Punsalan v. vda. De Lacsamana [G.R. No. L-55729. March 28, 1983.] First Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 5 concur Facts: Antonio Punsalan, Jr.

, was the former registered owner of a parcel of land consisting of 340 m2 situated in Bamban, Tarlac. In 1963, Punsalan mortgaged the land to PNB (Tarlac Branch) for P10,000.00, but for failure to pay said amount, the property was foreclosed on 16 December 1970. PNB (Tarlac Branch) was the highest bidder in said foreclosure proceedings. However, the bank secured title thereto only on 14 December 1977. In the meantime, in 1974, while the property was still in the alleged possession of Punsalan and with the alleged acquiescence of PNB (Tarlac Branch), and upon securing a permit from the Municipal Mayor, Punsalan constructed a warehouse on said property. Punsalan declared said warehouse for tax purposes for which he was issued Tax Declaration 5619. Punsalan then leased the warehouse to one Hermogenes Sibal for a period of 10 years starting January 1975. On 26 July 1978, a Deed of Sale was executed between PNB (Tarlac Branch) and Lacsamana over the property. This contract was amended on 31 July 1978, particularly to include in the sale, the building and improvement thereon. By virtue of said instruments, Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name (TCT 173744) as well as separate tax declarations for the land and building. On 22 November 1979, Punsalan commenced suit for "Annulment of Deed of Sale with Damages" against PNB and Lacsamana before the CFI Rizal, Branch XXXI, Quezon City, essentially impugning the validity of the sale of the building as embodied in the Amended Deed of Sale. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground of improper venue on 25 April 1980, finding that the ³warehouse allegedly owned and constructed by the plaintiff on the land of the PNB situated in the Municipality of Bamban, Province of Tarlac, which warehouse is an immovable property pursuant to Article 415 (1) of the New Civil Code; and, as such the action of the plaintiff is a real action affecting title to real property which, under Section 2, Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court, must be tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.´ Punsalan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, which the Court denied on 1 September 1980. Hence, the petition for Certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the petition without prejudice to the refilling of the case by Punsalan in the proper forum; with cost against the petitioner. 1. Buildings are always immovable under the Code Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property. 2. Annulment or rescission of sale of real property does not operate to efface the objective of recovering real property Even if one does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action. 3. Lack of allegation of improper venue does not warrant case to proceed as it also require other indispensable party The contention that the case should proceed as the respondent failed to allege improper venue and, therefore, issues had already been joined, is untenable. An indispensable party exist besides the parties in the Amended Contract of Sale, the validity of which is being questioned. It would be futile to proceed with the case against one respondent alone.

Lopez v. Orosa [G.R. Nos. L-10817-18. February 28, 1958.] En Banc, Felix (J): 10 concur. Facts: Enrique Lopez is a resident of Balayan, Batangas, doing business as Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Sometime in May 1946, Vicente Orosa, Jr. invited Lopez to make an investment in the theatre business (Plaza Theatre, Inc.). Although Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest in the business, he agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction of the proposed theatre and at Orosa's behest and assurance that the latter would be personally liable for any account that the said construction might incur, Lopez further agreed that payment therefor would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Pursuant to said verbal agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber for the theater on 17 May 1946, up to 4 December of the same year. The Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of land with an area of 679.17 m2 formerly owned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., and was acquired by the corporation on 25 September 1946. The total cost of the materials amounted to P62,255.85, of which Lopez was paid only P20,848.50, thus leaving a balance of P41,771.35. Orosa and Belarmino Rustia, corporation president, promised Lopez to obtain a bank loan to satisfy the balance, to which assurance Lopez had to accede. Unknown to him, however, as early as November 1946, the corporation already got a loan for P30,000 from the PNB with the Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor of said company as counter-security. As the land at that time was not yet brought under the operation of the Torrens System, the mortgage on the same was registered on 16 November 1946, under Act 3344. Subsequently, when the corporation applied for the registration of the land under Act 496, such mortgage was not revealed and thus OCT O-391 was correspondingly issued on October 25, 1947, without any encumbrance appearing thereon. Vicente Orosa, Jr. executed, on 17 March 1947, an alleged "deed of assignment" of his 420 shares of stock of the Plaza Theater, Inc., at P100 per share or with a total value of P42,000 in favor of the creditor, and as the obligation still remained unsettled, Lopez filed on 12 November 1947, a complaint with the CFI Batangas (Civil Case 4501, later R-57) against Vicente Orosa Jr. and

Plaza Theatre, Inc., praying that defendants be sentenced to pay him jointly and severally the sum of P41,771.35 with legal interest from the filing of the action; that in case defendants fail to pay the same, that the building and the land covered by OCT O-391 owned by the corporation be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof be applied to said indebtedness; or that the 420 shares of the capital stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., assigned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., to said plaintiff be sold at public auction for the same purpose; and for such other remedies as may be warranted by the circumstances. Plaintiff also caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on said properties with the Register of Deeds. The surety company, in the meantime, upon discovery that the land was already registered under the Torrens System and that there was a notice of lis pendens thereon, filed on 17 August 1948, or within the 1-year period after the issuance of the certificate of title, a petition for review of the decree of the land registration court dated 18 October 1947, in order to annotate the lights and interests of the surety company over said properties. Opposition thereto was offered by Lopez, asserting that the amount demanded by him constituted a preferred lien over the properties of the obligors; that the surety company was guilty of negligence when it failed to present an opposition to the application for registration of the property; and that if any annotation of the rights and interest of said surety would ever be made, same must be subject to the lien in his favor. The two cases were heard jointly and in a decision dated 30 October 1952, the lower Court held that Orosa and the Plaza Theatre, Inc., were jointly liable for the unpaid balance of the cost of lumber used in the construction of the building and the plaintiff thus acquired the materialman's lien over the same; the lien being merely confined to the building and did not extend to the land on which the construction was made. Plaintiff tried to secure a modification of the decision in so far as it declared that the obligation of therein defendants was joint instead of solidary and that the lien did not extend to the land, but same was denied by order of the court of 23 December 1952. The matter was thus appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling, and then to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, with costs against appellant. 1. Building is separate and distinct from land While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing ² that a building is by itself an immovable property (cf. Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery). In the absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. 2. Article 1923 (5); Lien charged to property for which credit was made A close examination of Article 1923 (5) of the Civil Code reveals that the law gives preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the refection or work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. In the case at bar, the lien for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors. Thus, the materialman's lien could be charged only to the building for which the credit was made or which received the benefit of refection, the interest of the mortgagee over the land is superior and cannot be made subject to the said materialman's lien. Prudential Bank v. Panis [G.R. No. L-50008. August 31, 1987.] First Division, Paras (J): 4 concur. Facts: On 19 November 1971, Fernando A. Magcale and Teodula Baluyut Magcale secured a loan of P70,000.00 from Prudential Bank. To secure payment of this loan, the Magcales executed in favor of Prudential Bank a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 2-storey, semi-concrete residential building with warehouse space (total area of 263 sq.m.); and granting upon the mortgagee the right of occupancy on the lot where the property is erected. A rider is also included in the deed that in the event the Sales Patent on the lot is issued of Bureau of Lands, the Register of Deeds is authorized to hold the Registration until the mortgage is cancelled or annotate the encumbrance on the title upon authority from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which title with annotation release in favor of the mortgage. The Real Estate Mortgage was registered under the Provisions of Act 3344 with the Registry of Deeds of Zambales on 23 November 1971. Subsequently, the Magcales secured an additional loan from Prudential Bank, secured by another deed of Real Estate Mortgage registeed with the Registry of Deeds in Olongapo City, on 2 May 1973. On 24 April 1973, the Secretary of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent 4776 over the parcel of land, possessory rights over which were mortgaged to rudential Bank, in favor of the Magcales. On the basis of the Patent, and upon its transcription in the Registration Book of the Province of Zambales, OCT P-2554 was issued in the name of Fernando Magcale, by the Ex-Oficio Register of Deeds of Zambales, on 15 May 1972. For failure of the Magcales to pay their obligation to the Bank after it became due, the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed. Consequent to the foreclosure was the sale of the properties mortgaged to the bank as the highest bidder in a public auction sale conducted by the City Sheriff on 12 April 1978. The auction sale was held despite written request from the Magcales through counsel, dated 29 March 1978, for the City Sheriff to desist from going with the scheduled public auction sale. The issue was raised to the CF Zambales and Olongapo City which, on 3 November 1978, declared the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage as null and void. The bank filed a motion for reconsideration on 14 December 1978, which the court denied on 10 January 1979 for lack of merit. Hence, the petition. The Supreme Court modified the decision of the CFI Zambales & Olongapo, declaring that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage for P70,000.00 is valid but ruling that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage for an additional loan of P20,000.00 is null and void, without prejudice to any appropriate action the Government may take against private respondents.

1. Building separate and distinct from the land In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is obvious that the inclusion of 'building' separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property. (Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr., et al., L-10817-18, Feb. 28, 1958; Associated Inc. and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Iya, et al., L-10837-38, May 30, 1958). 2. Building can be mortgaged apart from the land it is built; possessory rights may be validly transferred in a deed of mortgage While a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings; still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land (Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). Possessory rights over said properties before title is vested on the grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage (Vda. de Bautista vs. Marcos, 3 SCRA 438 [1961]). 3. A valid real estate mortgage may be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another The original mortgage was executed (19 November 1971) before the issuance of the final patent (24 April 1972) and before the government was divested of its title to the land (15 May 1972), an event which takes effect only on the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds (Visayan Realty Inc. vs. Meer, 96 Phil. 515; Director of Lands vs. De Leon, 110 Phil. 28; Director of Lands vs. Jurado, L-14702, May 23, 1961; Peña, "Law on Natural Resources", p. 49). In the case at bar, it is evident that the mortgage executed by Magcale on his own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents and purposes a valid mortgage. 4. Public land act and RA 730 not violated in first mortgage As to restrictions appearing to the Magcales¶ title; Sections 121, 122 and 124 of the Public Land Act refer to land already acquired under the Public Land Act or any improvement thereon. Section 2 of RA 730 refers to encumbrance or alienation before the patent is issued because it refers specifically to encumbrance or alienation on the land itself and does not mention anything regarding the improvements existing thereon. Both have no application to the assailed mortgage in the case at bar; as the former, the mortgage was executed before such eventuality, and the latter, it does not encumber nor alienate the land. 5. Mortgage made after issuance of Sales Patent an OCT prohibited; Estoppel does not give validating effect to a void contract As regards the second mortgage executed, such mortgage executed after the issuance of the sales patent and of the Original Certificate of Title, falls squarely under the prohibitions stated in Sections 121, 122 and 124 of the Public Land Act and Section 2 of RA 730, and is therefore null and void. Even if the title was voluntary surrendered to the bank for the mortgage to be annotated without the prior approval of the Ministry of Natural Resources; in pari delicto may not be invoked to defeat the policy of the State neither may the doctrine of estoppel give a validating effect to a void contract. Indeed, it is generally considered that as between parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy (19 Am. Jur. 802). It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. De los Amas and Alino, supra; Arsenal vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 54 [1986]). Such does not, however, preclude new contracts that may be entered into in accordance with the requirements of the law. Any new transaction, however, would be subject to whatever steps the Government may take for the reversion of the land in its favor. Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery [G.R. No. L-11658. February 15, 1918.] First Division, Carson (J): 5 concur, 3 took no part. Facts: The "Compañia Agricola Filipina" bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price. It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood. The indebtedness secured by this instrument not having been paid when it fell due, the mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff, in pursuance of the terms of the mortgage instrument, and was bought in by the machinery company. The mortgage was registered in the chattel mortgage registry, and the sale of the property to the machinery company in satisfaction of the mortgage was annotated in the same registry on 29 December 1913. On 14 January 1914, the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the building stood to the machinery company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a public document, was not registered and made no reference to the building erected on the land and would appear to have been executed for the purpose of curing any defects which might be found to exist in the machinery company's title to the building under the sheriff's certificate of sale. The machinery company went into possession of the building at or about the time when this sale took place, that is to say, the month of December 1913, and it has continued in possession ever since. At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the machinery company, the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" executed another mortgage to Leung Yee upon the building, separate and apart from the land on which it stood, to secure payment of the balance of its indebtedness to Leung Yee under a contract for the construction of the building. Upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay the amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, Leung Yee secured judgment for that amount, levied execution upon the building, bought it in at the sheriff's sale on or about the 18 December 1914, and had the sheriff's certificate of sale duly registered in the land registry of the Province of Cavite. At the time when the execution was levied upon the building, the machinery company, which was in possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the levy. Thereafter, upon demand of the sheriff, Leung Yee executed an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff in the sum of P12,000, in reliance upon which the sheriff sold the property at public auction to the plaintiff, who was the highest bidder at the sheriff's sale. The current action was instituted to recover possession of the building from the machinery company. The Court gave judgment in favor of the machinery company, relying upon Article 1473 and the fact that the company had its title to the building registered prior to the date of the registry of plaintiff¶s certificate. Hence the appeal.

and rights created by statute. The Bicerras filed a complaint claiming actual damages of P200. "Good faith. claiming to the owners thereof. this provision must always be understood on the basis of the good faith mentioned in the first paragraph. 1. 1962. L-16218. it remains an essential requisite of registration as it could not have been the intention of the legislator to base the preferential right secured this article of the code upon an inscription of title in bad faith. Miller. 250. Shadel. had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned. The materials of the house were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant. 2. or the lack of it. but in ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a given occasion. 52 La. Gilman. the legislator could not have wished to strike it out and to sanction bad faith. with safety. 6. vs." which constitutes good faith implies a "freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. moral and consequential damages amounting to P600. just to comply with a mere formality which. Construction of Article 1473 as to issue of good faith It is always to be understood on the basis of the good faith mentioned in the first paragraph.The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with costs against the appellant. will not make him an innocent purchaser for value. be determined. No. nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property. Construction should not defeat the purpose of law Even if Article 1473 of the Civil Code require "good faith. Cardenas vs. Such an interpretation placed upon the language of this section would open wide the door to fraud and collusion. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard. The force and effect given by law to an inscription in a public record presupposes the good faith of him who enters such inscription. Registry of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the building and the machineries installed therein The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of personal property. is in its last analysis a question of intention. and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel mortgages. and further. but on the ground that the agreed statement of facts discloses that neither the purchase of the building by plaintiff nor his inscription of the sheriff's certificate of sale in his favor was made in good faith. in relation to "possession" and "title. Breaux-Renoudet. and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property. Test of good faith Good faith. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein. is not a visible. Cf. the Court is necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may. and the costs. Abra. therefore. 505.] En Banc. 119 Mich." to the benefit of the person who thus makes the inscription. tangible fact that can be seen or touched. Pinkerton Bros. Cypress Lumber Co. Building separate from land does not affect character as real property.) Bicerra v. 8. 5. The building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed was real property. and that the machinery company must be held to be the owner of the property under the third paragraph of the above cited article of the code. . do not and cannot accrue under an inscription "in bad faith. The public records cannot be converted into instruments of fraud and oppression by one who secures an inscription therein in bad faith. not Article 1473 (on good faith). but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs. the question is to be decided in accordance with the following paragraph. 17." "the honest lawful intent. Makalintal (J): 10 concur. no costs were adjudged. which are predicated upon an inscription in a public registry. in its second paragraph." mortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. or the want of it. or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title. it having been found that the second purchasers who record their purchase had knowledge of the precious sale. 3. The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed. Facts: The Bicerras are supposedly the owners of the house (PhP 20. in given cases. Having been admitted in forma pauperis. The CFI Abra dismissed the complaint claiming that the action was within the exclusive (original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang.000) built on a lot owned by them in Lagangilang. Teneza [G. it appearing that the company first took possession of the property. 504.. controlling as to ownership of property The ruling cannot be sustained on the ground of Article 1473." and so it is that proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of good faith in which the courts always indulge in the absence of proof to the contrary.." but contain no express requirement as to "good faith" in relation to the "inscription" of the property in the registry. even if not mentioned unlike in ³possession´ and ³title´. Bromley.R. that the building and the land were sold to the machinery company long prior to the date of the sheriff's sale to the plaintiff. 108 Cal. Although article 1473. 2094-2098. vs. Good faith an essential requisite of ³inscription´ of property in registry. 10. Abra. So it is that "the honesty of intention. which the Tenezas forcibly demolished in January 1957. Bad faith: One cannot claim acquisition of title in good faith if knowledgeable of defect or lack of title One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein. 4. Possession before sheriff¶s sale." (Wilder vs. provides that the title of conveyance of ownership of the real property that is first recorded in the registry shall have preference. and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Ann. 55 Vt." in express terms. Co. second paragraph. if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective. and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation. November 29. and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists... does not obtain even in real disputes between third persons.

Maximo Quiambao. for it declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction´ is untenable.. . in compliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case 6268 of the same court (Alto Surety & Insurance vs. 2. may have privately given to the property levied upon. Further. but is only incidental to the real cause of action to recover damages. as in this case. the only positive relief prayed for. judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista. 3. "the order of attachment . this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. Ofilada. Standard Oil Co. 1952. Hence.. although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of Alto Surety. Concepcion (J): 9 concur Facts: On 4 June 1949. but view is limited to parties Parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. partly. of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture on the land. it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases. until said delivery. 630. As explicitly held. Neither this principle. Evangelista filed an appeal by Certiorari with the Supreme Court. In due course. Exception. Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera. . Sales on execution affect the public and third persons.000 and that there is no real property litigated as the house has ceased to exist. of New York vs. 8235 of the CFI Manila (Santos Evangelista vs. credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery. should have been served in the manner provided in subsection (e) of section 7 of Rule 59." As such. for the purpose of establishing his title over said house. by filing copy of said writ and the corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. On the same date.) Evangelista v. Inc. On appeal. Civil Code). as the highest bidder at an auction sale held. apart from recovering damages. Inc.00 a month from October. Rosario Guevara and Ricardo Rivera)" in which judgment.. citing various sources). plus costs. (Manarang v. the attachment having been levied as if the house in question were immovable property. RA 296 as amended) and not the CFI (Section 44. House of mixed material levied upon on execution is real property The house of mixed materials levied upon on execution. April 23. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house. However. No. much less a debt. when demolished A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Article 415. It is based. it is "ostensibly a personal property. Rivera refused to surrender it. although subject of a contract of chattel mortgage between the owner and a third person." of the Rules of Court. As this is a case for recovery of damages where the demand does not exceed PhP 2. which is real property. is real property within the purview of Rule 39. "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property. he obtained a writ of attachment. as "personal property capable of manual delivery. upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co. when they are not ordinarily so. This is the doctrine in Leung Yee vs. The regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties. but immovable property The house is not personal property. built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him. Juan Dee Co. bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. a declaration of being the owners of the dismantled house and/or of the materials in no wise constitutes the relief itself which if granted by final judgment could be enforceable by execution. Ofilada) 4. and securing possession thereof.. with the costs against Alto Surety & Insurance Co.1. But once the house is demolished. . in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 464). which absolved Alto Surety from the complaint. is applicable to strangers to said contract. on 8 June 1949. House is not personal property even if subject to chattel mortgage. 1958. House is immovable property even if situated on land belonging to a different owner. the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. House is not personal. After due trial. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the convenience or agreement of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings (Manarang v. Santos Evangelista instituted Civil Case No. for the sum of money. who. Hodges (48 OG 5374). Recovery of damages not exceeding P2.] En Banc. 44 Phil. Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien. and another one entered affirming that of the CFI Manila. De Jesus vs. 37 Phil. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7. had been rendered in favor of Alto Surety. not to the character which the parties have given to it or desire to give it. The regulation governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. by taking and safely keeping in his custody". id. sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to Evangelista and to pay him. the special consideration that parties to a contract may have desired to impart to real estate as personal property. P40. the case is within the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court (as per Section 88. Jaramillo. This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. upon the ground that. 48 OOG 2664. in Laddera vs. paragraph 1. L-11139. 644. section 16. the Court of Appeals held. The corresponding definite deed of sale was issued to him on 22 October 1952..000 and involving no real property belong to the Justice of the Peace Court The complaint is for recovery of damages. 1. 2. the CFI Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista.R. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. House may be considered personal property in a deed of chattel mortgage. Rules of execution strict on the character of the properties as real and personal notwithstanding agreement of parties The rules on execution do not allow. on 13 June 1953. on 8 October 1951. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of property is suited to its character. on 29 September 1950. a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to Alto Surety. upon expiration of the period of redemption. Alto Surety [G.. which was levied upon a house. Strong Machinery Company. and should not be interpreted as to allow. jointly and severally. upon the principle of estoppel. It appears that on 10 May 1952. Encarnacion. 72 Phil. although. nor said view. but immovable property. Ricardo Rivera) for a sum of money.

Iya [G. appellant's claim for preference must be granted. therefore. building and improvements thereon to be sold at public auction and the proceeds applied to satisfy the demands. the surety company included as it claims to have an interest on the residential house covered by said mortgage. for it similarly affects the public and third persons.00. Conclusion.] En Banc. evidently. The surety company then caused the said house to be declared in its name for tax purposes (Tax Declaration 25128). new Civil Code) could only mean one thing: that a building is by itself an immovable property. no proof was introduced thereon. Isabel Iya filed a civil action against the Valinos and the surety company (Civil Case 2504 with CFI Manila) praying for a decree of foreclosure of the land. May 30. raised an issue on whether or not copies of the writ of attachment and notice of attachment had been served upon Rivera.00. Valino failed to satisfy her obligation to the NARIC. Sometime in July 1953. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court. Without pronouncement as to costs. L-10837-38. holding that the chattel mortgage in favor of the Associated Insurance & Surety was preferred and superior over the real estate mortgage subsequently executed in favor of Isabel Iya. that lack of proof that the writ or notice of attachment to have been served leads to such not having been served. said surety company instituted Civil Case 2162 with the CFI Manila naming Adriano and Lucia Valino and Isabel Iya. made in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage Law would be valid and the right acquired by the surety company therefrom would certainly deserve prior recognition. Associated Insurance & Surety v. which encumbrance was duly registered with the Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal on 6 December 1951. for this reason. the surety company learned of the existence of the real estate mortgage over the lot covered by TTC 26884 together with the improvements thereon.5. the parcel of land on which the house is erected was still registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation. wherein the property was awarded to the surety company for P8. The spouses Valino were ordered to pay the amount demanded by said mortgagee or in their default to have the parcel of land subject of the mortgage sold at public auction for the satisfaction of Iya's claim. apart from being contrary to the admission by the parties. the building was transformed into a real property and the real estate mortgage created thereon was likewise adjudged as proper. on 29 October 1953. accordingly. it is obvious that the inclusion of the building. 2. executed a real estate mortgage over the lot and the house in favor of Isabel Iya. The residential building was. the Court held that the finding of the Court of Appeals to the effect that said copies had not been served upon Rivera is based upon a misapprehension of the specific issues involved therein and goes beyond the range of such issues. Felix (J): 9 concur Facts: Spouses Adriano and Lucia A.00. a grave abuse of discretion was committed in making said finding. although the latter could exercise the right of a junior encumbrancer. a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. Orosa). and that. after which the Court rendered judgment dated 8 March 1956.000. and as counter-guaranty therefor. the Valinos were able to secure on 18 October 1958. Subsequently. real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon. otherwise." (Lopez vs. inaccurate. ordered excluded from the foreclosure prayed for by Isabel Iya. Block 80 of the Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan. The decision however is without prejudice to any right that the Associated Insurance & Surety may have against the Valinos on account of the mortgage of said building they executed in favor of said surety company. 1. . is inaccurate Considering that neither the pleadings. the Valinos executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the aforementioned house in favor of the surety company. Building always immovable While it is true that generally. for where it be considered a personalty. Nature of property encumbered is the decisive factor in determination of preferential right The decisive factor in resolving the issue as to which of these encumbrances should receive preference over the other is the determination of the nature of the structure litigated upon. The surety company demanded reimbursement from the Valinos. nor the briefs in the Court of Appeals. the building then was still a personalty and a chattel mortgage over the same was proper. that the defendants had impliedly admitted that Rivera had received copies of said documents. who submitted the same on a stipulation of facts. On 6 November 1951. to secure payment of an indebtedness in the amount of P12. Rizal. the Valinos. however. as the mortgagors were already the owners of the lot at the time the contract with Isabel Iya was entered into.R. this pursuant to the contract of mortgage as the Valinos have failed to pay interest for more than 6 months already. Having completed payment on the purchase price of the lot. Evidence. Foregoing consideration apply to conditions for levy of attachment The foregoing considerations apply. It was ruled that as the Valinos were not yet the registered owner of the land on which the building in question was constructed at the time the first encumbrance was made. It is admitted that at the time said undertaking took place. the surety company was compelled to pay the same pursuant to the undertaking of the bond. Nos. Valino were the owners and possessors of a house of strong materials constructed on Lot 3. in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Art. AISCO Bond 971) subscribed by the Associated Insurance & Surety Co. and in view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary. the highest bid received therefor.000.000. which is. furthermore. 1958. Later. The company foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the house as a consequence. Moreover. which was duly registered and annotated at the back of the certificate of title. or on 24 October 1952. 6. the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and the subsequent sale thereof at public auction. which they purchased on installment basis from the Philippine Realty Corporation. and ordered that the proceeds of the sale thereof at public auction (if the land has not yet been sold). 415. to enable her to purchase on credit rice from the NARIC. be applied to the unsatisfied judgment in favor of Isabel Iya. and that. On the other hand. thus. a certificate of title in their name (TCT 27884). with equal force. However. to the conditions for the levy of attachment. The two cases were jointly heard upon agreement of the parties. who failed to do so. Lucia Valino filed a bond (P11. the mortgagee. A public sale was conducted thereafter by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal on 26 December 1952. recognized Isabel Iya's right to foreclose not only the land but also the building erected thereon. Lucia A. separate and distinct from the land. as defendants.

To hold it the other way.). 5. the registration of the chattel mortgage of a building of strong materials produce no effect as far as the building is concerned (Leung Yee vs.00 and 12% per annum interest on the principal. Building cannot be divested of character as realty when constructed on land belonging to another A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. No right acquired by chattel mortgage creditor who purchases real properties in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor. Rufino Pineda grouped the house with the truck which is inherently a movable property. 2. mortgaged his 2-story residential house. the house in question was treated as personal or movable property. A building is an immovable property. 644). a property may have a character different from that imputed to it in said articles. On 24 February 1961. registered with. Vicente Castro. acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale (De la Riva vs. borrowed from Conrado P. Tarlac. Execution of a chattel mortgage over a building invalid and a nullity As personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage (Section 1. trees. notwithstanding that the house of Rufino Pineda was made subject of the chattel mortgage for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person. etc. Rufino G. 4.550. but they likewise failed to pay on the said day. Pineda [G. Navarro. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from. the lower court dismissed the complaint with regards to Gregorio Pineda. having a floor area of 912 sq. but such property remains in its actual character as regards third persons who are not parties in the contract. The Pinedas failed to pay the mortgage debt when it became due. the only criterion being the union or incorporation with the soil. else the properties mentioned in the deed of real estate and chattel mortgage be sold to realize said mortgage debt in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Act 3135 and Article 14 of Act 1508. The judgment was appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 334 and 335 of the Spanish Civil Code (corresponding to Arts. L-18456. located at San Roque. this act produced no effect whatsoever for where the interest conveyed is in the nature of a real property. Pineda. but also and principally on the doctrine of estoppel. Act 3952). To secure the indebtedness. In the present case. questioning the lower court¶s decision in holding the deed of real estate and chattel mortgages appended to the complaint valid. Property may have a character different from that imputed to it by parties in a contract.] En Banc. and Rufino G.m. treat as personal property that . Tarlac. and ordering Rufino Pineda and Ramona Reyes to deliver the personal properties to the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac immediately after the lapse of 90 days in default of such payment.550 with 12% compounded interest plus P500 as liquidated damages and the cost of the suit from 14 June 1960 within 90 days from receipt of the copy of the decision.00. would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands. effective on the date of maturity. belong to the same owner (Lopez vs. November 30. which was registered in both the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Motor Vehicles Office of Tarlac. which consisted of liquidated damages in the sum of P500. Both mortgages were contained in one instrument. which mortgage has been declared null and void with respect to said real properties. sawali and wooden walls and wooden posts. They were granted another extension up to 30 July 1960. whereby Juana Gonzales. Navarro filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage and for damages. Summary of relevant cases In construing Arts. The house which was not even declared for taxation purposes was small and made of light construction materials: G. Lower Court¶s Decision predicated on the doctrine of estoppel and not only on the ground that the house mortgaged was erected on the land which belonged to a third person The trial court did not predicate its decision declaring the deed of chattel mortgage valid solely on the ground that the house mortgaged was erected on the land which belonged to a third person. Paredes (J): 8 concur Facts: On 14 December 1959. for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law. until fully paid.3. Orosa. in that "the parties have so expressly agreed" in the mortgage to consider the house as a chattel "for its smallness and mixed materials of sawali and wood". payable 6 months after said date or on 14 June 1959. Ah Keo. belonging to her. built on land belonging to another. Thus. Navarro v. 37 Phil. by way of Chattel Mortgage. it is enough that the house adheres to the land. 1.).C. 3.C. under Motor Vehicle Registration Certificate A-171805. the registration of the document in the registry of chattels is merely a futile act. 899). Strong Machinery Co. that in case of immovables by incorporation. registered in his name. erected on a lot belonging to Atty. Leung Yee vs. and 1 motor truck. It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement. No. Strong Machinery Co.R. plants. for to cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on the ownership of the land. by way of Real Estate Mortgage hypothecated a parcel of land. but they likewise failed and refused to pay. the execution of the chattel mortgage covering a building is clearly invalid and a nullity. the possibility is not remote that it would result in confusion. Building is immovable property Article 415 of the New Civil Code. ordering Juana Gonzales and spouses Rufino Pineda and Ramona Reyes to pay Conrado Navarro the sum of P2. Clearly. the Code does not require that the attachment or incorporation be made by the owner of the land. While it is true that said document was correspondingly registered in the Chattel Mortgage Register.. 1963. by the parties to the contract themselves. such as houses. with costs against appellants.. in classifying a house as immovable property. 60 Phil. it was held that under certain conditions. N. irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to. makes no distinctions whether the owner of the land is or is not the owner of the building. the register of Deeds of Tarlac. Rufino executed a document captioned "Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgages ". On 10 August 1960.. the fact that the land belongs to another is immaterial. Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales (married to Gregorio Pineda). the sum of P2. 415 and 416.. under TCT 25776.I. They were granted an extension up to 30 June 1960. sheets roofing.

with respect to third persons. and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property. et al.. C. if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to another person. 1431. Jaranillo). but without costs. Ofilada. Abad. Jaramillo opined that it was not chattel mortgage. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the contract. de Vera was the lessee of a parcel of land situated in the City of Manila and owner of the house of strong materials built thereon. et al. [CA]). was held to be a personal property not only because the deed of mortgage considered. Other situations are constantly arising. The issue where the chattel mortgage is held ineffective against third parties as the mortgaged property is real instead of personal is a question determine by the courts of justice and mot by the register of deeds. built of materials worth more than P62. In these two cases and in the Leung Yee Case. however. upon the principles of estoppel (Evangelista vs.] First Division. originally of Section 15 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508 as amended by Act 2496). it is considered as between the parties as personal property. The Iya cases refer to a building or a house of strong materials. such as a lessee or usufructuary. within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law.00 attached permanently to the soil. to an original petition of the Standard Oil Company of New York. it may be mortgaged as a personal property if so stipulated in the document of mortgage. register of deeds of the City of Manila. (42 Am. the subject building was a theater. Article 334 and 335 of the Civil Code does not supply absolute criterion on distinction between real and personal property for purpose of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law Article 334 and 335 of the Civil Code supply no absolute criterion for discriminating between real property and personal property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law. March 16. Upon examination of the instrument. Hodges.R. the house is considered as an immovable property (Art. are law in this jurisdiction. Registration adds nothing to the instrument. belonging to the owner of the house himself. 20329. and specially in execution proceedings. 2. The view that parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for the purposes of said contract. it has been a constant criterion nevertheless that. does not confer upon the register of deeds any authority whatever in respect to the "qualification. In a case. Jaramillo. 209-210. New Civil Code). It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may be agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property. The Supreme Court overruled the demurrer. de Vera. third persons assailed the validity of the deed of chattel mortgages. considered as a source of title. for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not appear to be personal property.W. in the present case. Those articles state rules which. who are not parties to the contract. the writ would be issued as prayed. cited in Davao Sawmill vs. but it must not be forgotten that under given conditions property may have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. purporting to convey to Standard Oil Company of New York by way of mortgage both the leasehold interest in said lot and the building which stands thereon. Gervasia de la Rosa Vda. Central Altagracia. in favor of the Standard Oil Company of New York. "There can not be any question that a building of mixed materials may be the subject of a chattel mortgage. Alto Surety). that the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house to be a chattel. Judge of the fourth branch of CFI Manila (9th Judicial District) and later Supreme Court Justice. 4.000. Hence. has been recognized. Standard Oil caused the same to be presented to Joaquin Jaramillo. and affects nobody's rights except as a species of notice. Jaramillo [G. In the case of Lopez vs. a conduct that may conceivably estop him from subsequent claiming otherwise (Ladera. it was one of the parties to the contract of mortgages who assailed its validity. et al. for it is now well settled that an object placed on land by one who has only a temporary right to the same. After said document had been duly acknowledged and delivered. and ordered that unless Jaramillo interposes a sufficient answer to the petition for mandamus by Standard Oil within 5 days of notification. No. does not become immobilized by attachment (Valdez vs.). it as such. partly." as the term is used in Spanish law. et al. Vda. Castillo). 1923. Cases cited are not applicable The cases cited by appellants are not applicable to the present case. It is based. Standard Oil v. It may be noted that in an administrative ruling by James Ostrand. as register of deeds of the City of Manila. and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. register of deeds. gathered from these cases is that although in some instances. considered as a general doctrine. The cause was brought to the Supreme Court upon demurrer interposed by Joaquin Jaramillo. Jur. provided the same position that the Register of Deeds has no authority to pass upon the capacity of the parties to a chattel mortgage which is presented to him for record. does not have judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine nature of document registered as chattel mortgage Section 198 of the Administrative Code. in which case. 1. it is duty for the register of deed to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on record. as his duties in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of a purely ministerial character. seeking a peremptory mandamus to compel the respondent to record in the proper register a document purporting to be a chattel mortgage executed in the City of Manila by Gervasia de la Rosa. The doctrine. and registration was refused on this ground only. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial only. Personal property may retain its character as such where it is so agreed by the parties interested even though annexed to the realty". a house of mixed materials has been considered as a chattel between the parties and that the validity of the contract between them. The matter depends on the circumstances and the intention of the parties. but also because it did not form an integral part of the land (Evangelista vs. cited in Manarang. is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. of chattel mortgages. upon which date she executed a document in the form of a chattel mortgage. a mortgaged house built on a rented land. Thus. vs. [CA]). and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage. therefore. and from time to time . for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgages. It should be noted. Street (J): 6 concur Facts: On 27 November 1922. Orosa. vs. permanently adhered to the land.which by nature would be real property (Standard Oil vs.

et al. It is to be noted that in the complaint filed in the municipal court. in which the proper classification of one thing or another as real or personal property may be said to be doubtful.] En Banc. or without his consent. the special consideration that parties to a contract may have desired to impart to real estate as personal property. Personal property may retain character by agreement Personal property may retain its character as such where it is so agreed by the parties interested even though annexed to the realty. 48 OG 5374. Lucia D. of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture on the land. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of property is suited to its character. and pursuant to an understanding either expressed or implied that it shall remain personal property.). Manarang v. 44 Phil. L-8133. Esteban brought an action against her in the municipal court of Manila for its recovery. Ladera. section 16. Hodges [C. the costs. 6. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed. that prima facie a house is real estate. No. A].are presented to the Supreme Court. The case facts do not mention circumstances of the case as decided in the municipal court to elevate the case to the Court of First Instance The Court of First Instance denied the petition. Jaranillo.. Manarang obtained a loan of P200 from Ernesto Esteban. Jur.. and the intention of the parties. (see Luna vs.. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the convenience or agreement of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings. vs. general rule. . 3. 7. holding that although real property may sometimes be considered as personal property. Criterion to determine property as personal or real Among the principal criteria for determining whether property remains personally or becomes realty are annexation to the soil. 644). Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. 90 Phil. or where it is affixed in the soil to be used for a particular purpose for a short period and then removed as soon as it has served its purpose. not to the character which the parties have given to it or desire to give it. The regulation governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. As Manarang did not pay the loan as agreed upon. The matter depends on the circumstances and the intention of the parties. Ofilada [G. Leung Yee vs. 2. 1. 630. but the sheriff refused the tender unless the additional amount of P260 representing the publication of the notice of sale in two newspapers be paid also. The general rule does not apply (1) where the improvement is made with the consent of the landowner. belonging to the owner of the land on which it stands. (42 Am. and De Jesus vs. Standard Oil vs. The regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties. That decision is not decisive of the question before the Supreme Court. Issue whether interest is in nature of real property not relevant to the issue of placing the document on record in Chattel Mortgage In Leung Yee vs. Labrador (J): 10 concur Facts: On 8 September 951. 2664. It is also important to note that the house mortgaged was levied upon at Manarang's request. 4. and the sheriff's fees). and in the prayer request is made that the house mortgaged be sold at public auction to satisfy the debt. House of mixed material levied upon on execution is real property The house of mixed materials levied upon on execution..R. is real property within the purview of Rule 39. p. 544. 1956. in which case it is considered as between the parties as personal property. a copy of the chattel mortgage is attached and mention made of its registration. or (2) to a building which is wrongfully removed from the land and placed on the land of the person removing it. the sheriff was in duty bound to cause the publication of the notice of its sale in order to make the sale valid or to prevent its being declared void or voidable. Strong Machinery Co. execution was issued against the same property mortgaged. So the Manarangs brought the suit to compel the sheriff to accept the amount of P277 as full payment of the judgment and to annul the published notice of sale.. even though it was erected against the will of the landowner. may have privately given to the property levied upon. Encarnacion 48 OG No. Manila.. and Williamson (37 Phil. Building of mixed materials may be subject of a chattel mortgage A building of mixed materials may be the subject of a chattel mortgage. either actual or construction. Ceniza. Before the property could be sold Manarang offered to pay the sum of P277 (amount of the judgment of P250. 72 Phil. although subject of a contract of chattel mortgage between the owner and a third person. and should not be interpreted as to allow. Real and personal property are real and personal property as they mean ordinarily under the Rules of Execution The rules on execution do not allow. Frank L. Strong Machinery Co. with costs. 5. exceptions The general principle of law is that a building permanently fixed to the freehold becomes a part of it. which has reference to the function of the register of deeds in placing the document on record. the Supreme Court held that where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property. 199-200. 3.. 37 Phil. May 18. and to secure its payment she executed a chattel mortgage over a house of mixed materials erected on a lot on Alvarado Street. 644. when they are not ordinarily so. the placing of the document on record in the chattel mortgage register is a futile act. et al. alleging that the loan was secured by a chattel mortgage on her property. the interest thereon. 464). Building is real property. which is real property. Guan Dee Co. Judgment having been entered in Esteban's favor. Republic vs.

de Uy Kim in the said foreclosure proceedings. any such right as against Mangubat. Vda. No right acquired by chattel Mortgage creditor who purchase real property at extra-judicial foreclosure sale A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extra. 1971. Reyes JBL (J): 10 concur Facts: On 1 September 1955 Vicencio and Simeon.] En Banc. 4. September 30. which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-GR 21797-R). Hodges). cited in Ladera v. Vda.Piansay v. No. October 30. damages and attorney¶s fees. And Uy Kim could not have acquired the house at public auction.R. but does not bind third persons. David mortgaged the said house to Marcos Mangubat. As a consequence. Jaramillo). Vda. the complaint was amended to include Piansay and Vda. David received a loan of P3. Plaintiffs have no cause of action Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house. forming. the CA denied the petition to lift or discharge the writ of execution on 28 April 1961. land Since it is a rule in the law that buildings and constructions are regarded as mere accessories to the land (following the Roman maxim omne quod solo inaedificatur solo credit) it is logical that said accessories should partake of the nature of the principal thing.000. de Uy Kim. Block 2554.Y. as between the parties to said contract (Standard Oil Co. and the house was sold to Claudia B. de Uy Kim as party defendants and praying that auction sale of 10 February 1953 and the deed of absolute sale between Vda.] En Banc. Navarro vs.). the sale of the house in question in the proceedings for the extra-judicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage. Pineda). Evangelista vs. David executed a chattel mortgage on a house situated at 1259 Sande Street. plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants herein. Act of registering in Chattel Mortgage register of an interest in the nature of real property is futile Tthe registration of the document in the registry of chattels is merely a futile act. The Court ordered David to pay Mangubat the sum of P2. Piansay in Civil Case 47664 cannot assail the right of Mangubat to levy execution upon the house in question because it had remained the property of defendant David. i. On 24 March 1956. De Uy Kim and Piansay be annulled. Perez.000 with interest at 12% per annum from Claudia B. In short. she could not have sold it validly to Salvador Piansay. Inc. et al. de Uy Kim might not be annulled but still it did not transmit any right from David to Uy Kim. Building and construction partake the nature of the principal thing. cited in Ladera v. Strong Machinery Co. On 1 March 1956.. who are not parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies (Leung Yee vs.000. Leonardo Uy Kim and Salvador Piansay is of no moment because the chattel mortgage executed by David in favor of Claudia B. The registration of the chattel mortgage of a building of strong materials produced no effect as far as the building is concerned (Leung Yee vs. Tumalad v. On 22 March 1954. 1. Tondo. over Lot 6-B and 7-B. de Uy Kim. 1964. Hodges). Hon. (De la Riva vs. The mortgage was registered in the Registry of Deeds . L-19468. In the present case. 5.00. for the collection of the loan of P2. On 10 February 1953. Alto Surety. Uy Kim. and to secure the payment of the same. Piansay and Uy Kim filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction in the CA (CA-GR 28974-R.000. is null and void insofar as defendant Mangubat is concerned. Vda. and did not confer upon Mrs. No. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Thereupon. against David and Mangubat. In the execution of Civil Case 29078. the mortgaged house was sold at public auction to satisfy the indebtedness to Claudia B. Quiapo. De Uy Kim. Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the alleged chattel mortgage constituted in her favor.e. which were being rented from Madrigal & Company. or on 31 July 1961. which is the land. acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale'. It follows that the Sheriff was not authorized to sell the house as a result of the foreclosure of such chattel mortgage. Manila. but a single object (res) with it in contemplation of law (Ladera v. Hodges). as buyer in said sale.R. Vda. Quezon Boulevard. After due hearing the lower court issued the order appealed from granting said motion and dismissing the complaint. the house which had been bought by Uy Kim at the foreclosure proceedings and sold by her to Piansay was levied upon at the instance of Mangubat. Mangubat filed a complaint against David with the CFI Manila (Civil Case 29078). Manila. Conrado S. Ah Yee). David [G. of N. which affirmed the decision but setting aside the award of damages in favor of Uy Kim. To prevent the sale at public auction of the house in question. vs.judicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor. Vicencio [G. de Uy Kim sold the same house to Salvador Piansay for P5. House may be levied upon as it remained the property of mortgage debtor The mere fact that the dispositive part of the decision in Civil Case 29078 states that the complaint is dismissed with respect to defendants Claudia B. Ah Kee. any dominical right in and to said house (De la Riva vs.. Acting upon the said petition. as they do. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders affirmed from. Strong Machinery Co. Chattel mortgage of a house between parties is valid. defendants-appellants. A reconsideration of said order having been denied. the same cannot and does not bind third persons. so that she could not have transmitted to her assignee. Judge Jesus Y. with costs against Piansay and Vda. 3. Claudia B. where the interest conveyed is in the nature of real property. Piansay and Uy Kim interposed an appeal directly to the Supreme Court. de Uy Kim. de Uy Kim and Salvador Piansay vs. 3. executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Tumalads. which mortgage has been declared null and void with respect to said real properties. plaintiff-appellees over their house of strong materials located at 550 Int. 2. Piansay. On 22 November 1949. L-30173. Cocnepcion (J): 10 concur Facts: On 11 December 1943. The chattel mortgage was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila on 19 December 1948. but dismissed the case against Uy Kim and Piansay. Piansay and Uy Kim instituted the present action at the CFI Manila (Civil Case 47664). because it was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured loan. with costs against the Piansay and Uy Kim.

in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (art. Orosa. does not become immobilized by attachment (Valdez vs. intended to treat the same as such. so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. 4. vs. No. In the case of Sy vs. the Tumalads commenced Civil Case 43073 in the municipal court of Manila. (Ladera vs. if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to another person. In the case of Manarang and Manarang vs. cited in Associated Insurance Surety Co. and the Sheriff of Manila authorized the Mortgagor¶s property after necessary publication.nature would be real property". and although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the property." whcih could only have meant to convey the house as chattel. The mode of payment was P150. it specifically provides that "the mortgagor voluntarily cedes. with costs against plaintiffs-appellees.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered. or at least. Further. among other things. the charge of fraud. citing Standard Oil Company of New York vs. 1. but also because it did not form part of the land. On 18 April 1956. Buildings as immovable The rule about the status of buildings as immovable property is stated in Lopez vs. Central Altagracia. Quintero and Ayala that "the answer is a mere statement of the facts which the party filing it expects to prove. and Plaza Theatre. it was held that "it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by . separate and distinct from the land. it was likewise held by the Court that in detainer cases the claim of ownership "is a matter of defense and raises an issue of fact which should be determined from the evidence at the trial. however that the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house to be a chattel. Fraud and deceit renders a contract voidable or annullable. Hence. Ofilada. and not void ab initio. the conterntions are not supported by evidence. C. the Court stated that the view that parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for the purposes of said contract. which by its very nature is considered personal property. there is nothing on record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. intended to treat the house as personality. sells and transfers by way of Chattel Mortgage the property together with its leasehold rights over the lot on which it is constructed and participation. It was also agreed that default in the payment of any of the amortizations would cause the remaining unpaid balance to become immediately due and payable. Jaramillo. cited in Davao Sawmill vs. Alto Surety)." What determines jurisdiction are the allegations or averments in the complaint and the relief asked for. Having lost therein. Inc." The "personal property" consisted of leasehold rights and a building. Hodges). It should be noted. payable within one year at 12% per annum. 2. a mortgaged house built on a rented land was held to be a personal property.150 was payable on or before August. praying. On appeal. Pineda. the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. however. Plaintiffs-appellees failed to file a brief and this appeal was submitted for decision without it.of Manila on 2 September 1955. In the case of Luna vs.N. Castillo). appealed to the court a quo (Civil Case 30993) which also rendered a decision against them. Dalman. Inc. and the Court held therein that it was a valid Chattel mortgage because it was so expressly designated and specifically that the property given as security "is a house of mixed materials. Iya. Deviations allowed. the municipal court rendered its decision in favor of the Tumalads. Encarnacion. it may be mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in the document of mortgage. particularly the mortgagors. 5. Moreover. the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract. up to July 1956. et al. It is based. and the lump sum of P3. such as the lessee or usufructuary. wherein the defendant was also a successful bidder in an auction sale. Claim of ownership by virtue of voidable contract fails without evidence that steps were made to annul the same Fraud or deceit does not render a contract void ab initio. and on 27 March 1956. but it is not evidence. Answer a mere statement and not evidence. Jr. and for Vicencio and Simeon to pay rent of P200. the subject of the contract designated as Chattel Mortgage was a house of mixed materials. the subject house stood on a rented lot to which defendants-appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee. the house on rented land is not only expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage. In the present case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and entered another dismissing the complaint. that the house be vacated and its possession surrendered to them. cases Certain deviations. Hence. defendants-appellants' claim of ownership on the basis of a voidable contract which has not been voided fails. 16 to the effect that the inclusion of the building. 'is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. the Court is given the authority to proceed with the hearing of the cause until this fact is clearly established. deceit or trickery. the mortgagor conveyed and transferred to the mortgagee by way of mortgage "the following described personal property. 1955. As highest bidder. the Tumalads were issued the corresponding certificate of sale. Allegations or averments determines jurisdiction It has been held in Supia and Batiaco vs. not only because the deed of mortgage considered it as such. starting September. 1956.. parties¶ treatment of real property as personal property. On 21 September 1956. the Chattel Mortgage enforceable." In Navarro vs. When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying. factors to determine In the contract. and further. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the same. Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained by the lessor of the land on which the house stood. it does so when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties. and can only be a ground for rendering the contract voidable or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. The mortgage was executed to guarantee a loan of P4. 3..800. In a case. that when the question to be determined is one of title. 27824-R) for the reason that only questions of law are involved.00 monthly.00 received from the Tumalads. In the latter case. New Civil Code) could only mean one thing that a building is by itself an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. for it is now settled that an object placed on land by one who had only a temporary right to the same. House treated by parties as chattel. by a proper action in court. upon the principle of estoppel' (Evangelista vs. 415. partly. have been allowed for various reasons. .R. the case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals (CA-G. a conduct that may conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.

On 25 May 1968.000 as attorney's fee. 1971 until he delivers possession thereof and the amount of P20. Case prematurely filed The period of redemption had not yet expired when action was instituted in the court of origin. he is. 1 took no part. Veneracion leased to Chua 1.000 plus attorney's fee of P2. 9. Thus. after the second lease agreement had expired. 7. it is the defendants-appellants themselves. Chua constructed on that lot a 2-storey building. The new lease contract stipulates that the lease shall terminate automatically without extension and the lessee shall vacate and surrender the premises without any obstruction thereon. and/or to remove his buildings and improvements. In the absence of such a compliance. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendantsappellants. Chua did not comply with their demand. After the third lease contract expired or on 1 May 1971. that in the event that the Lessee fails to surrender and vacate the leased premises at the expiration of this lease on May 1. Jr. On 6 February 1969 Veneracion died. He leased it in 1948 to Patrick Chua Peng Hian for 10 years. In such a case. Since plaintiffs-appellees' right to possess was not yet born at the filing of the complaint. Lopez vs. there could be no violation or breach thereof. accountable to the judgmentdebtor or mortgagor as the case may be.000 should the Lessor seek judicial relief by reason of Lessee's non-fulfillment or violation of the terms of the lease. while it is true that the Rules of Court allow the purchaser to receive the rentals if the purchased property is occupied by tenants. Neither was there an allegation to that effect.850 square meters of the lot for 3 years or from 1 May 1968 to 1 May 1971 at the monthly rental of P1. 60015. and Plaza Theatreand Leung Yee vs. the payment of the redemption amount and the consequent return to him of his properties sold at public auction. Cabanatuan City. the parties specifically stipulated that "the chattel mortgage will be enforceable in accordance with the provisions of Special Act 3135. Espe) 10. the original complaint stated no cause of action and was prematurely filed. as in the instant case. Section 6 of Act 3135 provides that the debtor-mortgagor may.] Second Division. On 11 April 1972. Party in chattel mortgage cannot question validity of chattel mortgage entered into Inlike in the Iya cases. The Court ruled that the mortgagors were entitled to remain in possession without any obligation to pay rent during the one year redemption period after the foreclosure sale. No. the purchaser thereof is not entitled. do not belong to the latter but still pertain to the debtor of mortgagor. as a matter of right. Chua Peng Hian v. CA [G. Chua appealed to the Supreme Court. Act 3135. lot located at 787 Melencio Street. 8. is to secure for the benefit of the debtor or mortgagor.R.500. Aquino (J): 4 concur. Strong Machinery and Williamson. to convey the buildings and improvements existing on the land to the Veneracion heirs and to pay the monthly rental of P1. and that the Lessee shall pay the Lessor "compensatory damages" of P20. In the present case. On 30 October 1980. Differently stated. the Veneracions filed in the CFI Nueva Ecija an action for specific performance against Chua. Orosa. Court¶s authority to review errors not assigned Even if there was no assignment of error to that effect. the Appellate Court rendered judgment ordering Chua and his family to vacate the land in question. Veneracion owned a 2. it seems. The trial court rendered a decision from which both parties appealed. Veneracion's heirs demanded that Chua vacate the premises and pay the accrued rentals. (Reyes vs. the governing provision is Section 34. Rentals received during redemption period credited to redemption price Before the expiration of the 1-year period within which the judgment-debtor or mortgagor may redeem the property. at any time within one year from and after the date of the auction sale. The rationale for the Rule. Rule 39.000 as compensatory damages plus P2. The CFI sentenced the mortgagors to pay a monthly rent of P200. who are attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. Hamada. redeem the property sold at the extra judicial foreclosure sale. F. having treated the subject house as personalty. reiterating Chan v. wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage.500 from June. The lease was renewed for another 10 years. 1984. to possession of the same. as debtors-mortgagors.194 sq. although they may be collected by the purchaser during the redemption period. as amended. Wherefore. Mortgagors entitled to remain in possession without rent within redemption period Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained by the lessor of the land on which the house stood. provided that the requirements of the law relative to notice and registration are complied with.m. the rentals receivable from tenants. as amended by Act 4118. It is only upon filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond that the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course. 1971. of the Revised Rules of Court which also applies to properties purchased in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.6. Section 14 of this Act allows the mortgagee to have the property mortgaged sold at public auction through a public officer in almost the same manner as that allowed by Act 3135. same shall automatically remain as property of the Lessor without the necessity of executing a Deed of Transfer or conveyance of the aforementioned properties. Estoppel. which is the law selected by the parties to govern the extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. Facts: Miguel C. the purchaser can not claim possession during the period of redemption as a matter of right. for the amount so received and the same will be duly credited against the redemption price when the said debtor or mortgagor effects the redemption. Chattel Mortgage Law Chattel mortgages are covered and regulated by the Chattel Mortgage Law. the Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. L. nevertheless. and that plaintiffs-appellees did not choose to take possession under Section 7. December 19. Section 7 of the same Act allows the purchaser of the property to obtain from the court the possession during the period of redemption: but the same provision expressly requires the filing of a petition with the proper CFI and the furnishing of a bond. Act 1508. No discretion is left to the court. 11. .00 from the time the chattel mortgage was foreclosed until when it was torn down by the sheriff. the ground floor being the sawmill and the second floor as residence. Chattel mortgage covered by Act 1508. that this document will serve as Deed of Transfer and Conveyance of the above mentioned buildings and improvements in favor of the Lessor.

Alienation in the contract of lease of the Lessee¶s improvements is not a disposition of conjugal realty without the wife's consent.) Poles made of two steel bars joined together by an interlacing metal rod. the stem of a small tree stripped of its branches. 5. Meralco paid the amount under protest. L-15334. which required Meralco to pay the amount of P11. nor by the character of the electric current it carries.R. 2nd Ed. 2. Jaramillo. and it is well understood in that . Several courts of last resort in the United States have called these steel supports "steel towers". 41 SCRA 143.651. Steel towers. Meralco's steel supports consist of a framework of four steel bars or strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop of which are cross-arms supporting five high voltage transmission wires and their sole function is to support or carry such wires. comparatively slender usually cylindrical piece of wood or timber. is not determined by their place or location. and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals which rendered a decision on 29 December 1958. Contract is the law between the parties.R. 1 took no part. telegraph poles. Luna vs. but includes "upright standards to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is supported. 152-3). In their decisions the words "towers" and "poles" were used interchangeably. Swift was awarded the said franchise on March 1903. Meralco became the transferee and owner of the franchise." (Webster's New International Dictionary. Definition of ³pole´ The word "pole" means "a long. the terms and conditions of which were embodied in Ordinance 44 approved on 24 March 1903. Paredes (J): 8 concur. L-24668. 1971. are called "poles" notwithstanding the fact that they are not made of wood. a tent pole. specifically. On 15 November 1955. Charles M. Inc. CFI has jurisdiction as action for specific performance is not capable of pecuniary The action sought was for specific performance of the stipulations of a lease contract. Partnership vs. These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current. Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls. US cases The conclusion that the steel supports in question are embraced in the term "poles" is not a novelty. 125 Phil. from its hydro-electric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956. are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers constructed by respondent at intervals. and they have denominated these steel supports or towers. L-30173. Facts: On 20 October 1902. Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires. The case is governed by the lease contract which is the law between the parties. and Consolidated Investment. No. ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the City Treasurer of Quezon City to refund to Meralco the sum of P11. The term also refers to "an upright standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is supported. 100 Phil. the petition for review was filed. Manarang vs. 3. with costs against the petitioners. heat and power system in the City of Manila and its suburbs to the person or persons making the most favorable bid.86. 965. 108. 91 Phil. The motion for reconsideration having been denied. City Treasurer [G.. Interpretation of poles so as to include towers is not a novelty. the Philippine Commission enacted Act 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct. In accordance with the definitions. July 31.. which is within the term ³poles. of New York vs. the Court of First Instance and not the municipal or city court has jurisdiction over the case (Ortigas and Co. Co Bun Kin vs. It was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (De Jesus vs. by extension. 2. CFI has jurisdiction over issue on rights of parties to a building constructed on land Where the issues raised before the inferior court do not only involve possession of the lot but also the rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon. No. as typically. 99 Phil. running from the province of Laguna to the said City. on land belonging to it. September 30. Ofilada. City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax Declaration 31992 and 15549. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from. maintain and operate an electric street railway and electric light. a similar typically cylindrical piece or object of metal or the like".] En Banc. After denying Meralco's petition to cancel these declarations an appeal was taken by Meralco to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. Security Bank & Trust Co. Lapitan vs. The four-year extension of the lease made by the trial court and the amount of damages do not merit any serious consideration.. Tumalad vs. sometimes. 24 SCRA 479). as electric poles. Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City. Ltd. 1 concur in result. Liongson. 4.651. nor the material or form of which it is made. Stipulation that Lessor would become owner of improvements is valid The validity of a stipulation that the lessor would become the owner of the improvements constructed by the lessee on the leased land has been sustained (Lao Chit vs. 44 Phil. July 25. It was not capable of pecuniary estimation. 3. a pole is not restricted to a long cylindrical piece of wood or metal. 105 Phil. 1907. but the use to which they are dedicated. 1968. with costs against the petitioner. as a dovecote set on a pole. 1981. 106 SCRA 121). 1964.´ are exempted from taxes under part II. paragraph 9 of Meralco¶s franchise Paragraph 9 of Meralco¶s franchise provides that the concept of the "poles" for which exemption is granted. Encarnacion.The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. a vessel's mast. 1. Garcia. 52488. Building and improvements on leased land treated as personal property The building and improvements on the leased land may be treated as personal properties (Standard Oil Co. G. Board of Assessment Appeals v. also. 1. on 22 April 1959." In the present case. 1091). Inc. p. Vicencio. Court of Appeals. 630. Scandia. 531. 490. January 31.

which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place. but before the court could act on his motion. for the annulment of sales and damages and involving land ownership. and Inspiration Consolidation Cooper Co. Judge Sancho Y. Caballero moved for reconsideration. 224. The Court resolved to treat the case as a special civil action upon consideration of the allegations contained. it cannot properly be raised for the first time on appeal. v. following which the latter. the Court through Judge Castrence Veloso. Judge Veloso issued. dismissed the petition.jurisdiction that a transmission tower or pole means the same thing. they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts. Estrada. 2nd. Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1. 5 days before entry of judgment. Ricardo Caballero) from cutting and milling the sugar cane crop which the company asserts to have planted in good faith. ordered Jose and Isabel Bañez (president and treasurer. which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the same. Plan Psu-118496 to Isidro A. Preliminary injunction in case 9562 and the partial writ of execution pending appeal issued in case 8195 are complementary and not interfering with each other. as used in Act 484 and incorporated in the Meralco's franchise. 6. They are not constructions analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. by stating which are immovable property. he would surely know what to do. Inter-Regional Development Corporation vs. 1016) 4. As per description. disturb or in any manner interfere with his possession thereof. a partial writ of execution pending appeal. The poles as contemplated thereon. nonetheless. It is the duty of the City Treasurer to refund. Inserto of the CFI Iloilo (Branch 1) enjoined Ricardo Caballero in Civil Case 9562 (Inter-Regional Development Corporation vs. L-39677. and even if they were. joined together by means of bolts. he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.. he cannot be sustained in his argument that as the City Treasurer is not the real party in interest. he should not be ordered to effect the refund. which was not made a party to the suit. 1.W. Isidro Estrada). third-party plaintiff. under the circumstances. for the conveyance of electric current from the source thereof to its consumers. and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. v. Article 415 of the Civil Code defines by enumeration The tax law does not provide for a definition of real property. because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. 252 p. without prejudice. of the Inter-Regional Development Corporation) or their privies to immediately vacate the possession of Lots 1 and 6. On July 6. The corporation appealed. Castro (J): 4 concur. The question has not been raised in the lower court and. 1975. and possession of the two lots was delivered to Estrada. it would be a departure to progress in technology. it was he who had insisted that respondent herein pay the real estate taxes. doctrine that equal courts have no power to interfere does not apply . Interpretation should not be restrictive and narrow to defeat the object for which the franchise granted The word "poles". 32-A Words and Phrases p. they are not intended for industry or works on the land. 3 and 5 The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1. instruments or implements. as they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner. therefore. The corporation filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Thus. but Quezon City. These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5. the Court of Appeals. leased the lots to Ricardo Caballero for a term of 10 years. 1 on leave Facts: In civil case 8195 in the CFI Iloilo (Branch 3. Absent incompatibility. but Article 415 of the Civil Code does. (See Steamons v. On 30 September 1974 the appellate court promulgated its decision setting aside Judge Inserto's preliminary injunction. on 16 October 1973. If the respondent would be required to employ "wooden poles. the issues raised. as to defeat the very object for which the franchise was granted. Inter-regional Development Corporation v. or on 15 November 1973. for injunction and damages. Salt River Valley Users' Ass'n. They can not be included under paragraph 3. notwithstanding its capacity to sue and be sued. Steel towers. the corporation filed civil case 9562. factually." or "rounded poles" as it used to do 50 years ago. On 16 January 1974. against the lessee Caballero to settle the question of ownership of the sugar crop for 1973-74 which the corporation alleged to have planted in good faith on the lands litigated in civil case 8195. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel bars or metal strips. 222. Having acted in his official capacity as City Treasurer of Quezon City. thus. legal technicalities cannot be availed of Indulging in legal technicalities and niceties which do not help the City Treasurer any. for. Dallas Power & Light Co. should be understood and taken as a part of the electric power system of the Meralco. should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation. 365. Compton 8 p. and the arguments adduced. starting with the crop year 1973-74. 7. given by the lower court. No. (Text) 212 S. for they are not machineries or receptacles. 5. The Court also issued a TRO preventing the CA from executing its decision. which Meralco paid under protest. however. 1973 the corporation filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. without costs. and not to molest. to the final outcome in case 9562 of the CFI Iloilo. Bryan. respectively. can better effectuate the purposes for which Meralco's franchise was granted. praying that Judge Veloso be enjoined from enforcing the partial writ of execution.R. This decision became final.] First division. CA [G. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the restraining order issued is made permanent. and preventing Caballero and his assigns from cutting the sugar cane. July 22. 249-250. Tax law does not define real property. Holding that the said Judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering partial execution. on 7 May 1973. on 25 May 1973. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.

or on 30 July 1923. good faith is issue True it is that under article 440 of the Civil Code the ownership of property includes the right of accession to everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially. trees. however. He also attached Sibal¶s real property in Tarlac. interest and participation therein. Johnson (J): 5 concur Facts: On 11 May 1923. as amended. while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any immovable property.. On 25 June 1924.579. 4. the landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted. 2 months later.. while the former refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon. or on 24 September 1923. and that within 1 year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff ordered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter.97 all of its rights and interest in the 8 parcels of land acquired by it in connection with civil case 20203 of the CFI Manila. which enumerates as real property as "Trees. the petitioner has alleged good faith in planting the sugar cane. Inc. Absent any incompatibility between the orders issued by Judges Inserto and Veloso. Landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted. (Decision of March 18. Within 1 year from the sale of said parcels of land. at the auction held by the sheriff of the Province of Tarlac. vs.93. Valdez. 26278. Procedure. The plaintiff alleged that the deputy sheriff of Tarlac Province attached and sold to Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on 7 parcels of land. he must first indemnify the planter before he can appropriate the same. under certain conditions.The preliminary injunction issued in case 9562 (by Judge Inserto enjoining Caballero from cutting and milling the sugar cane) and the partial writ of execution pending appeal issued in case 8195 (by Judge Veloso ordering the Bañez spouses to vacate and surrender possession of the parcels of land and not to molest or disturb Estrada's.550. having equal power to grant the relief. Leon Sibal 1. and that Valdez refused to accept the money and return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. are immovable property. 2. the mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits and products existing thereon. among which was included the sugar cane in question in the 7 parcels of land described in the complaint. was not subject to redemption. which consists of 11 parcels of land and a house and camarin situated in one of said parcels. Also. the appeal. the Supreme Court of Spain. the deputy sheriff sold at public auction said personal properties to Emiliano J. action was commenced in the CFI of the Province of Tarlac. including rights. On 14 December 1924. plants. while they are attached to the land. In the present case. Macondray & Co. by virtue of a writ of execution in civil case 1301 of the Province of Pampanga (Emiliano J. which is yet pending. Perishability of goods allow the hearing of petition for certiorari even if motion for reconsideration is pending in the lower court The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari even if a motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Court of First Instance. the deputy-sheriff of the Province of Tarlac.579. held that the lessee was entitled to gather the Products corresponding to the agricultural year because said fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to the lessee. growing crops may be considered as personal property.º). No. but as a matter of fact the order of Judge Inserto complements that of Judge Veloso. The latter refers to the land itself. possession thereof) do not interfere with the other. without specifying which said amount was to be applied. Valdez vs. including the camarin and the house were bought by Valdez at the auction held by the sheriff for the sum of P12. Sibal paid P2. has received in recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de España. under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909. bought said parcels of land. and that under article 415. among others. Valdez [G. and ungathered products. . 97. which is perishable. Inc. August 4. unless the contract expressly provides otherwise.) Thus. The 3 remaining parcels were released from attachment by virtue of claims presented by Cayugan and Tizon. 1927. Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the Tribunal Supremo de Espana as that growing crops may be considered as personal property Sugar cane may come under the classification of real property as "ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. under Spanish authorities. Civil Jurisprudence of Spain. of which P600 was for the sugar cane. plants and growing fruits..97 including interest. the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of the defendant holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property and. thus giving rise to a conflict of rights which poses the issue of the protection of the alleged planter in good faith without causing injustice to the landowner. And further. levied an attachment on Leon Sibal¶s 8 parcels of land for the sum of P4. Sibal v. On 9-10 May 1924. Paragraph 2. The issues as to who planted and whether the planter planted in good faith are the very issues posed in case 9562. with taxes and interests. as this. in a case of ejectment of a lessee of an agricultural land.R. by virtue of a writ of execution in civil case 20203 of the CFI Manila (Macondray & Co. On the same date. 8 of the 11 parcels. 1. 3. 1904. On 29 April 1924.200.273. After hearing and on 28 April 1926. Hence. Macondray sold and conveyed to Valdez for P2." That article. attached the personal property of Sibal located in Tarlac. in effect prematurely held that the petitioner is a planter in bad faith. the deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac. who paid therefor the sum of P1. Leon Sibal).] Second Division. in view of the urgency of securing a definitive ruling on the sugar cane crop. vol. Caballero's lessor. The redemption price of the parcels was reduced to P2. the ownership of which was the only issue adjudged in the decision pending appeal. the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. pending fruits and ungathered products may be sold and transferred as personal property. does not apply.000 to Macondray for the account of the redemption price of said parcels of land. as such. it is equally true that when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another. which holds that. Gathering crops existing as Estrada¶s right of ownership and possession premature The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the gathering of the crops existing on the land is part of Estrada's right of ownership and possession.

the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code. Ann. Section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the property of a judgment debtor which may be subjected to execution. is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence. "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property. and it may be sold by his judgment creditors.) 9. and the fruits of an immovable gathered or produced while it is under seizure are considered as making part thereof. European Railway Co. and may be sold by him. and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage. Sandel vs. Porche vs. 267. the fruits gathered or produced inure to the benefit of the seizing creditor. agreeably to the provisions of this Act. provides: "Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered. Ann. Hull. Ann." The Supreme Court of California. 3. Louisiana jurisprudence: Standing crops as immovable or movable based on owned and leased premises. chattels. Manresa admits growing crops as personal property Manresa.. must be specific and identified. and the title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence. thing must be owned by the vendor A valid sale may be made of a thing. and trees before they are cut down.. when produced by annual cultivation. (Citizens' Bank vs." 4. Sheriff and Tax Collector [106 La. to which the Code of Civil Procedure was pattered. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. vs. They must be also owned at the time by the vendor. They are. c. 21 Am. care for and protect the crop while growing. where the crops belong to the owner of the plantation.. without variation. 31 La. which though not yet actually in existence. Wiltz [31 La. are. however. 28 La." In the case at bar. liable to voluntary transfer as chattels.f. has held. (Porche vs. It belongs to the lessee. 761. in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. that growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property. Bodin [28 La. 244. for the purposes of attachment and execution. 165]. and other property. the factor's lien would not attach to the crop as a separate thing belonging to his debtor. Ann. (Emerson vs. Rep.) The thing sold. If a lessee obtain supplies to make his crop. Paragraph 2. Bodin. Article 334 of the Civil Code modified by Act 190 and 1508 Paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act No. fully recognizes that growing crops are personal property. Citizen¶s Bank v.. and where it is seized. as cited in Lumber Co. The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation. therefore. 10.. moneys. may be levied on as personal property. (Hull vs.. 250 [40 Am. or that in the sense that. Paragraph 2. 48 Conn. seizure by creditors Standing crops are considered as immovable and as part of the land to which they are attached. 629. and essentially owe their annual existence to cultivation by man. 244]) 5. 8. the phrase "personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. are likewise immovable. 63. Rep. 387. both real and personal. Growing crops are personal property Section 450 and most of the other sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the execution of judgments were taken from the Code of Civil Procedure of California.. shall be liable to execution. Klotz. admits that growing crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal property. Douglass. whether it be gathered or not.. and are considered as part of the land to which they are attached. rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein. American jurisprudence: growing crops by yearly labor and cultivation personal property The settled doctrine followed in the State of California and other states in connection with the attachment of property and execution of judgment is." The above provisions of Act 1508 were enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal property. a gathering as it were in advance. Jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of the growing crop. in discussing section 334 of the Civil Code. In other words.' but the immovability provided for is only one in abstracto and without reference to rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the property to which the crop is attached.. they form part of the immovable.. that growing crops were personal property and subject to execution. 7. Louisiana jurisprudence: Law cannot be interpreted result in absurd consequences If crop necessarily forms part of the leased premises the result would be that it could not be sold under execution separate and apart from the land. Valid sale of a thing not yet in existence. 11. whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested.. the Chattel Mortgage Law. St. It is equally well settled that they may be seized and sold under execution. and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law. . Cutting vs. Source of provisions on execution of judgment in Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190). and then belonging to the vendor." Section 7 in part provides that "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. Packers Exchange. 190 and by Act No. the sugar cane in question was personal property and was not subject to redemption. Personal property includes ungathered products. but the land belonging to the lessor would be affected with the recorded privilege. 27 La. under section 688 of the Code of Civil Procedure of that state. and inure to the benefit of the person making the seizure. Louisiana jurisprudence: Growing crop¶s mobilization by anticipation Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut down are considered as part of the land to which they are attached. no part of the realty. The law cannot be construed so as to result in such absurd consequences. 761]) 6.2. But the evident meaning of these articles is. and reads as "All goods. Crops. Ann. Lewis vs. 67 Me. which corresponds to paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Section 2 of said Act provides that "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage. 39 La. Chattel Mortgage Law recognizes growing crops as personal property Act 1508.. An. Article 344 of the Civil Code corresponds to Article 465 of the Civil Code of Louisiana Article 465 of the Civil Code of Louisiana. 418].. All annual crops which are raised by yearly manurance and labor. Wiltz.

Supreme Court in the matter of Royal Insurance Co. he is therefore entitled to one-half of the crop. when it was stated in the mortgage that the improvements. whether the state continues in the possession of the person who mortgaged it or whether it passes into the hands of a third person. decision of U. A. improvements. steel railway. Green should fail to obtain an additional loan from Cu Unjieng e Hijos. apparatus. growing fruits and rents not collected Article 1877 of the Civil Code provides that mortgage includes all natural accessions. of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to machinery. with costs to the appellant. H. promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the mortgagees. a loan secured by a first mortgage constituted on 2 parcels of land "with all its buildings.´ On 5 October 1926. 2. In order to carry out this plan.S. Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed. No. B. 1. so that instead of milling 150 tons daily..12. said machinery and equipment would become security therefor. Rep. for the purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production. president of said corporation.R. Personal security does not alter permanent character of machinery¶s incorporation with the central The fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person supplying him the purchase . proposed to the B. The installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central. A.. A. said B. the total amount supplied by him to B. The court has been inclined to to give more weight to the evidence adduced by him than to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. Exclusion of machinery from mortgage. 199 U. instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry. (Arts. in lieu of another of less capacity. Berkenkotter. 46. Having agreed to said proposition made in a letter dated 5 October 1926. together with whatever additional equipment acquired with said loan. Ct.710 to B. Green failed to obtain said loan. 41643. paragraph 5. Pomar and Compañia General de Tabacos. buildings. Machinery has character of real property Article 334. July 31. telephone line. Berkenkotter v.. with the declarations. the appeal. Pomar and Compañia General de Tabacos. Green. the Mabalacat Sugar Co. steel railway. improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment in all its parts. Miller. Furthermore. 353] as cited in Bischoff vs. Mortgage includes improvements and fixtures It is a rule. liquid containers. Mortgage include all natural accessions. Hence.000. H. B. A. with costs. Green binding himself not to mortgage nor encumber them to anybody until Berkenkotter be fully reimbursed for the corporation's indebtedness to him.000 against said corporation for unpaid salary. further cited in Cea vs. B.. and machinery that existed thereon were also comprehended. telephone line. in planting the palay in the disputed parcels of land and harvested therefrom 190 cavans.S. the improvements on the same are included. With the loan of P25. or 95 cavans. now existing or that may in the future exist in said lots. that in a mortgage of real estate. vs. A.000 offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B. the Mabalacat Sugar Company obtained from Cu Unjieng e Hijos. and rents not collected when the obligation falls due. 13. liquidator. Villanueva) 3. Berkenkotter. are also included. Green.] En Banc. utensils and whatever forms part or is a necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill. 5. The estimated cost of said additional machinery and equipment was P100. further cited in Cea vs. it is indispensable that the exclusion thereof be stipulated between the contracting parties (Bischoff vs. delivered the sum of P1. H. Civil Code). on 9 October 1926. 110 and 111 of the Mortgage Law. Cu Unjieng [G. B. Villa-real (J): 4 concur Facts: On 26 April 1926. constitutes a permanent improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon (article 1877. all objects permanently attached to a mortgaged building or land. 1935. Berkenkotter had a credit of P22. sugar-cane mill. although they may have been placed there after the mortgage was constituted. Villanueva). and limitations established by law.. A. not 190 cavans as ordered by the lower court. established by the Civil Code and also by the Mortgage Law. and Amadeo [26 Sup. with respect to the ownership of parcels of land. Absence from trial and failure to cross-examine lend weight to the evidence presented by the other party The absence of the plaintiff from the trial and his failure to cross-examine the defendant have lent considerable weight to the evidence then presented for the defense.000. and that in case B. it could produce 250. A. 4. to advance the necessary amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment. and details of such controversy The CFI Manila dismissed Berkenkotter¶s complaint.750. on 27 April 1927. with which the decisions of the courts of the United States are in accord. The case facts do not provide for the instance when the case was filed with the lower court. Inc. improvements. R. and 1877 of the Civil Code. Green having been P25. On 10 June 1927. and the amount of any indemnities paid or due the owner by the insurers of the mortgaged property or by virtue of the exercise of the power of eminent domain.750 and said credit of P22. necessity of stipulation In order that it may be understood that the machinery and other objects placed upon and used in connection with a mortgaged estate are excluded from the mortgage. therefore. A. growing fruits. the Mabalacat Sugar Company decided to increase the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment. Green applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of P75. purchased the additional machinery and equipment. B. amplifications. Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Lack of evidence of bad faith in planting palay in questioned parcels entitles plaintiff to ½ of the crop There being no evidence of bad faith on the plaintiff¶s part.

The fact that B. If rendition thereof is constituted by the filing with the clerk of court of a signed copy (of the judgment). Inc. CA [G. 505. mistake or duress. Prior thereto. Morfe. GR L-1254 [1948]. is not a valid notice of said judgment." The court of first instance being a court of record. Having been advised by the sheriff that the public auction sale was set for 4 December 1959. 1.00. and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them does not alter the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the central. the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. and signed by him. A. No. and filed with the clerk of the court. Ago.. The CA instructed the sheriff to suspend the issuance of a certificate of sale of the said sawmill machineries and equipment until the final decision of the case. 6. subject to the right of Cu Unjieng e Hijos under the first mortgage. L-10089. (De los Reyes vs. Martin vs. Judge Ortiz of the CFI Agusan dictated a decision in open court on 28 January 1959. Ago defaulted in his payments and so. Green bound himself to Berkenkotter to hold said machinery and equipment as security for the payment of the latter's credit and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them until Berkenkotter has been fully reimbursed therefor. These machineries and equipments had been taken to and installed in a sawmill building located in Lianga. while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing. the sugar central with which said machinery and equipment had been incorporated. unless a motion is filed on the ground of fraud. therefore. The Court of Appeals on 8 December 1959. G. as nothing could prevent B. Pastor D. Gonzales. was transferred thereby. 1 took no part Facts: In 1957. Green from giving them as security at least under a second mortgage. stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. it could still be subject to amendment and change and may not. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared that the issuance of the writ of execution against the sawmill machineries and equipments purchased by Pastor D. with costs against the petitioner. later followed. Martin. GR L-12439 [1959]). as well as the sale of the same by the Sheriff of Surigao. To enjoin said foreclosure. Judgment made in open court not real judgment of the court as it has not yet been rendered Section 1 of Rule 35 describes the manner in which judgments shall be rendered. Thus. Inc. providing that ³all judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge.money to hold them as security for the payment of the latter's credit. the court may still modify said order as the same is being put into writing. Grace Park Engineering was the only bidder for P15. Ago from the Grace Park Engineering. And even if the order or judgment has already been put into writing and signed.00. dated 23 September 1959. in order that a judgment may be considered as rendered it must not only be in writing. which Ago agreed to pay on installment basis. On 9 November 1960. A. instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage. It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court that constitutes rendition. after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar central. While it is to be presumed that the judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court.R. The parties to the case arrived at a compromise agreement and submitted the same in court in writing. Costs against Grace Park Engineering. although the certificate of sale was not yet executed. 75 Phil. issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the sheriff but it turned out that the latter had already sold at public auction the machineries in question as scheduled. Inc. Ago v. constitute the real judgment of the court. [?CA] Compromise agreement binding between parties A compromise agreement is binding between the parties and becomes the law between them. Creditor not vested with right of ownership but only with right of redemption The sale of the machinery and equipment in question by the purchaser who was supplied the money. [?CA] Judgment based on a compromise agreement is not appealable and is executory It is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a judgment based on a compromise agreement is not appealable and is immediately executory. constitute a rendition of the judgment.. on 1 December 1959.. signed by the judge. executing a chattel mortgage over said machineries and equipments to secure the payment of a balance of the price remaining unpaid of P32. (Gonzales vs. Labrador (J): 9 concur. 4. Ago continued to default in his payments as provided in the judgment by compromise. therefore. which was granted by the court on 15 August 1959. 1957) 3. The Provincial Sheriff of Surigao. Inc. does not vest the creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment but simply with the right of redemption.. signed by Ago and the Grace Park Engineering. October 31. are null and void. A writ of execution. and owned by the Golden Pacific Sawmill to whom he had sold them or assigned them in payment of his subscription to the shares of stock of said corporation on 16 February 1959 (a date after the decision of the lower court but before levy by the Sheriff). filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CA. Ago instituted Special Civil Case 53 in the CFI Agusan. 2. Inc. L-17898. Ugarte. Still. but it must also be filed with the clerk of court. Grace Park Engineering. 1962. It is only when the judgment signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment.R. Dictating judgment in open court is not valid notice of said judgment The mere fact that a party heard the judge dictating the judgment in open court. Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipments from Grace Park Engineering. Thereafter the sawmill machineries and equipments were installed in a building and permanently attached to the ground. Surigao del Sur. while the mortgage constituted on said sugar central to Cu Unjieng e Hijos remained in force. so Grace Park Engineering filed with the lower court a motion for execution..000. levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill machineries and equipments in question. is not incompatible with the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co. No. it is evident that the fact that a party . Inc. it is still subject to amendment or change by the judge. in 1958. July 31. The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open court with the stenographer taking note thereof does not. acting upon the writ of execution.000.] En Banc.. only the right of redemption of the vendor Mabalacat Sugar Co. Lapeña vs.

Mindanao Bus v. City Assessor [G. Cu Unjieng e Hijos. as required in Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. so the company filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the assessment. and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are immovable properties. having been issued before petitioner was served. the company filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. the transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. On the other hand. Cu Unjieng. 1962. 5. paragraph 5. 415 (5) By reason of installment in a building. September 29. usually found and used in hotels. Without costs. Movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. therefore. The company is also owner to the land where it maintains and operates a garafe. Sawmill machineries and equipment are real properties in accordance with Art. etc. for these businesses can continue or carry on their functions without these equipments.000. jeep-wagons. not essential and principal. 3 took no part. 7. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character. pressure pumps. it is necessary that he be served with a copy of the signed judgment that has been filed with the clerk in order that he may legally be considered as having been served with the judgment. are immobilized because they are essential to said industries. the sale made by the sheriff must be declared null and void. 415(5) of the Civil Code. The Court of Tax Appeal (CTA Case 710) held that the Company was liable to the payment of the realty tax on its maintenance and repair equipment. the same became a necessary and permanent part of the building or real estate on which the same was constructed. Machinery incidental in present case It cannot be said that the incorporation of the machinery and equipment in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company was not permanent in character because. 3. Machinery incidental to industry are not immobilized. which requires publication for properties with value above P400. L-17870. cash registers.. etc. of the old Civil Code) which provides machinery. Machinery essential to industry in Berkenkotter v. having its main offices in Cagayan de Oro. as essential and principal elements of a sugar central. are merely incidentals and are not and should not be considered immobilized by destination. blacksmith and carpentry shops. etc. The Supreme Court set aside the decision subject of the petition for review and the equipment in question declared not subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of the real estate tax. a party is not considered as having been served with the judgment merely because he heard the judge dictating the said judgment in open court. Issuance of writ of execution null and void As the signed judgment not having been served upon the petitioner. a repair shop. restaurants.400 said maintenance and repair equipment. Hence. It follows as a consequence that the issuance of the writ of execution was null and void. Facts: Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks in Mindanao.] En Banc. the installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of the Golden Pacific Sawmill. examples Movables which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry are distinguished from those which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental. without them the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. personally or by registered mail. though movable in nature. Machinery made immovable must be essential and principal elements of an industry or works Paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code (previously Article 344. Rules specific on the service of final orders or judgment Section 7 of Rule 27 expressly require that final orders or judgments be served personally or by registered mail. The company appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty.or an attorney heard the order or judgment being dictated in court cannot be considered as notice of the real judgment. typewriters. In the present case. which are incidentals. No judgment can be notified to the parties unless it has previously been rendered. a copy of the decision. the machineries are place therein on wooden and cement platforms. said judgment could not be effective upon him who had not received it. Inc. Thus. instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. In accordance with this provision. but .00 appear to have been sold without the necessary advertisement of sale by publication in a newspaper. not essentials. machineries of breweries used in the manufacture of liquor and soft drinks. Airline companies use forklifts. The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4. receptacles. In contrast. It is interpreted similarly to the case of Berkenkotter vs. IMB machines. and thus retain their movable nature. Sale made by sheriff void for lack of publication Considering that the machineries and equipments in question valued at more than P15. the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be permanent. where the Court held that the installation of the machinery and equipment in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company for use in connection with the industry carried by that company. converted the said machinery and equipment into real estate by reason of their purpose. the said sawmill machineries and equipments became real estate properties in accordance with the provision of Art. theaters. 6. 8. converting the said machineries and equipments into real estate within the meaning of Article 415(5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines. that a party has of a judgment that was being dictated is of no effect because at that time no judgment has as yet been signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.R. No. 1. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City sustained the city assessor. The notice. for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said building.. Labrador (J): 7 concur." 2.

Under such conditions the tenant in putting in the machinery was acting but as the agent of the owner in compliance with the obligations resting upon him.000. . 44 Phil. the "machinery. Davao Sawmill treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. and the sawing is conducted in the land or building. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa. 1967. 3. It must be noted that on a number of occasions. Jaramillo ([1923]. Transportation business not carried on in a building. all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the Lessee shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the Lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings. The distinction rests upon the fact that one only having a temporary right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied movable property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization to become the property of another. liquid containers. Facts: On 8 September 1948. It must further be pointed out that while not conclusive.00. or if the Lessee should leave or abandon the land leased. May 16. L-17500. The issue was raised in the Supreme Court involving the determination of the nature of said properties. so said equipment may not be considered real estate within the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code. of New York vs. In another action (Davao Light & Power vs. which was Davao Light & Power. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. One of such persons is the appellee by assignment from the original mortgagees. barrio of Tigatu. as of 13 July 1950). Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila (ATLANTIC) sold and assigned all its right in the Dahican lumber concession to Dahican Lumber Company (DALCO) for P500.] En Banc. However. or any person having only a temporary right. Standard Oil ruling key to issue on the character of the property It must be pointed out that Davao Sawmill should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of this property. 2. Mindanao Bus Company¶s transportation business is not carried on in a building. through the Bank. Altagracia) People¶s Bank v.C. the issue on the character of the properties arose from the consummation of a sale following the execution of the judgment in the other action.00 of which only the amount of $50. Dahican Lumber [G. and it was expressly stipulated that the machinery so put in should become a part of the plant belonging to the owner without compensation to the lessee. Cu Unjieng. deprived the tenant of any right to charge against the lessor the cost of such machinery. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property. tenement or on a specified land. In this connection the decision of the court in the case of Standard Oil Co. Impliedly.00 from the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.R. whether obiter dicta or not. Castillo [G. Malcolm (J): 4 concur Facts: The Davao Saw Mill is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government. August 7. Davao Light & Power v. and the properties in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff.000. with costs against the appellant. to develop the concession. a loan of $250. furnishes the key to such a situation. Immobilization of machinery. and the defendant herein having consummated the sale. DALCO obtained various loans from the People's Bank (P200. In the case of Berkenkotter vs. municipality of Davao.] En Banc. the characterization of the property as chattels by Davao Sawmill is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. equipment thus are not real estate Aside from the element of essentiality. (Valdes v.the delivery trucks and adding machines which they usually own and use and are found within their industrial compounds are merely incidentals and retain their movable nature. a usufructuary. but not when so placed by a tenant. In contrast. No. 4. proceeded to take possession of the machinery and other properties described in the corresponding certificates of sale executed in its favor by the sheriff of Davao. and the immobilization of the machinery which resulted arose in legal effect from the act of the owner in giving by contract a permanent destination to the machinery.000. Indeed the bidder.. In the contract of lease stipulated that on the expiration of the period agreed upon. 1935. Thereafter. unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. 1. No third party claim was filed for such properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the plaintiff herein. A sawmill would also be installed in a building on land more or less permanently.00 was paid. Davao Sawmill The trial judge found that the properties were personal in nature. No. and instruments or implements" are found in a building constructed on the land. tenement or specified land. DALCO also obtained. the conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. a judgment was rendered in favor of Davao Light & Power. Davao Sawmill v.000. when placed in plant by owner Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. Province of Davao. Dizon (J): 8 concur. 630). 40411. Concrete immobilization of lessee¶s machinery only if lease stipulates transfer of ownership on its termination Concrete immobilization takes place because of the express provisions of the lease which requires the putting in of improved machinery. which do not include the machineries and accessories in the improvements. a writ of execution issued thereon. Article 415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Instance on how controversy arose can¶t be found in the case facts. the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from.R. Davao Saw Mill). and as a consequence absolved the defendants from the complaint.

2. Therafter. As a result. Pursuant to the provision of the mortgage deeds quoted heretofore regarding "after acquired properties".286 shares of DAMCO to secure the same obligations. upon motion of all the parties. Further. On the same date.´ stipulation is clear and valid The stipulation in the Deed of Mortgage states that all property of every nature. and the same were subsequently sold for a total consideration of P175. CONNEL and DAMCO.00 which was deposited in court pending final determination of the action.151.678. Upon DALCO's and DAMCO's failure to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity. After 13 July 1950. all the parties appealed. respectively.00 each. together with all the buildings and other improvements existing thereon and all the personal properties of the mortgagor located in its place of business in the municipalities of Mambulao and Capalonga. on 15 July 1960. Subsequently. the Board of Directors of DALCO passed a resolution agreeing to rescind the alleged sales of equipment. 415. the Court. Both deeds contained a provision extending the mortgage lien to properties to be subsequently acquired by the mortgagor. that Articles 334 and 1877 of the old Civil Code are substantially reproduced in Article 415 and 2127. taken in exchange or replacement by the mortgagor "shall immediately be and become subject to the lien of this mortgage in the same manner and to the same extent as if now included therein".296 shares of stock of DALCO and 9. ordering it to pay the bank. however. and the other half as representing those obtained from the sale of the "after acquired properties". instruments or replacements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. therefore. It happens. Article 334 [5] of the old Civil Code gives the character of real property to machinery. 663). Camarines Norte in favor of the BANK. On ³after acquired properties. If such properties were of the nature already referred to. receptacles. This is consistent with previous rulings of the court.C. on 30 September 1953. Registry of chattel mortgage as to affect third party does not apply to the case Though it is the law in this jurisdiction that.000. liquid containers.500. the Court ordered the sale of all the machineries. they shall be replaced with others to be thereafter acquired by the mortgagor. With costs. in its own behalf and that of ATLANTIC. the Court. Company (CONNEL) and the sum of P2. On 16 December 1952. The Supreme Court modified the appealed judgment and affirmed in all other respects. such understanding either express or implied. the BANK paid the same to the Export-Import Bank of Washington D. Thereafter. Civil code does not define real property but enumerates them Article 415 does not define real property but enumerates what are considered as such. among them being machinery. executed by both DALCO and the Dahican American Lumber Corporation (DAMCO). Chattels place in real properties mortgaged within the operation of Art 415 (5). paragraph 5 and Art. a chattel mortgage must be registered and must describe the mortgaged chattels or personal properties sufficiently to enable the parties and any other person to identify them. a foreign corporation and a stockholder of DALCO. (1) In Berkenkotter vs. Whether old or new civil code to be used as guide irrelevant in this case The mortgages in question were executed on 13 July 1950 with the old Civil Code still in force. or in replacement of some of those already owned and used by it. issued an order transferring the venue of the action to the CFI Manila (Civil Case 20987).00) of this amount was considered as representing the proceeds obtained from the sale of the "undebated properties" (those not claimed by DAMCO and CONNELL).000. DALCO executed a second mortgage on the same properties in favor of ATLANTIC to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price of the lumber concession amounting to the sum of $450. of the new Civil Code. DALCO purchased various machineries. it would be poor judgment on the part of the creditor who does not see to it that a similar provision is included in the contract. instruments or . Mabalacat Sugar The chattels. 1. the Court issued a supplementary decision ordering the sale at public auction of lands object to the mortgages if DALCO fails to pay the bank and Atlantic. machinery. to affect third persons. In connection with these purchases. It is. No clearer language could have been chosen. 3. to the extent allowed by circumstances. immaterial in this case whether we take the former or the latter as guide in deciding the point under consideration. placed in the real properties mortgaged to plaintiffs. equipment and supplies of DALCO. Cu Unjieng (61 Phil. its obvious purpose being to maintain. In addition thereto DALCO and DAMCO pledged to the BANK 7. ATLANTIC. and adjudicating the half of the sum realized from sale of the properties unto the plaintiffs. As security. Cu Unjieng and Cu Unjieng Hijos v. buildings. On the following day. rendered Judgment against Dahican Lumber Co. 5. There can be no doubt that the provisions of said code must govern their interpretation and the question of their validity.00. all payable to the BANK. maturing on different dates). the corresponding agreements of rescission of sale were executed. and shall tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. such law does not apply to the present case (?reason). Illustrative cases: Berkenkotter v.000. Both mortgages were registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. etc. spare parts and supplies in addition to. and the other half to both the plaintiffs and defendant DAMCO and CONNELL.(through 5 promissory notes of $50. equipment. DALCO executed on 13 July 1950 a deed of mortgage covering live parcels of land situated in the province of Camarines Norte. the BANK.860. the original value of the properties given as security. spare parts and supplies by CONNELL and DAMCO to it. the BANK gave DALCO and DAMCO up to 1 April 1953 to pay the overdue promissory note. there appeared in the books of DALCO the sum of P452.55 as due to Connell Bros. Connell and DAMCO. came within the operation of Art. On 23 January 1953.34 to DAMCO. 2127 of the new Civil Code. and 2127 of the New Civil Code. commenced foreclosure proceedings in the CFI Camarines Norte against DALCO and DAMCO. Atlantic. On 30 August 1958. After due trial. or to be used (thus subject to wear and tear). the BANK requested DALCO to submit complete lists of said properties but the latter failed to do so. such stipulation is common is neither unlawful nor immoral. Upon motion of the parties. demanded that the agreements be cancelled but CONNELL and DAMCO refused to do so. 4. The Court further ordered that the cost of the receivership shall be borne by the Bank. It is only logical in all cases where the properties given as collateral are perishable or subject to inevitable wear and tear or were intended to be sold. and the latter assigned to the former its credit and the first mortgage securing it. ATLANTIC and the BANK. By a similar agreement one half (P87. on 12 February 1953.

However. the attorney's fees awarded in the appealed judgment. Intent of parties relevant The facts in the Davao Sawmill case are not on all fours with the current case. that proceeds obtained from the sale of the "after acquired properties" and the "undebated properties" should be awarded exclusively to the plaintiffs in payment of the money obligations secured by the mortgages under foreclosure. more reason to hold that such consensus impresses upon the properties the character determined by the parties who must now be held in estoppel to question it. 13. other damages cannot be computed Considering that the sale of the real properties subject to the mortgages under foreclosure has not been effected. should be borne by all the defendants. Mabalacat Sugar Co. 439). plaintiffs. There is. 1 took no part . They do not have superior right to lien DAMCO was a stockholder and CONNELL was not only a stockholder but the general agent of DALCO. installed after the constitution thereof. Central Altagracia relevant. must be deemed barred from denying that the properties in question had become immobilized. Central Altagracia Inc. as a matter of grace. In law. In the Davao Sawmill decision it was stated that the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. which was deemed necessary to safeguard the rights of the plaintiffs. and for use in the development of its lumber concession and that they were purchased in addition to. which were registered as such. that all items were supplied by different parties. Valdez v. 1902 and 2176 of the Old Civil Code. 12. In the present case. as financiers. December 26. Similar liability is demandable under Arts. Burgos v. therefore. In the present case. 8. machinery and accessories belonging to the mortgagor. and considering further the lack of evidence showing that the true value of all the properties already sold was not realized because their sale was under stress. months after the action to foreclose was filed 12 February 1953. having full notice of such stipulation. conspired jointly with CONNELL to violate the provisions of the fourth paragraph of the mortgages under foreclosure by attempting to defeat plaintiffs' mortgage lien on the "after acquired properties". they must be deemed to have been immobilized.R. In the present case. all the expenses of the Receivership. 20 and 21 ² which may be given retroactive effect (Arts. In the present case. holding that machinery placed on property by a tenant does not become immobilized. Davao Sawmill case not on all fours. or in replacement of those already existing in the premises on 13 July 1950. with the result that the real estate mortgages involved therein. Knowledge of suppliers of real mortgage stipulations Valdez vs. the "after acquired properties" are not disputed to be placed on and be used in the development of its lumber concession. In the former. without debate that DALCO was already insolvent at the date of the time of filing. in the same manner that all of them should pay to the plaintiffs. conceded an extension of time to pay up to 1 April 1953. jointly and severally. the report of the auditors and its annexes show that neither DAMCO nor CONNELL had supplied any of the goods of which they respectively claimed to be the unpaid seller. Expenses of receivership considered. they can not claim any right over the "after acquired properties" superior to the lien constituted thereon by virtue of the deeds of mortgage under foreclosure. machinery and accessories installed at the time the mortgage was constituted as well as the buildings. the facts clearly show that DALCO and DAMCO. while in the present case the parties had treated the "after acquired properties" as real properties by expressly and unequivocally agreeing that they shall automatically become subject to the lien of the real estate mortgages executed by them. No need for second registration as Chattel Mortgage in light of existing real estate mortgage The "after acquired properties" were purchased in connection with. Escolin (J): 10 concur. when the tenant places it there pursuant to contract that it shall belong to the owner. 64261. and (2) In Cu Unjieng Hijos vs. Chief of Staff. (58 Phil. Further.] En Banc. 6. a mortgage constituted on a sugar central includes not only the land on which it is built but also the buildings. Claims for damages supported The law (Articles 1313 and 1314 of the New Civil Code) provides that creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to defraud them. Proceeds from the sale of ³after acquired properties´ and the ³undebated properties´ awarded exclusively to plaintiff In view of the Court¶s opinion sustaining the validity of the mortgages in relation thereto. Davao Sawmill had repeatedly treated the machinery therein involved as personal property by executing chattel mortgages thereon in favor of third parties.S. Connell and Damco not ³unpaid suppliers´. (225 U. and that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. it then becomes immobilized as to that tenant and even as against his assignees and creditors who had sufficient notice of such stipulation. and agreed further that the same shall become immediately subject to the lien constituted by the questioned mortgages. No. did not have to be registered a second time as chattel mortgages in order to bind the "after acquired properties" and affect third parties. DAMCO and CONNELL. 58) was quoted in the Davao Sawmill case. 1984. jointly and severally. Defense of ³prematurity´ does not hold if debtor is insolvent When the law permits the debtor to enjoy the benefits of the period notwithstanding that he is insolvent by his giving a guaranty for the debt. If DALCO still owes them any amount in this connection. AFP [G. The true elements or factors that should determine the amount of damages that plaintiffs are entitled to recover from defendants are not present. 10. yet.g 11. must concede that the causes of action for collection of the notes were not premature. 2252-53) ² or under Arts. after failing to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity. ³After acquired properties´ immobilized. 9. that must mean a new and efficient guaranty. 7.replacements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry. the characterization of the "after acquired properties" as real property was made not only by one but by both interested parties.

The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in the petition. the Court take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 8. two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. The Court finds no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment in pursuing other remedies. Quezon City. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. and he can do whatever he pleases with them. were seized. enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant. may properly be considered moot and academic. Raymundo. Property seized need not be owned by person against whom the warrant is directed Section 2. the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. Quezon Avenue. that an examination had indeed been conducted by the judge of Col. A petition for certiorari. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. 7. documents. 20-82[a] and No. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on 9 August 1983. Balbino Diego. and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit. and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP. motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing. Laches defined Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which. without costs. Project 6. Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the PSG).g. such as [a] Property subject of the offense. 1. Road 3. .al. Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City]. " 2. publication and distribution of the said newspapers. 4.b) issued on 7 December 1982 null and void. as mandated by the Constitution as well as Sec. Letter of presidential friend Fiscal Flaminiano to Col. which was televised and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched. Defect on the address where items are to be seized is typographical error Search Warrants No. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. and 784 Units C & D. Jr. 6. No. 20-82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. equipment. Quezon City and 784 Units C & D. Project 6. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper.. could or should have been done earlier. before impugning the validity of the warrants before the Court. i. 3. issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19. Road 3. not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices. Quezon City. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. whenever the purposes of justice require it . the city fiscal of Quezon City. 19. and granted the writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants. The rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. Project 6. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos. paraphernalia. Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño. Road 3. respectively. prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants. Quezon City. it was said that "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation. books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos. by exercising due diligence. Extrajudicial effort negates presumption of abandonment of right to the possession of property Extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property. Failure to file motion to quash Petitioners. and office and printing machines. Precisely.e. and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. et. It may or may not be owned by him. Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to the judicial system. respectively. business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers. Jr. within legal bounds. In Vda. Burgos). were searched. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein. as well as numerous papers. 4. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. RMS Building. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. thereby refuting the charge of laches against them. 5. Quezon Avenue. the Solicitor General manifested that said articles would not be used until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of said articles. such articles seized ordered released to the petitioners. Determination whether warrant describes premises to be search with sufficient particularity In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity. 19. The Supreme Court declared the search warrants 20-82(a. Jr. RMS Building. Examination conducted Petitioners¶ objection that there is an alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses. Quezon City. [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense. Abadilla and his witnesses. de Ordoveza v. relying on the so-called executive benevolence or largesse (e. Urgency of constitutional issue raised overrides procedural flaw. The prayer of preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic when.Facts: On 7 December 1982. such as marking them as evidence in the criminal case. . Documents marked as evidence in criminal case do not affect issue on the validity of the warrants The documents seized lawfully belong to Jose Burgos. should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. But this procedural flaw notwithstanding. on 7 July 1983. . Ownership is of no consequence.

It is that it is not the policy of the government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. lists. and to finance the construction of a 2-story textile market building on said land. 14. Machineries remain to be movable property. instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. receptables. Calsons Inc. while in fact bolted to the ground. engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense" could not validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. This was confirmed by Foreign Minister Carlos P. L-19867.9. memoranda. Castillo. Romulo on 10 February 1982. It was also stipulated that the properties should be free from all liens and encumbrances other than the mortgage itself. because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate. the first of such due and payable beginning the month following the last release or the month following the expiration of the period for the construction of the building (or within 12 months). receipts. property or plant. a statement in the effect that the petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia. In accordance with . Thus state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free. of the existence of probable cause. Article IV. In connection with said loan appellants executed on 31 October 1957 a promissory note binding themselves jointly and severally to pay appellee the sum of P2M. 1968. Hall.00 was made on 7 November 1957. In the present case.221. pictures. 10.000. 12. not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant. whichever is earlier. owner should place the machinery to be immovable Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines. applied for a loan of P2M to appellee to pay the balance of the purchase price of certain parcels of land situated at the corner of Globo de Oro and Elizondo Streets. and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce´." was declared void by the U. Application to searches against newspaper publisher/editor Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 11. with interest at the rate of 7% per annum compounded monthly. petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. In Davao Sawmill Co. The machineries. The checks covering both releases were drawn in favor of the vendor of the mortgaged properties. The application was approved by appellee's Board of Trustees on 26 August 1957. reiterating Marcos¶ claims. while the second (and last) release in the amount of P30. pamphlets.S. alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials. which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person. May 29. Manila. Mere generalization will not suffice. remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. Closure of publications in the nature of censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press As a consequence of the search and seizure. said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. records. but not so when placed by a tenant. No. cards. State of Texas. news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885. 1 on official leave Facts: On 11 April 1957. the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. CFI. it was ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses. "machinery. Finding of probable cause required to issue warrant Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause. Calson [G. The first release in the amount of P819. Lack of IRR. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. In the present case. General warrants invalid In Standford v. v.] En Banc. no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized as reported in the 10 December 1982 issue of the Daily Express. usufructuary. unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. Makalintal (J): 7 concur. Supreme Court for being too general. Quiapo. GSIS v.000. the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law. as amended" is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. 15. Probable cause for search defined. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Further.R. contrary claim by Marcos and Romulo Sequestration under Section 8 of PD 885." 13. the search warrant which authorized the search for 'books. with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution. as amended. stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Constitution requires personal knowledge of complainant / witnesses to justify issuance of warrant In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge.69 each. or any other person having only a temporary right. recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. and the operations of the Communist Party in Texas. in 120 equal monthly installments of P23. these premises of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum were padlocked and sealed. it was said that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement. Machines not sequestered under PD 885.00 was made on 15 May 1958. In Alvarez v. natural or artificial. in his letter to US Congressman Tony P.

000. He was able to take two more. to pay the amortizations due and payable. Appellee cannot be estopped by a commitment made by its agent not reflected in the Agreement Estoppel is invoked by appellants on the basis of a letter dated 28 October 1957. Calsons. the first installment became due one month thereafter or on 7 December 1958.00. failed to begin. (2) that without the prior written consent of plaintiff defendants removed and disposed of the complete band sawmill and filing machine which formed part of the properties mortgaged. The steps taken by appellee negate any inference that it agreed to waive its right to have the properties "free from all liens and encumbrances.. The mortgage contract provides that the proposed building should be completed within 12 months from the date of the first release. the sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory. PCI Leasing and Finance. plaintiff filed supplemental complaint. namely: (1) that defendants failed. with an application for a writ of replevin (Civil Case Q-98-33500). Judgment was rendered on 3 March 1962 in favor of plaintiff. On August 11. therefore. Vendor¶s lien a legal encumbrance. but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest. Promissory note provides for due date of installments. much less complete. invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes. judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.000. which was executed on a later date. sent by the Manager of appellee's Real Estate Department to the vendor of the properties.e. They were therefore part of immovable pursuant to Article 415 of the Civil Code. seized one machinery with word that the return for the other machineries. . i. the vendor's lien in favor of the former owners. No. Two additional grounds for the foreclosure of the mortgage were alleged. upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing.628. On 6 March 1998.00 on the purchase price of the lots mortgaged. And to assure itself that no vendor's lien attached to the said properties. 3." as provided in the mortgage contract. Inc.00. since there was still a balance of P280. The commitment of said Manager was not recognized by the Board of Trustees of the appellee as shown by the fact that it was not incorporated in the mortgage contract. which is effective even if not recorded Even if the two certificates of title covering the mortgaged property do not show any lien or encumbrance thereon other than the mortgage itself. 31 October 1957.00 would be released within six (6) months from the date of the said letter. interest and surcharges demanded of them by appellee. hence. which was admitted without opposition. failed to submit to appellee evidence showing the reduction of defendant's account on the lot to at least P819. (4) and that. the date of the first release of P819. While the schedule of subsequent releases was clearly defined in the mortgage contract.. whichever is earlier and the rest on the 7th day of every month thereafter until the principal of P2M and the interest shall have been fully paid. beginning the month following the last release and/or the month following the expiration of the period for the construction of the textile market building. Appellee not estopped in invoking right to have properties free from vendor¶s lien One of the reasons why appellant Calsons. as well as subsequent ones. filed a complaint for sum of money. (3) that Calsons. On 7 April 1998. they went to the CA via an original action for certiorari. the construction of the supermarket building on the mortgaged properties.00.R. Appellee filed a complaint for the foreclosure of the mortgage with the CFI Manila on 11 August 1958. alleging a number of violations of the mortgage contract. as stipulated in the mortgage contract. the construction period expired on 7 November 1958. and defendants brought the appeal directly to the Court in view of the amount involved. It turns out in fact that appellants had failed to reduce their account on the lot to P819. appellee caused the additional conditions to be added to the original terms of the mortgage contract.the agreement between the parties. Said release having been made on 7 November 1957. with costs against appellants. 5. despite demands therefor. Appellee advanced the sum of P5. And the machineries were permanently attached to the property.00 on 1 December 1959. Panganiban (J): 3 concur Facts: On 13 February 1998. The lien is a legal encumbrance and therefore effective although not recorded. Inc. representing the unpaid balance of P280.00 for the annual premium.000 on the purchase price. With respect to the second release of P30. 137705.000. Appellants' failure to pay the amortizations. 2. praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.000.000. the old building standing on the mortgaged properties was insured for P300.] Third division. and the rest on the 7th day of every month thereafter.. On 6 April 1998. On 24 March 1998. 1959. and (2) that defendants failed to complete the construction of the textile market building on the mortgaged properties within 12 months from 7 November 1957. applied for the P2M loan was precisely to use part thereof to pay the balance of the purchase price of 5 parcels of land it mortgaged to appellee. Serg¶s Products v. to the effect that the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P280. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. Inc.000. 2000. would become due. the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. Failure to pay amortizations a violation of mortgage contract The promissory note executed by the parties clearly provides when the first installment. and installed there by the former owner to meet the needs of certain works or industry therein. the check was also drawn in favor of the vendor with the understanding that it would be used to pay the real estate taxes due on said properties and thus remove the corresponding tax lien imposed by law. 4. to wit: (1) that the mortgaged properties had not been freed by the mortgagor from certain liens and encumbrances other than the mortgage itself. PCI Leasing [G. installed by the owner to meet demands of industry or works The mortgage was on the lands "together with all the buildings and improvements now existing or which may hereafter be constructed" thereon. and need not be the subject of a separate chattel mortgage in order to be deemed duly encumbered in favor of appellee. no mention was made about the said commitment. but appellants failed to reimburse the same. 1.000. Machineries are immovables and are included in mortgage. petitioners filed a motion for special protective order. including accrued interest and surcharges. constitutes a violation of the mortgage contract and is sufficient ground for the foreclosure of the mortgage. on the portion of the loan released to them. August 22.00. On 25 March 1998. Inc.

3. they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. 1. They were not allowed. no place in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or in a petition for review under Rule 45. Hence. however. by a proper action in court. Title to property should be determined at trial. v. even granting that he charge is true. Petition for review on certiorari is clearly under Rule 45 The petition need not expressly indicate if it is being filed under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. . as there is nothing on record to show that it has been nullified or annulled. all of them have become "immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry. or whether the Agreement is invalid require a determination of facts and a presentation of evidence. or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code. In that case. or whether the Agreement is invalid. After agreeing to such stipulation. 5. property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. In the present case. Agreement presumed to be valid and binding The Agreement must be presumed to be valid and binding as the law between the parties. and ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties. Applying Tumalad. the name of the Judge from the caption of the case. Hence. by petitioners. therefore. Vicencio. 4. Section 3 provides that upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bonds the court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. As held in La Tondeña Distillers v. and that they had only been leased. said machines are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure (compare Tumalad v. but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 26 February 1999. they should be threshed out in the trial. Error in impleading the Judge as respondent not ground to dismiss the case While the judge should not have been impleaded as a respondent. although each of them was movable or personal property on its own. which had ironically been instituted by respondent. property thus subject to writ of seizure Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. with costs against petitioners. Remedies under Rule 60 either to post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiff¶s bond The validity and the nature of the contract are the lis mota of the civil action pending before the RTC. 10. both of which have no place in a petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 or in a petition for review in the Court under Rule 45. Hence. 7. As in the Makati Leasing and Finance case." 2. the conclusion of such supported by the title of the Petition. such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio. which is "Petition for Review on Certiorari. and the 31 March 1998 Resolution of the lower court. substantial justice requires that such lapse by itself should not warrant the dismissal of the present Petition. 6. there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected. A resolution of the questions whether the Agreement is a loan and not a lease. motu proprio. the Court noted that the remedy of defendants under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond. Writ of replevin issued for recovery of personal property Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only. Under the principle of estoppel. Parties estopped when parties stipulated properties as personal. the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60 was that questions involving title to the subject property should be determined in the trial. a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. as it is clear that the present recourse is under Rule 45. and lifted the preliminary injunction issued on 15 June 1998. 8. the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house of strong materials as a personal property because it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. The Court may deems it proper to remove. Third parties acting in good faith not affected by stipulation to consider real property as personal The holding that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. The questions whether the Agreement is a loan and not a lease. In the present case. is effectively a resolution of the merits of the case. 9. however. Vicencio). Wearever Textile Mills also held that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract. while the parties are bound by the Agreement. not owned. the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal property. real.Citing the Agreement of the parties. to invoke the title to the subject property. Similar cases In Trinidad v. petitioners assailed it first only in the RTC proceedings. Title to property should be determined at trial. the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. not in the proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure. Hence. not personal. Machinery immovable properties by incorporation The machinery were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. CA. the petition for review on certiorari. Thus." The machines are thus. third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal." It thus affirmed the 18 February 1998 Order.

. it was made unequivocably clear that said action was without prejudice to a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. As stated in Standard Oil v. discounted and assigned several receivables with the former under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. CA. and reinstated the orders of the lower court. may not be likewise treated as such.R. 3. Weareverf could not be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom. Unlike in the Iya cases. heavily relied upon by the Court of Appeals. Consequences cannot be blamed on the Court for the petitioners¶ failure to avail of remedies under Section 5. or at least. the enforcement of which was restrained upon Wearever's filing of a motion for reconsideration. who are attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. Chattel mortgage treating real property as personal property valid. the Court of Appeals. Equity prevents respondent to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another. de Castro (J): 5 concur. 6. as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby. selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel. The lower court reaffirmed its stand upon Wearever's filing of a further motion for reconsideration. the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Civil Case 36040). v. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned. Pronouncement on estoppel involving chattel mortgage applies to machinery There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out the present case from the application of the pronouncement in Tumalad v. there is absolutely no reason why a machinery. is not applicable to the present case as the nature of the machinery and equipment involved therein as real properties never having been . Makati Leasing brought the case to the Supreme Court by review by writ of certiorari. having treated the subject house as personalty" (Tumalad v. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants appellants. However. L-58469. Vicencio. If a house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby. & Leung Yee vs. Orosa. 4. No. Vicencio). Estoppel applies to parties as having treated the house as personalty ³Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property. repaired to the premises of Wearever and removed the main drive motor of the subject machinery. 5. Lopez vs. which allows the filing of a counter-bond. Makati Leasing filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgage to it. because it is a real property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code.L. the Deputy Sheriff assigned to implement the foreclosure failed to gain entry into Wearever's premises and was not able to effect the seizure of the machinery. as debtors mortgagors. it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property. with costs against Wearever Textiles. intended to treat the same as such. as long as third parties are not prejudiced The characterization of the subject machinery as chattel is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. the contention of Wearever that the petition has been mooted by such return may not be sustained. & Plaza Theatre. Wearever Textiles [G. Tumalad case more in parity with case The case of Machinery and Engineering Supplies. an order lifting the restraining order for the enforcement of the writ of seizure and an order to break open the premises of Wearever to enforce said writ. that the seizure will lead to the unemployment of their workers and nullify all efforts to rehabilitate the corporation. Inc. after ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the subject of replevin. Upon Wearever's default. Strong Machinery & Williamson. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Considering that Makati Leasing has reserved its right to question the propriety of the CA' decision. Law and jurisprudence support its propriety. Case not moot and academic with the return of the seized motor When the subject motor drive was returned. On 13 July 1981. much less of a chattel mortgage. Makati Leasing v. Machinery and Engineering Supplies v. which was later denied. Wearever Textile Mills. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Makati Leasing. Makati Leasing thereafter filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure with the CFI Rizal (Branch VI. the sheriff enforcing the seizure order. set aside the Orders of the lower court and ordered the return of the drive motor seized by the sheriff pursuant to said Orders. CA not applicable. 96 Phil. Such consequences should not be blamed on this Court. The appellate court also rejected the argument that Wearever is estopped from claiming that the machine is real property by constituting a chattel mortgage thereon. Jr. May 16. 2. 1983. which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose. it is the defendants-appellants themselves. F. Wearever Textile executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as a machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range.] Second Division. 1 concur in result Facts: To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation. as shown by the receipt duly signed by Wearever's representative. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court Petitioners' arguments. One who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.11. On 27 August 1981. so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Similar case. but on the petitioners for failing to avail themselves of the remedy under Section 5 of Rule 60. 70. Acting on petitioner's application for replevin. yet by ceding. Jaramillo. wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage. Inc. do not preclude the implementation of the Writ. 1. The lower court finally issued on 11 February 1981. in certiorari and prohibition proceedings filed by Wearever.

on 30 January 1907. The CFI dismissed the complaint as to Joaquin upon the ground that he had ratified those . The real property mortgaged by Isabel Palet was at her instance. duly authorized the bank to collect from certain persons and firms any and all debts owing by them to Aldecoa & Co. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking v. and on 30 August 1907. was reorganized in December 1896. as liquidator mortgaged to the bank..] En Banc. After the execution of said instruments. the parents being natives of Spain but domiciled in Manila. and to apply all amounts so collected to the satisfaction. the mortgage.280. in which the bank was not a party. by way of additional security for the performance of the obligations set forth in Exhibits A and B.. and decreeing that they were creditors and not partners of that firm. On 31 July 1903. and they were not the subject of a Chattel Mortgage. Aldecoa & Co. Joaquin. Zoilo. acquired by Aldecoa & Co. were duly recorded in the registry of property of the city of Manila on 23 March 1906. Thus. Exhibits A and B. was applied for registration (the undivided ¾ of said property being subject to the mortgage in favor of the bank). the Tumalad case bears more nearly perfect parity with the present case to be the more controlling jurisprudential authority. went into liquidation on account of the expiration of the term for which it had been organized. and A. as partners by being present and voting at meetings of the partners of the company upon matters connected with its affairs. registered under the provisions of the Land Registration. and 1887. Exhibit B. respectively. mortgaged to the bank the right of mortgage upon real property in the Province of Albay mortgage to it by one Zubeldia. in addition to certain securities of Aldecoa & Co. obtained from the bank a credit in account current up to the sum of P450.disputed nor in issue. S. of the shares of the Pasay Estate Company Limited. Aldecoa & Co. On the same date. as the result of the litigation between Aldecoa & Co. These two mortgages. and Cecilia (all Ibañez de Aldecoa). and Cecilia recovered a judgment in the CFI Manila for the payment of the balance of P155. and the widow became one of the general or "capitalistic" partners of the firm.07 to Cecilia Ibañez de Aldecoa. Joaquin. the application of which was granted by decree of the land court 8 September 1907. the property subject to the mortgage in favor of the bank. was executed wherein certain corrections in the description of some of the real property mortgaged to the bank by Exhibit A were made and the amount for which each of the mortgaged properties should be liable was set forth. 1 concurs in result. The firm of Aldecoa & Co. Later it was agreed that Isabel Palet and her sons should mortgage. certain of their real properties as additional security for the obligations of Aldecoa & Co. the legitimate children of Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa and Isabel Palet. in so far as they were concerned.31. who were 18 years old at that time. The widow. Limited. On 31 December 1906. Undoubtedly. Facts: The defendants. retaining her Manila domicile. [G. Macleod.000 upon the terms and conditions set forth in the instrument Exhibit A. Macleod. On 30 September 1908. mortgaged to the bank the shares of the Pasay Estate Company recovered from Alejandro S. and another P89. Isabel Palet went before a notary public and executed two instruments. Joaquin.117. by decree of the land court 8 March 1907. to the bank was valid. was null and void. Joaquin and Zoilo instituted an action against the bank for the purpose of obtaining a judgment annulling the mortgages created by them upon their interest in the properties described in Exhibits A and B. they were minors incapable of creating a valid mortgage upon their real property. with their consent and acceptance. On 23 February 1906. on 23 March 1906.000 was made by the bank upon the condition that any liability incurred on the part of the bank upon this injunction bond would be covered by the mortgage of 23 February 1906. therefore. 1 dissents. Joaquin.. Aldecoa & Co.689. were born in the Philippines on 27 March 1884. Trent (J): 3 concur.19). mortgaged to the bank the right of mortgage upon real estate in the province of Ambos Camarines mortgage to it by one Andres Garchitorena (P20. Further. Aldecoa & Co.40) and Liborio Tremoya (P75. left the Philippines and went to Spain in 1897 due to her health. Additional security for the performance of the obligation in favor of the bank under the terms of contracts Exhibit A and B were made on various dates. the 312 shares of the Pasay Estate Company. and for a judgment that these shares be sold and applied to the satisfaction of their judgment obtained on 30 September 1908. Urquhart. further mortgaged the right of mortgage upon real property in the same province mortgage to it by Tremoya Hermanos (P43. and in September of that year procured a judgment of the CFI annulling the articles of copartnership of Aldecoa & Co. Aldecoa & Co. 1915. while another property. On 18 February 1907. and Cecilia instituted an action in the CFI Manila against the bank for the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration to the effect that the contract whereby Aldecoa & Co. already in liquidation. to the bank. Aldecoa & Co. on 6 November 1906 and at the instance of Isabel Palet and her 3 children. but upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed that judgment and declared that the mortgage of the shares of stock in the Pasay Estate Co.. pro tanto. acknowledged an indebtedness of P154. On 30 November 1907. Judgment was rendered by the lower court in favor of the children. whereby she emancipated her sons.463. In 1908. 4 July 1885. Urquhart. Aldecoa & Co. Zoilo. Isabel Palet. of which Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa. and that. In October 1908.177.127. he was granted the authority expressed in that resolution. On 31 Mach 1907. Aldecoa & Co. became the owner. and Aldecoa & Co. and by resolution dated 24 January 1907. had been a member and managing director. wherein the injunction bond of P50. March 23. No. Aldecoa & co. On 22 December 1906. of any indebtedness of Aldecoa & Co. The 3 children appear in the articles of agreement as industrial partners. through a compromise agreement executed on 14 August 1907. On the other hand. both Joaquin and Zoilo participated in the management of Aldecoa & Co. was duly elected by the parties as liquidator. 8437. Zoilo. the father who died on 4 October 1895.20 each to Joaquin and Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa. Zoilo. upon the ground that the emancipation by their mother was void and of no effect. and Cecilia commenced an action against their mother. and did not return until the latter part of 1902.R. and the intervener.54).

but entered a judgment annulling said mortgages with respect to Zoilo.. It is therefore clear that the bank. judicially or extrajudicially. 4. and one or more of such debtors mortgage any of their real property situate in the jurisdiction of the court. and ordering the foreclosure of the mortgages. is untenable. 2. nor does the judgment of the trial court directs that this be done. Solidary obligation. by virtue of which the creditor deprives himself of his right to immediately bring an action for the enforcement of his claim. for its customers to cease their commercial relations with Aldecoa & Co. Furthermore. and not a mere surety for the performance of the obligations of Aldecoa & Co. execution should not issue against the properties of Doña Isabel Palet until all the property of Aldecoa & Co. Judgment was also entered denying the relief sought by the intervener. the Bank filed an action against the defendants for the purpose of recovering from Aldecoa & Co. 7. This is especially true for the reason that it was a well known fact that Aldecoa & Co. Isabel Palet a personal debtor in solidum with Aldecoa & Co. 6889 in the Supreme Court. is not responsible for any damages which might have resulted from the failure of the defendant's provincial customers to continue doing business with that firm.'s customers ceased doing business with that firm after it went into liquidation. and he was given authority by all the sureties to authorize the bank to proceed in this manner. the creditor. ordering the defendants to pay the sum of P344. and this necessarily implies that there were no credits in favor of the defendant firm of any kind whatsoever which had not already been deducted from the original obligation. Properties Isabel Palet mortgage were not security for performance of her solidary subsidiary obligation but part of the direct obligation of the firm itself Although the court recognized the subsidiary character of the personal liability of Doña Isabel Palet as a member of the firm of Aldecoa & Co. If two or more persons are in solidum the debtors of a third person. in case his obligation is not paid at maturity. in favor of the bank as additional security after Aldecoa & Co. 5. On 31 January 1911. This is the ordinary effect of a commercial firm going into liquidation. The bank is not trying to foreclose any mortgages on real property executed by Aldecoa & Co. for the whole indebtedness of the latter firm to the bank. Before that property can be sold the original mortgagors will have to be made parties. Money judgment against the firm and foreclosure judgment against the others It is true that the bank sought and obtained a money judgment against that firm. when he agreed with the bank upon the extensions granted to those debtors. and to foreclose certain mortgages executed by the defendants to secure the indebtedness sued upon. without any solidary liability.mortgages after becoming of age. On 10 August 1912. The authority to grant these extensions was conferred upon the bank by the liquidator. and at the same time and in the same action obtained a foreclosure judgment against the other defendants. as well as judgments of foreclosure upon the respective mortgages. being out of funds. judgment was entered in favor of the bank. for the collection of these credits. could not give its customers any further credit. The record shows that all the sureties were represented by Urquhart. has resulted in extinguishment of the mortgages created by Aldecoa & Co. Court has jurisdiction as bank does not seek to exercise mortgage right on real properties in the provinces The bank is not seeking to exercise its mortgage rights upon the mortgages which the defendant firm holds upon certain real properties in the Provinces of Albay and Ambos Camarines and to sell these properties at public auction in these proceedings. Extensions does not extinguish the mortgages The contention that the extensions granted to Aldecoa & Co.23 with interest of 7% per annum from date of judgment until fully paid. and decreed that as to any deficiency which might result after the sale of the mortgaged properties. shall have been exhausted. and to enforce the subsidiary liability of the other defendants for the payment of this indebtedness. and the costs. The real reason which caused the defendant's provincial customers to cease making shipments was due to the fact that the defendant. No evidence supports claim that bank prejudiced Aldecoa by inducing the customers to cease commercial relations There is no evidence to show that there was any inducement made by the bank to prejudice Aldecoa & Co. The mere failure to bring an action upon a credit.. In the present case. It is true that certain additional deeds of mortgage and pledge were executed by Aldecoa & Co. the bank was expressly empowered to take any steps which might be necessary. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. was insolvent. Both parties appealed from this decision and the case was given registry No.. but there is no stipulation whatever in any of these documents or deeds which can in any way be interpreted in the sense of constituting an extension which would bind the bank to wait for the expiration of any new term before suing upon its claim against Aldecoa & Co. or of the mortgages created by partners of that company to secure its liabilities to the bank.'s debtors. The properties mortgaged by Doña Isabel Palet were so mortgaged not merely as security for the performance of her own solidary subsidiary obligation as a partner bound for all the debts of Aldecoa & Co. and not a mere surety The extension of the term which. as partners of the Company. as soon as the same or any part of it matures. having exercised the authority conferred upon it by the company in a legal manner. and ordered the appellants whose appeals are determined to pay their respective portions of the cost. 3.924. Doña Isabel Palet is a personal debtor jointly and severally with Aldecoa & Co. may include all of the solidary debtors in the same suit and secure a joint and several judgment against them. 6. does not constitute an extension of the term of the obligation. an amount due from the latter as the balance to its debit in an account current with the Company. It may be possible that some of Aldecoa & Co. All of the defendants and the intervener have appealed. had failed to meet its obligation to pay the first installment due under the agreement of 23 February 1906.. 1. with the consent and authority of that firm itself. the person elected by them as liquidator of the firm. in accordance with the provisions of article 1851 of the Civil Code produces the extinction of the liability of the surety must of necessity be based on some new agreement between the creditor and principal debtor. . Complaint not vague nor ambiguous The complaint alleges that a certain specific amount was due from the defendant firm as a balance of its indebtedness to the plaintiff. but for the purpose of securing the direct obligation of the firm itself to the bank.

preservation..) but when the pendency of such a suit is set up to defeat another. September 26. is that "a plea of the pendency of a prior action is not available unless the prior action is of such a character that. 1 RCL. As the intervener has been paid for his services up to January 1910. and registered in due time in the registry of property. had a judgment been rendered therein on the merits.. Raised in the lower court. while the amount due the bank appears in a public instrument and is also secured by pledges and mortgages on the property of Aldecoa & Co. 21. out of which the intervener seeks to have his indebtedness satisfied.. . Van Vleck vs. thus the inquiry must therefore proceed to the other requisites demanded by the rule. Code of Civil Procedure. the case must be the same." In the present case. 113 N. repair. In the present case. since such other debts are recoverable to the extent that the property is preserved and maintained. Ayala did not appeal. or any document for that matter. 72 P. it will amount to res adjudicata against the second action. 13. ed. between the same parties. which were assigned to the bank on 30 January 1907. Receiver appointed by the court preferred in payment of fees over creditors. regardless of which party is successful. 1922.. There must be the same parties. nor secured by pledge or mortgage. Wetzstein vs. 2).000) to which the intervener is a creditor of Aldecoa & Co. and the same relief prayed for.. which the liquidator had anything to do with after 1910 was the real estate mortgages mortgaged to the bank as additional security. stated in 1 Cyc. must be paid in preference to the claims of creditors. The only personal property of Aldecoa & Co. is not evidenced by a public document. 42 Sou. No. is 16 shares of the stock of the Banco Español-Filipino. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from with costs against the appellant.. Gaston (148 Ala. Involuntary insolvency of Paul Strochecker v. there must be the same rights asserted. 214." This test has been approved. or an interest against both. The present suit is one for the foreclosure of the mortgages. 18700." The amount (P21. such an adjudication will deny the right of the bank to foreclose the mortgages. therefore. 9. 853). It may be conceded that if the final judgment in the former action is that the mortgages be annulled. 28. or in the success of either of the parties.000) sought by the intervener as salary represents his salary as liquidator of the firm and not to salary prior to liquidation. the amount (P14. he cannot be declared a preferred creditor of the bank. Urquhart was elected liquidator by the members of the firm of Aldecoa & Co. It was an action in personam and the bank was not a party. Judgment declaring the children as creditors and not partners of Aldecoa not binding to the bank It appears that a certified copy of the judgment entered in the former case. 214.8. 42 Sou. mortgage over real property not personal property Article 1922 of the Civil Code provides that. citing Section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that "A person may. therefore payment for this object has preference over any other debt. 20 L. Ltd. citing the quotation.. 552. 451. (which were in the possession of Aldecoa & co or its liquidator for only 1 day). 715.. was offered in evidence. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. These mortgages on real property cannot be regarded as personal property. 10. wherein it was declared that the children. and certain claims against debtors of Aldecoa & Co. 679. while another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the registry. This objection was sustained and the proffered evidence excluded. He did not receive his employment by reason of any judicial act. the ³credits for the construction.. Romualdez (J): 7 concur Facts: Half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. 366. This relief must be founded on the same facts. it could be pleaded in bar as a former adjudication of the same matter between the same parties (Watson vs. the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. The identity in these particulars should be such that if the pending case had already been disposed of. mentioned in Exhibit G. sec. Intervener is not a preferred creditor over the bank The intervener is seeking to have himself declared a preferred creditor over the bank. but Ramirez did. Mining Co. only when the judgment to be rendered in the action first instituted will be such that. The former suit is one to annul the mortgages. and it is only of personal property that article 1922 speaks of. Test of identity The test of identity. be permitted by the court to intervene in an action or proceeding. 450 shares of the stock of the Compañia Maritima (both items preceding were pledged before the liquidation). Gaston.. Ramirez [G. The judgment is binding only upon the parties to the suit and their successors in interest (sec. 1. and the title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the same. or at least such as represent the same interest. 330 shares of the stock of the Pasay Estate Co. 13 Wall. in Williams vs.R. on 10 March 1919.. clear that the intervener is not entitled to the relief sought. the case and the one pending in the Supreme Court are identical. 666). without the consent or approval of the bank or of any other creditor. It is applicable. In said ruling the court said ³that the expense of maintenance of property is bound to affect such persons as have an interest therein. such a judgment would be conclusive between the parties and could be pleaded in bar of the second action. 865). if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation. with regard to specified the personal property of the debtor. Plea of another action pending is not sustained if its pendency is set up to defeat another The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious (Williams vs. The only property of Aldecoa & Co. 11. Jones. Intervener was appointed by members of the Company without approval from the creditor-bank The ruling of the supreme court of Spain in 16 March 1897 was correct to the effect that the fees of a receiver. (28 Mont. 148 Ala. however. 306. W. Such evidence was objected to by the bank on the ground that is was res inter alios acta and not competent evidence against the bank or binding upon it in any way because it was not a party to that action. No. Further.. 552). Whatever may be due him for his services as liquidator is due under a contract of employment between himself and the members of the firm of Aldecoa & Co. at any period of a trial.. Intervener not preferred over creditors over the firm¶s personal property. 12. appointed by the court to preserve property in litigation. 1 Cyc.] First Division. It is. upon motion. Anderson (136 Iowa. or for the amount of the sale of personal property which may be in the possession of the debtor to the extent of the value of the same´ are preferred. whether they be the owners or creditors of the property. were creditors and partners of Aldecoa & Co..

Carlos [G. and that the facts do not constitute a public offense. and April 1. Illuminating gas subject of larceny even in the absence of statute Further. a corporation doing business in the Philippine Islands. 7. construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the penal code of that country. he was charged with the crime of theft. Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient. articles identical with articles 517 and 518 of the code in force´ in the Philippines (US v. Act. and to pay the costs. and of being transported from place to place (Commonwealth v. per curiam: 4 concur. as formerly. the same as gas. 123 and 125. 8 months and 21 days in prison. after reasonable inquiry and investigation. A warrant for the arrest of Carlos was issued by Judge Jenkins on 4 March and placed in the hands of the sheriff.20. nor himself. 1897. Electricity. is a valuable article of merchandise. believing that more light is consumed than what is shown in the meter. representatives of the company.500 kilowatts against 233 kilowatts). Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property In no way can the mortgage executed be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question. such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code. 1887. Thein. and as defendant refused to plead. 4. Right of ownership of electric current secured by article 517-518 of the Penal Code The right of ownership of electric current is secured by articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code. The sheriff's return shows that the defendant gave bond for his appearance. District of Intramuros. 1909 and until 3 March 1910. and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as neither the debtor. like those of gas. Shaw). US v. Grant and Kennedy. Marks on the insulation of the meter points to the use of ³jumper. From this judgment. No.´ Further. to identify the same. All personal property may be mortgaged. installed an additional meter on a pole outside Carlos¶ house to compare actual consumption (2. decided adversely to appellant's contention.) 2. 15 Phil. On the strength of a search warrant duly served by a police officer. Act 1508. In the case at bar. bought and sold like other personal property. Grant and Kennedy (18 Phil 122). Carlos was found guilty and was sentenced to 1 year. but not a mortgage upon property. The demurrer was overruled. 1. located at Calle Real Nos.26 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain January 20. Act 1508) requires only a description of the mortgaged property shall be such as to enable the parties to the mortgage. 1508. because he was not given a preliminary investigation as required by law. 6295. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. Meyers vs. legally in possession of the surety company (Sec. it is well-settled that illuminating gas may be the subject of larceny. and was ordered to indemnify Manila Electric Railroad and Light company in the sum of P865. . Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in possession Numbers 1. the electricity being the property of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company. Genato). September 1. 4.. 303) 4. susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the document is sufficient. The law (sec. It is a valuable article of merchandise. 1911. overrule of demurrer on issue involving alleged lack of preliminary investigation The question whether "the court erred in overruling the objection of the accused to the jurisdiction of the court. bought and sold like other personal property and is capable of appropriation by another. and much less upon the property in question. a plea of not guilty was entered for him. is in possession of the property mortgaged. After due trial. regarded by electricians as a fluid. (Sec. Carlos was found to have taken 2. 2. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business. Thus. and may be the subject of mortgage.273 kilowatts of electric current. It is true that electricity is no longer. No sufficient reason is presented why the Court should not follow the doctrine enunciated in that case. defendant appealed. worth P909. as there was a mere stipulation about personal security during said date. and since the registration of the mortgage has been.R. which is. the consumption registered in the inside meter is not the reasonable amount for the number of lights installed in Carlos¶ building. it was deduced that from 13 February. There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. may be seen and felt. a ³jumper´ was found in a drawer of a small cabinet in the room of the defendant¶s house were the meter was installed. and in overruling his demurrer´ is the same as was raised in US v. 7. 3. Thus. 3.1. US v. In the absence of any explanation for Carlos¶ possession of said device.] En Banc. but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner. without the consent of the owner thereof. where after a thorough examination and due consideration. the counsel for the defendant demurred to the complaint claiming the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused. a fluid used for lighting. and in some respects resembling electricity. On 15 March 1909. Test of proper subject of larceny The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal. but its manifestations and effects. ³his half interest in the drug business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez. On 14 March. Facts: Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of electricity furnished by the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company for a building containing the residence of the accused and 3 other residences. the application of these articles in cases of substraction of gas. the presumption raised was that Carlos was the owner of the device whose only use was to deflect the current from the meter. with costs against the appellant. 2. even in the absence of a statute so providing. or any other person.

1 C. a continuous taking of the gas and not a series of separate takings. consisting of the necessary piping and a gas meter. vol. p.. 221. rather than prejudicial to the defendant None of the essential rights of the defendant were shown to have been prejudiced by reason of the fact that the complaint covered the entire period. to indemnify the said corporation in the sum of P2. and 25 Cyc.. the sum total of the penalties imposed might have been very much greater than that imposed by the court in this case. Calle Evangelista. not being a registered installer of gas equipment. there was. No consent by company for defendant to misappropriate electricity The company had a contract with the defendant to furnish him with current for lighting purposes. and no mutual understanding between the company and the defendant. (See US vs. the gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter. C. 758 of Wharton's Criminal-Law. The covering of the entire period by one charge has been beneficial. 34 Minn.. the accused had been unsuccessfully prosecuted for an infraction of section 504 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila. and April 1.) 5. Later. 6 Cox C. instead of P2. 11 Cox C. as it was substantially all one transaction. and American courts all answer the question in the affirmative. 308. 6. a fluid used for lighting. It was substantially one continuous act. It was held also that even if the pipe had not been kept full. 1887.) US v. with subsidiary imprisonment for one day in case of insolvency. If twelve distinct and separate complaints had been filed against the defendant. It could not reduce the current so as to just furnish sufficient for the lighting of two.. Firth.(Decisions of supreme court of Spain. Shaw. 7. and no preconcert whatever between him and the company: The original design to misappropriate this current was formed by the defendant absolutely independent of any acts on the part of the company or its agents. R. and found that gas was being used. the gas company sued Manuel Tambunting at the CFI Manila. C. and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for 2 months and 1 day (arresto mayor) with the accessories prescribed by law. with costs against the appellant. 15 Phil. which later found the accused guilty of stealing a quantity of gas belonging to the Manila Gas Corporation. The pipe was never closed at its junction with the main. 1 C. while Manuel Tambunting was not home.. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Landmark case as to issue whether taking of gas constitute larceny The taking of gas may constitute larceny has never before been the subject of adjudication in the Supreme Court. although the "jumper" might have been removed and replaced daily or monthly. Manila. State vs. It was held. R. It could not stop the misappropriation without cutting off the current entirely. When the occupants at whose request this installation had been made vacated the premises. and in the same place. 21 Phil. Continuous act. These expressions were used in a case which involved the substraction and appropriation of electrical energy and the court held. or five lights. 222 Ill. Carlos..R. Upon 2 June 1919. Genato." (Regina vs. 175. 12. which drew off the gas from the main without allowing it to pass through the meter. Queen vs. 553) 2.. three.. 170.. 1897. The electricity was stolen from the same person. L. Before the institution of the case in the CFI. R. Upon arrival. as claimed by the defendant that he used during the most of this times but the current must always be sufficiently strong to furnish current for the thirty lights. and April 1. Analogy of a person stealing gas by means of a pipe A person stole gas for the use of a manufactory by means of a pipe. January 20. the taking would have been continuous. without the knowledge and consent of the gas company. 172. 172. supra. Street (J): 4 concur Facts: On January 1918. 1897. 1887.] En Banc. In this house the Manila Gas Corporation had previously installed apparatus for the delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors. 560. 234. fluid used for lighting The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code.. one of the inspectors of the gas company visited the house in question. and no knowledge by the defendant that the company wished him to take the current. L. US v. if anything. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with modification. Woods vs. in accordance with the analogy of the case involving the theft of gas. 11 Cox C. and in some respects resembling electricity. Manuel Tambunting and his wife became occupants of the upper floor of the house situated at 443. 385. A. articles identical with above articles 517 and 518. 234. but the decisions of Spanish.. English. Calle Evangelista. it being understood that the amount of the indemnity which the accused shall pay to the gas company is P4. W. 213. 293. There is no indication that the company wished the electricity to be taken. under a complaint charging that the accused. Tambunting [G. gas. in fact. in the same manner. People.. 363. 520. N..) . the application of these articles in cases of substraction of gas. also (England) Queen vs. & K. 1921. for cooking in the quarters occupied by the Tambuntings. construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of Spain. Tambunting appealed. Tambunting admitted that he was using gas without knowledge of the company for 2-3 months but denied making the connection where the meter used to be installed. Right of ownership of electric current. C. and consequently always remained full of gas. and turned off at night. 3 C. 10th ed. Cited on p. and not prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. which last mentioned apparatus was installed below. and no measures of inducement of any kind were employed by the company for the purpose of leading the defendant into temptation. 1. that if the pipe always remained full. C. note 10.. thus cutting off the supply of gas from said premises.). 1. 553. 7 L. Wellman. White. one for each month. Consolidation of complaint covering a period beneficial. Rep. The gas from this pipe was burnt everyday. No. Commonwealth vs.. at any time the defendant desired to use them. had placed a gas installation in the house at 443. is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain of January 20. January 18. Firth. 21 Phil. 16513. that electrical energy could also be the subject of theft (see US v. 4 Allen (Mass. C. Carlos. and to pay the costs.

the judge declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages.. vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property. Jarque [G. or within the period of 30 prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque. On further investigation it appears that this was an error because the mere mortgage of a ship is a contract entered into by the parties to it without reference to navigation or perils of the sea. March 25.] First Division. and does not.. no person desiring to use gas at all for domestic purposes can purchase the commodity at a lower rate per month than P2. 1935. Malcolm (J): 9 Concur Facts: On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co. was executed in favor of Jose Corominas. Admiralty jurisdiction of court raised to warrant court to sit en banc The case was decided by the court in banc. it has heretofore been accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel mortgage. We think that the facts above stated are competent evidence. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.) Similarly under the common law. with the result that an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent debtor. susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to place. which is the minimum charge for gas made by the gas company. or again within the 30-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings. 1. Chattel mortgage of a vessel. Presumably. confer admiralty jurisdiction. with costs against appellant. because no meter was used. and may be subject of larceny There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. and the conclusion is inevitable that the accused is at least liable to the extent of the minimum charge of P2 per month. A petition was filed with the CFI Cebu on 2 June 1932 in which it was prayed that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor. 10 Phil.) Indeed. Under the common law. therefore. as a motion was presented by counsel for the appellant in which it was asked that the case be heard and determined by the court sitting in banc because the admiralty jurisdiction of the court was involved. However. denominated as ³chattel mortgage´ on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. 399. a prosecution for violation of a city ordinance is not ordinarily a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense under the general law of the land.. Likewise water which is confined in pipes and electricity which is conveyed by wires are subjects of larceny (Ruling Case Law. however. while the average minimum is about P8 per month. and this motion was granted in regular course.) Philippine Refining v. Rivera [G. 5. is unenforceable against third persons.R. (Code of Commerce. but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. The absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. 694. Furthermore. L-11407. Rubiso v. Vessels are personal property under civil and common law Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages. article 585.] En Banc. The third mortgage was subscribed by Jarque and MN Brink (in what capacity the latter signed is not disclosed) and was not registered in the customs house until 17 May 1932. before the court showing that the general average of the monthly bills paid by consumers throughout the city for the use of gas in a kitchen equipped like that used by the accused is from P18 to P20. October 30. Garcia Gavieres. 3. 1 took no part . since the two offenses are of totally distinct nature.3. Chattel mortgage of a vessel without affidavit of good faith is unenforceable against third persons Section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Law deemed it a requirement to have an affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. while the third contains such. The petition on the matter of Jarque¶s insolvency was granted. bought and sold like other personal property. 4. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personality is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds. Torres (J): 5 concur. Inc. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on 12 May 1932. No. Justification of the P2 per month charge The court was justified in fixing the value of the gas at P2 per month. vessels are personal property. when it is certain that the minimum that could have been taken was worth a determinable amount. 41506. distinguished to chattel mortgage of other personality Since the term "personal property" includes vessels. Vol.R. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. (Bogart vs. (US vs. It is a valuable article of merchandise. section 2. 1917. There was evidence. but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages. however small the amount consumed. 17. Absolute certainty as to the full amount taken is of course impossible. they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.. Steamboat John Jay [1854]. p. As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking. No. 17 How. Acquittal in prosecution for violation of city ordinance not bar to prosecution for same offense under the general law of the land Acquittal of the charge of illegal gas installation in violation of Section 504 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila does not bar his prosecution for the offense of theft.) 2. but absolute certainty upon this point is not necessary. 4. Gas has character of personal property. The first two mortgages do not have an appended affidavit of good faith. 34). (Act 1508.

after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has been executed and recorded in the commercial registry. the record certainly does not furnish any positive evidence of the losses and damages alleged to have been occasioned. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. After the sale of the boat to the defendant Rivera. but. . pursuant to article 582 of the Mercantile Code. Gelito was one of the partnership owners of the Valentina. opportunely and on prior date. In both laws. on account of their value and importance in the world commerce. is true and sole owner of said pilot boat.] En Banc. 2. to the Chinaman Sy Qui. The certificate of sale and adjudication of the boat in question was issued by the sheriff on behalf of Fausto Rubiso. 3. who was careful to record his acquisition. This document was registered in the Bureau of Customs on 17 March 1915. Bauan. Effects of registration to liabilities of a vessel When the absolute owner of the purchased boat. and that Florentino E. and the rights he held are evidenced by the articles of partnership. September 27. whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel in the one entitled to enjoy the protection of the law. during his lifetime. at the time of the trial. After the hearing of the case and the introduction of documentary evidence. subsequent to the date when the judgment appealed from was rendered. Inscription in the commercial registry is necessary and indispensable in order that the purchaser's rights may be maintained against a claim filed by a third person. sold this boat to Florentino E. in the office of the Collector of Customs. amending solely in charging the Insular Collector of Customs with the fulfillment of the duties of the commercial register concerning the registering of vessels. and entered in the commercial registry (an unnecessary proceeding) on March 4. 4.Facts: Bonifacio Gelito sold his share in the pilot boat Valentina. nevertheless the sale at public auction was antecedently record in the office of the Collector of Customs. With the enactment of Act 1900 on 18 May 1909. was rendered. inasmuch as the amendment solely refers to the official who shall make the entry.500. the whole ownership in the vessel having been consolidated in behalf of the Chinaman Sy Qui. for the reasons aforestated. the latter's creditor Fausto Rubiso. Even if public auction is subsequent to private purchase. anchored in the port of Maricaban. Ships or vessels are of the nature and condition of real property. No special finding was made for costs. 1. On 10 April 1915. on January 27. was subsequent to its purchase by Rivera. Monserrat assigned to the former the usufruct of half of the said common shares of stock. The defendant appealed and moved for a new trial. The acquisition of a vessel must be included in a written instrument. according to the law. Villa-real (J): 4 concur Facts: Enrique Monserrat. who. the corresponding certificate of stock No. No. and was. Inscription in registry is necessary and indispensable Article 573 of the Code of Commerce provides in its first paragraph that merchant vessels constitute property which may be acquired an transferred by any of the means recognized by law. On the other hand. whether moved by steam or by sail. 5. Monserrat v.R. having been issued in the name of Ceron to that effect on 24 March 1930. Ceron [G. declaring the latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers for. in which the defendant and appellant was ordered to place at the disposal of the Fausto Rubiso the pilot boat in litigation. right of first to register is primary Florentino E. but.200 common shares of stock thereof. which facts are set forth in a deed ratified on the same date before a notary. The latter is a third person. inasmuch as. with respect to the rights of two purchases. No indemnity for losses and damages Aside from the fact that. suit having been brought in the justice of the peace court against the Chinaman Sy Qui to enforce payment of a certain sum of money.45. who was directly affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of the acquisition. the profits which might be . Batangas. on 4 January 1915. the vessel in question emerged unharmed from the place where it was stranded. Rivera took charge or possession of said vessel without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs and refused to deliver it to them. partake. and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of Commerce are nearly identical with article 1473 of the Civil Code. all the other liabilities of the vessel in favor of the creditors shall be considered canceled. Ceron. under claim that he was the owner thereof. of the nature and conditions of real property. this latter. was the president and manager of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Company and the owner of 1. 7. a better right than the defendant Rivera who subsequently recorded his purchase. the judgment of 6 September 1915. on 23 January 1915. consisting of 2/3 interest therein. wherefore this vendor is no longer entitled to exercise any action whatever in respect to the boat in question. while the private and voluntary purchase made by Rivera on a prior date was not recorded in the office of the Collector of Customs until 17 March 1915. Rubiso later acquired said vessel at a public auction sale and for the sum of P55. On 25 March 1930. Rivera's rights cannot prevail over those acquired by Fausto Rubiso in the ownership of the pilot boat Valentina. though the latter's acquisition of the vessel at public auction. in the use of his right as the sole owner of the Valentina. the plaintiffs brought suit in the CFI and alleged in the complaint that his clients were the owners of the pilot boat named Valentina. it cannot be affirmed that the defendant acted in bad faith specifically because he acquired the vessel on a date prior to that of its acquisition at public auction by the plaintiff Rubiso. has. This motion was denied and appellant excepted. Rubiso. in consideration of the interest shown and the financial aid extended him in the organization of the corporation by Carlos G. to a certain extent. the co-owner of the other 1/3 interest in said vessel. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists. Article 573 of Code of Commerce vis-à-vis Article 1473 of the Civil Code Ships or vessels. as in fact his name appears in the certificate of protection issued by the Bureau of Customs. which had been in bad condition since 1914 and was stranded in Tingloy. which shall not produce any effect with regard to third persons if not recorded in the commercial registry. said article was amended and appears as Section 2 of that Act. on 27 January 1915 and was also entered in the commercial registry on 14 March 1915. 37078. Rivera for P2. Said assignment or transfer only gave the transferee the right to enjoy. 1933. with the costs against the appellant.

such transfer is not absolute but constitutes a mere security for the payment of the mortgage debt. . the condition being that the sale shall be void upon the seller paying to the purchaser a sum of money or doing some other act named. and 'transfer of shares'. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and absolved defendants from the complaint therein. or absolute ownership of. Transfer in a chattel mortgage not the transfer contemplated in Section 35 of the Corporation Law. means the absolute and unconditional conveyance of the title and ownership of a share of stock. encumbering. 127 Pac. 662. making him the owner thereof). haciéndole dueño de ella" (to assign or waive the right in. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate endorsed by the owner or his attorney in fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. Chattel mortgage defined Section 3 of Act 1508. 46 LRA [NS] 455). as amended by Act 2496. (Noble v. mortgaging. some shares of stock of the Manila Yellow Taxicab. the number of the certificate. as used in Uniform Stock Transfer Act. If the condition is performed according to its terms the mortgage and sale immediately become void. and which. Transfer defined Diccionario de la Academia de la Lengua Castellana: The word "transferencia" (transfer) is defined as "accion y efecto de tarnsferir" (the act and effect of transferring).³ 4. giving to words of common use their popularly accepted meaning and to technical terms or words of art. transfers the title and ownership thereof to the mortgage creditor. Smith Wholesale Grocery. the date of the transfer. No transfer. Ceron endorsed to Matute the certificate of stock. or the performance of some other obligation specified therein. The entry and notation of a chattel mortgage upon the books of the corporation is not a necessary requisite to its validity. Section 35 of the Corporation Law provides that ³the capital stock of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificates signed by the president or the vice-president. In the present case. 1. with costs against the defendants. the date when the notation of Exhibit A in question appearing in the books of the corporation and the same date when the shares of stock were sold at public auction to satisfy Ceron¶s debt to Matute. Law Dictionary of "Words and Phrases": "Transfer' means any act by which property of one person is vested in another. president of Erma Inc. for the sum of P30. prohibiting him from selling. their accepted special signification. appealed from the decision. implies any means whereby one may be divested of and another acquire ownership of stock. alienating or otherwise exercising any act implying absolute ownership of all or any of the shares in question. until the transfer is entered and noted upon the books of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the transaction. inasmuch as it does not appear from the text of the Corporation Law that an attempt was made to give a special signification to the word "transfer". 6.17." 2. Absolute and unconditional conveyance of title and ownership of a share of stock "A 'transfer' is the act by which the owner of a thing delivers it to another with the intent of passing the rights which he has in it to the latter. and a chattel mortgage is not within the meaning of such term. although the mortgage on the usufruct enjoyed by the mortgage debtor Ceron in the said 600 shares of stock is hereby declared valid. 14. the transferor having reserved for himself and his heirs the right to vote derived from said shares of stock and to recover the ownership thereof at the termination of the usufruct (Exhibit A). he did not inform Matute of the existence of the document (Exhibit A) and the latter never had any knowledge thereof. and declaring the mortgage constituted on the ownership of the shares of stock null and void and without force and effect. On 26 February 1931. the transfer in question becoming null and void from the time the mortgage debtor complies with his obligation to pay his debt. plain and ordinary signification in accordance with the common and approved usage of the language. among which were the 600 common shares of stock in question. and the mortgagee is thereby divested of his title.000. and the number of shares transferred. Matute. except as between the parties. we it shall be construed according to its accepted meaning in ordinary parlance. shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws. countersigned by the secretary or clerk and sealed with the seal of the corporation. Ft. defines the phrase "hipoteca mobiliaria" (chattel mortgage) as ³a conditional sale of personal property as security for the payment of a debt.e. a thing in favor of another. 34 Okl. of which Matute has been in possession ever since. Section 35 of the Corporation Law does not require entry except of transfers of shares of stock in order that such transfers may be valid as against third persons. Transfer in a chattel mortgage a mere security for the payment of the mortgage debt Although a chattel mortgage. the defendants therein." 5. as "ceder o renunciar en otro el derecho o dominio que se tiene sobre una cosa.. i. and the Sheriff of Manila. shall be valid.. unless there is reason to believe from the context of the statute that such words have been used in another sense. The Stock certificate was recorded in the name of Ceron and the deed of transfer was noted on page 22 of the Stock and Transfer Book of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Company. Ceron mortgaged to Eduardo R. as has already been said. Words in statute to be taken in their natural. accompanied by delivery of the mortgaged thing. with costs against the appellee. plain and ordinary signification It is a rule of statutory construction that the words of a statute are to be taken in their natural. Erma Inc.´ and that ³no share of stock against which the corporation hold any unpaid claim shall be transferable on the books of the corporation. and the verb "transferir".derived from the shares assigned him. When Ceron mortgaged the shares to Matute. Case facts do not provide for details on how the case was instituted in the CFI Manila The CFI Manila rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff declaring the plaintiff the owner of the 600 shares of stock. Ceron continued as secretary of the Manila Yellow Taxicab until 5 May 1931. 3. The chattel mortgage is not the transfer referred to in section 35 of Act 1459 (the Corporation Law) which transfer should be entered and noted upon the books of a corporation in order to be valid. however.

Co Toco. Evidence would show that Matute found the shares. 9 attachments had been issued and served and noted on the books of the corporation against Co Toco¶s shares and Chua Guan objected to having these attachments noted on the new certificates which he demanded. and. the defendants refused to cancel said certificates (Co Toco¶s) and to issue new ones in the name of Chua Guan because prior to the date of the latter¶s demand (4 February 1933). Chua Chiu assigned all his right and interest in said mortgage to the Chua Guan and the assignment in the office of the register of deeds in the City of Manila on 28 December 1931. the sheriff executed in his favor a certificate of sale of said shares. As special defense. in the province in which the property is situated. the registration of such a mortgage or the effect of such registration was not in question. Summers and China Banking Corporation).894 shares of stock to the plaintiff by cancelling the old certificates and issuing new ones in their stead. represented by 9 certificates having a par value of P5 per share mortgaged said shares to Chua Chiu to guarantee the payment of a debt of P20. and as such conditional purchaser in good faith. second. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. and there was no question involved there as to the right of priority among conflicting claims of creditors of the owner of the shares. Difficulty on the practical application of the Chattel Mortgage law to shares of stock of a corporation The practical application of the Chattel Mortgage Law to shares of stock of a corporation presents considerable difficulty. No. it has been doubted whether shares of stock in a corporation are chattels in the sense in which that word is used in chattel mortgage statutes (see Fua Cun vs. and even elsewhere. The said certificates of stock were delivered with the mortgage to the mortgagee. The sheriff auctioned said shares on 22 December 1932. Chua Chiu. The plaintiff tendered the certificates of stock standing in the name of Co Toco to the proper officers of the corporation for cancellation and demanded that they issue new certificates in the name of Chua Guan. On 28 November 1931. the owner of 5. 5. Co Toco defaulted in the payment of said debt at maturity and Chua Guan foreclosed said mortgage and delivered the certificates of stock and copies of the mortgage and assignment to the sheriff of the City of Manila in order to sell the said shares at public auction.390. In the present case. Samahang Magsasaka [G. Butte (J): 4 concur Facts: On June 18. 1. The term situs is not one of fixed or invariable meaning or usage. attachment and garnishment of shares of stock It is a common but not accurate generalization that the situs of shares of stock is at the domicile of the owner. praying that the defendants transfer the said 5. An action for writ of mandamus was filed with the CFI Nueva Ecija. 2. November 2. and in the office of the said corporation on 4 January 1932. holding that the attaching creditors are entitled to priority over the defectively registered mortgage of the appellant. the possession of the property mortgaged must be delivered to and retained by the mortgagee. without special pronouncement as to costs.894 shares of the capital stock of Samahang Magsasaka Inc. as an equity in shares of stock is of such an intangible character. and in the office of the said corporation on 30 September 1931.. The officers (the individual defendants) refused and still refuse to issue said new shares in the name of Chua Guan. Matute (Erma Inc. it is entitle to the protection of the law.7. Nothing appears in the record of that case even tending to show that the chattel mortgage there involved was ever registered anywhere except in the office of the corporation. The parties entered into a stipulation in which the defendants admitted all of the allegations of the complaint and the plaintiff admitted all of the special defenses in the answer of the defendants. It is a general rule that for purposes of execution. Gonzalo H. Chua Guan v. attachment and garnishment. Domicile of corporation decisive for purposes of execution. and the Court has obtained little aid from the decisions of other jurisdictions because that form of mortgage is ill suited to the hypothecation of shares of stock and has been rarely used elsewhere. Registration of chattel mortgage in the office of corporation not necessary and had no legal effect The registration of the said chattel mortgage in the office of the corporation was not necessary and had no legal effect. and it also provides that if the property is situated in a different province from that in which the mortgagor resides the mortgage shall be recorded both in the province of the mortgagor's residence and in the province where the property is situated.] Second Division. free from all liens and encumbrances and made no reference made to the deed Exhibit A. it is not the domicile of the owner of a certificate but the domicile of the corporation which is decisive. Whether the shares of a corporation could be hypothecated by placing a chattel mortgage on the certificate representing such shares are settled by the case of Monserrat vs. if he is a non-resident. Ways in executing a valid chattel mortgage effective against third persons Section 4 of Act 1508 provides two ways for executing a valid chattel mortgage which shall be effective against third persons. Ceron.) a conditional purchaser in good faith Erma.. The said mortgage was duly registered in the office of the registered of deeds of Manila on 23 June 1931. and on this stipulation they submitted the case for decision. . 7 of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Company. acquired in good faith Ceron's right and title to the 600 common shares of stock evidenced by certificate No. 42091. without such delivery the mortgage must be recorded in the proper office or offices of the register or registers of deeds. and the plaintiff having been the highest bidder for the sum of P14.000 due on or before 19 June 1932. Proper place of registration of a chattel mortgage Section 4 provides that in such a case the mortgage shall be registered in the province in which the mortgagor resides at the time of making the same or. 3. 4. 1931. The situs of shares of stock for some purposes may be at the domicile of the owner and for others at the domicile of the corporation. In fact. Inc. as a conditional purchaser of the shares of stock in question given as security for the payment of his credit. Nor should one lose sight of the difference between the situs of the shares and the situs of the certificate of shares.R. First. as recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of the company. 1935.

R. petitioners in G. that section 35 of the Corporation Law enacts that shares of stock "may be transferred by delivery of the certificate endorsed by the owner or his attorney in fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. Act 1508. The remedy lies with the legislature. the mere possession and retention of the debtor's certificate by the creditor gives some security to the creditor against an attempted voluntary transfer by the debtor. From the standpoint of the debtor this may be unsatisfactory because it leaves the creditor as the ostensible owner of the shares and the debtor is forced to rely upon the honesty and solvency of the creditor. common. which occurs always . provided by. and ³those which belong to the State without being for public use. and in 1966.´ ³waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion. In this sense the property mortgaged is not the certificate but the participation and share of the owner in the assets of the corporation. Decisions in the case of Monserrat vs. L-43190] Second Division. is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Meanwhile. The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for registration." 3. banks. Moreover. Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals. Pila. L-43105.´ ³continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves. as to ownership of shares in a corporation By analogy with the foregoing and considering the ownership of shares in a corporation as property distinct from the certificates which are merely the evidence of such ownership. have been described as those which. roadsteads. setting aside that of the trial court. Facts: A lot with an area of 17." The use of the verb "may" does not exclude the possibility that a transfer may be made in a different manner. private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands. also Bautista v. the only safe way to accomplish the hypothecation of share of stock of a Philippine corporation is for the creditor to insist on the assignment and delivery of the certificate and to obtain the transfer of the legal title to him on the books of the corporation by the cancellation of the certificate and the issuance of a new one to him. Of course. No. No. L-43190. Transfer by endorsement and delivery of certificate with intention to pledge sufficient to give legal effect The transfer by endorsement and delivery of a certificate with intention to pledge the shares covered thereby should be sufficient to give legal effect to that intention and to consummate the juristic act without necessity for registration. however. as the latter's share in the inheritance. No. the shares still standing in the name of the debtor on the books of the corporation will be liable to seizure by attachment or levy on execution at the instance of other creditors. If this province is also the province of the owner's domicile. Cruz. the chattel mortgage should be registered both at the owner's domicile and in the province where the corporation has its principal office or place of business.´ to the enumeration. August 31. If not. The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. shores. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. Article 502 adds "rivers and their natural beds. CA [G. Public lands / public dominion Property. a single registration is sufficient. Santos del Rio filed his application for registration of said parcel on 9 May 1966. Classification of property as either of public dominion or of private ownership. The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918. is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. it appears that in the present state of our law. during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966. or those of public dominion. which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory. under existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership. Article 402 includes ³those intended for public use. It is to be noted.R. ports and bridges constructed by the State. Method of hypothecating shares of stock by chattel mortgage cumbersome and unusual in the present state of law. Determinant is rainfall and not gravitational pull (tides) The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been interpreted in the case of Government. ponds. or pools. Cuevas (J): 4 concur.311 sq. some of them had made voluntary payments to private respondent. it seems to be a reasonable construction of section 4 of Act 1508 to hold that the property in the shares may be deemed to be situated in the province in which the corporation has its principal office or place of business. Public lands. they opposed Santos del Rio's application for registration. Santos del Rio. and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" as property belonging to public dominion.m. Extent of a lake bed The extent of a lake bed is defined in Artcile 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866. applicant private respondent. and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. such depth being the "regular.6. 1984. Sometime before 1966. 1 took no part. CA [G. with costs against private petitioners. Laguna. 2. his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son. Republic v. Colegio de San Jose to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957. private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in 1966.]. and ordered the registration of the land described in the application in favor of Santos del Rio. 8. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment affirmed from. 1 on leave.laws of the corporation expressly enact that transfers may be made only upon the surrender of the certificate. 7. rivers. private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in question. In violation of the original agreement.´ and ³ lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private oppositors. as ³the natural bed or basin of lakes. Court¶s construction of Section 4. canals. Risks of debtor and/or creditor. natural. such as roads. and are reserved for public purposes. was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on 19 April 1909. thus leaving the creditor in an insecure position even though he has the certificate in his possession. The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. and others of similar character. Highest Ordinary Depth in a lake. Remedy is with legislature Apart from the cumbersome and unusual method of hypothecating shares of stock by chattel mortgage. vs. 1. torrents.R. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision. situated in Barrio Pinagbayanan. Ceron and in the present case have done little perhaps to ameliorate the present uncertain and unsatisfactory state of our law applicable to pledges and chattel mortgages of shares of stock of Philippine corporations. Laguna and 20 meters from the shore of Laguna de Bay.

6. 4.R. since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as amended by RA 1942). Definition does not apply to land adjacent to lake Foreshore land is that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. continuous. Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement. or the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. Macaraig [G. 92047. 7. Tolerance of possession cannot ripen into ownership As the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the permission of. July 25. Reclamation requires proper permission. 1990. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration. through Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June 1958. could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed 4-5 months a year during the rainy season. their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall. Gutierrez. exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than 30 years. Further. this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. which is an ordinary occurrence. for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. continuous. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry. the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff)." 8. therefore. 92013 & 92047. Tax declaration strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription. Foreshore land defined." While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. those which belong to the government and which may be availed of by private entities. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector". In the present case.]. Laurel v. (J): 5 concur Facts: The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956. Section 48 of the Act enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation. Purpose of land registration under Torrens System The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. public. peaceful. 5. Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. the applicant del Rio. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds. No. 1990. ." As intended. such as ³those who. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription. and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot). it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. have been in the open. public. they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. or thus rain "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. 9. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith. The alternation of high tides and low tides. and as tenants of. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land. therefore. the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government authorities. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. No. applicant by himself and through his father before him. the Reparations Law. peaceful. when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase. Jr. continuous. The land sought to be registered. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title Even if the land sought to be registered is public land.or most of the time during the year. Garcia [G. And even if such reclamation had been authorized. applicant would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title. the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.´ it thus cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning cited by the Director of Lands. reclaimed land does not automatically belong to party reclaiming the same Private persons cannot. Ojeda v. under bona fide claim of ownership. rather. the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery). is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. exclusive. by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest. Reparations Agreement). The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in 20 years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2. RA 1789. July 25. also Open. In the present case.R. the fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent. prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. counted from 19 April 1909. exclusive and adverse possession of the land Applicant presents tax declarations covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts dating back to 1948. since the inundation of a portion of the land near the lake is not due to ³flux and reflux of tides.] En Banc. has been in open.

but merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale. shores. EO 296 amended nationality provision for the sale of procurements for the private sector. and resides in the social group. Property of public dominion outside the commerce of man As property of public dominion. the temporary restaining order of which was granted by the court on 20 February 1990. their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3. Section 63 (c) of RA 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation. Carlos J. it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.R. not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. ports and bridges constructed by the State. and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. 92047. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person. and others of similar character. 335 [1960]) An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. 3. of land at 306 Ropponggi. Roponggi lot is a property of public dominion The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. lease or disposition. The Government did not act favorably to said proposal.179 sq. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds. but the citizens. is patrimonial property. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause. roadsteads. On 25 July 1987.´ Article 420 provides that property of public dominion includes ³(1) those intended for public use. a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan. lease or other disposition. on 11 August 1986. to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation. Amidst opposition by various sectors. 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). such as roads. but instead. Further EO 296 does not declare that the properties lost their public character. Lazarao. the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries. A property continues to be part of the public domain. RA 1789). does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. which is not of the character stated in the preceding article. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. the Supreme Court resolved to decide the 2 cases. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under EO 299. In the present case. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. thereby granting the petitions and enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo. . Bercilles. No. banks. that these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy. without being for public use. and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. the recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi. Director of Lands. Two petitions for prohibition were filed seeking to enjoin respondents. Japan. m. and AO 3-A to 3-D. which respondents have failed to show. rivers. Conversion to patrimonial property happen if property is withdrawn from public use. with great vigor. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment. Valdez. 1. Only the private sector properties can be sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. a writ of mandamus was prayed for to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspite of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process. 5-Chome Minato-ku. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. After multiple motions for extension to file comment by the respondents." In the present case. Abandonment must be certain and positive act based on correct legal premises The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. the President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale. the Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. RA 6657. 2. RA 6657 does not authorize the disposition of Roppongi property as it is outside the commerce of man. its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.During the incumbency of President Aquino. canals.´ Article 421 provides that ³all other property of the State. the Executive branch of the government has been pushing. did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. 4. Tokyo. Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code Article 419 provides that ³property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. 1 building in Nampeidai. It is this nationality provision which was amended by EO 296. Japan scheduled on 21 February 1990. v. torrents. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3. The Court also made permanent the 20 February 1990 temporary restaining order. an application to the satisfaction of collective needs. a Japanese firm. not the procurements for the government (the latter which includes Roppongi property) EO 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. RA 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12. Further. It cannot be alienated. (2) those which belong to the State. In G. the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. 5. 108 Phil. 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). therefore. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.

The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. Opinion of Secretary of Justice irrelevant. . Moreover. the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: (1) for property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. at the very least. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v.6..000. are to be determined. 213 U. and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Co." The requirement has been retained in Section 48. Pullman Co. The Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case. et al. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. the approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. Bidding Committee. Conveyance must be authorized by law enacted by Congress and requires executive and legislative concurrence Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party) provides that ³in cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of P100.S. the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law. by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.. In the present case.. the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which. Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292. by the President. the formalities of conveyance. 312 U. in question. shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. instrument. Such deed. 65 Phil. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. 496 [1941]). Louisville and Nashville R. none of the above elements exists. the essential validity and effect of the transfer. such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. 12. Conflict of law rule does not apply when conflict of law situation does not exist A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law situation exists. 13. 8. There is no law authorizing the conveyance of the Roppongi property. The rule of lex situs does not apply. 175. The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. and without force and effect of law The subsequent approval on 4 October 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or.S. it is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. governed by Philippine law The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. besides economic and financial benefits The Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos ² veterans and civilians alike. did not pass upon the constitutionality of EO 296 nor did it uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property. Official authorized to convey real property). Approval of the President of the recommendation of the committee to sell the Roppongi property premature. Bidding Committee. This is governed by Philippine Law. Roppongi is a reminder that cannot ² should not ² be dissipated. 11. Value of the Roppongi property. or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer. Vera. Issue on the authority of officials to dispose property belonging to state. 9. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable. and not validity of ownership or title. 10. together with the proper recommendations. The Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader. 1989 case on the Roppongi property: Ojeda v. or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance. There is no need to discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold. the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic development projects including the CARP. which provides that ³Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed. Issue of whether the property can be sold precedes the issue of who can acquire The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. the need to determine which law should apply. Constitutional questions raised in the Supreme Court The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Hence. Railroad Commission v." Thus. 56 [1937]). Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots. [1909]. (2) for property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality. Issue different The resolution of the Supreme Court in Ojeda v. the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. 7. for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred. The Congress had already convened for more than a year." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of RA 6657.

. Manila Lodge subsequently sold said 5. Grant of public nature strictly construed against the grantee The grant made by Act 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a "public" nature. In its decision promulgated on 30 June 1975. v. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the reclaimed area.000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments. Statutory Construction. is declared to be property of the City of Manila. the same having been made to a local political subdivision. Inc. to which was issued TCT 67488. This petition was granted on 15 February 1963. issued an order. Reclaimed area of public dominion. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension at the north end not to exceed 500 feet by 600 feet in size. TDC and Manila Lodge 761. September 30. BPOE. and not only a particular provision thereof.700. the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public. in order to unravel the legislative intent. On 12 December 1963 TCT 73444 was issued to TDC." Subsequently. i." was later changed by court order to "Manila Lodge No. to the Elks Club. at petitioner¶s cost. At the time of the sale. provides by necessary implication. with the approval of the Governor General. that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body. m. intended for public use. for a hotel site. part of the public domain.07 sq. but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights. conveyed 5. (BPOE) on the basis of which TCT 2195 was issued to the latter over the parcel of land which was part of Luneta Extension in the District of Ermita. and that it had received quarterly installments from TDC until 15 October 1964 when the latter failed without justifiable cause to pay the subsequent installments. "The Elks Club. for the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property. No. m.e. The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. Hence. it is thus necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act 1360. 3. From this order TDC and BPOE appealed to the Supreme Court which on 31 July 1968 affirmed the trial court's order of reannotation. and to lease the same.Manila Lodge 761 v. the whole statute. CA [G. 2. Castro (J): 3 concur. the court. The Supreme Court denied the petitions for lack of merit. and on 20 January 1911. as a consequence of such reservation. The City of Manila set up a special and affirmative defense claiming that TDC is not a purchaser in good faith. so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. L-41001. therefore. Inc. Hence.07 sq. On 19 November 1963 the BPOE sold the land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation which paid P1. a new Certificate of Title 2196 was issued on 17 July 1911 to the City of Manila. the petitions for review on certiorari..543. After due trial the court a quo rendered on 14 July 1972 its decision finding the subject land to be part of the "public park or plaza" and. and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City of Manila whatever consideration it had paid the latter. BPOE appealed to the Court of Appeals.543. with material dredged from Manila Bay. CA [G. and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It cannot be patrimonial property as Act 1360. of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U. OCT 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. as amended. L-41012] First Division. TDC filed a complaint against the City of Manila and Manila Lodge 761. after segregating therefrom the portion sold to the Manila Lodge No.000 as damages. after hearing. and in order to discover said intent. that TDC reserve the right to recover amounts from BPOE in case that the judgment on the parcel of land declares it a public park. and is of public dominion. . 761. Facts: On 26 June 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. Manila Lodge 761 admitted to have sold the land in good faith. dated November 19.R. One compelling reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such grant a gratuitous donation of. the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. 1976. as amended. For the remainder of the Luneta Extension. 1964. amending Act 1360. The court consequently declared that the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No. This reason for strict interpretation obtains relative to the aforesaid grant for although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta extension. 761. the Court of Appeals concurred in the findings and conclusions of the lower court upon the ground that they are supported by the evidence and are in accordance with law. an extension to the Luneta. and accordingly affirmed the lower court's judgment. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks. should be considered.A. On 13 July 1911 the City of Manila. BPOE with the CFI Manila praying that Entry 4608/T-1635 found in TCT 73444 covering the parcel of land with buildings and improvements thereon purchased from BPOE be cancelled.S. 761." In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the CFI Manila. From said decision. The registered owner. intended for public use The reclaimed area. affirming a prior sale dated 16 January 1909. BPOE. Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute. public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason. that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter. there was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property. On 28 April 1971. to a responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed 99 years.R. also Tarlac Development Corp. the Philippine Commission passed on 18 May 1907 Act 1657.]. No. 1. Branch IV. Inc. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee. In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase. was null and void. the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which if included would defeat the policy of the legislation. In the present case. 1 concurs in the result. 761. directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after 50 years. that Manila pays TDS the sum of P100.

4. Ownership defined Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further limitations than those established by law." The right to dispose ( jus disponendi) of one's property is an attribute of ownership. 5. Statutory Construction; every word, clause of statute interpreted in a way that no part becomes inoperative or superfluous If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside, lease, or sell given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe the statute as to render the term "authorize," which is repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or superflous. To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act. Act 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb "authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statute or section." Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property, for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute. 6. Presumption of full knowledge of prior laws and legislation when lawmaking body enacts a statute It is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the statute, it had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with respect thereto. If by another previous law, the City of Manila could already dispose of the reclaimed area, which it could do if such area were given to it as its patrimonial property, it would be a superfluity for Act 1360 to authorize the City to dispose of the reclaimed land. 7. Extension to Luneta is also a public park or plaza and for public use The reclaimed area, being an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila," it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use. 8. Extension defined Extension signifies enlargement in any direction ² in length, breadth, or circumstance. 9. Bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are part of the national domain open for public use A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain. In the present case, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the Manila Bay. 10. When shore or part of bay is reclaimed, it does not lose character of being property for public use When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use, according to Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis. When the tract of land owned by a private individual wears away and later on is submerged in water in ordinary tides (thus becoming part of the shore), until the Government later on undertakes the dredging of the estuary and dumping the sand and silt from estuary on the low lands completely submerged in water forming the reclaimed lots, they belong to the public domain for public use. Hence, a part of the shore, and for that purpose, a part of the bay, did not lose its character of being for public use after it was reclaimed. 11. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius; Southern portion is not the northern portion authorized to be leased or sold Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est exclusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more imperative inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in this case where the city is authorized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the corporation. 12. Property of public use; Intention to consider property for public use important, not actual construction or layout Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article. Properties of provinces and towns for public use are governed by the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain. In order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient. It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already construed or laid out as a plaza in order that it be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such. 13. Conversion of property of public us to patrimonial property requires explicit declaration by the executive and the legislative department As held in Ignacio vs. The Director of Lands, it is only the executive and possibly the legislative department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property is no longer required for public use, and until such declaration is made the property must continue to form part of the public domain. In the present case, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration. The courts are undoubtedly not primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to determine whether any public land is still needed for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.

14. Circumstantial evidence far removed in time to be considered contemporaneous to the enactment of Act 1360 All items of alleged circumstantial evidence are acts far removed in time from the date of the enactment of Act 1360 such that they cannot be considered contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not far-fetched that this mass of circumstantial evidence might have been influenced by the antecedent series of invalid acts, i.e. the City's having obtained over the reclaimed area OCT 1909 (20 January 1911); the sale made by the City of the subject property to Manila Lodge No. 761; and the issuance to the latter of TCT 2195. It cannot be gainsaid that if the subsequent acts constituting the circumstantial evidence have been based on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent invalid acts and Torrens titles, they can hardly be indicative of the intent of the lawmaking body in enacting Act 1360 and its amendatory act. 15. Mention as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring title OCT 7333 (13 November 1935), covering the lot where the American Embassy [Chancery] stands, states that the property is "bounded on the Northwest by properties of Army and Navy Club and Elks Club." Even if said boundaries were delineated by the Philippine Legislature in Act 4269, this does not mean that the Legislature "recognized and conceded the existence of the Elks Club property as a private property and not as a public park or plaza. A contrary argument is non sequitur, plain and simple. Said Original Certificate of Title cannot be considered as an inconvertible declaration that the Elks Club was in truth and in fact the owner of such boundary lot. Such mention as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring title nor can it validate a title that is null and void. 16. Government not estopped by mistake or errors on the part of its agents The Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against public policy. In the present case, the 13 July 1911 sale executed by the city of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. Estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly. 17. Sale void and existent; cannot be ratified by lapse of time or by express ratification The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has been, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No. 761, an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was in contemplation of law, no contract at all. 18. Good faith of purchaser cannot create title where none exist The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first vendee but also against all its successors, which are not protected by law. The doctrine of bona fide purchaser without notice does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser cannot create title where none exists. Santos v. Moreno [G.R. No. L-15829. December 4, 1967.] En Banc, Bengzon JP (J): 9 concur Facts: The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned a vast track of marshland in Macabebe, Pampanga called Hacienda San Esteban, which was administered and managed by the Ayala y Cia. From 1860 to 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered nipa sap or "tuba". It operated a distillery plant in barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol which was in turn manufactured into liquor. Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem; thus Ayala y Cia dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called "arundines". By the gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of rivers. In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It converted Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi. The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from residents of the surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-opening of those canals. Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen and some residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at Sapang Malauling Maragul, Nigui and Quiñorang Silab. Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case 4488 in the CFI Pampanga which preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (Civil Case 4527) in the same court. The CFI Pampanga rendered judgment in both cases against Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Secretary of Commerce and Communications conducted his own investigation, found and declared on 8 November 1930 that the streams closed by Roman Santos were natural, floatable and navigable and were utilized by the public for transportation since time immemorial. However, on 8 May 1931 the said official revoked his decision and declared the streams in question privately owned because they were artificially constructed. Subsequently, upon authority granted under Act 3982 the Secretary of Commerce and Communications entered into a contract with Roman Santos whereby the former recognized the private ownership of 6 streams and the latter turned over for public use 2 artificial canals and bound himself to maintain them in navigable state. The Provincial Board of Pampanga and the municipal councils of Macabebe and Masantol objected to the contract. However, the Secretary of Justice, in his opinion dated 6 March 1934, upheld its legality. Roman Santos withdrew his appeals in the Supreme Court.

On 25 February 1935 the municipality of Macabebe and the Zobel family executed an agreement whereby they recognized the nature of the streams mentioned in Panopio's report as public or private, depending on the findings in said report. This agreement was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications on 27 February1935 and confirmed the next day by the municipal council of Macabebe under Resolution 36. On 12 June 1935 however, the Secretary of Justice issued an opinion holding that the contract executed by the Zobel family and the municipality of Macabebe has no validity. Still, despite the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, the streams in question remained closed. In 1939 administrative investigations were again conducted by various agencies of the Executive branch of our government culminating in an order of President Manuel Quezon immediately before the national elections in 1941 requiring the opening of Sapang Macanduling Maragul, Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu. Said streams were again closed in 1942 allegedly upon order of President Quezon. Roman Santos acquired in 1940 from the Zobel family a larger portion of Hacienda San Esteban wherein are located 25 streams which were closed by Ayala y Cia. 18 years later or in 1950, Congress enacted RA 2056. Thereafter, on 15 August 1958, Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act No. 2056 against fishpond owners in the province of Pampanga who have closed rivers and appropriated them as fishponds without color of title. On the same day, Benigno Musni and other residents in the vicinity of Hacienda San Esteban petitioned the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to open the following streams: Balbaro, Batasan Matua, Bunga, Cansusu, Macabacle, Macanduling Maragul, Mariablus Malate, Matalabang Maisac, Nigui, Quiñorang Silab, Sapang Maragul and Sepung Bato. On 20 October 1958 Musni and his co-petitioners amended their petition to include other streams: Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Batasan Matua, Bato, Bengco, Bunga, Butabuta, Camastiles, Cansusu, Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga, Mabutol, Macabacle, Macabacle qng. Iba, Macanduling Maragul, Malauli, Magasawa, Mariablus Malate, Masamaral, Matalabang Maisac, Mariablus, 3 Nigui, Pita, Quiñorang Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung Bato, Sinag and Tumbong. On March 2, 4, 10, 30 and 31, and 1 April 1959, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications rendered his decisions ordering the opening and restoration of the channel of all the streams except Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Nigui, Pepangebonan, Nasi and Bulacus, within 30 days. On 29 April 1959, after receipt of the Secretary's decision, Roman Santos filed a petition with the CFI Manila for injunction against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian C. Cargullo. As prayed for, preliminary injunction was granted on 8 May 1959. On April 29 and 12 June 1959, Roman Santos received the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications dated March 10 and March 30, March 31, and 1 April 1959. Consequently, on June 24, 1959 he asked the court to cite in contempt Secretary Florencio Moreno, Undersecretary M. D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo for issuing and serving upon him the said decisions despite the existence of the preliminary injunction. The Cou rt however ruled that Secretary Moreno, Undersecretary Bautista and Cargullo acted in good faith, and hence were merely "admonished to desist from any and further action in this Court, with the stern warning, however, that a repetition of the acts complained of shall be dealt with severely." On 18 July 1959 the trial court declared all the streams under litigation private, and made the writ of preliminary injunction permanent. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian Cargullo appealed to the Supreme Couurt from the order of 17 July 1959 issued in connection with Roman Santos' motion for contempt and from the decision of the lower court on the merits of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, except as to Sapang Cansusu which was declared public and thus as to which the judgment of the lower court was reversed. No costs. 1. Motion for reconsideration not required as a condition precedent to judicial relief in RA 2056; Congress intend decision of Secretary of Public Works and Communication to be final and executory subject to a timely review by the courts RA 2056 does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent to judicial relief. From the context of the law, the intention of the legislators to forego a motion for reconsideration manifests itself clearly. RA 2056 underscores the urgency and summary nature of the proceedings authorized thereunder. Thus in Section 2 thereof the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under pain of criminal liability is duty bound to terminate the proceedings and render his decision within a period not exceeding 90 days from the filing of the complaint. Under the same section, the party respondent concerned is given not more than 30 days within which to comply with the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, otherwise the removal of the dams would be done by the Government at the expense of said party. Congress has precisely provided for a speedy and a most expeditious proceeding for the removal of illegal obstructions to rivers and on the basis of such a provision it would be preposterous to conclude that it had in mind to require a party to file a motion for reconsideration an additional proceeding which would certainly lengthen the time towards the final settlement of existing controversies. The logical conclusion is that Congress intended the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to be final and executory subject to a timely review by the courts without going through formal and time consuming preliminaries. 2. Question of Constitutionality rightly aired before a competent court; not within competence of Secretary of Public Works and Communications The petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 2056 and the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to order the demolition of dams across rivers or streams. Those questions are not within the competence of said Secretary to decide upon a motion for reconsideration. They are purely legal questions, not administrative in nature, and should properly be aired before a competent court as was rightly done by the petitioner. 3. Appeal of the decision of the Secretary to the President dispensed with as Secretary is alter-ego of the President As to the failure of Roman Santos to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, suffice it to state that such appeal could be dispensed with because said Secretary is the alter ego of the President. The actions of the former are presumed to have the implied sanction of the latter. 4. Action correctly filed with the CFI Manila; Purpose is to review the decision of the Secretary, even if the resolution of controversy rests in the ownership of the streams; Section 1 of Rule 5, not section 3, is controlling The mere fact that the resolution of the controversy would wholly rest on the ownership of the streams involved would not

It cannot be held that the law is constitutional but applied unconstitutionally as the petitioner¶s dikes were demolished through an administrative. Review of Secretary¶s decision by the court. injunction or certiorari is not very material. and their beds. for that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation. Further. the CFI shall confine its inquiry to the evidence presented during the administrative proceedings. are a part of the public domain. The acts of the Secretary of Public Works are Communications are the object of the litigation. and that of a similar character. riverbanks. ports and bridges constructed by the State. waters or waterways and (b) areas declared as communal fishing grounds. has been recognized by the King of Spain and later by the Philippine Government when the same was registered under Act 496. Hacienda San Esteban is titled land and private ownership thereof by Ayala y Cia. Articles 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 provides that property of public ownership includes ³that devoted to public use. sewers. or lake of the public domain and use. Evidence not presented therein shall not be admitted and considered by the trial court. Insular Government (marchlands not susceptible to appropriation by occupation) not applicable The doctrine in Montano vs. proceeding. Whereas.necessarily classify it as a real action. Injunction proper if person constructs a dam across a public canal. to provinces. stated inversely. but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws. to whom the statute had not entrusted the case. Note that the law provides for an expeditious administrative process to determine whether or not a dam or dike should be declared a public nuisance and ordered demolished.´ Thus. since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo. canals. which is situated within a public land "No private person has a right to usurp possession of a watercourse. Montano v. (2) Continuous or intermittent waters from springs or brooks running in then natural channels and the channels themselves. in either event the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary. while they run through them. or to towns from the moment they leave such lands. 23 Phil 631) Inversely. dikes or any other works in areas declared as communal fishing grounds. For the rule is that outside its territorial limits. Article 72 of the Spanish Law of Waters (8 August 1866) provides that ³the water-beds on public land. The purpose of the suit is to review the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. 10. is unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the law itself violates the Constitution. Building of dams. (2) Lakes and ponds and their beds when formed by nature on . 11. the suit ought to be filed in the CFI whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the place where the Secretary is found or is holding office. the channels of which are of public ownership. it was an error for the lower court to conduct a trial de novo. rivers. at the election of the plaintiff. and public institutions´ are of public ownership. in the present case. of creeks through which spring waters run." (Bautista v. shall be ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited constructions as herein provided. Alarcon. Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 As to Public Ownership. Section 1 provides that ³civil actions in CFIs may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. (1) public navigable rivers. Insular Government. In reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. 7. Waters which flow continuously or intermittently from lands belonging to private persons. and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence. dikes or any other works which encroaches into any public navigable river.´ 9. to enjoin him from enforcing them and to prevent him from making and issuing similar decisions concerning the streams in Hacienda San Esteban." Thus. RA 2056 applies to 2 types of bodies of water RA 2056 applies to two types of bodies of water. RA 2056 is not unconstitutional The Court has held in Lovina v. unless it shall have been proved that he constructed the same within property of his exclusive ownership. "the findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid before him. or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides. streams. 5. and are free from fraud or imposition. shores. section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission. stream. And to say that such an administrative process. to the State. (6) Subterranean waters on public lands. Such conclusion amount in effect to declaring the law unconstitutional. As held previously by the Court. has no application in the present ccase inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled and precisely Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6. and as indicated in said case. dikes or other works on navigable public waters a public nuisance Section 1 of RA 2056 law provides that ³the construction or building of dams. hence. (5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds. when put to operation. (4) Lakes and ponds formed by nature on public lands. Moreno that said law is constitutional. and to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court. even though constructed under contract. such as roads." Article 407 of the same Code provides that ³(1) Rivers and their natural channels. roadsteads. coastal waters. (3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public. the petition for injunction was correctly filed in the CFI Manila as the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian Cargullo are found and hold office in the City of Manila. a private person may take possession of a watercourse if he constructed the same within his property. torrents. the court has no power to enforce its orders. Article 408 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 provides that ³(1) Waters. and such usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal provisions which explicitly exclude such waterways from the exclusive use or possession of a private party. and (9) The waste waters of fountains. that a marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation. Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court does not apply to determine venue of this action. It is immaterial that the action should be one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari. inquiry limited to evidence presented during the administrative proceedings Whether the action instituted in the CFI be for mandamus. Section of the same rule applies. namely. branch of a river. either continuous or intermittent rising on private estates. Public and Private ownership under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889." As to Private Ownership. not judicial. The natural water-beds or channels of rivers are also part of the public domain. 6. 8. coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the construction or building of dams. (7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works.

Hence. and other streams. The streams. Said Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek or canal already existed at the time of the institution of the registration proceedings wherein judgment was rendered resulting in the issuance of certificate of title 329 in favor of Romulo Mercado. . The channels. except for Sapang Cansusu. Further. being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River. Nasi and Bulacus was dismissed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the case considered closed.such estates. and floodgates of a ditch or aqueduct are deemed to be an integral part of the estate or building for which the waters are intended. channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates over which they flow. because it was assumed that the streams were used "by the public as fishing ground and in transporting their commerce in bancas or in small crafts without the objection of the parties who dug" them (applying Mercado v. Sapang Cansusu is a natural stream. nor any right to make use of its beds or banks. the aforesaid creek appears.R. On the plan of the land. the dams across them should not be ordered demolished as public nuisances. considered as canals. being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and his personnel. after having so connected them. Lower court made no finding of contempt to be review by the Supreme Court With respect to the issue of contempt of court on the part of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian Cargullo for the alleged issuance of administrative decisions ordering demolition of dikes involved in this case after the writ of injunction was granted and served. The creek could have been of private ownership had not its builder lost it by prescription. Municipal President of Macabebe not the same as present case In Mercado v." 12. Canals constructed by private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership. However. banks. 14. connected the two recesses or bodies of water in question by means of excavation and. Consequently. the said streams. the Secretary of Justice answered in the negative the query of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications whether the latter can declare of private ownership those streams which "were dug up artificially". bed. as then found by the Bureau of Public Work. Mercado v. the streams involved in the present case were artificially made and denoted to the exclusive use of the hacienda owner. the conclusion would be inevitably in favor of private ownership. Quiñorang Silab. 15. The said administrative decision has not been questioned in this appeal by either party. the Batasan-Limasan creek was originally dug by the estate owner who. Nigui. Mercado v. in order to facilitate the cutting and transportation of firewood and other products. In those cases. are of private ownership and hence. do not support the factual premise that the streams in question were used by the public "without the objection of the parties who dug" them. Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters (8 August 1866) provides that ³the water-beds of all creeks belong to the owners of the estates or lands over which they flow. are of private ownership in contemplation of Article 339(1) of the Spanish Civil Code. "the water. Case involving petition for the opening of Sapang Malauling. produced on the said hacienda. and those of brooks crossing estates which are not of public ownership´ are of private ownership. closed. 37986. towards the Nasi River on the east or towards Limasan creek on the west. Municipality of Macabebe)." Further. Canals of private ownership Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. of which they originally were. made other excavations at both ends towards the said directly connecting both bodies of water. The owners of estates through or along the boundaries of which the aqueduct passes can assert no ownership over it. admittedly a public stream. belong to the owners of Hacienda San Esteban. they belong to the public domain either as rivers pursuant to Article 407(1) of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or as property devoted to public use under Article 339 of the same Code. the watercourses which were dammed were natural navigable streams and used habitually by the public for a long time as a means of navigation. which belongs to the public domain Sapang Cansusu. No. a public stream. and at the time the case was tried as well as when the certificate of title was issued in favor of the Romulo Mercado. Whereas. subsequently allowed said creek to be used by the public for navigation and fishing purposes for a period of 22 years. the facts. continuous or intermittent formed by rain water. Municipal President of Macabebe. which was presented in the said case. Case different from cases involving dammed natural navigational streams The present case should be differentiated from those cases where the Court held illegal the closing and/or appropriation of rivers or streams by owners of estates through which they flow for purposes of converting them into fishponds or other works. and (5) The channels of flowing streams. and Article 408(5) of the Spanish Civil Code. 17. the original owner of the hacienda. considering that the owners of Hacienda San Esteban held them for their exclusive use and prohibited the public from using them. The Court cannot therefore take as controlling in determining the merits of this case the factual premises and the legal conclusion contained in said opinion. March 1. Mercado case cannot be applied in the present case due to differences in factual premises In his opinion of 12 June 1935. there is no conviction for contempt reviewable by this Court and any discussion on the matter would be academic. and which later became known as the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek. Diaz (J): 4 concur Facts: Mariano Mercado. 16. (3) Subterranean waters found therein. 18. suffice it to state that the lower court made no finding of contempt of court.] Second Division. Parties thereto excluded in present case The petition for the opening of Sapang Malauling Maragul. (4) Rain waters falling thereon as long as they remain within their boundaries. therefore. 13. belongs to the public domain. Character of canals based on the estate over which they flow. of the streams in question which may be classified as creeks. Further. none of the herein defendants nor the Insular Government filed opposition or objection thereto. Necessarily. Its closure therefore by the predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal. 1934. Municipal President of Macabebe [G. they are deemed excluded herein. unless they base their claim on title deed which specify the right or the ownership claimed. Pepangebunan. Applying the principle therein enunciated to the present case.

both the residents of the hacienda and those of other nearby barrios and municipalities. and formerly belonging to Romulo Mercado. unless they base their claim on title deed which specify the right or the ownership claimed. and creeks undoubtedly obvious on the ground that. the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek may be considered as belonging to the class of property enumerated in paragraph 8 thereof. in addition to the foregoing. and (5) The channels of flowing streams. 216. in 1928 he closed the two openings thereof towards the Nasi River on one side and Limasan creek on the other side. a creek is no other than arm extending from a river. such as roads. before it was closed.Once the said Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek or canal was opened from the Nasi River to Limasan creek. rivers. It was then that Romulo Mercado. banks. 7. continuous or intermittent formed by rain water. and that of a similar character. (2) Lakes and ponds and their beds when formed by nature on such estates. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. Further. it is none the less true that it is not included in any of the kinds of private property therein enumerated. bed. with costs against the appellant. while the former is a recess or arm extending from a river. if the appellant and her predecessors in interest had acquired any right to the creek in question by virtue of excavations which they had made thereon. the owners thereof as well as strangers. canals. Article 408(5) speaks of channel of creeks and not the creek itself Appellant cannot invoke in her favor the Article 408 (5) on the ground that although it is true that the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek passes through her hacienda. xxx´ are of public ownership. The appellant and her predecessors in interest. 2. And. (3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public. and the similarity between rivers. 216). c. nor any right to make use of its beds or banks. as it was not established that anyone ever obtained the privilege of fishing in the BatasanLimasan creek." b. the appellant's (Eufemia Mercado) predecessor in interest. laid down the doctrine that creeks are property of the public domain (15 Enciclopedia Juridica Española. as has been stated. Creeks are property of public domain Article 339 provides that canals. to the State. and the appellant and her predecessors in interest certainly lost such right through the said cause. Article 408 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 provides that ³(1) Waters. 6. Creek and brook distinguished A creek is not a brook because the latter is but a short. 1890. Notice cannot constitute sufficient evidence A mere notice does not constitute sufficient evidence that the creek in question is the property of the public domain. Eufemia Mercado appealed the order of the Secretary of Commerce with the CFI Pampanga. continuous stream of water (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española). and floodgates of a ditch or aqueduct are deemed to be an integral part of the estate or building for which the waters are intended. not only appropriated for themselves the channel of the said creek but also the creek itself. torrents. and at other times without even the latter's knowledge. Hence. xxx (8) Waters which flow continuously or intermittently from lands belonging to private persons. (3) Subterranean waters found therein. Furthermore. 1. while they run through them. Title does not confer any right to the creek It is useless for the appellant to allege that she has obtained certificate of title 329 in her favor because the said certificate does not . and they cannot now claim it exclusively for themselves after the general public had been openly using the same from 1906 to 1928. and those of brooks crossing estates which are not of public ownership´ are of private ownership.) 5. the necessary authorization to devote it to their own use to the exclusion of all others. as any other property susceptible of appropriation. the present petition. (15 Enciclopedia Juridica Española. The Secretary of Commerce ordered Romulo Mercado to remove the two dikes which he had constructed at both ends of the creek named Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun. may be acquired or lost through prescription. which later dismissed said appeal. not only the residents of the hacienda and those who visited it but also some of the residents of the nearby barrios and municipalities began to use it as a means of communication in attending to their needs. Such evidence cannot be given any weight. since the time it was opened as a water route between the Nasi River and Limasan creek. ports and bridges constructed by the State. either continuous or intermittent rising on private estates. and those of a similar character are property of public ownership. which traverses part of the hacienda described in certificate of title 329 of the registry of deeds of Pampanga. Use and enjoyment of a creek may be acquired or lost through prescription Even granting that the Batasan-Limasan creek acquired the proportions which it had. or to towns from the moment they leave such lands. riverbanks. canals. that is. (4) Rain waters falling thereon as long as they remain within their boundaries. such privilege being placed at public auction. "the water. under article 407. which participates in the ebb and flow of the sea. holding the creek in question as property of the public domain. (2) Continuous or intermittent waters from springs or brooks running in then natural channels and the channels themselves. The owners of estates through or along the boundaries of which the aqueduct passes can assert no ownership over it. torrents. Public and Private ownership under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 a. the Contentious Court of Spain (Tribunal Contencioso de España) in a decision dated June 25. it being a fact that. The use and enjoyment of a creek. and in fact they have not obtained. Articles 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 provides that property of public ownership includes ³that devoted to public use. had been using it not only for their bancas to pass through but also for fishing purposes. As to Public Ownership. rivers. shores. As to Private Ownership. 3." Article 407 of the same Code provides that ³(1) Rivers and their natural channels. almost. roadsteads. in closing the two openings of the said creek and converting it into a fish pond. 4. to provinces. but which now belonging to the Eufenua by virtue of a formal donation made to her. sometimes with the permission of the owners of the hacienda. they had lost such right through prescription inasmuch as they failed to obtain. decided to convert the said creek into a fish pond and with that object in view. as a result of excavations made by the laborers of the appellant's predecessor in interest.

On 9 May 1959. and declared that the regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River to be property of public dominion.al. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini. He prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. S: Julian Tumolva. Isabela. during part of the year. Binalay v. would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. and furthermore. possession and damages against petitioners.. Finding of facts by lower courts entitled to great respect. river water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. the other portion under water was left unsurveyed). No. during the dry season. being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. et. and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On 21 October 1969. et. both courts rejected the assertion that the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is. the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation. the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.e. The elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island.8 hectares + 2. On 10 November 1982. the creek in question was closed a few years after excavations had been made in the land under consideration. This situation compelled Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. For about 8 months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth.9489 hectares of 8. It was found to have a total area of 22. during the rainy season. without pronouncement as to costs. In effect. Santos does not apply in present case The doctrine laid down in the case of the Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Through the years.9087). Whether the conclusion reached thereafter is correct is a question of law It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect. because it so appears in the certificate itself. not reported) is not applicable in the present case because the subject matter in that case is not of the same nature as the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek. forks at a certain point to form two (2) branches ² the western and the eastern branches ² and then unites at the other end. On 15 December 1972. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and. The Cagayan River running from south to north. The thing involved herein. Feliciano (J): 4 concur Facts: The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini. This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent. 1991. The Court also declared that the ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to Manalo. river water does not flow into the eastern branch. however.] Third Division. March 18. E: National Road.R. 1. They filed a motion for reconsideration. Manalo [G. the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season. It would remain under water for the rest of the year. E: Provincial Road. in the words of the trial court. Guillermo Manalo acquired 8. W: Cagayan River). The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. Manalo purchased another 1. . While this condition persists. to vacate the premises of Lot 821 and restraining them further from entering said premises. The submerged portion. Government of the Philippine Islands v.. without pronouncement as to costs. Manalo filed a complaint before the then CFI Isabela. No. dry river bed. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products. Isabela having an estimated area of 20 hectares. But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. who are in possession of Lot 821 insist that they own Lot 821. the Batasan-Limasan creek. Branch 3 for quieting of title. 1. 92161. to form a narrow strip of land. et. is included among the various exceptions enumerated in section 39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is subject by express provision of the law.8122 hectares) and Lot 822 (11. further north. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks. Furthermore. is perfectly navigable by bancas throughout the year. Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. however. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. being of the public domain. affirmed the decision of the trial court.65 hectares purchased. The thing involved therein was simply a date or. In the present case. 8. declared Manalo as the owner of Lot 307. in the case of Urbano Santos.al. 1927. daughter of Judge Juan Taccad (N: Francisco Forto. Isabela (Lot 307. W: Cagayan river). i. Binalay. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact.al. without success. On 24 July 1974. 27202. Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV 04892.R. In 1964.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad. a low depression on the defendant's land where there was a waterway passable by bancas at high tide. the two parcels of land were consolidated as one lot during the cadastral survey at Balug.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Taccad (N: Balug Creek.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 (10. Binalay. but which completely dried up at low tide and during the dry season. the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. inasmuch as the said creek. the trial court rendered a decision declaring Manalo as the lawful owner of Lot 821 and ordering Binalay. and prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey. by the exposed. S: Faustina Taccad [now Manalo]. Santos (G. is a question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court. other hand. appealed to the Court of Appeals which.. promulgated September 2.confer upon her any right to the creek in question. Tamauini.

is sudden and forceful action. 5. As it is. San Mateo.72 hectares. among other things. 1967] Bengzon JP (J): 8 concur Facts: Dr. depict the depressed portion separating Lot 821 and Lot 307 as a river bed. Hilario v. without being for public use. and others of similar character. Article 70 of the Law of Waters applicable. Article 420 applies to existing beds. to whom a new certificate of title was issued. the flooding. in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken. requisites Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible.45 hectares. Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. 6. Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River. On the contrary. Jose Hilario. the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. evven if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are property of public dominion. L-19570 April 27. is compatible with the fact that huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner. 4. (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea). the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River. banks. In the present case. Further. such as roads. Upon his death this property was inherited by his son. Rizal).´ and ³(2) those which belong to the State. or such topographic feature. Accretion.91 hectares) is the northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22. the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Manalo himself. what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. During the lifetime of plaintiff's father. Manresa. in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed property. This topography of the land. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Upon the other hand. 8. Article 462 applies to new beds in relation to Article 457 (Accretion) Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code. thus the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821. Specifically. Colegio de San Jose not applicable to present case Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Size of land considered alluvium and topography of land negates conclusion of increment It is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11. such as that both parties claim adverse possession of Lot 821 and both parties presenting tax declarations on the subject land. the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores. by operation of law. and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). shores. Government of the Philippine Islands v. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. Jr. The total landholding purchased by Manalo is 10. and (3) the banks. Alluvial process is slow and gradual. The dike-like slope of such depression. during direct examination.. Even if there is no record of when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel. roadsteads. canals. rivers. Lot 821 (11. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory. Article 70 provides that ³the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods". the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river. not sudden and forceful Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land to Manalo is the western branch. the Court notes that the parcels of land bought by Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang. City of Manila [GR No. ports and bridges constructed by the State.3 To prevent . The conclusion of the Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record. even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. 3. Quieting of title requires equitable title or interest in subject real property Under Article 477 of the Civil Code. and is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. stressed the public ownership of river beds. That case involved Laguna de Bay. since Laguna de Bay is a lake. Private ownership of the bed of a river cannot be acquired as the land constituted property of public dominion. Still. Article 420 of the Civil Code states that ³(1) those intended for public use. Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. the bed already existed even before the sale of the land to Manalo (with the bed being referred to as ³old bed´ or even ³Rio Muerte de Cagayan´). the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and gradual manner. Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks. The description of the lot acquired from Taguba and the other from Taccad refer to the dried up bed or the eastern branch of the river as the Cagayan River serving as the western boundary in the Deeds of Sale. torrents. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting. "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the running waters. Colegio de San Jose is not applicable to the present case.2.91 hectares. that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. Further. (2) the bed. not Article 74 Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the present case. 7.

canals.. and that of a similar character´ are property of public ownership. gravel and sand from the nearby areas along the River. On 22 October 22. 1949. in 1937. . 1957. the Bureau of Mines and Atty. the riverbank is part of the riverbed. are absolved of liability from extracting materials from subject property (of public domain). On August 30. Article 73 of the Law of Waters which provides that the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips of zones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. as the cost of materials taken since 1949. In 1947. which form part of them. in the amount of P1. it provides that ³that devoted to public use. Old Civil Code and Law of Waters of 1866 controlling law Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937. elements follow same nature of ownership. solidarily. rivers. and Engr. bed. ordering the City of Manila and Director of Public Works to pay Hilario in solidum the sum of P376. it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature also. Means to recover Article 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that "whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bed through a private estate. In 1945. and you have. Eulogio Sese. defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case. it follows that the banks. as that "' River' consists of water. On 13 May 1954. Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership. and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to reimburse intervenor Calalang of P36. If you could sink the bed. is of public ownership. the question should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought a reconsideration of the same. Subsequently. New bed.000. it should either be totally public or completely private. are of public ownership Under the old Civil Law and the Law of Waters. Still. are also of public ownership. The US Army paid. Remove the banks. bed and banks". Hilario's estate. long before the present Civil Code took effect. including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Busuego. torrents. the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal. Natural bed or channel of a creek or river defined The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest [ordinary] floods (Article 70 of the Law of the Waters). (2) the bed and (3) the banks. the Director of Public Works. All these constitute the river. On 21 December 1956. and started scraping. the appeal. Further. ports and bridges constructed by the State. 3. Artcile 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear. the lower court resolved the motions to reconsider with an order. as part of the riverbed. It is a compound idea. but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the event that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this purpose. all riverbanks are of public ownership.000. (1) the running waters.its entry into the land.989. riverbanks. Hilario and Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration. plaintiff amended his complaint and impleaded as additional defendants the City of Manila. Hence. All riverbanks. a boundless flood" 6. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. which the lower court denied. instead of a river you would have a fathomless gulf. A river is a compound concept consisting of running waters. and banks A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements. alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement had between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. when river changes course. segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works. 4. and dismissing the case against the Bureau of Public Works insofar as money claims are concerned without prejudice to Hilario taking action against proper party in such claim.e. The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from. On 14 March 1954. 2.00. the new bed shall be of public ownership. However. these several parts constituting the river. the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations. the Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Evaporate the water. as part of the riverbeds. American authorities are in accord with this view. the banks of the River are part of its bed. it should have only one nature.60 as cost of gravel and sand extracted from the plaintiff¶s land. as the nature of banks follows that of the bed and the running water of the river. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join the litigation as intervenors. a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. as per issue of fees and penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. the new Engineer-incharge of the plant. it cannot exist without all its parts. No Costs. a bed and banks. The operations eventually extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently. the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises. For years. shores. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. plus costs. and that "A 'river' consists of water. River is of public ownership. Law explicit Since a river is but one compound concept. 5. such as roads. holding that the 2/5 portion of the area in controversy to Hilario. left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate. and Engr. The use of the words "of its bed [de sus alveos] " clearly indicates the intent of the law to consider the banks for all legal purposes. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest. these safeguards served their purpose. District Engineer of Rizal.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations. and his agent and employees. a claim for damages was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo. i. plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendants City Engineer of Manila. excavating and extracting soil. and entered another judgment to the effect that the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works. 1. Thus. Without any qualifications." Banks are not mentioned in the provision. Since rivers are of public ownership. and you have a dry hollow. a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities. the whole river. the lower court rendered its decision. and the portion within the strip of land question declared not part of public domain and confirmed as part of Hilario¶s private property. roadsteads. the then administrator of Dr.

was on the northern 2/5 of the disputed area. Subsequently. which is quite far from the waterline. The bank near the water edge. Natural is not synonymous to original or prior condition "Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". is about 3 meters high and has a steep grade right at the edge where it drops almost vertically to the watercourse level. respectively. However. Banks of river different in topography There is a difference between the topography of the two sides immediately adjoining the River. as such was already superceded by then. Considering the peculiar characteristics of the two sides banking the river. that on the west is more or less lateral. when the river is swollen but the flowing water is kept within the confines of the "primary" and "secondary" banks. The public nature of riverbanks are obtained only by implication until the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1899. or horizontal. even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature. So. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866. and even inundate the surrounding areas. which was explicit in Article 339 that riverbanks were declared public property since they were destined for public use. riverbanks became of public ownership. ingenuo y sin doblez en su modo de proceder. because of prior law or custom. distinction due to physical order cannot prevail The conclusion made by the lower court that only the northern 2/5 of the disputed area remained as plaintiff's private property is predicated from the findings that the portion where rice and corn were found in the ocular inspection of 15 June 1951. This is bereft of evidence. which defined "beds" and "banks" and considered the latter as part of the former. the water would rise vertically. Hence. left undisturbed all vested rights then existing. in dealing with the legal order. of the Code. Thus. In other words. canio contraVuesto a sobre natural y milagroso. that this cannot be a part of the bed because of the existence of vegetation which could not have grown underwater. on the other hand. when the waters overflow beyond the said banks. Article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866 is the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the banks and the policy of the law to devote all banks to public Use. In other words. This law. Legal definition applies with the legal order. By the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. therefore. But subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. That plants can and do grow on the banks which otherwise could not have grown on the bed which is constantly subjected to the flow of the waters proves the distinction between "beds" and "banks" in the physical order. the easement in Article 73 only recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks. riverbanks and beds are public under Artciles 339 and 407. be that lateral line or strip which is reached by the waters during those high floods that do not cause inundations. on the east. were able to acquire ownership over the banks. this flood does not happen regularly. while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws. Thus. 7. Limits of banks of rivers Article 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the limits of banks of rivers "By the phrase 'banks of a river' is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations.the law expressly makes all three elements public." 8. high only. the rise in the waterlevel would not have the same effect on the two sides. the law must have used the word "natural" only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and banks. Under Law 6." which is on the east. it did not authorize future private appropriation of riverbanks. origivario de un pueblo o imcio'n. the water covering more ground until the "secondary bank" line is reached. However. and gradually slopes up to a height of about 2 to 2-1/2 meters along the line indicated as "secondary bank". ni artificio. Diccionario De La Real Academia Española: "NATURAL-perteneciente a la naturaleza o conforme a la calidad o propriedad de las cosas. by statutory definition. but on the west. albeit impliedly only because considered part of the bed which was public. 10. regular y que comumnente sucede. The line indicated as "primary bank. as the unexcavated portion of the land is the southwestern ¼. unlike in the Law of Waters. there were only three such floods. The farthest extremity of the bank on the west side would. as this would conflict with clear legislative policy enunciated in Article 339 of the Code that all riverbanks were of public ownership. since the new banks were formed when the river changed its course in 1937. Title 28. But nowhere in the law was there any provision authorizing the private appropriation of the banks. until the top of the "primary bank" is reached. has no such steep acclivity. History of ownership of River Banks Article 553 was never intended to authorize the private acquisition of river banks. hecho con verdad. di cese tambien de las cosas que imitar a. The article merely recognized and preserved the vested rights of riparian owners who. following the Roman Law rule. 9. par. The easement would preserve the private ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. Partida 3. while the flowing waters are declared so under Articles 33. the extent reached by the waters when the River is at high tide. 11. the Law of Waters of 13 June 1879 reenacted Article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866 and affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds and the treatment of the banks as part of the bed. facilmente creible. Article 553 of the old Civil Code does not intend to authorize private acquisition of river banks but recognizes vested rights of riparian owners. In the present case. is about 30 to 50 cms. This occurs annually. One is the so-called "ordinary" flood. . about three to four times during the period. while the water expansion on the east is vertical. que se produce por solas las fuerzas de la naturaleza. the banks cannot be subjected to the provisions of the Siete Partidas. Ordinary and extraordinary flood There are two types of floods in the area during the rainy season. Then there is the "extraordinary" flood. On the contrary. This was possible under the Siete Partidas which was promulgated in 1834. -nativa. Further. the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition provided by the Diccionario de La Real Academia Española. legal definitions prevail. mezela ni compocision alguna. la naturaleza con propiedad. American cases cannot be applied as these do not involve a similar statutory provision. and that this portion is man-made. the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners. 12. Since the first paragraph of Article 36 of the Law of Waters if 1879 was reenacted in Article 553 of the Code. to claim private ownership of the banks. From 1947 to 1955. The opposite side. there would be a low angled inclined rise. this article must also be understood not as authorizing the private acquisition of riverbanks but only as recognizing the vested titles of riparian owners who already owned the banks. y par eso.

It was due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. He cannot. Extraction confined on the banks of the river and not beyond limits of the west bank to invade his private estate. the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks then. Defendants did not unjustly profit at plaintiff¶s expense as they are not responsible for the shifting of the river Defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's expense. i.. They were. the defendants conducted their operations only in the New Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the watercourse then. 1985 sq. it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any compensation at all. City Engineer Manila. was due to two typhoons which caused the erosion of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which increased its level from as much as . with the River.13. This zone. In the present case. 16. whereas in 1950. which constitute part of the public domain wherein they had the right to operate. Floodings not accidental as they are annual. the lateral extremity of the west bank then. On 26 June 1976. Lot 2.m. as previously established. under proper authorization. The movement eastward of the channel by as much as 31 meters.453 sq. even from the American period. west bank. no extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of this zone. through the defendants. the River should have moved westward. all that space between the "secondary bank" line and the "primary bank" line. m. On 24 June 1973. where the level of the ground had been lowered. What is held is that at the time the defendants made their extractions. above the "temporary bank" line. Moreover. It does not indicate how wide it was in the other parts. This line is located east of the "secondary bank" line. The government. Movement of the river. Gutierrez Jr. the Tancincos filed an application for the registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu-131892: Lot 1. the west bank of the River extended westward up to the "secondary bank" line. at present. Therefore. Meycauayan. 18. Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. but not unjustly. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.93 to 2 meters. from 1945-1955 From 1945 to 1949. Under the "following-the nature-of-things" argument advanced by plaintiff. Hilario cannot recover damages from defendants From 1947 to the early part of 1949. However. River of different width. No.35. the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court. Lot 3. therefore. Republic v. Hilario's own evidence indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. Such area sampled shows only the width of the River near the southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead.R. have been made only on the strip of land west of the River. 17. plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the area he has lost. What was mainly considered there was Article 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes. They were not responsible for the shifting of the river.m. the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds covered by TCT 89709... Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. from 1950 to 1952. In the latter part of 1949. until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree. 19. And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in point. defendants were extracting from public property then.e. it cannot be attributed to defendants' operations. especially up north. to the east. may have been enriched by chance. Furher. and from 1953 to 1955. CA [G.e. is about 1 km. 50. none of these is involved. On 7 March 1975. and have invaded his private estate. in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration. this bank had moved. On 6 March 1975. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west bank. Movement of the river not due to excavation and extraction of materials The excavations and extractions of materials.) On 5 April 1974. 1984. plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting along the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the same. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan.. working within a confined area along the west waterline. the river was only 60 meters wide. therefore. Vicente. that defendants have not gone beyond the receding western extremities of the west riverbank. long and extends northward up to pt. recover from them. L-61647. ponds and pools. October 12. 14. Plaintiff not denied of property without just compensation The Court does not declare that the entire channel. It appears sufficiently established. All that space to the west of said receding line" would still be part of plaintiff's property and also whatever portion adjoining the river is. the abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the other riparian owners.] First Division. (J): 5 concur Facts: Benjamin Tancinco. This forced the defendants to go southeast of the "Excavated Area". Further. 15. From 1954 to 1955. i. has permanently become part of the riverbed. from 1950 to 1953. the extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond the camachile tree. These floods can hardly be called "accidental". Government v. Under Article 370 of the old Civil Code. 33837 sq. it was already 140 meters wide. claim of unnatural widening unfounded Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943. 5. Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892. no longer reached by the non-inundating ordinary floods. They have confined their extraction of gravel and sand only from which the banks of the River. Azucena Tancinco Reyes. defendants' area of operation was still farther east of the New Accretion Area. the northern and western boundaries of which were 20 meters away east from the camachile tree. its lateral borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree. . Colegio de San Jose does not apply Evidence shows that the River floods with annual regularity during the rainy season.

These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. a case for certiorari for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Misamis Oriental. it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. The Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations. Alluvion as exclusive work of nature indispensable The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion. the petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA. Branch 24 and subsequently. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. 97 SCRA 734). surmises and conjectures.On 30 July 1976. Power to review vested in the Court. Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno. the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion.R. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken." 3. 2. (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the RTC Misamis Oriental. there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. 5. Before he died. both of which were dismissed.. said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements. and ordered the private respondents to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs. but there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. No accretion to speak of as the transfer of dikes is man-made and artificial. Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. and thus. In the present case. and impossible. June 26. which decision was affirmed by the RTC Misamis Oriental. 98045. Thus. Sometime in 1979. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. Inc. Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-10600571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. CA [G. City of Manila. the lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. Romero (J): 4 concur Facts: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo. Reason in giving riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. Branch 4. if there is any accretion to speak of. Article 457 NCC There is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan Rivers. went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Carolina Industries Inc. and (5) when the court. Puntod. CMS Stock Brokerage. The Supreme Court granted the petition. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC Cagayan de Oro City. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. In the latter part of 1982. the appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower cost. Accretion. In the instant case. No. This excludes from Art. Branch 25. Adjudication of land in question as private property is null and void The conclusion that can be made from said alleged accretion being declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 is that areas could not have been there in 1939. (Cortes v. On 19 August 1982. As a result. Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals. 10 Phil. 1996. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. 567). 4. paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. absurd. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied. in making its findings. When the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed. without costs. The case was remanded to the Municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory. 1. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that ³to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. reversed and set aside the decision appealed from. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. Binding effect of the findings of facts by lower court not absolute The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. requisites Article 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. Branch 20. v. Hence. Vda. De Nazareno v. 6. petitioners¶ predecessor-in-interest. it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions. A decision was rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya.] Second Division. Before the approved survey plan could be . the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.

Thus. et al. Director of Lands. give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters. part of the public domain. it was held that accretion. alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands. City of Manila. 1. Alluvion in present case not accumulated by action of waters or current The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case as the first and second requirements of the rules were not met. It cannot be claimed. De Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC. soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land. The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land. as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code. the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. which was denied. 5. made in compliance with the order of the District Land Officer. In the present case. it was ruled that the requirement that the deposit should due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case. Subject land being public. 3. for the annulment of the verification. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for and by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands." In the case of Meneses v. when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 8. Based on the report. requisites Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public application.. It has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders. Findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their jurisdiction final. Hence. Current defined In Hilario v. Petitioners estopped in the denying the public character of land and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands Petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject land. resulting to the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands. branch 22. the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the findings of the ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea). Putting it differently. consequent to its sawmill operations. in Tiongco v. . requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible. Man-made accretion part of public domain In Republic v. Again. As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders. in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Thus. it was held that the word "current" indicate the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. that the accumulation of such boulders. it was deemed a man-made accretion and. 2. The petitioners Desamparada vda. having been the subject of Survey Plan MSI-10-06000571-D which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. therefore. On appeal. as such. as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law.released to the applicant. Regional Director of Bureau of Lands¶ decision entered for and by authority of the Director of Lands Administrative remedies have been exhausted in the present case. report and recommendation. the petition. resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. CA. soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. Administrative remedies exhausted. the same would still be part of the public domain. not reviewable by the Courts The Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river. CA. 6. however. Accretion belongs to the riparian owners. and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man. 4. the Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. the Bureau of Lands. Cad. Similar cases where alluvion is artificial. the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering an amendment to the survey plain of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents. decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the parcel of land. By their own admission. 7. The report of the Land Investigator. recommended the Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571D (Lot 36302. a fortiori. soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible. Bureau of Lands and Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction The subject land is public land.

No. Insular Government (19 Phil. disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. Up to the month of February 1927 nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation. In the Enciclopedia Jurídica Española.. disposition and management of lands of the public domain. it was held that where. roadsteads. the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey. he clearly acts within his jurisdiction. 11. when Rolleo Ignacio acted on the motion for reconsideration of the late Antonio Nazareno. They then pass to the public domain." Article 1. the error is one of judgment. in behalf of Cabangis. all surnamed Cabangis. Does not bar petitioner¶s application It is incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private respondents Salasalans and Rayabas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over the subject land. in equal parts. The CFI Manila rendered judgment (in cadastral proceeding 373 of the CFI Manila. where it appears that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed. GLRO Cadastral Record 373) adjudicated the title and decreed the registration of lots 36. and in this case they become part of the shore or beach. in the disposition of public lands. or the like. and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. block 3035 of cadastral proceeding 71 of the City of Manila. torrents. Elvira and Tomas. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and lots 36. rivers. were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of Cabangis. surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company. but not an act or grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with water. such as roads.] Second Division. It should be noted that petitioners¶ own application still has to be given due course. Record 373. 'rada' (roadstead). due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay. so as to become a part of the 'playa' (shore of the sea). declared lot 40 for such purpose. or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to question involving public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. canals. and remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation. being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of this administrative discretion. 28379. riverbanks. thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots. held that that in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide. of the Civil Code provides that ³property of public ownership is that devoted to public use. Ballesteros. 4 and 5 of the Public Land Law (CA 141). the subject matter of the proceeding. 10. The execution order merely directed the segregation of petitioners¶ titled lot from the subject land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. states that when´ the sea advances and private properties are permanently invaded by the waves. sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. 1929. In the case of Calibo v. the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms or tempests. Cabangis [G. Error in judgment not annullable by certiorari The Director of Lands is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession. The Government of the Philippine Islands appealed said judgment before the Supreme Court. be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3. but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new nature. Property of public ownership Article 339. it is a de facto case of eminent . From the year 1896 said land began to wear away. lease. it was held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify. Palad's (Director of Land) execution order merely implements Hilario's order. with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code. private property may become 'property of public ownership. Government v. Section 3 provides that "the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control. and that of a similar character." 2. 1.R. directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right. He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact. block 3055 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila in favor of Consuelo. adopt. roadstead and the like makes the property of public ownership In the case of Aragon vs. Director of Lands authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession. Undersecretary of Department of Agricultural and Natural Resources has authority to review decisions or orders of the Director of lands with respect to public lands under the administration of the Bureau and the Department In the case of Hamoy v." In the present case. being the occupants thereof. Pedro Gil. until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides. and dismissed the claims presented by the Government of the Philippine Islands and the City of Manila. Based on the finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually Palad.' as defined in article 339 of the code. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 223). volume XII. Abandonment of land to become part of the shore of the sea. GLRO. subsection 1. the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented. ports and bridges constructed by the State. classification.9. Where the tides are not appreciable. and if he errs in appraising the evidence. He cannot.´ while Section 4 provides that ³subject to said control. provides that ³the shores are part of the national domain open to public use. Consorcia. shores. therefore. 39 and 40. notwithstanding the fact that he was an ³Officer-in-charge´ of the Bureau of Lands. 39 and 40. March 27. of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. he was acting on said motion as an Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. page 558. and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Execution order does not award portions of subject land to private respondents but merely segregated the petitioner¶s titled land from the subject land. case 3. 39 and 40 of cadastral proceeding 373 of the City of Manila are held to be public land belonging to the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Government of the Philippine Islands. Villa-Real (J): 6 concur Facts: Lots 36.

not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons.00 to the Tandayags as damages. until 1901. the waves of Manila Bay had been gradually and constantly washing away the sand that formed the lots here in question. or private persons. pueblos. Insular Government. 4. The complaint was subsequently amended to implead the Director of Land as defendant. such being perfected before the effectivity of RA 5440. and to pay the costs as well. They have a house on said lot. with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. Inundation by sea due to acts independent of the will of the owner of land (removal of large quantity of sand) In the case of Buzon vs. the rise of the waters of the sea that covered the lands there in dispute. Construction of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters (3 August 1866) Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 provides that the ³lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea. In the latter year they were reclaimed from the sea by filling in with sand and silt extracted from the bed of Vitas Estuary when the Government dredged said estuary in order to facilitate navigation.50 annually. no private person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by the law. was due not to the action of the tide but to the fact that a large quantity of sand was taken from the sea at the side of said land in order to fill in Cervantes Street. In the present case. unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority. and are not necessary for purposes of public utility. Land eroded by gradual erosion by ebb and flow of tide and reclaimed by filling done by government are public land The lots in question having disappeared on account of the gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide. thus leaving uncontradicted the evidence adduced by the claimants Aguilar et al. the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. 1. Spouses Ignacio and Candida Tandayag have been occupying this foreshore land through a Revocable Permit issued by the Director of Lands. Failure of the oppositor to present evidence In the case of the Director of Lands vs. and not subject to indemnity. No. and the mere fact that the waters of the sea covered it as a result of said act. or for the coastguard service. Aguilar different.. Claiming ownership of the said land. 1 on leave Facts: De Buyser is the registered owner of Lot 4217 of the Surigao Cadastre. de Buyser appealed directly to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law. and ordering de Buyser to pay P250. said spouses paid the Bureau of Lands the amount of P6. a former lessee of the De Buyser. Aguilar. the Insular Government did not present any evidence in support of its contention. 28 Phil. possession and occupation of said lots.. as they were converted into public land. especially.. the portions of the land became a part of the public domain. exists. when the land was completely submerged and was reclaimed as a result of a certain work done by the Government in 1912. is not sufficient to convert it into public land. 505. . because. 39 and 40.domain. For the use and occupation thereof. the subject-matter of this controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from. L-22763. unless otherwise declared by either the executive or legislative branch of the government. De Buyser filed an action against the Tandayags in the CFI Surigao to recover possession of this land as well as rents in arrears for a period of 6 years." The true construction of the provision is that the State shall grant these lands to the adjoining owners only when they are no longer needed for the purposes mentioned therein. From the judgment. 3. which borders the Surigao Strait. (Aragon vs. as to the ownership. entirely independent of the will of the owner of said land. shall become the property of the party constructing such works. and this court properly held that because of this act. the latter could not lose the ownership thereof. 223. It is outside the commerce of man. After due trial. allegedly for having illegally issued a revocable permit to the Tandayags. In the present case. with proper permission. Case of Buzon v.) De Buyser v. March 18. or that the essential conditions for such grant under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters. when the sea water completely covered them. Alluvial formation along seashore is part of public domain Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and. no person could acquire title thereto except in form and manner established by law Article 5 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that ³lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State." In the present case. 5. Government of the Philippine Islands. as the land was high and appropriate for building purposes. or for the establishment of special industries. constitutes abandonment.] Second Division. or by the provinces. and having remained in such a state until they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government. When lands are converted to public land. Contiguous to said lot is a parcel of land which was formed by accretion from the sea. de Buyser's evidence failed to prove that the land in question is no longer needed by the government. the evidence shows that from 1896. Insular Government and City of Manila different. 6. by permission of Tomas Cabangis. Thus." The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and depositing their bancas on lots 36. Ownership of land reclaimed from the sea. Insular Government and City of Manila. form part of the public domain. and allowing portion of their land to be completely covered by water. Escolin (J): 5 concur. the failure of the Cabangis to protect their land by building a retaining wall with consent of competent authority. they are public land. the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. Case of Director of Lands v. therefore.R. and thus they remained until the year 1912. 2. Francisco vs. does not confer on the latter or his successors the ownership of said lots. 1983. when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea. Director of Lands [G. 19 Phil. which De Buyser alleged had been purchased by the Tandayags from one Francisco Macalinao. holding said land in question to be formed along the shore by action of the sea and thus part of public domain.

3. In his turn. Rizal. an application for the sale or lease of lands enumerated under Section 59 thereof. 7. while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay. one must apply for a permit to use the land. holding it to form part of the public domain. May 30. bay is an opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain. with an area of 37. Article 1. Grant of revocable permit allowed by the passing of Act 2570. subject to revocation. 1960. Manila Bay is a part of the sea. amending Section 5 of Act 1654 The lease of reclaimed lands and of the foreshore was formerly provided by Act 1654. Such circumstance evidently prompted the legislature to all the temporary use of the foreshore in this manner by means of revocable permit. such as the cases of Ker & Co. for the use of any portion of the lands covered by this chapter for any lawful private purpose. Bureau of land acting for and in behalf of Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources in granting the revocable permit The grant of a Revocable Permit for the temporary use and occupation of the disputed land is valid. should be filed with the Bureau of Lands. Insular Government). After hearing. who had erected thereon light material houses and dwellings. one has no right whatsoever in the foreshore land as to be entitled to protection in the courts of justice. acting for and in behalf of the Secretary (now Minister) of Agriculture and Natural Resources who is empowered to grant revocable permits under Section 68 of the Public Land Act which provides that ³the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may grant to qualified persons temporary permission upon the payment of a reasonable charge. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. being a mere indentation of the same. 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are applicable. This measure was apparently deemed necessary as well as expedient in order to legalize the habitual use of the coast and shores of these islands by the people. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion." Ignacio v. filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove).] First Division. Not having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands which has administration and control over the area in question. 6. No. Application of Law of Waters on lands bordering Manila Bay. As defined. Under the Public Land Act. Valeriano alleged that he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries. To the application. Cauden. vs. salt and other maritime industries.. Old Civil Code). Occupation or possession of land formed along the shore by action of the sea mere detainer if without authority from the Government to occupy said land The occupation or possession held. Act 2570. lands could only be leased in the manner and under the conditions provided by the said law in a manner that no revocable permits were allowed. referring to accretions formed by the sea. as well as to authorize the provisional occupation and use contemplated by the law providing for its formal lease. an arm of the sea.R. the CFI Rizal dismissed Ignacio¶s application for the registration of the parcel of land. on 25 January 1950. situated in barrio Gasac. by filing the corresponding application for permit.877 sq. is a mere detainer that can merit from the law no protection such as is afforded only to the person legally in possession (Aldecoa v. with costs. where it was held that such land formed . Navotas. its disposition falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Bureau of Lands." This is inapplicable as it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers. 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters apply (accretion formed by the sea) as bay is part of the sea Articles 1. Disposition of property of public domain under Bureau of Lands. cases The Supreme Court has in some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. 1. 6 Phil. and approved by the President. It is clear thus that the State never relinquished ownership over the land. Failure to submit to its jurisdiction does not entitle one to protection of the courts on the matter of right to foreshore land The land being property of public dominion.. Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. 3. under which. planting it with api-api trees. amended Section 5 of Act 1654 so as to authorize the temporary use of the foreshore under a revocable permit. which provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. at any time when. Montemayor (J): 8 concur Facts: Faustino Ignacio. He also claims that he had occupied the land since 1935. without the records disclosing whether the requisite authorization to occupy the parcel of land formed along the shore by the action of the sea from the Spanish Government of the Philippines. the parcel being formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which borders it on the sourtwest. temporary structures used in connection with fishing. Article 457 NCC does not apply as it covers accretion on banks of rivers Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366. Director of Lands [G. the Director of Lands. It merely allowed them to continue their temporary occupation and provisional use of the premises under revocable permit renewable every year in the meantime the land is not actually needed by the government for public improvements (Boulevard and seawall protection purposes). Like any other private party. Later. adjoining a parcel of land that Ignacio has previously acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936.m. having been legally issued by the Bureau of Lands. distinct from a river. 5. a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. L-12958. the Director of Lands did not declare the land as no longer needed for public use. an inlet of the sea. adverse and public for a period of 20 years until said possession was disturbed by Valeriano. 732. Revocable Permit application does not relinquished State¶s ownership over the land In approving the Revocable Permit Application of the Tandayags. being a foreshore land covered by the ebb and flow of the tide. 2. and that his possession has been continuous. issued on 13 January 1947. 4. in his judgment the public interest shall require. involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay.

in cadastral case 30. is illegal and is a mere detainer. which has been in possession thereof since time immemorial by means of its tenants or lessees and farmers." It is beyond discussion that Laguna de Bay belongs to the public domain. the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. without special pronouncement as to costs. and the highest depth they attain during the rainy season is the extraordinary one.R. volume XXI defines "lake" as ³a body of water formed in depressions of the earth. while the latter is uncommon. Laguna. Extent of the bed of Laguna lake Article 74 of the Law of Waters defines the bed of a lake as ³the natural bed or basin of lakes. or pools. fed by floods. belong to the public domain. the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one. Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth. the claimant Colegio de San Jose contends that the parcels of land are a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging it. 1. transcending the general rule. ³Ordinary´ and ³extraordinary´ depth distinguished The word "ordinary" is defined in the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy as that "not exceeding the average. 4. and fed by public waters from rivers. 1929. 6. ordinarily of fresh water. Lakes and ponds existing upon public lands belong to public dominion Article 407 of the Civil Code provides that ³lakes and ponds formed by nature on public lands. and thus is a lake. The CFI rendered. and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth.." (Natividad vs. settled. 505.] Second Division. transcends the general rule. or for coastguard service. a decision in favor of Colegio de San Jose ordering the registration of the 2 parcels of land (lot 1 and 2) in accordance with law. or for the establishment of special industries." while ³extraordinary´ is defined as the ³uncommon. Appeal was made by the Government of the Philippine Islands before the Supreme Court. coming from rivers. and its evidence tends to prove that they have always been known as the shores of Laguna de Bay. etc. Director of Lands (93 Phil. or for coast-guard service. brooks. 37 OG 2905) 5.. 2. 3. current. or going beyond that which is ordinary. Raised in the CFI Laguna. natural. so that the people can fish in said flooded strip. order. the lot in question forms part of the public domain. although the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land. It further stated that its ruling should be understood in the manner that the lease of said lands executed by the Colegio de San Jose in favor of Carlos Young y Baldwin is valid and subsists under the terms and conditions set forth in the instruments and providing for the issuance of the proper decree once said decision becomes final.by the action of the sea is property of the State. and not very deep. or springs. without previous permission from the proper authorities. August 28. 30829. Government of P. or measure. nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters (Vicente Joven y Monteverde v. ponds. and their channels´ are of public ownership. No. and connected with the sea by them". Aldecoa & Co. Colegio de San Jose [G. in the present case. or for the establishment of special industries. 19 Phil. brooks and springs. 134). being a natural lake existing upon public lands. the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground . The flooded strip includes the aforementioned pass itself. the hollow bed of which is bounded by elevations of land. natural. If no such declaration has been made by said departments. lies with the executive and possibly the legislative departments Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility.. the width of which strip varies from 50 to 70 meters and up to the eastern border of the pass claimed by the municipality of San Pedro Tunasan. it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby. surpassing. the Government contends that the said two parcels of land belong to the public domain. and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. 505) Government v. and "lagoon" as ³a small lake. GLRO Record 359 of San Pedro." In the present case.. inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular. is not necessary for purposes of public utility. Director of Lands [CA]. it pertains to the national domain. provides that ³natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters. common. inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce. or admitted by the majority. 4. "The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion. common." Thus. Francisco vs. without pronouncement as to costs. Public domain not subject to ordinary prescription Land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription.." According to said definitions. which occurs always or most of the time during the year. Court are not in position to determine if land are used as specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters The courts are neither primarily called upon. the waters of Laguna de Bay cover a long strip of land along the eastern border of the two parcels of land in question. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs. Villa-Real (J): 5 concur Facts: During the months of September to November every year. which is usually completely covered with water. Ordinarily fresh water. occurring always or most of the time. order or measure. We believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea. commonly met with. (Insular Government vs. Declaration that land is not necessary for purposes of public utility. On the other hand. exceeding. the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay. Interpretation of Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866. is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. Laguna Lake is a lake not a lagoon The Enciclopedia Juridica Española. not going beyond what often happens or takes place. Article 44 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866.I. 28 Phil.

the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion. (4) that said two parcels of land. . do not belong to the public domain. the bed of a lake is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth. Where the tides are not appreciable. On 8 August 1968. do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters. whereas the waters of Laguna de Bay at their highest depth reach no farther than the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question. they still belong to the said claimant Colegio de San Jose bordering on said Laguna de Bay. or Lot 2. Land in question do not belong to the public domain Inasmuch as. being accidentally inundated by the waters of Laguna de Bay continue to be the property of the claimant Colegio de San Jose. insofar as the 1. The Court. and inasmuch as. In the same manner as the shore of the sea is that space covered and uncovered by the waters during tides. its interior or terrestrial limit being the line reached by its highest ordinary depth." This provision refers to the waters of the sea." 7. therefore. Therefore. 1989. the Alagads filed before the Municipal Court of Pila. which refers to a lake. by virtue of a final judgment in said case. and has therefore no application to the present case. Article 367 of the Civil Code does not apply.8421 hectares (survey plan Psu-226971. disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area. Sarmiento (J): 4 concur Facts: On 11 October 1951. streams. 8. which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels. and that the Alagads could not have had an imperfect title to it as it was the barrio folk who filled up the land to elevate the land to its present condition. and Antonio Alagad filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga. which treats of the ownership and use of said waters of the sea. 6. No. Carlos. (5) that even supposing that the said two parcels of land have been formed by accession or deposits of sediment by the waters of said Laguna de Bay. Laguna.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1 is concerned. Pila. The barrio folk did not appeal. 66807. not of the lakes Paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Law of Waters provides that shores are part of the national domain open to public use. 9. lakes and their beds belong to the public domain. January 26.covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season. and January to August. Said article provides that ³lands accidentally inundated by the waters of lakes. according to article 407 of the Civil Code. is extraordinary. was issued in the names of the Alagads. contending that such is foreshore land. Lot 1 with an area of 5. which are governed by special provisions.] Second Division.R. Justo. and that by the shore is ³understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. nor lose those inundated by them in extraordinary floods. so the shore of a lake is that space covered and uncovered by the waters during the tides. The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly. being included in Title I. pursuant to Article 84 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. said parcels are outside said bed and. issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case 52. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. mortgaging. consequently." The provision refers to ponds and lagoons. On 16 January 1956. the two parcels of land in litigation were considered as accretions gradually deposited by accessions or sediments from the waters of Laguna de Bay. being terrestrial waters. the exterior or terrestrial limit being the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since 26 July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. or during the months of September to November.1263 hectares (survey plan Psu-116971). they would still belong to the claimant Colegio de San Jose as owner of the lands bordering on said Laguna de Bay.e. amendment 2).2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2. up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. on 6 October 1970. dated 18 October 1956. or by creeks. pursuant to Article 77 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Alagad [G. Laguna (Civil Case 52) an action to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. that is. and other streams. by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof. Melitona. and lakes. and (6) that the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of the waters of the sea are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes. In August 1966. i. belong to the owners of such lands. was declared public land. judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the barrio folk therein to return possession of the premises to the Alagads. (3) that the two parcels of land in litigation form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to the claimant Colegio de San Jose. Accretion upon lands contiguous to lakes belong to the owners of such lands Article 84 of the said Law of Waters provides that ³accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks. which is extraordinary. Article 77 of the Law of Waters apply Article 367 provides that ³the owners of estates bordering on ponds or lagoons. the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms or tempests. 5. Carmen (with spouse Espiridion Kolimlim). shall continue to be the property of their respective owners. the legal provision applicable to the case is that contained in article 77 of the aforesaid Law of Waters. (2) that the highest depth reached by said waters during the rainy season. Decree N-51479 was entered and OCT 0-401. according to article 74 of the Law of Waters. Paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Law of Waters applies on shores of the sea. Librada (with spouse Emerson Abano). which was owned by it. Summary of the Court¶s decision in the present case The Court held (1) that the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth during the dry season. rivers. a lagoon being legally distinct in character from a lake. with an area of 8. Lake waters. The Republic filed a petition for ³annulment of title and reversion. during the months of December. and the Alagads from selling. they must belong to Colegio de San Jose as part of Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. namely. Considering that the inundation of the land in question is made during the months of September to November. Demetrio. their ownership and use are governed by Title II of said Law of Waters." Even if. rivers. Republic v. supplemented by orders issued on 21 March 1956 and 13 August 1956. continuously.

(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves. even if constructed by a contractor. Property of public dominion: Property for public use or public service "Property". common. is patrimonial property. (1) it must be a final judgment.). Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth. it could not be said that the Government had been prejudiced by some negligent act or omission. was set for hearing. Property of the public dominion. identity of parties. Highest Ordinary Depth Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake. which occurs always or most of the time during the year. and finally denied by the court. Romero. it is seen that the acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and intentional in character. is the controlling norm. and their beds. and (4) there must be. 1. the following requisites must concur. There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition. The recourse to legal provisions is necessary. rivers. and those situated upon lands of communal use belong to their respective µpueblos. and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. shores. Central Bank of the Philippines and Nilo v. On 16 July 1971. all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Central Bank.. In Ramos. as to waters Article 502 provides that ³(1) Rivers and their natural beds. Lakes. much more. such as roads. incapable of private appropriation. C4 93 SCRA 503. and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Otherwise. 2. State cannot be bound by or estopped from the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents The State cannot be bound by. the appeal." meaning to say.or if it (2) belongs to the State. Laguna de Bay is a lake (Colegio de San Jose case). Such primordial consideration. In both cases. on a holding that the City Attorney. 5. on the other hand. are not applicable. according to the Civil Code. torrents. much less the acquiescence of public officials. for under Article 74 of the Law of Waters. (3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion. ponds. sewers and public establishments´ are of public dominion. it forms part of the national dominion. or estopped from. (8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to private persons. Patrimonial property and property of public dominion "All other property of the State which is not of the character mentioned in article [420]. and pools existing upon the lands of private individuals.The case was set for pre-trial on 6 July 1971. This is so because the state as a persona in law is the judicial entity. For it is a wellsettled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case. or the State or provinces. which are also of public dominion. to which the attorney representing the Republic did not appear. the court dismissed the complaint. And if there was no such jurisdiction. or otherwise. refers to things held by the State by regalian right. Arrieta. and Nilo v. requisites for a prior judgment to become a bar Res judicata is not an impediment to reversion of property. where the rise in water level is due to the "extraordinary" action of nature. (3) it must be a judgment on the merits. Appeal was made to the Court of Appeals. roadsteads and others of similar character. (6) Subterranean waters on public lands. in any event. could have ably defended the City (Davao City). (5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds. or to a city or municipality from the moment they leave such lands. et al. between the first and second actions. property pertaining to the national domain. Thus. the portions inundated thereby are not considered . (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs. rainfall for instance. ports and bridges constructed by the State. (7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works. Hence. the Court stated that a certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v.¶" 7. When Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season. the Court applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the part of the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its promises. It is also ordained in Article 44 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 that ³natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters. (4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands. not the apparent carelessness. canals. such depth being the "regular. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court. et al. Animus. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration. Mendoza vs. in order to determine the character and ownership of the parcels of land in question. 3. Public Dominion. or public lands. "is either of public dominion or of private ownership." Property is of public dominion if it is (1) intended for public use. then the principle of res judicata does not apply. without being for public use. In Republic v. the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents. Ramos v. the Court must resort to the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores. CA. Res judicata is not an impediment to reversion of property. which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present charter. property "open to disposition" by the Government. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts. under the present Constitution. Republic v. In Nilo. belong to the respective owners of such lands. to the State. since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. They are things res publicae in nature and hence. the Court denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the defendant had been "erroneously" represented in the complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor. "[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands. and (9) The waste waters of fountains. natural. Romero not applicable to the present case The cases of Ramos v. Inasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake. identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. in which cases." 6. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. belong to the public domain. non-suited as a result thereof. banks. which sustained the trial court for failure to show in the record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. and reinstated the Republic¶s complaint and thus remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Court of Appeals. ³the natural bed or basin of lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth" and in which case. 91 SCRA 113) 4. to a province. and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor.

thereby almost depriving Bautista of the quantity of water necessary for the maintenance of his fishery. The Court thus remanded the case to the court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. No. in such manner that they narrowed and reduced the bed of the ditch to an approximate width of 25 centimeters.] First Division. under any circumstances. Court not a trier of facts. Said ditch had existed for more than 50 years and had a width of about 6 meters. Bautista¶s fishpond is formed by two parcels of land. On October 1907. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion. of the pueblo of Obando. and land capable of registration as private property. Property of public ownership Article 339. constructed thereon the retaining walls of their respective fisheries. the lower court ordered that the injunction become final and ordered Alarcon and Santos to cease occupying the tracts specified in the judgment (adjacent to the canal or ditch). the Court cannot make a ruling because it is not a trier of facts. 4. which was acquired by Bautista through prescription for a period of more than 40 years. 37. 39. and is divided into two separate fisheries. and that of a similar character. Alarcon and Santos closed the canal completely and rendered Bautista¶s fishery completely dry. is a property of public use and not susceptible of private appropriation The canal. By written instrument of 10 April 1908. 2. of the land is due to precipitation. 8153. Bautista filed a complaint against Alarcon and Santos with a prayer for a preliminary injunction. and it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition. unless it shall have been proved that he constructed the same within property of his exclusive ownership. branch of a river. with the costs against the Alarcon and Raymundo. near the middle of the canal. 1. No proof adduced that Alarcon and Santos are owners of the canal Alarcon and Santos have not adduced any proof whatever that they are the owners of the canal. roadsteads. No private person has the right to usurp possession of a watercourse belonging to the public domain No private person has a right to usurp possession of a watercourse. despite its proximity to the waters. the water which flows from the Obando River into the said canal. E: Talinducan River. No. to remove their respective dikes. drawn from the Obando River. (4) Lakes and ponds formed by nature on public lands and their beds. together with the water that flows through it. used as a fishpond in the barrio of Pangjolo and the sitio called Talinducan. the beds of which shall also be public property" are property of public ownership. 9. of the Civil Code provides that "property of public ownership is (1) that destined to the public use. W: fisheries of Toribio Alarcon and Julian Santos. Law provisions applicable to the present case The provisions of Articles 339 (1) and 407 substantially agree with those of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866.R. and others relevant to the matter under discussion. and a canal or ditch which is between these fisheries). private parties could not. S: Cornelio Enriquez and Benito Enriquez. Facts: Toribio Bautista was the owner of a tract of land. such as roads. On 25 February 1909. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. 1. the dikes of their respective fisheries. Canal. in substitution of Santos. On 21 June 1911. Torres (J): 4 concur. Bautista v. on which account the plaintiff's fishery on the high land had been almost entirely deprived or water. Foreshore land A foreshore land has been defined as "that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. as is demonstrated by the record. shores. it does not become foreshore. one low and the other high. (3) Waters using continuously or intermittently in lands of said public ownership. 1912. terminating at Bautista's fishpond and serving as a boundary line between Alarcon¶s and Santos¶ fisheries. Alarcon [G. together with its water. not enough evidence to arrive a conclusive disposition. . Bulacan (N: fishery of Julian Santos. (5) Rain water running through ravines or sandy beaches. After the filing of the complaint. therefore. ports. Alarcon and Santos occupied said ditch." Article 407 of the same code provides that "(1) Rivers and their natural beds. in its western part.part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. usurp the greater portion of it without committing a notorious and glaring violation of the law that protects the properties of the State and the rights of its citizens. belongs to that class of property of public use and domain which is not susceptible of private appropriation. canals. as did Alarcon and Santos by reducing the bed of the canal. torrents. and. and banks. although together they are supplied with water. the low land from the Talinducan River. made applicable to these Islands by the Spanish Government and published in the Gaceta de Manila of 24 September 1871. 72. and bridges constructed by the State. 36. Alarcon and Teodoro Raymundo. 3. Neither have they adduced any proof whatever that they are the owners of the right to an easement for conveying water. The bed of the said ditch or canal was not owned by neither Alarcon and Bautista. (2) Continuous or intermittent waters from springs or brooks running in their natural beds and the said beds. 5. Remand The case has to be decided alongside the above principles and regretfully. is connected with and derived from the Obando River." If the submergence. as is shown by the text of articles 33. appealed through a bill of exceptions. and such usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal provisions which explicitly exclude such waterways from the exclusive use or possession of a private party. or lake of the public domain and use. but none of them may utilize and receive such water exclusively and to the detriment of the rest. Both parties are entitled to utilize." or ³The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. and to pay Bautista P100 and the costs of the suit. and the high land from the said canal or ditch which. rivers. however. for the needs and benefit of their fisheries. thus obstructing and almost completely preventing the passage of the water. the preliminary injunction was issued by the court. to allow them to reduce the volume of the flow by constructing. 2 concur in result. 8. December 24.

February 19. A creek. under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government. as they are in accordance with law. and up to the present. Manaoag) and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond. due process followed Petitioners were not deprived of their right to due process as mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world. is null and void and of no legal effect. Municipal President of Macabebe). as defined by said act of Congress of 1 July 1902. September 30. for a period of 10 years next preceding the taking effect of this act.] Second Division. or force majeure. Mandurriao. nor its conversion into a fishpond. ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte. the trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River (therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation). continuous exclusive. acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority to pass. 2. 1908. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court below. petitioners. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the sea. Ruling of the lower court in relation to Section 54. Before the respondents were able to comment on the petition. alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands. paragraph 6 of Act 926 provides that ³all persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open. but what definition has been given to that phrase by the act of Congress. 1986. with the costs against the appellant. and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter. Appeal was made before the Supreme Court. Mapa v. and has been uninterruptedly. Alarcon and Santos liable for damages Alarcon and Santos. for more than twenty years. L-66575. Bugallon. Insular Government [G. 3. Municipal council authorized to pass laws dealing with its municipal waters The Municipality of Bugallon. Mangaldan v. A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the lower court. except when prevented by war. are jointly obligated to indemnify Bautista for the losses and damages which they occasioned him by the construction of their fishery dikes and the reduction of the capacity of the said canal. paragraph 6 of Act 926 Section 54. defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. No. and the annulment of Resolutions 38 and 95 of the Municipal Council of Bugallon. The phrase . CA." 2. as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters. Definition of agricultural land as used in Act 926 rather its meaning as to its nature The issue is not what is agricultural land. The Compromise Agreement. which was originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River.. Maneclang v. Publication a constructive notice to the whole world.al. but no exception was taken to the order denying it. in the possession of the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period. Fernan (J): 4 concur Facts: Adriano Maneclang.6. it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual (Diego v. and held that Resolution 38. is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription (Mercado vs. the petition for review on certiorari. Pangasinan. as the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of the petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled properties. Judgment was rendered in favor of Mapa and the Government has appealed. the latter through Raymundo. L-3793. 1 concur in result Facts: Mapa sought to register a tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent. situated in the barrio San Antonio.] First Division. et.R. thus. and as a public water. shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same. in the amount fixed by the trial court in the judgment appealed from. No. municipality of Iloilo before the Court of Land Registration. filed before the then CFI Pangasinan (Branch XI) a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague. and salt deposits. the same being contrary to law and public policy. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On 15 August 1975. Willard (J): 2 concur. which affirmed the same on 29 April 1983. and set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare the same null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. Stipulations null and void for being contrary to law and public policy The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership of the fishpond in dispute. as fish ponds. the town of Molo being between the sea and the said land.R. 1. and Resolution 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries were passed by the members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon. Hence. the awardee in the public bidding of the fishpond. nipa lands. the petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza. 1. Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative powers. IAC [G. the findings of which are approved. the lower court ruled that "from the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland. Pangasinan.´ In the present case. Manaclang appealed said decision to the IAC.

It could not sell it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Act 926."agricultural public lands" as defined by the act of Congress of 1 July 1902 is found not only in section 54 but in other parts of Act 926. Agricultural land are those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral or timber lands There seem to be only 3 possible ways of deciding the question whether the land is agricultural. but it says nothing about his decisions as to whether it is or is not agricultural land in its nature. for section 22 relating to leases limits them to "nonmineral public lands. The question as to whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided. not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided. The Government could not give a free patent to this land to a native settler. during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto. sale. as defined by act of Congress of 1 July 1902. and leases made by the administrative officers (pursuant to Section 2 of Act 926. but the Court believes that the construction adopted is less objectionable than any other one that has been suggested. 3.´ On the other hand. Construction of the phrase ³agricultural land´ cannot be left to remain uncertain The objection to adopting the construction on account of its uncertainty is emphasized when it is consider that whether certain land was or was not agricultural land would be a question that would finally have to be determined by the courts. to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain. Section 13. Section 34) on the theory that the lands were agricultural lands by their nature. other than timber and mineral lands. character of land not raised in that case. were within the strictest definition of the phrase "agricultural lands. The first is to say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural land" can be found in the act of Congress. that there is a definition in the act and that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired from Spain except those which are mineral or timber lands. for that relates only to "agricultural public land." 5. unless there is some express provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers to determine the question for themselves. In fact. as defined by the act of Congress of 1 July 1902. or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands. whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy. and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided. and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years. That a single homestead entry shall not exceed 16 hectares in extent. Method to deciding the question whether land is agricultural land. sold. as defined by section 18 and 20 of the act of Congress of 1 July 1902. in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV. Section 13 and 15 of the Act provides only semblance of the definition of the phrase Section 13 provides that "the Government of the Philippine Islands. After homesteads have been entered. Section 26. Jones v. If the contention of the Attorney-General is correct. as claim by attorney-general The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands unless they are such by their nature. provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes. which were in the Province of Benguet. improvement. as defined in the act of Congress of 1 July 1902." It appears that such lands had been cultivated for more than twelve years. to leave the matter of their true character open for subsequent action by the courts would be to produce an evil that should if possible be avoided. 6. not being timber or mineral land. Insular Government not conflicting. and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6. Effect if agricultural land is taken to mean exclusively to be that of its nature. it appears from the decision that those lands. The construction of the phrase would never be entirely free from objection. third. that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it means land which in its nature is agricultural. Act 926 was applicable thereto. 4. and this land because of its nature is not agricultural land. Section 34 relating to free patents to native settlers makes no provision for any determination by the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the character of the land applied for. Power to determine nature of land by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands pursuant to Act 926 Section 2 of Act 926 relating to homesteads provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine whether the land described is prima facie under the law subject to homestead settlement. of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise. subject to the provisions of this act and except as herein provided. and held that the land. 7. The court below adopted the latter view. It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the said act. by general legislation. not that the lands therein involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration . for section 10 only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands. and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease. for Chapter I of Act 926 allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public lands" in the Philippine Islands. relating to the sale of public lands. What that case decided was. that the grant or sale of such lands." Neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the phrase "agricultural land. Section 15 provides that ³the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered on such terms as it may prescribe. It could not allow the land to be entered as a homestead. came within the definition of agricultural land. Section 26 relating to the lease of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes and further summarily determine from available records whether the land is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or salts. but the law pertaining to agricultural lands There is nothing in this case of Jones vs. The Insular Government which at all conflicts with the result here arrived at. Section 13. and it seems that the same construction must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that law. lands. but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents. and. the second. 8. shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness. but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect of have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President.

and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands. the application was approved by the CFI Capiz. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. Villareal [G. then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act 926. Montano v. Insular Government (1909) mangrove swamps or manglares were defined as ³mud flats. one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. which was the charter in force when the case arose. Director of Forestry that ³the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as 'terrenos forestales. No. Insular Government. These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands. 1902. but which are also. Insular Government. Jocson v. lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions: agricultural. the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds. Director of Forestry. residential. If they are agricultural lands. promulgated in 1935. Manglare with few trees is not timber land Notwithstanding the definition provided by the legislature in the 1917 Administrative Code as to ³public forests´. alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land. The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment. classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber. the Court said that the phrase 'agricultural lands' as used in Act 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains. including the Director of Foresty on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.R. mineral and timber or forest lands. Act 926 applies to those cases Addressing itself directly to Section 1820. as under the uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law. in the present 1987 Constitution. with cost against him. Decisions reiterating mangrove swamps are agricultural land a. resettlement. Insular Government (10 Phil. a land consisting of 178. and land which has only bushes. b. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian. Facts: Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949." . Jocson v. alternately washed and exposed by the tide." d.. Although these flats are literally tidal lands. fisheries or ordinary farm lands. the decision being immediately executory. The 1973 charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial. which exist naturally. L-32266.were not agricultural lands but that the law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were not rules and regulations within the meaning of section 13. This provision has been reproduced. 1. to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Timber land in English means land with trees growing on it.' The Court thought there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros. Montano v. they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. 2. Only public agricultural land allowed to be alienated under Commonwealth Constitution Under the Commonwealth Constitution. which also germinate there. 1989. Mangrove swamps or manglares defined In Montano v.113 sq. The manglar plant would never be cited a tree in English but a bush. 3. until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands. manglares. the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. Rep. He was opposed by several persons.] En Banc. whether they are used as nipa swamps. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics. and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. February 27. Capiz. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation. Mangrove swamps considered agricultural lands and susceptible to private ownership Mangrove swamps were considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership. 1 took no part. Their disposition was provided for under CA 141 (Public Land Act). c. 175). only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea. m. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law. Definition found in the 1917 Administrative Code cannot affect rights vested prior to its enactment. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. After trial. Director of Forestry v. the Court declared that ³in the case of Mapa vs. Cruz (J): 13 concur.' The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Classification of the lands of the public domain By the Philippine Bill of 1902. the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when 2 years later it held in the case of Jocson v. the Act of Congress of July 1st. Director of Forestry. mineral or agricultural lands. but with substantial modifications.

for the purposes of their administration and disposition. Role of each branch of government The determination of the question of classification of lands is a function initially belonging to the legislature. 5. Republic v. including nipa and mangrove swamps. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Obias. inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress. The Court declare that the opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable. Section 6 provides that ³the President. the Court. the Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute." were not private properties and so not registerable. and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. Administrative Code of 1917. Mangrove lands are agricultural in nature In Tongson v. de Porkan. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (1983). Thus do the three departments. pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources. They do not form part of the public domain. it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees. (b) Timber. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that ³mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow. Intermediate Appellate Court. promulgated on 4 March 1933. remains unamended up to now. providing in Section 1820 of said code that ³for the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes. Vallarta v. f. As such. De Centenera v. 6. manglares. upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For their part the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or. De Porkan (1988). Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another. and (c) Mineral lands. upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Tongson v. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. which became effective on 1 October 1917. Mangrove lands are not forest as used in the Act of Congress In Garchitorena Vda. 7." c. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917. the executive officials may then. the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands. IAC. provides that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. President given function of making periodic classification of public lands In CA 141. Yngson v. Mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of the country Subsequently. Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction over mangrove lands still classified as forest lands In Yngson v. reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands. No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. all unreserved public land. citing Krivenko v. where the trees are small and sparse.e. the Philippine Legislature categorically declared that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. not registerable In Vallarta v. the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply. Decisions declaring mangrove lands form part of public domain a. Director of Forestry. Delegation of powers. declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. All public lands not timber or mineral lands are agricultural public lands In Republic v. Classification of land is the function initially belonging to the legislature. de Centenera v. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. in the discharge of their own role. assuming they are valid. fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land.´ . Unless and until the land classified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Obias. shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into: (a) Alienable or disposable. Heirs of Amunategui v. the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands. Director of Forestry. This case was decided only 12 days after the De Porkan case. Register of Deeds. The legislature having made such implementation." The legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. nipa palms. Forest lands or swamp mangrove are not private properties. and all forest reserves of whatever character. more than 15 years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917." g. Director of Forestry." Section 7 of the same Act provides that ³for the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands. Forests do not lose classification if stripped of its cover In Heirs of Amunategui v. the President. administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty "to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed" and in accordance with the policy prescribed. the ruling in Vda. the Court held that ³a forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. De Centenera v. which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). Director of Forestry. which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land. Obias was reiterated." 4. Vda." b. Such lands are not forest in character. whether they are used as nipa swamps. except as otherwise specially indicated. shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. coordinating with each other. they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

] Third Division. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property. into agricultural land. that the TCTs were acquired by the de Ocampos and the Santoses by virtue of Sales Patents 5339 and 5387 issued on 17 November 1972 and 3 February 1973. The Court repeats its statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. 13. upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest. and in effect veto it. with the approval of the Department Head.in view of the representation of Placido and Armando Manalo that they have in actual. the Court has no duty as judges but to apply it. (b) Residential. Director of Forestry. The mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps. 1989. or otherwise disposed of. in the exercise of our own discretion. transfer lands from one class to another. 9. as forest land. being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian. the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional. to prove that the land is registerable. but shall remain as such for forest uses. or for similar productive purposes. commercial. and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.With particular regard to alienable public lands.6344 hectares. 64753. which is lacking in the present case. to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. On 2 October 1971. the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified.´ Section 1827 (Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes) provides that ³lands in public forest. Holdings as that manglares as agricultural land covers only those lands which ownership had already vested before the effectivity of the 1917 Administrative Code The Court¶s previous description of the term in question as pertaining to agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. the Court has no authority to ignore or modify its decision. 11. shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands. April 26. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration. Mangrove swamps of Sapian are forest land The land under contention.R. More importantly. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and. and (d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. as the Court has held in countless cases. let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Tax declarations are not sufficient to prove possession Tax declarations are not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant. it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses. industrial. not including forest reserves. upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof. respectively. 1 took no part Facts: The de Ocampos and the Santoses claim to be the co-owners of 2 parcels of land containing an area of 33. assuming the requisite conditions. shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section. charitable. peaceful. No. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. Section 9 of the same law provides that "for the purpose of their administration and disposition. To be so. at any time and in a similar manner. has jurisdiction over the property The survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands. IAC [G. continuous and open possession of the parcels . Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly inofficious. Manalo v. Right to the registration of subject land not established Applicant has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950. 12. (J): 3 concur. and may. as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership. it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code. is accepted and invoked by the executive department. sold. the Revised Administrative Code provides in Section 1826 (Regulation setting apart forest reserves. and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest. and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. Gutierrez Jr. and presently embraced within TCT T-44205 and T-43298 respectively. not Director of Lands. cannot be invoked. as follows: (a) Agricultural. according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined. Mangrove swamps or manglares comprised within the public forests of the Philippines Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. it must be considered forest land. The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process clause. The President. or revoke any such proclamation. Revocation of same) that ³Upon the recommendation of the Director of Forestry. The legislature having so determined. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises." As for timber or forest lands. 10. more or less. no less noteworthy. Under the law." 8. or other similar purposes. by the Director of Lands under CA 141(Public Land Law). That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it. the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof. (c) Educational. both of the Registry of Bataan.

The land. as amended. 73246. was turned over to the Philippine government. thru the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that the applicant. March 2. with costs against the Manalos. 89 SCRA 648 [1979]). Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Bataan which was turned over to the Philippine Government only on 22 December 1965 (Republic v. have the personality to file the case against persons whom they alleged were in possession of void titles (see Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and the Supreme Court. Inc. This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. Since the lots were no longer part of the public domain. Further.] Second Division. the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to accept the Manalo application in April 1967 as the lands were not yet surveyed. Court of Appeals. the Director of Lands issued Free Patents 522897 and 502977 to the Manalos. the appellate court sustained the trial court's decision. After hearing. Suffice it to say that we find the conclusions of the lower court and appellate courts amply supported by evidence and the time-honored doctrine is applied. CA 141. The former prayed that their titles over the said parcels of land be declared as the true and valid ones. the annotations that the land became disposable and alienable made only on 19 May 1971. it was held that the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State (Secs. Mariveles. C-C. (See Philippine National Bank v. Their titles to the land in question. citing the Sumail case).S. Nocon (J): 4 concur Facts: Land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf." Thus. IAC [G. Character unchanged during transfer from US to the Philippines in 1965 It is not correct to say that when the U. Pacific Farms. Republic v. of which the land in question forms part. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on 19 May 1971. 1973 Constitution). 8. Land in former Military Reservation made disposable in 1971. 76 SCRA 146 [1976]). Court of Appeals. 5. 2.R. the area consists of 187. the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over them. the de Ocampos and the Santoses instituted an action for the cancellation of the Manalos¶ titles over certain parcels of land. Court of Appeals. The ownership and control over said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11. 4. the same automatically became a disposable land of the public domain. If the land in question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government in 1965. Situated in the Municipality of Bani. then there is no need to certify it to be disposable in 1971. The Republic of the Philippines. Under such a situation. 1993. the trial court found for the de Ocampos and the Santoses and ordered the cancellation of the Manalos' titles over the lots in dispute.S. Director of Lands v. Chapter VII of the Public Land Law. as amended: Yngson v. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application. the Court seriously doubts whether Placido Manalo and their predecessors in-interest could have been in possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed because "lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry. Military Reservation in Bataan. 159 SCRA 433.288 sq. m. and by virtue of which OCTs 296 and 297 were respectively issued in the names of the petitioners covering the disputed parcels of land.S. On 18 October 1973. holders of the titles based on free patents acquired subsequent to the declaration of alienability and disposability. The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging . are null and void. 1. Hence. Intermediate Appellate Court. Private respondents de Ocampo and Santos have legal personality to file When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on 19 May 1971. under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. 99 SCRA 742 [1980]). and free patents were issued covering the same. The survey plans were only approved on 17 June 1971.. more or less. continued to be a military reservation land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienable in 1971. In the absence of such classification. 3. Inc. Art. and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. CA. Lastly. and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony (Republic v. 89 SCRA 648 [1979]). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of RA 274. 123 SCRA 441 [193]. 8 & 10. the Manalos filed a petition for review by certiorari.of land in Cabcaben. Unclassified land remains as is until released and rendered open for disposition In Republic v. thus. 258-260 [1986]. that absent the recognized exceptions. and that this Court decides appeals which only involve questions of law. Map 26-40). the Manalos appeared not to have satisfied the requirement of possession since 4 July 1945. No. therefore. Martinez. 418-419 [1987]). XIV. one of the requisites before a free patent could be issued would be an ocular inspection. and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Republic v. having been obtained in contravention with the requirements provided by law. although the same were still then part of the U. 445 [1988]). Pangasinan. the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition (Sec. The Supreme Court denied the petition. by virtue of Free Patent Application (III-4) 508 and (III-4) 519 filed with the Bureau of Lands under the provisions of Section 44. (155 SCRA 412. Nothing was shown that such had been made. the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and. On appeal. Military Reservation. Article 14. CA. thus. Manalo¶s title null and void as it was obtained in contravention with the requirements provided by law The big tract of land in Mariveles. but its nature as a military reservation remained unchanged. per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project 4-A. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms. 142 SCRA 252. Act 496. Finding of facts of CA conclusive absent the recognized exceptions It is not the function of the Supreme Court to evaluate each piece of evidence presented before the lower court. Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the case belong was formerly a portion of the U. Bataan since 1944 as evidence by their documents duly filed with the Bureau of Forestry and of Lands. Military Reservation in Mariveles.

Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title. nor PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree_. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants or of their predecessors-in-interest way back in 1921 does not necessarily prove ownership. to J. Under the Commonwealth Constitution. upon the recommendation of the proper department head. Apparently realizing such prohibition. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. certified on August 8. the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Thus. In the absence of such classification. mistake or error of its officials or agents. The Supreme Court granted the petition. mistake or error of its officials In Director of Lands v. which states that it is only the President. if the original tracing cloth plan was indeed with the Land Registration Commission. 1. Hence. was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. 3. timber and mineral lands. 8. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and Lino Anit. there is no reason why the applicant cannot easily retrieve the same and submit it in evidence. Their disposition was provided for under CA 141 (Secs. only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. the land remains unclassified until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Other private parties also filed their oppositions. Antonio Araneta. Antonio Araneta. as amended. 2. Amendment o the name of applicant an attempt to evade disqualification The amendment of the application from the name of Pacific Farms. to the name of J. On the other hand. Requirement of republication due to amendments to the application Amendments to the application may be due to change in parties or substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for. applicant amended its application to conform with the mandates of the law. In Director of Lands v. On 4 October 1979. in order to facilitate effective implementation of said laws. Both laws are existing and can stand together. inalienable. the decision of the lower court was affirmed on 12 December 1985. showing subject property to be within unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific Farms. it being an essential requirement for registration. Inc. in fact. or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands. The applicant must present evidence and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. What is required is the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for and objection to such requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly. all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Inc. 7. Despite the supposed amendment. Reyes. 4. Courts have no authority to classify unclassified land. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. if omission there was. instead of Act 496. namely: Mineral. requires republication and registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. but were subsequently withdrawn. on the other hand. Antonio Araneta. as applicant. Classification of lands of the public domain Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories. 5. CA. Hence. Failure to submit original tracing cloth as evidence fatal In Director of Lands v. which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. In an amended application. Burden of proof in proving the land is alienable or disposable The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. it was held that it is a well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission. in the present case. hence. whether the 1973 or 1987. in adjudicating the land to the then applicant.that the land is within the unclassified public land and. This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable. in that case. Pacific Farms. As to amendments to the application due to change in parties. 681. and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. the fact that BF Map LC 673 dated 1 March 1927. PD 1529 was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Likewise. it was held that failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is fatal it being a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Inc. the property must be held to be part of the public domain. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. 6-7). 6. it was ruled that the submission of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for registration.. Tax declarations and receipts not conclusive evidence of ownership Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by evidence. LC Map No. It is of no import that the Director of Lands failed to object to the presentation of the certified copy of the said plan. there was no republication. Reyes. As held in Director of Lands v. 9. a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. the petition for review. neither the Land Registration Act. republication is required if the amendment is due to substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for. and reversed the decisions of the courts a quo. PD 1529 applied properly in the present case There is no relevant dispute in the lower court's application of PD 1529. the contention that the BFD. Under the Regalian Doctrine. Regalian Doctrine The courts cannot release the subject property from the unclassified category. Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands. assuming that the land involved is registrable. State cannot be estopped by omission. Submission of tracing cloth mandatory in registration. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. The Constitution. 1927 which was the basis of .

Branch III. containing an . thus recommending the land to be disposed with the Public Land Law. The Republic of the Philippines. 637 dated 1 March 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission. 4. to the Director of Forest Development that such land was devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and producing fishponds. 1 took no part Facts: In their application for registration filed on 10 May 1976. approximately 9. represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the ground that the land is within the unclassified region of Obando and thus are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the alienable portion of the public domain. however long. And the fact that BF Map LC No. Cad-302-D.the report and recommendation of the Land Examiner. cannot be well taken. of the District Forester. Bulacan (as per BF Map LC 637. Applicant¶s remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. Case 3. possession cannot ripen into private ownership Since the subject property is still unclassified. which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. 3. N-299-V-76 of the former CFI Bulacan. In fairness to applicants. The parties stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region of Obando. that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation.R. 73085. without prejudice to the availment by the applicants of the proper administrative remedy. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property. that it cannot be conclusively relied upon and was not even presented in evidence. the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. June 22. Barrio de Ayuti.3 hectares. the Courts a quo released the subject property from the unclassified category. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. is too antiquated. the Merchans filed a complaint dated 7 August 1974 against Republic of the Philippines for quieting of title over said property located in Sitio de Malapianbato alias Arras. Regalian Doctrine The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. Government called upon to classify the land The Government should seriously consider the matter of the reclassification of the land in question. Classification of public land an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department. cannot ripen into private ownership. mistake or error of its officials or agents. it does not follow that all lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development. the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. Republic v. 58867. No. 1. Unclassified land does not ripen to private ownership Since the subject property is still unclassified. and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 1984.] Second Division. cannot ripen into private ownership. mistake or error of its officials or agents The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. CA [G. Cadastral survey does not release the land as alienable. Obando Cadastre under Plan Ap-03-000535 situated in Obando Bulacan. 10. whatever possession the applicant may have had and however long. 1990. and. This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. In the absence of such classification. it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System. The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by applicants. but as a matter of policy encouraged. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision. Lucban. The conversion of subject property does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. The attempt of people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their name should not only be viewed with understanding attitude.] First Division. After hearing. No. In the present case. Unclassified property. whatever possession applicants may have had. and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names. 11. 1 March 1927). Land still within jurisdiction of Bureau of Forest Development While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961. petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question. State cannot be estopped by the omission. and dismissed the application for registration in Land Registration Case No. applicants claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for (Lot 2347. IAC [G. adjoining Kailongan River and which has been converted to a fishpond) partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on 2 May 1958. 2. Director of Lands v. Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur. This was affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Court. Besides. No evidence has been submitted that the land has been released or subsequently classified despite an Indorsement (17 November 1976). June 4. Quezon.R. Paras (J): 4 concur Facts: Claiming that they acquired the property by virtue of a document which they alleged to be a Spanish title originally issued in the name of Bernardo Merchan. 5. or the alleged titling of properties around it. does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.

and others. 3. Puno. Civil Case C-12921). Meanwhile. 401 [1960]. The trial court. Spanish Titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership. The Government moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the land is part of a forest reserve established by Proclamation 42 (14 October 1921). No. Animas. Under the same decree. Merle Castillo. Pastrana and other stallowners filed an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan. Medina now presiding in the trial court. lands not under the Torrens System shall be considered as unregistered. and dismissed Civil Case 7840 and Registration Case N-1055. Reyes and Alinsunurin v. Jose Manuel. Hence. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where the Francisco Dacanay lives. orders and resolutions performed promulgated and issued by then Judge Madella after 2 January 1976. De la Cruz. 637 [1968]. Juanita and Rafael Malibaran. Republic v. and required the Merchans to file an answer to the motion to set aside the decision of December 1975. City Mayor Macario Asistio. which was denied. Rivas. Carmen Barbosa. Alejandro Castron. while the case above was pending before the CA and on 29 December 1976. However. the motion to vacate was granted.] En Banc. In the present case. the trial court issued an order declaring the said failure as a waiver to present evidence and to cross-examine the Merchans' witnesses and declared the case submitted for decision. claiming possession over the land described therein which he sought to be recognized by the government during the Spanish regime. Antonio Martinez. Nancy Bugarin. Muñoz. Grino-Aquino (J): 13 concur. praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to discontinue the demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action. Gozon and Gonzales streets. on 20 December 1987. Ruben Araneta. 67 SCRA 221 [1975]. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court. 107 Phil. decisions. Asistio [G. nor does it state that Bernardo Merchan has acquired ownership over the land. Director of Lands v. 41 Phil. This proclamation was superseded by Proclamation 716 (26 May 1941) establishing the Mts. and possession thereof. private respondents' predecessor-in-interest. Court of Appeals. In 1987. However.R. designating certain city and municipal streets. 132 Phil. Adorable v. Crisaldo Paguirigan. Jr. Director of Forestry v. but were denied. the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or their deputies before the RTC Caloocan City (Branch 122. Court of Appeals. as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City. 6 months after the effectivity of PD 892. 93654. issued an order setting the case for pre-trial. 68 SCRA 177 [1975]. the petition. it dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction which it had earlier issued. A motion to set aside the decision of 18 December 1975 was filed. roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Court of Appeals. can not convert them into private property (Vano v. On 16 September 1976. Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park. May 6. The document does not contain the specific area of the land which is claimed to be owned by the Merchans. Judge Delia P. The document does not say it is a title. 141 SCRA 329 [1986]) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry (Republic v. The Merchans filed a motion to declare the Government in default for failure to file its answer within the reglementary period. On 29 November 1977. 89 SCRA 648 [1979]. Thereafter on 27 September 1976. MMC Ordinance 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission. Possession does not convert them to private property The land in question was proclaimed part of a forest reserve by virtue of Proclamation 42 (14 October 1921). did . 1 took no part Facts: On 5 January 1979.area of 166 hectares. Director of Forestry. caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96. Upon application of vendors Rodolfo Teope. Director of Lands v. issued them licenses to conduct vending activities on said street. 133 SCRA 701 [1984]. Forest lands or forest reserves not capable of private appropriation. On 3 March 1980. To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear the city streets. however long. Republic v. 56 SCRA 499 [1974]. the Merchans filed a manifestation assailing the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case. On 21 April 1976. Land in question proclaimed as part of a forest reserved by Proclamation 42 and 716. 135 SCRA 156 [1985]. Thereafter. The Government filed for a motion for reconsideration. there is no proof of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is disposable or alienable. is a mere instrument executed by Bernardo Merchan. On 18 December 1975. Madella rendered a decision declaring the Merchans as owners of the land subject of the litigation. Pursuant thereto. the city administration in Caloocan City changed hands. Meanwhile. shortly after the decision came out. and on 23 July 23. more or less." The motion was denied. 161 [1920]. the Caloocan City mayor opened up 7 flea markets in that city. For failure of Government's counsel to attend the scheduled hearing. Republic v. 1992. 1. V. effective 16 February 1976. Government of the Philippine Islands. Court of Appeals. 2. the Merchans filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Medina. The latter motion was granted. the city mayor and city engineer. this time presided by Judge Benigno M. the CA denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order that it previously issued. which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 154 SCRA 476 [1987]). The court issued the writ prayed for. Director of Lands. the Merchans filed an application for the registration of the parcel of land involved in Civil Case 7840 (LRC N-1055). Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park. Director of Lands v. It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation. The Government appealed to the then IAC. Bienvenido Menes. Republic v. the Supreme Court rendered a resolution declaring null and void all judicial acts. Dacanay v. allegedly a Spanish title. PD 892 (16 February 1976) With the passage of PD 892. Document not a Spanish title The document itself dated 29 July 1870. Lands not under Torrens System considered unregistered. Teope. the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the Merchans. issued an order declaring the Government¶s motion for reconsideration moot and academic in light of the aforementioned resolution. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the Merchans. and by Proclamation 716 (26 May 1941) which declared the area as part of the "Mts. Mila Pastrana. Judge Manolo L.

among others.not pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets. the kinds of merchandise. Garcia. arising from public office. Dacanay filed a petition for mandamus on 19 June 1990. 505). the lessee must restore possession by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may have collected as rent. roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas. but "the fact remains that there is an omission of an act which ought to be performed. the following jurisprudence co/principles are applicable on the matter: (1) They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts. 339. City of Manila vs. As reiterated in the case of Baguio Citizens Action Inc. Civil Code of the Phil. or cause to be removed or demolished. shall be determined and prescribed by the mayors of the cities and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila where the same are located. and in clear violation of the decision in Civil Case C-12921. Gerardo Garcia. 19 SCRA 413. 59. Relate case. Considering the nature of the subject premises. On 3 April 1989. Municipality of Cavite. If possession has already been given. 1. finding that the Mayor¶s and the City Engineer's inaction is purely motivated by their perceived moral and social responsibility toward their constituents. Gonzales and Heroes del '96 Streets and to enforce PD 772 and other pertinent laws. maintenance and management and operation of flea markets and vending areas. 2. the market stalls occupying said city streets with utmost dispatch within 30 days from notice of the decision. Jurisprudence applicable to property of public dominion The streets. and for other purposes. being of public dominion must be outside of the commerce of man. The Supreme Court established that Dacanay and the general public have a legal right to the relief demanded and that the city officials have the corresponding duty. Insular Government. These letter was referred to the city mayor for appropriate action. the decision being immediately executory. and this applies to even case involving the use or lease of public places under permits and licenses issued by competent authority. Aldecoa. IC.. subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission and consistent with the guidelines hereby prescribed. it was held that ³tThe property being a public one. Rojas. 19 SCRA 413 citing Unson vs. roads and open spaces to be used as sites for flea markets (tiangge) or vending areas. and that the permits granted are therefore considered null and void. Gozon.. Gozon. (3) They are not subject to attachment and execution (Tan Toco vs. 29-30). After conducting a preliminary investigation. Related case. Francisco Dacanay wrote a letter to Mayor Asistio calling his attention to the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del ¶96 street and asked for demolition on 7 March 1988.). facilities and other appurtenances used by him in the conduct of his business after the close or termination of business hours. the Manila Mayors did not have the authority to give permits. Aquino. s. Occupation of private individuals of public places devoted for public use a nuisance The occupation and use of private individuals of sidewalks and other public places devoted for public use constitute both public and private nuisances and nuisance per se. hence. Lacson. 49 Phil. As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96 Street. Dacanay filed a complaint against Mayor Asistio and Engineer Sarne (OMB-0-89-0146) in the Office of the Ombudsman. II. 19 Phil. (2) They cannot be acquired by prescription against the state (Insular Government vs.´ 5. 47 SCRA 183. and thus ordered the City Mayor and City Engineer of Caloocan City or their successors in office to immediately enforce and implement the decision in Civil Case C-1292 declaring that Heroes del '96. (Padilla. 4. goods and commodities sold and services rendered: and other matters and activities related to the establishment. and they are ordered to remove or demolish. City of Manila v. it was held that properties for public use may not be leased to private individuals. measurement or specification of the structures. pp. Such a lease is null and void for the reason that a municipal council cannot withdraw part of the plaza from public use. praying that the city officials be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case C-12921 which upheld the city mayor's authority to order the demolition of market stalls on V.´ Section 2 of said ordinance provides that ³the streets. 695). 1983 Ed. and Gonzales Streets are public streets for public use. 6th Ed. Municipal Council of Iloilo. The City Council. upon the theory that such holders could not take advantage of their unlawful permits and license and claim that the land in question is a part of a public street or a public place devoted to public use. 602). wrote a follow-up letter to the mayor and the city engineer on 7 April 1988. ³an ordinance legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public land is null and void. Tolentino. maintenance and management of flea markets and vending areas. to the squatters. Bidin. sought the intervention of President Aquino through a letter. (4) They cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Captain 520. Invoking the trial court¶s decision." The Ombudsman recommended the filing of the corresponding information in court. through the tolerance of the city officials. Even municipalities can not acquire them for use as communal lands against the state (City of Manila vs. citing Umali vs. written or oral. . the rates or fees or charges to be imposed. 52). A. Rojas. 1979 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is an ordinance ³authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets. the Ombudsman rendered a final evaluation and report on 28 August 1989. subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission. the following guidelines.´ 3. p. V. 100 Phil.´ Section 6(m) of said ordinance provides that ³in the establishment operation. and without receiving any response. Context of the ordinance of the Metropolitan Manila Commission as to the establishment of flea markets on municipal streets. Rep. roads and open spaces Ordinance 2. 327). shall be observed: xxx (m) that the permittee shall remove the equipment. 10 Phil. Ordinance legalizing the occupancy of squatters of public land is null and void In the case of City of Manila vs. Vol. 121 SCRA 368. 30 Phil. under certain terms and conditions. the design. Return of rent In the case of Municipality of Cavite vs. Garcia et al. (Municipality of Cavite vs. levied and collected. Civil Code Annotated. Vol. in clear violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. II. vs. beyond the commerce of man. equipment and apparatuses to be used or put up: the allowable distances: the days and time allowed for the conduct of the businesses and/or activities herein authorized. to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose (Enriquez vs.

and Muyot vs. The disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. peace. has been leasing portions of the streets to them. grants the City Engineer similar powers. Section 185. 135 SCRA 235). The City Engineer is also among those required to comply with said Letter of Instruction. provides that "Municipalities are political bodies corporate. Vda. Public street cannot be made subject to a lease A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. for by its very nature it may be enjoyed as though it were private property. is of little . 24950. According to article 344 of the Code. De la Fuente. 8. paragraph 4 of BP 337(Local Government Code) provides that the City Engineer shall (c) Prevent the encroachment of private buildings and fences on the streets and public places. Distinction according to Manresa. Property of provinces and municipalities Article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces and (municipalities) into property for public use and patrimonial property. citing the Municipality of Cavite vs.] En Banc. Lease or licenses null and void for being contrary to law As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street. that is. The third group. The Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health. 4860). 420.966. and generally to exercise the powers hereinafter specified or otherwise conferred upon them by law. Article VII. plus the interest. 102 Phil. All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is patrimonial and shall be subject to the provision of the Civil Code except as provided by special laws. of little practical importance in view of different principles under American Rule Commenting upon article 344. removal and safety of private buildings. and a few days before the sale." The Administrative Code does not specify the kind of property that a municipality may acquire. Section 27. The CFI Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to pay the Tantoco the amount so claimed. (k) With the previous approval of the City Mayor in each case. (j) nspect and supervise the construction. Basa consisting of 592 sq. to sue and be sued.e. 424. is not intrinsic with this kind of property. paragraph g. that the said attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the municipality. Castañeda and Macalino. wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality. the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that the attachment on the said property be dissolved. those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public or private property (Zansibarian Residents Association vs. and was affirmed by the Supreme Court." Such distinction. order the removal of materials employed in the construction or repair of any building or structures made in violation of law or ordinance. as found by the trial court in Civil Case C-12921. Further. the police stations on Mabini street.. by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling. Rojas. good order and general welfare. Muncipal Council of Iloilo [G. is used in the name of the town or province by the entities representing it and. the Charter of the City of Caloocan. By order of 12 August 1925. drives and public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or provinces. March 25. private property. squares. vs. one on Calle J. however. and furthermore. Capacity to acquire property The municipal law. thereby dissolving the said attachment. repair. and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 sq. the City Government. to be exercised by and through their respective municipal government in conformity with law. to contract and be contracted with. 15 SCRA 142. Municipalities¶ capacity to sue and to be sued. Villamor (J): 7 concur Facts: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42. it may not be the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment. fountains. and Mandurriao. as to the patrimonial property of the towns. and public waters. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from with costs against Tantoco. 1926..G. being the purchase price of two strips of land. contrary to law. Espiritu vs. and Section 1 of Letter of Instruction 19 ordering certain public officials.. the Court declared the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the municipality null and void. are property for public use. m. more or less general. section 2165 of the Administrative Code. safety. 1. with the corresponding lots. 48 O. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. 3. No. as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. one of whom is the Municipal Mayor to remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks.R. Molo. giving a source of revenue. From this order Tantoco has appealed by bill of exceptions. among others. RA 5502. The Executive Order issued by the Acting Mayor authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. in their proper corporate name. like any private property. to acquire and hold real and personal property for municipal purposes. and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations. Being outside the commerce of man. The first differs from property for public use in that generally its enjoyment is less. After notice of the sale of said property had been made. 1 and m. De Tantoco v. Civil Code). 2. 7. and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete structures. as it is limited to neighbors or to a group or class thereof. such use. 30 SCRA 602. It shall be competent for them. "between that of common benefit and that which is private property of the town. and cause buildings and structures dangerous to the public to made secure or torn down. of Makati. 869. m. Manresa says that "In accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) we must distinguish. one police patrol automobile. used as markets by Iloilo. provincial roads and foot-path. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. Said judgment was appealed. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio. Likewise. the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. streets. Mun. Authority of the city mayor and the city engineer to order the demolition of illegal structures "The authority of the Municipality to demolish the shanties is mandated by PD 772.40.6. M.

such as public buildings. streets. tt is generally held that property owned by a municipality. consequently. except that in the New England States the individual liability of the inhabitant is generally maintained (McQuillin). and used for public purposes. and when this privilege is closely related to a service of a public character. ³the rule is that property held for public uses. US Law and Jurisprudence: Members or inhabitants not personally liable for debts of the municipality The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporation proper are not personally liable for the debts of the municipality. Tufexis v. parks. cemeteries. Municipal corporations are created for public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their aggregate or public capacity. and the like. and a stock of liquors carried in a town dispensary. such right of the creditor to the collection of a debt owed him by the debtor who enjoys the said special privilege of usufruct in a public market is not absolute and may be exercised only through the action of a court of justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained under the special right of usufruct enjoyed by debtor. US Law and Jurisprudence: Insurance money derived from destroyed municipal property exempt from execution likewise exempted If municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed. streets. by one who took no part in the contract. open to the public. So city waterworks. wharves. it was held that a wharf for unloading sugar and molasses. 3. US Jurisprudence: Wharf a property for public use and not subject to attachment In City of New Orleans vs. Likewise. This rule applies to shares of stock owned by a municipal corporation and the like. although if the public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to execution. where not used for a public purpose but for quasi private purposes. The rule also applies to funds in the hands of a public officer. rather than a judicial question. parks. Likewise it has been held that taxes due to a municipal corporation or county cannot be seized under execution by a creditor of such corporation. precisely as similar property of individuals is seized and sold. because that would be to permit a person who has contracted with the state or with the administrative officials thereof to conduct and manage a service of a public character. Louisiana Construction Co. ed. the general rule is that such property may be seized and sold under execution against the corporation. 35 Law.practical importance in this jurisdiction in view of the different principles underlying the functions of a municipality under the American rule. 8. US Law and Jurisprudence: Municipal properties for public use. the question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held. S. engines and engine houses. are exempt. consequently. But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used for private purposes. thus giving rise to the possibility of the regular course of a public service being disturbed by the more or less legal action of a grantee. the insurance money stands in lieu thereof and is also exempt (McQuillin). in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants. are not subject to execution.1160): State statutes often provide that court houses. property not useful or used for a public purpose but for quasi private purposes. as a general proposition. It was further held that the fees collected were also exempt from execution because they were a part of the income of the city. The special concession of the right to usufruct in a public market cannot be attached like any ordinary right. hose and hose carriages. 25 Law. as distinguished from its public or governmental capacity. Special concession of the right to usufruct in a public market cannot be attached like any ordinary right It was held in Tufexis v. 5. Thus. held by municipal corporations. . 430). real and personal. This consideration. The reason for the exemption is obvious. is exempt.. Ltd. wharves landing places. yet when among such property there is included the special right granted by the Government of usufruct in a building intended for a public service. Whether or not property held as public property is necessary for the public use is a political. par. was property for the public use of the City of New Orleans and was not subject to attachment for the payment of the debts of the said city. (140 U. that ³even though a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out of his debtor's property. property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and. and in some instances practically destroy it. The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and. engine houses. Where property of a municipal or other public corporation is sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation. school houses. jails other buildings owned by municipalities and the lots on which they stand shall be exempt from attachment and execution. 149. 4. fire engines.. without the knowledge and consent of the administrative authorities. hospitals. it was held that a public wharf on the banks of the Mississippi River was public property and not subject to execution for the payment of a debt of the City of New Orleans where said wharf was located. 23. 7. In Klein vs. is subject to execution on a judgment against the municipality. said property is also inalienable. deduced from the principles of moral equity has only given way to the more enlarged contemplation of the great and paramount interests of public order and the principles of government. exempted from attachment and execution As expounded by McQuillin in Municipal Corporations (Vol. But where a municipal corporation or county owns in its proprietary." 6. promenades. There is something very repugnant to the moral sense in the idea that a municipal corporation should contract debts. and that having no resources but the taxes which are due to it these should not be subjected by legal process to the satisfaction of its creditors.. As stated in Corpus Juris (Vol.. and generally everything held for governmental purposes. 355). City of New Orleans (98 U S. p. to the prejudice of the state and the public interests. Public buildings. is not subject to levy and sale under execution against such corporation. both not within the commerce of man The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal property is similar in character. ed. and to deny them these means the very purpose of their creation would be materially impeded. Property of public domain applies to municipal property for public use. Olaguera. is unalienable and not subject to prescription. 556). to be substituted. 9. property. squares. But independent of express statutory exemption. but not properties for quasi-private purposes.. and may be sold. where the public market had been levied upon by virtue of the execution arising from the debt of the municipality of Guinobatan. Olaguera. But the mere fact that corporate property held for public uses is being temporarily used for private purposes does not make it subject to execution. squares. 654. It was held that land was public property as necessary as a public street and was not subject to execution on account of the debts of the city. public markets. That they may properly discharge such public functions corporate property and revenues are essential.

Proprietary rights. and penalties. Rizal including the lots 670.R. assignments of the Bureau of Lands' sales certificates were duly recorded. The lots enumerated above were included in the land sought to be expropriated and Nicanor Jacinto was made a party defendant in the proceedings. Based upon considerations of this character. fixed by the court. in the same manner that the rights of the creditors of a railroad company can be exercised and their creditors collected only out of the gross receipts remaining after deduction has been made therefrom of the operating expenses of the road. and on 16 November 1923. 11. sales certificates were issued by the Bureau of Lands to Frank W. it was stated that "municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme authority of a state for the public good. Caloocan. 950. although the corporation is in debt. 697 698. either in the treasury or when in transit to it. and a creditor of such person can recover his debt only out of the income or revenue obtained by the debtor from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said privilege. not affected by condemnation proceedings The proprietary rights. As the actual purchase price to be paid by the purchaser from the Government only amounts to P13. execution was levied upon all of his right.725. political.000 as the provisional value. in connection with the so-called Angat Water Works Project. Copies of the complaint as well as of the order of 31 March 1925. 1926. 699. Character of property for public use basis why property of a municipality necessary for governmental purposes may not be attached The movable and immovable property of a municipality. and to provide for the police and local government of certain designated civil divisions of its territory. Director of Lands [G. The doctrine of the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained. 955. Municipal income exempt from levy and execution Even the municipal income is exempt from levy and execution. fines. and denied the petition as to the execution of deeds of conveyance. They exercise. to be recorded as notices of lis pendens. 952. the sheriff of Rizal sold the property to Nicanor Jacinto.33 as indemnity for the expropriation. 1. Ostrand (J): 7 concur Facts: During the period from 1911 to 1913. ³ 10. The Supreme Court ordered the Director of Lands to receive the balance of the purchase money for any or all of the lots in question if and when payment thereof is tendered by Jacinto. The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public use of the municipality be exempt from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of private individuals in accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 696. He admitted the existence of the right of condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation. 1. of the parcels so to be condemned. of which amount Carpenter up to the year 1923. rejected the tender and refused to execute and deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him. by delegation from the legislature. 701. Under a judgment rendered against Carpenter in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case 24607). Applicant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the applicant for the lots enumerated belonging to the Tala Friar Lands Estate in Novaliches. but demanded the sum of P64. . 26374.839. The Director of Lands. 467).The privilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjoy the usufruct of a public market cannot lawfully be attached and sold. except that of occupation. To enable them beneficially to exercise these powers and discharge these duties. 953. may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public-property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against them.650 to cover the remaining balance of the sales price of the lots in question and demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance for said lots. The total area of the land covered by the sales certificates being over 1. 691. 700. as by licenses. The sheriff's sale was registered in the Bureau of Lands. 951. To this end they are invested with certain governmental powers and charged with civil. 956.600. and certificates of assignment were issued and delivered to Nicanor Jacinto in September 1924. are not affected by the condemnation proceedings until the title has passed to the plaintiff and that does not occur until the award of compensation or damages has been satisfied. necessary for governmental purposes.490 hectares and the purchase price amounting to about P56. Deprived of its regular and adequated supply of revenue. 690. On 31 March 1925. were filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Rizal on 11 February 1926. 957. without costs. and on the same date the CFI Rizal issued an order authorizing the Metropolitan Water District to take possession of said parcels of land upon deposit with the provincial treasurer of the sum of P3.] En Banc. upon the advice of the Attorney-General. the Metropolitan Water District considered Jacinto's demand excessive and declined to pay the claim. and the ends of its erection thwarted. p. 695. The revenue of the public corporation is the essential means by which it is enabled to perform its appointed work. In Municipal Corporations by Dillon (Vol. 954. chiefly by taxation. By virtue of this order. the applicant tendered payment to the Director of Lands of the sum of P4. such a corporation is practically destroyed. Carpenter for more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands states located in Novaliches. the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the CFI Rizal for the condemnation of certain parcels of land situated in the municipality of Caloocan for the construction of an earth dam and a first-class highway 3 kilometers long. a portion of the sovereign power." Jacinto v. The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted. In the month of July 1926.272. title and interest in the lots purchased together with the improvements thereon. and municipal duties. and 1050. had paid in installments the sum of P16. except the right of occupation. and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law. they are clothed with the authority to raise revenues. including interest. and subordinately by other modes. December 31. the Metropolitan Water District entered into occupation of the land and began the construction of permanent improvements thereon. are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The main object of their creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state. Judgments rendered for taxes. and has no means of payment but the taxes which it is authorized to collect. No.

quarters for the cuadrilleros. Property is a patrimonial property of the State As early as 1852. not conclusive against him. Roa. 201 U. 3. and ordered the judgment entered after the expiration of 20 days and the records of the case remanded to the lower court for proper action. 46 Phil. but with Castillo testifying that he bought the property by verbal agreement with Roco. the land had been used by the municipality constructed thereon buildings for the storage of property of the State. He knew at that time of his purchase in 1894. 303. Code of Civil Procedure. The evidence does not make out a case of estoppel against him. They are admissions by him to the effect that at that time the pueblo was the owner of the property in question. and others of a like character. It therefore had ceased to be property used by the public and had become a part of the bienes patrimoniales of the pueblo. The defendant can not rely upon the ordinary period of prescription of 10 years because he was not a holder in good faith. So that. under section 567 of the Administrative Code. (18 R. Municipality of Oas v. Proof should be manifestly against decision for the factual finding to be reversed In this state of the evidence. No case facts providing details of how the case was filed by lower court. The municipality claims ownership in view of a document (minutes of the 27 February 1892 meeting of the principalia of the town) stating that the land was bought in 1832 by the town¶s parish priest. Purchaser in bad faith. that erection of houses in said land is prohibited by order of the corregidor of Nueva Caceres. 1.) 3. therefore. but it rests upon the principle that when the defendant in a suit has himself made an admission of any fact pertinent to issue involved. of course. procured a possessory of information which was allowed by an order of the justice of the peace of Oas on the 19 January 1895. Jose Castillo sold it to Roa. claims that Juana Ricarte and Juana Riquiza sold the land to Juan Roco in 1876. L. As early as 1852. or of selling to him the land on which it stands. 333. one in 1892 and the other in 1893. (De la Rama vs. the finding of fact made by that court can not be reversed. are competent evidence against him. Code of Civil Procedure.. L-2017. even if the statute of limitations ran against a municipality in reference to a public square. which is the property of the defendant. Petition for a writ of mandamus not proper remedy to compel a conveyance Mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely contract rights. Jose Castillo. consequently the extraordinary period of prescription does not apply. Roa [G.2. Duty to execute deeds of conveyance devolved upon the GovernorGeneral The writ cannot issue in the present case unless it appears that the Director of Lands "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. and that the repair of the building was prohibited upon the owner thereof. after his purchase in 1894. while the Roa alleged that he was the owner of the property. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged with the duty of receiving the purchase money payable under that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to receive. that the pueblo was the owner of the property. the Municipality has constructed thereon buildings for the storage of property of the State. it could not avail the defendant in the present case. Statements signed by Roa competent.) 2. S. and did present evidence to overcome the effect of these admissions. on the contrary. De la Rama. such as that in the present case sought to be enforced. 337. 121. 1906.R. authorities of the town ordered the demolition thereof and declared that the owner of the building." (Section 222. Roa was also able to construct a substantial building on the said after he ³acquired´ the property from Castillo. Quiogue vs. claiming that it was a part of the public square of said town. Jose Castillo. his father-in-law. He was entitled to. but not conclusive. as a purely ministerial act. The Court also declared Municipality is entitled to recover the costs of both instances. rights determined as if both are in good faith Roa constructed the building in bad faith for he had knowledge of the fact that his grantor was not the owner thereof. and that on 17 December 1894. on the other hand. arts. Roa. par. that duty. and had so stated in writing. Willard (J): 3 concur Facts: The Municipality brought the action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas. and others of a like character. When the building on the land was destroyed by typhoon on 13-14 May 1893. Land is patrimonial property of the Government. Romualdez.] First Division. quarters for the cuadrilleros. 341. No. Unless it is so. 4. 344. trust. had no right to reconstruct said building as the land did not belong to him. Prescription requirement of 30 years not met The present action was commenced on the 17 December 1902. nor the actual judgment of said court The Supreme Court modified the judgment appealed from and declared the Municipality is the owner of the land and that it has the option of buying the building thereon. 1. Said document was signed by Roa himself. 4.) 5. Both Roa and the Municipality in bad faith. (Civil Code. and recorded in the Registry of Property on the 28 March of the same year.) The admissibility of these statements made by Roa do not rest upon section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (sec. appears to devolve upon the Governor-General. They are.. This resolution was also signed by Roa..) The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine Government and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers of such lands. Director of Land has duty to receive purchase money payable under Act 1120 By section 14 of Act No. November 24. Roa not estopped The two statements signed by Roa. or station. evidence against him. which relates to declarations or admissions made by persons not a party to the suit. C. No deed of conveyance from Juan Roco to Jose Castillo was presented by evidence. There was a . we can not say that the proof is plainly and manifestly against the decision of the lower court. such purchase money when tendered. it can be received against him. There is no evidence of any adverse occupation of this land for 30 years.

or. law 12. through Resolution 2193 (3 October 1968). Subsequently. the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder and on 3 March 1969. Leyte. Upon this lot is built a stone fort which has stood there from time immemorial and was in times past used as a defense against the invasion of the Moros. it shall be torn down.bad faith also on the part of the Municpality in accordance with the express provisions of article 364 since it allowed Roa to construct the building without any opposition on its part and to so occupy it for 8 years. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in relation to the parcel of land described. provides that ³that which belongs privately to the state. and the mines as long as no concession in regard to them is made" is public property. no building shall be erected within 300 paces of the walls or stockades of the new cities. the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. The Civil Code provides that. becomes a part of the property of the state. Cebu City. 7054. such as walls. Hence. as an abandoned road. the instant petition for review. After hearing the parties. executed a deed of absolute sale to the petitioner for a total consideration of P10. or planted on another's land. In the present case. Legal anchors In volume 2. 1913. fortresses and other constructions for the defense of the country. Still. or planting is done in good faith shall have a right to appropriate as his own the work. or planting after the indemnity mentioned in articles 453 and 454. authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Presumption of grant by the state to municipality may be invoked only is property is used distinctly for public purposes The Court has ruled where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public purposes (such as for the municipal court house. law 1 of the Laws of the Indies. for the security and defense of the cities as is now assured by the castles and fortresses. On 26 June 1974. on 19 December 1968. Bad faith on the part of the owner is understood whenever the act has been executed in his presence with his knowledge and tolerance and without objection. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides that where there has been bad faith. when it ceases to be used for the public use and which is destined for the necessities of the defense of the country. 328. and if any building is erected within 300 paces of the wall or other building so strong that ever at a greater distance it would prejudice the defenses. 2. the City of Cebu. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene v. not only on the part of the person who built." Article 399 of the Civil Code. Article 341 of the Civil Code provides that ³public property. The rights of the parties must. Article 361 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of the land on which the building. (J): 4 concur Facts: The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M.] First Division.00. Defense of national territory rests upon the state and not upon towns and villages The defense of the national territory against invasion by foreign enemies rested upon the state and not upon the towns and villages and for this reason all of the defenses were constructed by the National Government. to pay him the value of the land and to force the person who sowed to pay the proper rent. the public market. and on the northwest by San Isidro Labrador Street. 1975. on 11 October 1914 the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title. Borces Street. presume a grant from the state in favor of the municipality.] Second Division." Municipality of Hinunangan v. be determined as if they both had acted in good faith. the rule may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes. title 7. 1. L-40474. it becomes the property of the state in what may be called the private sense. and dismissing the petition as to that parcel of land. therefore. but has that it has exercised acts of ownership over the land by permitting it to be occupied and consenting to the erection of private houses thereon. book 3.800. By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale. and contains an area of 10. The Court of Land Registration ordered said registration in favor of the petitioners. the land which it stands on is also dedicated to that purpose. The Insular Government appealed as to the registration of the title of one of the parcels of land only. and as a result. Pursuant thereto. No. the City Council of Cebu. Concepcion Jr. Borces Street. LRC Record N-44531). . Petitioners applied for the registration of the title to the lands so described. declared the terminal portion of M. January 20. and the owner of the same shall be paid from the Royal Treasury for the damages caused him. August 29. but also on the part of the owner of the latter. the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution 2755. Director of Lands [G. Fortress not being in use does not deprive the state of its ownership The fact that said fortress may not have been used for many years for the purposes for which it was originally built does not of necessity deprive the state of its ownership therein. it is bounded on the northwest by the maritime zone. Mabolo. Bercilles [G.R. and cannot be applied against the state when occupied for any other purpose. on the southwest by Manalili Street. Moreland (J): 5 concur Facts: Land in question is situated in Hinunangan. Mabolo. sowing. when the fortress ceases to be used for the purpose for which it was constructed. 4. On 23 September 1968. to oblige the person who has built or planted." It is clear thus that the fortress in question was erected for the national defense and was a part of the property of the state destined and used for that purpose. No. the petitioner filed an application with the CFI Cebu to have its title to the land registered (LRC N-948. the same not being included in the City Development Plan. the evidence does not disclose that the municipality has used the land for purposes distinctly public. title 7. sowed.8 sq. reads as ³We order that. in part. sowing. 3. Fortresses and its land property of the State. Cebu City. it was stated that ³we command that all the ground roundabout the castles and fortresses be clear and unoccupied. on the southeast by North America Street.R. which is not for public use and which is destined for the public good or to increase the national riches. the public school." Book 4. the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. but affirming the judgment in all other respects. through the Acting City Mayor. or other necessary municipal building) and in the absence of proof to the contrary. m.

street or alley." It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. claiming to be entitled thereto and retaining it to the present day. Tarlac [G. of public use. roadsteads. and that in consequence thereof. avenue. and bridges constructed by the State. holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church. such as roads. As expressly provided by Article 422 of the Civil Code. or to the church. To said judgment the representative of the Municipality excepted and moved for a new trial on the ground that it was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The motion for a new trial was overruled. but not to the parish curate. 1. ports. rivers. March 11. On 1 September. . he would appeal to the Supreme Court. "property of public dominion. City of Baguio). fountains. shores. archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church. No. Tarlac. Customs in creation of new town under the old Laws of the Indies The town of Victoria was formerly only a barrio of the town of Tarlac and known as Canarum. 1. if his motion were overruled. such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces. City is empowered to close city road or street and withdraw the same from public use Section 31 of the Revised Charter of Cebu City (Legislative Powers) provides that ³any provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding. boulevard. as the legal administrator of the properties and rights of the Catholic Church within the archbishopric of Manila. it was a custom observed by all the towns established administratively in these Islands under the old Laws of the Indies. Subsequent sale valid When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use. Harty v. Faithfulness to the public trust will he presumed. the City Council shall have the following legislative powers xxx to close any city road. that from the very beginning. torrents. History of the municipality of Victoria. is a public plaza of the said town. To this end they must have laid out the streets and the plaza of the town. the squares. The power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. a certain amount of land was always reserved for plazas." Further. was approved. the promenades. On 15 June 1908.] En Banc. Harty. 3.The Supreme Court set aside the order of the lower court. public performances and religious processions were held thereon without hindrance either on the part of the local authorities or of the curate of said town. that on their creation. 3. and special and communal property. when no longer intended for public use or for public service. the representative of Monsignor Jeremiah J. and held that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house. and had continued to possess the same ever since up to 1901. the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu. the trial court rendered judgment. streets.000 to insure the fulfillment of the judgment in the event that it should be totally or partially affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from. and public waters. Street withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property. and banks. filed a written complaint in the CFI Tarlac against the municipality of Victoria. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance (Favis v. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. commons. and the ordered said court to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title. Property of public ownership Article 339 of the Civil Code provides that "property of public ownership is (1) that destined to the public use. alleging that the parish of the said town had been and was then the owner of a parcel of land within the said municipality. in which year the municipality unlawfully and forcibly seized the said property. 1909. Further. destined to the use of all the residents of the recently founded town. Torres (J): 5 concur Facts: On 17 January 1908. park or square." 2. and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which. that it had acquired said parcel of land more than 60 years previously. 2. and named Victoria. Article 344 of said code provides that "property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads.R. but furnished the bond as directed by the court. 5013. the Municipality was ordered to furnish bond in the sum of P1. the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. after receipt of a copy had been acknowledged by the adverse party. To said order the Municipality excepted. in very clear and unequivocal terms. and sentenced the Municipality to vacate the same and to pay the costs. and at the expiration of about 12 years the parish of said town was constituted and the priest who was to perform the office of curate was appointed." Further. Victoria. It was converted into a town in 1855. canals. known as the plaza of the church of Victoria. Discretion of the city council cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the court The city council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. had a better right to the possession of the land described in the complaint. and he notified the court that. in the center of which were situated the church and parish house from the commencement. and as it is unquestionable that the said large space of land was left vacant in the center of the town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town. because at the time there was no curate at the new town of Victoria. and the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts. the Municipality excepted. the Municipality is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both instances. states that "property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. and that of a similar character. The late Tanedo donated the land occupied by the Church to the church and not to the parish curate There are good grounds to suppose that the late Vicente Tanedo donated the land now occupied by the church and parish house in said municipality for religious purposes. absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. the large tract of land that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a public plaza." Thus.

which the Appellate Court denied on 27 September 1983 for lack of legal and factual basis. N-52176 in respect of the ³Heirs of Isabela Avendano´. Zapanta [G. 5. who owned the space of land where the church and parish house were erected.4. and the public abattoir. additional public structures were built thereon. for the entertainment of the appeal on the merits. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. Antipolo v. or perhaps the intention to improve the and embellish the said plaza for the benefit of the townspeople. Even though all the remaining space of land which now forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been owned by the said Tanedo. There is indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public market as far back as 1908. N-52176 to continue to be valid. Procured trees set out in the plaza does not constitute an act of private ownership That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said town procured fruit trees and plants to be set out in the plaza. or at the latest. plazas. December 26. One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing 9. which ANTIPOLO claimed it had not received. 3.R. The other applicant was "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño". Branch XV. the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. m. Tax declaration mere indicia of a claim to ownership At the time the application for registration was filed on 8 August 1977. 2. It has not been satisfactorily shown that the municipality or the principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole of said land to the curate of Victoria or to the Catholic Church. He had applied for registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 sq. indeed. Lands presumed to be public lands unless contrary is proven. and (4) declared the certificate of title issuied in the name of Conrado Eniceo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. among other things. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court. LRC Record N-52176 null and void in respect of the ³Heirs of Joaquin Avendano. Disputed property devoted to public use and public service. On 8 August 1977. Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur. ANTIPOLO filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) of the CFI Rizal. the appeal was dismissed on 23 August 1983 despite the fact that before the dismissal. the petition for review on certiorari. but evidences the public use thereof. the case was dismissed. we shall resolve the substantive merits of the appeal to the appellate tribunal from the judgment rendered in the case. Makati (the Registration Court). this Court had held that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interests of substantial justice specially where. since 1920 "up to today. Plazas destined for public use not subject to prescription Pursuant to Article 1936 of the Civil Code. 1984. Waiver of rights thereon in favor of the public presumed It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro Tañedo. Proof lacking if the land Tanedo donated include the whole large tract constituting the town plaza. destined to the public use are not subject to prescription.] First Division. LRC Rec. does not constitute an act of private ownership. ANTIPOLO took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal. Certain it is that the Curate has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town. it being a public plaza destined to public use and was not private ownership. nor could it have been so donated. the disputed property was already devoted to public use . in their Answer. 65334. a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal. Branch XIII. Pasig against named "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño". 6. ANTIPOLO had submitted its Appellant's Brief. like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center. to be public land subject to ANTIPOLO's use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. pleaded a special defense of res judicata. 1 took no part. had voluntarily donated it to the Catholic Church but proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said Tanedo comprehended the whole of the large tract which at the present time constitutes the plaza of the town. nor that it was in possession thereof under the form and conditions required by law. it must be presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople. ANTIPOLO perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. (3) ordered the Register of Deed of Rizal to cancel all certificates issued by virtue of decree issued in LRC N-9995. Those public structures occupy almost the entire area of the land. inasmuch as it has been fully proven that said plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of the town of Victoria ever since its creation. Court resolves merits due to 3 motions for early decision filed A remand to the lower Court. The defendants. or patrimony of the town of Victoria. m. The Supreme Court (1) set aside the resolutions of the appellate court (now IAC) dated 23 August 1983 and 27 September 1983. and transfers therefrom as decreed in LRC N-995. LRC Rec. The application were approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. Technicality yields to broader interests of substantial justice. (2) set aside the judgment of the CFI Rizal in Civil Case 41353 and rendered the judgment and decree of the CFI Rizal in LRC N9995. No. ANTIPOLO filed a motion for reconsideration. its appeal was disallowed. would ordinarily be the appropriate relief. or of the Province of Tarlac. a ground for dismissal of an appeal. since all the residents have enjoyed the free use of said plaza. Remand is ordinarily the appropriate relief.826 sq. Facts: The Municipality of ANTIPOLO. has considered the disputed property." Gradually. 1. for more than 50 years now. However. and their assignees praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. as in this case. without pronouncements as to costs. the Integrated National Police Building. After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense. Hence. Possession does not presuppose ownership. described below. Upon motion of the Avendano heirs to dismiss on the ground the ANTIPOLO had not filed its Brief within the reglementary period. On 22 May 1981. the important issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Land Registration Court has been raised. When jurisdiction is questioned Although failure to file Brief within the time provided by the Rules is. considering the three Motions for Early Decision filed by private respondents.

As to property for public use. in Baclaran. Property of provinces. Lt. 1992. On 17 December 1990. maintain and manage the flea market with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. 1990 of the municipal council subject to conditions. maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. since they had been in possession. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove ownership. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court. cities and municipalities. the municipal council issued a resolution authorizing the Parañaque Mayor to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment. Garcia Extension and Opena streets. Therefore. by oversight. a service cooperative. Cruz. 1990 which authorized the closure of J. authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets. the municipality and Palanyag. then the principle of res judicata does not apply. Civil Code). Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran.G. J. in the provinces. 97764. and considering. without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. fountains. its Decision adjudicating the disputed property as of private ownership is null and void. consists of the provincial roads. Consequently. Res judicata does not apply since Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the registration of public property Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of ANTIPOLO. Lt. 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]). Macasiano. Article 424 of Civil Code provides that "property for public use. Gabrielle G. erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time. and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment.G. the squares. by which no rights are divested. It was not a bar to the action brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata. 993 and 454. city streets. that the decision.and public service. Ledesma vs. 423. PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command. Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing the demolition of market stalls along J. 2. is not a decision in contemplation of law. roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas. for want of jurisdiction of the court. such are to be held to be null and void and perforce. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code. since as far back as 1916. and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void. Gabrielle St. it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MCC Ordinance 2. they must be ordered cancelled. Animas. Bayanihan. operation. No. Effects of decision which is null and void by virtue of lack of jurisdiction The want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders the judgment void and a mere nullity. Gabrielle. the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance 86. the grantee does not. 1990 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag. Diokno [G. otherwise. market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets. Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market. 503. Property for public use The property of provinces. G. s. s. 1. lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System. become the owner of the land illegally included' (Republic vs. City of Zamboanga. cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. Bayanihan. can never become executory. Lt. Bayanihan. the Municipality of Paranaque passed Ordinance 86. public waters. Cruz. On 16 October 1990. ANTIPOLO had also declared the disputed property as its own in Tax Declarations 909. On 20 June 1990. 769). s. by virtue of the said certificate of title alone. Medialdea (J): 12 concur Facts: On 13 June 1990. from which no rights can be obtained. further. Gen. . the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor.R. 6. entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate. and public works for public service paid for by said provinces. Macasiano v. under certain terms and conditions. since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. cities or municipalities. Cruz. or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest. thus. and can be attacked at any time. 4. Properties for public service deemed public and under absolute control of Congress Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. It follows that 'if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes. the market stalls shall be dismantled. Parañaque. it was outside the commerce of man and could no longer be subject to private registration. the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance 86 s. The claim of the Avendano heirs that they merely tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO which had borrowed the disputed property from them. 1979. 49 Phi. Under these circumstances. On 8 August 1990. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by Macasiano thru the OSG. with no jurisdiction over the subject matter. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Titles null and void. 5. which neither binds nor bars any one." In the present case. Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. and hence. and reversed and set aside the 17 December 1990 decision of the RTC which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the PNP Superintendent.G. or by virtue of the decision or decree of the court. Cancellation pursued through ordinary action When the titles issued by a Court. Hence. the municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction. On 23 October 1990. On 13 September 1990 Brig. Gabrielle. On 20 July 1990. promenades. Municipality of Iloilo. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. Gacia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of the municipality. ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G. Cruz and J. The Supreme Court granted the petition. August 10. It never attained finality. G. 56 SCRA 499. And if there was no such jurisdiction.] En Banc.G. cities and municipalities.

and Muyot v. Closure of roads Local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road. Bercilles In Cebu Oxygen v. it may not be the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva. Mabolo. establishment of flea market on municipality streets does not help solve problem of congestion It is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people. The allegations of the municipality that the closed streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that the first condition has been met. Castañeda and Macalino. Borces Street. city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare.g. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health. 8. maintain peace and order. Cebu Oxygen v. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion but rather leads to inconvenience to children as the normal transportation flow is disrupted. Civil Code). Further. LGU has no power to lease a road available to public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic The legal provision (Chapter II. in gratia argumenti. Cruz. safety and convenience. 5. the ambulances and people rushing patients to St. peace. those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. 30 SCRA 602. They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. Bercilles. alley. ambulances and fire engines are not able to use the roads for a more direct access to the fire area and thus lose valuable time that should have been spent in saving properties and lives. 424. the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Section 10 of the LGC) which gives authority to local government units to close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. the disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. G. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10. the designation by the Municipality of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent (fourth condition). good order and general welfare. Bercilles. And further. When it is already withdrawn from public use. street or park. and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Lt. street. Rojas. through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code. the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by the municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. De la Fuente. The Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i. Bayanihan. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Asistio. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. Article 424 NCC lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Local governments have no authority to regulate use of public properties unless authority is vested upon by Congress. safety. Cebu City as an abandoned road. close any barangay. Legal provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. Thereafter. Likewise. the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare. The leases or licenses granted by the City Government to stallholders are null and void for being contrary to law. The Executive Order issued by the acting Mayor authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. Based on this objective. Dacanay v. houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health. Related case. In gratia argumenti. 102 Phil. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit (LGU) (Article 422 NCC. 7. 4860). park or square. the City Council passed another resolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding. It is only then that the LGU can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. In such case. Moreover. the same not being included in the City Development Plan. 9. Related case. The Court held that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use. Powers of local government unit not absolute The powers of a local government unit are not absolute.. Espiritu v. 869. the City Council of Cebu." However. which states ³A local government unit may likewise. 48 O. through a resolution. Being outside the commerce of man." 4. that the municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance.G. city or provincial road. v.G. Cebu Oxygen v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio. 420. Gabrielle. the LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Rita Hospital located along GG Cruz Street are delayed as they are unable to pass through said street due to the stalls and vendors.3. Chapter II of the Local Government Code (BP 337). municipal. ordinance cannot be validly implemented as municipality has not complied with conditions imposed by the MMA for the approval of the ordinance Even assuming. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province. as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. declared the terminal road of M. Asistio In Dacanay v. to pollution and deterioration of health of residents due to the garbage left by the vendors on the streets. Baclaran area congested. e. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract 6.e. 15 SCRA 142 citing the Municipality of Cavite v. et al. . 66 SCRA 481 [1975]).

the whole municipal market was rehabilitated. town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private individuals. September 21. Pangasinan [G. was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. The occupation of the plaza and the construction of temporary buildings thereon mostly for market. On 25 January 1957. dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by appellants and lifting the preliminary injunction it initially issued. 2. Montemayor (J): 10 concur Facts: During the last world war. Applicability of the Dacanay case. It affirmed the decision appealed from.shift stalls. was merely tolerated by the municipality. the lower court decided the case and held that the land occupied by Villanueva et.al. 11. the general public have a legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio. Cruz (J): 3 concur. and after Liberation. On 12 January 1982. where the CFI Pampanga (Branch 2. and the law in force at time the rights were vested As in the Dacanay case. were not evicted from the place and that by 1971. BP 337 (Local Government Code).] En Banc. but rather the market stall fees charges on all market vendors in a public market. There was absolutely no contract or agreement between the appellants and the municipality. 8 of the market stall building owners filed a petition for prohibition in the CFI Pangasinan against the Municipal Council. from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. 1 on leave Facts: On 7 November 1961. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. and absent any complaints from the appellants nor their counsels. to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. appellants voluntarily vacated the public plaza of Pozorrubio. specially of residences. s.R. 1958. and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Castaneda [G. Town plazas are properties of public dominion. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested. was not for the rent of the portion of the public plaza occupied by the market stalls.10.al. the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando.R. while the case was pending. as Villanueva. January 21. the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution 29. which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. L-61311. instead of a resolution for the satisfaction of the parties and guidance of the town officials and residents. and the town officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from encumbrances or illegal private constructions. No." thereby impliedly revoking Resolution 218. when the emergency has ceased. General public has legal right to demand the restoration of city streets to their specific public purpose As in the Dacanay case. being public in nature. on 28 April 1956. a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa.] First Division. On 2 November 1968. because of the destruction of the public market during the war. said temporary occupation or use must also cease.. The Supreme Court decided the case in a formal resolution. In time. the Municipal Mayor. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. The Municipal Treasurer collected from these stall owners fees at the rate of P. Espiritu v. with costs against appellants. fee not rent but market stall fees The fee of P. However. In answer to this resolution. The trial court. Town plazas are properties of public dominion to be devoted to public use and made available to public in general. the market building of the town of Pozorrubio was destroyed. they and the 128 other persons were assigned specific areas or space allotments therein for which they paid daily fees to the municipal government. The action was protested on 10 November 1961. et. Concrete fences were constructed in the premises. even small residences. 1. Appeal was filed by the appellants to the Supreme Court. on a portion of the town plaza.25 per square meter collected by the Municipal Treasurer. No contract or agreement between appellants and municipality. a motion for the dismissal of the case was filed as the case has become moot and academic. et. In 1951. along Mercado Street. The decision was apparently not enforced. and the Chief of Police of Pozorrubio. the market vendors began constructing temporary and make. the Municipal Council of Pozorrubio passed Resolution 209. and ordering the removal of the appellant¶s stalls from the public plaza within 10 days from notice. On 18 January 1964. about renting of the Plaza to the former. While in case of war or during an emergency. Villanueva v. but the owners of the structures on the plaza failed and refused to transfer to said market place. illegal private construction a nuisance subject to abatement according to law Town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls. Contracts by Local Government governed by the original terms and conditions. even residence purposes. however. the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the . 1987. Pampanga. ordering the occupants and owners of the structures on the plaza to remove their buildings within 60 days from receipt of the resolution. L-11014. both cases involve an ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in laws applicable during its time. The appellants failed to comment on the petition for dismissal. Civil Case 2040) issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented Villanueva. has already been repealed by RA7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which took effect on 1 January 1992.25 per square meter a month. No.al. 1961.

the squares. s. Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. and article 1271. after investigation by the municipal attorney. new Civil Code. who later became governor of Pampanga. 1119. et.immediate implementation of Resolution 29. Police power delegated to the municipality The problems caused by the usurpation of the place are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. the Municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose. improve the morals. et al. which are for public use are communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce of man. Muyot v.al. General Welfare Clause. .] The booths served as fruit stands for their owners and often. 7.) The sidewalk was intended for and was used by the public. blocked the free passage of pedestrians who had to take the plaza itself which used to be clogged with vehicular traffic. 3. 2. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties (Espiritu v. 603. it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. This intention was reiterated in 1964 through the adoption of Resolution 29. Town plazas are properties of public dominion. The court denied the petition on 19 July 1982. where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person.´ On 14 June 1982. old Civil Code). rivers. like common lands. to come to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Municipality of Cavite v. filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI Pampanga (Civil Case 6470). del a Fuente In Muyot v. fountains. This is pursuant to Article 344 of the Civil Code which provides that ³property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads.al. for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Roxas. nor is it empowered so to do. and devoted to public use. et. the mayor was justified in ordering the area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative authorities. et. and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Land reserved for a public plaza According to former San Fernando Mayor Rodolfo Hizon. the contract of lease is null and void and of no force or effect because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract.. to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. s. It is not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract. That being the case. Thus." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution 29. Any contract entered into by the City of Manila in connection with the sidewalk. Cruz. and lifted the temporary restraining order issued on 9 August 1982. comfort. The place occupied by Villanueva et. the promenades. In leasing a portion of the plaza or public place. Investigation merely a deference to the requirements of due process The officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando. fountains. Rojas (1915). OIC of the office of the mayor had authority to issuing order to demolish the stalls as declared by judicial and legislative authorities. and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians.al. This rule was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite v. Pozorrubio The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls. not repugnant to law.. and public waters. Police power cannot be bargained away through contract Police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In calling first for the investigation (which Villanueva. 1964). Every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. in going from one place to another (The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public. Portion of sidewalk also beyond commerce of man. Espiritu v. specially of residences. (Municipality of Cavite vs. streets. on 26 June 1982. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces. is ipso facto null and ultra vires. 6. 5. There is no reason to disturb the findings in Civil Case 2040 in the current case Civil Case 6740. conformably to the orders from the court (Civil case 2040) and the council (Resolution 29. 4. as it was not within the commerce of man (Article 1347. Rojas A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. 30 Phil. being likewise beyond the commerce of man. and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof.al from which they are sought to be evicted is a public plaza. prompting Villanueva.al. to remove all taint of arbitrariness in the action he was called upon to take. the National Planning Commission had reserved the area for a public plaza as early as 1951. could not be a proper subject matter of the contract. peace. if not always. Public plaza beyond the commerce of man and cannot be subject of lease or any contractual undertaking. affirmed the 19 July 1982 decision and the 5 August 1982 order of the lower court. Even without the investigation and recommendation of the municipal attorney. or even abrogate it entirely. which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.´ and Article 1271 which prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. and for the protection of property therein. forming part of the public plaza of Sta. by the municipal council of San Fernando. Town plazas are properties of public dominion. promote the prosperity. saw fit to boycott). Municipal Council of Pozorrubio). 1. Macalino as OIC of the office of the mayor of San Fernando issued a resolution requiring the municipal treasurer and engineer to demolish the stalls. and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation [Sec. etc. Villanueva. as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. he was just scrupulously paying deference to the requirements of due process. plazas and streets. The sidewalk. to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. good order. et. with costs against Villanueva. and the motion for reconsideration on 5 August 1982. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations. Cruz. 1964. the decision being immediately executory. de la Fuente.

leaving it and as it was before her occupation. san roque (?1 lot). as it formed part of the public plaza called Soledad.al. municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose. March 28. 1968. the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of Rojas." The lease contract. Burleigh school (2 lots). 1039 was that the said plaza and other places therein enumerated should be kept open for public transit. whereby the municipality of Cavite leased to Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad. Rojas [G. the squares. in area that forms part of the public plaza known under the name of Soledad. 1. etc. Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. this court decided that neither the municipality nor the objectors were entitled to inscription. without special finding as to the costs. and . representing the municipality. the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. wherein the 60days within which it was ought to vacated elapsed without Rojas doing so. There is no ground for the indemnity sought in the nature of damages.R. This motion was denied. Communal things cannot be sold as they are outside the commerce of man Article 1271 of the Civil Code prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract.58 a quarter in advance for occupation thereof (schedule fixed in Ordinance 43. Torres (J): 3 concur. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and declared the land occupied public. and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces. occupied a parcel of land 93 sq. 2. The lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot). passed January 12. Section 50 of the Act also provided that "buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. L-24440.] En Banc. In the case of Nicolas vs. the court rendered the judgment dismissing the complaint with cost against the Municipality. represented by its president Catalino Nicolas. and thus prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that possession of the said land lies with the Municipality and ordering Rojas to vacate the land and deliver possession thereof to the Municipality. afterwards amended on 14 March 1912.Municipality of Cavite v. Curuan school (1 lot). fountains. Leprosarium (3 lots)." Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use. the 12 February 1895 decision of the Spanish Supreme Court stated that "communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for public use. common lands. 1039. located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. s. rivers.] En Banc. with exception on the part of the Municipality. which is for public use and is reserved for the common benefit. Bengzon (J): 8 concur. but the municipality must in its turn restore to Rojas the rentals collected. who occupied some parts thereof with their houses and who also sought that inscription be decreed in their name of the parcels of land in this plaza occupied by them. the promenades. Rojas has been required by the municipality to vacate and deliver possession of the said land. wherefore there can be no doubt that the defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land of the municipality leased by her. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place for private use. Jose (6 Phil 589). 9069. and public places of the municipality of Cavite. Thus. For the same reasons as have been set forth. hydro-electric site (1 lot). streets. which in its turn must restore to Rojas all the sums it may have received from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased. 1903). Rojas constructed thereon a house. Plaza Soledad. paying the Municipality a rental of P5. with the condition that Rojas are obligated to vacate the leased land within 60 days subsequent to the Municipality's demand to that effect. wherein the municipality of Cavite. and as the successor to the rights said entity had under the late Spanish government. by virtue of a lease secured from the Municipality (Resolution 10. Thus. Rojas must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite. the provincial fiscal of Cavite. Property for public use in provinces and in towns Article 344 of the Civil Code provides that "property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads. The counsel for the municipality excepted and in writing asked for a reopening of the case and the holding of a new trial. had exclusive right. because the intention of Act No. 1concur in result Facts: The Municipality (constituted through Act 82). Municipality or objectors not entitled for inscription of land for public use and reserved for the common benefit By section 3 of the said Act No. No. et. The Court ordered Rojas to vacate it and release the land within 30 days. Hospital site (3 lots). City of Zamboanga [G... and the corresponding bill of exceptions was filed. is null and void and of no force or effect. control and administration over the streets. Rojas. in accordance with the provision of Article 1303 of the Civil Code. belonging to the municipality of Cavite." The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon. dated 3 July 1907). m. such as the plazas. for with respect to the objectors said plaza belonged to the municipality of Cavite and with respect to the latter the said Plaza Soledad was not transferable property of that municipality to be inscribed in its name. streets. 3. consequently Rojas is not entitled to claim that the municipality indemnify her for the damages she may suffer by the removal of her house from the said land. approved and forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court. nor is it empowered so to do. high school playground (2 lots). because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad. 1 on leave Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city.R. the Philippine Commission granted to the municipality of Cavite all the land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad. and public waters. As plazas and streets are outside of this commerce. plazas. with objection on the part of Maria Jose et al. On 12 October 1936. March 31. by an instrument dated 5 December 1911. filed a complaint in the CFI Cavite against Rojas alleging that the lease secured from the municipality of Cavite is ultra vires and therefore ipso facto null and void and of no force or effect. lanes. Trade school (1 lot). sought inscription in its name of the land comprised in the said Plaza Soledad. No. fountains. 1915. and by virtue of Act 1039. 1904. for the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of public domain. and the lease of said parcel of land as null and void. School site (3 lots). Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. burleigh (9 lots). After hearing and on 27 March 1913.

the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction as prayed for. Rules authorize conversion of proceedings to an ordinary action Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the propriety of declaratory relief filed in the lower court on the assertion that the law had already been violated and that the province of Zamboanga del Norte sought to give it coercive effect. fountains.46 previously paid to the latter. judgment was rendered declaring RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives the province of its private properties. RA 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. by order of the President. The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March 1960.373. on 17 June 1961.200.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. the Rules anyway authorize the conversion of the proceedings to an ordinary action. and is entitled to the price thereof. and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. and public works for public service paid for by said provinces.00. and municipalities. all the properties in question. in partial payment of the P704.05 due it.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Over the city¶s opposition. the Executive Secretary. Section 6 of the law provided that ³upon the approval of the Act. the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Procedural aspect. since assuming the same to be true.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties.373. and declared permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on 8 June 1967. the Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga. apportioning 54. without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.00. Property owned by municipality in its governmental capacity. The deductions.220.46 has already been returned to it. consists of the provincial roads. The province filed a motion to reconsider praying that the City be ordered instead to pay the P704.294. the Court proceeded to the more important and principal question of the validity of RA 3039. RA 3039 was approved amending Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings. Properties patrimonial except for playground Applying the norm in the Civil Code. all aggregating P57. in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. Hence. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity. cities. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of RA 3039. conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1. properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred. ordered the province to execute the corresponding public instrument deeding to the city the 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title upon full payment. the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June 1948. cities and municipalities. upon the recommendation of the Auditor General." 4. the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45. in the provinces.11 which the city took back from the province out of the sum of P57.373. dismissed the counterclaim of the city. the funds. a Cabinet Resolution was passed. On 4 June 1962. or municipalities.11 of the P57. On 6 June 1952. 1. On 26 May 1949. is divided into property for public use and patrimonial properly. On 17 March 1959. then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. 25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for the City and to remit the same to the province until the sum has been fully paid. and ordering the city to effect payments in favor of the province of whatever balance remains of the provinces's 54. cities and municipalities Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that ³the property of provinces.another 23 vacant lots. P43. on 14 July 1951. without costs. property is public. Properties of provinces.244. the lower court granted the province¶s motion. However. After trial and on 12 August 1963.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte. city streets. This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on 5 March 1962. public waters. promenades. pursuant to CA 39. 2." On 11 January 1955. cities. issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Section 50 of CA 39. In 1945. fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1. by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of the City. effective as of 1945. Congress has absolute control over it If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity. However. then for the quarter ending 30 June 1960. payable by Zamboanga City.030. in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.46. assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines. the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. municipal streets.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum.373.220." On 12 July 1961. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones. free of charge.05 and in relation to this ordered the finance secretary to direct the Commissioner of Internal revenue to deduct from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25%. on the basis of Resolution 7 dated 26 March 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.030. RA 286 created the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. 3.373. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code. the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. This effectively revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July 1951. The Supreme Court set aside the decision appealed from and entered another ordering the city to return to the province in lump sum the amount of P43. when the provincial capital of the Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. except the two (2) lots used as High School ." Article 424 of the same code provides that ³property for public use. the appeal to the Supreme Court. after deducting therefrom the sum of P57. a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the CFI Zamboanga del Norte against Zamboanga City. the squares. Application of Article 424 NCC a. ordered the city to pay the province the sum of P704.

the auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling. in the absence of proof to the contrary. Ejusdem Generis. As ordinary private properties. however. Under this norm. and its successors-in-interest. 7. This result is understandable because. 10. where it was stated that "where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public purposes. etc. it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government. Properties devoted to public service are deemed public Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations. But even assuming that provincial funds were used. or other necessary municipal building.playgrounds. presume a grant from the State in favor of the municipality. Assumption based on history.e. Cantos. Said eight lots constitute the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools and partake of the nature of the same. Registration cannot convert public property to private The fact that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. . the public school. public. The consequences are dire. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when CA 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the present case at their own expense. to be considered public. Province cannot be deprived of its share in the value of the 26 other lots RA 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone. as indicated by the wording. Director of Lands. 6. Thus. b. are not really deprived of the benefits thereof. and so. The Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property. This was the norm applied by the lower court.. police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial properties. the hospital and leprosarium sites. said buildings. all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public. the police patrol automobile. public health. c. properties for public service in the municipalities are not classified as public." (2) Viuda de Tantoco v. Dire consequence of holding property for public service similar to ordinary private property The Court is more inclined to uphold the view that the controversy is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations (State v. such as for the municipal court house. 8. Hence. and in Municipality of Tacloban v. all these to the detriment of the local community. public education. 424. and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. Law of Municipal Corporations prevails over that of Civil Code. which are public in nature. Jurisprudence Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) Hinunangan v. 9 it was held that the capitol site and the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial properties. Moreover. they follow the nature of said lands. they can be levied upon and attached. since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration. could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Application of the Law of Municipal Corporations a. The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. the rest remain patrimonial. hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites. just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Article. Even the capitol site. that rule may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes. Director of Lands. They can even be acquired thru adverse possession. Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question. those located in the city. RA 3039 valid insofar as it affects 24 lots previously used by the province in its governmental capacity RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site. and Character of buildings as accessory to the land The records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. a total of 24 lots. 9. (3) Municipality of Batangas v. Jurisprudence And it cannot be said that its actuation was without jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. The province then. The playgrounds. will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. but. using national funds. b. Buildings on 24 lots are public. properties not included in ³public works for public service´ They would not fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule. the public market. Province) than along that of Civil Law. Municipal Council of Iloilo held that municipal properties necessary for governmental purposes are public in nature. unlike in the classification regarding State properties. still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands. Director of Lands. 5. Burleigh lots constitute appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools and partake of the nature of the same The eight Burleigh lots are adjoining each other and in turn are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built. 11. school sites and its grounds. held squarely that a municipal lot which had always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of a municipality. the Court will. i. would fit into this category.

October 12. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity. and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders. 13. the Cabinet resolved to transfer said properties practically for free to Zamboanga City. is dividends. 96 Am.R. Remaindermen in trust of the corpus of the estate. Pennsylvania rule. however made. The remaining balance. however made. the principles obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws". No.) . Bachrach v. Law of Municipal Corporation. which prevails in certain jurisdictions in the United States. declares stock dividend is not an income but merely represents an addition to the investment capital The so-called Massachusetts rule. which prevails in various other jurisdictions in the United States. dated 26 March 1949. L-2659. cannot be paid in lump sum. 28 Pa. of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General. In 1952. Province not guilty of laches Under CA 39. The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach... Inc. The lower court granted the petition and overruled their objection.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature. one-half of all his estate shall be divided share and share alike by and betweenhis legal heirs.. Massachusetts rule.030.) It holds that a stock dividend is not in any true sense any dividend at all since it involves no division or severance from the corporate assets of the subject of the dividend. (Minot vs. and that it takes nothing from the property of the corporation. petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company. said share to be computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution 7. 99 Mass. As successorin-interest to more than half of the properties involved. All the foregoing.46 had already been made. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. 1950. Seifert [G. On 10 June 1948. M." For purposes of the article. partial payments were effected subsequently and it was only after the passage of RA 3039 in 1961 that the present controversy arose. the amount of P43. The share. made during the lifetime of the usufructuary or life tenant are income and belong to the usufructuary or life tenant. 368. Pennsylvania Rule.39% share in the 26 lots should then be paid by the City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Dec. are negative laches. 262 Pa. legal heirs of the deceased. 705.. for the purpose of Article 424 NCC. While in 1951. M. as administrator of the estate of E.11 already returned to the City. when declared as dividends in whatever form. Hence. it could not have validly affected a completed act. Bachrach.000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock. while dividends go to life tenants The testator intended the remaindermen should have only the corpus of the estate he left in trust.030. to transfer to her the said 54.373. if any. Paine. The estate of E. and that all dividends should go to the life tenants. except as to the P43. is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. as capital." (In re Thompson's Estate. Zamboanga del Norte entitled to 54.000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108. claiming that said dividend. regards cash dividends. although paid out in the form of stock. being in accordance with the above-quoted provisions of the Civil Code. Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. It is true that profits realized are not dividends until declared by the proper officials of the corporation. and stock dividends. however. bequests and gifts) to his wife¶s enjoyment. Payment cannot be paid in lump sum Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's 54..11 should be immediately returned by the City to the province. and the form of the distribution is immaterial. and not in lump sum. Siefer and Elianoff appealed.000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. (Earp's Appeal. Thus. but merely represents an addition to the invested capital. all earnings of the corporation made prior to the testator stockholder belong to his estate The so-called Pennsylvania rule. 274..000 shares. as income. opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. the cause of action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949 after the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question. received from the latter 54. 2. declares that all earnings of the corporation made prior to the death of the testator stockholder belong to the corpus of the estate. to the exclusion of his brothers. The titles to the registered lots are not yet in the name of Zamboanga City. Mary McDonald Bachrach. 101.) The rule supports appellee's contention.12. Article 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has been so far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in question.39% share in the amounts collected in the 26 patrimonial properties. however large. but distribution of profits. In fact. the classification of municipal property devoted for governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case. Section 50. thus. Hence. RA 3039 took effect only on 17 June 1961 after a partial payment of P57. 105 Atl. Bachrach. the rule supports the appellant¶s contention that a stock dividends is not an income (unlike a cash dividend). that it does not distribute property but simply dilutes the shares as they existed before. 273. in the amount of plaintiff's 54. In his last will and testament made varius legacies in cash and willed all the fruits and usufruct the remainder of his estate (after payment of legacies. as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate. as the return of said amount to the city was without legal basis. considered ³special law´ The classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Article 424 of the Civil Code is "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. as owner of 108. 278. The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed from. the old province was dissolved. 3.] En Banc. a reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. Ozaeta (J): 8 concur Facts: The deceased Emil Maurice Bachrach left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach. 14. with costs against the appellants. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff. and that all earnings. 1.

the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. Inc.. and belong to the usufructuary in proportion to the time the usufruct may last. for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7. It seems Mariano Lacson Ledesma is indebted from Bachrach Motor.000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment.. although declared in stock. among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma. on the other hand. the rents of buildings. and of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision. just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother. Civil Fruits under Article 355 of the Civil Code Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First.R. as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the bank. without express finding as to costs.850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on 30 June 1930.] En Banc. but it would give the power to the corporation to beggar the life tenants. 1931. therefore.. To secure the payment of its debt.4. the profits of which are not distributed at fixed periods. the payment of the bonus being made at once. 780). dividends. it is in reality. 35223.500.000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. for the adjectives "otras" and "analogas" agree with the noun "rentas.´ Article 475. Further.500 part of the credit in question. either in cash or stock. in this case. had a preferred right to receive the amount of P11. the aforesaid central. and it ordered the central to deliver said sum to Bachrach Motors. provides that ³When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or periodical revenue. When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in an industrial or commercial enterprise.. or in part from time to time. and had funds which might be so used." Bachrach Motors v. and to pay Bachrach Motors a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint. The complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus.076. The PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. substance not form The law regards substance. W. was indebted to the PNB. And upon conclusion of the hearing. At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the P7. the circumstance of which is not found in the case facts. to wit: the rent of a building. Romualdez (J): 7 concur Facts: On 22 December 1923. If the dividend be in fact a profit. Talisay-Silay Milling [G. Testator¶s intent. by a resolution passed on the same date. 20 S. and." The "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things. is based upon the earnings of the company. for the benefit of the ramaindermen. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co. industrial. and devoid of reason and justice. 778. even if declared as stock. and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Under section 16 of the Corporation Law. represents surplus profits. the 108. 6. second. or other similar sources of revenue." as do also the other adjectives "perpetuas" and "vitalicias. and such a rule might result not only in a violation of the testator's intention. It is but a mode of distributing the profit. and amended on 23 March 1928. No. A stock dividend proper is the issue of new shares paid for by the transfer of a sum equal to their par value from the profit and loss account to that representing capital stock. In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits. Pennsylvania rule more in accord with local statutes The Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with Philippine statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule. whether called by one name or another. the phrase "u otras analogas" refers only to rents or income. who. which is based upon the earnings of the company is an income of the capital invested in it In Hite vs. the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Dividend. Hite (93 Ky. In the present case. except from its earnings. or otherwise. being unborn when the will was executed. for the delivery of the amount of P13. and that the sale made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void.. 257. third. who may perhaps be unknown to the testator. and shall be applied in accordance with the rules prescribed by the next preceding article. 7.. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares..02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma's bonus. the rent of land. and certain kinds of income. the proceeds from leases of lands. Inc. it succeeded in inducing its planters. undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to 2% of the debt secured according to the yearly balance. the income of the capital invested in it. 1. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property under that mortgage. either in money or fruits. held that "where a dividend. Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an owner by purchase in good faith.. although declared in stock. as it found no merit in the appeal. . it should be held to be income. Usufructuary entitled to fruits of the property in usufruct Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural. Any dividend. such profits shall have the same consideration. They represent profits.500) belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it. Articles 474 provides that " Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day. 5. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. September 17. Bachrach Motor Co. each matured payment shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such right. Inc. According to the context of the law. Inc. Talisay-Silay answered the complaint that Mariano Lacson Ledesma¶s credit (P7.. The Court is unwilling to adopt a rule which to us seems so arbitrary. and really a corporation has no right to declare a dividend. and not form. the income from perpetual or life annuities. or the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer. or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such payment. no corporation may make or declare any dividend except from the surplus profits arising from its business. are the wife and children of the testator. The 54. as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. to mortgage their land to the bank. whether cash or stock.. PNB appealed.

Inc. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed. On 30 January 1962. the amount of P4. the owner of the materials may remove them in any event with a right to be indemnified for damages.. Otherwise. As held. 1 concurs in result Facts: On several occasions from 1 October 1956 to 2 March 1957 the Carried Lumber Company sold and delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms. the sum of P4. but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured. 1961 the trial court rendered judgment sustaining the Company's claim. Asserting absolute and exclusive ownership of the buildings in question. and the plantings. Consequently. Inc. Article 447 of the Civil Code provides that ³the owner of the land who makes thereon personally or through another. the court rendered judgment annulling the levy of 16 January 1962 and the certificate of sale of 12 February 1962. The owner of the materials. whether personally or through another. On 16 January 1962 the sheriff levied upon the 6 buildings. which is something quite distinct from and independent of the property referred to. Esguerra [G. De Barretto v. The court. the accessory. shall pay their value. However. so on 19 December 1961 the corresponding writ of execution was issued. Carried Lumber Company is an unpaid furnisher of materials The appellant is an unpaid furnisher of materials. provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. within which it may exercise the option of redeeming the 6 buildings. vs. The Court granted. if he acted in bad faith. (a) declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of the 6 buildings. Castro (J): 8 concur.2. the appeal. on the other hand. he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials.710. makes constructions or works thereon. 2. is not based upon the value. constructions or works.18 with legal interest from 23 September 1961 until the said amount shall have been fully paid. The owner of the land who in good faith. the land being considered the principal. using materials belonging to somebody else. The judgment-debtor did not appeal. becomes the owner of the said materials with the obligation however of praying for their value. and (b) adjudging the defendants jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff in the sum of P2. Compensation should be borne by the person who benefited by the accession Well-established in jurisprudence is the role that compensation should be borne by the person who has been benefited by the . on 17 October 1958 the Company instituted Civil Case D-775 with the CFI Pangasinan to recover the said unpaid balance from the Insular Farms. the appellant ² which apparently has no desire to remove the materials. Shielded by an indemnity bond of P7.R. there must first be some proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated. constructions or works with the materials of another. which the latter used in the construction of 6 buildings at its compound in Bolinao. Applying article 447 by analogy. such as insolvency. however in view of the equities attendant in the case.710. It is neither rent of buildings. is entitled to remove them. must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said materials. the sheriff proceeded with the announced public auction on 12 February 1962 and sold the levied buildings to the Company for P6. denied the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages on the ground that it was not "prepared to find that there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any of the defendants." The legal provision contemplates a principal and an accessory. no need to decide on the existence of a materialman¶s lien. 4. Pangasinan. does not involve a question of preference of credits. Inc. November 29. The present case.18 has not been paid by Insular Farms. the buildings are considered as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. without pronouncement as to costs. praying that judgment be rendered.710. however. according to the resolution of the central granting it. et al. proceeds from lease of lands. he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. by paying Carried Lumber Company the sum of P4. about 7 months before the Company filed the present action (Civil case D-775). it is not civil fruits of that land. and even if it were minded to do so. not an income of the land The amount of the bonus. the Pacific Farms filed a complaint on 14 May 1962 against the Company and the sheriff with the CFI Pangasinan. As the bonus is not obtained from the land. the settlement of a decedent's estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.000 by way of actual damages and for such amount as the court may deem proper and just to impose by way of exemplary damages and for costs of the suit. Likewise unchallenged is the lower court's factual finding that out of the total procurement price of P15. cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings ² has the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. On August 23. 1. or liquidation proceedings of similar import. before there can be a pro rata payment of credits entitled to preference as to the same specific real property. plantings.110. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment. the Pacific Farms filed a third-party claim asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed on 21 March 1958.78. constructions or works being destroyed. or income under Article 355 of the Civil Code. No. L-14938 (6 SCRA 928) is inapplicable in the present case because it concerned not one but two or more preferred creditors who.] En Banc. Bonus not a civil fruit. according to the annual balance.18 remains outstanding and unpaid by the Insular Farms. of the total procurement price of P15. et al. must necessarily be convened and the nature and extent of their respective claims ascertained. 1969.000. importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property. if it does own the six buildings." Hence. or without the plantings.000. It is undenied and undeniable that the appellant furnished lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms which the latter used in the construction of the six buildings. 3. Pacific Farms a period of 30 days from the date of the finality of the judgment. however. After due trial and on 30 May 1963. if the landowner acted in bad faith.120 put up by the Company and the Cosmopolitan Insurance Company. L-21783. and. Pacific Farms v. Application of Article 447 by analogy The application by analogy of the rules of accession would suffice for a just adjudication. and dismissed the complaint. pursuant to articles 2242 and 2249 of the Civil Code. Villanueva not applicable The case De Barretto. Thus the appellee. Villanueva. Application by analogy of the rules of accession suffice. and is not one where two or more creditors have separate and distinct claims against the same debtor who has insufficient property.

(Fabular v. declaring Madlangawa as a builder or possessor in good faith. 1988. It should therefore shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials. pursuant to article 447. Olaes (1 SCRA 1159. the company appealed to the Court of Appeals and upon affirmance by the latter of the decision below. Tecson [G. e. Inc. Antonio Araneta is not only the president of the Insular Farms but also a director and counsel of Pacific Farms. the company filed with the trial court (Judge Jose H. 3. The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered Judge Tecson to immediately issue a writ of execution ordering the Madlangawa to vacate the disputed premises and deliver possession of the same to the company.R. like. Court of Appeals. the present petition has not been rendered moot and academic by the decision in Manotok v. the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements" because the option given by law either to retain the premises and pay for the improvements thereon or to sell the said premises to the builder in good faith belongs to the owner of the property. represented Insular Farms in Civil Case D-775 is the same lawyer for the present action. Options available to the parties In Queme v. et al. of J. No. 6. the judge held that in view of peculiar circumstances which supervened the institution of the case. 119 SCRA 329)" The judge cannot deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the Madlangawa was adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of "peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution of this case. to reimbursement for the value of its unpaid materials. as a necessary corollary. no addition can be made thereto In Duenas v. otherwise there would be no end to legal processes.g. Tecson). the exercise of option belongs to the owner of the property and that upon finality of judgment. the company elevated its case to the Supreme Court. v. Mandi (151 SCRA 530. the appellant acted correctly in bringing an action (D-775) against the Insular Farms. First. 1163). L-47475. On 5 August 1977. the Supreme Court issued a resolution dated 11 July 1977 denying the company's petition for lack of merit. as a matter of right. it was helpless to prevent the sale of the property built from lumber and construction materials it furnished. the appellant could pursue any remedy available to it under the law in order to enforce the said right. National Housing Authority. the company filed the present petition for mandamus alleging that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to exercise option and for execution of judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. Manotok. But certainly. was valid and effective. On 7 October 1977. Insular Farms never moved to implead Pacific Farms as a necessary party-defendant in Civil Case D-775. On 21 May 1987. for instance. Gutierrez Jr.accession. When decision becomes final and executory. it was held that ³after a judgment has become final. Block 1. Third. August 19. Second. a motion for the approval of the company's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment. the appellee benefited from the accession. Current action proper Carried Lumber not as advantageously situated as Pacific Farms. and thus cannot possibly exonerate it from making compensation.500. Not satisfied with the trial court's decision. It follows. and enforcing its right of reimbursement through the execution of the final judgment it obtained in the said case against the six buildings in the possession of the appellee who now stands to benefit therefrom. NHA. Thus. However. The only right given to the . Said court rendered judgment. 545). of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by the company the sum of P7. PD 1669 was issued providing for the expropriation of the Tambunting Estate. et al. from the lumber and materials that went into the construction of the six buildings.). Madlangawa be ordered to deliver possession of the property in question to the company. Atty. that the sale at public auction conducted by the defendant sheriff of the six buildings described in the certificate of sale dated 12 February 1962. Thus. Curiously. b) thereafter. There is no basis for the judge to deny the petitioner's motion to avail of its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property. It may be reasonable that Araneta as president of Insular Farm knew about the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the lumber and construction materials supplied or furnished by the appellant to the Insular Farms. No doubt.] Third Division. i. to its execution which is only a ministerial act on the part of the judge. without pronouncement as to costs. the prevailing party is entitled. the Court rendered a decision in the Elisa Manotok case ruling that PD 1669 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. Antonio Araneta¶s law firm. (J): 4 concur Facts: Manotok Realty filed a complaint against Nilo Madlangawa for recovery of possession and damages with the then CFI Manila. it became incumbent upon the trial court judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. When decision becomes final. On 13 July 1977. 2. this decree was challenged before the Supreme Court in GR 55166 (Elisa R.00.. Amadeo Santiago Jr. the motion for approval was denied. 5. Manotok Realty v.e. judge incumbent to issue necessary writ of execution When the decision of the trial court became final and executory. 1. J. and nothing can be done therewith except its execution. no additions can be made thereto. because it has a right. On 28 December 1980. Pacific Farms not a buyer in good faith so as to exonerate it from making compensation The appellee's stance that it is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith is open to grave doubt because of certain facts of substantial import (evident from the records) that cannot escape notice. praying that the court issue an order: a) approving the exercise of the company's option to appropriate the improvements introduced by Madlangawa on the property. Manotok Realty. There being no separate registry of property for buildings and no procedure provided by law for registering or annotating the claim of an unpaid furnisher of materials. Insular Farms and Pacific Farms are housed in adjacent rooms at the Insular Life Building as early as 21 March 1958. it was held that ³under Article 448. After a denial of its motion for reconsideration. the introduction of certain repairs of and other substantial improvements on the controverted property. Carried Lumber not as advantageously situated as Pacific Farms. the right to appropriate the works or improvements or 'to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land' belongs to the owner of the land. ordering the company to recognize the right of Madlangawa to remain in Lot 345.

the basis for the builder's right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the landowner. for which they were seeking reimbursement.. to recover them from any person withholding possession thereof from them. See also Manotok Realty. entitled to retain possession of the stalls respectively put up by them until and unless indemnified for the value thereof The decision also declared that the Bulaong and Mercado Groups had executed the sub-letting agreements with full awareness that they were thereby violating Ordinance 14. But by Order dated 9 January 1976. Carolina S. to sub-lease the stalls. 98 Phil.122 SCRA 206)" 5. Improvements gutted by fire. 10 June 1988). justify the denial of the landowner's exercise of option. C. builder¶s right to retain extinguished Since the improvements have been gutted by fire. On 7 January 1976. 103 SCRA 7) It is such a builder in good faith who is given the right to retain the thing. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted. No.. much less." 6. (Art. no issue remained under genuine controversion.' (Art. Inc.] First Division. the builder. and notice of the order of denial was received by them on 18 December 1975. Assuming the indifference of the Court and the other group to its opposition. until he has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses. Repairs and improvements introduced after the filing of the complaint in bad faith The repairs and improvements introduced by the builder after the complaint was filed cannot be considered to have been built in good faith. the members of the Bulaong Group constructed new stalls therein at their expense. (GR L-44001. and Avelina C.. from 1956 to 1972. Narvasa (J): 4 concur Facts: Lolita C." 4. June 10. 129 SCRA 51. Florentino Agulto. Queto v. as well as a 29 May 1973 directive of the Office of the President requiring enforcement of said Ordinance 14. citing Caram v. 14 Phil. notice of which had been served on them on 3 November 1975. The Mercado Group and the Municipality filed on 14 November 1975. Judge Benigno Puno rendered a summary judgment in all the cases. it was held that "to be deemed a builder in good faith. CA [G. Phil. Yap (13 SCRA 190. 348) and that he be unaware 'that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. motions for reconsideration of the summary judgment. v. Nucom (the Mercado Group). Chico. the municipal officials of Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong Group and declared the persons comprising the Mercado Group as the rightful lessees of the stalls in question. After the Mercado Group had been in possession of the market stalls for some months. which prohibited the sub-leasing stalls by the lessees thereof. Mercado v. 546. In 1972. v. Civil Code. It rejected the claim of the Municipality of Baliuag that it had automatically acquired ownership of the new stalls constructed after the old stalls had been razed by fire. Joaquin Ignacio. Their theory was anchored on their claimed ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own expense. CA. Inc. Inc. Monton.. and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons (Arts. cf. L-44001. v. et al. The Mercado Group thereafter filed motions for summary judgment.A.e. and hence had no cause of action one against the other and no right to recover whatever had been given or demand performance of anything undertaken. Eastern Trading Co. Gomez de la Serna. Civil Code). and necessary. 627. Severino Salaysay. v. to which the Mercado Group did not respond.. . there is no other recourse for the builder but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to the landowner. Luciana Cabrera. approved on 5 July 1973. the Trial Court directed inter alia the execution of the judgment. cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. Agana. even as against the real owner. instituting in that court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition "to annul that portion of the summary judgment awarding damages to the Bulaong Group and to restrain the Judge and the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan from enforcing the same. and their resulting right. Court of Appeals. Bulaong. (Art. 1988. and therefore. The market was destroyed by fire on 17 February 1956. The members of the Bulaong Group sued. the Mercado Group filed a notice of appeal. dated 14 December 1964. adjudging that its decision had become final because the appeal documents had "not been seasonably filed.A. 7. 86 Phil. Susana Bernardino (the Bulaong Group). it is essential that a person assert title to the land on which he builds. Builder in good faith In Paz Mercado. holding that the judgment had become final and certiorari or prohibition could not be availed of as a substitute for the . C." The writ was issued. and they thereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag. These were denied. and consequently the court's declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and proper. 42. Granados v. as such owners. Arriola v. 544 and 1123. Lopez. 129 SCRA 122. Laureta. 196). Good faith cease after filing of the complaint In Mindanao Academy. Inc. that he be a possessor in concept of owner. Elmer Flores. this legal fiction of (Yap)'s good faith ceased when the complaint against him was filed. 526. they were thus in pari delicto. to which the Bulaong Group objected. i.. et al. asserting that in light of the admissions made at the pre-trial and in the pleadings. an appeal bond and a motion for extension of time to file their record on appeal. Policarpio v. Recognition of the Mercado Group's rights over the stalls was subsequently manifested in Municipal Ordinance 49. Civil Code. The municipal authorities justified the cancellation of the leases of the Bulaong Group by invoking the provisions of Municipal Ordinance 14.builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements. the members of the group sub-leased their individual stalls to other persons: Paz Mercado. it was held that "although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between themselves their rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction. On 24 October 1975." The appellate Court rendered judgment on 14 May 1976 affirming the judgment of the lower court. The Group went to the Court of Appeals. Bulacan. Civil Code. the former presented affidavits and depositions to prove the value of the improvements.R. 134 SCRA 329. They filed several individual complaints with the CFI seeking recovery of their stalls from the Mercado Group as well as damages. in substitution of the former. and the Mercado Group's motion to quash the same and to re-open the case was denied. 525. Sarmiento v. have been individual lessees of stalls in the public market of Baliuag. Hon. declaring the members of the Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith.

unless there are reasons to depart Upon the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. 6. "should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount. That they did not join in the move to have a hearing on the issue of damages is an indication that they considered it unnecessary. even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. i. Error of judgment reviewable by appeal. the Mercado Group moved for reconsideration of an adverse judgment. Erroneous judgment does not render decision void. Once again. And when a court exercises its jurisdiction. appeal bond and motion for extension were. they recognized the Court's competence when they filed their answers to the complaints without questioning the Court's jurisdiction of the subject-matter. until he has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses. Computation of 30-day reglementary period In accordance with Section 3. Peculiar scenario. and admissions on file. that on 18 December 1975. as was their right. Lessees cannot be considered builders in good faith The members of the Bulaong group were admittedly lessees of space in the public market. as stated by the Rules. even as against the real owner. Parties recognized jurisdiction when they filed pleadings Under the law. and taking account of well established precedent from which there is no perceivable reason in the premises to depart. that he be a possessor in concept of owner. 7. and that he be unaware "that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. without altering the form or substance of the property leased. that they were owners of any part of the land occupied by the market so that in respect of any new structure put up by them thereon. or affidavits. the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. that on 14 November 1975. and in truth never did make the claim. The peculiar circumstances of the present case operate to exclude it from the scope of the rule. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. or 20 days after receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration. cannot be allowed. had in fact opposed their motion and had pointed out precisely the need for a hearing on the controverted matter of damages. and once again were rebuffed. they filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision. being merely an error of judgment. presented 1 day after the expiration of the 30-day period to perfect an appeal. they could be deemed builders in good faith (in accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code). They were evidently quite confident of obtaining a favorable judgment. is not lost by any error in the exercise thereof that might subsequently be committed by the court. therefore. If it did. together with the affidavits. except as to the amount of damages. a lessee who "makes in good faith useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended. The parties composing the Mercado Group cannot dispute this. they therefore could not. appeal bond and motion for extension of time until 7 January 1976. the resolution of such issues as are found to be genuine should be made upon proof proferred at a formal hearing. As it turned out. with costs against the Mercado Group. is reviewable only by appeal. or sham or fictitious ² which can be done by depositions. Rule in summary judgment It is only the ascertainment of the character of the issues raised in the pleadings ² as genuine. Jurisdiction not lost by any error in the exercise thereof committed by the court. they were wrong in their prognostication. the 30-day reglementary period of appeal shall be deducted the "time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending. presented affidavits and depositions to prove the value of the improvements. any error that the Court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. their motion would be granted if "the pleadings. once acquired. An appeal by way of certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.e. or after the lapse of 11 days from receipt of said decision. by which this court is bound." They knew that the Bulaong Group. 4. not by special action of certiorari or prohibition Jurisdiction. They made no response whatever.. 2. not by the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition. the Mercado Group did not ask that the matter be ventilated at a hearing. as affirming and not eroding the rule. the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction not only over the persons of the parties but also over the subject matter of the actions at bar. remove the improvements. not an interlocutory disposition or order The summary judgment rendered on 24 October 1975 was not an interlocutory disposition or order but a final judgment within the . they received copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration. unlike the builder in good faith. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 1. apparently in view of the Court's and the Mercado Group's indifference to the notion of having a hearing on the matter of damages implicitly indicating the belief of the superfluity of a hearing. 5. indeed neither at that time nor at any other time thereafter did any one of them ever raise the question. it is essential that a person assert title to the land on which he builds." 8. This. When the Bulaong Group. They knew or were supposed to know that. depositions. or submit counter-affidavits. for which they were seeking reimbursement. Jurisdiction of the lower court. Summary judgment a final judgment." 3. an error committed while engaged in that exercise does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the appealed judgment. and that such an eventuality would preclude the claimed reimbursement or recovery of damages. show that. there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It is an exception that should however be taken." can only claim payment of "one-half of the value of the improvements" or. Court bound by factual holding of the CA. admissions.group's lost appeal. as defendants. every error committed by a court would deprive it of jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. there is no question that the the Mercado Group had failed to perfect an appeal from the summary judgment within the reglementary period fixed by the Rules of Court. On the other hand. It is such a builder in good faith who is given the right to retain the thing. Moreover. To be deemed a builder in good faith. and that they did not file their notice of appeal. had moved for summary judgment. The record discloses that they received copy of the summary judgment on 3 November 1975. Summary judgment requested by the Mercado Group The petitioners (Mercado Group) were the parties who. The notice of appeal. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. of course.

thus putting an end to the litigation as its level. This is axiomatic. be instances when certiorari may exceptionally be permitted in lieu of appeal. Remedy to a final judgment is an appeal The remedy available against a final judgment was an appeal in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. slow. nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. insufficient. Juan filed an application of Torrens title over the land for himself and his supposed co-owner Restituta. Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building. nor any plain. L-35648. The judgment became final and has thus gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect. i. A judgment contrary to the express provisions of a statute is of course erroneous. as when their appeal would be inadequate. Judgment contrary to express provisions which becomes final and executory. Cadastral Case 12) pronouncing Juan (married to Restituto) as the owner of the land. These findings were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. before the barter) by Tan Queto. binding and effective as any valid judgment That the judgment of the Trial Court applied the wrong provision of the law in the resolution of the controversy has ceased to be of any consequence. And certain it is that the special civil action of certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal." There may to be sure. Ownership was acquired by the spouses by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the . Assuming they are factual findings. By that summary judgment the Court finally disposed of the pending action. Land is conjugal. Civil Code). On 22 September 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with the consent of her husband) for a period of 10 years. or one of the errors.] Resolution En Banc. if erroneous The findings of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. ascribed to the Court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. February 27.meaning of Section 2. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari. as a consequence of the cadastral case. 9. 1 votes to deny reconsideration. 1 dissents. but on appeal in the CFI. the judgment invoked that relative to the rights of builders in good faith. Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot. and the spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of land with the house constructed thereon previously owned (that is. a decision was promulgated (GLRC 1638. On 22 November 1938. CA [G. and if it becomes final and executory. 3. 2 took no part Facts: Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot 304-B of the Cadastre Survey of the Municipality of Centro. for annulment of the barter. Findings of the lower courts ordinary conclusive upon the Court. Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot. Tan Queto v. they cannot bind the Court. without any objection on the part of Restituta. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Ownership by tradition The land is conjugal. and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effect of the judgment complained of. or to avoid future litigations. No. The availability of the right of appeal obviously precluded recourse to the special civil action of certiorari. and though erroneous. not paraphernal. but it is not void. will henceforth be treated as valid. This is true even if the error. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 1987. The remedy to obtain a reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal. 10. as Tan Queto's exclusive property. Tan Queto filed for a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated 16 May 1983. or the exercise of power in excess thereof. Land not transferred to Restituta by donation. for it to be paraphernal The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation inter-vivos because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 1. Meanwhile.e. none of which situations obtains in the present case. and for recovery of the land with damages. Misamis Occidental) either as a purported donation or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50. leaving nothing more to be done by it with respect to the merits. not paraphernal. without costs. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to Restituta of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. The Supreme Court set aside its decision promulgated on 16 May 1983. 749. the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and Tan Queto. 2. and will be enforced in accordance with its terms and dispositions. Thereafter. specially where the right to appeal has been lost through a party's fault or inexcusable negligence. and rendered a new one declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereon. The transaction took place during her mother's lifetime (her father having predeceased the mother) and consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in its decision. an OCT was issued in Juan¶s name. it becomes as binding and effective as any valid judgment.R. On 22 January 1935. Paras (J): 10 concur. instead of the legal provision governing lessees' rights over improvements on leased realty. The CFI and the Court of Appeals found the disputed lot as paraphernal and that Tan Queto was a builder in bad faith. On 22 April 1962. one of the requisites for availment of the latter remedy being precisely that "there should be no appeal. It is a proposition made plain by Section 1 of Rule 65 which lays down as a condition for the filing of a certiorari petition that there be 'no appeal. still if they are erroneous inferences from certain facts.00 as the alleged consideration thereof. On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City. exception. On 10 October 1962. The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case.

there being no proof that Restituta had paraphernal funds of her own). Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all installment payments. On 30 January 1981. 4. Sale not fictitious nor simulated. Civil Code). Pleasantville Subdivision.00 and another P50. there is no such flaw or defect because it is Tan Queto himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the property. In the present case. 448. the appellate court affirmed the decision with respect to the order to vacate the premises of Lot 9. plus costs of litigation. Allegation of simulation cannot prejudice a stranger The sale cannot be said to be fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) as there was a valid consideration therefor. Panganiban (J): 4 concur. Civil Code) with P50. Assuming that there had indeed been a simulation. Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50. filed a third-party complaint against Pleasantville and CTTEI. He is a builder-possessor (jus possidendi) because he is the owner himself. The MTCC thus ordered Kee to vacate Lot 9. Civil Code). No. such amount bearing an interest of 12% per annum. furthermore. CA [G. accompanied Kee's wife. Donabelle Kee.] Third Division. When Kee refused to vacate. reimbursement should be given him if Restituta decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. still Restituta¶s failure to prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done. good faith and bad faith The Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis. Assuming Tan Queto recognized Restituta as the owner. and reversed the order Pleasantville and CTTEI to pay Jardinico attorney's fees and costs of litigation. having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal. 1 took no part Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation a parcel of land designated as Lot 9. he cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot. The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. On the other hand. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle Tan Qyeto to the rights of a builder in good faith (Art. to remove all structures and improvements he introduced thereon. The difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former is not aware of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is aware of such defect or flaw (Art. Jus possessionis. Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof to Kee. 712. demanding that the latter remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. Inc. 7. dismissed the third-party complaint against Pleasantville CTTEI. The lot is therefore conjugal. 1996.00 as attorney's fees. Tan Queto an owner-possessor Tan Queto having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with Juan (who has been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the owner-possessor of the lot.") There is no admission of Restituta's exclusive ownership. Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee. 448. and to pay a rental of P15.00 a day computed from the time the suit was filed on 12 March 1981 until he vacateds the premises. Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C. the RTC Bacolod City (Branch 48) ruled that Pleasantville and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent and found Kee a builder in bad faith. 5. Pleasantville Development v. The rescission was effected in 1979. Unfortunately. a store. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase presupposes ownership in another). On appeal. in turn. 79688. ergo. Lot 9 was vacant.000. Tan Queto recognized Restituta as an owner. The Court further rendered judgment against Kee to pay Jardinico the sum of P3. Thereafter. for she was a co-owner (with Juan. Phase II and located at Taculing Road. before the complaint was instituted. the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger to said strategem (like petitioner herein).00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. who had taken possession thereof. Civil Code).T.R. The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement. 6. Zenaida Octaviano.contract of sale (See Art. Jardinico confronted Kee. makes her also in bad faith. On 20 January 1975. bad faith of one neutralizes the bad faith of the other Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal. not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other than the owner. for the preparation of the lot plan. much less is he a builder in bad faith. 8. not the owner Tan Queto admitted Restituta was "an owner" (not the owner) of the lot in his Answer. Kee. an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot. (CTTEI). the removal of the structure and improvements introduced thereon at Kee¶s expense. Kee proceeded to construct his residence. the exclusive real estate agent of Pleasantville Development. These amounts were paid prior to Kee's taking actual possession of Lot 8. on 26 March 1974. and. Upon completing all payments. to inspect Lot 8. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment. But in either case there is a flaw or defect. CTTEI through its employee. but failed. and to pay the Jardinico rentals of P15. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee.00 a day until he vacates the premises. Jardinico filed with the MTCC a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. After the discovery.00 on 27 January 1975. and this is true. February 1. Consequently. Following the . and that Kee had not contested the rescission. Jardinico secured on 19 December 1978 from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City TCT 106367 in his name.000 as attorney¶s fees and P700 as cost and litigation expenses. The MTCC also found that Pleasantville had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latter's failure to pay the installments due. and therefore "an owner. Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. with an interest of 12% per annum. At that time. 526. The MTCC also ordered CTTI and Pleasantville to pay Jardinico in solidum for the amount of P3. jus possidendi. Thus. The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and Pleasantville. the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Torres Enterprises. Bacolod City. Tan Queto nursed the belief that the lot was actually Restituta's (making him in bad faith).

the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damages. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable. however. he went to the subdivision developer's agent and applied and paid for the relocation of the lot.T. unless the waiver is contrary to law. it was. as such fact does not negate the negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot to Kee. the appellate court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot 9). the same cannot now be quantified and awarded). and thus ordered the CTTEI and Pleasantville to be solidarily liable for the demolition expenses and value of improvements destroyed or rendered useless in case Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and thereafter remove the structures. as well as litigation expenses. Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds of the property with which he is dealing. Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Such circumstance is relevant only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful detainer against Kee. Further. such as being present during the geodetic engineer's relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to countercheck for errors. Deed of Sale between Kee and Jardinico merely regulates the reciprocal rights of the parties and has no effect on the liability of Pleasantville ." 6. 7. CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of Pleasantville when it made the delivery to Kee. deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon. Upon Kee's receipt of the map. as well as litigation expenses. Contractual breach cannot be the basis to negate the presumption of builder in good faith Violations of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith. as he was unaware of the "mix-up" when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8. has no relevance on the liability of Pleasantville. The Court dispensed with the award of rentals to Jardinico. and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. 3. Pleasantville filed the petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. The appellate court ordered CTTEI and Pleasantville to pay in solidum the amount of P3. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI. 1. i. The Court also ordered Pleasantville Development and C. Good faith presumed It is thus highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by another. the one alleging bad faith has the burden of proving bad faith. Prudent acts to ascertain land to build on Under the Torrens system of land registration.000.e. who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. In the present case. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals of such deal.denial of his motion for reconsideration on 20 October 1986. 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). Principal responsible for acts of agent if damaged caused to third persons.000. It is this negligence that is the basis of Pleasantville's liability.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees. It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI. The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith (entitled to rights under Articles 448. done within the scope of his authority. or for the amount representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico if Jardinico chose to sell the land to Kee. or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property. And as good faith is presumed. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. In acting within its scope of authority. wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. 2. negligent. Jardinico and Kee on 24 July 1987 entered into a deed of sale. what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Because of CTTEI's blunder. 5. not to mention the social humiliation that would follow. public policy. for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. and because of the company's positive identification of the property. Kee a builder in good faith.T. and that Pleasantville Development and C. public order. he had to find a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT 69561 matched Lot 8. his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's employee. Torres Enterprises solidarily liable for damages due to negligence (however. Agent is personally liable for damages if he exceeds his authority The principal is responsible for the acts of the agent. But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property. Scenario of bad faith improbable. as principal of CTTEI. Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery. or good customs. Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals. Rescission does not negate the negligence of CTTEI The Contract of Sale on Installment covering Lot 8 between Pleasantville and Kee. per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code. These alleged violations may give rise to Pleasantville's cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach). morals. and should bear the damage caused to third persons. as well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic engineer. and ruled that the award of rentals was without basis. On the other hand. which referred the matter to the Court of Appeals. 4. Thus. Recovery of damages not waived Kee did not contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from Pleasantville's negligence.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees. and modified the decision of the Court of Appeals by declaring Wilson Kee a builder in good faith. "Rights may be waived. which was rescinded long before the present action was instituted. There was no need for him to have acted ex-abundantia cautela. Pleasantville. Torres Enterprises to pay in solidum the amount of P3. since the amount and/or extent of such damages was proven during the trial. Octaviano. on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9.

Appellate court erred in modification of the application of the law on ground of equity The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other. died. et al. on 11 December 1961. (2) that Eduarda Caridad claims right and title thereto as a mere heir and successor-in-interest of said Andres Caridad. who had been in possession of the southern portion of said Lot 8864 since 1939. This may be concluded based on the circumstances that (1) that the Caridads do not dispute that during the pendency of the cadastral proceeding (to which judgment was rendered awarding said lot 8864. granting Baltazar's motion. no damages due Pleasantville¶s liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. with costs against the Caridads. Not satisfied. The Supreme Court shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals. On 2 January 1962. his surviving spouse Silvina Caridad. June 23. Baltazar presented a motion to compel Eduarda and Silvina Caridad to remove their respective houses which they built in 1958 and 1959. etc. the sheriff enforced the writ and placed Baltazar in possession of the southern portion of the lot. one of whom is Eduarda Caridad. Pleasantville supposedly liable for damages due to agents negligence. GLRO Cadastral Case 1222). 29 April 1960. 2. 11. 10. Pleasantville¶s should be held liable for damages. in the cadastral case praying for writ of possession against Silvina Caridad and her daughter. However." Baltazar v. the trial court rendered decision. to order the sheriff to demolish the same. the trial court issued an order. and consequent issuance of the final decree of registration of the same. ordering the Caridads to remove their respective houses from the southern portion of said lot 8864 within 30 days from receipt of said order. 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). which deed governs the rights of Jardinico and Kee as to each other. said lot was registered in the names of applicant spouses under OCT O-1445. the corresponding decree was issued on 12 July 1941. Arts. in the office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. as builder in good faith and owner in good faith. sitting as a land registration court. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order. awarding Lot 8864 of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) cadastre to the spouses Julio Baltazar and Constancia Valencia as their conjugal partnership property. while the cadastral case involving said lot was pending before the trial court. The "terms and conditions in the said deed of sale are strictly for the parties thereto" and that "there is no waiver made by either of the parties in said deed of whatever favorable judgment or award the Court of Appeals may make in Kee¶s and Jardinico¶s favor against Pleasantville and CTTEI. Eduarda Caridad. In the meanwhile. Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9. respectively. after due hearing. the registered owner of Lot 8864. 58 OG 3349). are regulated by law (i. Order compelling Caridads to remove their respective houses from the disputed lot. L-23509. is valid and enforceable against the latter. Award of attorney¶s fees lies with the discretion of the court depending on the case¶s circumstances The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of each case. as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code. 8. Caridad [G. For such negligence. there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial court. No writ having theretofore been issued in Baltazar's favor. whichever is applicable in the exercise of the landowner¶s options. and before the decision was rendered and the corresponding decree issued in 1941. 1. in the southern portion of the disputed lot. No need to remand the case for the determination of the value and the land In view of the deed of sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico. and pursuant thereto. 9. the Caridads appealed (CA-GR 31289-R). (L-15609. respectively. The extent and/or amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence is adduced. 1966. dated 23 January 1941. dated 20 March 1962.The deed of sale regulates the reciprocal rights of Kee and Jardinico. Reyes JBL (J): 8 concur Facts: In the cadastral proceeding (Cadastral Case 54. there is also no further need to remand the case to the court of origin "for determination of the actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot 9). the Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or . on 5 November 1959. Jurisdiction of the CFI. the trial court. Due to lack of evidence.´ The deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of Pleasantville. No.. in the event of their failure to do so. and. Thus.R. of the cadastral court. granting Baltazar's motion to compel the Caridads to remove their respective houses from the disputed lot. Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his interests and for the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the negligence of Pleasantvile's agent. it stressed that they had reached an agreement independent of the outcome of the case. Pleasantville's liability is grounded on the negligence of its agent. his surviving wife and children filed a motion. and their children. The appellate court. granted Baltazar¶s motion. At any rate. On 6 December 1961.. on the ground of "equity". On 20 March 1962. and overruled Caridad¶s opposition but directed the sheriff not to remove or destroy the permanent improvements on the lot without an express command. the late Andres Caridad. Mencias. were in possession of the southern portion of the disputed lot . Said decision having become final. in favor of Julio Baltazar).e. certified the appeal to the Supreme Court for raising only questions of law. Lack of opposition in previous proceedings The order. 448. to issue writ of possession and order demolition of improvements In Marcelo vs. the Court deleted the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision holding Pleasantville and CTTEI solidarily liable for demolition expenses or the amount pertaining to the value of the lot. however. the order having become final. On 23 January 1962. It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the application of such law. hence no damages could be awarded.] En Banc. and (3) that the Caridads do not dispute the propriety and validity of the order of the cadastral court. Julio Baltazar. which was later transcribed. granting the writ of possession in favor of Baltazar as well as its enforcement.

all auxiliary writs. On 8 March 1966. among others. It would foster unnecessary and expensive litigations and result in multiplicity of suits. that should he not remove the said buildings and improvements within a period of two months after the expiration of this Agreement. beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's title despite judicial adjudication. demolish or remove the improvements made by the defendant or his agent on the property. 391.. had neither sought Stohner's ejectment from the premises. Rule 124. if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein (Demorar vs. Charvet leased said lot to Richard Stohner for a period of 5 years at the monthly rental of P40. Stohner. May 30. which the judicial system abhors. Manila (TCT 25664). . 6. Del Rosario.00 as back rentals from December 1965 to August 1966. especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which without said writ of demolition would be ineffective. setting aside the judgment of the city court and dismissing Baculanag's complaint. L-33422. that ³the lessee may erect such buildings upon and make such improvements to the leased land as he shall see fit." During the existence of the lease.000. To require a successful litigant in a land registration case to institute another action for the purpose of obtaining possession of the land adjudged to him. damages. ordering Stohner to pay Baculanag the sum of P360. 43 Phil 333. Rule applies to land registration cases in a suppletory character and not only to ordinary actions involving the delivery or restitution of property The provision of the Rules of Court applies not only to ordinary actions involving the delivery or restitution of property. and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of costs. The fact that in 1959 the Caridads demolished and replaced their old house with new and bigger ones cannot enervate the rights of the registered owners. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court Section 13. thru counsel. As no agreement was reached. Rights of registered owner cannot be defeated by an unsuccessful opponent through the subterfuge of replacing his old house with a new one from time to time The Caridads cannot be regarded as builders in good faith because they are bound by the 1941 decree of registration that obligated their parents and predecessors-in-interest. rendered a decision.00. Balucanag instituted in the City Court of Manila an ejectment suit against Stohner and after due trial. Mrs. except by special order of the court. sitting as a land registration court.authority of the CFI. or for the purpose of securing fruits of his victory. the Judge has the inherent power to issue the writ of demolition. Balucanag v. as a consequence of the writ of possession issued by it.000 for the improvements and constructions he has made on the lot. The lease contract provided. any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. nor the removal of his house therefrom. said improvements being allegedly valued at P35. however. wrote Stohner a letter demanding that he vacate the premises. However. provides that ³the officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of property by placing the plaintiff in possession of such property. Manlapas vs. by reason of the continued refusal of the respondent to remove his house thereon and restore possession of the premises to petitioner. of the Rules of Court provides that ³when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer. would be a cumbersome process.] Second Division.R. likewise. No. either for Stohner would purchase the lot at 12% per annum on the value or that Balucanag reimburse Stohner the amount P35. processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. and also because the latter. Harvey. lot located in Zamora Street. payable in advance within the first 10 days of each month. et al. Every court has inherent power to do necessary thing s for the administration of justice In Shioji vs. it being agreed. the court rendered a decision.´ 4. Mrs. Branch IX. to vacate the premises and the sum of P100 as attorney¶s fees. Escolin (J): 4 concur. The CFI held that Stohner was a builder in good faith because he had constructed the residential house with the consent of the original lessor. 3. 11 Phil. Its issuance is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is being deprived of the possession of the lots in question. In reply thereto. but also to proceedings under the land registration law. Otherwise. He offered proposals for a possible compromise. Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the builder. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (How execution for the delivery or restitution of property enforced). and profits included in the execution. Ibañez. Builders in bad faith. including the writ of demolition. 1 took no part Facts: Cecilia dela Cruz Charvet was the owner of a 177.´ In the present case. processes and other means necessary to carry into effect the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law in land registration cases to issue a writ of possession to the successful litigant. 7. after conducting a trial de novo. claimed that he was a builder in good faith of the residential house erected in the land. the rights of the latter to enjoy full possession of their registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his old house with a new one from time to time. 5. the Lessor may remove the said buildings and improvements or cause them to be removed at the expense of the Lessee. All such buildings and improvements shall remain the property of the lessee and he may remove them at any time. Pandacan. On 31 August 1952. the officer shall not destroy.´ In line with this doctrine.m. 298). Power of a judge to issue all auxiliary writs to carry into effect the jurisdiction conferred upon the court by law Section 6. For Stohner's failure to pay the rents. Thus. On appeal.00. and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules. Pasay Estate Company vs. 48 Phil. rents. a writ of demolition must. which order may only issue upon petition of the plaintiff after due hearing and upon the defendant's failure to remove the improvements within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court. issue. Llorente. Charvet.50 sq. the Judge has the power to issue all auxiliary writs. The provisions of the Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases in a suppletory character (Rule 132). after the expiration of the lease contract on 31 August 1957. to order. Balucanag. the demolition of improvements introduced by the successor-in-interest of a defeated oppositor in the land registration case. Francisco [G. Mrs. it was pointed out that ³independent of any statutory provision. 1983. 51 OG 2872. the CFI Manila. every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Charvet sold the said lot to Rosendo Balucanag. Section 13. Stohner made fillings on the land and constructed a house thereon. also thru counsel.

In the present case. if the rent is to be paid daily"). the lessee may remove the improvements.000. the Paulina refused to accept the monthly rentals. Lopez v. Ernesto. On 14 February 1992. to pay the Geminianos P40 a month as reasonable compensation for their stay thereon from the filing of the complaint on 14 April 1993 until they vacated. the lessee nevertheless continued in possession of the premises with the acquiescence of the lessor. After the expiration of the lease contract in November 1985.R.00 a month. the mother of Federico. Upon failure of the Nicolas spouses to heed the demand.. Furthermore. de Geminiano.. portion of that lot stood the Geminianos' unfinished bungalow. the lessee's right to continue in possession ceases and his possession becomes one of detainer. useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended. Larry and Marlyn Geminiano. with costs against Stohner. The Supreme Court set aside the decision in Civil Case 67503. if the rent agreed upon is annual. Stohner cannot be ejected until he is reimbursed of the value of the improvements. it was held that ³the principle of possessor in good faith refers only to a party who occupies or possess property in the belief that he is the owner thereof and said good faith ends only when he discovers a flaw in his title so as to reasonably advise or inform him that after all he may not be the legal owner of said property. which provides that ³if the lessee makes. does so at his own risk in the sense that he cannot recover their value from the lessor. 120303. at the rate of P40. which the Geminianos sold in November 1978 to Dominador and Mary Nicolas for the sum of P6. On a 12-sq. the former being the successor in interest of the original owner of the lot. that the lessees were not builders in good faith and the reimbursement as such are governed by Article 1678.000 as attorney's fees. 4. Article 1678 is law applicable. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount. and that the value of the house and improvements was P180. Inc.] Third Division. 2. much less retain the premises until such reimbursement. Asuncion. It cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he knows that he is not the owner of he leased premises. with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot occupied by the house. Possessor in good faith. Paulina Amado-Geminiano executed a contract of lease over a 126 sq. Options of the lessor and the lessee The law applicable to the present case is Article 1678 of the Civil Code. the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee ½ of the value of the improvements at the time. No. " The article gives the lessor the option to appropriate the useful improvements by paying ½ of their value. and from day to day. vs. It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit. Implied new lease (tacit recondition) created when lessee continued in possession of the premises with the acquiescence of the lessor. Davide Jr (J): 4 concur Facts: Lot 3765-B-1 (314 sq. Phil. the lot was registered in the latter's names. CA [G. After such notice. without altering the form or substance of the property leased. from month to month. the Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the Geminianos.000 as there was controverting evidence presented. Thus. A lessee who introduces improvements in the leased premises. m. " 3. which resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee in 1972. Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo. plus costs.and thus. The Court thus ordered the Nicolas spouses to vacate the premises. for the lessee's right under the law is to remove the improvements even if the leased premises may suffer damage thereby. An implied new lease or tacita recondition was thus created between the parties. the period of which is established by Article 1687 of the Civil Code (³If the period for the lease has not been fixed. But he shall not cause any more damage upon the property than is necessary. Neither can he deny the ownership or title of his lessor. however. The latter was ordered to vacate the premises in question and to pay Balucanag the rentals due from March 1969 up to the time he surrenders the premises. there is no dispute that the relation between Balucanag and Stohner is that of lessor and lessee. the agreed rental in the instant case being payable on a monthly basis. however. Maria. who in turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses Agustin and Ester Dionisio. even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. The Nicolas spouses then introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their names. which the CFI denied. including that portion on which the house stood.00. Lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith Article 448 of the Civil Code applies only to a case where one builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof and it does not apply where one's only interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract. In 1982. it is understood to be from year to year. the lessee's failure to pay the stipulated rentals entitles lessor to recover possession of the premises. the Geminianos filed with the MTCC of Dagupan City a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. from week to week. Inc. the duration of the new lease must be deemed from month to month. if it is monthly. and to pay the sum of P1. July 24. Geminiano v. and that if indeed there is a legal lease existing. invoking Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. portion of the lot. The trial court held that there was no lease to speak of to be renewed as the lot was acquired by Maria Lee in 1972. . and the lessee cannot compel the lessor to appropriate the improvements and make reimbursement. On 9 February 1993. He shall not. in favor of the Nicolas spouse for P40 per month for a period of 7 years commencing on 15 November 1978. Baculanag filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. its renewal can only be made on a month-to-month pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code.) was originally owned by Paulina Amado vda. Subsequently. Period fixed according to Article 1687 While the lease contract entered into expired on 31 August 1957. cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. m. if the rent is weekly. the Geminianos sent. As such. via registered mail. in good faith. and Eastern Trading Co. The lessor may thus terminate the lease after each month with due notice upon the lessee. m. Philippine and Eastern Trading In Lopez. a letter addressed to Mary Nicolas demanding that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears within 20 days from notice. 1. 1996. Baculanag filed a motion for reconsideration.

The first thing that the spouses should have done was to reduce the alleged promise into writing. the private respondents cannot bank on that promise and profess any claim nor color of title over the lot in question. Estoppel applies even if lessor has no title. No.R. portion of the said lot by virtue of a contract of lease executed by the Geminianos' mother in their favor. it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property. Fernandez-Abesia [G. i. otherwise. Gancayco (J): 4 concur Facts: Spouses Estanislao and Concepcion del Campo and Bernarda Abesia are co-owners pro indiviso of a lot (Lot 1161 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu. On appeal.e. 8. L-49219. were entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements with the right of retention until reimbursement had been made. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract. they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.. one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. The latter cannot raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven. are then estopped to deny their landlord's title. they could be considered builders in good faith. it would not make the spouses possessors or builders in good faith so as to be covered by the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. the RTC Dagupan City reversed the trial court's decision and rendered a new judgment: (1) ordering the Geminianos to reimburse the Nicolas spouses for the value of the house and improvements in the amount of P180. but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord.000.] First Division. Plainly. and may be asserted not only by the original lessor. 3. 2. which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made. The spouses¶ sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. Del Campo v. and reinstating the decision of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dagupan City in Civil Case 9214. The Supreme Court granted the petition.000. The lessees who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease. Non-owner of the premises may lease property While the right to lease property is an incident of title and possession. ownership of the property is not being transferred. and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. 6. the Nicolas spouses knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. The spouses filed an action for partition with the CFI Cebu. After all. Cebu City. CA does not apply. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the Geminianos' motion for reconsideration. an agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein is unenforceable. Pecson v. and as such. 1988. TCT 61850) in the proportion of 2/3 and 1/3 share each.00 and to pay the latter P10. may be asserted not only by original lessor but also those who succeed to his title The Nicolas spouses came into possession of a 126 sq. but also by those who succeed to his title. in relation to Article 546 of the same Code. Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. Nicolas spouses estopped. Hence. does not apply to lessee Article 448 of the Civil Code. reversing and setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 January 1995 in CA-GR SP 34337.On appeal by the Nicolas spouses. Lessees not possessors not builders in good faith Being mere lessees. and the Nicolas spouses as lessees. respectively. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created. No forced co-ownership There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson vs. is not present in the present case. applies only to a possessor in good faith. The right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code. 4. 7. 5. Court of Appeals.000. is therefore well-established. unless some note or memorandum thereof be produced.m. arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. The trial court appointed a . with costs against the Nicolas spouses. Article 448 in relation to Article 546 applies only to a possessor in good faith. "A state of forced co-ownership" would not be created between the Germinianos and the Nicolas spouses. Not having taken any steps in order that the alleged promise to sell may be enforced. Option does not render the Nicolas spouses builders in good faith Even if the Germinianos indeed promised to sell. Since the Germinianos refused to exercise that option. Promise unenforceable unless option is in writing Neither the deed of sale over the house nor the contract of lease contained an option in favor of the Nicolas spouses to purchase the said lot. Alleged option to buy not supported by evidence. the petition for review on certiorari. only the temporary use and enjoyment thereof. because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application of that provision. April 15. Flores and Cavan Streets. The juridical relation between the Geminianos' mother as lessor. because under Article 1403 of the Civil Code. 45 sq.00 as litigation expenses. m. Lessees governed by Article 1678 The rights of the lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements. It ruled that since the Nicolas spouses were assured by the Geminianos that the lot they leased would eventually be sold to them. this time by Geminianos. a person may be a lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the premises leased. and (2) allowing the Nicolas spouses to remain in possession of the premises until they were fully reimbursed for the value of the house. however. or to assert a better title not only in themselves. the Nicolas spouses cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. at the corner of F. 1.00 as attorney's fees and P2.

then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Abesia may demolish or remove the said portion of their house. which found that the houses of Juan and Isidro actually encroached upon a portion of the land belonging to Florencio. 1. The survey subsequently disclosed that the house of Juan occupied 42 sq. Court of Appeals. Victor) ruled that although Juan and Isidro occupied a portion of Florencio's property. plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. 72876. at their own expense. to petitioner Florencio. Thus. m. after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement. m. and ordered Abesia to demolish at her own expense part of her house which has encroached Lot 1161-A and deliver said area to the spouses. was originally owned by Baltazar Ignao who married twice.5 sq. Justo acquired the 1/8 share of Leon for P500. In such case. Situation governed by co-ownership Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that ³the owner of the land on which anything has been built. Thereafter. they should be considered builders in good faith. The lower court held that Article 448 of the New Civil Code does not apply in the case. the spouses have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of Abesia upon payment of indemnity to the latter as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code.commissioner in accordance with the agreement of the parties. of Florencio's land or a total of 101 sq. the proper rent. it would be useless and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise the first option (of appropriating part of the house standing on his lot) since this would render the entire houses of Juan and Isidro worthless. Otherwise. m. sowing or planting. plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build.) Juan and Isidro. The trial court then applied the ruling in the similar case of Grana vs. Options available to the parties Applying Article 448 of the Civil Code. if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the Abesia¶s house built thereon. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances. of the land pertaining to the spouses which Abesia obviously built in good faith. Baltazar had also 4 children but the latter waived their rights over the controverted land in favor of Justo. Juan and Isidro. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. m. previously alloted to them by the trial court in Civil Case N-1681. the trial court ordered a licensed geodetic engineer to conduct a survey to determine the exact area occupied by the houses of Juan and Isidro.). Article 448 of the Civil Code applies if co-ownership is terminated by the partition The provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply when the co-ownership is terminated by the partition. recommending that the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A (30 sq. Leon.5 sq. where the Supreme Court had .] Third Division. and giving the remaining portion with a total area of 266. m. the rate of rental shall be determined by the trial court. Abesia shall pay the value of the 5 sq. m. sown.75 sq. In case of disagreement. Florencio inherited the 5/8 share of his father Justo plus his 1/8 share of the land which he bought or a total of 6/8 (representing 400. m. No. January 18. the spouses may oblige Abesia to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. Article 448 of the Civil Code does not apply when co-owner built. defendants may remove or demolish at their own expense the said portion of their house. with an area of 534 sq. Abesia¶s house occupied the portion with an area of 5 sq. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. IAC [G. Upon agreement of the parties. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established. of the land in question. Abesia appealed to the Court of Appeals. Without costs. An ocular inspection was conducted by the lower court. m. However. of land occupied by their house at such price as may be agreed upon with the spouses and if its value exceeds the portion of the house that Abesia built thereon. or planted in good faith. m. Florencio instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real property against Juan and Isidro before the CFI Cavite (Civil Case 2662). The parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of the 5 sq.) and Lot No. or 2/8 thereof to Juan and Isidro. as in the present case. 1991.R. Florencio alleged that the area occupied by the 2 houses built by Juan and Isidro exceeded the 133. he had 4 children. Otherwise. while that of Isidro occupied 59 sq. In his first marriage. 2. Ignao v. Florencio and his uncles Juan and Isidro were co-owners of a parcel of land." Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds. m. the trial court (thru Judge Luis L.m. the then CFI Cavite in a decision dated 6 February 1975 directed the partition of the aforesaid land. the sole issue is the applicability of the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code relating to a builder in good faith when the property involved is owned in common. Otherwise. m. Fernan (J): 3 concur Facts: A lot situated in Barrio Tabon. Cavite.5 sq. m. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. Municipality of Kawit. The Supreme Court modified the decision appealed from by ordering the spouses to indemnify Abesia for the value of the said portion of the Abesia¶s house in accordance with Article 546 of the Civil Code. The parties were ordered to pay the commissioner¶s fee (P400 in proportional share). Abesia may choose not to buy the land but Abesia must pay a reasonable rental for the use of the portion of the spouse¶s land as may be agreed upon between the parties. alloting 133. on the other hand. as he is not a third party. In case of disagreement. namely Justo (the father of Florencio). 3. the court shall fix the terms thereof. with 60 days upon notice. In his complaint. Of course. However. Justo owned 4/8 of the land which was waived by his half-brothers and sisters plus his 1/8 share or a total of 5/8. or planted in good faith. In his second marriage. The said commissioner conducted a survey. and the cost of suit (also in proportional share).5 sq. which certified the case to the Supreme Court on account of the question of law involved. In its decision. he shall pay reasonable rent.5 sq. m.) each of the land or a total of 133. 1161-B (15 sq. The trial court observed that based on the facts of the case.00 which he later sold to his son Florencio for the same amount. if the spouses elect to appropriate the same. and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Thus. When Justo died. had 1/8 share (66. and when it appears that the house of Abesia overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 sq. Abesia shall then pay the reasonable rent to the spouses upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. and the one who sowed. m. no actual partition was ever effected. The houses of the spouses and Abesia were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. sown. Pursuant to an action for partition filed by Florencio Ignao (Civil Case N-1681). if they so decide. of the spouses¶ Lot 1161-A. prepared a sketch plan and submitted a report to the trial court on 29 May 1976.m. On 17 July 1978. However.

or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. Determination of price to be paid premature The question on the price to be paid on the land need not be discussed as this would be premature inasmuch as Florencio has yet to exercise his option as the owner of the land. Thus.000. without pronouncement as to costs.00. On the other hand. The Ejectment suit was elevated to the CFI Pasay where. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works.000." As co-owners. because until division is effected such portion is not concretely determined. Agana [G.00. Juan and Isidro may remove or demolish at their own expense the said portions of their houses encroaching upon Florencio's land. eventually. the court shall fix the terms thereof. he shall pay reasonable rent. the Appellate Court (Second Civil Cases Division). it was held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds. Sarmiento v. Abesia. it ordered Florencio to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions of his land respectively occupied by the latter at P40. plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build. On 17 October 1977. m. No. The following 6 January 1975. Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that "the owner of the land shall have the right to appropriate or to oblige the one who built to pay the price of the land. 57288. On 27 August 1985.00 as the value of the residential house. filed an Ejectment suit against them. But in a qualitative sense.000. each co-owner has the same right as any one of the other co-owners. and to execute the necessary deed of conveyance to the Juan and Isidro. Olaes. affirming the decision of the trial court. sowing or planting. In such case. except co-ownership is terminated In the case of Spouses del Campo vs. 1.. Every co-owner is therefore the owner of the whole. Co-owners hold property in common dominion.000. Should the value of the land exceed the value of the portions of the houses that Juan and Isidro have erected thereon. after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances. 5. within 30 days from entry of judgment. quantitatively speaking. and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion.00 to P10. the proper rent. In case of disagreement. Sarmiento submitted the deed of sale of the land in her favor. Jose C. within 60 days. to exercise the option to reimburse Ernesto and wife the sum of P40.00. and.000. Sarmiento did not exercise any of the two .000. which showed the price to be P15. occupied by them at such price as may be agreed upon. Hence the petition for review by certiorari. Right to appropriate works or to oblige builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner As held in Quemuel vs. It was probably assumed that the wife's mother was the owner of the land and that. The Supreme Court modified the decision appealed from. ms.000. on 21 April 1975. Otherwise. or the option to allow them to purchase the land for P25. Florencio. April 30. However. promulgated a decision. thereby depriving Florencio of his right to choose. the parties may have unequal shares in the common property. Ernesto did construct a residential house on the land at a cost of P8. Sarmiento asked Ernesto and wife to vacate and.00. Florencio appealed to the IAC. after the submission of memoranda (pursuant to the provisions of RA 6031) and on 29 March 1979. However. 4. Without costs. the latter's mother had told him the couple could build a residential house on a lot of 145 sq. Melencio-Herrera (J): 5 concur Facts: While Ernesto Valentino was still courting his wife (Rebecca Lorenzo). In 1967.00 to P40. Santos. (Lot D of a subdivision in Parañaque). said Court rendered a modifying decision under Article 448 of the Civil Code. that it had a value of P20. with each an owner of share (abstract and undetermined until partition is effected Prior to partition. Jr. 1984. the part of the land they intruded upon.00 per sq." The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. The figures were not questioned by Sarmiento. then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. and the one who sowed. Ernesto testified that the then cost of the residential house would be from P30.] Second Division. or sell to private respondents the 101 sq. It then ordered Ernesto and wife to vacate the land after Sarmiento has paid them the mentioned sum of P20. the Municipal Court found that the Valentinos had built the residential house in good faith.advanced a more "workable solution". Sarmiento was required. who. Intermediate Appellate Court.00. it would somehow be transferred to the spouses. Article 448 does not apply to a co-owner. sown or planted in good faith. plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.R. Article 448 Article 448 provides that ³the owner of the land on which anything has been built. 2. Court of Appeals. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court erred when they peremptorily adopted the "workable solution" in the case of Grana vs. on 7 September 1974. "an undivided estate is co-ownership by the heirs. the latter may choose not to buy the land but they must pay reasonable rent for the use of the portion of Florencio's land as may be agreed upon by the parties. it was categorically ruled that the right to appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner.00. the rate of rental and other terms of the lease shall be determined by the trial court.000. As cited in Eusebio vs. when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in good faith. & Mrs. and ordered the owner of the land. to sell to Juan and Isidro. The Court directed Florencio to exercise his option to either appropriate as his own the portions of the houses of Juan and Isidro Ignao occupying his land upon payment of indemnity in accordance with Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.000. all the co-owners hold the property in common dominion but at the same time each is an owner of a share which is abstract and undetermined until partition is effected. In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court. m. sold the same to Leonila Sarmiento. but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement." 3. It subsequently turned out that the land had been titled in the name of Mr. disregarding the testimony of Ernesto.

but as to the Nuguid's claim that the sale included the apartment building.000 and upon such payment. offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. . In its decision of 7 June 1994. sown or planted in good faith. for P103. Valentinos in good faith Ernesto Valentino and his wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar circumstances under which they had constructed the residential house. 605. without pronouncement as to costs. the proper rent. On November 1993.00 per month from said date (as this is the very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot). As far as they knew. But he cannot as respondents here did. has the option. He is entitled to such remotion only when. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the apartment building on the lot. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. the trial court issued a writ of possession directing the deputy sheriff "to place Juan Nuguid in possession of subject property located at 79 Kamias Road.options within the indicated period. is null and void. Davide Jr (J): 3 concur. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. and ordered Pecson to account for any and all fruits of the improvements received by him starting 23 June 1993 with the amount of P53. was a correct decision. the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the order of the trial court citing Articles 448 of the Civil Code.00. Entry of judgment was made on 23 June 1993. the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it on 12 October 1983 to the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid. the parties shall be allowed to adduce evidence on the current market value of the apartment building. otherwise Pecson shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity. Quezon City. could reasonably be expected to later on give them the land. upon the other hand.000 to be offset therefrom. Nuguid filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building.000. on which he built a 4-door 2storey apartment building. The Court also held that as Nuguid has been declared the uncontested owner of the lot in question as per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated 23 June 1993.] First Division. it held that the issue concerning it was "not a subject of the litigation. either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. Hilario. he shall pay reasonable rent. In its decision of 30 April 1992. Quezon City. The owner of the land. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 32679 and the Order of 15 November 1993 of the RTC. In its decision of 8 February 1989. under article 453 (now Article 546). Pecson should pay to Nuguid rent of no less than P21. under article 361 (now Article 448). Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision.000. 115814. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to P12.Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV 293)1. Acting thereon. the provision for the exercise by Sarmiento of either the option to indemnify the Valentinos in the amount of P40. furthermore.000. 1995. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. 608 [1946]). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari. the trial court issued on 15 November 1993 the challenged order. citing Article 546 of the Civil Code. No. May 26.R. Quezon City in Civil Case Q-41470." (Ignacio vs. Options available for owner of the land The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another. and the one who sowed. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale in Civil Case Q-41470 before the RTC Quezon City." 3. 2. 1. on 18 November 1993. Pecson moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was not acted upon by the trial court. after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548. CA [G.000. The order of the trial court compelling the Valentinos to remove the building on Sarmiento¶s land because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land. after having chosen to sell his land. However. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street. having stated they could build on the property.000. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the contention that the apartment building was included in the sale. Sarmiento then instituted the instant Certiorari proceedings. It also agreed with the trial court that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale of the commercial lot. for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement. Pecson filed the petition for review on certiorari. ordering Nuguid to reimburse Pecson the construction cost of P53. The petition to review the said decision was subsequently denied by the Supreme Court.00. In the present case. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by Nuguid to Pecson. Nuguid is entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and improvements thereon. heirs and representatives. such rent being offset against the amount pertaining to the construction cost. 1 on leave Facts: Pedro P. Pecson v.00. the land was owned by Ernesto¶s mother-in-law who. in the Court¶s opinion. or the option to allow the Valentinos to purchase the land at P25. Instead. The Court of Appeals ruled that Pecson¶s quest to be restored in possession of the premises is rendered moot and academic as the deputy sheriff has enforced the writ of possession and the premises had been turned over to Nuguid¶s possession. with all the improvements thereon and to eject therefrom all occupants therein. the RTC dismissed the complaint." Pecson then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the order of 15 November 1993 (CA-GR SP 32679).00 with the Court as the purchase price for the land. Article 448 of the Civil Code In regards to builders in good faith. assignees. Article 448 of the Code provides that ³The owner of the land on which anything has been built.00. the other party fails to pay for the same. 76 Phil. Branch 101. and Ernesto was then allowed to deposit the sum of P25. is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building.000." In resolving Nuguid¶s motion to reconsider this issue. In such case. their agents. For this purpose. the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the assailed decision. the court shall fix the terms thereof. sowing or planting.

one of whom has built some works. Said complaint was later amended to include Depra as a party plaintiff. until he is paid the proper indemnity. Agustin Dumlao owns an adjoining lot. or sown or planted something. the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount of P40. the Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits. planted or sown. (453a)´ 2. or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. After trial the Municipal Court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith. necessarily. 1985. the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of 34 sq. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. Coleongco v. for Regalado constructed the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Regalado Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder. In Javier vs. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder. as the case may be. The building.000. Pertinent provisions: Article 448 and Article 546 of the Civil Code Article 448 provides that ³the owner of the land on which anything has been built. with an area of approximately 8. sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith.00. Consequently. the court shall fix the terms thereof. not the cost during time of construction Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined. situated in the municipality of Dumangas. In such case. Article 546 does not state the manner to determine value of useful improvements. the proper rent. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land. Regalado. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. and not its current market value. ms. Beatriz Derla. De la Fuente. However. 6. Jr. including the two courts below. as stated in Rivera vs. Current value of the property. Concepcion. Guided by this precept. to administer complete justice to both of them is such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by Pecson. the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Since Nuguid has opted to appropriate the apartment building. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land.00. the lower court erred in holding the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965. Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in the case. as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. despite the finding that the useful improvement. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land in which it is built. As Pescon has not been paid. rendered judgment on 29 September 1973. In the present case. filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on 6 February 1973 against Dumlao in the Municipal Court of Dumangas.R. he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and. 4. Strict application of Article 448: does not apply to owner who subsequently loses ownership of land by sale or donation. m. and the one who sowed. his mother. bamboos. As held in Coleongco vs. the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land. Elsewise stated. Agana. and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code. Builder in good faith¶s right of retention until indemnification for improvements. he shall pay reasonable rent. Application of Article 448 by analogy in preventing a state of forced co-ownership The provision on indemnity in Article 448 may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties. 3. sowing or planting. where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land.000. known as Lot 685. of Depra's property. In Sarmiento vs.000.00 to P10. was built in 1967 at a cost of between P8. Objective of Article 546 is to administer justice between parties involved. Applicability of Articles 448 and 526 Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties. to prevent unjust enrichment to one of the parties. Iloilo. L-57348. Melencio-Herrera (J): 5 concur. with an approximate area of 231 sq. After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of Depra's lot made on 2 November 1972.] First Division. .1. for then there can be no questions as to good or bad faith on the part of the builder. Depra v. m. the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house. a residential house. the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner. 1 took no part Facts: Francisco Depra is the owner of a parcel of land registered under TCT T-3087. In 1972. May 16. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding 4-unit apartment building for a measly amount. sown or planted in good faith. after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548.870 sq. Parties¶ right to adduce evidence on present market value of improvement The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. sower or planter had acted in good faith. it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. No. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement. Pecson is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building. the income therefrom. 5. 7. a useful improvement. a house and camarin made of strong material based on the market value of the said improvements. (361a)´ while Article 546 provides that ³Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. when Dumlao constructed his house on his lot. agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. no rents due The trial court erred in ordering Pecson to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. In De Guzman vs.. Dumlao [G. In this regard. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith. sower. after writing a demand letter asking Dumlao to move back from his encroachment. the value of the house at the time of the trial. designated as Lot 683. Value to be based on market or present value.

ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with Depra, as lessor, and the Dumlao as lessee, over the disputed portion with an area of 34 sq. m., the rent to be paid is P5.00 a month, payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first 5 days of the month the rent is due; and the lease shall commence on that day that this decision shall have become final. From the foregoing judgment, neither party appealed so that, if it were a valid judgment, it would have ordinarily lapsed into finality. Still, Depra did not accept payment of rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court. On 15 July 1974, Depra filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao before the then CFI Iloilo (Branch IV), involving the same 34 sq. m., which was the bone of contention in the Municipal Court. Dumlao, in his Answer, admitted the encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit is barred by res judicata by virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become final and executory. Premised on the joint motion for judgment based on the stipulation of facts by the parties, the Trial Court on 31 October 1974, issued the assailed Order, decreeing that the 34 sq.m. is part and parcel of Lot 685 of the Cadastral Survey of Dumangas of which Depra is owner as evidenced by TCT 3087 and such plaintiff is entitled to possess the same; without pronouncement as to cost. Thus, an appeal was filed with the then Court of Appeals, which the latter certified to the Supreme Court as involving pure questions of law. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and ordered the case remanded to the RTC Iloilo for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. It ordered (1) the trial court to determine the present fair price of Depra¶s 34 square meter-area of land, the amount of the expenses spent by Dumlao for the building of the kitchen, the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the kitchen built thereon; and after said amount have been determined by competent evidence, (2) the RTC shall render judgment, (a) granting Depra a period of 15 days within which to exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the kitchen a his own by paying to Dumlao either the amount of the expenses spent by Dumlao for the building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige Dumlao to pay the price of said area. The amounts shall be paid by the obligor within 15 days from notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it, (b) that if Depra exercises the option to oblige Dumlao to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because the value of the land is considerably more than that of the kitchen, Dumlao shall give written notice of such rejection to Depra and to the Court within 15 days from notice of Depra's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of 15 days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial Court, within 15 days from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than P10 per month, payable within the first 5 days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than 2 years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since 1952 that Dumlao has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by 10% for the second year of the forced lease. Dumlao shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the 2-year period, or upon default by Dumlao in the payment of rentals for 2 consecutive months, Depra shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed by Dumlao or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by Dumlao to the Court for payment to Depra, and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court, (c) ordering Dumlao to pay Depra an amount computed at P10 per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of Depra's land for the period counted from 1952, the year Dumlao occupied the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease, and (d) that the periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Decision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee; Without costs. 1. Decision of the Municipal Court null and void, cannot operate as res judicata The Decision of the Municipal Court is null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). The Municipal Court overstepped its bounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to CFI (now RTC) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec. 19 (2) BP 129). Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. 2. Difference in causes in detainer and action to quiet title; Judgment in detainer case not a bar to action respecting title to land Even if the Decision of the Municipal Court were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land." 3. Court system a dispute resolving mechanism; Legal effect of agreement of parties within context of mutual concession and stipulation Consistent with the principles that the Court system must be a dispute resolving mechanism, the Court accords legal effect to the agreement of the parties, within the context of their mutual concession and stipulation. They have, thereby, chosen a legal formula to resolve their dispute (Stipulation of Facts) ² to apply to Dumlao the rights of a "builder in good faith" and to Depra those of a "landowner in good faith" as prescribed in Article 448. The Court thus refrained from further examining whether the factual situations of Dumlao and Depra conform to the juridical positions respectively defined law, for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith" under Article 448.

4. Builder in good faith; Article 448 Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that ³the owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof." Pursuant to the foregoing provision, Depra has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of Dumlao's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to Dumlao. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part of his land. 5. Right of remotion The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. In the present case, Dumlao had expressed his willingness to pay for the land, but Depra refused to sell. 6. Ignacio v. Hilario An order of the lower compelling the builder to remove their buildings from the land belonging to the landowner only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946])." 7. Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code vis-à-vis Article 448 of the New Civil Code; Benefits extended to builder but landowner retained his option The original provision found in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code provides that ³the owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in Articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent." The Code Commission must have taken account of the objections (of some commentators) to Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code. Hence, the Commission provided a modification thereof, and Article 448 of our Code has been made to provide that ³the owner of the land on which has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof." Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his options. 8. The fairness of the rules in Article 448 Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs. Ibañez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050). Quemuel v. Olaes [G.R. No. L-11084. April 29, 1961.] En Banc, Paredes (J): 9 concur Facts: Angel S. Olaes and his wife, Juliana Prudente, registered owners of lot 1095 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, located in Rosario, Cavite, sought the recovery of the possession of the said lot and rentals therefore in Civil Case 5442 CFI Cavite, from Alejandro Quemuel and his wife Ruperta Solis, who claimed to be in possession under the tolerance of the former. On 16 March 1954, the trial court ordered Quemuels to return the possession of lot 1095 to the Olaes spouses and to pay the latter P20 a month from January 1954, until they shall have vacated the premises. The Quemuels did not appeal from said decision which became final on 22 April 1954. Thereafter, the Olaes spouses sought the execution of the decision. To forestall ejectment, the Quemuels filed on 1 July 1954 the complaint (Civil Case 5518, CFI Cavite). The Quemuels seek to reduce the monthly rental of P20 fixed in Civil Case 5442, and to compel the Olaes spouses to sell to them the portion of the lot 1095 where their house is erected. The Olaes spouses filed a motion to dismiss on 9 July 1954, alleging lack of cause of action, res adjudicata; prescription, and the cause of action, if any, is barred by the Quemuels' failure to set it up as a counter-claim in Civil Case 5442. On 17 September 1954, the trial court dismissed the complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. An appeal was taken by the Quemuels to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR 14837-R) which, by the agreement of the parties, certified the case to the Court. The ex parte petition filed by the Quemuels in the Supreme Court on 9 August 1956, asking that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite and the Olaes, enjoining them from demolishing the house of the Quemuels until there is a final decision in said Case 14837, was denied on 14 August 1956. The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed from, with costs against the Quemuels.

1. The Complaint states no cause of action; If the rent imposed by court are found excessive, the Quemuels are free to vacate the property A cause of action presupposes a right of the plaintiff and a violation of such right by the defendant. According to the complaint itself, the rental of P20 monthly and the order to vacate, were provided in a prior judgment (Civil Case 5442) which is final and its validity is not assailed. There being no law that fixes the rental of the same land at 7 1/2% of its alleged market value, the plaintiffs have no right thereto, or a right which could be violated. The defendants are not compelling the plaintiffs to rent the property but wanted them to vacate the premises (Civil Case 5442). If the rental determined by the trial court were excessive, the plaintiffs are free to vacate the property. For plaintiffs to insist on possessing the property and fixing the rentals themselves, would have no legal sanction at all. 2. Builder in good faith: Right to appropriate works or improvements belong to owner of the land, builder¶s right to reimbursement; Builder cannot compel owner of the land to sell land Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or improvements or "to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land" belongs to the owner of the land. The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. This is assuming that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith. 3. Quemuels not builders in good faith; Builder builds under claim of title The Quemuels are not builders in good faith. Article 448 of the new Civil Code, (equivalent to Article 361 of the old Civil Code) is intended to apply only to a case where one builds, or sows, or plants on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title and not to lands wherein one's only interest is that of tenant, under a rental contract, which is the present case (Alburo vs. Villanueva, 7 Phil., 277). The tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner (Rivera vs. Thailand, 48 Phil., 396; see also 3 Manresa 4th Ed. pp. 215-216). 4. Quemuels are lessees From the pleadings and the documentary evidence submitted, it is indisputable that the land in question originally belonged to the government as part of the Friar Lands Estate and the title thereto was in the name of the government until it was purchased by Agapita Solis who applied, thru the Bureau of Lands, to purchase the land by installments. The corresponding Sale Certificate 531, effective 1 July 1909 was executed. In Olaes spouses' complaint, they alleged that they are the owners of lot 1095 and that the Quemuels have been occupying southeastern half portion thereof, without any right thereto, except the tolerance of the Olaes spouses. The Quemuels were not unaware of the flaw in their title, if any, and that their true relation with the Olaes spouses was that of tenant and landlord, and, that their rights are governed by Article 1573 in relation to article 487 of the old Civil Code. Article 1573 provides that ³a lessee shall have with respect to useful and voluntary improvements, the same right which are granted the usufructuaries." Article 487 provides that ³the usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct any improvements, useful or recreative, which he may deem proper, provided he does not change its form or substance, but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without injury to the property". 5. Lessee cannot compel lessor to pay for the improvements or to sell the land; Right to remove improvements if it can be done without damage to the land From Articles 487 and 1573, it can clearly be inferred that the Quemuels cannot even compel the Olaes spouses to pay for the improvements the former made in the property or to sell the latter's land. The Quemuels' only right, is to remove the improvements, if it is possible to do so without damage to the land. 6. Identity of case 5442 and 5518; Assuming otherwise, covered by Res judicata In Case 5442, the matter of the rental was in issue, and the same was considered and decided by the trial court, which ordered the Quemuels therein "to pay a reasonable compensation of P20 a month beginning with January, 1954, until they shall have left the premises". In the present case (5518), the parties are the identical parties in Civil Case 5442, the same lot 1095 is the subject matter of both cases; the same issue, namely, the amount of the rental is involved. Even assuming that Quemuels have a cause of action, the doctrine of res judicata already operates against them. 7. Lot purchased by Agapita Solis; Assuming otherwise, covered by Prescription Lot 1095 was purchased by Agapita Solis from the Government on 1 July 1909. After full payment of the purchase price, TCT 10771 covering said lot was issued to said Agapita Solis on 8 June 1933. Assuming that the Quemuels or their alleged predecessor-in-interest, had a cause of action for claiming the ownership of portions of said lot, such cause of action accrued at the latest on 8 June 1933. The statute of limitations provide that the Quemuels or their predecessor had 10 years from said date, within which to file the corresponding action; which cannot be had as the Quemuels filed the complaint after more than 21 years or on 1 July 1954. 8. Failure to set up a counterclaim in Civil Case 5442 Whether the cause of action is for recovery of ownership or for an alleged right to purchase the property, or for reimbursement for some improvements, the Quemuels should have set it up as a counterclaim in Civil Case 5442, because same was necessarily connected with, or arose out of the transactions involved in Civil Case 5442 (Section 6, Rule 10, Rules of Court). 9. De Jesus v. Belarmino does not apply In De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al. (GR L-6665, 30 June 1954; OG July 1954, p. 3064), it was held that "where the complaint was dismissed not because of any evidence presented by the parties, or as a result of a trial on the merits, but merely on a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the sufficiency of the motion should be tested on the strength of the allegation of facts contained in the complaint and no other", which has been interpreted to apply to cases where the motion to dismiss is based solely on the ground of lack of cause of action. Considering the fact that (1) In the present case, documentary evidence and the records of the Civil Case 5442 were presented and considered by the trial court; and (2) in the De Jesus case, the only ground for dismissal was the lack of cause of action, while in the present case, aside from said ground, plaintiffs alleged other grounds, the said ruling finds no application.

the possessor in good faith. the defendant shall have the right to retain the same until the above.G. Reyes JBL (J): 8 concur Facts: After trial in Civil Case 770 of the CFI Bulacan. having become final. December 29.A.mentioned amount is satisfied. and should the plaintiff choose to acquire the house. 78 Phil. The motion was denied by the court. No. On appeal by the de la Cruzes. mother of the de la Cruzes. who are entitled to acquire said defendant's house built thereon. belonging to the former. For lack of evidence.500. As a result. 1962. all surnamed "de la Cruz". by paying its owner the sum of P7. in retaining the land and its improvements pending reimbursement of his useful expenditure. ordering the San Diegos to vacate the land upon payment of the sum P3. 5. The Supreme Court granted the writ prayed for. . No rental required during period of retention The judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals.00. Amor vs. and Urbano. Chunaco (C.00. This provision is expressly made applicable to builders in good faith (Article 448).500. Costs against de la Cruz 1. That duty is compellable by mandamus. De Guzman v. is exorbitant.] En Banc. the instant petition for mandamus was filed to compel the judge to issue the writ applied for. but upheld the defense of the San Diegos as builders in good faith.) 36 O. 2455). Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed from this judgment. the San Diegos. moved to execute paragraph (b) of the dispositive portion of the decision in order to collect the sum of P3. Buenaventura vs. and held that the land in question belongs not to the defendant De la Fuente.R. Garcia. agreed verbally that the latter should occupy.00. No. to recover a parcel of land and damages from Gil San Diego and Rufina San Diego. 1930. who were in possession of the parcel of land in litigation. In 1912 De la Fuente built his house upon said land. If it also orders the San Diegos to vacate only upon such payment. De la Fuente on the other hand receives rent at P40 per month (from Payumo and later.504).000. explicitly ordains the payment by the de la Cruzes of the amount of P3. the value of his security would be impaired (cf. Options of the landowner. is not bound to pay any rental during the period of retention. on complaint of Jose. in addition to a house he intended to build. 2. Taw Pe Chan). Without express pronouncement of costs.00.San Diego v. and the 30 days for its payment having elapsed. 32433. otherwise.500. for the same reason that the judgment fixing that amount is no longer subject to alteration. Tufexis vs. 62 Phil. dismissing the counterclaim of the de la Cruzes. or to compel him to pay them the price of the land agreed upon by the interested parties. 17 Phil. Maria. became at the same time thirdparty defendants in substitution of their deceased mother. the CFI and the CA opined that the de la Cruzes' suit to recover the property was an exercise of their right to choose to appropriate the improvements and pay the indemnity fixed by law.500.affirmed the the remainder of the judgment appealed from insofar as it is not incompatible with this decision. The right of retention thus granted is merely a security for the enforcement of the possessor's right to indemnity for the improvements made by him. that the San Diegos built a house on the land in good faith. or against de la Fuente and Taw Pe Chan to pay in solidum damages of P120 a month from 15 January 1928. Jugo. L-17985. Paredes. by way of indemnity. The vendor (mother of the de la Cruzes) subsequently died. they can no longer insist on selecting another alternative. De la fuente however claims that the land belongs to him. since they did not ask for the modification of the judgment and allowed it to become final. The court voided the sale on the ground that the vendor had no right to the land.00 "within 30 days after this decision becomes final" to the San Diegos. and a motion for reconsideration was likewise of no avail. This option is no longer open to the landowners herein because the decision in the former suit limits them to the first alternative by requiring the San Diegos to vacate the land (and surrender the improvements) upon payment of P3. Consequently. and in default thereof. Over 2 years later. During the proceedings.504. which house was repaired in 1928 (house was appraised by the court at P7. 78 Phil. the de la Cruzes. Writ of Mandamus The judgment ordering payment to the San Diegos of P3. Baraña. 456). dela Fuente [G. September 29. Decision limited to appropriation of the improvement which the landowner did not object to.00 and thereafter to vacate the premises. set at P3. the Court rendered a decision declaring the deed of sale null and void.R. Romualdez (J): 8 concur Facts: Francisco de Guzman and Crisanto De la Fuente. and the execution is leviable on any property of the de la Cruzes. hence. the San Diegos filed a third-party complaint against said vendor. 759. without pronouncement as to costs. The de La Cruzes acquiesced in this view. 3. Montesa [G. The Supreme Court modified the judgment appealed from. 703. Evidently. being close friends and compadres. The court found that the disputed portion of a parcel of land belonged to the de la Cruzes through hereditary succession. it did so in recognition of the right of retention granted to possessors in good faith by Article 546 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Raised in the trial court (actual controversy not available in the case facts). the land here in question. Decision final and cannot be altered Normally the landowner has the option to either appropriate the improvement or to sell the land to the possessor.500.500 by the de la Cruzes within 30 days after the decision becomes final. and the same. Court¶s duty to execute a final judgment. Hence. and ordered the CFI Bulacan to issue the writ of execution in favor of San Diegos. the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. who were the plaintiffs. nor can they be heard now to urge that the value of the indemnity. no judgment was rendered against de la Fuente and Payumo to pay damages at P697. became final and executory. Judgment based on right of retention due to possessors in good faith. by purchase for P1. and now final. but to the plaintiffs.50 from 1 October 1926 to 15 January 1928. Viquiera vs. De la Fuente was required to pay rent at P45 per month from 1 October 1926 to 31 December 1927 and at P120 a month from 1 January 1928. the price as fixed by the competent court.] First Division. the de Guzmans contend that de la Fuente occupies their land by mere tolerance. the CFI has the ministerial duty to order its execution (Zulueta vs. The trial court ordered de la Fuente to vacate the premises and restoring such to the de Guzmans. including the land now in question and its improvements. thereafter. having acquired the land from Catalina Anastacio.

the necessity for the repairs of the house has been sufficiently proved. and one artesian well. on 13 April 13.] En Banc. and the other is the owner. 2.e. provided for in article 361 of the Civil Code. Montemayor (J): 8 concur Facts: In 1939 Lucio Tio was the owner of a parcel of land. On 28 August 1952. Lucio Tio on 4 June 1946. While it is true that said power of attorney is annotated at the back of the Torrens title of Tio. knowing. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on the opinion that the case involved only questions of law. but they did not. which to date has not been rendered. it was still incumbent upon the Segarras to ascertain the scope and authority of Fadullon under said power of attorney. Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration. i. 3. inasmuch as. On the same date. the possibility of such collusion lingers. Collusion or conspiracy vis-à-vis short period of redemption While the evidence did not disclose a collusion or conspiracy between Fadullon and the Segarras. that they were dealing with an agent under a power of attorney executed before the war. on the strength of the said power of attorney Fadullon sold the property to the spouses Dionisio Segarra and Clemencia N. the trial court ordered Tio to pay the Segarras the sum of P5. 3. one can logically infer that the conclusion of the two courts. de Segarra with right to repurchase within the short period of 30 days.e. filed a complaint in the CFI Cebu. a power of attorney in favor of one Esteban Fadullon executed by Lucio Tio was registered in the land records of Cebu City and annotated at the back of the TCT. he took the appeal. denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration are set aside. Civil Case 181 to annul the sale. as they did.300. After hearing the trial court rendered judgment annulling the sale. Inquiry on the agent¶s power of attorney The alleged power of attorney executed by the late Lucio Tio in favor of appellant Fadullon was registered in the land record of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City and annotated at the back of TCT 10548 on 29 December 1939. his wife. on 15 May 1946. On the same date the deed of mortgage in favor of the Cebu Mutual Building and Loan Association was also annotated on the same certificate of title. One party owner of the land. Further. the deed of mortgage in favor of the Cebu Mutual Building and Loan Association was annotated in the said Torrens title. in good faith. of the building thereon. should have placed the Segarras on their guards. and it now belongs to said Francisco de Guzman and his children.300 or otherwise allow the latter to purchase the lot. Upon failure of Fadullon to make the repurchase within the period. that the . 2. and registered with the office of Register of Deeds for Cebu 12 days thereafter. Land owned by the de Guzmans The record shows that the owners of the land were Francisco de Guzman and his deceased wife. 1927 did not by itself destroy said good faith. (Lucio Tio later on succeeded by Salvacion Miranda. and ordered a new one to be issued in the name of Lucio Tio and his wife Salvacion Miranda. on the one hand. the Segarras within 10 days after the expiration of the period filed a sworn petition for the consolidation of their ownership and registered said petition in the office of the Register of Deeds on 15 May 1946. after his demise. the case facts did not provide when) The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order of 28 August 1952 and the order of 15 October 1952. one party owner of the building This is a case where one party is the owner of the land. No. L-8220. yet.300 or to allow them to buy the land should Tio decide not to pay for the improvements. 1955. 1. under TCT 10548. with costs against Fadullon and the spouses Segarra. This circumstance. the Segarras did not require Fadullon to produce his power of attorney. In 1946. The Segarras appealed to the Court of Appeals under CA-GR. Order to pay rent an indicatum that the lower courts perceive defendants as possessors in bad faith From the decisions of the lower courts. the extrajudicial notice given by the defendant about November. Fadullon executed the sale with the right to repurchase within the extraordinary short period of 30 days. 1946. Fadullon [G. and will continue to exist as long as there is no final judgment to the contrary.1. and that they had introduced the improvements aforementioned in good faith and asked the court to order Tio to pay for the said improvements valued at P5. i. 6550-R and the said Tribunal affirmed the appealed decision and further required the Segarras to pay Tio the reasonable rentals on the property from the filing of the action until said property shall have been returned to the latter. lot 1589-J of the Banilad Estate. Good faith wanting in the manner the lot was sold.R. It turned out however that during the possession of the property by the Segarras they had introduced improvements thereon consisting of a building of 3 rooms and a storage room. De la Fuente¶s possession of the land in good faith De la Fuente's possession of the land commenced and continues in good faith. and explained his lack of opposition for the reimbursement with the understanding that the trial court was sufficiently informed and impressed with the bad faith with which defendants bought the land and introduced improvements thereon. on the other hand. This encumbrance alone should have been sufficient to put the Segarra spouses upon an inquiry as to the authority of Fadullon to sell to them the same property 6 years later. Apprised of the sale of his property. On 9 December 1939. Cebu. again. October 29. with tower and water tank and a cement flooring covering about 1/3 of the lot which according to the Segarras cost them P5. to say it more mildly.canceling the new Certificate of Torrens Title 392 on the property in the name of the Segarras. and. Good faith wanting in the manner the lot was sold. Tio filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the Segarras are possessors and builders in bad faith. considering the short period of one month within which to redeem and the surrounding circumstances. They filed a motion with the trial court claiming that they were possessors in good faith of the lot in question. Miranda v. Upon the decision becoming final the corresponding writ of execution was issued directing the Sheriff to put Tio in possession of the lot. Obviously there was in this transaction a prevailing intention of railroading the property into a new ownership as may be proven by the fact that said purchasers filed a sworn petition for consolidating their ownership barely 10 days after the expiration of 30 days.

320. and the cost of suit.000 as attorney¶s fees. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court except for the modification that the monthly rental that petitioners should pay private respondent from 24 July 1990 until the latter finally vacate the premises in question is reduced to P7. giving a period of 2 years extension of occupancy to Chua and Co Sio Eng starting 24 July 1990.00 representing back rentals as of 1991 and a monthly rental of P10. They are not entitled to a reasonable extension of time to occupy the premises on account of the fact that the lease contract between the parties has already expired. justice and good faith demand that Chua and Co Sio Eng should pay said rental arrearages. the RTC Makati (Branch 59) ruled that the lease was for a fixed period of 5 years and that. Hence. a monthly rental of P7. ordering them to pay Ibarra the sum of P188. Banco Nacional Filipino. The court also ordered the dismissal of Chua¶s and Co Sio Eng¶s counterclaim for lack of merit. which was likewise denied. On 24 July 1990. costs against Chua and Co Sio Eng. Ramon Ibarra filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners in the MTC Parañaque. Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: Jose L. to pay Ibarra the amount of P42. The court ordered Chua and Co Sio Eng to vacate the premises and to turn over possession thereof to Ibarra. Contract is the law between parties. it is not the province of the court to alter a contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties. v. dated 8 October 1992. Amendments to pleading allowed to conform to the evidence in the record Any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent. Absolving rentals leads to unjust enrichment Chua¶s and Co Sio Eng¶s rental arrearages from 1986 to 1989 was an issue raised at the pre-trial and on which issue Ibarra presented evidence without any objection from the former. otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Objection waived if objection to admission of evidence not made at time the evidence is offered. Parañaque. The lease was for a period of 5 years. To absolve the defendants from paying rentals in arrears while they continue occupying and enjoying the premises would be allowing the defendants to enrich themselves at Ibrarra¶s expense. Chua and Co Sio Eng appealed to the Court of Appeals. Rule 10. the petition for review on certiorari. The dispute was referred to the barangay captain for conciliation but still no settlement was reached by the parties. its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which .000 from 24 July 1990 until Chua and Co Sio Eng shall have vacated the same. which affirmed the decision. 3. but that the builder is unwilling or unable to buy the land.R.306 representing accrued or bank rentals from 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1989. No. about seven months after they received the summons on 10 June 1946. with costs against them. Chua¶s and Co Sio Eng's continued stay in the premises became illegal. CA [G. §5 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows the amendment of the pleadings in order to make them conform to the evidence in the record. Considering that Chua and Co Sio Eng incurred said rental arrearages because they did not pay Ibarra the automatic 10% increase in their monthly rental every year for the years 1986 to 1989 as agreed upon and stipulated in their lease contract which contract is the law between the parties.000. and should they disagree as to the amount of the rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount. Chua and Co Sio Eng became deforciants subject to ejectment from the premises. which on 4 February 1992 rendered a decision. They exchanged proposal and counterproposal. Miranda (Tio) in her brief says ± without denial or refutation on the part of Fadullon and the Segarra spouses ± that the latter applied for a building permit to construct the improvements in question on 4 December 1946 and the permit was granted on 11 January 1947.50 for the use or occupancy of the premises starting 1 January 1990 until 24 July 1990 and at P10.] Second Division. No lease to be extended when the lease contract expired After the lease terminated on 1 January 1990 and without the parties thereafter reaching any agreement for its renewal. from 1 January 1985 to 31 December 1989.806. and ordering them to pay Ibarra the amount of P15. the contract of lease provided for a fixed period of 5 years from 1 January 1985 to 31 December 1989. upon its expiration on 1 January 1990. On appeal by both parties. Authority of the court to fix a longer term of lease applies to cases where no period is fixed by parties The MTC was in effect making a contract for the parties which it obviously did not have the power to do. as there was no longer any lease to speak of which could be extended. As held in Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Metro Manila. Furthermore. In the present case.defendants were not possessors in good faith. even proof that defendants were considered possessors and builders in bad faith. and then they decide to leave things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee. 1999. The contract expressly provided for the renewal of the lease at the option of the lessees "in accordance with the terms of agreement and conditions set by the lessor. Inc. the amount of P10.. dated 8 October 1992. 1. but they failed to reach agreement. The potestative authority of the courts to fix a longer term for a lease under Article 1687 of the Civil Code applies only to cases where there is no period fixed by the parties. Possibly he might be required to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not to appropriate the improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land. Metro Manila.000 representing reasonable attorney¶s fees.320. The fact that the Court of Appeals sentenced the defendants to pay rentals is an indication. the parties discussed the possibility of renewing it. or at least that they were not possessors and builders in good faith. 4. He has a right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. A builder in good faith may not be required to pay rentals. Chua v. In its decision.00 thereafter until the expiration of the aforesaid extension of their occupancy or until the subject premises is actually vacated.00. January 21. 109840. Chua and Co Sio Eng filed motion for reconsideration. Chua and Co Sio Eng were lessees of a commercial unit at 3086 Redemptorist Street in Baclaran. with costs against Chua and Co Sio Eng. 2." Prior to the expiration of the lease.

which provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made. Article 1675 excludes cases falling under Artilce 1673 Article 1675 of the Civil Code excludes cases falling under Article 1673 (which provides among others. the balance after deducting the expenses of the sale to be delivered to Bernardo. Bataclan shall carry out the payment in the terms suitable and fixed by the Court. it was not prejudicial but favorable to the petitioner. such as the wall and the existing coco and abaca.000. The decision of the lower court was affirmed in all other respects (GR 37319). and when he appeared in court he informed the court that he had no money with which to pay for the land. as the court cannot supply material stipulations or read into contract words which it does not contain. at P300 per hectare. 5. sown. if any. or. Article 1678 merely grants to such a lessee making in good faith useful improvements the right to be reimbursed one-half of the value of the improvements upon the termination of the lease. or planted. Article 1678 as relief In a number of cases. Under those circumstances.000 and the legal expenses of the sale. Bernardo informed the CFI Cavite that he elected to compel Bataclan to pay him the value of the land. P18. Vickers (J): 4 concur Facts: The CFI Cavite issued on 24 April 1934 an order for the sale at public auction the land subject of civil case 2428 between Vicente Santo Domingo Bernardo (plaintiff therein) and Catalino Bataclan (defendant therein). courts may fix a longer period of lease. and that from the balance. Award of attorney¶s fees reasonable Chua and Co Sio Eng were correctly ordered to pay attorney's fees considering that Ibarra had to go to court to protect his interest. the lower court (Judge Sixto de la Costa) issued an order for the sale of the land at public auction in order that the Bernardo might be paid from the proceeds the sum of P18.642 to P2. to pay that sum to Bataclan the cost of the existing wall and all plantations in the land. 1. May 6. 7. one who builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof.] En Banc. in relation to Article 546.000.212. with the costs against Bataclan. and the value of the improvements made by Bataclan thereon was increased from P1. to remove the improvements if the lessor refuses to make reimbursement. should be delivered to Bataclan. Bataclan v. to require the person who sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefor. Hence. Article 361 of the Civil Code Article 361 of the civil code.212 should be paid to Bataclan. without regard to its wisdom or folly. the petition for a writ of certiorari to annul the order of the CFI. it would always be in his power to "improve" his landlord out of the latter's property. that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee when the period agreed upon or that which is fixed has expired) from the cases wherein. No. within 30 days. and also with the right to retain the possession of the land until this amount is paid to him.212. The Supreme Court denied the petition. Bernardo can choose. Article 448 applies to possessor in good faith and not to lessee There is no provision of law which grants the lessee a right of retention over the leased premises on the ground that the lessee made repairs and improvements on the premises. 1935. CFI Cavite [G. from the date he is notified. because his only right was to purchase the land for the sum of P18.e. provides that ³any owner of land on which anything has been built. P2. Article 448 of the Civil Code. or to compel Bataclan to pay him the price the land.000. in good faith. i. 8. On appeal to this court the value of the land containing 90 hectares was reduced from P300 to P200 a hectare. In case Bernardo chose to compel Bataclan to pay him the price of the land. and his right to appeal was an adequate remedy. The lower court held that Bernardo has the right to the possession of the land and that Bataclan has the right to demand from the former the sum of P1. applies only to a possessor in good faith.642 for the expenses done in good faith." 2. or to compel the person who has built or planted to pay him the value of the land or. upon paying the compensation mentioned in articles 453 and 454. Bataclan asked for a period of 15 years in which to pay to owner of the land the value thereof. However. the basis of the decision of the lower court. 3. On 24 April 1934. Bernardo elected to compel Bataclan to pay him the value of the land. and that Bataclan appeared in court and stated that he did not have any money. shall be entitled to appropriate the thing so built.R. in the alternative.they have made for themselves. If there was any irregularity in the court's ordering the sale of the property at public auction under the conditions stated in the orders of 16 March 1934 and 24 April 1934. Appeal could have been the proper remedy Bataclan could have appealed from the order in question. 6. it would have been futile for the court to grant Bataclan a reasonable period of 30 or 60 days in which to pay Bernardo the sum of P18. and ordered that if said payment was not made the land should be sold at public auction for the payment of said sum to Bataclan. pursuant to Article 1687. sown. the Court has held that this right does not apply to a mere lessee otherwise. the payment should be made within the period agreed upon by the parties or that it would be fixed by the court. On 16 March 1934 the lower court (Judge Rovira) modified his order and ordered that from the proceeds of the sale Bernardo should be paid for the land at the rate of P200 a hectare. The award of P10. if any. Court may fix the period of payment It is true that in the decision in question it was provided that in case the plaintiff elected to compel the defendant to pay him the value of the land. that the court on 24 January 1934 then granted Bernardo 30 days in which to pay bataclan the sum of P2. Without costs. and that the balance.000 is reasonable in view of the time it has taken this rather simple case for ejectment to be decided. Rationale on why Article 448 does not apply to lessees. . or planted. 43456.

and certainty no authority is vested in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454. Thus. Subsequently. for how much. the proper rent. Article 361 provides that ³The owner of land on which anything has been built. is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building. the parcel of land in question was included as part of the lot belonging to Gregorio Bongato and Clara Botcon for which OCT RO-72 (138) was issued in their favor on 12 February 1923. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.000 for the buildings. offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. 1.Ignacio v. (b) an order to compel Hilario and Dres to pay them the sum of P2. without pronouncement is made as to damages and costs. Order amends judgment substantially and thus null and void The order of Judge Natividad compelling the Ignacios to remove their buildings from the land belonging to Hilario and Dres only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land. and upon their death. the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never become final. the court rendered judgment declaring Bongato and Sanchez owners of the . 4. The procedure is erroneous. Agusan. but it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods of time within which the option may be exercised and payment should be made. in the last instance. with costs against Hilarion and Dres. Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. And execution cannot be had. the lower court (Judge Alfonso Felix). Hilario and Dres prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay the Ignacios for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot. m. Original decision did not become final as it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot. rendered judgment holding Hilario and Dres as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to the Ignacios the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith. the rights of both parties were well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. L-12486. Article 453 provides that ³Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. and within what time may the option be exercised.R. sown or planted in good faith. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. partly rice-land and partly residential. the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof. of residential land. 1946. and the time to which the option may be exercised In the decision of Judge Felix.] En Banc. Felipe Natividad). upon the other hand. the former being the daughter of Marcos Bongato by his first marriage while the latter is the son of Eusebia More also by her first marriage. Francisco and Luis Ignacio concerning the ownership of a parcel of land. Right of retention of builder in good faith The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another. all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or unappealable. April 30. the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidence presented by the parties. Right of remotion only available if he chose the latter and the owner of the building cannot pay The owner of the land. Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez sued Leonor Grana and Julieta Torralba before the CFI Agusan. Gutierrez-David (J): 8 concur Facts: In 1909 a cadastral survey of Butuan. or (c) a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement. was made by the Bureau of Lands. this lot was purchased by the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia More. in a motion filed in the same CFI (Judge Hon. matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the present case. Option of the landowner to pay for the building or sell his land to the owner of the building. furthermore. for the recovery of 87 sq. the motion was granted by Judge Natividad. these particulars having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final.´ He cannot however refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution. it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding. L-175. the period of time within which the Ignacios may pay for the land.R. for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is. In that survey. After trial. sowing or planting. after having chosen to sell his land. is null and void. for after the judgment has become final. and the one who sowed. August 31. the Ignacios should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore Hilario and Dres in the possession of said lot. After hearing. the sheriff being ignorant as to how. the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ignacios praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad. No. as well as the period of time within which Hilario and Dres may exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land. Grana v. under article 453. Moran (J): 10 concur Facts: Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres filed a complaint Damian." 2. CA [G. On 13 April 1951. either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. Hilario [G. On 25 November 1933. He is entitled to such remotion only when. After the trial of the case. under article 361. the other party fails to pay for the same. 3. has the option.] En Banc. Hence. After such hearing. 1960. and. No. the land was inherited by Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez. or sell to them the residential lot for P45. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work. The Supreme Court set aside the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad and ordered the lower court to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected.

it would seem. then Grana and Torralbe may elect to rent the land. Arias. (Miranda vs.. Torrens certificate conclusive and indefeasible after lapse of period to which it may be impugned A Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which it may be impugned (Reyes. 3.] En Banc. A builder in good faith may not be required to pay rentals. and in the proper case. 36 Phil. De Guzman vs.00 monthly from the time Bongato and Sanchez made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. the court of origin is hereby instructed to intervene and fix the terms thereof. without pronouncement as to costs. Borbon. for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. Right of retention. August 16.. Should they disagree. the land in question is part of the lot covered by the Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the name of Bongato¶s and Sanchez' predecessors in interest. then they must vacate the same and must pay reasonable rent of P10. has not been made a party defendant in the case. Off. 55 Phil. 8. is for the owners to sell to the builders that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new).e. et al. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement.. However. expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. Practicality of the options considered The owners of the land have the choice of either appropriating the portion of the house which is on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity to the builders. plus attorney's fees and costs. If the builders are unwilling or unable to buy. Resurvey plan cannot alter or modify a title If a subsequent certificate of title cannot be permitted to prevail over a previous Torrens title (Reyes. or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. 13). Capistrano (J): 10 concur. No proof that first survey is erroneous No proof was presented to show that the first survey was erroneous or that it included part of the contiguous land of Grana¶s and Torralba¶s predecessor in interest (Isidaria Trillo) as part of the lot now covered by OCT RO-72 (138). et al. If Bongato and Sanchez choose to sell the land and Grana and Torralba are unwilling or unable to buy. Gaz. Grana and Torralba were found to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. 2. Grana and Torralba brought the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review.land in controversy and ordering Grana and Torralba to vacate and deliver it to the former and to pay a monthly rental of P10. 1969. January 31. Kasilag vs. 7. Borbon. The decision. Mojica [G. Rodriguez.00 from the date of filing of the complaint until they actually vacate said land. In the present case. Builder in good faith not required to pay rentals until he is reimbursed expenses incurred by him The appellate court erred in ordering Grana and Torralba to pay monthly rentals of P10. They are consequently estopped from alleging that the complaint should have been dismissed for nonjoinder of an indispensable party. it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative. vs. 50 Phil. in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of a lease. 5. Supp. 51 Off. then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so.. after payment to the builder of necessary and useful expenses. 247). Fadullon. (Article 361. Petitioners estopped in claiming mother was not included as an indispensable party for the complaint to be dismissed Grana and Torralba clearly asserted ownership over the land in dispute as well as over Lot 310 in their answer to the complaint. on appeal. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease. L-25450. which. supra) with more reason should a resurvey plan not be allowed to alter or modify such title so as to make the area of the land therein described agree with that given in the plan. old Civil Code. If such is the case. 4. with the employment of reasonable diligence would have easily been discovered and produced at the trial.. the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building. the owners cannot oblige the builders to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the portion of the house. has become incontrovertible evidence of the ownership of the land covered by it. see also Martinez vs. 1941. 195). Grana and Torralba shall pay reasonable rent of P10. Said title has not been contested up to the present. et al. et al. Gaz.. Builders in good faith Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question. 801. and should they fail to do so. No. He has a right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. The alleged sketch plan of the resurvey (TS-65 Butuan Cadastre) was not presented in evidence. The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision in the sense that Bongato and Sanchez were directed to exercise within 30 days from the decision their option to either buy the portion of the house of Grana and Torralba on their land or sell to the latter the portion of their land on which it stands.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same. 6226.00 monthly from the moment Bongato and Sanchez exercised their option up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms. Yumul vs. 791... The more workable solution. Of course. (See Government of the Philippines vs.. 500. Rivera. 1 took no part . et al.. therefore.R.. p. Options of the owners of the land.. it being alleged that their mother Maria Cupin. and. Santos v. vs.. 6.. i. having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the only modification of disallowing the award for attorney's fees. De la Fuente. 28 Phil. then the builders must pay reasonable rent. Article 448 of the new). 1. 64 Phil. No new evidence to grant motion for new trial The Court of Appeals did not err in denying the motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence as the new evidence sought to be introduced was the sketch plan of the second survey. or selling to builders that part of their land on which stands the improvement. who owns the land in question as part of her Lot 310. 501. then the court shall fix the same. et al. 97 Phil. Baganus. buy that portion of the house standing on their land.

he must be deemed a builder in bad faith. plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another. As builder in bad faith he lost the improvement made by him consisting of the reconstructed house to the owners of the land without right to indemnity. Mojica.00. the Allanigue brothers and sisters chose to have the house or improvement built by Leonardo Santos demolished pursuant to their motion for demolition. Options of the landowner in good faith The owners of the land became owners of the improvement consisting of the house built in bad faith if they chose to appropriate the accession. the trial court. and his right. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the city on the basis of a stipulation of facts. Maria San Agustin and Felicidad San Agustin. Felicidad. or that the planting or sowing be removed. against Judge Angel H. based on merits. Carmen. a motion to recall the writ of execution insofar as his house was concerned. Res Judicata.e. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it. Successor-in-interest bound by the judgment in Civil Case 217-R Leonardo Santos is bound by the judgment in Civil Case No. 217-R because he is a successor-in-interest of his parents. m. brought an action (Civil Case 217-R) before the CFI Rizal against their sister. Leonardo Santos and the defendants in the case. issued an order dated 9 December 1965. and for the annulment of certain conveyances involving the same.") 3. rendered judgment ordering the partition of the lot among the 11 plaintiffs and the defendant Lorenza Allanigue. if any. Hence. The prior judgment. The fact that the sale to Leonardo Santos from his parents was registered. Catalina. planted or sowed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Antero. all surnamed Allanigue (being brothers and sisters). Identity of the case The present petition is barred by the prior judgment of the Court in GR L-19618. is claimed under them. Improvement of the house made after predecessor-in-interest were summoned. the Judge. for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. The defendants having voluntarily removed their houses. the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal and the plaintiffs in the case.Facts: On 19 March 1959. Mojica). had been summoned in 1959 in Civil Case 217-R. successor-in-interest of the NAWASA. Pacita and Eleuteria. loses what is built.000. notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith. 4. Lorenza Allanigue. He filed with the sheriff a third-party claim. Santos a builder in bad faith. which. and identity of cause of action (the order of the Judge for the removal or demolition of the houses standing on the lot). MWSS v. The motion was denied. CA [G. was one of the petitioners in that case against the same official and private respondents in the instant petition. his parents. said owners could choose instead the demolition of the improvement or building at the expense of the builder.] Second Division. pursuant to Article 449 of the Civil Code (³He who builds. Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue. having an identity of subject matter (the portion of the lot and the house standing on said portion alleged by petitioner to belong to him).. had become final. 1.R. NAWASA appealed to the then Court of Appeals and argued in its lone assignment of error that the city should have been held liable for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System. the only house that remained standing on the lot was that belonging to Leonardo Santos. no right of indemnity Leonardo Santos' house having been built and reconstructed (after March 1962) into a bigger one after his predecessors-ininterest. her husband. 1986. as respondents. defendants in Civil Case 217. The judgment thus in GR L-19618 is res judicata in the instant case on the question of the validity of the order of demolition of 9 December 1965. Feria (J): 4 concur. pursuant to Article 450 of the Civil Code. Aurelio." In the present case. the defendants and movant Leonardo Santos having failed to remove their houses from the lot within the period given them. appealed (petition for review on certiorari) to the Supreme Court raising the sole issue of whether or not it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks System. The Supreme Court denied the petition. is of no moment because. Parañaque. the Supreme Court denied the petition after finding that Leonardo Santos did not follow the procedure sanctioned by law in vindicating his alleged ownership. NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses RA 1383 which vested upon it the ownership. on motion of the plaintiffs in the same Civil Case 217-R. provides ³The owner of the land on which anything has been built. he is bound by the judgment against them. not a party defendant but a son of defendants Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue. the court ordered the sheriff to demolish said houses. In a subsequent order the court set off Lorenza Allanigue's share against the amount that she had failed to pay as rents to the plaintiffs as directed in the decision. Petitioner Leonardo Santos. i. On 2 April 1962. Leonardo Santos.R. on motion of the plaintiffs. Civil Code. 1 took no part Facts: The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA). Subsequently. he should have filed an ordinary civil action to vindicate his alleged ownership of the house and the portion of land on which it was built. August 25. with costs against the petitioner Leonardo Santos.) However. Simeon Santos. After the said decision of the Supreme Court had become final. Teodorico. Vidal. 2. Rizal. (Article 445 and 449. Manuel. No. possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255. after hearing the plaintiffs' evidence. in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built. now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). and with the court. filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR L-19618). . L-54526. planted or sown without right to indemnity. the lower court (Judge Angel H. as petitioners. A writ of execution was issued on the judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the lot and deliver its possession to the plaintiffs. In its decision of 28 February 1964. for partition of a 360sq. Defendants having been declared in default. ordered the demolition of the defendants' houses. On 15 March 1962. owned a house standing on the lot. Melanio. in part. directing the sheriff to demolish the house of Leonardo Santos. MWSS. the present petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court. planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work. lot situated at San Dionisio.

An example of this is a case where the petitioner-appellant claims that the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in making its findings of fact. CA cannot invoke to modify the provisions of the Code. July 10. and finally. Only possessor in good faith has right to be refunded for useful expenses with right of retention until reimbursed. and under Article 547 thereof. Carbonell v. The only parties in an appeal by certiorari are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. and the joinder of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan becomes necessary. Nos.R. Justice Muñoz Palma dissented on the ground that since both purchasers were undoubtedly in good faith.). Justice Teehankee (now Chief Justice) concurred on the same premise as the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma that both the conflicting buyers of the real property in question. Jan.. Inc. Common error in joining the court as party respondent in an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court It is a common error of joining the court (be it a Regional Trial Court. such improvements were not actually identified. CA [G. as that assuming that MWSS (NAWASA) has the right to remove the useful improvements. Lianga Timber Co. Removability of useful improvement should have in the counterclaim. provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession (Article 549. provided such suffers no injury thereby The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure.The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. and hence a rehearing would be required which is improper at the current stage of the proceedings. loses what is built. no evidence whatsoever had been introduced by MWSS on the issue of removability of the improvements and the case was decided on a stipulation of facts. Practice. only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed. 76761. 1989. 80 Phil. Yap (13 SCRA 190). In the present case. namely petitioner Carbonell as the first buyer and respondents Infantes as the second buyer. G. Possessor in bad faith has right to remove improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure. respondents Infantes' prior registration of the sale in good faith entitled them to the ownership of the land. vs. 3. 1969. 26 SCRA 703). Case is not a precedent The decision in the case of Carbonell vs. but as a matter of equity allowed them to remove the useful improvements they had introduced on the land. the pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence. It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or respondent. the lower courts found that respondents Infantes were possessors in good faith. Inasmuch as only four Members concurred in ruling that respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two Members ruled that they were possessors in good faith. March 31.R. could not be separated without causing substantial injury or damage to the Dagupan Waterworks System. plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another. said decision does not establish a precedent. Pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence The procedural objection of the City is technically correct. 31. Sandiganbayan. the First Division of this Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared petitioner Carbonell to have the superior right to the land in question. Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs v. or the Sandiganbayan) as a party respondent in an appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if the can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. Possessor in bad faith does not have the right to remove useful improvements Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds. (Cf. Consequently. Court of Appeals (69 SCRA 99) cannot be invoked to modify the clear provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines that a possessor in bad faith is not entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses or to removal of useful improvements.. Lianga Lumber Company vs. with costs against MWSS. 1977. thus justifying the review by this court of said findings of fact. it was held that "if the defendant constructed a new building. Inc. the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 4. Yap In Mindanao Academy. 6. 2. 7. thus rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of reimbursement. 66497-98. or removal of useful improvements without damage to the principal thing Under Article 546 of said code. 5. NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity (Santos vs. that such improvements. Id.] Second Division. may be deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective dates of their purchase. Mindanao Academy v." As a builder in bad faith. (Cf. because they were outside of the scope of the judgment and may be retained by him. as he alleges. Elks Club vs. four Members ruled that they were not. Rovira. planted or sown without right to indemnity." What this Court allowed appellant Yap to remove were the equipment. NAWASA should have alleged its additional counterclaim in the alternative . Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur . January 9. Mojica. 1986. he cannot recover its value because the construction was done after the filing of the action for annulment. On appeal. the Intermediate Appellate Court. On the question of whether or not respondents Infantes were possessors in good faith. No. books.for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements or for the removal of all the useful improvements it had introduced. In said case. even if they could be identified.) In such a case. The joinder of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan as party respondent in an appeal by certiorari is necessary in cases where the petitioner-appellant claims that said court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 1. 272) The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. 76 SCRA 197). furniture and fixtures brought in by him. (See the exceptions to the rule of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan in the case of Sacay vs.

616.455 sq. On 28 September 1971. on the premise that accretion belonged to the Government. The Bureau of Lands did not act on Pena's request either. the Bureau of Lands subdivided the property into 3 parts. allocated to Pena). Fernandez. their constitutional rights to due process of law. returning to the Bureau of Lands the disposition of the lots which remained unallocated by the LSDC at the time of its abolition. E by a street beside the public plaza. his request to BOL that the area be adjusted from 1. Pena allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay on the lot. as awarded to Larrabaster. this being the area embraced within the boundaries described in the Supplementary Deed of Sale executed between him and Larrabaster on 8 September 1956. Although LSDC had initially denied the request. allegedly by failure to accord due process of law to Mendoza.500 sq. 1969. that he was not made a party to the administrative case. to which the latter in its Resolution 488. Foundation. responded by advising Mendoza to direct its protest to the Office of the President. on 27 January 1970. Larrabaster leased the lot to Basilio Mendoza and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat on the portion thereof. and not notified of proceedings before the 13 May 1969 decision nor served a copy thereof.93 sq. ms. RA 1160 transferred the custody and administration of the Marbel Townsite to the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). which was created to wind up the affairs of LSDC. S by Bulok creek and the National Highway. Koronadal. which was presented while his request for reconsideration with the Office of the President. And on 3 September 1969 the BOL recommended to the Director of Lands the issuance of a patent in Pena's favor. was pending. 1977. ms. On appeal.Facts: On 15 April 1948. On 10 May 1985 the Trial Court rendered its Decision in Civil Case 98 dismissing Mendoza's Petition for Certiorari.93 sq. On 29 June 1956 Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and interests over Lot 336 to Jose B.500 sq. it subsequently confirmed the sale to Pena in its Resolution 139. Mendoza did so and on 28 September 1971 said Office rendered its letter-decision affirming its 13 May 1969 decision. without prejudice to the reopening of the administrative case in said Office as to accord all parties concerned..616. ms. On 18 June 1954. Due process. but the BOL again denied the same under its Resolution 439.616. Having thus been given a chance to be heard with respect to his protest there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. The BOL then recommended that Pena be awarded Lot 108 instead of the whole of former Lot 355. such procedural defect was cured when Mendoza elevated his letter protest to the Office of the President. and while his protest with the Office of the President was still pending. Home Lot 336 (later known as Lot 355. On 23 June 1978..500 to 3. These observations do not justify the conclusion that the decisions of the Office of the President were vitiated.m. 1. involving the same Decision of 13 May 1969. Pena. but due to accretion. Decision of the Office of the President not vitiated After the Office of the President had rendered its Decision dated 13 May 1969. 1. 1985.. Pena. the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court in its 28 November 1986 Decision. i. prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of Liquidators (BOL). On 20 August 1956 Pena requested NARRA to approve the transfer of rights but the latter did not act thereon in view of Proclamation 336. Notwithstanding the transfer. Mendoza filed a letter-protest on 1 August 1969 with the BOL.500 sq.. ms. ms. and since home lots had an average area of 1. hence. On 8 September 1956 a Supplementary Deed of Sale was executed by the same parties defining the boundaries of Lot 355 (formerly 336: N by Bulok creek and a street. On 25 November 1952 the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LSDC) took over the functions of the NLSA. Pena must have realized that the property contained an area bigger than 1. South Cotabato. and W by Bulok creek).) was allocated to him on the basis of a report of the supervisor of the Settlement District that the lot was vacant and free from any claim or conflict. the same Office. August 21. 394-395. to conform to its actual area. 1956. ms. In its Resolution 139.500 sq. reasoning that the benefits of accretion accrue to the owner. Assuming absence of notice and opportunity to be present in proceedings: Defect cured Even assuming that there was absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the administrative proceedings prior to the rendition of the 10 February 1969 and 13 May 1969 Decisions by the Office of the President. s. Lot 108. 3. 1976. 77 SCRA 321 [1977]. On 14 May 1969 the BOL approved Resolution 236. s. 72 SCRA 388. The BOL conducted an investigation and reported that Lot 355. and Lot 109 (661 sq. not served with a copy of the 10 February 1969 Decision.93 and not 1. Pena moved for reconsideration stressing that the award should be for 3. the BOL denied the request. on 13 May 1969. s. also Sumpang v. and not to the Government (Article 457).500 sq. ms. Jesus M. On 1 August 1969 Mendoza addressed a letter-protest to the BOL. Mendoza cannot justifiably claim that he was denied due process. Montemayor vs. May 31. Mendoza followed up with a Supplemental Petition to annul the administrative Decision of 20 September 1971 denying his protest. The latter office directed him to file his protest with the Office of the President. Pena alleged that the lot transferred to him by Larrabaster contains 3. allocated to Basilio Mendoza).. 137 SCRA 56 [1985]). L-44251. 1964. ms. including Mendoza. contained only 1. Upon Pena's motion for reconsideration. allocated to Arturo Roxas).93 sq. which subjected the controversy to appellate review but eventually denied reconsideration. On 10 February 1969 the Office of the President ordered that the area of Pena's lot (Lot 108) be maintained at 1. only. namely: Lot 107 (1. L-25897. Cotabato. In the meantime. Inciong. ms. Civil Case 98). (1. Larrabaster applied with the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) for a home lot at the Marbel Settlement District. ms.500 sq. and reinstated the Decision of 10 May 1985 of the RTC (Branch 24. Araneta Univ. Excepting to this. (See also Dormitorio v. s. modified its Decision and held that the award to Pena of the original Lot 355 is maintained. L50992. directing its LSDC unit to advise Pena accordingly. s. since the lot was almost surrounded by a creek. 1967. dated 6 August 1969.500 sq. Pena appealed to the Office of the President. when he filed his petition for certiorari before the CFI Cotabato. the area increased to 3. ..e.. Pending administrative request for reconsideration abandoned in favor of judicial proceedings Mendoza had abandoned his pending administrative request for reconsideration in favor of judicial proceedings. Due process. 2. Mendoza resorted to Civil Case 98 for Certiorari before the then CFI Cotabato against the public officials and Pena. June 19. The Supreme Court set aside the Decision of 28 November 1986 of the Court of Appeals.616. Mendoza's request for reconsideration was denied by said Office. which he did. On 10 July 1950 Larrabaster's application was granted. 1964. ms.

8. 1956. on 10 February 1976. fraud. Branch III. Accretion. however. as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.R. 635 [1940]). and that "In the sale of a friar land. L-19100. even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Ang Tibay vs. Mendoza¶s filing of Miscellaneous Sales Application inappropriate and without legal force and effect Mendoza's filing of a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the Disputed Property with the Bureau of Lands on 6 November 1962 is inappropriate and without any legal force and effect since the same was no longer public land subject to disposition by the Government. said stream is made the boundary. No. to Larrabaster and now to his assignee (Peña) belong the accretions to said lot which may no longer be allocated to others by the Government. 69 Phil. the Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due to the failure of Ferrer's counsel to submit the requisite memorandum in support of the petition. No. at 810. and all the area inside said boundaries be considered as included in the sale´. on the ground that the court had no authority to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack. 1963. although the government reserves title thereto. even if it occurred prior to completion of installment payment While it may be conceded that Lot No." It also opined that creeks are included within the meaning of this Civil Code provision. On 23 March 1976. Ferrer filed with the CFI La Union. Court of Industrial Relations. a complaint for reivindicacion (Civil Case A-86) against Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. 1963. Consequently. The stream may advance or recede but it will always constitute the boundary or boundaries of the lot. in the name of Magdalena Domondon. The Office of the President could not have relied upon said report if the same had not been before it when it rendered the questioned Decisions. Bautista [G. that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence. without prejudice. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then CFI La Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against Balanag and Domondon (Civil Case A-514). 814 [1950]). Finding of facts of Executive Branch given respect as long as supported by substantial evidence In reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the government. 9 SCRA 557." 6. the authority of the Bureau of Lands to dispose of lots was limited to "unallocated areas. Authority of Bureau of Lands limited to the disposal of lots in unallocated areas Under Proclamation 336. which provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on 3 May 1977. 10. On 03 August 1978. Bautista dismissed. Ferrer vs. the Office of the President modified its conclusions in its Decision of 13 May 1969by taking into account Article 457 of the Civil Code. Fabre. On 07 December 1976. 7. the Court resolved to reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the petition. Moreno. In Director of Lands. Ricardo Rizal." 5. which were absent in the present case. Gloria A.] Third Division. Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title P-168. 355 technically belongs to the government because it was bought from the latter under an installment plan. which is immediately north of the land in question. dated 19 August 1977. Vicente. Article 457 also applies to creeks Upon re-study. March 14. 1120 pending payment in full of the purchase price. Vitug (J): 4 concur Facts: On 25 November 1956. the findings of fact made therein must be respected. vs. albeit the Government still retained the naked title thereto. and that any accretion by the lot even before payment of the last installment belongs to the purchaser thereof. it was held that "When the lot bordering on a public stream is sold on installment basis by the government. 806. In a Resolution dated 28 September 1978. as well as the allocation of said lots to two other individuals. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's Resolution. He is entitled to all the benefits which may accrue to the land as well as suffer the losses that may befall it. because it constitutes a collateral or indirect attack on the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title. Ferrer was allowed to file the petition for review on certiorari under RA 5440 considering that only questions of law had been raised. that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion. On the other hand. the beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser. 9 SCRA 852). Larrabaster had already acquired the beneficial and equitable title over the Lot 355. et al. 46963. La Union by virtue of accretion. Judge Bautista issued an order dismissing Ferrer's complaint." Since the property no longer belonged to the Government the subdivision thereof by the Bureau of Lands into 3 lots. s. pursuant to Free Patent 309504 issued on 24 January 1966. or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun. et al. Ferrer claims ownership a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay. .4. 81 Phil. was beyond the scope of its authority. et al. lot or parcel bordering on rivers under Act. it cannot be rightfully concluded that the benefits of accretion must still be retained by the said seller. she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT T-3280. Reopening the case will lead to protracted litigation To reopen the case as ordered by the Court of Appeals would open wide the doors to a protracted litigation of a controversy that has been pending for approximately 19 years. Gloria A. Judge Antonio G. vs. 1994. 682 [1948]). December 27. Timbancaya vs. (87 Phil. L-17821. or error of law (Lovina vs. merely for its protection. the complaint. No irregularity that can be imputed to the administrative decisions No irregularity may be imputed to the administrative decisions by reason of the fact that allegedly a copy of the investigation report of the BOL was not among those elevated to the Trial Court or among those marked in evidence. 9. Accretion belongs to riparian owner. November 29. and the purchaser has the right to insist that the original boundaries be preserved. determine the credibility of the witnesses.

Ferrer the lawful owner of accretion Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that ³to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. would be thirty years. and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute. In the present case. without costs. 1990. 181 SCRA 793). 147 SCRA 37. supra). 1155. 6. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe (Agne vs. 66075-76. but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant. IAC. and rendered judgment declaring Ferrer to be the owner of the disputed parcel of land and ordering Balanag and Domondon to reconvey the same to Ferrer. Balanag and Domondon acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966. 7. the judicial relationship is a patent nullity The ten-year prescriptive period is applicable to an action for reconveyance if. January 4. nonetheless. vs. however.. Director of Lands. as well as Civil Case A-514 filed in 1976 following the dismissal the month previous of Civil Case A-86. Court of Appeals. the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately owned (Agne vs. on 22 March 1976. Court of Appeals." Undoubtedly. et al. it is susceptible to direct. 147 SCRA 37). 3. 91385. In the present case. Civil Code. Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur . in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may. the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by the resolution of the case and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case to the trial court (Heirs of Crisanta Almoradie. Court of Appeals. Balanag and Domondon cannot claim ownership by acquisitive prescription Balanag and Domondon claim ownership of the disputed property by acquisitive prescription. Considering. for purposes of acquisitive prescription. the court then. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void (Tuason vs. Director of Lands. the applicable period of acquisitive prescription. Prescriptive period interrupted when action is filed in court or if action is pending Even assuming. since the public grant and the title correspondingly issued to Balanag and Domondon that can create that juridical relationship is a patent nullity. Civil Code.) Given the settings in the present case.] First Division. 177 SCRA 313). Nos. direct the owner to reconvey the disputed parcel to its lawful owner (Limaza vs. Action to declare title void does not prescribe Although. That possession. Agustin v. G. 8. an order from the Supreme Court requiring such reconveyance can certainly be just and warranted. the running of the prescriptive period is to be deemed interrupted when an action is filed in court (Art. Ferrer. it is based on an implied or constructive trust. upon which a constructive trust can be predicated. 1994. Tuason vs. (See Art. 1. IAC [G. cannot be invoked. et al. The rationale for the rule is to provide some kind of compensation to owners of land continually exposed to the destructive force of water and subjected to various easements (Agustin vs. Escudero vs. Where the owner of the land is determined. SCRA 69). this time without need of title or of good faith. not from fraud or deceit. 182 SCRA 855. vs. 457. Civil Code) or. At that time. Cureg vs. Does not apply if issuance is null and void. when one is already there pending. 5. as well as to collateral. 157 SCRA 357. Director of lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land which ceased to be public land. 1134. 10 year prescription period applies to action for reconveyance if it is based on an implied or constructive trust. Sr. obviously. Court of Appeals. et al. Title incontrovertible 1 year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant. on 10 February 1976. In the present case.R. Article 1456 of the Civil Code. Alluvion belongs to riparian owner. Director of Lands. the rule does not apply when such issuance is null and void. No.. in fact. Parenthetically. Dulay. Court of Appeals. Ferrer is the lawful owner of the accretion. 158. IAC. indeed. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years. 195 SCRA 374). Expeditious administration of justice Where the determinative facts are before the Supreme Court. Agne vs. vs. the same finding has also been made by the trial court in Civil Case A-86. Civil Code) in Civil Case A-86 pending since 1965. she being the registered owner of Lot 1980 which adjoins the alluvial property. After Civil Case A-86 was dismissed. supra). attack (Estoesta. Lianga Bay Logging Co. 179 SCRA 203). the Free Patent was issued on 24 January 1966 and OCT P-168 was transcribed in the Registration Book of La Union on 08 February 1966. was deemed interrupted upon their receipt of summons (Art. Civil Case A-86 for reivindicacion between the parties was still pending in court. that a constructive trust did arise. it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain. 187 SCRA 218. ordinarily. Binalay vs. moreover. 1123.R. Assuming. Rationale for the rule Alluvion gives to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion which is gradually received from the effects of the current of waters (Art. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years if the adverse possession is with a just title and the possession is in good faith. instead of remanding the case to the trial court. without prejudice. if at all. Title issued null and void The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land. promptly filed Civil Case A-514.The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court (Civil Case 514-A). Manalo. 2. IAC. 4. The nullity arises. July 5. the length of time that the case has been pending between the parties.

the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. 7881 to 7885. Elias Macababbad. Article 459 provides that ³whenever the current of a river. On 24 April 1970. it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. In 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. Arturo Balisi. 7891 and 7892. together with its accretion and to restore possession to Pablo Binayug and Geronimo Urbina. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward. Reason for the principle of accretion benefiting a riparian owner The reason for the principle is because. by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. In April 1969. OCT 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by Eulogio Agustin. Urbina and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River. On the other hand. 7875 to 7879. 7881 to 7885. was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6. Macario Melad. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968. 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad. 408. Maria and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case 343-T) to recover Lot 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6. Domingo Quilang. Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay. grew from its original area of 18 hectares. and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements. in 1968. On 29 November 1983. and. Justo Adduru. Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial. Jose Allabun. 4. Balisi and Langcay. depositing silt on the western bank. with costs against Agustin. But upon motion of the Melads. their representatives or agents to vacate Lot 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463. Binayug was in possession since 1947 of Lots 3349. Rizal. Binayug. the petition for review. et. while the Melads. the predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad. if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters. Binayug and Urbina from the premises. Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions. in Civil Case 344-T. Cesar Cabalza. with costs against the Agustin. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeal conclusive with the Supreme Court The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the Melads. leaving a piece of . Nicanor Mora. Conditions for accretion to benefit a riparian owner Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible. Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir). the Cagayan River changed its course. 567). To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river. Eulogio Agustin. Teofilo Tagacay. now CA. The trial court likewise ordered. creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs.6-hectare accretion. However. claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the Melads. Only when Lot 3351. accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao. As the years went by. Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed the decision in Civil Case 344-T." Article 463 provides that ³ whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches. 9 Phil. In 1925. Baldomero Cagurangan. 7891 and 7892. while Eulogio Agustin. is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. Vicente Camilan. in the process. Hence. the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was Agustin's Lot 8457. Ownership of accretion not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the river The' ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed). returned to its 1919 bed. Eulogio Agustin appealed the decision in Civil Case 343-T. and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern. 1. 293 on 1 June 1956. Agustin. Andres Pastor. or Tuguegarao. Binayug's Homestead Application W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 and his possession recognized in the decision in Civil Case 101. 132 SCRA 514). their representatives or agents to vacate Lots 3349. and affirmed the decision of the IAC. 10 Phil. On 16 June 1975. cut across the lands of Maria Melad. and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs.6 hectares had been added to it. Tuason. covered by a homestead patent issued in June 1950 to Pablo Binayug. Cagurangan. Binauyg and Urbina who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river. after a big flood. It is has an area of 8 hectares planted to tobacco and corn and another 12 hectares overgrown with talahib. City of Manila. the trial court ordered on 15 August 1975 the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case 344-T against Cagurangan. Without pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs. with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956.Facts: The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. In 1950. and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. was issued OCT P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 806). Juan Langcay. That finding is supported by Art. On 21 April 1970. CA. (366)" 2. Gregorio Tuliao. Binayug and Urbina. depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Binayug on the western bank. 3. Banong Aquino. The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. and Arturo Balisi. Through the years. Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud. In the present case. 87 Phil. the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it. Titong Macababbad. Lot 3351. the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court. as a result of Civil Case 343-T. all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case 343-T. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.al. provided that he removes the same within two years. (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water. Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were Pablo Binayug and Maria Melad. ordering Eulogio Agustin. Director of Lands vs. 7875 to 7879. the Heirs of Baldomero Langcay. It was gradual and imperceptible. side of the river. Timoteo Melad.

Morte. (TCT 25618.711 sq. Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5. m. 1. all of whom are disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can be attributed to them.´ Reynante v. Neither was there any mention of the hut and nipa palms for such to be included in the subsequent least to de la Cruz. Moreover. 2. his heirs entered into a written agreement denominated as ³Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan´ dated 29 November 1984 with Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum of P200. The court observed that the controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan.land or part thereof isolated. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 February 1990 and reinstated the decision of the MTC Meycauayan. 177 SCRA 495. affirming the decision of the lower court in toto. an occular inspection was conducted by the trial court dated 2 December 1988 which was attended by the parties and their respective counsels. On 28 February 1990. Reynante refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2. and reversed the decision of the lower court. Reynante continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted therein. Department of Environment and Natural Resources. and 6. 76216. Reynante in prior possession Reynante was in possession of the questioned lots for more than 50 years. Map 3122 dated 8 May 1987. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Reynante. Carandang. Bulacan with an area of 188. the heirs formally demanded that Reynante vacate said portion since the latter had already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. 1992. . the Court of Appeals could not legally restore the heirs' possession over lots 1 and 2 simply because Reynante has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2. the heirs filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction against Reynante with the MTC Meycauayan Bulacan (Branch 1. 73 Phil.C. together with the sasa or nipa palms planted theron. the Court of Appeals rendered its decision (CA-GR 19171). Civil Case 1526) alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth. During the tenancy. m. the heirs based their claim of possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on the written agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered his rights over the fishpond.1107 hectares as described in the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for Reynante falls within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under Project 15 per B. he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria (German Management & Services. he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Bulacan containing an area of 1. Action for forcible entry An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title of the property is never determined. and Carling Dumalay. actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto. September 14. 1989. the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that Reynante had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2. Apolonio D. however. Court of Appeals. and the heirs of Gorgonio and Concepcion Carlos thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own.] Second Division. Reynante filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. There is nothing. Inc.000 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay-kasama at tagapamahala. Reynante surrendered the fishpond and the 2 huts located therein to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos. On 5 November 1990. on the document that the tenant was giving other matters not mentioned in the document. and each party bearing their respective costs of the suit. No. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession. Paras (J): 5 concur Facts: More than 50 years ago. Meycauayan. He was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein. No. The heirs of Leoncio and Dolores Carlos. This fact is bolstered by the "Sinumpaang Salaysay " executed by Epifanio Lucero. took over the physical. Disputed lands not included in TCT 25618 The disputed lots involved in the present case are not included in TCT 25618 as per verification made by the Forest Management Bureau. the petition for review on certiorari. The Court ordered Reynante to restore possession of the piece of land. a a circumstance that gives the impression that said hut and palms do not belong to the heirs. Hence. On 17 February 1988. Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos.096 sq. v. G. After the death of Don Cosme Carlos. The heirs appealed to the RTC Malolos Bulacan (Branch 8. m. In the present case.R. On the other hand. These lots are located between the fishpond covered by TCT 25618 and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River.´ Pursuant to the said written agreement. Bulacan (Branch I). without pronouncement as to attorney's fees. 95907. except their desire to tell the truth. That tract of land situated at Barrio Liputan. 3. and thus denied the petition seeking to issue a restraining order. 498. From said decision. the owner of the land retains his ownership. 3rd Judicial Region) and on 8 August 1989 it rendered its decision in favor of the heirs. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.L. 3rd Judicial Region.R. On the other hand. 469 [1942]). CA [G. if he has in his favor priority in time.011 sq. if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession. 499). Meycauayan. On 10 January 1989. On 22 April 1988. Despite receipt thereof. over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan. Land Registry of Bulacan).F. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. respectively. April 8. Reynante harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. Meycauayan River it being a part of the public domain.

and postal addresses. and by other amendments to his original petition dated 30 August and 25 September 1906. excepted to said judgment and moved for a new trial on the ground that the same was contrary to law and to the weight of the evidence.ms.91 sq. and Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre. on behalf of Pedro P. Julia Tuason. On 18 September 1906. highways. and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. October 12. Tuason." In the present case. No. Roxas. equivalent to 17. the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws. under lease. L-61647. attorneys Rosado. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land. registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. opposite the first parcel of land.m. The hacienda was not mortgaged nor that any person has any right to or any interest therein. y Ubaldo. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. and in her opinion the latter included a considerable portion of the land owned by her. and was assessed at P98.70 sq.221. cited in Agustin v. the municipality of San Pedro Macati.904 corresponded to the portion of said hacienda included within the limits of the city of Manila and P256. 115 Phil. The municipality of San Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested registration.R. wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. Roxas v. by the municipality of San Pedro Macati. On 24 April. Torres (J): 4 concur Facts: On 19 February 1906. The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means of subpoenas and notices published in the daily papers. and 9 meters and 20 centimeters along each of its sides. v. so long as the same is occupied by the said building or by another in substitution thereof and used for the public good and for official purposes.." the second said parcels. together with its appurtenances.4. the Aguirres and the municipality of San Pedro to pay their respective share of the costs." belonging also to Roxas.446. 1990. July 5.. applied for the registration of the estate owned by Roxas (Hacienda de San Pedro Macati) in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Hon. Sanz & Opisso. (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water. residences. The building constructed of strong materials. Requisites of accretion Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible. Roxas amended his application and gave the postal address and names of several occupants of the property. called the "Casa-Quinta" or "Casa de Ingenieros.70 centares which must be deducted from the original description. and that all the land occupied by roads. 521) it was held that "an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. 187 SCRA 218). which was the subject of another bill of exceptions and appeal by the Roxas. On 24 July 1906. of which P59. Relief is application of survey The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed by monuments belonging to her or that the . L-3788. rectifications are made in the boundaries of the hacienda. Jose Bonifacio Roxas. On 17 October 1906. lanes. an area of 8." occupying. is erected within parcel "C. or 14 ares and 46. appeared and by a document dated 10 September 1906. No evidence showing Julia Tuason owns the strip of land on the bank of the creek. designated on the accompanying plan under the letters "A" to "D". the last of which represents a decrease of 1. and ordered the registration of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati in favor of Pedro Roxas excluding the parcel of land with a frontage of 23 Spanish yards and a depth of 24 Spanish yards occupied by the municipal building. such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. its boundaries being stated. the attorney for Alejandro Aguirre and Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for registration alleging that the 2 parcels of land owned by them had been improperly included within the bounds of said hacienda in the parcel marked "C. the court rendered decision. 132 SCRA 514. set forth her opposition to the registration and authentication of the title of Roxas.34. 1984.595.557.R. one of them. which is the only subject of the respective bill of exceptions and appeal interposed by them. In Ignacio Grande. Tuason [G. The property consists of 4 parcels of land. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from as regards Julia Tuason and the municipality of San Pedro Macati. assuming that the heirs had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question).34. protects the title already possessed by the owner. et al. and stated in addition that the total area of the hacienda is 17.613. 5. thereafter. Julia Tuason. and by Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre as to the second parcel. G. 1.m. The respective bills of exceptions having been presented.761 hectares 51 ares and 5 centares. But to obtain this protection. Intermediate Appellate Court. irregular shape. but merely confirms and. Aguirre and the municipality of San Pedro Macati again excepting. Said hacienda was acquired by Roxas by inheritance under the will of his late father. No. and public landing places belonged to the public domain and should be excluded from registration in favor of Roxas. (GR L-17652. containing a total area of 1. still their failure to register said accretion for a period of 50 years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons. as specified in the corrections made to the technical description. Court of Appeals. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. 66075-76.] First Division. said second parcels measures 10 meters and 87 centimeters on its front and rear. 30 June 1962. as regards the parcel marked "C. and it is almost wholly occupied. declared the appeal of Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre to be abandoned. Nos. G. Roxas requested the summoning of the persons therein named. said motion was overruled. which the government has the right to use without the payment of rent therefor. and assessed at P415. and ordered Tuason.R. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing." for the reason that two old monuments which had separated their respective properties had been pulled down and new ones erected without her consent. consists of a building lot situated in Calle San Pedro. et al. December 21. by accretion. are stated in the application.615. the same were forwarded in the ordinary manner to the Supreme Court.. alleging that the land occupied by the municipal building and the public school had been in the possession of the town from time immemorial. by about 429 tenants whose names. as well as the residence of the owner of the property and of his attorney in fact. making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties.105 sq. overruling the opposition made by Julia Tuason. Court of Appeals. Accretion does not automatically become registered land Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of the banks (Article 457).769 corresponded to that portion situated in the Province of Rizal.430 sq.ms.. 1907.

small bancas plying on it around the Island of Suavoy. and that said creek traversed said barrio from one end to the other. having then a width of about 4 Spanish yards. 3. on account of the accretion. The possession thereof by the municipality has been but for a few years only. 7. the Spanish Government had recognized the dominion of Roxas' predecessor over the land occupied by said municipal building and by the town cemetery. and if she did not do so it must be because she renounces its verification in this manner or for some other reason. 9. 5. forming part of the barrio or sitio of Suavoy. who have been cultivating their respective parcels of land together with the corresponding portion of the said strip down to the bank of said creek.. others 2 meters. or the Tuason's land. Strip of land occupied by tenants of the hacienda The strip of land. and no proof is offered in the record that the land of Julia Tuason reached the other side of the creek toward the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati. the same being returnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such purpose. in order to affirm on good grounds that her land extended to the opposite bank of the aforesaid creek. and the grant made by the owner was ever understood to be only of the usufruct thereof so long as used for public purposes. it being recognized as the boundary line between both properties. to Julia Tuason. the original owners thereof. Municipality of San Pedro Macati merely enjoys usufruct of the plots occupied by the municipal building and town cemetery Roxas is the owner of the building lots and portions of land to which the opposition of the municipality of San Pedro Macati refers. she would have applied for a survey and demarcation of her property in accordance with the area of the same stated in her title deed. Said tenants when cultivating the land did not cross the creek." The provision is perfectly applicable to the strip of land. Notwithstanding the fact that the time prescribed has been exceeded. running parallel to the creek and forming a portion of its bank. the government of the Province of Manila having recognized the title thereto which pertained to Roxas. and even though the law does not require an express act of possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate. and some 1 meter. Thus. the gradual effect of the currents. has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the hacienda inasmuch as it has increased all along the bank of the creek. according to the documents offered in evidence by Roxas. on the part of the municipality. and if her statement were true. was simply usufructuary. which. and the possession thereof. No legal reason for Tuason to own strip of land No legal reason whatever exists why the slow increase which has taken place on the hacienda's side should be considered as belonging to Tuason. since in the bill of sale executed by the procurador general of the Augustinian friars on 28 March 1893. Roxas requested in a petition on 26 June 1907 that the Aguirres¶ appeal be considered as having been abandoned. . and some of the monuments of the hacienda were 4 meters distant from the bank. the latter has only the usufruct of the plot occupied by the municipal building as long as the same or any other building of a public and official nature is erected thereon. the Aguirres have not filed their brief nor notified Roxas regarding the same. Old monuments of no importance in this case The situation of the old monuments and the placing of new ones in the intervening space is of no importance. inasmuch as the latter does not own the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that the slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both properties equally since Tuason has not been able to show or prove that her land has been thereby reduced. Nor does the record show that there was more land on the side of the hacienda. no mention is made of monuments erected thereon nor of any creek existing in the large tract of land purchased by her. was duly forwarded. Creek wider in 1871 In 1871 the said creek was wider. whereby their claim to the second parcel of land was dismissed. Prescription unavailing to plot occupied by public school In connection with the land occupied by the public school of said town. When the school building having been destroyed. there being no evidence in support thereof. Accretions belong to riparian owners Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession to real property provides that "rhe accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon. The proven fact that said creek was wider in 1871 is the best explanation as to why some of the monuments of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati are at some distance from the bank of the same. owner of the hacienda. 2. The hacienda¶s tenants were never molested or interfered with by the Augustinian Fathers or their tenants. the land was abandoned. the municipality can not dispose of it as a property of its own because. 8. Prescription thus can not be invoked because the possession thereof was interrupted and ceased many years since.creek which divides the sitio or Island of Suavoy from the land of the said hacienda is included within the Tuason's land. inasmuch as it has already been shown that Tuason has no title to the accretion which by spontaneous increase formed the strip of land between the creek and the monuments. Their bill of exceptions. Said request is held to be well based and in accordance with the law. 6. irregular in shape. whereof the said plot forms a part. no opposition based on ordinary or on extraordinary prescription may be made by the municipality because the plot was granted only for the purpose of erecting thereon a public school. Aguirres¶ appeal abandoned The attorney for Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre excepted to the decision of 17 October 1906. entered in the general register under 3788. it is certain that the owner of the hacienda has possessed it for more than 30 years through his tenants. except that the land is situated in the barrio of Suavoy and that it is bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati. has always been occupied by tenants of the hacienda as being an integral portion thereof. not included in the tract acquired by Tuason from the Augustinian Fathers. even at the time when the land owned by Julia Tuason belonged to the Augustinian Fathers. 4. from the fact that the land of Julia Tuason was bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati it does not follow that the strip of a few meters in width on the bank of the creek belonged to her. nor later by Julia Tuason or her tenants when cultivating the strip of land.

444). Primo Gerardo(+) and Salud Gerardo(+) have also been in actual. of a parcel of land. . et. under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants. namely Soledad Gerardo. and the boundary on the north became Cagayan River. Nieves. E: Domingo Guingab. and W: Marcos Cureg). cited in Camo v. is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of title.520. to 4. 384. Apostol's claim over the land allegedly existing between Cureg's land and the Cagayan River.584 sq. Cureg appealed to the then IAC Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court on 15 October 1985 (CAGR CV 03852).al. 73465. Manuel. et. which declarations are all in the name of the latters¶ predecessor-in-interest. 12 Phil. Said land was declared for taxation purposes under TD 08-3023 in the name of Francisco Gerardo. et. Manuel. in support of their claim. 29 Phil. and appear to have been subscribed by him after the last war. Cabagan. III-373 for quieting of title and damages. Isabela which contained an area of 2. (Evangelista v. E: Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg). Nieves and Flordeliza Gerardo. 29 May 1987. the ownership and possession of the land was succeeded by his only issue. 404). reversed and set aside the decision appealed from. purposely eliminating completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.R. while Salud Gerardo was survived by Lilia Maquinad. September 7. Act 496 (now Section 44 of PD 1529). that the "subject land" is an accretion to their registered land and that they have been in possession and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years.5000 hectares (N: Cagayan River. Sometime about the last week of September and or the first week of October 1982.ms. the land is bound and title thereto quieted. a reasonable attorney's fee of P5. the latter being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo. On 10 September 1982. with an assessed value of P70. open. No. subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39. ordering that the writ be made permanent.. who died in February 1944. Pepito. that the area under the new TD 15663 was increased from 2. The declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. 2. to pay Apostol. Antonio and Elpidio Carniyan with the RTC Isabela (Civil Case Br. et. Cabagan. On 17 July 1984. Elumbaring v. an original certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises. In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Decree of registration bars all claims and rights arising or existing prior to decree A decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration (FerrerLopez v.al.00. 401-402). S: Antonio Carniyan. Soledad Gerardo. that since time immemorial and/or before 26 July 1894. Cureg's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 8 January 1986. who died before the outbreak of WWII. 437. when the Gerardos. By the issuance of the decree. they were prevented and threatened by the Carniyans (Leonida Cureg and Romeo.al. the trial court rendered judgment declaring Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of the parcel of land containing an area of 5. 1. Primo Gerardo was survived by Rosa. and Flordeliza Gerardo along with Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the land to Domingo Apostol. Hernando. ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Cureg. 1989. In a decision rendered on 6 July 1984. open. The complaint alleged that the Gerardos and Maquinad are the legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo.al. Isabela. Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against Leonida. Elumbaring.500. that upon the death of Francisco Gerardo.5 hectares [N: Cagayan River. Hernando. m. and ordering Cureg. 111-373). Since Cureg's original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River. Maquinad and Apostol were about to cultivate their land together with its accretion. Riosa Bayco. Medialdea (J): 3 concur Facts: On 5 November 1982. Rosa Gerardo. relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their OCT P19093. et.00. Soledad. supra. Cureg et. The Supreme Court granted the petition.´ About the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition. 607.Cureg v. In 1979. and which was declared for taxation purposes under TD 13131.000.al.790 sq. peaceful and continuous possession of the same. and rendered judgment dismissing Civil Case Br. S: Pelagio Camayo. p. The heirs of Antonio Carniyan (Cureg. peaceful and continuous possession.) alleged in their answer that the land claimed by the Gerardos and Apostol is non-existent. containing an area of 2. the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rule of Court. Domingo Gerardo who.al. and W: Sabina Mola]. OCT indicates true and legal ownership Gerardos' and Maquinad¶s (therefore Apostol¶s) claim of ownership of their alleged 2 & 1/2 hectare land is anchored mainly on 4 tax declarations. which cancelled TD C-9669. situated in Casibarag-Cajel. Domingo Apostol. Antonio and Elpidio: surviving spouse and children of Antonio Carniyan) from continuing to do so. when it was established during the trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war. together with his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual.. Court of Appeals (GR 50420. 150 SCRA 393. that Domingo Apostol declared the land and its accretion for tax purposes under TD 08-13281 on 15 September 1982. in the name of Francisco. Pepito. the land already manifested signs of accretion of about 3 hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on 12 November 1982. Tabayuyong. litigation expenses of P1. E: Domingo Guingab. the verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance. it was ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein. et. 7 Phil.790 sq. IAC [G. The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on 28 July 1983 on the ground that the Carniyans (Cureg) were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982.ms.(N: Domingo Gerardo. together with 3 legal or forced heirs. Romeo. Hence. Tax Declaration not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. Carniyan revised on 28 November 1968 his TD 13131 dated 24 July 1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his OCT P-19093 issued on 25 November 1968 pursuant to Free Patent 399431 dated 21 May 1968. Cureg's OCT P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations offered by Apostol. On the other hand.] First Division. and W: by Sabina Mola) and with an assessed value of P3. CA.00 and costs. with costs against Apostol. Rosa. Francisco Gerardo. the late Francisco Gerardo. Nieves Gerardo. S: Antonio Carniyan.al. The late Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land (acquired from his father-in-law Marcos Cureg on 5 October 1956 as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale) situated in Casibarag-Cajel. that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo.

rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to the Grandes. and dismissing the Grandes' action against the Calalungs. who claimed it as an accretion to his land. Court of Appeals.964 square meters (1. et. by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez. when the Calalungs entered upon the land under claim of ownership. On 25 January 1958. are in actual possession of the land. 5. Antonio Carniyan. which provides that ³to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers. After trial. the Grandes instituted an action in the CFI Isabela against Domingo and Esteban Calalung to quiet title to said portion (19. it is said that "to the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. and for many years thereafter.3. No. on 14 September 1960. contrary to the statement of the trial court and the appellate court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to survey because persons other than defendants were in possession of the land. the same was found to be occupied and cultivated by. Plan PSU-83342. province of Isabela. among others." Grande v. Accretion does not automatically become registered land The area covered by OCT P-19093 is only 4. 4. 1962). the Calalungs appealed to the Court of Appeals. First. on cross-examination. Accretion belongs to riparian owners The land in question is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code. granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT P-19093. Third. et. 1962. (See Grande v. by action of the current of the Cagayan River. were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof. the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site. The accretion attached to said land is approximately 5. such application was disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion. ms.al. Esteban Guingab. Second. located at barrio Ragan. The increase in the area of Cureg's land.al.al. Apostol. municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini). Albano. The tax declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 already states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River.584 sq. Isabela. Cureg not estopped as Tax Declarations subsequent to issuance of OCT states northern boundary is Cagayan river A tax declaration. unless some superior title has supervened. and undisturbed possession of said portion. In effect. it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System. 1. Alfonso.964 square meters) formed by accretion. et. being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. more or less. CA [G. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930. a geodetic engineer. Cabagan. In their answer. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Eulalia. with an area of 3. and ordering the Calalungs to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to the Grandes. but he did not pursue the same because he learned from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of an application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila.5 hectares. on direct examination stated that in 1974.al. Barrera (J): 7 concur. L-17652. Said property is identified as Lot 1.] En Banc. the CFI Isabela. 1948. and an alluvial deposit of 19. (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan. being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later date. the late Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to it. belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of . that by 1958. Since then. its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). as shown by OCT 2982. Cureg. Evidence Evidence on record proves that Cureg. in the name of Antonio Carniyan. which rendered.5032 hectares.. 3 took no part Facts: Eulogia. alleging in their complaint (Civil Case 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest. boundary owner on the east of the land in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River. is that Cureg.9964 hectares). issued on 9 June 1934). Tax Declaration of earlier date cannot defeat OCT of later date. were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457). so much so.R. As such. et. witness for Apostol. a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place.00 as damages and costs. with costs against the Grandes. alluvium should properly belong to the riparian owners." which statement appears only to be a conclusion. until September. a decision (CA-GR 25169R) reversing that of the CFI Isabela. Fourth. revealed that when his property was only more than 1 hectare in 1958. and Sofia Grande are the owners of a parcel of land. asserting that they have been in continuous. in actual possession. Alluvium belongs to riparian owner By law. nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and cultivating said accretion. the appeal by the Grandes to the Supreme Court. Thus. witness Rogelio C. and to pay to the latter P250. June 30. on 4 May 1959. to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without the Grandes' consent. as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and thus is estopped from claiming otherwise." 6. in whose name said land appears registered. of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land. dated 18 February 1958. since prior to the year 1933 to the present. L-17652. the Calalungs claim ownership in themselves. he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him.al. June 30. the trial court in its Decision stated the reason for denying private respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Grandes also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. Unsatisfied. et. open. had been added to the registered area. an order by the Director of Lands dated 14 August 1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan. The appellate court erred in considering Tax Declaration 13131.

and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. 17 July 1959). and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. 4. 3. and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Laureana Rodriguez. not 1948 Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934. in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.the water. was convinced that the Calalungs were really in possession openly. Grandes relinquished possession of lot occupied by the Calalungs The Grandes did not file an action until 1958. Consequently. et al. et al. 1 on leave . Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses. Pedro Grande tried to stop it. 72 years of age. immediately after the process of alluvion started up to the filing of the action in 1958. There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and Article 366 of the old. never became registered property. as they are the registered owners of the land to which it adjoins. Tuason. while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof. who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms (recollection of the Calalung¶s peaceful possession since 1940 or 1941). Medialdea (J): 3 concur. the tax declaration of which was superseded in 1948 by another. (See Galindez.] First Division. containing an area of some 458 sq. In 1946. and the technical description of the land given therein. Finding of Court of Appeals conclusive. 6. Calalungs in possession of land since 1934. because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor. But to obtain this protection. so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by the Land Registration Act. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. No. vs. but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. Accretion not registered subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons Accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. 53 Phil. not in 1948 as claimed by the Grandes. under a claim of ownership since 1933 or 1934. become ipso facto registered land. vs. Just as the Supreme Court. 55). Imprescriptibility of registered land under land registration law. but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner. The increment. is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. December 12. It would virtually deprive the title. Domingo Parlan. The testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of Pedro Grande and his lone witness.R. the Grandes are the lawful owners of said alluvial property. arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties. and that the Grandes woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958.. CA [G.´ The area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvion. the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. prescription had already supervened in favor of the Calalungs. 7. has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. therefore. making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. Baguisa. after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Thus. Applicable law on prescription: Act 190 not Civil Code. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing. the Grandes relinquished their possession to the part thus included. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. To hold otherwise. and Vicente C. What rights he has. 2. since possession started in 1933 or 1934 The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code. would be productive of confusion. is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land. does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. continuously and adversely. Accretion to registered land does not ipso jure becomes entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptability of title under Land Registration Act An accretion to registered land. both owners of properties nearby. and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. ms. Viajar v. however. Pedro Laman. The excuse they gave for not immediately taken steps to recover possession of the lot was that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan. By then. This finding of the existence of these facts. When the Calalungs had their land surveyed in April 1958. of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. are declared not by said Act. 1988. 5. by extension. but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession. albeit in a negative manner. just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not. which started in the early thirties. not because he claimed the accretion for himself and for the other Grandes. upon consideration of the evidence. Prescription supervened in favor of Calalungs The Court of Appeals. since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950. he declared the land for purposes of taxation. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. The fact remains that the Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after the Grandes' property covered by OCT 2982 was registered on 9 June 1934) up to the time they instituted the action in the CFI Isabela in 1958. 77294. CA-GR 19249-R. Bacani (Calalungs' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof was then less than one hectare). Ownership of a piece of land and registration under Torrens system are different. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the Calalungs acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

Facts: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo (154,267 sq. ms., TCT T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo). Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan. On 6 September 1973, Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his wife, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the latter¶s names. Later, Angelica Viajar had Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused. The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 sq.ms.; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819 sq.ms of what was Lot 7340 has been in the possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of Ladrido; and that the Viajars have never been in actual physical possession of Lot 7340. On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido (Civil Case 9660) with the CFI Iloilo. Summoned to plead, Ladrido filed his answer with a counterclaim. The Viajars filed their reply to the answer. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo Te as another defendant. The Viajars sought the annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event the possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Te filed his answer to the amended complaint and he counterclaimed for damages. The Viajars answered the counterclaim. During the pendency of the case, Celso Viajar sold his rights over Lot 7340 to his mother and coplaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this reason, Angelica F. Viajar appears to be the sole registered owner of the lot. On 25 May 1978, Ricardo Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties defendants. After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was admitted. On 10 December 1981, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs against them, declaring Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes LadridoIgnacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 sq.ms., and pronouncing that as owners of the land, the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof. Not satisfied with the decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo on 29 December 1986 (CA-GR CV 69942). The Viajars filed a petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. 1. Accretion belongs to riparian owners Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that ³to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." 2. Change in the course of the river gradual The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion (Martinez Cañas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133). In the present case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to Lot 7511 (Lot A: 14,036 sq.ms., Lot B, 11,819 sq.ms. and Lot C, which is not in litigation, 4,057 sq.ms). The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on 30 August 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos. 3. Finding of facts by lower court conclusive upon Supreme Court The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and this finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found no valid reason to disturb the finding of fact. 4. Section 45 and 46 of Act 496, Land Registration Act Section 45 of Act 496 provides that ³the obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof." Section 46 of the same act provides that ³No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." 5. Registration does not protect riparian owner against diminution of the area of registered land; Interpretation of Article 366 of the Civil Code with the Land Registration Act / Torrens System The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. In Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason (53 Phil. 55), it was ruled that Article 366 of the Civil Code provides that ³any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.´ Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of

the adjoining stream. Similarly in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia (109 Phil. 133), it was ruled that if the land in question has become part of one¶s estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to another's estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude the former from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration Act. 6. No damages recoverable from Ladridos As the Ladridos are the owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverable from them. Hodges v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-12730. August 22, 1960.] En Banc, Gutierrez-David (J): 8 concur Facts: A lot ± formerly a part of Lot 908 of the Cadastral Survey of Jaro, Iloilo ± was acquired by C. N. Hodges from Salustiano Mirasol in January 1950, and subsequently registered in his name as evidenced by TCT T-2504 issued by the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. This property was bounded on the north by the Salog River. Adjoining that river on the other side is Lot 2290, which was purchased by Amador D. Garcia from Dr. Manuel Hechanova on 15 April 1950. On 12 July 1950, Garcia had the land he bought resurveyed. The survey plan disclosed that the land, which was originally surveyed in 1912 and was then bounded on the SE and SW by the Salog river, had increased in area by the river bank, and that the added area, which bounds the land on the SE and SW, is in turn bounded on the SE and SW by the Salog river. In due time, Garcia applied for the registration of the additional area under the Land Registration Act, and on 22 March 1952, the cadastral court rendered a decision holding that the land sought to be registered is an accretion to Lot 2290 and decreeing that the land be registered in his name. On 30 June 1952, the corresponding OCT O-229 was issued in favor of Garcia. CN Hodges filed an action with the CFI Iloilo for the possession of a portion of land designated as Lot 908-Q with an area of 5,931 sq. m. , which is alleged to have been separated from plaintiff's land by the "natural change" in the course of a river. The court ruled in favor of Garcia. Hodges appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court that it was decided upon a stipulation of facts and for that reason questions of fact can no longer be raised on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, with costs against CN Hodges. 1. Presumption in the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden (avulsion) In the absence of evidence to show that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. (Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil., 55.) 2. Fact on alluvion or accretion not contradicted In any event, it was agreed upon by the parties in open court that from the year 1917 until the construction of the dike (in 1939) along the river the course of the Salog river, starting from the edge of lot 2290, gradually ate up the bank towards the side of the poblacion of Jaro and at the same time gradually deposited sediments towards the side of Lot 2290; that when Garcia bought lot 2290 from Dr. Manuel Hechanova in 1950, he found out that there was an accretion along one side of said lot, to which Garcia applied for its registration, to which culminated in the issuance of an OCT in his favor; and that because of the gradual deposit of sediments of the Salog River along his land, lot 2290, Garcia has been in possession of said land since 1950 until now, while Hodges and his predecessors in interest since the gradual loss of lot 908-Q, covered by water, has never been in actual possession of the said lot. The foregoing facts have never been denied or contradicted by plaintiff, and they clearly show that the increase in area of Lot 2290 by the river bank was due to alluvion or accretions which it gradually received (from 1917 to 1939, or for a period of 22 years) from the effects of the current of the river. Neither did Hodges file any opposition despite due publication of the notice of the application and hearing. Further, the land now being claimed by Hodges had been litigated in three civil cases, while Garcia was recognized as the owner of the land and held legally entitled to its possession. 3. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land The land in question has become part of Garcia's estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to Hodges' estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude Garcia from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks. (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the new.) Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act. (Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason) Baes v. CA [G.R. No. 108065. July 6, 1993.] First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur Facts: In 1962, the government dug a canal on a private parcel of land (Lot 2958, with area of 33,902 sq.m.) to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek. This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in his name under TCT 10990 and then had it subdivided into 3 lots (Lot 2958-A, 28,889 sq.m, TCT 11041.; Lot 2958-B, 3,588 sq.m, TCT 11042.; and Lot 2958-C, 452 sq.m., TCT 11043). In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally occupied by the canal, the government gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area as Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated 20 June 1970. The property, which was near but not contiguous to Lot 2958-C, was denominated as Lot 3271-A and later registered in the name of Felix Baes under TCT 24300.

The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up the old bed of the creek. Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A designated as Lot 1, Blk. 4, resurveyed and subdivided. On 12 January 1968, he submitted a petition for the approval of his resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming that after the said lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found that there were errors in respect of their bearings and distances. The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the CFI Pasay City in an order dated 15 January 1968. As a result, the old TCTs covering the said lots were canceled and new ones were issued (Blk. 4: Lot 1-A, 672 sq.m., TCT T-14404; Lot 1-B representing the increase in size after the resurvey, 826 sq.m., TCT T-14405; Lot 2958-C-1, 452 sq.m., TCT T-14406; and Lot 2958-C-2 representing the increase after resurvey, 2,770 sq.m., TCT T-14407). Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated and this time further subdivided into 4 lots (Lot 1, 147 sq.m., TCT 29592.; Lot 2, 950 sq.m., TCT 29593; Lot 3, 257 sq.m., TCT 29594; and Lot 4, 1,868 sq.m., TCT 29595). In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot 1-B (TCT 14405) on which the Baes had erected an apartment building, covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C (TCT 29592 to 29595), with an increased area of 2,770 sq.m. after resurvey and subdivision, had been unlawfully enlarged. On 17 November 1982, the Republic filed a petition for cancellation of TCT 14405 and 29592 to 29595 with the trial court (Civil Case 0460-P). Baes did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT 29592, 29594 and 29595 and was not able to prove during the trial that the government utilized a portion of Lot 2 under TCT 29593. The trial court therefore decreed that the original Lot 2958-C (452 sq.m.) be reverted to its status before the resurvey-subdivision of Lot 2958-C. Baes appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court, declaring TCTs 14405, 29592, 29593, 29594, 29595, and TCT 29593's derivative titles TCTs 124725, 124726, 124727 and 124729, ordering the Register of Deeds for Pasay City to cancel them and issue new ones in their stead in the name of the Baes after segregating from TCT 29593 452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958-C (covered by cancelled TCT 11043) belonging to Felix Baes, and dismissing the counterclaim. Baes appealed to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the petition, with costs against Baes. 1. Article 461 of the Civil Code applies to a natural change in the course of the stream; If change of course is due to works, belongs to concessioners if not to owners of land covered by the waters Article 461 of the Civil Code provides that ³River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.´ Article 461 refers to a natural change in the course of a stream. If the change of the course is due to works constructed by concessioners authorized by the government, the concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the concessioners. If there is no such grant, then, by analogy, the abandoned river bed will belong to the owners of the land covered by the waters, as provided in this article, without prejudice to a superior right of third persons with sufficient title. 2. Riparian owner entitled to compensation if change in the course of river by artificial means If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means. Baes¶ loss of the land covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss. 3. Ownership of dried up portion of creek in addition to fair exchange of similar lots by parties a double compensation Baes has already been compensated as there has been a fair exchange of Lot 3271-A belonging to the Government and Lot 2958B belonging to Baes, which were similar in area and value, through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property which the parties freely entered into. Baes cannot claim additional compensation because allowing Baes to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the creek would be a clear case of double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the state. The exchange of lots between the petitioners and the Republic was the result of voluntary negotiations. If these had failed, the government could still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of eminent domain, upon payment of just compensation, as the land was needed for a public purpose. Ronquillo v. CA [G.R. No. 43346. March 20, 1991.] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manila and covered by TCT 34797 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Florencia and Amparo del Rosario were daughters of said Rosendo del Rosario. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by Mario C. Ronquillo since 1945. Both del Rosario and Ronquillo have filed with the Bureau of Lands miscellaneous sales application for the purchase of the abandoned river bed known as Estero Calubcub and their sales applications, dated 5 August 1958 and 13 October 1959, respectively, are still pending action before the Bureau of Lands. Del Rosario claims that long before 1930, when TCT 34797 over Lot 34 was issued in the name of Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in possession of said lot including the adjoining dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub, having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, said titled lot was occupied by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of del Rosario on condition that the former will make improvements on the adjoining dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts del Rosario's titled lot. After a relocation survey of the land in question sometime in 1960, del Rosario learned that Ronquillo was occupying a portion of their land and thus demanded Ronquillo to vacate said land when the latter refused to pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand Ronquillo refused to vacate. On the other hand, Ronquillo claims that sometime before 1945 he was living with his sister who was then residing or renting Del Rosario's titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on the disputed dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub with a small portion thereof on the titled lot of del Rosario. Later in 1961, said house was destroyed by a fire which prompted him to rebuild the same but, this time it was built only on the dried-up portion of the old

the Solicitor General presented a letter from the Director of Lands to the effect that neither of the parties involved in the present case has filed any public land application. not by natural forces. In his Motion to Admit Comment. citing its ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Findings of appellate court conclusive to the Supreme Court. among others. based on the former's representation that he had already vacated the same prior to the commencement of this case.Estero Calubcub without touching any part of del Rosario¶s titled land. such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. in the 4 May 1989 reply. DBP filed a Manifestation/ Compliance stating that DBP's interest over TCT 139215 issued in its name (formerly TCT 34797 of the Del Rosarios and TCT 135170 of Benjamin Diaz) has been transferred to Spouses Victoriano and Pacita A. On 3 April 1989. the trial court has jurisdiction. the Solicitor General manifested that pursuant to a request made by this office with the Bureau of Lands to conduct an investigation. and who. Amparo and Florencia del Rosario lodged a complaint with the CFI Manila praying. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the remaining effective portion of the appealed decision which declares Del Rosario as riparian owner of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. not by a natural change in the course of the waters. respondent court opines. the petition for review. The Del Rosarios opposed the motion arguing that since they are claiming title to the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian owners. the trial court rendered judgment ordering Ronquillo to deliver to del Rosario the portion of the land covered by TCT 34797 which is occupied by him and to pay for the use and occupation of said portion of land at the rate of P5 a month from the date of the filing of the complaint until such time as he surrenders the same to del Rosario and declaring Del Rosario to be the owners of the dried-up portion of estero Calubcub which is abutting del Rosario' property. respondent court modified its decision on 28 January 1976 by setting aside the first portion of the trial court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender to the Del Rosarios that portion of land covered by TCT 34797 occupied by the former. Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo. surmises or conjectures. It stated further that even assuming for the sake of argument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared. Evidence reveal change in the course of river not caused by natural forces A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused. 1. the testimony of the witness belies such fact. and the Solicitor General was also required to inquire into the status of the investigation being conducted by the Bureau of Lands. There is nothing in the testimony of lone witness Florencia del Rosario nor in said relocation plan which would indicate that the change in the course of the estero was due to the ebb and flow of the waters. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on 25 September 1975 and declared that since Estero Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in the course of the waters. while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the matter. (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. but through the active intervention of man. In its resolution dated 10 January 1990. Exceptions The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of errors of law. However. which were rejected as the Manila City Engineer¶s Office needed the dried portion of the estero for drainage purposes. Consequently. Amparo del Rosario or Florencia del Rosario has filed any public land application covering parcels of land situated at Estero Calubcub. was subsequently considered impleaded as such in the Court¶s resolution of 10 September 1976. the abandoned river bed belongs to the Del Rosarios as riparian owners. the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form part of the land of the public domain. The position taken by the Director of Lands (in his comment on 3 September 1978. and 17 August 1989 comment) explicates that Article 370 of the old Code does not apply as the abandoned riverbed as such was abandoned not by the natural change in the course of the river but by the drying up of the bed caused by human activity. not having been impleaded. Ronquillo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land and. said dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner. the Court required Ronquillo to implead one Benjamin Diaz pursuant to the former's manifestation that the land adjacent to the dried-up river bed has already been sold to the latter. Rosendo. (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting. but due to the dumping of garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. this time impleading the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which subsequently bought the property adjacent to the dried-up river bed from Benjamin Diaz. However. Upon motion of Ronquillo. and that said appellate court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this Court. the Supreme Court issued a resolution requiring the Solicitor General to comment on the petition in behalf of the Director of Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic of the Philippines. In a resolution dated 20 January 1988. Rosendo del Rosario. thus. and that she is the only one still alive among the private respondents in the case. mistaken or impossible. . that they be declared the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. Ronquillo filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari. The Director of Lands also added that the del Rosario and Ronquillo have claimed pending sales applications over the dried portion of the estero (admitting thus that it is public land under the authority of the Bureau of Lands). Hence. He further claims that said dried-up portion is a land of public domain. On 13 September 1990. (2) when the inference made is manifestly absurd. 2. On 17 May 1976. the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau sent a communication informing him that the records of his office do not show that Mario Ronquillo. In compliance therewith. the Court ordered that DBP be impleaded as a party respondent. under Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it considers applicable to the present case. (4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts. The inescapable conclusion is that the driedup portion of Estero Calubcub was occasioned. On 29 June 1979. Rama. Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated 11 September 1990. On the contrary. The resolution of the motion to dismiss was deferred until after trial on the merits. On 26 December 1962. Amparo and Casiano del Rosario have all died. the appellate court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the rightful owners of the dried-up river bed. Manila as verified by its Records Division. with costs against Ronquillo. there are certain exceptions. and (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. On appeal (CA-GR 32479-R).

It may be noted that in the years 1916 and 1917 a cadastral survey was made of the district where the lands of both the plaintiffs and the defendants are situated and that upon the plans of that survey the then course of the river is excluded from the cadaster and set apart as a public stream. This new course was the course of the river previous to the year 1911. without cost. Article 370 of the old Civil Code applies only to natural change in the course of the waters.] First Division. accompanied by the defendant district engineer (Manuel Reyes). and Sixto Timbol (plaintiffs) are the owners of various parcels of land in the municipality of Mexico. Since the land is to be used for drainage purposes the same cannot be the subject of a miscellaneous sales application. This certainly does not indicate abandonment on the part of the Government. the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners. In the case of a public stream. Del Rosario and Ronquillo estopped from claiming land is not public land The fact that Ronquillo and del Rosario filed their sales applications with the Bureau of Lands covering the subject dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub cannot but be deemed as outright admissions by them that the same is public land. Considering the finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man. proceeded to the point where the river had first begun to change its course. Article 370 of the Civil Code cannot be solely relied on to have the conclusion that the old bed of the river Abacan became ipso facto absolutely abandoned upon the river varying its course in 1919. all of the parties appeal. 18771. 1923. . Defendant Mercado and Pimping set up a counterclaim for P40. During the said month. Estero Abacan is a public stream. Land used for drainage purposes cannot be subject of a miscellaneous sales application The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. previously to the month of August 1919. Law clear. Mercado [G. Dried up portion of Estero Calubcub belongs to public domain. 4. the parcels of land belonging to them were divided by a small river known as the Estero Abacan. From 1911 until August. stating that the alleged application filed by Ronquillo no longer exists in its records as it must have already been disposed of as a rejected application for the reason that other applications covering Estero Calubcub. proceeded with laborers of the defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping to excavate the old bed of the river for the purpose of causing the river to return to this bed. Action of the government to return the river to its old course The river is a public stream.000. it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the present case and. 5. As soon as practicable after the river changed its course. a petition for a writ of injunction was filed by the plaintiffs to restrain the defendants from entering upon the lands. dated 28 April 1989. it is not necessarily the action of the river itself which is the only and final determining factor in such abandonment. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions 23 nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. and after locating this point upon the cadastral plan. the bed is of public ownership and the public cannot be considered absolutely divested of this ownership until there is some indication of an intention of the part of the Government to acquiesce in the change in the course of the stream. were all rejected by the office because of the objection interposed by the City Engineer's office that they need the same land for drainage purposes.3. which are abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. Sampaloc. 1919. no room for interpretation Article 370 of the old Civil Code which provides that "the beds of rivers. From this judgment. 2. district engineer Manuel Reyes. a complaint was made to the provincial board of Pampanga by various land owners. The court absolved the defendants (landowners Mercado and Pimping.R. Eutiquiano Cuyugan. The defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping are the owners of various parcels of land which. The Government is not compelled to stand idly by and let nature take its course is clearly indicated by article 372 of the Civil Code. caused it to change its course. and from disturbing the plaintiffs in their peaceful possession of the same. of the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands. They also pray for damages for trespass on the land. Ostrand (J): 7 concur Facts: Nicolas Panlilio. 1. Manila for areas other than that contested in the presented case. the river no longer flowed in the channel through the lands of the plaintiffs but had opened a new course for itself through the lands of the defendants where it still continues to flow. This is made more evident in the letter. No. On 25 June 1920. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. hence. steps were taken under the direction of the Government functionaries to bring it back into its old course and work was continued until interrupted by the present action. without cost. including the defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping. the defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping. were situated to the east of the land of the plaintiffs and were not touched by the Abacan River. March 26. alleging that the plaintiffs. The complaint was endorsed to the district engineer and on 10 June 1920. its bed is of public ownership and was definitely located and determined in the cadastral survey. Pampanga. and leaves no room for interpretation. If the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging to different owners the new dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the other. belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout the respective length of each. a very heavy flood occurred in the Abacan River and when the flood subsided. After the termination of the 1919 rainy season and early in the year 1920." The law is clear and unambiguous. Action of river not the only and final determining factor in the abandonment of a river bed While the abandonment of the bed may be the consequence of the riving changing its course. setting forth that the new course of the river was destroying their land and rendering it useless and asking that the river be returned to its former channel. They are now estopped from claiming otherwise. thus invading said defendants' lands and causing damages in the sum mentioned. Panlilio v. and Pampanga Constabulary Commander Telesforo Martinez) from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim. by placing bamboo stakes in the River Abacan.

et. Asingan. et. Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said parcel of land upon the death of her father. to pay in solidum the amount of P800 representing attorney¶s fees. (minor. and to pay the costs. Agne Jr. filed a complaint against Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the former CFI Pangasinan for annulment of title. when spouses filed a complaint against them. On 30 January 1985 the former IAC affirmed in toto in AC-GR CV 60388-R the decision of the trial court. even if true. Felix Oriane. alleged in their said complaint that the land in question.al. Agne.000 per year) from the date of the filing of the action at the rate of 6% interest per annum until fully paid.al. that in the year 1920. Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: The land subject matter of the case was originally covered by Free Patent 23263 issued on 17 April 1937 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon. the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case U-2286. an abandoned river bed. also Agne v. Presentacion declared the said land for taxation purposes in her name under TD 11506 and taxes were paid thereon in her name. Heirs of Carlos Palado (Fortunata Palado and Isabelita Palado). and with the denial of Agne et. 72255. Agne. not only because of the delay in the filing of the complaint but specifically since the ground relied upon by the plaintiff therein. ordering Agne. Librado Badua. while the above case was still pending. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under TCT 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog. Estanislao Gorospe (represented by Elizabeth G. strategy and intimidation. appealed to the appellate court. Panfilo Soingco. On 13 April 1971. reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land. to pay in soludum the produce of the land (P5. Agne. taking advantage of the abnormal conditions then obtaining. to surrender physical possession of land in question. that an action to annul a free patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action.R. Badua). Agne.al's motion for the reconsideration of the order was denied on 11 September 1974. February 6.] Second Division. pursuant to the said patent. that Gascon repeatedly demanded the surrender of the physical possession of said property but the latter refused. would not warrant the annulment of the free patent and the subsequent original certificate of title issued to defendant. that since 1920. et al.e. belongs to them pursuant to the provision of Article 370 of the old Civil Code.al. is of private ownership and. et. Taganas). No. alleged that the land in question was formerly a part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River. that they have introduced improvements thereon by constructing irrigation canals and planting trees and agricultural crops thereon and converted the land into a productive area. acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon. Hilario Escorpizo. Evidence falls short As to the claim for damages. Claim for damages.al. and was issued TCT 32209 on 6 April 1960.'s motion for reconsideration. et. spouses Joaquin and Presentacion Gascon filed Civil Case U-2286 in the then CFI Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against Marcelino C. et. which was formerly a portion of the bed of Agno-Chico river which was abandoned as a result of the big flood in 1920. al. et al.]. that during the Japanese occupation. et. 1. On 24 June 1974. Feliza Diccion Agne. Marcelino S. Agne. therefore. Barroga. Nicolas Villanieva. such evidenced however falls short of showing that this was the primary cause of the change and of the damage to the defendants' property. and that the said patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land. the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon OCT 2370. et. Heirs of Roman Damaso (Jorge Damaso and Alejandro Damaso). by operation of law. Pangasinan which is now in the possession of Agne. Heirs of Sabina Gelacio Agapito (Serapio Agapito and Nicolasa Agapito). the evidence undoubtedly shows that the plaintiffs placed bamboo stakes across the river and that the stakes may have caused an accumulation of sand or sediment which in turn may have contributed to the change in the course of the river. No. the latter. that they found out that the said land was granted by the Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent 23263. Agne.R. took possession of said land by means of fraud. Primitivo Taganas. et. which action was docketed as Civil Case U-2649. Barroga not controlling The lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case U-2649. Medrano). that it was only on 13 April 1971. as the case of Antonio relied upon in the dismissal order is not controlling.al. 1990.. cannot be the subject of a public land grant. Isabelo Mauricio. filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court (GR 72255). that by virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in force. they and their predecessors in interest occupied and exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the abandoned river bed in question abutting their respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the exclusion of all other persons. Agne. Bernardo Palattao. Leano and Dominga R.al. et. 1990. On 21 June 1974. Agne. Agaton Taganas (represented by Florentino C. Case of Antonio v. In that case. issued an order dismissing Civil Case U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case of Antonio. Santos and Paulino D. the CFI Pangasinan.3.. vs. IAC [G. et. February 6. the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. hence the petition for review on certiorari (GR L-40399) The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed decision of IAC in AC-GR CV 60388-R and the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case 2649. represented by Feliza Diccion Agne).al.al. and rendered judgment ordering the Gascon to reconvey the parcel of land to Agne. Heirs of Francisco Ramos (Encarnacion R. particularly Herminigildo Agpoon. stealth. On 21 May 1937. Director of Lands [G. that the land was previously covered by a titulo real. Herminigildo. . i. Agne v.al. pursuant to which OCT 2370 was issued in the latter's name. 40399. a big flood occurred which caused the said river to change its course and abandon its original bed. On 6 March 1974. became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties.

are the riparian owners of the lands adjoining the said bed. without the necessity of any action or exercise of possession on their part.2. There need be no act on the part of the riparian owners to subject the accession to their ownership. 5. which are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss. as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident. Free Patent 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible. the riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this article. when the Agno River changed its course. imprescriptibility of registered land governed by Land Registration Act. and an action to annul the same does not prescribe. an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. The nullity arises. Act 2874. 6. Agne. 7. constitute a sufficient cause of action against private respondents. nullum producit effectum. Rule on incontrovertibility of certificate of title upon expiration of 1 year. In the present case. has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership." Thus. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory. and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits.al. Cause of action. once the river bed has been abandoned.al. the land in dispute since early 1920 was already under the private ownership of Agne et. the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately owned. or of private ownership. was an abandoned bed of the Agno River and that Agne. al. The acquisition of ownership is automatic. 9. as the result of the right of accretion. without the need of any formal act of acquisition. the law then in force. In the present case. Agne owns property. that if at the time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already private property of another and. and a title so issued is null and void. Land of private ownership. Their action for reconveyance . Imprescriptibility does not apply as title based on public grant The failure of Agne et. not part of the disposable land of the public domain. then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land. No title acquired by applicant patentees if land already a private property of another As ruled in Director of Lands vs. but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. 10. The said rule is not applicable to the case since the title claimed by spouses Gascon is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the Government. pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Being null and void. 4. Ownership of accession governed by Civil Code. does not apply in the present case The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of one year. the land in question having been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another person. it being an admitted fact that the land in dispute. Such an action is different from a review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud. not from the fraud or deceit but. and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain. Facts alleged in complaint hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss The facts alleged in the complaint. Void patents produce no legal effects A certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain. Land held in freehold or fee title. and the owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners. Action to annul void title issued pursuant to a public grant does not prescribe Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title was issued pursuant to a public grant. constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act 2874. Quod nullum est. which presupposes that it was inceptively a public land. Although an accretion to registered land is not automatically registered and therefore not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Riparian owners ipso facto owners o abandoned river bed (Old Civil Code) The old Civil Code.al. The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest in the law of nature. et al. et. the new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom. the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effects whatsoever. to register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes of taxation did not divest it of its character as a private property. Action to quite title imprescriptible since petitioners are in possession of land Since Agne. The nullity arises. The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act. not from the fraud or deceit. et. does not apply where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all. from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Since the accessory follows the nature of the principal. inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof. Ownership over the accession is governed by the Civil Code. there need not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our ownership. prior to its registration. after the entry of the decree. the President of the Philippines or his alter ego.al. Sisican. provides that ³the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. et. as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident. became owners of aliquot portions of said abandoned river bed as early as 1920. the Director of Lands. therefore. Such abandoned river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser. said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void if the property covered thereby is originally of private ownership. as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law. are in possession of the land in dispute. 3. and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Director of Lands does not have authority to grant free patent for said land Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of Gascon's predecessor in interest was issued. Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the Land Registration Act. although it is not. 8. was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain.

It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land. Eduave had been in possession of the property although the tax declaration remains in the name of the deceased father.. Gancayco (J): 4 concur Facts: A certain parcel of land is located in Sta. if the determinative facts are before the Court and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute. Heirs of Antonio Factura. while in tax declaration the area is only 4. In 1966 due to the movement of the river deposits on the land that was not eroded increased the area to almost half a hectare and in 1970 Eduave started to plant banana trees. the Land Registration Act does not create or vest title. 31 Phil. To paraphrase from Angeles vs. The land was eroded sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon Ineng.al. It does not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.. 15. for a consideration of P6. 11. Their undisturbed possession for a number of years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her title. Resort to the provisions of the Land Registration Act does not give one a better title than he really and lawfully has. Further.452 sq. especially if the registration was done in bad faith.000. m. Cagayan de Oro City. Maravill (48 Phil 838). It only confirms and records title already existing and vested. the Court. m. Samia.al. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all. he cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of registration. see no need for remanding Civil Case 2649 for further proceedings. together with his coheirs. in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of said title issued upon the patent.937 sq. dated 31 May 1979. the remedy of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. Eduave engaged the services of a surveyor who conducted a survey and placed concrete monuments over the land. 12. Jagualing v. The entire land had an area of 16. The land was the subject of a reconveyance case. Tagoloan. and hold that the facts and the ends of justice in this case require the reconveyance by the Gascons to Agne.which.452 sq. et. Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area. The Acts do not give anybody. the Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud. and she reasoned out that she included the land that was under water. m. seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. 14. Land Registration Act and Cadastral Act does not give anybody better title than what he really or lawfully has A free patent which purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. Civil Case 5892).. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. Saleeby. It is not a mode of acquiring property. CA [G. to the prejudice of his neighbor. The registered owners' right to recover possession of the property and title thereto from Agne. Misamis Oriental with an area of 16. and mortgaged the land to the Luzon Surety and Co. The . Land Registration Act. al. On these considerations. an adverse claimant of a registered land. been converted into a stale demand. Registration does not vest title. with or without bad faith on his part.. the Court. The long and continued possession of the former under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning. Conclusiveness of a Torrens title not available for use to perpetual fraud and chicanery. Eduave also paid taxes on the land in litigation. bounded by the Tagoloan river on the north. is not precluded from filing an action for reconveyance which. 1991. as well as the fact that these cases have been pending for a long period of time. may direct the defendant registered owner to reconvey the property to the plaintiff. destroying the bigger portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut tree. Janita Eduave claims that she inherited the land from her father. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. Since the death of her father on 5 May 1949. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. and east and by the portion belonging to Vicente Neri on the west. the certificate of title. Reneiro Factura and Aldenora Factura. may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. In 1973. appearing in the deed of extrajudicial partition. 13. Gascon. a better title than he really and lawfully has. forming part of an island in a non-navigable river. seeks to quiet title to property as against the registered owner who was relying upon a Torrens title which could have been fraudulently acquired. which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of the parties. the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by such a resolution and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case of the trial court. March 4. et. of the disputed lot. and acquired sole ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale. undisturbed in his possession thereof for a period of more than 50 years and not knowing that the land he actually occupied had been registered in the name of another. in the CFI Misamis Oriental (Branch V..R.] First Division. 590). in effect.00. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. No. who resorts to the provisions thereof. Authority of the Court to order the reconveyance of property Where the evidence show that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent and title granted to another and that the defendant and his predecessor in interest were never in possession thereof. Court of Appeals. m. To such adverse claimant. 94283. over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud. by long inaction or inexcusable neglect. which is a total nullity. a claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing. The land is declared for tax purposes under Tax Declaration 26137 with an area of 16. et al. As held in Caragay-Layno vs. et. between Janita Eduave vs. Laches The failure of the spouses Gascon to assert their claim over the disputed property for almost 30 constitute laches and bars an action to recover the same. Agne¶s title superior over Gascon¶s. Felomino Factura. in effect.452 sq. in the present case. more land than he really owns. Possession The title of Agne. In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was void ab initio. Registration is not a mode of acquiring property The quality of conclusiveness of a Torrens title is not available for use to perpetrate fraud and chicanery. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land. As stated in Gustillo v. Cruz. or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another. which may have been issued to him under the circumstances. south. has.

Jagualing¶s possession cannot be considered in good faith. from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land. Land formed by accretion belongs to riparian owner. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code. and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Hence. which agreement was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds.289 sq. an adequate and valid defense to support their claim of good faith. declared Eduave as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of the case and ordered Jagualing to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to Eduave. Eduave. or whether it was . The complaint was dismissed by the trial court because it did not accept Eduave¶s explanation regarding the initial discrepancy as to the area they claimed (4937sq. 4. m. the Jagualings have rights better than that of Eduave. The trial court added that should the State allow the island to be the subject of private ownership. The Court of Appeals. as to the caretaker agreement between her and Eduave) without explaining why it doubted their credibility. or whether it was due to the action of the river under Article 465. Island formed in a non-navigable and non-floatable river. The trial court. as to metes and bounds of the property and the effect of the typhoon. The Court of Appeals did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. under Article 465. the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof. 5. CA properly applied Article 463 The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court because it did not take into account the other pieces of evidence in favor of the private respondents. however. it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. Rudygondo and Janita Eduave filed with the RTC Misamis Oriental an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against Jagualing. and Candida Ehem. 1. because they are presumed to have notice of the status of Eduave as riparian owners who have the preferential right to the island as recognized and accorded by law. m. no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. 16452 sq. not qualifying as possessors in good faith. As such it cannot be registered under the land registration law or be acquired by prescription. Jagualing started occupying the land in 1969. From the evidence thus submitted.g. in which case there is strictly no accession because the original owner retains ownership.289 sq. the agreement entered into by Eduave and Tagoloan Aggregates to extract gravel and sand. or more accurately. 2. because it disregarded the testimony of 2 disinterested witnesses (Gergorio Neri. v. which is belied by other circumstances tantamount to acts of ownership exercised by Eduave over the property prior to said year (e. they may claim ignorance of the law. to Janita Eduave in a notarial document of conveyance. properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or isolation. and thus. redirect or control the course of the Tagoloan River. even without a specific act of possession over it.e. 3. because it favored the theory that Eduave became interested in the land only in 1979 not for agricultural purposes but in order to extract gravel and sand. Evidence not properly appreciated by trial court. i. and tax clearances. citing Article 420 of the Civil Code. Accordingly. Under this provision. specifically Article 465 of the Civil Code. they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. but such is not. If. Land however may yield to adverse possession of third party if riparian owner fails to assert claim Lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. after a subdivision of the lot 62 Pls-799. it held that it was outside the commerce of man and part of the public domain. m. The court found that the island is a delta forming part of the river bed which the government may use to reroute. The Supreme Court found no error committed by the appellate court. During the typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river control was washed away causing the formation of an island. Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing assert that they are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18. the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties. and containing 1.. they may acquire ownership over the island only through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of thirty years. the monuments placed by the surveyor whose services were engaged by Eduave. denied the petition for lack of sufficient merit. pursuant to the decision of the CFI. Eduave also applied for concession with the Bureau of Mines to extract 200 m3 of grave. In fact.000 sq. entered into an agreement with Tagoloan Aggregates to extract sand and gravel. Jagualing have been in possession of the property for only about 15 years. therefore. was designated as Lot 62-A. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. By their own admission. Article 465 The parcel of land is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river. the present petition. the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof. Hence. which agreement was duly registered with the Register of Deeds). recognized the validity of Jagualing's possession and gave them preferential rights to use and enjoy the property. without pronouncement as to costs. Doctrine of acquisitive prescription The property may be acquired by adverse possession for the required number of years under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription. the court found that the island was formed by the branching off of the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. the island cannot be adjudicated in their favor.m. as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered. This preferential right is.. the appellate court had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave actually existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. Actual occupation of the land by Jagualing included improvements and the house. because the island is longer than the property of Eduave. the payment of land taxes thereon. and after an ocular inspection the permit was granted. under Articles 3 and 526 of the same code. paid land taxes as evidenced by tax declaration 26380 and tax receipts. On 17 July 1987 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation.m. and the subdivision plan was approved as Pls-799-Psd-10-001782. whether the island was initially formed by the branching off or division of the river and covered by Article 463 of the Civil Code. after permit was granted.heirs of Antonio Factura had ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1.). however. Origin of island not tackled as case is not between opposing riparian owners but between a riparian owner and one in possession of the land There is no need to make a final determination regarding the origins of the island. also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. however.

. he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. they have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. on 9 February 1983 the German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Quasi in Rem. 76216 and 76217. The Supreme Court denied the petition. On 24 July 1986. but characterized as quasi in rem. USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan. Rizal. 6. German Management moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated 26 September 1986. violence or terror. which duty properly pertains to the State. Thus. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession. No. if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing. as the case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners contesting ownership over an accession but rather between a riparian owner and the one in possession of the island. must invoke the aid of the competent court. Judgment conclusive upon the parties and does not bind the State and other riparian owners The Court is not prepared to concede that the island is a delta which should be outside the commerce of man and that it belongs to the State as property of the public domain in the absence of any showing that the legal requirements to establish such a status have been satisfied. Moreover. No violation of due process by appellate court The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist. Gernale then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless. fruit bearing trees and other crops that they planted by means of force. German Management proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale. San Isidro. such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case.al were already in peaceable possession of the property at the time German Management entered the property. the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. The Appellate Court held that since Gernale. Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the MTC.al. The comment filed by petitioner on 26 February 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July 1948. which makes it a case of avulsion under Article 459. Hence the present recourse. with an area of 232. On 26 February 1982. CA (Gernale. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing. Rizal. When possession has already been lost. which is absent in the present case. On appeal. The land was originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19. et. it is thus not technically an action in rem or an action in personam. 1 concur in result.] Third Division. On 7 January 1985. violence and intimidation. Title is not involved. residents of Pennsylvania." . Ownership not an issue Notwithstanding the claim that German Management was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property. m. Having heard both parties. Thus. Since the petition is an upshot of the action to quiet title brought by Eduave against Jagualing. Rizal. the actual possessors can commence a forcible entry case against the former because ownership is not in issue. 3. the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. corn. the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Gernale et.al. 4. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property. 2. said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. Antipolo. with costs against German Management. "in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. Villeza) [G. German Management advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.caused by the abrupt segregation and washing away of the stockpile of the river control. Philadelphia. which is an action in personam concerning real property. Consequently. 1. alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD27.al. under Act 141.942 sq. corn and fruit bearing trees 12 to 15 years prior to German Management's act of destroying their crops. German Management & Services v.al. This is clear from Article 536 NCC that . Doctrine of self-help can only be exercised only at the time of actual or threatened dispossession of property The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of the prior possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is unavailing because the such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the MTC Antipolo. Actual possessors can commence forcible entry. were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by German Management. et. the judgment in proceedings of this nature is conclusive only between the parties and does not bind the State or the other riparian owners who may have an interest over the island involved herein. September 14. 1 on leave Facts: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose. Fernan (J): 2 concur. 1989. et. the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process. Prior possessor has security to remain in property until lawfully ejected by person having better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria A party may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it may present. manifested by the fact that they even planted rice. the MTC dismissed Gernale et. and that they were deprived of their property without due process of law when German Management forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice and bulldozing the rice. (TCT 50023 of the Register of Deeds Rizal issued 11 September 1980 cancelling TCT 56762/ T-560). if he has in his favor priority in time. the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand. Finding that part of the property was occupied by Gernale and Villeza and 20 other persons. Gernale.'s complaint for forcible entry. the RTC Antipolo.R. and affirmed the CA decision.