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AUSTRIA VS. HON. ANDRES REYES niece from registering their claim even to properties
G.R. No. L-23079
February 27, 1970
Doctrine: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled
under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution
of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause
must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from
the face of the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of the
cause.
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda.de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a
petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and
testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The
will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate
designated for respondents, all of whom were Basilias
legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be
the nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents
had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, thereby making them mere
strangers to the decedent and without any right to
succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance
should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to
intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply
that Basilia was deceived into believing that she was
legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate
to the respondents as the latter's legitime, with the
inference that respondents would not have instituted
the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious
adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred
that from the use of the terms, "sapilitangtagapagmana"
(compulsory heirs) and "sapilitangmana" (legitime), the
impelling reason or cause for the institution of the
respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law
she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil
Code applies whereby, the statement of a false cause
for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not
written, unless it appears from the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known
the falsity of such cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse
of discretion in barring the petitioners nephews and
adjudicated by the decedent in her will.
HELD:
NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under
article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites
must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs
must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be
shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face
of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The
decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal
manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent
such we look at other considerations. The decedents
disposition of the free portion of her estate, which
largely favored the respondents, compared with the
relatively small devise of land which the decedent left for
her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on
her part to give the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding
the respondents from the inheritance, considering that
petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the
bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert
the clear wishes of the decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side,
especially where the will evinces an intention on the part
of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate,
as was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and
the wishes of the testator should be allowed to prevail.
Granted that a probate court has found, by final
judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary
capacity and her last will was executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows
that giving full expression to her will must be in order.
Aznar vs. Duncan
G.R. No. L-24365
June 30, 1966
Doctrine: Preterition
FACTS:
Christensen died testatewherein he declared that he has
no living descendant or ascendant except a natural
daughter Lucy Duncan; that he is leaving the residue of
his estate to said Lucy Duncan; and that he is
bequeathing the amount of P3,600.00 to Helen Garcia to
whom he is not related in any way. The will was admitted
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to probate. In the decision allowing the will the court
declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the
deceased. Subsequently, in the partition proceedings, an
order was issued approving a project of partition
wherein the estate was divided equally between Lucy
Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in
his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who
had been judicially declared as such after his death. The
said order was based on the proposition that Helen
Garcia had been preterited in the will thus resulting in
the annulment of the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir;
hence the estate passed to both of them as if the
deceased had died intestate. Lucy Duncan appealed on
the sole question of whether the estate, after deducting
the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in
equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan
as instituted heirs should be merely reduced to the
extent necessary to cover thelegitime of Helen Garcia to
1/4 of the entire estate. She contends that the case
should be governed by Art. 906 of the Civil Code.Helen
Garcia, on the other hand, contends that the case should
be governed by Art. 854 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was preterition in the instant case.
HELD:
It is submitted that in this case there is no preterition
within the meaning of Art. 854 of the Civil Code. It is true
that there is a total omission of the acknowledged
natural child in the testators will, and apparently the
rule regarding preterition should, therefore, be applied.
But then, we must consider the fact that a donation inter
vivos is actually given to a compulsory heir as an advance
on his inheritance. That is why in the partition of the
estate of the donor upon the death of the latter, it must
be collated and subsequently, it must be charged against
the legitime of such compulsory heir. Consequently,
there is no omission in this case which is complete and
total in character. Hence, if there is an impairment of the
legitime of the acknowledged natural child because the
value of the property donated is less than the legitime to
which he is entitled by operation of law, his remedy lies
in the right granted in Art. 906 of the Civil Code. He can
ask for the completion of his legitime.
BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-39247
June 27, 1975
Topic/Doctrines: Testacy is preferable to intestacy.
An interpretation that will render a testamentary
disposition operative takes precedence over a
construction that will nullify a provision of the will
(Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate
children. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the
probate of his mothers notarial will, which was
written in English. In that will, Leodegaria declared
that it was her desire her properties should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied
out of the fruits of her properties. She devised and
partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her
husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed
the probate of the will.There after, Felix Balanay, Sr.
signed an instrument waiving and renouncing his
right in Leodegarias estate in favor of their 6
children.Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her
rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void; that
the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner
of the southern half of the conjugal lots and; that
she could not partition the conjugal estate by
allocating portions of the nine lots to her children.
She prayed that the will be declared void for being
contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The probate court declared the will void on the basis
of its own independent assessment of its provisions
and not because of party's arguments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court erred in passing
upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling
on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring
it void.
HELD:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will's intrinsic validity even before its formalvalidity
had been established. But the probate court erred
in declaring that the will was void and in converting
the testate proceeding into an intestate
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proceeding.The will is intrinsically valid and the
partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. As
aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very
existence of a purported testament is in itself prima
facie proof that the supposed testator has willed
that his estate should be distributed in the manner
therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state
that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect
independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-
27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565). To give
effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is
the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to
intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes
precedence over a construction that will nullify a
provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of
testacy especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate. So compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be avoided and that
the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for
the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-
23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762). As far
as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the
testator must be followed and the dispositions of
the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque
vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540,
546).
NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799
May 21, 1943
Topic/Doctrine: Institution of Heirs
FACTS:
This is a case where the testator AgripinoNeri in his
will left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein
respondents, with omission of the children by his
first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of
the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
testator with the belief that he had already given
each of the children portion of the inheritance,
particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied
by the respondents over which registration was
denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an
aggregate amount of money which the respondents
were indebted to their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will shall be cancelled in view of
the omission of heirs. Whether or not there was
disinheritance.
HELD:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and
declared a total intestacy on the ground that
testator left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage but
upon the erroneous belief that he had given them
already more shares in his property than those given
to the children by his second marriage.
Disinheritance made without a statement of the
cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of
heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited
person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls
the institution of heirs.
In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier. SULPICIO
RESURRECCION
vs.
AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936
FACTS:
Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her
husband Sulpicio Resurreccion as her universal heir
and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in
favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The court,
finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in August, 1930,
even before the testatrix made her will, ordered
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that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the
fund of the estate. Gil Francisco Javier's children and
heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the
legacy of P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from
the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this
amount to the funds of the estate. The only witness
who testified to this effect was Agustin Javier, Gil's
brother, who alleged that he was in the house of the
testatrix in May, 1931, and in a conversation with
her he informed her that their brother Gil had
already died, leaving a widow and children. But
against this testimony was presented that of
Sulpicio Resurreccion.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of a legacy made in favor of a
person who was already dead not only before the
death of the testatrix but even before the will was
made?
HELD:
Furthermore, if the testatrix, in making her will,
knew that Gil was already dead and that he had left
children, it cannot be explained why she left the
legacy to Gil and not to his children, if such was her
intention, particularly because, according to the
evidence for the appellants, she knew one of said
children named Jose.
Consequently, in either case, whether the testatrix
knew that Gil was already dead or she was ignorant
thereof, as she had left the legacy in favor of Gil,
there is no reason to admit that it was, nevertheless,
her intention to leave it to his children. Appealed
judgment is affirmed. SO ORDERED
Resureccion v Javier
63 Phil 599
Doctrine: Incapacity to inherit from the deceased
person.
Facts:
On Oct. 18 1932, Felisa Javier made a will instituting her
husband Sulpiccio universal heir and among other things,
left a legacy of P2000 in favor of her brother, Gil.
The testator died on Jan 22, 1933 and her will was
probated on March 4 of said year.
On Oct. 12, 1933, the court finding that Gil died on
August 1930, even before the testatrix made her will, and
ordered that the legacy of P2000 in his favor revert to the
fund of the estate.
Gils children claiming that they are entitled to receive
the legacy of P2000 in favor of their father.
Issue:
WON Gils children are entitled to such legacy?
Held:
Not. Gil, now deceased, upon being instituted a legatee
by the testatrix, lacked civil personality, which is
extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to
inherit by will on the ground that he could not been
subject of the right.
RESURRECCION VS. JAVIER
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936
Doctrine: A legatee should be capacitated to inherit. A
person who was already dead not only before the death
of the testator but even before the will was madecannot
be a legatee/devisee. Principle of representation takes
place only in intestate inheritance.
FACTS:
On October 18, 1932, Felisa Francisco Javier made a will
instituting her husband SulpicioResurreccion as her
universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of
P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The
testatrix died on January 22, 1933, and her will was
probated on March 8th of said year.
On October 12, 1933, the court, finding that Gil Francisco
Javier died in August, 1930, even before the testatrix
made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his
favor revert to the fund of the estate.
Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that
they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2,000 in favor
of their father, appeal from the court's resolution
ordering the reversion of this amount to the funds of the
estate.
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ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier is capacitated to
be a legatee who was already dead not only before
the death of the testatrix but even before the will was
made.
2. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier can be represented
by his heirs and entitled to the amount of legacy.
HELD:
1. NO. The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose
by will of all her property or any part thereof in favor of
any person qualified to acquire it (art. 763, Civil Code).
Upon being instituted as legatee by the testatrix, Gil
Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is
extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to
inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the
subject of a right (art. 32, Civil Code).
2. NO. Gil Francisco Javiers institution as a legatee had
absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are not now
entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot even
claim under the principle of representation because this
takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as
the legatee died before the testatrix, he could transmit
nothing to his heirs (Art. 766, Civil Code).
SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana
Maria Alcantara
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO,
Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
G.R. No. L-31703
February 13, 1930
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: FIDEICOMMISSARY
SUBSTITUTION
FACTS:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the
plaintiff's name with the association known as La
Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the
liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased,
whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres
Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his
son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment
for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara,
husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the
sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in
said judgment, levied an attachment on said
amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff,
alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria
Alcantara.
The appellants contend that in these clauses
the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution,
while the appellee contends that it is a
fideicommissary substitution.
ISSUE:
WON the deposited amount belong to the
fideicommisary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara.
HELD:
This will certainly provide for a substitution of heirs,
and of the three cases that might give rise to a
simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code). The
testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and
universal heiress, and provides that upon her death
(the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and
approval of the report of the committee on claims
and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy
the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause
provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does
not contain anything in conflict with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution.
The disposition contained in clause IX of the will,
that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate.
In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in
conformity with the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted
receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at
the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on
the second heir.
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in
the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right
to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but
does not say she may dispose of it. This is an
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indication of the usufruct inherent in
fideicommissary substitution.
Another clear and outstanding indication of
fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the
provision that the whole estate shall pass
unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say
the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate,
without diminution, in order to pass it on in due
time to the fideicommissary heirs.
TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ VS. VDA. DE RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-27952
February 15, 1982
Doctrine: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validate a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted." One degree means one
generation. The second heir must be related to and be
one generation from the first heir.
FACTS:
The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2
grandnephews and his companion Wanda.The widow is
French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is
an Austrian who lives in Spain.Moreover, the testator
provided for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain
with only his widow as compulsory heir. A project
partition was submitted wherein one part shall go to the
widow and the other part or "free portion" shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez, the grandnephews. It was
provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the
widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct
in favor of Wanda. The grandnephews opposed the
project of partition and one of the grounds was that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid
because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs
or substitutes within the first degree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not fideicommissary substitution is valid.
HELD:
The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes
are not related to Wanda. The second heir mustbe
related to and be one generation from the first heir. It
follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a
child ora parent of the first heir. Therefore, the estate of
Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as
follows:1/2 thereof to his widow as her legitime and 1/2
of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto
and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct
to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, the
substitutes.
CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION
ELENA MORENTE
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA
G.R. No. L-3891
December 19, 1907
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: MODAL INSTITUTION
FACST:
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following
clauses:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which
may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my
brothers after my death, and that he shall
not marry anyone; should my said husband
have children by anyone, he shall not convey
any portion of the property left by me,
except the one-third part thereof and the
two remaining thirds shall be and remain for
my brother Vicente or his children should he
have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to
dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is
located, which is one of the properties
belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again
within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena
Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the
proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo
Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second
marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the
legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection
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was made in the court below by the husband to the

procedure followed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the will of Consuelo contained modal institution

HELD:

Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary

provisions may be made conditional and article 793
provides that a prohibition against another marriage may
in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or
widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix
intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift
which is contained in the first clauses of the will?

It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs

that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided
in the third clause that he must continue to live in a
certain building. It is provided in the second clause that
he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is
attached the condition that if he fails to comply with
them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first
clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he
does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to
dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit
the property given him in the first clause; nor is it
anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall
incur such a loss
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all
the clauses contained therein, and with reference to
such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the
case, and after such consideration we cannot say that it
was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband
married again he should forfeit the legacy above
mentioned. In other words, there being no express
condition attached to that legacy in reference to the
second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can
be implied from the context of the will. In order to make
a testamentary provision conditional, such condition
must fairly appear from the language used in the will.