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62 SCRA 275 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
Marcos as a De Jure President Under the 1973 Constitution TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
nullification of some Presidential Decrees issued by then President
Ferdinand Marcos. It was alleged that Marcos does not hold any legal Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of
office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy,
Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders.
comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
government. entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
HELD: Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto proceedings and System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a
Benigno Aquino, Jr. et al, have no legal personality to sue because usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it
they have no claim to the office of the president. Only the Solicitor impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We
General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
file such a quo warranto petition. petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308
On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Martial was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January
Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that the Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as
factual bases (the circumstances of lawlessness then present) had
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged
not disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that the question as
to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued
Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O.
continue in office beyond 1973. While his term of office under the
No. 308
1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by
the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people
expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 Ruling: YES
under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17,
1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the
initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this was the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and
decision of the people, in whom sovereignty resides . . . and all the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver
government authority emanates . . ., it is therefore beyond the scope that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the
of judicial inquiry. The logical consequence therefore is that President implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner
Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner
is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue
that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of
the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate
as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep.
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.
identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show their But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the
forthe formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for
this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on standing the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The
is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right. There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair
and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed
in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in

character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., PETITIONER,VS. THE
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE COURT OF TAX
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily FACTS:
judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved. Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation,
primarily engaged in themanufacture of wheat flour, and produces
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling.
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court. During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive,
petitioner exported Pollardand/or bran which was loaded from lighters
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade whileanchored near the
the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is breakwater
not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues
Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already on the said exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. was paid by petitioner under protest.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
According to the petitioner,products of the Philippines found in
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, excludes bran (ipa) and
business of the House.
pollard (darak) because they are merely waste from theproduction of

The main contention before respondent Court of petitioner was "that

in as much as nogovernment or private wharves or government
facilities were utilized in exporting the pollardand/or bran, the
collection of wharfage dues is contrary to law.

Respondent Commissioner of Customs said that petitioner was

liable for wharfage dues uponreceipt or discharge of the exported
goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of thenon-use
of government-owned or private wharves.

ISSUE: Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in

accordance with law.

RULING: The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit:

"There shall be levied, collected andpaid on all articles imported or
brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines

exceptcoal, lumber, creosoted and other pressure treated materials as PESIGAN VS. ANGELES
well as other minor forest products,cement, guano natural rock
asphalt, the minerals and ores of base metals (e.g., copper, lead, FACTS: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao
zinc, iron,chromite manganese, magnesite and steel), and sugar dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos
molasses exported from the Philippines, a chargeof two pesos per and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health
gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage xxx"One category refers to certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to
what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and
areexported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were
obvious that as long as the goods areproduced in the country, they fall negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
within the terms of the above section.The first and fundamental duty confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt.
of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation
andinterpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of
application is impossible or inadequatewithout them. The law is clear; carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr
it must be obeyed.The objective of the act must be carried out. Even if Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners
there be doubt as to the meaning of thelanguage employed, the filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private
interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later
If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause
desire to be excluded from theoperation of the Tariff and Customs of action.
Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It
isdesirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of ISSUE: Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in
the coverage of the Act be kept closed.Otherwise, the end result the Official Gazette.
would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate.
HELD: Said executive order should not be enforced against the
The decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
1967 is affirmed. With costs against petitioner. regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it onsecond
and third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 contend that it shouldhave amended the House bill by striking out the
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. text of the bill and substituting it with the textof its own bill, so as to
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate conform with the Constitution.
from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article
6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 ISSUE: W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having originated from
and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not the Senate, and not the HoR.
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate HELD: Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has
passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred not been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out power to propose amendments to bills (required to originate in the
its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill House), passed its own version. An amendment by substitution
remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners,
(only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form, and considering the petitioner has
and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.) not shown what substantial difference it would make if Senate applied
such substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm. While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills
must originate exclusively in the HoR, it also adds, but the Senate
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, may propose or concur with amendments. The Senate may then
holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners erred
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill.
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill,
to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note as the latter was a mere amendment of the former. As such, it did not
also that there were several instances before where Senate passed have to pass the Senate on second and third readings. Petitioners
its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue question the signing of the President on both bills, to support their
and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by contention that such are separate and distinct. The President certified
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino the bills separately only because the certification had to be made of
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would the version of the same revenue bill which AT THE MOMENT was
make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what being considered. Petitioners question the power of the Conference
has been done. Committee to insert new provisions. The jurisdiction of the conference
committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate
TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision, given that
such are germane to the subject of the conference, and that the
FACTS:Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines,
respective houses of Congress subsequently approve its report.
Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association) seek
Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the
reconsideration of the Courts previous ruling dismissing the petitions
withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not expressed in the title of
filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the
the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes that the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Petitioners contend that the R.A. did
title of the R.A. satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.
not originate exclusively in the HoR as required by Article 6, Section

MIRASOL VS CA (2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine
National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture (3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols
signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of
the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial
Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated Courts.
for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to
their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule
PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just
amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim. words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree,
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their
outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the against the taking of private property without just compensation.
National Government. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise
performance, and damages against PNB. of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging
statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
Trial Court. opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the
the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
mandamus. upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments,
and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one
Issue(s): more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
Section 10, are self-executing.
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony. requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self- 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution

could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the HERMINIO ASTORGA VS ANTONIO VILLEGAS
cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence
in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then
on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then
latter shall be chosen over the former. filed a petition for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the
the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas
Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights
of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said
Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said
necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No.
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on
necessary for the purpose. Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then
Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill
was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such
deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which
were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent
back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter.
The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA
4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the
Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the
President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version
that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended
by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact,
the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew
and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the
withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the
statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.

HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress both houses. Constitution does not even provide that the presiding
is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this
case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of
this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked
to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the
Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC
also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was
never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would
be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body. The lawmaking
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses
and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential. Because the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is not conclusive proof of a bills due enactment. The
Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the
Senate Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266
,therefore it did not become a law. Senate President declared that his
signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification
that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. This declaration should be
accorded greater respect than the attestation that it invalidated.
Certification that was made by the presiding officer is merely a mode
of authentication. The essential thing is the approval of congress and
not the signature of the presiding officers. Function of attestation is
not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., VS. SOCIAL SECURITY that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication
COMMISSION, in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it renders an
opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Facts: The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on Administrative interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it is
October 15, 1958 requiring all employers in computing premiums to the courts that finally determine what the law means.
include employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay,
as well as the cash value of other media remuneration. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the
circular as it is contrary to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7,
1957. Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employers and the employees respective monthly
premium contributions. The counsel questioned the validity of the
circular Social Security Commission overruled the objections Victorias
Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as

contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the
Social Security Commission to adopt, amend and repeal subject to
the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act

Held: Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines

compensation as: All remuneration for employment include the cash
value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash.
Except: that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received
during the month; bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make,
although not legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of compensation to: (f)
Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash
value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except
that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the

Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees

concerned with the interpretation of the law as amended which was
Social Security Commissions duty to enforce. The Commission
simply stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and

ENRIQUE MORALES VS ABELARDO SUBIDO Morales argued that the above version was the one which was
actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a conference committee the only change made in the provision was the
city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelors degree. insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with
Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill
position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill
designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, being deliberated upon.
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of
Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill,
the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the
appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil matter.
service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, Subido
certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of
Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it
is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent
any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
served the police department of a city can be qualified for said matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on
office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative
deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the
journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not
holds a bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed Forces now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not
of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate
who has served the police department of a city or who has served as
officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.

RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as
circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed
remove their residence from their native habitat and to established the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro,
and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was
end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it
Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical
very low culture. area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where
solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for they can adapt to the changing times.
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of
the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen
Administrative Code, which provides: is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of
and approved by the provincial board was challenged. a class.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code

constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are
being deprived of their liberty.


I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the

constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the
doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is