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Modern prisons are among some of the most physically secure facilities, with almost every area under
tight access control and surveillance. Pictured here is the exterior of Shata Prison in Israel, which is
secured through the use of high fences, razor wire, protective barriers, guard towers, and security lighting.
Physical security describes security measures that are designed to deny unauthorized access
to facilities, equipment and resources, and to protect personnel and property from damage or
harm (such as espionage, theft, or terrorist attacks).[1] Physical security involves the use of
multiple layers of interdependent systems which include CCTV surveillance, security
guards, protective barriers, locks, access control protocols, and many other techniques.
Contents
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1Overview
o 2.1Deterrence methods
2.1.1Physical barriers
2.1.2Natural surveillance
2.1.3Security lighting
2.2.2Video surveillance
o 2.3Access control
o 2.4Security personnel
3See also
4References
Overview[edit]
Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. showing planters being used as vehicle barriers to increase
the standoff distance, and barriers and gates along the vehicle entrance
Physical security systems for protected facilities are generally intended to: [2][3][4]
detect intrusions and monitor/record intruders (e.g. intruder alarms and CCTV systems);
and
in-port cargo
10-1. Ports and harbors are prime targets for enemy and criminal activities.
Perimeter areas of these facilities are more vulnerable because of the
extensive distance and exposed beach or pier areas. Terminal areas may
include fully developed piers and warehouses or may be an unimproved
beach where logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) or roll-on/roll-off (RORO)
operations are conducted.
10-3. When providing security for cargo, the focus is on providing a security
overwatch for the cargo as it moves from the port to the combat area. Inside
a port's perimeter, access to cargo is limited by
Operating random mounted or dismounted patrols (with MWDs,
if available).
HN agreements.
Protective lighting.
Log booms.
Nets.
Buoys or floats.
Barges.
10-7. While most of the barriers described above will stop or impede access
to facilities from boats or swimmers, nets are among the most effective.
Well-marked, partially submerged objects are also effective; however, there
may be legal prohibitions against placing barriers that may constitute a
hazard to navigation. These barriers should be placed only after
coordination with and approval by the appropriate legal and HN authorities.
Sometimes it is best to close off the waterside of a pier. A floating boom will
keep small boats out. Suspending a cable or a chain-link net from the
bottom of the boom will deny access underwater.
10-10. The keep-out zone is the zone closest to the protected assets. It
extends from the asset to the maximum range of anticipated threat
weapons. Security forces should prevent the entry of all unauthorized craft
or vessels into this zone. The tactical response force (in this case, a boat)
may be used. In addition to organic security, forces may be provided by HN
or contracted personnel.
10-11. To keep the cargo secured while transferring from one transport
method to another, the traffic moving in and out of cargo-handling areas
must be controlled. MP forces can
10-12. A holding area should be provided if gates are used by vehicles other
than cargo vehicles. Cargo vehicles can pull into the holding area while they
are being checked. The holding area should be large enough to handle the
volume and size of traffic. A wooden deck or platform at, or slightly higher
than, the level of the truck bed can be used to facilitate checking. The
platform must be at least as long as the vehicle (such as an empty flatbed
trailer). Such a platform makes it quicker and easier to observe
and check cargo.
RAIL CARGO
10-15. Because a train's movement is determined directly by the condition of
the tracks, cargo moving by rail is particularly vulnerable to attack. The
destruction of switches, signals, or the track may be a delaying harassment;
or it could trigger a major catastrophe. Since railroads can be such high-
value targets, the commander may task MP or other US forces to provide
on-board security for critical cargo.
10-16. Most train crews consist of four or five people who control the train
the engineer, a conductor, a fireman, a senior brakeman, and a brakeman or
a flagman. The conductor is the train commander unless a transportation
railway service officer is assigned to the train. The train commander is
responsible for the train's operation and security. He makes all decisions
affecting the train. The security force's commander is responsible for the
cargo's security. The train crew and the security force watch for and report
any discrepancies or interruptions to normal procedures at any time during
the movement. Information about the movement is usually sent along the
movement route by the chief dispatcher through a telephone circuit.
Degree of threat.
10-18. Security forces prepare and maintain a record (by car number) of
guarded cars in the train. Security forces can ride in
The caboose.
A security-force car. (If only one security car is used, it should be near
the center of the train; if more than one is used, cars should be spaced to
provide the best protection for the train.)
10-19. The security force on a train must keep a constant check on car
doors, seals, wires, and locks to detect tampering. The following instances
must be noted and reported immediately:
Irregularities in procedures.
10-20. When planning rail-cargo security, the time schedule for the rail
movement must be obtained. A map reconnaissance of the route should be
provided, detailing bridges and tunnels that are especially vulnerable.
10-22. The shipper is responsible for the security of all carload freight until it
is turned over to the Transportation Railway Service and the loaded cars are
coupled to a locomotive for movement. The shipper or field transportation
officer should complete the freight waybill or the government bill of lading.
This report shows the car number, a brief description of contents, the weight
of the load, the consignor, the consignee, the origin, and the destination. In
addition, it may show special instructions for the movement or security of the
car and its contents. Careful documentation is essential for
10-24. Railway cars are sealed after loading. A seal shows that a car has
been inventoried and inspected. The standard method of sealing a railway
boxcar door (in addition to padlocks or wires) is with a soft metal strap or a
cable seal that contains a serial number. Maintaining rigid accountability of
all seals is necessary to prevent the undetected replacement of an original
seal with another. While sealing does not prevent pilferage, a broken seal is
a good indicator that the car and its contents have been tampered with.
Train security forces or operating crews can easily check the seals on cars
when the train stops. Broken seals should be reported immediately to help
pinpoint the time and place of a possible theft. When vehicles are shipped
by railcar, sensitive and high-value items must not be secured in the
vehicles. Container-express (CONEX) and military-van (MILVAN) containers
are ideal for shipping these and other small items on flatcars since they
greatly reduce the chance of pilferage. These containers must be locked and
sealed and, if possible, placed door to door for additional security.
10-26. When the train is stopped, security forces should dismount and check
both sides of the train, verifying that seals, locks, and wires are intact. They
must report a broken seal immediately to help pinpoint the time and place of
the theft.
pipeline cargo
10-29. Pipeline systems are widely used in a theater of operation to
transport bulk petroleum products or other liquids. Such systems are open to
a number of security threats from the point of entry to the point of final
delivery. Pipeline systems are composed of storage and dispersing facilities,
pump stations, and extended pipelines. They also include discharging
facilities for tankers at ports or other water terminals.
10-30. The type and extent of risk to a pipeline varies with the level of
conflict in the AO. In a communications zone, the chief hazard is likely to be
pilferage. Pipelines can be tapped by loosening the flange bolts that join
sections of pipe or by cutting holes in the hose line. The risk rises if gasoline
is scarce and expensive on the civilian market. Sabotage is a security
hazard during all levels of conflict. It is committed by any method such as
simply opening pipe flanges, cutting a hose line, or setting fires and causing
explosions to destroy portions of the line.
10-33. Dedicated security forces are rarely sufficient in number for the
surveillance of an entire pipeline system. All available supporting forces (in
the course of their normal duties) should observe and report items of
intelligence for further investigation. Examples of suspicious activities in the
pipeline area might include the unusual presence of commercial tanker
trucks, the appearance of gasoline drums or cans, or an increased use of
motor vehicles in fuel-scarce areas. Other resources available to the
commander for coordination and support include HN and MP elements
responsible for the AO, as well as the security officer of the petroleum group
or battalion.
Convoy Movement
10-34. As convoy movements are tactical in nature and are discussed in
detail in FM 19-4, they will be briefly discussed here. When moving by
convoy, consideration should be made for the following:
Congested traffic areas.
Travel during night hours when traffic is reduced rather than travel
during daylight hours when traffic congestion is heaviest.