III.

BILL OF RIGHTS
1. DUE PROCESS OF LAW (ARTICLE III, SECTION 1)

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (ART. III, SEC. 1)

no precise definition because it might prove constricting and prevent the judiciary from
adjusting it to the circumstances of particular cases
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice
embodiment of sporting idea of fair play
guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of the government

Protection of Person
Covers Natural (citizen and alien) and Artificial Persons. As to the latter, with respect only to
property because its life and liberty are derived from and subject to control of legislature.

Deprivation (in Sec. 1, Art. III)

connotes denial of right to life, liberty or property
not unconstitutional. what is prohibited is deprivation without due process of law.

Life
connotes integrity of the physical person
not mere animal existence; embraces the enjoyment by the individual of God-given faculties
that can make his life worth living.

Liberty
freedom to do right and never wrong (Mabini)
right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude

Property
anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract
all things within the commerce of man
However, one cannot have a vested right to a public office as this is not regarded as property.
If created by statute, it may be abolished by the legislature at any time.
Mere privileges are not property rights and are therefore revocable at will
Substantive Due Process
requires intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty or property

REQUISITES:
1. Lawful Subject
2. Lawful Means

Procedural Due Process

- restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of government
- Notice + Hearing (...hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial)
1. Judicial Due Process
Requisites: [IJHJ]
1. [I] Impartial and Competent Court
2. [J] Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of t he defendant and/or property
3. [H] Hearing
- not necessarily trial-type hearing; submission of position papers is enough
- right of a party to cross-examine the witness against him in a civil case is an
indispensable part of due process
- the filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of a hearing
- Cases in which notice and hearing may be dispensed with without violating due
process:
a) abatement of nuisance per se
b) preventive suspension of a civil servant facing admin. charges
c) cancellation of passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime
d) statutory presumptions
4. [J] Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing

2. Administrative Due Process

REQUISITES [HEDSPIK]:
1. [H] Right to a hearing
2. [E] Tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. [D] Decision must have something to support itself
4. [S] Evidence must be Substantial
5. [P] Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected
6. [I] Tribunal, body, or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the facts and law of the controversy
7. [K] Decision is rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
 the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), v JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD

40 PHIL 136
Facts:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British
subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the
Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought
to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise
between ports in the Islands. Application (Certificate of Philippine Regitry) was
made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a
certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate,
giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not
citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands under Act No. 2761
which provides:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a
vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of
Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and
of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall
be optional with the owner.
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a
certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of customs
is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be
engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such
ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the
equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from
owning vessels, and because classification of corporations based on the
citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No.
2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due process of law because
by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial
attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could
not use.
Issue: Whether the legislature through Act no. 2761 can deny registry of
vessel with foreign stockholders.
Ruling: Yes. We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a
corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded
by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the
right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to
that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but
does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the
police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.

The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph

of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color,
or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise,
are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is
concerned. Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of
treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based upon some
reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection.

A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of

course, cause the inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by
reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of
the equal protection of the laws.

To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or

companies to obtain a certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they
be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or
both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of
the exceptions.

One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching
in influence is, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was
designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its `police
power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very
necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in
view, must often be had in certain districts. This is the same police power which
the United States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the conditions
which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its
people." For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic
Law could could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
 Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature
is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the
Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building.
VILLEGAS VS HIU 86 SCRA 275
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance
prohibiting aliens from being employed or
engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit
fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong
Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed
a petition to stop the enforcement of such
ordinance as well as to declare the same null and
void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due
process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in
question violates the due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed
to get a permit from the City Mayor who may
withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens
****XXX
Equal Protection Delegation of Powers
Administrative Bodies
Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the
City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila
Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No.
6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign
nationals to be employed within the City of
Manila without first securing a permit from the
Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them
P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition
for prohibition against the said Ordinance
alleging that as a police power measure, it makes
no distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00
employment permit, which is out of proportion
to the cost of registration and that it fails to
prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the
action of the Mayor, thus, violating the
fundamental principle on illegal delegation of
legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI
ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the
Ordinance as being null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of
equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.
HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue
delegation of power.
Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only
because it is excessive but because it fails to
consider valid substantial differences in situation
among individual aliens who are required to pay
it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification, should be
based on real and substantial differences having
a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of
P50.00 is being collected from every employed
alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part
time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring
a person before he can be employed to get a
permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.

39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to
that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe
who were considered to be of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and
was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue
of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which
provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether
or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to
execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial
governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was
said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated
in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle
them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory
nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of
law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

A. Aspect of Due Process

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]

Facts:

Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest,
filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing
Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in
English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and
dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The
appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are
Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it
constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the
legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal
with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held:

Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the
municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese
characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar
with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is
not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in
its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans,
Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without
distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be
imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by
learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a
receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary
injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.

***XXX

JAVIER vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986
Due Process impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in
May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress,
vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the
complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation
of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board
to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before
the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before
proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a
former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2 nd Division but the
Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier
was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and
academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and
waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
***XXX

Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986)

Facts:

An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are
unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead
as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military
respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan
did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military
accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President
Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder
charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross
violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the
prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no
double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The
lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction
when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian
President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was
undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction
owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void
and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the
account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined
verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and
rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.

***XXX

274 SCRA 358 Political Law Constitutional Law Due Process; Administrative Bodies
Dismissal of Employees

Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, a Japanese national
alleged that Singson extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and
that to settle the issue, she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the
investigating committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment. Singson then
filed a case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of
Singson as he found PALs side insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2 nd Division thereof.

The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio
Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino same arbiter which decided Singsons case. The
commissioners deliberated on the case and thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala
deliberated on the motion. The motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that Singson
was denied due process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the
NLRC, in reviewing PALs appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of
one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each
from the workers and employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal
representation and impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3)
commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case
under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The infirmity of the
resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by two
commissioners and without the participation of Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of
his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of Singsons right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous
error. It negated his right to due process.

***XXX

Tejano vs. Ombudsman

 GR 159190, 30 June 2005; Second Division, Chico-Nazario [J]

FACTS:

On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred inthe approval of his
subordinates on the filing of the proper information for violation of Section3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz andVicente dela Cruz of V&G. Afterwards, the
case was filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a
Period of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation. Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation
and ordered the Officeof the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation,
convinced thatno probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente
delaCruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, recommended the dismissal of the case. On 10 December 1999,
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminaryinvestigation as Special
Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note assign
the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.

ISSUE:

WON THE OMBUDSMAN IS JUSTIFIED IN DISAPPROVEDING THERECOMMENDATION FOR

THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.

HELD.

NO. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review hisdecision on
appeal. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant caseand having
recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved OmbudsmanDesierto to recuse
himself from participating in the review of the same during thereinvestigation.

***XXX

VALLADOLID v. INCIONG
G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983 (FIRST DIVISION)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner, in was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard

operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector by the president of JRM. The
transfer was motivated by the interception of business and confidential matters to a competitor hotel by
(allegedly) Villadolid who was then working as a switchboard operator and while serving in his capacity
as clerk/collector, copies of Accounts Receivables reached the competitor hotel (Tropicana Apartment-
Hotel) although said copies were not referred to them. That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions that
Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for the aforementioned disclosures, a plan for the
entrapment was conceived by the Copacabana Apartment- Hotel. After the entrapment scheme had been
effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a 5 day vacation leave which was extended to 30 days.
When he went back to work, JRM refused to admit him and instead asked him to resign. RM maintains
that Valladolid left the office that same day and never returned, because he was reprimanded for his
unauthorized absences. Valladolid later on filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with vacation and sick
leave pay.
The Ministry ruled that the application for clearance with preventive suspension is denied and respondent
(JRM) is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant (Valladolid) to his former position without backwages
and without loss of seniority rights. Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor
seeking modification of the same, praying for the award of backwages from the time he was illegally
dismissed but the Deputy Minister of Labor (Inciong) dismissed both appeals after finding "no sufficient
justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from.

ISSUE:
1. WON the non-award of backwages raised by Valladolid claiming that the Orders of Deputy
Minister of Labor are contrary to law and evidence.
2. WON JRM was deprived of due process when the Deputy Minister of Labor sustained the finding
of respondent Regional Director that there is no evidence to support the dismissal of private
respondent.

HELD:Petitions for certiorari are DENIED.

RATIO:
1. Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the employee's misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the
same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for
the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded of his position. However, as this was Valladolid's first offense, as found by the
Regional Director, dismissal from the service is too harsh a punishment, considering that he had
not been previously admonished, warned or suspended for any misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-
collector, he need not be given access to facts relative to the business of Copacabana, which, if
divulged to Tropicana would be to the former's prejudice.
The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid were unauthorized but did gross
neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires deliberate refusal to resume employment
or a clear showing in terms of specific circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for
work. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was committed by respondent Regional
Director in ordering his reinstatement without backwages.
2. JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that applications for clearance
have to be summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered within ten (10) days
from the filing of the opposition. As this Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due
process where the Regional Director merely required the submission of position papers and
resolved the case summarily thereafter.

***XXX

Zaldivar Vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 79690-707, February 1, 1989

Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, respondents powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the
Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct
an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in
the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he
was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked
to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it
will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the
Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SCs order '"heightens the people's apprehension
over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the
small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free was publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then
sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for
alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself
from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this
Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found
respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he
assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for
this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in
disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible
tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which
penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held
that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner
and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake
is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of
the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of
the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the
society.

***XXX

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002 PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish
Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by
the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of
the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for
Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069
in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed
before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.
Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M
in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide
lower court.

ISSUES:

Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD:

Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to
conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine
of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness
that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with
other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability
and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His
guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person

charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found
proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in
the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a)leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there;
and
b)remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return
and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government
has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

***XXX

146 SCRA 446 Civil Law Preliminary
Title Publication Presidential
Proclamations etc What unless otherwise
provided means in Article 2 of the Civil
Code
With the Supreme Courts decision that
ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official
Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and
effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and
clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be
made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as
long as the people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon
the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it
finds the same as impractical. That is not its
function for such is the function of the
legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is
merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance
with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court
declared that all laws shall immediately upon
their approval or as soon thereafter as possible,
be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after 15 days from their real party in interest and the relator at whose
publication, or on another date specified by the instigation the proceedings are instituted
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the need not show that he has any legal or
Civil Code. The clause unless otherwise special interest in the result, it being
provided pertains to the date of publication and sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
not the requirement of publication.
such interested in the execution of the laws.
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right
Tanada VS Tuvera
recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not
Facts: Herein Petitioners seek a writ of
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would
mandamus to compel respondent public
indeed be difficult to conceive of any other
officials to publish, and cause the
person to initiate the same.
publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
(2) As to second issue, YES. Art. 2 of the
general orders, proclamations, executive
Civil Code do not preclude the requirement
orders, letter of implementation and
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
administrative orders in compliance with the
the law itself provides for the date of its
people's right to be informed on matters of
effectivity. The clear object of this provision
public concern, as well as the principle that
is to give the general public adequate notice
laws to be valid and enforceable must be
of the various laws which are to regulate
published in the Official Gazette or
their actions and conduct as citizens.
otherwise effectively promulgate. On the
Without such notice and publication, there
other hand, the Respondents, thru the
would be no basis for the application of the
Solicitor General seek for its dismissal on
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
the ground of petitioners lack of standing.
would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the
Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are the
transgression of a law which he had no
proper party to file the instant petition;
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
(2) WON publication in the Official Gazette
one.
is required before any law or statute
It is needless to add that the
becomes valid and enforceable
publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
Held: (1) YES. The Court already held in its
a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
previous decisions that: When the question
law that before a person may be bound by
is one of public right and the object of the
law, he must first be officially and
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
specifically informed of its contents.
a public duty, the people are regarded as the
***XXX

Go vs CA
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon
Maguans car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioners car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police
forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time,
positively identified petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing
trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested
without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station
six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had
not been just committed at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who
arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the personal
knowledge required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the
right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go; Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
 Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioners wifes name. That information did not, however, constitute personal
knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.

2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there
had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
and proceeded to trial without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary
investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave
to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioners claim to
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

***XXX

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations

69 Phil. 635 Political Law Constitutional Law Due Process in Administrative Bodies
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Motion For New Trial; Grounds

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that
the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National
Workers Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio
was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR,
filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the
trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are
of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory
accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

***XXX

2. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (ART. III, SEC. 2)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (ART. III, SEC. 2)

embraced in the concept of due process

 embodied in a separate clause to provide for a more specific guaranty against undue
favoritism or hostility from the government

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE attacks ARBITRARINESS in general

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE attacks UNWARRANTED PARTIALITY OR

PREJUDICE

SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

EQUALITY IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW law be enforced and applied equally

A law which denies equal protection is the same with a law which permits such denial. (read
People vs Vera)

Requisites:

1. it must be based on substantial distinctions

2. it must be germane to the purposes of the law

3. it must not be limited to existing conditions only

- must be enforced as long as the problem sought to be corrected exists

4. it must apply equally well to all members of the class

- both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed

Meaning (Persons protected)

-All persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.

-Natural and juridical persons are entitled to this guarantee.

-With respect to juridical persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.

Scope of Equality

Economic

(1) Free access to courts

(2) Marine wealth reserved for Filipino citizens

(3) Reduction of social, economic and political inequalities

Political

(1) Free access to courts

(2) Bona fide candidates being free from harassment/discrimination

(3) Reduction of social, economic and political inequalities

Social

Valid Classification

(1) Substantial distinctions

(2) Germane to the purpose of the law

(3) Not limited to existing conditions only

(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class

95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after
Being 65

Judicial Review; Requisites thereof

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he
has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.

In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This
law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and
the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the
provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been
merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea
that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office
and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify
them from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be
a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law
should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other
hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local
officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official
just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Forbes, Harding, Trowbridge vs. Chuoco Tiaco, Crossfiled

Presidential immunity from suit; president is immune from civil liability and may not be sued during
his tenure.

Facts:

This is an original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the
Hon. A. S. Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit
him from taking or continuing jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and PENDING before him
in which Chuoco Tiaco (respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron Forbes, J. E. Harding, and C. R.
Trowbridge (petitioners herein) are defendants.

The plaintiffs are W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and
CHIEF OF POLICE J. E. Harding and CHIEF OF THE SECRET SERVICE of the city of Manila C. R.
Trowbridge. Defendant A. S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila. Defendant Chuoco Tiaco is a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a resident of the Philippine
Islands for the last 35 years having a family in the country and some properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a
case for DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and
forcibly prevented his return for some months in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be
and to remain in the Philippine Islands as established by law.

Crossfield issued an INHIBITION against Forbes et al from spelling or deporting or

threatening to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco. Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of
prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried
out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government
in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred
to, but the Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions
dismissed. The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a
respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty
without due process of law.

Issue: WON the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action.

Ruling: The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no
authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he
will, unimpeded and restrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the
execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free
from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On
the contrary, it means, simply, that THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, LIKE THE JUDGES OF THE
COURTS AND THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE, MAY NOT BE PERSONALLY
MULCTED IN CIVIL DAMAGES FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXECUTED IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the
matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-
General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived
of his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority
of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is to mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary,
it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability
of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is
liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have
exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. WHAT IS HELD HERE IS
THAT HE WILL BE PROTECTED FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES NOT
ONLY WHEN HE ACTS WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO WHEN HE IS WITHOUT
AUTHORITY, PROVIDED HE ACTUALLY USED DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT, THAT IS,
THE JUDICIAL FACULTY, IN DETERMINING WHETHER HE HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT
OR NOT. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If
he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which
two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the
lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination. In such a case, he acts, not as Governor-General, but as a private individual, and, as such,
must answer for the consequences of his act.

***XXX***

People vs Hernandez GR 6025-26 18 July 1956

Facts: Defendant-appellant Amado Hernandez is a bonafide member of Congress of Labor Organizations.
CLO is an affiliate of Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, a known group performing rebellious activities.
Hernandez was charged and convicted of the crime of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and
robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Prosecution maintains that capital punishment may be
imposed for the crime he was convicted of. Defense contends that there is no complex crime in the crime
of rebellion. It was deemed best not to disturb the course of action taken by the lower court, which denied
bail to Hernandez, hence the motion to post bail.
Issue: Whether or not equal protection was observed in the administration of justice?
Decision: Motion for bail granted. The ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence,
are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately there from. Indeed, if one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense
be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to
prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The
reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the
result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate
and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer
the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum
total of the separate penalties for each offense.
***XXX***
Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286

Facts: This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year
1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's
Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by
an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the
Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or
the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all
money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to
ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate
monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on
the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was
denied.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the
government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies,
and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

Issue: Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal
protection of laws.

Held: YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to
state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the
identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that
military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of
the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets
it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by
fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The
plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of the
people of the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain
that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the
Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can
be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject
to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or
dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor
and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners'
right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this
case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials
in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by
the EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they
should object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.

***XXX***

Mirasol v. DPWH GR No. 158793 8 June 2006 Carpio, J.

In 1957, RA 2000 (Limited Highways Act) was enacted. Subsequently, DPWH Administrative Order 1
(prohibiting motorcycles on limited access highways), DPWH Department Order 74 (declaring certain
portions of the NLEX and SLEX as limited access facilities), and DPWH Department Order 215
(declaring Coastal Road as a limited access facility) were issued.

James Mirasol, Richard Santiago, and the Luzon Motorcyclists Federation, Inc. sought to have the DPWH
issuances invalidated for violating RA 2000. Consequently, the Toll Regulatory Board issued Department
Order 123, which allowed motorcycles with engine displacements of 400cc inside limited access
facilities.
The trial court dismissed the petition but declared DO 123 invalid.

Issue: W/N Administrative Order 1 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.

Rulling: NO. It is neither warranted nor reasonable to say that the only justifiable classification among
modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created
equal. Real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient
to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the tollways. The most obvious and
troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
four-wheeled vehicle. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on tollways
that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of
transport could use it.

Dontrine: Classification by itself is not prohibited. It can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that
is, if it is not based on substantial differences.

A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like
due process and equal protection of the law.

***XXX***

Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. v Treasurer of Ormoc City 22 SCRA 603 (1968)

Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.,
in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12,
087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity
of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to
enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional
limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on
August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the
taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms
of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution.

(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights,
Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.

Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies
not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the
present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for
it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only
sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily
collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance
provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until
declared otherwise.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12, 087.50 plaintiff-
appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

***XXX***
 EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW (Case Digest)

Philippine Judges Association vs Prado, 227 SCRA 703, CRUZ, J .:

FACTS: The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers
of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts
who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 (see ISSUE for the grounds stated by the
petitioners).

ISSUE: WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds:

1) its *title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;

(2) It did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its
final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and

(3) It is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

HELD:

1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of
the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing clause which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges
is merely the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
required to be briefly expressed in its title.

2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may
propose an entirely new provision. The court also added that said the bill in question was duly approved
by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification by Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by President the
President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of
the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look into the petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government.

3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things
similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege (Pres, VP,
Senators etc.). If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it.

Therefore, Sec 35 of RA 7345 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

-----------------------

* "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

** Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation
may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

***XXX***
PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS, GR 132875-76 FEBRUARY 03, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
 The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
***XXX***
240. TIU VS CA, G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999(Equal Protection of the Law)
FACTS: Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled "An Act
Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there to special
privileges. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97, clarifying the application of the tax and duty
incentives. The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-
duty-free privilege was operative. The petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO
97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. This Court referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals. Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the
exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA
7227.Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A
and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the
1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as
amended . . .'"
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD: No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside
and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. The
fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to
the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. Classification, to be valid,
must (1) rest on substantial distinctions,(2) be germane to the purpose of the law,(3) not be limited to
existing conditions only, and(4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Supreme Court
believed it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the
confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to
transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining
industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases
for their businesses and industries.
***XXX***

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
 [G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998]

(EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)

FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is
an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens,
taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among
other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of
the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this
constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast
companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other
political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that
it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to
require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According
to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this
years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process
of law and without just compensation.

RULING: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus,
such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time
as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they
may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public
funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air
time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a social
function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find
their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection
with the holding of elections is for that common good.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

***XXX***