntary, ISPs did not seek to
recover the costs of notice and notice by seeking reimbursement from copyright holders for
processing or forwarding the notices. Rather, it was only when a copyright holder took the next
step and actually sought to obtain the identifying information through a Norwich order that ISPs
would seek to recover their costs of these lookups. This is because, unlike the notice and notice
system, these lookups are not automated. Rather, they must be done manually, and go through a
series of additional verifications before they are disclosed.7

18. The manual lookup process acts as a check on the automated system to ensure that
Rogers is disclosing only accurate personal identifying information. As a result, it is Rogers’
practice to verify any customer information before disclosing it to comply with a court order.
Plainly, there would be an extremely high cost to disclosing incorrect customer information. It
would cause, among other things, unnecessary disruption to the customer (being improperly
drawn into potentially expensive court proceedings). This manual process takes between 20 to 30
minutes per IP address.8

Notice and Notice is Enacted into Law

19. The Notice and Notice Provisions were contained in Bill C-11, which was ultimately
enacted into the Copyright Modernization Act.9 When this bill was being debated by Parliament,
the Heritage Minister described notice and notice as a “unique model” that had been developed
by Canadian ISPs. It was also one of the “key elements” that consumers had told the government
they wanted as part of the bill during pre-legislative consultations.10 Consistent with the principle
of balance between owners and users, the Minister specifically distinguished notice and notice

7
Jackson Affidavit, paras. 20, 21, LA, Tab 8
8
Jackson Affidavit, paras. 21-23, LA, Tab 8
9
S.C. 2012, c. 20
10
House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., No. 031 (18 October 2011) at p. 2109 (Hon.
James Moore)

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from the notice and take-down system, stating that the government “disagree[d] with the
American approach with regard to copyright.”11

20. Following passage of the Copyright Modernization Act, in 2013 the Ministers of Industry
and of Heritage sent a letter to stakeholders seeking input on the implementation of the notice
and notice regime (the “2013 Ministers’ Letter”). The letter explained that the Ministers’ goal for
the notice and notice regime was “that a system be in place that is both balanced and functional;
but most importantly, it must endeavor to deter infringement.”12 The letter also described how
the government intended the notice and notice system to operate:

The Act requires that under the Notice and Notice regime, when an ISP or host
receives a notice from a copyright owner that one of its subscribers might be
hosting or sharing infringing material, it forwards that notice electronically to that
subscriber, and informs the copyright holder once this has been done.

… Additionally, ISPs and hosts will be required to retain a record allowing the
identity of the alleged infringer to be determined for a period of 6 months.13

21. The operative provision of the Copyright Act containing these requirements (to forward
the notice if possible, inform the claimant of the status, and retain records), s. 41.26, is set out
below.

Obligations related to notice Obligations
41.26 (1) A person described in paragraph 41.26 (1) La personne visée aux alinéas
41.25(1)(a) or (b) who receives a notice of 41.25(1)a) ou b) qui reçoit un avis conforme
claimed infringement that complies with au paragraphe 41.25(2) a l’obligation
subsection 41.25(2) shall, on being paid any d’accomplir les actes ci-après, moyennant
fee that the person has lawfully charged for paiement des droits qu’elle peut exiger :
doing so, a) transmettre dès que possible par voie
(a) as soon as feasible forward the notice électronique une copie de l’avis à la personne
electronically to the person to whom the à qui appartient l’emplacement électronique
electronic location identified by the location identifié par les données de localization qui
data specified in the notice belongs and sont précisées dans l’avis et informer dès que
inform the claimant of its forwarding or, if possible le demandeur de cette transmission

11
House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., No. 031 (18 October 2011) at p. 2109 (Hon.
James Moore)
12
Letter from the Honourable James Moore and the Honourable Shelly Glover, p. 3, LA, Tab 6
13
Letter from the Honourable James Moore and the Honourable Shelly Glover, p. 2, LA, Tab 6

6
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applicable, of the reason why it was not ou, le cas échéant, des raisons pour lesquelles
possible to forward it; and elle n’a pas pu l’effectuer;
(b) retain records that will allow the identity b) conserver, pour une période de six mois à
of the person to whom the electronic location compter de la date de réception de l’avis de
belongs to be determined, and do so for six prétendue violation, un registre permettant
months beginning on the day on which the d’identifier la personne à qui appartient
notice of claimed infringement is received or, l’emplacement électronique et, dans le cas où,
if the claimant commences proceedings avant la fin de cette période, une procédure
relating to the claimed infringement and so est engagée par le titulaire du droit d’auteur à
notifies the person before the end of those six l’égard de la prétendue violation et qu’elle en
months, for one year after the day on which a reçu avis, conserver le registre pour une
the person receives the notice of claimed période d’un an suivant la date de la réception
infringement. de l’avis de prétendue violation.

22. An ISP that fails to perform its obligations under s. 41.26(1) can be subject to a claim for
statutory damages of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000.14

23. Section 41.26(1) contemplates a fee being paid to ISPs to trigger the obligations to
forward the notice, inform the claimant, and retain records. However, section 41.26(2) stipulates
that this fee shall be zero unless the Minister fixes a maximum fee by regulation.15 There is
currently no regulation fixing a fee. The 2013 Ministers’ Letter explained that since the primary
goal of the system was to deter infringement, “we will not be consulting on the setting of a fee
for the transmission of notices at this time.”16 Notably, the 2013 Ministers’ Letter confirms the
understanding of the fee as being for the limited purpose of transmitting notices.

24. While the Notice and Notice Provisions set out what an ISP is required to do on receipt of
a notice, the Copyright Act is silent on the question of when or whether a subscriber’s identity
information should be disclosed to the copyright owner. That question was instead left to the
ISPs and, ultimately, the courts, to deal with on a motion for third party discovery (i.e., a
Norwich order). The 2013 Ministers’ Letter reflects this understanding, stating that “the identity
of the subscriber may be released to the copyright owner with a court order.”17 This is a key

14
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 41.26(3)
15
Copyright Act, s. 41.26(2)
16
Letter from the Honourable James Moore and the Honourable Shelly Glover, p. 4, LA, Tab 6
17
Letter from the Honourable James Moore and the Honourable Shelly Glover, p. 2, LA, Tab 6

7
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point. None of the legislative amendments purport to change the common law rule that a party
seeking third party discovery must pay the third party’s costs. The Court of Appeal accepted this
conclusion, holding that the “Norwich order process remains to govern disclosure,” but then
proceeded to effectively eliminate the well-established Norwich requirement that the third party
be compensated for the inconvenience and expense of complying with the order.

25. Canada’s “unique model” for dealing with copyright infringement online has now been
recognized in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. While the rest of the TPP
signatories are required to use a mechanism closer to the DMCA, Canada is permitted to satisfy
its obligations to facilitate copyright enforcement on the internet through notice and notice.18

Use of Notice and Notice is Growing

26. The notice and notice system has proven very popular with copyright owners. In 2010,
Rogers received a total of 207,000 notices during the year.19 In 2016, it received, on average,
upwards of 200,000 notices per month.20

27. As of 2015, Canadian ISPs served more than 12 million residential subscribers and 1.1
million business subscribers.21 Rogers offers internet services in Ontario, New Brunswick, and
Newfoundland and Labrador, and had approximately 2,145,000 internet subscribers at the end of
2016.22 It is reasonable to assume, based on this market share, that Canadian ISPs receive more
than 1.2 million notices per month.

28. While copyright owners have been sending many notices, Norwich orders are much less
common. However, even those have been increasing. In 2014, Rogers did not receive any notice
and notice-related court orders (requiring it to disclose the identity of subscribers associated with

18
See Article 18.82 and Annex 18-E of the Trans-Pacific Partnership text
19
Testimony of Pam Dinsmore, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-32,
Evidence, 40th Parl., 3rd Sess., No. 19, (22 March 2011), p. 3
20
Jackson Affidavit, para. 10, LA, Tab 8
21
Communications Monitoring Report, 2016, Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission, pp. 249, 250
22
Affidavit of Dana Drake, sworn August 4, 2017, para. 2, LA, Tab 10

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its IP addresses). In 2015, it had to respond to court orders requiring it to disclose 13 subscriber
identities. In 2016, Rogers was required to disclose subscriber identities associated with 274 IP
addresses.23

The Underlying Proceeding

29. In the underlying proceeding, the applicants (respondents on this application, collectively
referred to as “Voltage”) commenced a “reverse class action” alleging that the proposed
unidentified representative respondent and others similarly situated have infringed their
copyright in several films by engaging in online file sharing.24 The respondent John Doe was not
a party to the original motion in the Federal Court or the appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal,
and is not a party to this application.

30. Voltage identified John Doe’s IP address and determined that it was associated with a
Rogers subscriber. It approached Rogers regarding the disclosure of Doe’s identity. Rogers was
prepared to make the disclosure if Voltage obtained a court order and paid it $100 per hour to
cover its costs associated with complying with the order. Voltage would not agree to those
terms.25

31. Voltage then brought a motion to require Rogers to disclose the identity of the subscriber.
Contrary to the common law requirement for granting a Norwich order, Voltage asked the Court
to excuse it from reimbursing Rogers for its costs of complying with the order.26

The Federal Court Held that the Norwich Principles Apply

32. Rogers took no position on whether the court should order disclosure of its customer’s
identity, but opposed Voltage’s demand that Rogers not be reimbursed for its reasonable costs of
compliance. It argued that established principles related to Norwich orders (named after the 1974
House of Lords decision first approving of them, Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs & Excise

23
Drake Affidavit, para. 3, LA, Tab 10
24
Reasons for Order and Order of the Federal Court dated July 28, 2016, para. 1, LA, Tab 3 [FC
Decision]
25
FC Decision, para. 18, LA, Tab 3
26
FC Decision, para. 2, LA, Tab 3

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Commissioners), require that the third party not be burdened by bearing the costs of discovery in
a proceeding where it simply holds information. Voltage argued that sections 41.25 and 41.26
had displaced the Norwich principle requiring compensation for costs incurred.

33. The motion judge agreed with Rogers. He held that the provisions did not “provide any
detailed or comprehensive mechanism for copyright owners … to enforce their rights as against
alleged infringers. At best, [they provide] a mechanism for copyright owners to send a notice of
claimed infringement via an ISP to an alleged infringer with the knowledge that there will be
records available at some later date to determine the identity of such infringer if necessary.”27

34. The motion judge recognized the long-standing rule of statutory interpretation, endorsed
by this Court, that Parliament is presumed not to change the common law, unless a statute does
so with “irresistible clearness.”28 He therefore concluded that the test in Norwich, adopted into
Canadian law several years ago,29 continued to apply:

(1) the applicant for a Norwich order must have a bona fide case;

(2) the third party must have information on an issue in the proceeding;

(3) an order of the Court is the only reasonable means by which the information can
be obtained;

(4) fairness dictates that the information be provided prior to discovery or trial or, in
the circumstances of this case, prior to certification of the proposed class
proceeding; and

(5) the order must not cause undue delay, inconvenience, or expense to the party
against whom such an order is to be issued or others.30

27
FC Decision, para. 11, LA, Tab 3
28
FC Decision, paras. 9, 12, citing Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board
v. OPSEU, Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, LA, Tab 3
29
Glaxo Wellcome PLC v Minister of National Revenue, [1998] 4 F.C.R. 439 (C.A.)
30
FC Decision, para. 13, citing BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, 2005 FCA 193, LA, Tab 3

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35. The motion judge determined that Voltage had met the first four criteria. However, he
was unpersuaded by Voltage’s argument that they were not required to reimburse Rogers for its
costs. He reviewed the Notice and Notice Provisions, and concluded that ISPs “are only
obligated under section 41.26(1) to do two things:” (1) forward the copyright owner’s notice of
claimed infringement electronically to the pertinent Internet protocol address; and (2) retain
records to allow the subscriber’s identity to be determined for specified periods of time.
However, he held that neither of these requirements was relevant to discovery orders, and
therefore they did not override the Norwich principle that when discovery is ordered against a
third party, the third party must be reimbursed for its costs.31

36. The motion judge therefore granted Voltage’s request for an order compelling Rogers to
disclose the identity of its subscriber, on certain terms, and required it to pay Rogers’ costs of
$100 per hour.32

Court of Appeal Found “Implied Obligations”

37. Voltage appealed the portion of the motion judge’s order requiring it to reimburse Rogers
for its costs. The Court of Appeal determined that the Notice and Notice Provisions require ISPs
to comply with numerous “implied obligations,” which the Court held the ISPs are required to
discharge without reimbursement. Because the Court of Appeal concluded that these implied
obligations overlap considerably with what is required to comply with a third party discovery
order, it reversed the motion judge and held that ISPs were not permitted to recover almost any
of their costs for complying with these orders.

Court of Appeal misinterpreted the aims of the legislative scheme

38. Contrary to the well-established principle of balance, the Court of Appeal took the view
that the animating purpose of the Copyright Act is the protection and vindication of the copyright
owners’ rights.33 It concluded that allowing the internet to “become a collection of safe houses
from which pirates … can pilfer the products of others” would nullify the aims of the Act. It

31
FC Decision, para. 11, LA, Tab 3
32
Order of the Federal Court dated July 28, 2016, paras. 1, 2, LA, Tab 3
33
Appeal Reasons, para. 23, LA, Tab 4

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therefore held that the legislative regime “must be interpreted to allow copyright owners to
protect and vindicate their rights as quickly, easily and efficiently as possible while ensuring fair
treatment for all.”34

39. The Court’s one-sided view of the Act informed its interpretation of the Notice and
Notice Provisions. Ignoring the long history of the system and the goals expressed in the 2013
Ministers’ Letter, the Court of Appeal interpreted sections 41.25 and 41.26 as if they had been
designed solely to assist copyright owners vindicate their rights. It therefore concluded that the
Notice and Notice Provisions were designed “to reduce the complications and answer many of
the questions that can arise when a Norwich order is sought” and make the disclosure process
more administrative in nature and faster.35 It relegated the need to put suspected infringers on
notice so that they may cease further infringing conduct to a “secondary aim” of the Notice and
Notice Provisions.36 It also suggested that an ISP’s insistence on a court order prior to disclosing
the identity of their subscribers was merely to “protect it against aggrieved customers whose
information is being disclosed,” 37 rather than for the bona fide protection of the privacy of
internet subscribers, who may not have done anything wrong.

Obligations Imposed on ISPs

40. Because it was focused almost exclusively on the rights of copyright owners, the Court of
Appeal interpreted the Notice and Notice Provisions as imposing a series of unstated obligations
on ISPs. In addition to the express obligations in s. 41.26(1) (forwarding a notice to a subscriber
and retaining records allowing the subscriber’s identity to be determined) the Court of Appeal
held that the provisions also required ISPs to maintain their records in a particular form that
“allow [them] to identify suspected infringers quickly and efficiently” and that “can be used by
the copyright owner to determine its options and … by the court to determine issues of copyright
infringement and remedy.”38

34
Appeal Reasons, paras. 26, 27, LA, Tab 4
35
Appeal Reasons, para. 21, LA, Tab 4
36
Appeal Reasons, para. 22, LA, Tab 4
37
Appeal Reasons, para. 58, LA, Tab 4
38
Appeal Reasons, paras. 34, 38, LA, Tab 4
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41. In total, the Court of Appeal concluded that ISPs were required by s. 41.26(1) to take
seven separate steps, which it described as “significant obligations,”39 and to do so without a fee:

(1) maintain records in a form that allows them to identify suspected infringers;

(2) locate relevant records;

(3) identify the suspected infringer;

(4) verify a subscriber’s identity;

(5) send notices to the suspected infringer and copyright owner;

(6) translate the records into a manner and form that allows them to be disclosed
promptly and to be used by copyright owners and the courts to determine the
identity of suspected infringers; and

(7) keep the records ready for prompt disclosure.40

42. Because the Court of Appeal viewed these obligations as overlapping with what would be
required to make disclosure for a Norwich order, the Court concluded that Rogers was not
entitled to be reimbursed for its costs. Remarkably, it suggested that this was not a burden on
ISPs because “after all, depending on the elasticity of demand, the costs can be passed on to the
subscribers of the products of internet service providers, some of whom are the suspected
infringers.”41

43. The Court also ignored the difference between ISPs’ costs and free-standing fees,
reasoning that if ISPs were “allowed to charge without restriction,” the purpose of the Act and
the Notice and Notice Provisions (protecting the rights of copyright owners) would be frustrated,
as ISPs “could potentially charge a fee so large that copyright owners would be dissuaded from
obtaining the information they need to protect and vindicate their rights.”42 Instead, the Court
advised the ISPs on how to manage their business processes, recommending that they should

39
Appeal Reasons, paras. 42, 43, LA, Tab 4
40
Appeal Reasons, para. 40, LA, Tab 4
41
Appeal Reasons, para. 49, LA, Tab 4 [emphasis added]
42
Appeal Reasons, para. 50, LA, Tab 4

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“apply their advanced technological expertise to their systems to make their compliance with
subsection 41.26(1) more automatic, more efficient and less expensive.”43 Although the Court
did not say so expressly, its suggestion is that ISPs should bear the cost of these investments in
technology.

44. The Court carved out a narrow (and, in the Court’s own words, negligible) exception to
the no-reimbursement rule, holding that ISPs could charge a fee “for the actual, reasonable and
necessary costs associated with the act of disclosure” but defined the “act of disclosure”
narrowly to encompass only “the delivery or electronic transmission” of the relevant records and
the ISP’s participation in the obtaining of a disclosure order.44 The Court held that the “actual,
reasonable and necessary costs” associated with disclosure were likely to be negligible, and the
costs associated with a motion for disclosure would be minimal because the disclosure motion
would proceed in writing on consent or unopposed, except in extraordinary cases.45

45. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the Federal Court’s decision was “vitiated
by legal error” as it allowed Rogers to be compensated for steps that, in its view, were included
among the implied obligations in s. 41.26(1). Therefore, it set aside that aspect of the Federal
Court’s order. 46 It also determined that Rogers had not provided evidence about “its actual,
reasonable and necessary costs that can and should be compensated” and had therefore not
satisfied its burden of demonstrating it should be entitled to any payment for costs incurred in
responding to the order.47 It even ordered that in light of the “position taken by Rogers in this
litigation” Rogers should actually pay Voltage’s costs of the appeal, which turned out to be over
$6,000.

46. The Court of Appeal’s reasons appear to impose obligations on ISPs in relation to records
retention and response time that go beyond those in the Act, and have far reaching consequences.

43
Appeal Reasons, para. 52, LA, Tab 4
44
Appeal Reasons, paras. 61, 62, LA, Tab 4
45
Appeal Reasons, paras. 63, 64, LA, Tab 4
46
Appeal Reasons, para. 73, LA, Tab 4
47
Appeal Reasons, para. 75, LA, Tab 4

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For example, the Court’s reasons suggest that Rogers must maintain millions of records per year
in a “promptly disclosable” form usable to the courts, so that it can respond promptly to requests
for Norwich orders. However, it only receives Norwich order requests for approximately 0.01
percent of those records. It makes no sense for Rogers to bear the cost of getting ready to
respond to requests for 10,000 times more Norwich orders per year than are actually sought.

47. Following the Court of Appeal’s decision, copyright owners have also attempted to rely
on it to argue that ISPs have an obligation to make disclosure quickly, and even in priority to
requests made by law enforcement in criminal matters.48

PART II – QUESTION IN ISSUE

48. The question in this application is whether the proposed appeal raises an issue of national
or public importance that warrants granting leave to appeal. The applicant submits that it does.
As this Court has observed, ISPs and other internet intermediaries are “vital to national economic
growth” and copyright disputes between creators and users should not be “visited on the heads of
the Internet intermediaries.”49 The Court of Appeal’s decision interprets the recent Notice and
Notice amendments to the Copyright Act in a manner that is inconsistent with the guidance given
by this Court, and wrongly imposes costs and obligations on ISPs and their subscribers – 13
million Canadians.

49. In particular, this case raises the following issues that warrant this Court’s consideration:

(1) What is the scope of the obligations imposed on Canadian ISPs by sections 41.25
and 41.26 of the Copyright Act?

(2) Do those obligations supplant ordinary Norwich principles related to third-party
discovery orders, and in particular, the principle that a third party should be
reimbursed for the costs it incurs?

48
Reply Written Representations of Dallas Buyers Club, LLC, dated June 30, 2017, in Federal
Court File No. T-1674-16, LA, Tab 9
49
Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet
Providers, 2004 SCC 45, para. 131 [“CAIP”]

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PART III – CONCISE STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
Issue 1: What is an ISP’s Obligation under the Notice and Notice Provisions?

50. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Copyright Act involves balancing the
rights of users and the rights of creators, against a backdrop of trying to apply national laws to
fast-evolving technology.50 It has also recognized that ISPs play a crucial role in modern society
by standing at the portals of the internet 51 as conduits for information. 52 They are service
providers to individuals and businesses, and other content providers depend on their services to
deliver their content over the internet to those end-users.53

51. The enactment of the Notice and Notice Provisions was intended to confirm and
formalize the existing informal balance struck voluntarily by ISPs through the notice and notice
regime that pre-dated the 2012 amendments. The Court of Appeal’s decision upsets the balance
and purports to impose significant obligations on ISPs that are not found in the Copyright Act.
Instead of treating ISPs as a conduit for information, and the portal for the internet, the decision
below brings them into the fray in the fight between users and owners, and seeks to impose the
burden of almost all transaction costs relating to Norwich orders onto innocent third parties,
contrary to well-established principles.

ISPs are Innocent Bystanders

52. This case is, in essence, the sequel to the issues arising from unauthorized music
downloading that this Court considered in SOCAN v. CAIP. In that case, various rights holders
sought copyright royalties from ISPs for their role in providing the infrastructure for
unauthorized downloading of music from the internet. The Court rejected that request.

50
CAIP, paras. 40, 41, citing Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34
and CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13
51
CAIP, para. 16
52
Reference re Broadcasting Act, 2012 SCC 4, para. 7
53
Reference re Broadcasting Act, 2012 SCC 4, para. 2

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53. In explaining the Court’s decision, Binnie J. observed that, while the difficulty of online
enforcement threatened the collection of copyright royalties, this was not a reason to impose
additional costs on ISPs. He admonished copyright holders that:

[B]y enacting s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, Parliament made a policy
distinction between those who abuse the Internet to obtain “cheap music” and
those who are part of the infrastructure of the Internet itself. It is clear that
Parliament did not want copyright disputes between creators and users to be
visited on the heads of the Internet intermediaries, whose continued expansion
and development is considered vital to national economic growth.54

54. One of Parliament’s goals in enacting the Copyright Modernization Act was to provide
rights holders with tools to assist in enforcing their copyright online, including by expanding a
previously voluntary system and making participation in the system mandatory. However, there
is nothing in the Copyright Modernization Act that suggests Parliament completely changed its
policy objectives, and in particular had opted to visit the costs of copyright disputes “on the
heads of internet intermediaries,” notwithstanding their crucial economic and technological role.

55. The Court of Appeal decision is inconsistent with this Court’s admonition and its
repeated calls for balance. Instead, it focused solely on the rights of copyright owners and
interpreted the legislative regime to ensure they could “protect and vindicate their rights as
quickly, easily and efficiently” as possible. While easy enforcement may be desirable in abstract,
there is no reason why it should override all other goals, and impose substantial financial burdens
on third parties. If Parliament wanted only to protect and vindicate copyright owners’ rights, it
could have embraced notice and take-down, which is far easier and more efficient for owners
than notice and notice.

56. But Parliament declined to do so. Instead, it enacted the notice and notice system with the
clear goal of ensuring balance between different stakeholders, and not visiting the disputes on the
innocent intermediaries. Viewed through this lens, rather than an exclusive concern for
vindicating copyright owners’ rights, it is clear that whether or not the Notice and Notice
Provisions actually impose the list of implied obligations enumerated by the Court of Appeal is a
question of national or public importance.

54
CAIP, para. 131 (emphasis added)

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57. Indeed, the government’s own understanding of the notice and notice system appears to
be at odds with the Court of Appeal’s decision. The 2013 Ministers’ Letter makes it clear that the
government’s goal was a system that is both balanced and functional, and that it would leave
questions of disclosure to the courts. The description of the regulatory power related to fees was
confined to the transmission of notices and the maintenance of records.

58. In any event, the concerns regarding compensation that appear to have motivated the
Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the Notice and Notice Provisions are misplaced, for two
reasons. First, the Court’s concern that allowing ISPs to “charge without restriction” would
potentially place hurdles in the way of copyright owners ignores the fact that the existing law
related to Norwich orders contains built-in restrictions: it allows compensation only for the
“costs incurred by the respondent in assembling the information.” 55 There is no evidence or
suggestion that Rogers made a profit on Norwich compliance; it simply seeks to collect its costs.

59. Second, to the extent that any costs are incurred by rights holders in enforcing their
copyright in the courts, these costs can be recovered from infringers when they are found liable.
Reimbursing the ISPs’ costs for compliance with third party discovery is in substance no
different from paying a filing fee to commence a claim.

60. The result of the Court of Appeal’s order is that ISPs, and by extension their millions of
innocent subscribers, are forced to bear the costs of private rights-holders attempting to enforce
their copyright against alleged infringers. This Court should grant leave in order to provide
guidance about whether this is the result that was intended by Parliament in enacting the Notice
and Notice Provisions.

Issue 2: To what extent do any obligations imposed on ISPs supplant ordinary Norwich
principles?

61. This Court recently noted that Norwich orders are being used increasingly in the online
context by plaintiffs in order to obtain the identities of defendants to claims related to their
conduct on the internet.56 The Federal Court of Appeal has set out the applicable principles for

55
BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, 2005 FCA 193, para. 35
56
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34

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obtaining a Norwich order in the case of allegations of online copyright infringement. Those
principles are set out in paragraph 34 above, and include that the plaintiff must have a bona fide
case, that a non-party must have information on an issue in the proceeding, and that any order
made will not cause undue delay, inconvenience or expense to the third-party or others.57

62. To the extent that the Notice and Notice Provisions impose any obligations on ISPs over
and above the express obligations in s. 41.26(1), this Court’s guidance is required in relation to
whether those obligations reach the threshold of “irresistible clearness” required to override the
well-established and understood requirements of Norwich orders.58

Limited Future Opportunities for Review

63. The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of ISPs’ obligations under the Notice and Notice
Provisions is one of general application: it is not dependent on the application of any particular
facts in this proceeding. Moreover, the Court of Appeal stated that future disclosure motions of
the type underlying this appeal should proceed in writing and either be unopposed or on consent.
It is therefore unlikely that future cases will present any opportunity for the Court of Appeal or
this Court to consider the issues raised in this application.

Conclusion

64. The Court of Appeal’s decision imposes a set of obligations on ISPs that are not
expressly contained in the Copyright Act. If these obligations are to impose costs on ISPs and by
extension on millions of innocent Canadians, they should receive the careful consideration of this
Court.

PART IV – COSTS SUBMISSIONS

65. Rogers submits that the costs of this application should follow the event.

57
Voltage Picture LLC v. John Doe, 2014 FC 161, para 45, citing BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe,
2005 FCA 193
58
Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. OPSEU, Local 324, 2003 SCC
42, para. 39

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092

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

66. The applicant seeks an order granting leave to appeal the judgment of the Federal Court
of Appeal dated May 9, 2017 in Court File No. A-278-16, with costs.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 2017.

Torys LLP

_____________________________ ________________________________
Andrew Bernstein / James Gotowiec Yael Wexler

Counsel for the Applicant, Ottawa Agent for the Applicant,
Rogers Communications Inc. Rogers Communications Inc.

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093

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
No. Name Paragraph

CASES

1. BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, 2005 FCA 193 34, 58, 61

2. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 50

3. Glaxo Wellcome PLC v Minister of National Revenue, [1998] 4 F.C.R. 34
439 (C.A.)

4. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34 61

5. Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. OPSEU, 34, 62
Local 324, 2003 SCC 42

6. Reference re Broadcasting Act, 2012 SCC 4 50

7. Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. 48, 50, 53
Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45

8. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 50

9. Voltage Picture LLC v. John Doe, 2014 FC 161 61

Secondary Sources

10. Article 18.82 and Annex 18-E of the Trans-Pacific Partnership text 25
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership

11. Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation before the U.S. Copyright 14
Office, In the Matter of Section 512 Study, April 1, 2016, pp. 9-12
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/04/01/eff_comments_512_study_4.1.2016.
pdf

12. Communications Monitoring Report, 2016, Canadian Radio-television and 27
Telecommunications Commission, pp. 249, 250
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/PolicyMonitoring/2016/cmr
.htm
094
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No. Name Paragraph

13. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., No. 031 (18 October 19
2011) at p. 2109 (Hon. James Moore)
http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-1/house/sitting-
31/hansard

14. Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, “Notice and 13
Takedown in Everyday Practice” (March 22, 2017). UC Berkeley Public
Law Research Paper No. 2755628, p. 15
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628

15. Testimony of Pam Dinsmore, House of Commons, Legislative Committee 26
on Bill C-32, Evidence, 40th Parl., 3rd Sess., No. 19, (22 March 2011)
http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-3/CC32/meeting-
19/evidence

16. Wendy Seltzer, “Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: 14
Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment” (2010) 24 Harv. J.
Law & Tech. 171
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1577785
095

PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 Loi sur le droit d'auteur, L.R.C 1985, c. C-
42

Notice of claimed infringement Avis de prétendue violation
41.25 (1) An owner of the copyright in a work 41.25 (1) Le titulaire d’un droit d’auteur sur
or other subject-matter may send a notice of une oeuvre ou tout autre objet du droit
claimed infringement to a person who d’auteur peut envoyer un avis de prétendue
provides violation à la personne qui fournit, selon le
cas :
(a) the means, in the course of
providing services related to the a) dans le cadre de la prestation de
operation of the Internet or another services liés à l’exploitation d’Internet
digital network, of telecommunication ou d’un autre réseau numérique, les
through which the electronic location moyens de télécommunication par
that is the subject of the claim of lesquels l’emplacement électronique
infringement is connected to the qui fait l’objet de la prétendue
Internet or another digital network; violation est connecté à Internet ou à
tout autre réseau numérique;
(b) for the purpose set out in
subsection 31.1(4), the digital memory b) en vue du stockage visé au
that is used for the electronic location paragraphe 31.1(4), la mémoire
to which the claim of infringement numérique qui est utilisée pour
relates; or l’emplacement électronique en cause;
(c) an information location tool as c) un outil de repérage au sens du
defined in subsection 41.27(5). paragraphe 41.27(5).

Form and content of notice Forme de l’avis
(2) A notice of claimed infringement shall be (2) L’avis de prétendue violation est établi par
in writing in the form, if any, prescribed by écrit, en la forme éventuellement prévue par
regulation and shall règlement, et, en outre :
(a) state the claimant’s name and a) précise les nom et adresse du
address and any other particulars demandeur et contient tout autre
prescribed by regulation that enable renseignement prévu par règlement
communication with the claimant; qui permet la communication avec lui;
(b) identify the work or other subject- b) identifie l’oeuvre ou l’autre objet
matter to which the claimed du droit d’auteur auquel la prétendue
infringement relates; violation se rapporte;
(c) state the claimant’s interest or right c) déclare les intérêts ou droits du
with respect to the copyright in the demandeur à l’égard de l’oeuvre ou de
work or other subject-matter; l’autre objet visé;
(d) specify the location data for the d) précise les données de localisation
096
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electronic location to which the de l’emplacement électronique qui fait
claimed infringement relates; l’objet de la prétendue violation;
(e) specify the infringement that is e) précise la prétendue violation;
claimed; f) précise la date et l’heure de la
(f) specify the date and time of the commission de la prétendue violation;
commission of the claimed g) contient, le cas échéant, tout autre
infringement; and renseignement prévu par règlement.
(g) contain any other information that
may be prescribed by regulation.

Obligations related to notice Obligations
41.26 (1) A person described in paragraph 41.26 (1) La personne visée aux alinéas
41.25(1)(a) or (b) who receives a notice of 41.25(1)a) ou b) qui reçoit un avis conforme
claimed infringement that complies with au paragraphe 41.25(2) a l’obligation
subsection 41.25(2) shall, on being paid any d’accomplir les actes ci-après, moyennant
fee that the person has lawfully charged for paiement des droits qu’elle peut exiger :
doing so, a) transmettre dès que possible par
(a) as soon as feasible forward the voie électronique une copie de l’avis à
notice electronically to the person to la personne à qui appartient
whom the electronic location l’emplacement électronique identifié
identified by the location data par les données de localization qui
specified in the notice belongs and sont précisées dans l’avis et informer
inform the claimant of its forwarding dès que possible le demandeur de cette
or, if applicable, of the reason why it transmission ou, le cas échéant, des
was not possible to forward it; and raisons pour lesquelles elle n’a pas pu
l’effectuer;
(b) retain records that will allow the
identity of the person to whom the b) conserver, pour une période de six
electronic location belongs to be mois à compter de la date de réception
determined, and do so for six months de l’avis de prétendue violation, un
beginning on the day on which the registre permettant d’identifier la
notice of claimed infringement is personne à qui appartient
received or, if the claimant l’emplacement électronique et, dans le
commences proceedings relating to cas où, avant la fin de cette période,
the claimed infringement and so une procédure est engagée par le
notifies the person before the end of titulaire du droit d’auteur à l’égard de
those six months, for one year after la prétendue violation et qu’elle en a
the day on which the person receives reçu avis, conserver le registre pour
the notice of claimed infringement. une période d’un an suivant la date de
la réception de l’avis de prétendue
violation.
Fees related to notices
(2) The Minister may, by regulation, fix the
maximum fee that a person may charge for
performing his or her obligations under
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subsection (1). If no maximum is fixed by Droits
regulation, the person may not charge any (2) Le ministre peut, par règlement, fixer le
amount under that subsection. montant maximal des droits qui peuvent être
exigés pour les actes prévus au paragraphe
(1). À défaut de règlement à cet effet, le
Damages related to notices
montant de ces droits est nul.
(3) A claimant’s only remedy against a person
who fails to perform his or her obligations
under subsection (1) is statutory damages in Dommages-intérêts
an amount that the court considers just, but (3) Le seul recours dont dispose le demandeur
not less than $5,000 and not more than contre la personne qui n’exécute pas les
$10,000. obligations que lui impose le paragraphe (1)
est le recouvrement des dommages-intérêts
préétablis dont le montant est, selon ce que le
tribunal estime équitable en l’occurrence,
d’au moins 5 000 $ et d’au plus 10 000 $.
098
Government Gouvernement
of Canada du Canada

Undisclosed recipients Destinataires non divulgues

Dear Sir or Madam: Madame, Monsieur,

We are looking forward to bringing all Nous nous rejouissons a la perspective de
aspects of the Copyright Modernization Act faire entrer en vigueur toutes les
into force in order to further deter dispositions de la Lot sur la modernisation
copyright infringement in Canada. To that du droit d’auteur afin de dissuader
end, the government will be bringing the davantage la violation du droit d’auteur au
Notice and Notice provisions into effect in Canada. A cet egard, le gouvernement fera
the near future. With the intention of entrer en vigueur les dispositions sur le
moving forward, the Ministers of Industry regime d’avis et avis dans un proche
and of Canadian Heritage are seeking your avenir. Avec 1’intention d’aller de l’avant,
views on the implementation of the regime. les ministres de 1’Industrie et du Patrimoine
canadien souhaitent obtenir votre opinion
sur la mise en oeuvre du regime.

The Notice and Notice regime is intended Le regime d’avis et avis vise a decourager
to discourage online copyright la violation du droit d’auteur en ligne en
infringement by providing copyright foumissant aux ayants droit un outil pour
owners with a tool to enforce their rights, faire appliquer leurs droits, tout en
while also respecting the interests and respectant aussi les interets et les libertes
freedoms of users. We recognize that the des utilisateurs. Nous reconnaissons que la
Copyright Modernization Act formalizes Lot sur la modernisation du droit d’auteur
existing voluntary practices currently in officialise des pratiques volontaires
place. Once Notice and Notice is in force, existantes actuellement en place. Lorsque
the provisions will legally require internet l’avis et avis sera en vigueur, les
intermediaries, such as ISPs, hosts and dispositions obligeront legalement les
search engines, to take action upon interm6diaires Internet, comme les FSI,
receiving a notice of alleged infringement hotes et moteurs de recherche, a agir apres
from a copyright owner. Marketplace avoir re?u un avis de violation alleguee
solutions that deter infringement continue d’un ayant droit. Les solutions
to be welcomed and we look forward to commerciales pour dissuader la violation
seeing further solutions as they develop. du droit d’auteur continuent d’etre
favorablement accueillies, et nous
attendons avec interet de voir d’autres
solutions a mesure qu’elles seront
elaborees.

...2

/n i«t»
Canada
099
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-

The Act requires that under the Notice and Le regime d’avis et avis prevoit que le FSI
Notice regime, when an ISP or host ou l’hote qui a regu d’un ayant droit un avis
receives a notice from a copyright owner selon lequel un de ses abonnes peut etre en
that one of its subscribers might be hosting train d’heberger ou d’dch anger du contenu
or sharing infringing material, it forwards illicite, doit transmettre cet avis
that notice electronically to that subscriber, electroniquement a cet abonne, puis en
and informs the copyright holder once this informer 1’ayant droit.
has been done.

If the ISP or host is unable to forward the Si le FSI ou l’hote n’est pas en mesure de
notice, it must inform the copyright holder transmettre l’avis, il doit informer Payant
as to the reasons why. Additionally, ISPs droit des raisons pour lesquelles il ne peut
and hosts will be required to retain a record pas le faire. En outre, les FSI et les hotes
allowing the identity of the alleged seront tenus de conserver un dossier
infringer to be determined for a period of permettant de determiner l’identite du
6 months, or longer if court proceedings contrevenant pendant six mois, ou pour une
are initiated. The identity of the subscriber periode plus longue en cas de procedures
may be released to the copyright owner judiciaires. L’identity de l’abonnd peut etre
with a court order. ISPs or hosts that fail to divulguee a 1’ayant droit sur ordonnance du
retain such records or to forward notices tribunal. Les FSI ou hotes qui ne
may be liable for statutory damages conservent pas de tels dossiers ou ne
ranging from $5,000 to $10,000. transmettent pas les avis peuvent etre
passibles de dommages-interets preetablis
allant de 5 000 a 10 000 dollars.

] A copyright owner can also send a notice Un ayant droit peut egalement envoyer un
- to a search engine. If the notice refers to avis a un moteur de recherche. Si l’avis fait
: material that has already been removed reference a du contenu qui a deja ete retire
i . from the specified electronic location in the de I’emplacement electronique precise dans
notice, the search engine is expected to l’avis, le moteur de recherche devrait
remove any copies it may have generated supprimer toutes les copies qu’il peut avoir
; in die course of its business (for caching gdnerees au cours de ses activites (a des fins
jj purposes, for example) within 30 days. At de memoire cache, par exemple) dans les
ij any time prior to the expiration of the A
30 jours. tout moment prdcddant
? 30-day period, a copyright owner may only Texpiration de la periode de 30 jours,
I seek an injunction against the search 1’ayant droit ne peut obtenir qu’une
■ engine. Any copies not removed after injonction contre le moteur de recherche.
ij 30 days will not benefit from the limitation Toutes les copies non retirees aprfes les
j of liability, and the copyright owner will be 30 jours ne bendficieront pas de la limitation
ij in a position to pursue other remedies de la responsabilite, et 1’ayant droit sera en
(e.g., damages) against the search engine mesure de se prevaloir d’autres recours
. for infringement of copyright. In order to (p. ex., des dommages-interets) contre le
be considered valid, the legislation moteur de recherche pour violation du droit
. specifies that notices must: d’auteur. Pour etre consideres valides selon
la loi, les avis doivent:
...3
100
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a. be in writing; a. etre etablis par ecrit;

b. state the claimant’s name and address b. preciser les nom et adresse du
and any other particulars prescribed by demandeur et contenir tout autre
regulation that enable communication renseignement prevu par
with the claimant; r&glement qui permet la
communication avec lui;

c. identify the work or other c. identifier 1’oeuvre ou 1’autre
subject-matter to which the claimed objet du droit d’auteur auquel la
infringement relates; pretendue violation se rapporte;

d. state the claimant’s interest or right d. declarer les interets ou droits du
with respect to the copyright in the demandeur a l’egard de 1’oeuvre
work or other subject-matter; ou de 1’autre objet vise;

e. specify the location data for the e. preciser les donnees de
electronic location to which the claimed localisation de 1’emplacement
infringement relates; electronique qui fait 1’objet de
la pretendue violation;

f. specify the infringement that is f. pr6ciser la prdtendue violation;
claimed;

g. specify the date and time of the g- preciser la date et l’heure de la
commission of the claimed commission de la pretendue
infringement; and violation;

. h. contain any other information that may h. contenir, le cas echeant, tout
be prescribed by regulation. autre renseignement prevu par
reglement.

Individuals and organizations interested in Les personnes et organisations souhaitant
providing their views to us are encouraged nous faire connaitre leurs points de vue
to describe what, specifically, should be sont encouragees a decrire, avec precision,
required in tire form and content of notices quels devraient etre selon eux la forme et le
and what regulation would be needed in contenu des avis, et quel reglement serait
addition to what the law requires. It is our necessaire en plus de ce que requiert la loi.
goal that a system be in place that is both Nous avons comme objectif de mettre en
balanced and functional; but, most place un regime qui soit a la fois dquilibre
importantly, it must endeavour to deter et fonctionnel, mais qui doit surtout
infringement. It is not clear at this time permettre de dissuader la violation du droit
that regulation beyond the legislation will d’auteur. Compte tenu du fait qu’il n’est
pas evident h ce stade qu’une

...4
101
-4-

help better achieve this. Therefore, please stade, il n’est pas evident que le reglement
provide concrete evidence and empirical contribue k l’atteinte de cet objectif,
data, where available, to support your veuillez fournir, au besoin, des preuves
views. concretes et des donnees empiriques k
l’appui de votre opinion.

As our primary goal is to deter Comme notre objectif principal est de
infringement, we will not be consulting on dissuader la violation du droit d’auteur,
the setting of a fee for the transmission of nous ne consulterons pas pour le moment
notices at this time. au sujet de 1’imposition de frais pour la
transmission des avis.

Should there be additional information that Si vous estimez que de l’information
you believe would be useful to the suppldmentaire serait utile au
Government as it brings the Notice and gouvernement pour l’entrde en vigueur du
Notice regime into force, please also regime d’avis et avis, veuillez aussi fournir
include that information. ces renseignements.

We thank you in advance for your interest Nous vous remercions k l’avance de votre
in deterring copyright infringement in interet a l’egard de la dissuasion de la
Canada and contribution to this discussion. violation du droit d’auteur au Canada et de
We are also looking to move forward in the votre contribution a cette discussion.
early fall so please provide us with your Comme nous envisageons d’aller de l’avant
comments to us by Friday, November 8, au debut de l’automne avec l’entrde en
2013, to the following address: vigueur du regime, nous vous saurions gr6
Notice-AvisConsultations @ ic. ec.ca de bien vouloir nous transmettre vos
commentaires d’ici le vendredi
8 novembre 2013 a l’adresse suivante :
Notice-AvisConsultations @ ic. gc.ca

If you have any questions, please don’t Si vous avez des questions, n’hesitez pas
hesitate to contact £ communiquer avec
Ms. Anne-Marie Monteith, Director, Mme Anne-Marie Monteith, directrice,
Copyright and Trademark Policy, Industry
Politique du droit d’auteur et des marques
Canada tanne-marie.monteith@ic.gc.ca') or
de commerce, Industrie Canada
Ms. Lara Taylor, Director, Policy and
(anne-marie.monteith@ic.gc.ca') ou avec
Legislation, Department of Canadian
Heritage tiara.tavlor@pch.gc.cab for Mme Lara Taylor, directrice, Politiques et
further information. legislations, ministere du Patrimoine
canadien (lara.tavlor@pch.gc.ca').

...5
102
-5-

Thank you for taking the time to consider Nous vous remercions de prendre le temps
this important matter. d’examiner cette importante question.

Sincerely, Veuillez agrder, Madame, Monsieur,
1’expression de nos sentiments les
meilleurs.

The Honourable Shelly Glover, P.C., M.P. L’honorable Shelly Glover, C.P., ddputee
103 55 26
From: Ken Clark <kclark(g)airdberlis.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2016 5:28 PM
Subject: Federal Court Application T-662-16
To: Karen Levin <karen.levin(g>rci.rogers.com>. Peter Mckibbon <peter.mckibbon(5>rci.rogers.com>
Cc: Jessica Millar <imillar(5)airdberlis.com>. Patrick Copeland <pcopeland@airdberlis.com>

Dear Mr. McKibbon and Ms. Levin,

We are counsel for Voltage Pictures, LLC and the Applicants in Federal Court File No. T-662-
16. On Tuesday, April 26, 2016 we sent tocopvriqhtnotice@roqers.com the attached notice
(email and Notice attached) regarding the sending of a “notice-and-notice” notice to an unknown
infringer of five of Voltage Pictures’ copyrighted movies.

As you will see in the notice, the infringer was a Rogers subscriber, who was allocated IP
address 174.112.37.227 and who was observed having in its possession the following works, at
the following times:

Work Date Time (UTC)
The Cobbler 2016403*24 05:25:16

Pay The Ghost 2016-01*14 08:14:55
GoodKfll 2016-02-18 03:45:27
Fathers and Daughters 2016-03-10 02:23:04
American Heist 2018-01-26 01:06:07

We would like to know the identity and contact information for the Rogers subscriber identified
by the IP Address set out above, allocated at the times set out above. We understand that
normally this would not be provided due to privacy legislation, however, we request formal
confirmation of same.

In the expected event that Rogers will not disclose this information, can you please indicate to
us who we should be communicating with in respect of counsel as we intend to bring aNorwich
motion to compel Rogers to disclose this information, so that we may serve on this individual the
attached Notice of Application.

Also please note that the attached Application is a proposed class action as against all
individuals who are unlawfully file sharing the above-referenced works. We believe that there
are thousands of Rogers’ subscribers who will form part of the Defendant Class, and we would
like to have a discussion with Rogers in respect of how to deal with that issue.

Can you please let us know if you would be prepared to have a meeting with us to discuss
these issues.

Also, please let us know if you have any questions or require any further information.

Yours truly,
104 56

Ken Clark, B.A.Sc. (Mech. Eng.), B.C.L., LL.B .
Certified Specialist
(Intellectual Property Law: Patent, Trade-mark and Copyright)

T 416.865.4736
F 416.863.1515
E kclark@airdberlis.com

Brookfield Place • 181 Bay Street
Suite 1800 » Box 754
Toronto ON • M5J 2T9* Canada
www.airdberlis.com

Aird & Berlis uj
0wrfrter» nod SeUCtor*
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