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AT Settler Colonialism

1. Interpretation---the aff gets to weigh the 1ac and the negative has to defend a
political strategy for resolving the links---
a) Weighing the AFF against a realizable alternative is key to education about what
ought to be done --- the ballot should simulate its enactment --- their interp only lets
us criticize the status quo
b) Fairness --- the 1ac was 8 minutes of scholarship defending why the aff is good, we
should be able to use that scholarship --- their interp unpredictably robs the 2AC of
resolutional offense

2. Prioritize the impacts of the affirmativeExtinction comes before the value to life:
we cannot evaluate or change the value the value to life if we are all dead

3. The 1ac outweighs and turns the K US China relations make the world a better
place for everyone.

4. The alt doesnt solve the aff because they do nothing to address the offering of the
wolf amendment and in turn cant solve for the affirmative in any way. The alternative
of the Kritik allows for the death of billions of people due to our impacts

5. Perm do both.

a. Permutation solves- only engaging institutional structures is able to change the

status of international relations
Gerard 2015 (Kelly, School of Social Sciences, University of Western Australia, Explaining ASEANs
Engagement of Civil Society in Policy-making: Smoke and Mirrors, Globalizations, Vol. 12:3,, mmv)

In light of the limitations of dominant IR theories in explaining how and why governance institutions
consult CSOs, this study harnesses political economy analysis to explain this trend. Recognising that
different systems of structuring civil society participation produce varying opportunities for CSOs to
shape policy, this article applies the framework of Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007), where modes of
participation serve as the unit of analysis. A mode of participation is the institutional structures and
ideologies that shape the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and groups in the political process
(Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007, p. 774). This framework recognises that institutions structure the form
politics can take, making particular forms of participation acceptable. As such, modes of participation
organise conflicts because they determine which conflicts are expressed, mediated or marginalized
(Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007, p. 779). In analysing modes of participation, this approach is concerned with
the questions of who is represented within these sites, what forms of participation are deemed
permissible, the struggles that have taken place to establish these spaces, and whose interests are
furthered through their creation. In examining who can participate and how, the key consideration is
whether participation enables CSOs to contest policy, defined as the articulation of views that challenge
institutional policy. This analytical focus is crucial because participation that entails representation but
not contestation functions in legitimating prevailing interests, without providing a channel for CSOs to
deliberate policy, thereby marginalising the conflicts CSOs have organised around. The modes of
participation framework is drawn from the work of social conflict theorists, considering institutions,
markets, and states not as unitary, independent, and coherent entities but as social structures, meaning
they are defined by conflicts among competing social forces. Recognising that civil society consultations
do not emerge independently but are shaped by struggles between competing social forces, this
framework acknowledges these struggles as significant in determining how CSOs participate in policy-
making . This framework thus enables analysis of the relationship between the structure of these spaces
and the interests they privilege. Hence, this framework not only describes modes of participation as
being more or less useful for activists agendas, but explains why, with reference to underlying political
economy relationships. This article extends the modes of participation framework from Jayasuriya and
Rodans (2007) application to domestic regimes to examine the relationship between CSOs and regional
and global governance institutions. This extension of this framework is based on recognition that state
borders do not constitute a boundary for political power, and actors will employ strategies to advance
their interests across governance scales (Jessop, 1990). Each territorial scale, whether local, subnational,
national, regional, or global, has a specific configuration of actors, resources, and political opportunities,
and actors subsequently seek to rescale the governance of an issue in accordance with their interests
(Hameiri & Jones, 2012). Consequently, the governance of a single territorial scale cannot be examined
in isolation from othersdomestic political projects are intricately bound up with the form and
trajectory of regional and global governance institutions.

6. Perm do the alt: floating pics are bad because they moot the 1ac

7. Case acts as a DA to the alternative

8. Space induces the Overview Effect that changes human perception

White 98 (Frank White, senior associate of the Space Studies Institute in Princeton, The Overview
Effect: Space Exploration and Human Evolution, 23-25, 6-25-11, DS)

Most space travelers flourish in the new medium. They enjoy them- selves and sometimes regret having to
return home. Having been out of the "womb," they may feel that returning home is like a constriction of
possibilities. In Gene Cernan's words, "You can't return home without feeling that difference ... You wonder, if only
everyone could relate to the beauty and the purposefulness of it, the reality of the infinity of time and space, how our star moves through
time and space with such logic and purpose. "24 In "An Astronaut's Diary," initially recorded aboard the shuttle Discovery, astronaut Jeff
Hoffman reads from a poem written by a mountain climber. He offers it toward the end of the mission as an example of how it
feels to be in space and then return to Earth. The poem also captures the power and the long-term impact of the
Overview Effect: You cannot stay on the summit forever; you have to come down again. So why bother in the first place? Just this:
what is above knows what is below, but what is below does not know what is above. One climbs, one sees;
one descends, one sees no longer, but one has seen. There is an art of conducting oneself in the lower regions by the memory of
what one saw higher up. When one can no longer see, one can at least still know. 25 Being in space, like
mountain climbing, is an intensely human experience. Analysis can capture the essential features of the space- flight experience,
but cannot do it justice, because it is a multi- dimensional life experience. Most astronauts see it as the culmination of their life
goals, a feeling reinforced by a community of fellow astronauts and supportive space program workers. There is an intense psychological
buildup to lift-off, punctuated by a note of fear, followed by a feeling of incredible power as the rockets fire, and then the sense of moving into
a whole new world where one's perceptions of the universe itself are transformed. Charles Walker said, "Space
is a place, but it is also an all-encompassing experience. "26

9. These link arguments generate their coherence through a romanticization of the

Other which implies their naturalized existence outside of a binary relationship to
Europeattempts to escape from the violence of language itself result in political
Michaelson and Shershow, 2007 (Scott and Scott,Professors of English at UC-Irvine and Michigan
State respectively, South Atlantic Quarterly 106.1 Rethinking Border Thinking )

Mignolos other conceptual metaphors share a similar incongruity. Mignolo claims that subaltern
reason absorbs or incorporates hegemonic forms of knowledge, formulations that imply a certain fusion or
combination. He also claims, however, that those hegemonic forms have been displaced by the subaltern
term in order to make room for it. The two terms also engage in battle, something that implies struggle and conflict without any necessary
implication of their final combination (a battle might logically result, for instance, in one or the other terms obliteration or destruction).
As we will eventually show, this
unstable fibrillation among this set of metaphors exposes Mignolos project to
one or more readings that directly contradict his avowed intentions. Now, just as Mignolo claims, in The Darker
Side of the Renaissance, that Amerindian signifying practices are radically distinct from European ones, so in Global Histories/Local Designs
he suggests, more broadly, that a modern (Western) epistemology is absolutely closed off to its other, and unable to recognize Amerindian
alternatives (Local, 9, emphasis original). A brief detour here through the thought of sociologist Anibal Quijano will be helpful in further
assessing this claim.14 Mignolo often acknowledges his debt to Quijano, whose problematic opening moves are reproduced and amplified in
Mignolos text. Quijanos notion of the coloniality of power describes social relations within the last five hundred years of historical
capitalism (27)15 and includes a set of four institutions: the capitalist enterprise proper, the bourgeois family, the nation-state, and
Eurocentrism (545).16 The last of these institutions, Eurocentrism, is
defined by Quijano in terms of two of its nuclear elements,
evolution and dualism, which produce race as a basic category for purposes of classification and
domination (542). As Delgado de Torres tellingly explains, the coloniality of power defines a set of social relations
between colonizer and colonized that are internal to Europe itself (Reformulating, 27; emphasis added). Or, 44 as
Quijano puts it, a binary, dualist perspective is particular to Eurocentrism (Coloniality, 542; emphasis added).17 Quijanos first
assumption, therefore, is that Europe should be understood as a closed, self-sufficient cultural totality, which during the conquest and
colonization of the Americas encounters other, alternative local totalities and attempts to impose its totality on theirs. As Mignolo argues,
There is nothing outside the totality of a given local history, other than other local histories perhaps producing either alternative totalities
or an alternative to totality (Local, 329). For Quijano, similarly, the world is composed of a great number of different peoples, each with its
own history, language, discoveries, and cultural products, memory and identity (Quijano, Coloniality, 551). But as Michaelsen has argued
at length elsewhere, such
an assumption, which undergirds anthropologys traditional understanding of the
concept of culture itself, cannot be intellectually sustained. There are no individual, cultural
totalities; instead, the globe is composed of nothing but relations, in which each presumed totality
depends on manifold others for its bordered sense of coherence.18 Local histories, then, literally do
not exist, and epistemologically cannot exist, for the same reason that any individual identity cannot
exist: such identities are forever-incomplete political projects, rather than given, original existants; and
as projects, they seek to efface their intersubjective limits, ceaselessly attempting to purge all of the
other identities upon which they fundamentally depend. No people, then, has ever had its own
identity, much less its own cultural products (including language): We are stitched together and shot through with all
of our others (Michaelsen, Limits, 58). Nothing can escape this logic, including fifteenth-century New World contact, which radically
reconfigured (already) relational identities (38). Quijanos second, related assumption is that dualism is the exclusive and specific property
of Europe and Eurocentrism. Even Quijano himself, however, has difficulty maintaining this position consistently; at one point, for example,
he approvingly cites Immanuel Wallerstein regarding a trait common to all colonial dominators and imperialists, ethnocentrism (Quijano,
Coloniality, 541). This
ethnocentrism, or the division of the world into an accented us/them dichotomy,
would be one possible expression of a dualist or binary ontology, as Quijano makes clear (552). And if,
historically, all colonial dominators and imperialists are ethnocentric, then all such dominators are
dualist at their core. But a list of such 555555 dominators would perforce have to include many New
World examples prior to the European invasions, such as the Iroquois, Mayan, Mexica, and Incan
empires. It would thus be impossible to limit ethnocentric dualism to Europe in particular.
Notwithstanding this apparently obvious problem, Mignolo follows Quijano closely here. Though he never says so with much
emphasis, Mignolo comprehends Amerindian gnosis as fundamentally different from a Western or
European one, precisely because it is grounded in a logic of complementarity rather than dualism or
binarity: The Sun and the Moon, in Amerindian categories of thought are not opposite, contrary or contradictory; they are complementary.
To extend deconstruction beyond Western metaphysics or to assume that there is nothing else than Western metaphysics will be a move
similar to colonizing global designs (Local, 326).19 We first note that the
division of the world into binarity (Europe) and
complementarity (its others, including Amerindia) runs uncomfortably close to the long history of the
romanticization of the other.20 In particular, it seems a mere variation on the anthropological distinction
between societies premised on individuality and difference, and those grounded in community or
cooperation.21 The introduction of such an old, essentialist binary into Mignolos text should give any
reader pause. If Mignolo were correct, however, this would mean that Amerindian logic is
fundamentally nonhierarchical and nonexclusive and that Amerindian gnosis involves no structural
oppositions at all. Such gnosis would have, then, no inflections, no hierarchies, and no values of any kind.
No term or concept could ever be privileged; each would be deemed necessary to its othersupplying its lack, and completing the other,
rather than opposing it.22 But this completion would necessarily imply a higher order of synthesis: if man is
not privileged over woman, for instance, and such terms are instead complementary, then they
would necessarily find their completion in some higher, perhaps neo-Platonic, third sex concept, or,
perhaps, life or human being. But then, by the same logic, even the human being would
necessarily be judged as complementary with regard to that which is animal or inanimate, and so
forth, endlessly foreclosing inflection and hierarchy. In every possible register (race, culture, class, caste,
gender, sex, age, or the like), difference would undergo no valuation. There would be differences, perhaps, but
they would exist in peaceful coexistence rather than violent hierarchy.23 At the limit of this thought, the
citizen and the stranger would necessarily be thought in comple-5 mentary fashion, disenabling the very possibility of the
state and sovereignty, all basic structures of governance, and indeed, all modes of thinking and
decision making that begin from systematic discrimination. We must conclude, therefore, that the
positing of radical complementarity implies a withdrawal from the political decision in general, into an
alternative, arcadian space in which nothing ever need be decided. But as Derrida writes: We know
what always have been the practical (particularly political) effects of immediately jumping beyond
oppositions, and of protests in the simple form of neither this nor that (Positions, 41). In other words,
complementarity, rather than fundamentally opposing binarity, leaves every available term for
discrimination in place, preventing any means of intervening in the field effectively (Derrida, Positions, 41).5

10. Alt cant solve attempts to break down colonialism are always coopted by a
different oppressive group
Gillen & Ghosh 7
(Paul, Devleena Colonialism & Modernity Google Books)

After World War II colonial rule was rapidly abandoned the first of two sudden political breakdowns in the 20th century,
the second being the even more rapid demise of European Communism in 1989-1991. Japanese colonies became independent or were
By the late 1960s,
occupied by China or the United States in 1945. South Asia followed in 1947 and 1948, with Indonesia in 1949.
nearly all the significant territories of the British and Frence empires had become independent states.
Ironically, the Portuguese colonies, among the first to be acquired, were among the last to be abandoned, when the Salazar dictatorship ended
in 1974. The process was far from peaceful. France fought two major colonial wars, in Algeria and Vietnam, losing both. Later Portugal fought
unsuccessfully to retain Angola and Mozambique. Internecine political and ethnic conflicts frequently coincided with
or followed the granting of independence. Examples were the partition of India and Pakistan, civil wars and resistance in
Nigeria and Indonesia, and communist insurrections in Korea and Malaya. An important motivation for decolonization
stemmed from the growing appeal of the nation-state ideal. What historian Frederick Cooper points out in relation to
the French Empire applies across the board, including the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s: Demands for equality of
wages, benefits, and ultimately standard of living among all people who the government asserted to be
French - backed by well-organized protest movements and in the context of world-wide debates over self-determination and anticolonial
revolutions-resented the French government with the dilemma of either giving up the idea of Greater
France or facing its metropolitan citizens with never-ending demands and an unpayable bill. The national
conception of France was consolidated in the same process that gave rise to nation-states in North and sub-Saharan Africa.15 The
sovereignty of colonial states passed from European governments to governments which at first, and
usually for some time, were dominated by the Westernised elite that had led the struggle for
independence. IN nearly all cases, the institutional and legal forms of governance were continuous with
those of the colonial period.

11. This alternative is apolitical because it is premised on a pure and uncontaminated

view of politicsworking within existing democratic structures is better
Michaelson and Shershow, 2007 (Scott and Scott,Professors of English at UC-Irvine and Michigan
State respectively, South Atlantic Quarterly 106.1 Rethinking Border Thinking )

The Nation-State and Democracy It remains only to consider the more practical opposition allegedly put in play by
the redemptive possibilities of border thinking: the contrast between an alleged Amerindian
democracy and the European nation-state. Here we begin, one more time, by following Quijano, whose elaboration of the
problem of the nation-state will prove yet again to rest on a concealed contradiction. Quijano suggests that the nation-state is an
intrinsically European phenomenon and therefore, following the argument we have previously
summarized, embodies a dualist or binarist ontology. Nationstates in Latin America itself were founded on the European
model, which explains at least in part their long histories of racial violence. He cites several examples of Latin American states (Argentina,
Uruguay, and Chile) that were premised, at their foundations, on the conquest and land divestment of indigenous peoples, followed by a
project of racial homogenization through extermination. This
is, one must conclude, a kind of limit case that
indicates with particular vividness how the nation-state as such must always embody an ethnocentric
dualism (56264). One might therefore expect that Quijanos project would involve a critique of the nation-state to the limit of its
foundation: that is, to the limit6 of its division of the world into citizens and strangers. Instead, however, Quijano adopts a decidedly liberal
framework for merely judging particular states on the basis of their relative processes of democratization (559). For example, Quijano
makes this surprising observation about the United States: In spite of the colonial relation of domination between whites and blacks and
the colonial extermination of the indigenous population, we must admit, given the overwhelming majority of whites, that the new nation-
state was genuinely representative of the greater part of the population (560). The Latin American nation-state, therefore, must be capable
of moving in either of two opposing directions: it can achieve the homogenization required to be representative, on the one hand, by the
exclusion of a significant part of the population, or, on the other hand, by means of the fundamental democratization of social and political
relations. And, of course, it is this total democratic inclusion which for Quijano provides for the possibility of stable and
firmly constituted nation-states (564). As we have argued elsewhere, however, such inclusion is not
achievable, for fundamental reasons of sovereignty and law: The decision to enact the most minimal
social contract . . . cannot but divide and exclude along one line or more at the moment of its sovereign founding (102).24
The figure of the subperson, or what Giorgio Agamben refers to as bare life, is fundamental to state formation.25 Whether the
subperson is categorized according to race, gender, class, and/or religion, one or more of these
categoriesor some equally exclusive or even empty categoryis necessarily foundational for any
state. Elsewhere we have also characterized the dream of a nonexclusive state, divested of the power to make a sovereign cut or decision
between mere beings, as a characteristic of political liberalism par excellence.26 We will suggest here that Quijanosand Mignolos
vision of democracy has all the same problems. Deciphering Mignolo on the question of the nationstate is
difficult, however, because his remarks on the subject are fleeting and opaque. He notes that the European universal
proclamation of democracy was blind to the local histories in which that very proclamation was taking place in relation to almost three
hundred years of colonialism and the constitution of the modern/colonial world system (Local, 317). European
democracy, for
Mignolo, has no transcendental value but is instead a kind of empty signifier that has been invoked by figures
such as Pinochet, Allende, Stalin, Reagan, and the elder Bush (Local, 317). Border thinking, however, holds out the
possibility of reconfiguring 77777 democracy in complementary and nondualist terms. Here the Zapatista
insurgency in Chiapas, Mexico, will be the prime example: The Zapatistas are again showing the limits of democracy in its
regional eighteenth-century definition and recasting it based on the five hundred years of particular local histories in the Americas. . . .
Democracy was taken off the domain of global designs and reconverted to the needs of Chiapass local history where indigenous and
Western wisdom interactwhere the colonial difference is being addressed and border thinking enacted. Government of the people, by the
people, and for the people has next to it today another dictum: To rule and at the same time obeying. (Local, 319) Mignolo
here to be setting two sorts of democracies in opposition to one another. The first is Abraham Lincolns
democracy: of the people, by the people, and for the people, as the Gettsyburg Address (1863) has it. The other is
Amerindian democracy: To rule and at the same time obeying. If we understand Mignolos
formulation, the latter mode of democracy wholly collapses the distinction between the sovereign and
the subject, and between the very ideas of sovereignty and law (or between the unprecedented
decision and the subjects compliance with its codification in the form of law). Mignolo here appears to
be referring to something like direct democracy, in which all citizens immediately or directly
participate in the political decision-making process.27 Zapatista democracy favors participatory democracy or
horizontal structures of governance within the community to the point where the EZLN (Ejrcito Zapatista de Liberacin Nacional) has
advocated in its communiqus the full renunciation of the executive branch of government, substituting a communitarian consensus-based
model for executive decision making.28 So Mignolo must be taking Lincolns famous phrase as defining representative rather than direct
democracy. He might even be going so far as the reading proposed by Giorgio Agamben, who detects in the tripartite structure of the
Gettysburg clauses a repetition that implicitly sets another people against the first, so that of the people refers merely to a ruling class
who feel a sense of compassion for an excluded class (for the people). For Agamben, Lincolns Gettysburg Address is radically
incommensurate with the peoples sovereignty . . . claimed as a principle.29 In either case, Mignolos
point seems to be that
the Zapatistas have resolved the problem of political exclusivity and founded, in Chiapas, a777 polity of
absolute inclusion that surmounts the pesky difficulties of representation.30 They have, in other words, achieved
the dream of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose Of the Social Contract (1762) postulated a general will of all as an antidote to the problem
that force produces no right.31 We have no desire here to critique the Zapatistas insurgency and its historically significant challenge to
neoliberal governance in Mexico and elsewhere. But it
is obvious that consensus-based decision making is no cure-all
for the problems of representative government, nor does it simply put an end to the exclusion of
some political subjects. Indeed, as Jacques Rancire suggests, by abolishing dissensus and placing a ban
on political subjectivization, consensus reduces politics to the police.32 Even Rousseau himself
recognized that under the regime of a politics of consensus, whoever refuses to obey the general will
shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be
forced to be free (Social, 53). We also observe, finally, that Mignolos dream of an absolutely unmediated
democracy could exist at all only if the two seemingly opposed actions of ruling and obeying could
somehow take place, as the dictum itself suggests, at the same time.33 We would thus have to imagine beings who
both obey and rule; and not merely in turn, sometimes doing one and sometimes the other, but both at once. The beings capable of this
extraordinary simultaneity of ruling and obeying would thus somehow have extricated themselves from the problem of time itself, both
philosophically and practically. By the same token, the democracy constituted by the gathering of such beings would
exist as if in a continuous present, capable of neither improvement nor decline, and in fact closed off to
new events in its own infinite and absolute completion. Such a political vision is all the more
unexpected in that, after all, Mignolos project is otherwise an essentially historical one. Mignolo
analyzes and celebrates, above all, a border thinking that emerges only after a historical confrontation
and interaction of two radically different ways of thinking and being; and as such, border thinking is
something that must have been, at some particular time and place, new. And yet the democracy that
emerges from such border thinking apparently no longer exists in time or history at all. In other words, Mignolo
seems to envision a history that leads via a particular necessary sequence of events to a particular telosand then stops. This

teleological vision simply reinstalls in the future Mignolos arcadian vision of a originally good
Amerindian voice. For us, as for Derrida, on the contrary, democracy 88888888 is always to come,
something that can never be made absolutely present once and for allprecisely because, as democracy, it must
question and interrogate every border, remaining infinitely incomplete and open: to the unforeseeable, to the future, and to the
unexpected arrival of the other. And this, indeed, will take time.

12. We control impact uniqueness status quo is structurally improving

Ridley 10 visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of The Economist,
and award-winning science writer, (Matt, The Rational Optimist, 2010 pg. 13-15) //AD

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has
multiplied six times , yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen
more than nine times . Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet
Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of
her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth,
accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus,
typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke.
She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a
refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being
rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It
is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into

bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income
per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three
(Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africas rate of improvement has
been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge
in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you
could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the
1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant
twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average
South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as
much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average
Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy
in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich
have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption
twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and
twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years
longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of
people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen since the 1950s. The percentage
living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly
high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 though it probably wont.
The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.
A) They embrace anti-politicsthis dooms their project, creates
atrocity and creates a vacuum filled by the right:
Carl Boggs, 1997 (National University, Los Angeles, The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in
Late Twentieth-Century America,

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a
loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in
large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems
that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved - perhaps even unrecognized -
only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis,
poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be
understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically , the
widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time
when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to
impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and
dilution of politics, as larger num-bers of people turn away from public concerns toward
private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of
politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the
meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as
the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the
vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands
further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality,
that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose
their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-
informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and
reactionary elites - an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of
a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a
part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the
face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more
virulent guise - or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become
what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec-tive interests that had vanished
from civil society.75
B) Privileging representations and the micro-political encourages anti-
politicsthis is especially true in the manner in which theyve
deployed it:
Carl Boggs, 1997 (National University, Los Angeles, The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in
Late Twentieth-Century America,

Postmodernism and its offshoots (poststructuralism, semiotics, differ-ence feminism, etc.) have indeed
reshaped much of academia, including such disciplines as sociology, history, literature, film, and communica-tions. More than
that, the theory (if that is the correct label for some-thing so diffuse) amounts to a kind of anti-
paradigm paradigm, which often refocuses debates around defining motifs of the post-Fordist order:
commodification of culture, the media spectacle, proliferation of images and symbols,
and loss of faith in conventional political ideologies and
fragmentation of identities, the dispersion of local movements,
organizations. So far as all this is concerned, post-modernism can be viewed as marking a rather healthy break with the past.50 The
problem is that the main thrust of postmodernism so devalues the common realm of power,
governance, and economy that the dynamics of social and institutional life vanish from sight. Where the
reality of corporate, state, and military power wind up vanishing within a post-modern amorphousness,
the very effort to analyze social forces and locate agencies or strategies of change becomes impossible.
In its reac-tion against the comprehensive historical scope of Marxism, the micro approach
dismisses in toto macropolitics and with it any conceivable modern project of
radical transformation. An extreme "micro" focus is most visible in such theorists as Baudrillard
who, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, in effect "announce the end of the political project in the
end of history and society"51 - a stance that replicates the logic of a profoundly
depoliticized culture.
C) Moving away from anti-politics is vital to check extinction:
Jonathan Small & Meg Buckley, 2006 (former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, Moving

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face
these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say
unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the
capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective
action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted
natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations
with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and
most of all solidarity ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer
suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our
collective fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new
paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankinds next great challenge comes also great opportunity.
Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish
together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole
world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black,
woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and
destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a
predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the
opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature.
Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of
human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world,
we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We
need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will
inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a
modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged
individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are
the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. Well need to
trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the
gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social
justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an
exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we
will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are
specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic
engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward
explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences
contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their
relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often
ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we
do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term,
focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social
justice refers quite simply to
a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality.
The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The
Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the
government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract
theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made
over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, lets not get bogged down on subtleties.
Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community
issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that todays youth are less involved
politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it
demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic

engagement and todays youth. But one thing is for sure; todays youth no longer see government and
politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world.
Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author
Kurt Vonnegut said, There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I dont know what can be
done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president. Maybe the youths rejection of American
politics isnt a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience.
Consequently,the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster
fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in
the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our
challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government
and commerce, have the potential for positive change. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more
specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic
engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service
learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves
to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative
office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service
learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic
engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern
education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement,
and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we
get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to
jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that
seeks to do just that.
1AR Extensions
Overview effect extensions
*dont read* basically the o/v effect says that when we say earth from space for the
first time we had a bunch of unity or whatever because all of us looked the same from
space and we realized our humanity, so this is a turn to the K because once we go to
space with China it will have an extreme humbling effect on us all and it solves for the
K anyway

The overview effect solves all war

Livingston 2 M.D. in Business
(David, The Ethical Commercialization of Outer Space,

Most astronauts claim to view Earth differently after having been in space. Often their commentaries
show a world that is united in space, but unfortunately absent on Earth. When the Saudi-Arabian Prince
Sultan Bin Salman al-Saud went into orbit in June 1985 he said, "I think the minute I saw the view for the
first time was really one of the most memorable moments in my entire life."8 When asked by the
interviewer how it changed his understanding of God, the Sultan said, "It really strengthens your
convictions. To me, it's an opportunity to prove that there is no conflict being a Muslim, or any other
religion. Looking at it from here, the troubles all over the world, and not just the Middle East, look very
strange as you see the boundaries and border lines disappearing."9 U.S. Congressman Bill Nelson, who
went to space in January 1986, said upon his return: "If the superpower leaders could be given the
opportunity to see the Earth from the perspective from which I saw itperhaps at a summit meeting in
space in the context of the next centurythey might realize that we're all in this with a common
denominator. It would have a positive effect on their future decisions concerning war and peace.10
Such space-based perspectives and their spillover effects on those of us unable to experience space
firsthand may ultimately have a greater influence on our commercial space business practices than
anything we do or say on Earth. Robert Bigelow of Bigelow Aerospace of Las Vegas was recently
interviewed about his announcement to invest $500 million of his own money over the next several
years to build a space cruise liner for Earth to moon tourism. Bigelow understands the limitations of our
perceptions and the way we do things, especially since we have technology that enables us to do so
much. When asked during his interview if his cruise liner would have defenses onboard in case of a
meeting with a hostile ET, Bigelow replied: I'm not so sure exactly who the Klingons are. I think the jury
is still out on whether or not its the human race. I think we have a huge divergence between our paths
of improvement on spiritual maturity, while at the same time this century we compare that against the
path of our technological advancements. You have to have some harmony. I think in order to be a
member of a species that is a space-faring species that other species shouldn't fear, I think you have
some type of meeting where your technological maturity is met to some degree with spiritual maturity.
Anti- ptx o/v
Arguing that there is no difference between the right and the left in the American
political systemsaying that the only solution is to withdraw altogether and focus on
our individual ideologies and personal politicsthe problem is that their rhetoric of
anti-statism gets co-opted while they splinter the fragile leftist coalition of American
Anti-ptx link extension
Their State K links to anti-politicsits sweeping nature plays into the hands of
conservative forcesthe tea party movement is more likely to win in American
politics than the radical Kritik of the state they endorse:
Carl Boggs, 1997 (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century


After California anti-tax crusaders launched the Proposition 13 cam-paign in 1978, an upsurge of
movements on the right fed into a rapidly-growing anti-statist current that transformed the
whole terrain of American electoral politics. Winning millions of adherents, these movements took
many forms: libertarians, Christian fundamentalists, anti-abortion campaigns, groups, the National Rifle Association, local
militias, and so forth. While usually ambivalent toward the public sphere, they nonetheless entered it and often used it to great
advantage. Yet popular hostility toward government was never just a right-wing phenomenon; it
had already resonated within the new left, the counter-culture, some progressive
movements, and a nascent neo-liberalism. As a general mood, anti-politics can be seen as a response to
the mounting crisis of the public sector at a time when competitive pressures within the global market began to intensify. It
can also be understood as a growing reaction against bureaucracy in any form. Anti-
statism was further reinforced by the crisis and then eclipse of Communism around the world - a development interpreted by
many as validation of free-market capitalism and privatized consumption styles fetishized in the leading industrial nations. When the decline of
European social democ-racy is taken into account, the waning of the entire socialist tradition becomes a watershed event for justifying the most
extreme (and Uto-pian) forms of anti-statism. In this milieu the "death of socialism" -and with it the discrediting of any government planning or
regulation of the economy - is widely interpreted as a sign that state power is fundamentally corrupt and inefficient at all times and all places.
American society in the 1990s has seen the resurgence of a fiercely anti- government right-wing
populism comprising not only free-marketeers and anti-tax partisans but also a bizarre variety of cults, militias, and enclave groups, mostly
but not entirely drawn from the ranks of the familiar "angry white male." Many see themselves caught up in an all-out war

against an evil and oppressive federal government that taxes and regulates citizens beyond reason. Others
see the national state apparatus as some kind of agency of international conspiracies, some-times involving the United Nations. Inevitably,
violent confrontations of one sort or another have taken place - the Waco standoff and conflagration at the Branch Davidian compound, the
Oklahoma City bombing, the protracted holdout of the Montana Freeman, the Amtrak train derailment, and numerous others. In hundreds of
lesser episodes, federal agents and employees around the country have been victims of threats, intimidation, and various hostile acts.
Gallop Poll taken in May 1995 revealed that no less than 39 percent of Americans believe the federal
government constitutes an enemy of human rights. In the first ten days following the Oklahoma City events a number of
federal agencies received a total of 140 bomb threats. Twice in 1994 and 1995 disgruntled citizens took employees hostage, in San Francisco
and Puerto Rico, to protest shoddy treatment at the hands of government agents. Public officials at all levels are frequently the target of verbal
assaults. Such manifestations of popular outrage cannot be dismissed as the irrational acts of marginals
and crazies, though this element does enter the picture; far more common is the lashing out of working people who
feel powerless and believe, quite rightly, that most govern-ment officials and politicians care little about
their problems. Whether this revolt against politics can have any strategic value in a period of global interdependence and worsening
social crisis raises yet another set of issues. In fact, the historical meaning of contemporary anti-statism is far from clear. Here it is
necessary to mention that the neo-conservative and right-wing attack on big government has been, and
continues to be, highly selective insofar as these groups would actually hope to strengthen the most
oppressive and authoritarian fea-tures of the state (the military, police, prison system, controls over
personal life) while tearing down those social programs that account for no more than three percent of the total federal
budget. Nor is there the slightest inclination to disturb the most gargantuan and powerful institutions of all - the multinational corporations,
huge financial net-works, and their global extensions in the World Bank and IMF. Some- how these huge fortresses of power and wealth escape
the conservative attack on "bigness," waste, and lack of accountability. The reality is that the modern state and corporations are thoroughly
interwoven, and both are integrated into the permanent war economy. In Theodore Roszak's words: "When we talk about 'big government' in
America, this ought to be the meat of the discussion. It is big war that created and sanctioned the big corporations. It is the big corporations
that undergird big government. Big government is quite simply the Ameri- can economy as our local extension of global industrialism."17

Anti-politics thus represents an abstract, ultimately duplicitous rejection of state power;

retreat from the public sphere does not suggest popular mobilization against big government as such
but rather an assault on just the redistributive and welfare functions of the state. Put more simply: the
idea of dismantling the welfare state is really a code for lowered taxes, deep cuts in social programs,
deregulation, and freeing of more resources for private consumption. The values asso-ciated with citizen
participation, much less a recovery of the public sphere, have no place on this agenda. Thus the Reagan
presidency, galvanized and legitimated by its strong opposition to entrenched
governmental power, actually contributed to the expansion of that power year by year. Resources were
poured into the military; the space program, intelligence, and law enforcement rose to record levels; taxes were increased; administrative corruption spread; and
bureaucracy showed no signs of dissolving. Reagan also concocted his famous Star Wars scheme, which, if enacted, would have been the most expensive
government program in history. Still, Republicans persisted in their libertarian blather about the evils of state power, always invoking "free-market" values that, in
fact, have no relevance to the United States or any capitalist economy. The reality is that the much-celebrated shift back to an autonomous market, family values,
local neighbor-hood, and individual consumption could never occur without eroding the very foundations of state-integrated corporate capitalism.

And this turns their objectives: the anti-politics vacuum will be filled by the rightnot
the left:
Carl Boggs, 1997 (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century


the prevailing mood of anti-politics: they reproduce to a deeply-

Both mall culture and mass media symbolize
atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The
Fall of Public Man, where citizen involvement in a res publica is effaced "by the belief that social meanings

are generated by the feelings of individual human beings," so that the common
terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated.15 Sheldon Wolin refers to this
development as a "crisis of citizenship," reflected in the carving up of the public sphere by
local, privatized interests.16 The point has been reached where most Americans can no longer
imagine a system truly open to citizen participation, where the ordinary person might have influence. Viewed in this way,
modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also reinforces widespread feelings of
alienation and powerlessness. Individuals feel engulfed by forces beyond their control - bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the

global economy. Under these conditions psychological retreat from the public sphere may
seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such firmly entrenched bastions of
power will not vanish simply because they are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their
hegemony will simply go unchallenged.