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93/99 ISSN 0583-4961

INSTITUT ZA NACIONALNA ISTORIJA

GLASNIK


XIX XXI :
, (, 26-27 2015)

GLASNIK god. 60 br. 2 str. 1-212 Skopje 2016


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Irena Stawowy-Kawka
,
.............................................................................................................. 7
Macedonians in Greece comparison with other national, ethnic and religious
minorities .................................................................................................................. 7

,
................................................... 21
Polish traditions in the Macedonian culture ............................................................ 21

Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues ............... 31
C 2001 -
................................................................................................................. 31



: ...................................................................................... 47
The Macedonian political emigration in Eastern and Western Europe after the Second
World War: parallels ............................................................................................... 47

,
70- 80-
........................................................................................ 53
Cultural relations between the people`s Republic of Poland and socialist Republic of
Macedonia in the 1970s and 1980s. ........................................................................ 53


: , , .............. 67
Skopje and Warsaw: Representation of history, symbols and identity .................... 67

Rafa Wonica
The role of financial intelligence units in combating money laundering in Poland and
Macedonia: a comparative analysis ........................................................................ 75

: ........................................... 75

3
Maciej Kawka
The processes of self-identification in the Balkan and Macedonian discourses
- Linguistic approach .............................................................................................. 87

....................................................................................... 87

-

(- ) ..................................................................... 97
Association method as opportunity for perception of differences
(Macedonian-Polish associations) .......................................................................... 97

,
- ............................................ 107
Macedonian Polish-parallels in phraseology ........................................................ 107


nomina instrumenti (- ) ............ 117
About the category nomina instrumenti (Macedonian-Polish parallel) ................. 117


- ............................................................... 125
Stylistics internet stylistics .................................................................................... 125

Katarzyna Kropiak
Comparative analysis of the politics of nation - building in Poland and Macedonia in
the post-war period. .............................................................................................. 135

......................................................................... 135

Daniel Wilk
Civil society in the transformation process: the examples of
Poland and Macedonia .......................................................................................... 151
:
....................................................................................................... 151


(19191941) ................................ 161
Exports of the Macedonian opium to Europe (1919-1941) ................................... 161

4
,

/ ................................................................................................. 167
Institute of hygiene in Skopje and its activites in the Kingdom of
SCS/Yugoslavia .................................................................................................... 167


. (1872-1903) .............. 177
From the life of the Polish ilinden uprising fighter Julius Caesar Rozenthal
(1872-1903) .......................................................................................................... 177


19 ............ 185
Communal condition in Macedonian cities at the end of the 19th century ............ 185


XVIII XIX .... 191
Contribution to the trade activity of ews in Macedonia in XVIII and XIX century ... 191



( ) ............................ 203
International opium conventions in the interwar period (parallels the ingdom of
Yugoslavia -the Republic of Poland ) .................................................................... 203



.................................................................................................................. 207
The conditions of the city economy in the Skopje region during the interwar period ... 207

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323.15 (495.6:=163.3)

MACEDONIANS IN GREECE COMPARISON WITH OTHER


NATIONAL, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Irena Stawowy-Kawka
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The article is devoted to assessment of the freedoms enjoyed by the Macedonians


who live in Greece, as well as comparison of their status with other religious and national
minorities, irrespective of whether they are recognised by the state or not. Athens, which
remains in the western European system of well-established democratic values, is not subject
to the same legal regulations as the other European Union countries which have signed and
ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, drawn up in
Strasbourg on 1 February 1995. It came into force on 1 February 1998 and was the first

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European legal act to comprehensively deal with these issues1, which, unfortunately, has not
been ratified by Greece. The problem is that the European Union countries have not adopted
a joint definition of minority, and the fact that Athens cites serious concerns of its political
nature, in particular, the threat to state security due to the influx of migrants, irredentist
tendencies or attempts to eliminate tensions among ethnicities allows it to use discriminatory
practices. In Greece, the minority policy has become clearly dependent on history, and is used
in the current foreign policy.
The problem of national and religious minorities is the subject of a work edited by
Richard Clogg2 and a monograph by Vincent Dontot3. National minorities in the Balkan
countries have been also discussed by Stojan Kiselinovski and Irena Stawowy-Kawka4, as
well as Hugh Poulton5. What is also important for the issues in question is the scientific work
dedicated to Muslims in Europe, including the chapter devoted to Greece, written by Anna
Parzymies6.

Greece has signed the basic international documents related to protection of the
rights of the national and religious minorities in its territory7. What guarantees the
respect for human rights in Greece is the constitution, which in Article 4 ensures
equality of citizens before the law as well as equality of women and men. Article 5
stipulates that everybody who lives in the territory of Greece enjoys full protection
of life, dignity and freedom, irrespective of their nationality, race, language, religious
and political beliefs. Their personal freedom is inviolable, it is forbidden to restrict
it in any manner when it comes to movement and settlement, except for situations in
which it could prevent a crime, and only on the basis of a courts verdict. This Article
also gives citizens the right to peaceful public assembly, which may be forbidden
only when there is a very significant risk for the public security, as well as risk
of public or economic life being disrupted8. Article 12 of the Greek constitution

1
The text of the Convention: http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/
guideminorities8en.pdf, [access: 22.12. 2014], Out of the 47 members of the Council of
Europe, currently 39 countries are parties to the Convention. It has been signed but not
ratified by four countries: Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxembourg. The convention has
not been signed by: Andorra, France, Monaco and Turkey, as of 2011.
2
R. Clogg, Minorities in Greece. Aspects of a Plural Society, London 2002.
3
V. Dontot, Les populations turcophones et pomaques de Grece dans les relations Greco-
Turques , Athens 1997.
4
. , . -, (XXI ), ,
2004.
5
H. Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, Minority Rights
Publications, London 1993.
6
Muzumanie w Europie, A. Parzymies (ed.), Dialog, Warszawa 2005, pp. 3553.
7
In Greece, two very important international documents which protect minority rights
are not in force: Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
8
Greek constitution of 1975, as amended in 1986 and 2001: www.ypes.gr and www.

8
. .,

guarantees the possibility of establishing non profit associations and unions under
the applicable law9.
In addition, the constitution guarantees citizens the freedom of speech, press,
expression and bans censorship, except for cases in which the Christian or other
recognised religion is defamed, the president is defamed, classified information
which may pose a threat to the states security and defence or obscene content is
disclosed.
However, irrespective of the norm adopted, international conventions and
individual articles in the constitution, it is hard to say that Greece respects them.
What constitutes the basis of the states policy is the assumption that an ethnically
homogeneous country is built by the Greek nation, which believes in the Orthodox
faith and speaks the Greek language. Due to such a policy, no official statistics on
minorities are kept, and researchers interested in this issue assume that religious
and national minorities currently account for 5 to 10 per cent of the total number of
Greeces inhabitants. For instance, Hugh Poulton says that the contemporary Greece
is the sum of various civilisations and nations:
After some time, majority of the population maybe 95 per cent will be
ethnically Greek, and this is the fact which frequently cannot be explained, in
addition significant hellenisation of the minorities takes place Vlachs, Turks,
Pomaks, Roma, Albanians, Macedonians and others10.
On the other hand, Tadeusz Czekalski says:
Greece is the only Balkan country which does not recognise national minorities
in its territory, despite the fact that the percentage of the people who speak other
language than Greek is estimated at over 10 per cent of the population11.
The reason for which Greece does not recognise various national, religious and
language groups was the willingness to consolidate the independence regained in
1830, and then the unification of the provinces, which demonstrated various level
of national awareness as well as civilisational and cultural development. In the
Balkans, where solving ethnic conflicts has frequently taken very drastic forms,
Greeks, who wanted to pre-empt such events, resorted to various methods, such as
exchange of populations, change of surnames, nationalist education, and themselves
used various methods, e.g. exchange of populations and change of surnames. Thus
they declared the ethnic unity of their country. Not only the Greek state, but also
society has a negative attitude both to national and religious minorities, as well as
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

II

All national and religious minorities in Greece can be divided in the following
way: national minorities, i.e. those which identify themselves with the nation in any

syntagma.idx.gr, [access: 22.12.2014].


9
Ibidem.
10
H. Poulton, The Balkans, p. 175.
11
J. Bonarek, T. Czekalski, S. Sprawski, S. Turlej, Historia Grecji, Krakw 2005, pp. 643.

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of the nation states usually a neighbouring one:: Turks, Albanians, Macedonians,


Bulgarians, Jews; ethnic and language minorities which do not have their own
country: Roma, Vlachs; and religious minorities: Muslims: (approx.120 thousand),
Catholics (approx. 45-50 thousand), Protestants (including Evangelicals, Methodists
and Seventh-day Adventists approx. 20 thousand), Jehovahs Witnesses (approx.
70 thousand) and Orthodox Christians of the old rite (so-called Old Believers from
700 thousand to l million)12. The only religious minority whose rights have been
officially recognised in Greece for a long time is the Muslims who live in Western
Thrace. They gained their rights under the Treaty of Lausanne of 192313.
Others are refused the rights enjoyed by minorities, and find it hard to apply
for their legal status. The main aim of the article will be to prove that Greece, being
a European Union Member State, denies Macedonians, as well as other national,
ethnic and religious minorities (except for Muslims in Western Thrace), the official
right of recognition. It leads to limited possibility of political and social participation
among minorities and faster assimilation.
Greece does not keep official minority statistics14, and the data are estimates.
Furthermore, there is no extensive literature devoted to that subject, as official Greek
studies present the thesis that there are no national minorities in the territory of the
country. What is allowed, however, is the position which accepts existence of a
religious minority officially recognised by the state followers of Islam15. Muslims
in Greece have the right to publish their magazines, as well as establish cultural and
educational organisations. Voice of Thrace has been printed in Xanthi (since 1981),
as well as Passing and Truth in Komotini (since 1967). When it comes to Islamic
organisations, associations and societies, the following ones operate: Muslim Union,
Muslim Youth Association, Organisation of Muslim Teachers from Western Thrace
and others. All of them are Muslim rather than Turkish in their nature. Attempts
12
Minority Rights Group International, global classification of minorities and tribal
people - Greece: Review 2007,www.unhcr.org, [access: 22.12.2014], see also: The Catholic
Church in Greece, www.interkrit.net/ccc/004.htm, [access: 22.12.2014].
13
The Greek-Turkish population exchange agreement was signed on 30 January 1923.
Whereas Greece signed the peace treaty with Turkey on 24 July 1923, the border delineated
between both countries did not apply to the Dodecanese (which, at that time, belonged to
Italy), and its course was determined by the peace treaty signed in Paris on 10 February 1947.
14
The latest census conducted in 1951, during which respondents could inform about
their religious and national affiliation, showed that in Greece there were: 116,650 Muslims,
24,965 Catholics, 4,954 Protestants, 6,325 Jews. In terms of languages, it was as follows:
92,443 Turkophones, 41,017 Slavophones, 39,885 Vlachs, 22,736 Albanians, 18,671
Pomacs, 7,429 Roma.
15
The most frequently quoted Greek authors include: L. Divani, Ellada Kai Mionotites,
Ateny 1995; Ch. Rozakis, K. Tsitselikis, D. Christopoulos, The Place o fthe Mufti in the Greek
State of Low, in: To meionotiko fainomeno stin Ellada; Mia simvoli ton koinotikon epistimon,
Athens 1997; L. Divani, Ellada Kai Meionotites: To systima diethnous prostasisa tis
Koinonias ton Ethnon, Athens 1995; A. Pollis, Greek National Identity: Religious Minorities,
Rights and Europe Normsan , in: R.Christopoulos (ed.), Nomika zitimata thriskeftikis eterotitas
stin Ellada, Athens 1999; D. Constatine, Religion, Civil Society and Democracy in Orthodox
Greece, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 2004, no. 6 (1).

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at creating Turkish organisations and their operation are criticised and forbidden.
Courts argue that the adjective Turkish refers to inhabitants of Turkey, and cannot
be used for Greek citizens, whereas using it to refer to Greek Muslims is a threat to the
public order. For this reason, even well-established associations and groupings, such
as: Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace (Bat Trakya Trk retmenler
Birlii) established in 1936, Turkish Union in Xanthi (Iske Trk Birlii), established
in 1927 and others have been made illegal because of their name16. What concerns
Greeks is the contemporary conservative movements, even certain forms of extreme
fundamentalism, which demonstrate solidarity with extreme Islam, which can be
explained by the fact that Turks from Western Thrace have not experienced the
Europeanisation conducted in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk.
Muslims have the right to education at 279 schools the Turkish language is
taught by 770 teachers17 (it is estimated that the primary, post-primary and secondary
schools are attended by 11-14 thousand students). Furthermore, two Koranic schools,
which are financed by the state, operate in Komotini and Echinos. In 2013, during a
conference devoted to the Treaty of Lausanne, riots broke out when a lecturer was
refused the right to use Turkish18.
The same rights enjoyed by Turks are enjoyed by Pomacs, too. Their population is
estimated at 35-45 thousand19. They live mainly in Xanthi in the Rhodope Mountains
and in the villages along the river Marica. They use a language which is classified as
a South Slavic Bulgarian dialect with significant influence of Turkish. Since the 1990s
Pomacs have organised festivals of their culture. They do not have their own schools
or magazines, as officially the language used by the group does not exist. However, in
2002, the authorities allowed printing a Greek-Pomac dictionary, which was expected
to discourage Pomacs from declaring themselves as Turks. Nevertheless, as Muslims,
they are covered by the Turkish language education at the primary and secondary level.
There is, however, a discussion on the correctness of that process.
There is a similar problem with the Roma. They have the status of a language
minority, but it only applies to the Roma who live in Western Thrace, because the
provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 apply to them, as well as to Turks and
Pomacs. It is worth remembering that resettlements which were decided when the
Treaty was signed did not cover the Muslim population in the Greek Western Thrace.
The number of Roma people is estimated at 150 thousand. However, Amnesty
International estimates that there are 250-300 thousand of them.20Although, it is
16
A. Parzymies, Muzumanie w Europie, p. 47.
17
Cf. Ministry of Education and Confessions, http:/www.ypepth.Gr/en ec home.htm,
[access: 22.12.2014]. Cf. also C. , . -, ..., p. 85.
18
J. Gajda, Turcy bez prawa do uywania ojczystego jzyka, http://balkanistyka.org/
turcy-w-grecji-bez-prawa-do-uzywania-ojczystego-jezyka/, [access: 22.12.2014].
19
Ibidem, p. 87. The population data, 3035 thousand, based on the 1994 research and
similar ones, come from the Greek Helsinki Committee The Pomacs General data on the
language. In 2004, the data provided by Pomacs themselves suggest that their number in
Greece is approximately 40 thousand.
20
L. Divani says that when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the group was 3.5
thousand strong; idem, Ellada, p. 70. The number of Roma people in Greece is estimated

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very difficult to determine the actual number of the Roma who live in Greece, not
only due to the fact that they often change the place of living, but because of the
fact that no official research is conducted in this area. What is characteristic of the
Pomacs and Roma is fluidity and relativity in terms of defining their nationality.
They very often declare themselves are Turks, and, what is more, use Turkish not
only for religious purposes, but also on an everyday basis. This is connected with
the higher status of Turks enjoyed in the Muslim community, and the possibility to
take advantage of privileges, e.g. sending children to schools where Turkish is the
language of instruction.
It should be pointed out that the Orthodox faith in Greece has a guaranteed
status of the nationwide religion, which dominates and has a very strong position.
The interest of the Greek Orthodox Church, being the entity which spells out and
guards the national interest, prevails over the need to protect the rights of religious
minorities.

III

Macedonians are a national group called Slavophones () or currently


Skopjians () in Greece. According to the census conducted in Greece,
which indicated existence of national minorities, i.e. the one from 1951, the country
was inhabited by 41,017 Slavophones, that is Macedonians, whereas independent
researchers believe that as many as 150-300 thousand of them live in Greece.21 Most
of them are concentrated in the following prefectures: Florina (Mac.Lerin), Kastoria
(Mac. Kostur) and northern part of Kozne, (Mac. Koani).
The Macedonians in Greece are refused to be awarded the national identity.
What complicates the situation is the fact that not all people from that group identify
themselves with the Macedonians who live today in the Republic of Macedonia.
Some of them have been assimilated (mainly the young generation), declare only the
language identity, and do not aspire to be granted the status of a national minority.
Others do not define their identity as Macedonian but local one Slavic-Macedonian
(), and just part of them identify themselves with the contemporary
nation from the Republic of Macedonia (they use the term Makedones to define
their national status)22. Christian Voss calls the Macedonians in Greece a hidden

by H. Poulton, The Balkans, p. 188, at approximately 140 thousand, out of which about 45
thousand are nomads, cf. Amnesty International Report of 8.04. 2014, http://amnesty.org.pl/
no_cache/archiwum/aktualnosci-strona-artykulu/article/8166.html, [access:: 22.12. 2014].
21
Cf.. J. Byczkowski, Mniejszoci narodowe w Europie 19451974, Opole 1976,
p. 56 their number is estimated at approx. 150 thousand, similarly as . ,
(19131995), 2000, p. 48,90, 94 and .
, . -, ..., p. 75 for 160 thousand. On the other hand,
H.J. Axt, Macedonien: ein Streit um Namenoder ein Konflikt vor dem Asbruch?, Europa
Archiw. Zeitschrift fr Intrnationale Politik, 10.02.1993, p. 68, says that the number of the
Macedonians in Greece ranges from 150 to 300 thousand.
22
GHM, Minority Rights Group Greece (MRG - G), Report about Compliance with
the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of the National Minorities,

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. .,

language group, but the group is hidden not only at the language level lack of
access to education in the Macedonian language, to publications, radio and TV
programmes, but also at the socio-economic one, i.e. lack of equal access to political,
economic and social goods for this group of people23.
During World War II and Greek Civil War (1946-1949), Macedonians cooperated
with the communist movement with changing approval of the Communist Party of
Greece (KPG), depending on the political situation. Tito publicly announced that
he could not remain indifferent to the persecution of Macedonians in Greece. The
diplomatic relations established between Athens and Belgrade after the war were
suddenly broken off when in January 1946 Belgrade recalled the Yugoslavian
ambassador from Greece, when Yugoslavia started cooperation with the KPG,
which fought for power. Due to the fact that the main forces of Greek communists
were concentrated in the north of the country, i.e. in Macedonia, it was important
to win the hearts and minds of the Macedonian population organised in NOF
National Liberation Front. In October 1946,
the talks between the representatives of KPJ and KPG led to an agreement on
cooperation of the party and military structures of NOF Macedonians from Aegean
Macedonia. On 21 November, NOF units were incorporated into DAG. On 19
August 1947, in statutory act no. 5, the DAG Headquarters awarded to Macedonians
wide-ranging cultural and educational rights, including the right to teaching in their
language. In the years 1947-1949, as many as 87 schools were opened in Aegean
Macedonia, which were attended by approximately 10 thousand children taught
in the Macedonian language24. Furthermore, Macedonians established cultural and
educational societies, published magazines, organised performances, and sang folk
songs in their language. The fact that Macedonians were granted the right confirming
their national status was so important that during the civil war in the years 1946-1949
they fought en masse on the side of the KPG. According to Macedonian sources,
14 thousand out of 30 thousand DAG participants were Macedonians. They fought
in organised structures: NOF, AF (Mac.
Womens Anti-fascist Front) and NOMS (Mac.
- National Liberation Youth Union) 25
Their mass participation on the side of the KPG during the civil war raised
concern among numerous Greeks. What was also incomprehensible in Greece
was the division of Macedonia into: Vardar, Aegean and Pirin Macedonia, as
used by Yugoslavian researchers. All foreigners living close to the Yugoslavian
border were recognised as undesirable after the war. In 1953, decree no. 2536
was adopted, which allowed new settlers, with healthy national awareness, i.e.
Greek one, to come to the northern territories26. The decree was anti-Macedonian
www.greekhelsinki.gr, [access: 15.03.2014].
23
Ch. Voss, Language use and Language Attitudes of a Phantom Minority Bilingual
Northern Greece and the Concept of hidden minoritieshttp://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/
blob.html?type=html&serial=1075733088324,
24
. , . -, ..., p. 73.
25
. , (19131989), 1990, p. 138.
26
Poulton, The Balkans, p. 178. The decree was anti-Turkish in its nature.

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in its nature. In that period, Macedonians were forbidden to use their language in
public life, and at Orthodox churches they were obliged to use exclusively Greek.
During Papagoss rule, all Macedonians were removed from official positions
(public ones) and passport-free border movement between Greece and Yugoslavia
was suspended27. As early as 1959, the authorities in the towns and villages near
Edeesa, Kastria or Cagliari required Macedonians to officially confirm they do not
speak their language. The process of assimilation began, which proceeded relatively
fast, because it facilitated access to education and jobs, and, in consequence, social
advancement. Although the biggest repressions towards Macedonian populations
took place until 1974, the introduction of the democratic system did not significantly
change Macedonians fate.
However, one cannot forget to mention the consequences of the failure to, thus
far, regulate inter-state issues for citizens of Greece Macedonians or, as Greeks call
them Slavophones as well as emigrants after the civil war in Greece (1946-1949).
Lack of agreement in this respect adversely affects the situation of Macedonian
associations as well as social and political organisations, which the Greek authorities
deny the minority status. After the civil war in Greece, Macedonians who decided
to emigrate were deprived of citizenship under Article 19 of the Code of Greek
Nationality, which was completely abolished as late as 1998. In 1982, Athens made
a decision which allowed repatriation of Greeks who took part in the civil war on the
communists side to the country (excluding Macedonians). According to Dimitrias
Christopopulos and Konstatinos Tsitselikis, this was done to enable only Greeks to
take advantage of that opportunity, rather than those who declare themselves to be
Macedonians28. Such practices are used towards persons who are from Greece, but are
not of Greek nationality, which violates the constitutional right of citizens equality
and Greeces obligations in the area of protection of national minority rights. These
persons, who are holders of Macedonian passports or passports of other countries
but have not been born in Greece, often find it difficult to enter its territory. This can
be exemplified by the events of 19 July 1998. On 16-19 July, the Global Reunion
of Children of Refugees from Greece after the civil war was organised in Skopje to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of those events. On the last day of the Reunion,
some of the participants wanted to visit the families and places of their origin as
part of the celebrations. Out of 161 participants of the Reunion, 51 were refused
entry to Greece, whereas 20 others resigned from an attempt to cross the border
due to the lack of visas. There were citizens of Canada, Australia, Czech Republic
and Hungary, who were refused the entry, e.g. due to the fact that (according to the
Greek authorities) they incorrectly wrote the place of birth in the passport (they used
Macedonian names rather than the official Greek ones). Up to now, such apparently
simple issues as the possibility to visit the place of ones birth or graves of the loved
ones have not been regulated. In order to visit them, one needs to be a Greek or
submit a declaration on Greek descent, i.e. being born in Greece.

Ibidem, p. 179.
27

D. Christopopulos, K. Tsitselikis, Legal Aspects of religious and linguistic Otherness


28

in Greece. Treatment of Minorities and Homogeneis in Greece: Relics and Challenges, www.
kemo.gr, [access: 15.03.2015].

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. .,

Greece has developed a number of categories and criteria to divide the population
on which it depends, to a significant extent, whether a given person has a chance to
regain citizenship. These authorities take a hostile view of cultural and educational
associations which promote the Macedonian cultural heritage and contacts with
Skopje. As early as 1981, a list of academic institutions whose diplomas were
not recognised in Greece was created. Among them was Ss. Cyril and Methodius
University of Skopje. In theory, all cultural and educational institutions enjoy
constitutional guarantees i.e. freedom, but in fact any references to the Macedonian
affiliation attract overt disapproval and even repressive actions not only on the part
of official elements, but also Greek society, which considers them unpatriotic.
One of the fighters for the rights of the Macedonian minority is a Greek clergyman
Nikodimos Tsarknias, who belongs to the leaders of the Movement for Protection of
Macedonians Rights in Greece, created in 1989. When Tsarknias demanded that
this minority be allowed to keep its culture, tradition and language, he was punished
by the bishop of Flrina, who dismissed him from his duties for disobedience and
publications in the newspaper Ta Moylena. Later, he was restored to office for
some time, only to be dismissed again in 1991. Tsarknias joined the Macedonian
Orthodox Church, which is considered to be schismatic, and was on numerous
occasions convicted of illegally holding clergy functions and wearing the cassock29.
In 2001, the Macedonian Orthodox Church in Greece was established in the town of
Aridea (Central Macedonia).
According to Evangelos Kofos, what does not raise controversy is the existence
of a group of Slavs in northern Greece (this fact is not denied), but the use of the term
Macedonian when referring to that minority and the language used by it. Kofos
wrote: the fact that the population of the Slavonic descent wants to (...) function as
an ethnic or national minority is not a problem; the problem is the name they have
chosen in the Greek language Makedones by which to identify themselves
in Greece30. Consent for such an understanding of the term Makedonos would
be tantamount to depriving over two million Greeks living in the northern part of
the country province of Macedonia of their regional identity. This prevailing
conviction that Macedonias society is homogeneous in its Greek part is common.
The situation of Macedonians in Greece improved in 1990s. Mainly thanks
to democratic European institutions and regulations which require protection of
minority rights in its territory, which apply to Greece.
Officially, the Macedonian political party, which operates since 1994, is Vinoito
(Rainbow), earlier registered as a cultural organisation. Its members and supporters
take part in nationwide elections, and on this basis their number is estimated at 10
thousand persons.31 In the 1994 election to the European Parliament, the party received
7,263 votes, i.e. 5.7 % of the votes cast in Flrina prefecture (). It is accused of
29
US State Department, International Religious Report 2005. Greece, www.state.gov/g/
drl/irf/2005, [access: 15.03.2015].
30
E. Kofos, The Unresolved Difference over the Name: a Greek Perspective, in: Athens
- Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis, (ed.) idem, Athens 2005, p. 132.
31
GHM, Minority Rights Group Greece (MRG - G) op. cit., www.kemo.gr, [access:
15.03.2015].

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separatists tendencies, illegal appropriation of the name Macedonia and willingness


to tear the province carrying this name away from Greece. A signboard in Macedonian
language placed on the Vinoito building was removed by the law enforcement
bodies. That case ended up at the Strasbourg Tribunal, which adjudicated that Greece
violated the European Convention on Human Rights32. In 2010, Vinoito opened its
second seat in the city of Edessa. Human rights organisations inform about cases of
exerting pressure by local authorities, which is expected to prevent representatives
of the Macedonian minority from gaining access to media, e.g. printing houses
received suggestions that the publishers of one of the few Macedonian magazines Ta
Moylena, published since 1993 as Zora, are devoid of patriotism and cooperate
with agents from Skopje. At the beginning of 2010, the following newspapers were
published for the first time: Zadruga and Nova Zora (20 thousand copies).
What was an important event was the publication, on the initiative of Vinoito
party, of a Greek-Macedonian (- -
) and Macedonian-Greek dictionary with explanation by Centre Maurits
Coppieters (CMC)33, a European political foundation with its seat in Brussels,
together with the House of Macedonian Culture. The first volume was published
in 2009, whereas the second one in 2011. The fight for registration of the House
of Macedonian Culture was started by the organisation in 1989 and has not come
to a positive end until today, despite the fact that Macedonian obtained a positive
judgment regarding recognition of their organisation from the Strasbourg Court,
which on 5 December 2003 decided that Greece violated Article 11 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of association. Despite
the Courts verdict, the problems with the registration of the House of Macedonian
Culture are due from the fact that its name includes the word Macedonian. On the
other hand, in 2009, the Greek authorities registered the Cultural and Educational
Movement in the city of Edessa (Mac. Voden).
Today, despite Athens assurances that it respects international human rights
standards, one should conclude that the situation of the Macedonian minority in
Greece is bad. Certain hope may be connected with the possibility of joining the
European Union by the Republic of Macedonia. However, until the Greek veto
has not been lifted in this respect, the Macedonian minority will be a hostage of
historical reasons and prejudices which accumulate. The stalemate will last until
Greece decides to start genuine dialogue and discontinues the sham action taken
so far to please the public, whereas Macedonia makes concessions regarding its
constitutional name.

32
The lawsuit was filed by Pavlos Vaskopoulos and Petros Vessiliadis, when they were
accused of sowing discord among the local populations, Article 192 of the Greek penal code,
in connection with placing the organisations signboard in the Macedonian language. The
case was resolved on 27 May 2004, cf. The European Court of Human Rights - Chamber
judgment - Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece (application no. 74989/01), https://wcd.coe.
int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=927761&Site=COE, [access: 15.03.2015].
33
Centre Maurits Coppieters (CMC) was established in 2007, and is recognised by
the European Parliament as a political foundation at the European level. The House of the
Macedonian Culture is, among other organisations, its full member.

16
. .,

Albanians who have lived in Greece for generations are called Arvanites or
Albanophones. This national group is not recognised by Greeks. They create small
pockets of population near Corinth, Argos, Beocia and Attica, as well as the Ionian
Islands and Thrace. As far as their number is concerned, researchers estimate that
140 thousand of them live in Central Greece. In Western Thrace there are about 30
thousand Albanians.34 They use various Albanian dialects (southern) ones, which
are generally believed to be mutually incomprehensible. They speak Greek on a daily
basis. Their situation can be compared to that of Vlachs. The assimilation policy as
well as migration to big cities makes contact with ones environment difficult. In the
1980s, the Albanian community intensified its cultural activity, thanks to which a
few associations were created, e.g. Arvanite Union of Greece (
), which publishes bimonthly Besa, Arvanite Culture Centre (
), Association of Corinth Arvanites (
) and others. Their activity is, however, limited. Another group of Albanians
in Greece includes Chams. Their name comes from the area they inhabit in Epirus, i.e.
Chameria (Alb. amria, Gr. ), which, in its majority, is located in Greece,
in Tesprotia prefecture. It is an area of conflict between Athens and Tirana due to the
issue of mutual treatment of the national minorities living in this part of Greece, but
also in southern Albania. During the Ottoman Empire, Epirus was inhabited mainly
by Albanians as well as Greeks and others. During the Greek national revival, Athens
became interested in that area; in addition, Greeks never treated Albanians as a nation
capable of creating its own state. The creation of Albania in 1913 and the division
of Epirus into two parts under the Protocol of Florence adopted in the same year
deepened Greeces discontentment, in particular due to the fact that two big cities
which Athens aspired to ended up on the Albanian side. These were: Korce (Alb.
Kor) and Gjirokaster (Alb. Gjirokastr). Greeks used economic and demographic
arguments to show that this area belonged to them. Due to the division of Epirus with
the Albanian-Greek border, a bigger part of the area, called Chameria by Albanians,
ended up in Greece. Today it is very difficult to estimate the number of Albanian-
speaking population living in Chameria. This is due to the fact that Greece does not
recognise this population as Albanian and does not gather statistics reflecting the
actual state of affairs. American organisation Democratic Cameria League estimates
the number of Chams at approximately 100 thousand35, whereas the Organization
for the European Minorities at 65-100 thousand.36 In the past, Greece pursued a
policy similar to the one in Macedonia in order to reduce the number of Macedonians
in that region. During World War II, Albanian Muslims supported Italy, for which
they were punished according to Albanian calculations, approximately 2-5 thousand
of them died, and the rest were forced to escape to neighbouring Albania. Greeks
allowed followers of the Orthodox Church to stay. After the war, Tirana demanded

P. Hill, Mehrsprachkeitenp. 64; P. Trudgill, On Dialect: Social and Geographical


34

Perspectives, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 135.


Organisations website: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMJ7R6RJJfQ, [access:
35

15.03.2015].
36
Cf. http://www.eurominority.org/version/eng/minotity-detail.asp?id_pays=19&id_
minorites=gr-alba, also : http://archive.today/www.eurominority.org, [access: 15.03.2015].

17
60 2 2016 Irena Stawowy-Kawka

that this population be allowed to return to the houses they abandoned in Greece, but
to no avail37. In 1991, the Albanian diplomacy estimated its financial claims from
the Greek state at USD 350 million, as of 1945, i.e. 2.5 billion at the actual prices.38
In addition, the property lost by Albanians refugees from Chameria and even
cultural autonomy of Albanians in Chameria was demanded for. In 1992, in the town
of Konispoli, located in northern Chameria in the territory of Albania, a monument
for the victims of the genocide perpetrated on Chams was unveiled. There, each year
Albanians organise celebrations to commemorate the events of World War II, death
of their compatriots and their time as refugees. The National Political Association
Chameria (Shoqria Politike Atdhetare amria), established on 10 January 1991
also celebrates Chams holiday on 27 June each year. Whenever a politician from
Athens arrives in Tirana, a group of Chams protest to remind him of their unsolved
problems in Greece. What exacerbates the problem is the fact that Greek society, up
to now, has not come to terms with the loss of northern Epirus, and it is common
that its inhabitants are called Voreiepirotes (). After the compulsory
atheisation of Albania during the communist rule, in the period of transformation it
was Greek clergy which took over the initiative to revive the Orthodox Church in
Albania, and the Greek minority in Albania tried to create party structures of Greek
nature, such as: Omonia (Unity), Human Rights Protection Party etc. There were
numerous incidents on the Tirana-Athens line until 1996, when both countries signed
the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. It guaranteed, among other things, legalisation
of stay of thousands of Albanians working until then without a permit in Greece,
and the possibility to open schools in Greek language in the territory of northern
Epirus. It is difficult to predict what the Greek-Albanian relations in the future will be
like, and how the policy towards Chams in Greece and Voreiepirotes in Albania will
influence them. Today Greeks in Albania have their schools, support of Greek clergy
at Orthodox churches, and they try to create their own political parties as well as
cultural and educational associations. On the other hand, Greece does not want to hear
about starting a discussion about creating a school with Albanian as the language of
instruction in Filiates (Alb. Filat), which its residents demand. For Greeks the problem
of Chams does not exist, and Chams aspirations are only supported in Albania. What
is, however, important is the support offered to Tirana from Greece, when it applied
to become a NATO member, and Greeces positive attitude to Albanians in their
aspirations to membership in the European Union.
Vlachs are an ethnic group which is not recognised in Greece. At home and in
their environment they use dialects which belong to the group of Romance languages,
but they have not developed a language norm for the whole community. In Greece,
they are usually divided into two groups: Aromanians (, Gr. ) and
Megleno-Romanians ( ), although because of differences in

37
For details of this issue cf. M. Vickers, The Cham Issue: Albanian National and
Property Claims in Greece, 2002, http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts21/AH2002_1.html,
[access: 15.03.2015].
38
T. Czekalski, Pnocny Epir i Czamuria - wspczesne oblicze sporu grecko-
albaskiego, in: Nard - pastwo - Europa rodkowa w XIX i XX wieku, (ed.) A. Patek i W.
Rojek, Krakw 2006, p. 312.

18
. .,

dialects other divisions are also used. For instance, those who have a lot of Albanian
influences in their language are called Arvanito-Vlachs ()39. The
estimated number of Vlachs in Greece varies. The Greek census of 1951 said that
39,855 Vlachs and 7,424 Romanians live in the territory of Greece. These numbers
were understated. Most researchers estimate that population at 120-300 thousand40
and believe that, in the Balkans, Vlachs are the most numerous group in Greece.
These differences result from the fact that Athens is not interested in promoting
multiculturalism in its territory on the contrary, it pursues a policy of uniformisation
and assimilation of ethnic and national groups. Most Vlachs identify themselves
as Greeks, and they fulfil their political aspirations as part of the Greek state,
representing the Greek raison detat. They often hold high government or public
administration positions. Some Vlachs Megleno-Romanians have immigrated to
Romania and adopted the Romanian national identity.
Currently, the Vlach dialects does not enjoy official status, and Vlachs are not
covered by teaching in their native tongue at any level of the education. A Vlach
dialects course was organised at Saloniki University. Despite that, Vlachs are
bilingual. The young generation, especially those who live in big cities and do not
have contact with their community on a daily basis use it only for contacts with
the elderly or at home. Local Vlach associations operate in areas where bigger
Vlach communities are located. In addition, festivals are organised, and recordings
of songs in Vlach dialects are collected. The most well-known are festivals in
the village of Metsovo () which gather Vlachs from the neighbouring
countries. That revival of activity took place in the 1980s thanks to the European
Community. In 1984, the The PanhellenicFederation of Vlach Cultural Associations
was created ( ). On 8-9
September 2012, the organisation organised the 13th Vlach Symposium devoted
to the tradition, music, folk culture and dances of Vlachs from the Struma valley,
which was attended by over 1,000 people. In 2002, there were 29 registered local
associations in the territory of Greece41. They include such cultural associations, as:
, and others.

39
They are also known as Ffrasheriots or Feasheriot Vlachs ( or
) because of the place in Northern Epirus in Albania Frashr.
40
V.B. Sotirovi, The Balkan Vlachs an Extinguishing Ethnolinguistic Group, p.
12, http://www.sotirovic.blog.com, [access: 10.03.2015] estimates the number of Vlachs in
Greece at 120 thousand. Cf.. P. Hill, Mehrsprachkeiten in Sdosteuropa , Zeitschrift fr
Balkanologie, J.1990/26, estimates the number of Vlachs at 150 300 thousand, p. 56.
41
26/8/2002, http://www.aromanian.net/greece.
html, [access: 10.03. 2015]. Thed Kahl estimates the total number of similar associations registered
in Greece at 200. Cf. T. Kahl, Aromanians in Greece: Minority or Vlach-speaking Greeks? http://
www.farsarotul.org/nl27 1.htm from the Farsarotul Newsletter, [access: 10.03.2015].

19
60 2 2016 Irena Stawowy-Kawka

***

The national and ethnic minorities in Greece, i.e. Macedonians, Turks, Albanians,
Vlachs, Roma have legally guaranteed freedoms which allow them to establish their
respective organisations, cultural associations and publishing houses using the mother
tongue, provided that they do not indicate their national character.42 The attempts at
establishing national Macedonian, Turkish or Albanian political organisations and
cultural associations raise objections. The lack of such a possibility prevents them
from having legal capacity, i.e. active participation in Greeces political and social
life. In this respect complaints submitted at the Court of Human Rights do not help,
as they are not respected by the Greek authorities.
As is the case with Vlachs, Macedonians in Greece are also not perceived by the
Greek authorities and Greeks themselves as a safe group not claiming any territorial
rights. On the contrary, they have gained the reputation of those who continue
thinking about a change of borders and stealing the Hellenic culture and its heroes,
which does influence the situation of this group in Greece. However, ever more often
the EU countries indicate the need for Greece to become more involved in protection
of the rights of national, ethnic and religious minorities, as well as adapting its law in
such a way as to ensure full compliance with the fundamental freedoms and human
rights. What is also disapproved of is the Greek governments failure to implement
the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

42
Cf. Gay McDouglas: HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL Tenth session Agenda item 3.
Report of the independent expert on minority issues, Gay McDougall, MISSION TO GREECE
(816 September 2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/10session/A.
HRC.10.11.Add.3.pdf, [access: 10.03.2015].

20
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

930.85:378.014-5 (438:497.7)

POLISH TRADITIONS IN THE MACEDONIAN CULTURE


,
. ,

,
- ,
. ,

Abstract

In this article we traced the relations between Macedonia and Poland through the
information about the character of the Polish university studies in Macedonia at the University
St Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philology Blazhe Koneski in the period of 55 years.
Throughout the following points:
1. History of relations between Polish and Macedonian slavists
2. Stages of university Polish studies in Macedonia
3. Scientific activities of university Polish studies in Macedonia
3.1. Polish-Macedonian and Macedonian-Polish linguistic ties in coordination
MANU
4. University Polish studies in Macedonia on Internet
5. Translation work of university Polish studies in Macedonia
5.1. Polish studies Translation Laboratory at the Faculty of Philology Blaze
Koneski
5.2. The role of the University Polish studies due the popularization of Polish
literature translated into Macedonian and vice versa
6. Teaching activities of the University Polish studies in Macedonia and care for the
graduated students
7. Guest professors from Polish universities
8. Supporters of the University Polish studies in Macedonia in period of 55 years

21
60 2 2016 ,

Throughout this overview we can see the richness of scientific contacts in the past and
open perspectives in these contacts in the future, between Macedonian and Polish slavists and
translators at the university level.

Keywords: Polish, Macedonian, history of the linguistics scientific relations, polish


university studies.

1.


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462-464. Mieczysaw Maecki, Dwie gwary macedoskie. Sucho i Wysoka w Solunskiem. I.
Texty; II Sownik. Krakw 1934; 1936.

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29
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

323.15 (497.7: =163.41) 2001

SERBIAN MINORITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF


MACEDONIA1AFTER 2001 MAIN ISSUES

C
2001 -

Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska
PhD, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at
the Jagiellonian University in Cracow

( )
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2001
.

1
The official name of the Macedonian state is the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia FYROM due to an ongoing dispute over the name of the state with Greece,
which does not want to agree to Macedonia using the name: Republic of Macedonia.
However, in everyday language, in the media or even in politicians public speeches we can
hear the name: Republic of Macedonia. So, the author of this article is using that name in
the text or more simply: Macedonia. Analysis around the name dispute could be fund also:
Maciej Kawka, Pawe Paneta, Dyskursy o Macedonii, Krakw 2013, 6068, Irena Stawowy-
Kawka, Albaczycy w Macedonii 19442001, Krakw 2014, 211212.

31
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

: , ,
.

When looking at Serbian minorities, the Serbian diaspora or Serbian people who
live anywhere outside the homeland the Republic of Serbia we should take into
account the dynamic changes in the situation of this nation during the last 30 years.
Before the breakup of Yugoslavia,Serbs lived all over the world, while keeping
in touch with the homeland. They lived, among others, in Western Europe, North
America or Australia. The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) brought a new order tothe region. New countries were created with new
borders, where the status of nationalities changed, includingthat of the Serbs, who
had lived in a multi-ethnic Yugoslav state. In fact, the Serbs were the most numerous
nation in Yugoslavia, accounting for 8,526,872 of 23,528,230Yugoslav citizens in
1991, or 36,2% of the population. In the Yugoslav republics, exceptingtheRepublic
of Serbia, lived nearly 2 million Serbian people, all having the status of a constitutive
nation2. After the breakup of Yugoslavia (and Serbia and Montenegro in 2006) these
people became a minority in 4 out of 5 ex-Yugoslav republics(Slovenia, Croatia,
Montenegro and Macedonia); they retain the status of a constitutive nation only in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (with Bosniaks and Croats).
This article is a part of wider researches into thecondition of the Serbian nation
located within former Yugoslavia. In this text there is presented a comprehensive
picture of the position of this nation on theborders of the Republic of Macedonia after
2001. Thisturning point has been defined because of a very important occurrence,
which was the signing of the Framework Agreement. This document had general
importance for all minorities in Macedonia, among them the Serbs, whose situation
started to change just after 2001.
After the Second World War, communist Yugoslaviawascomposed of six federal
republics. One of thesewas the Republic of Macedonia as a separate administrative
area, where the percentage of Serbs regularly grew until the disintegration of
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In 1953 the number of Serbian people in Macedonia was
35,000, and in 1971 46,000. In 1994 three years after proclamation of independence
by Macedonia this number felt to 40,228, an effect not only of emigration, but also
assimilation. According to the census of 2002 there were 35,939 of Serbs within the
Macedonian state (less than 2% of the entireMacedonian population). The census of
2011 has not been finished, but in the opinion of Milutin Stani activist and chairman
of the Serbian Cultural and Information Center Spona other statisticsshowed that
there were fewer and fewer representatives of the Serbian population. Whereas some
Serbian organizations in Macedonia have claimed that it was possible that within
areas of this state were livingeven 100,000Serbs3.
2

a , . , http://
dijaspora.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/strategija_mvd2011.pdf, p. 34 (Retrieved on
28. 04. 2015).
3
,
2002, . , , 2005, 34, http://

32
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues

80% of the Serbian population of Macedonia lives in the Skopje Valley and
Kumanovo Valley regions, where they are seen as indigenous people. 13% lives in the
area of Vardar Valley, where they are partly seen as autochthons, and partly as economic
immigrants, who arrived in the period of communist Yugoslavia. The concentration
of the Serbian population in some areas is noticeable, and Duan Veljkovi4indicated
that thisis the reasonforbetter co-organisation and co-operation in the frame of the
same nation. This integration was strengthened by friendly relationships and family
ties, which were created by marriages within the community5.

LAW REGULATIONS

Before 1991, when Macedonia proclaimed independence from Yugoslavia, the


Serbs had the status of a constitutive nation, as they did in the whole Yugoslav state.
They lost this in 1991 and found themselves as a minority group with undefined
legalstatus. The New Constitution, enacted on 17th November 1991, did not define
them officially as a national minority and did not mention them in the preamble,
so they were automatically classified asagroup of other nationalities/others6.
Probably,thiswas the effect of tracingover of the regulations of the last socialist
Macedonian constitution from 25th of February 1974, where in the first part named
Social Order the wordsThe Socialist Republic of Macedonia is the national state7
of the Macedonian nation and the state of Albanian and Turkish nationalities within
(art. 1)8 can be found. This notation corresponds with the preamble of the Constitution
of 1991, which says that: Macedonia constituted itself as the national state of the
Macedonian nation, which ensuresthe full rights of equal citizenship and permanent
cohabitation of the Macedonian nation with Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romas and
other nationalities who are living in the Republic of Macedonia9.

www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/knigaXIII.pdf (access 29. 12. 2015), ,


j, . (editor in
organizer . o, no 2/2004, , 2004, 832; Ljubia Stoiljkovi, Srbi
u Makedoniji. Pogubne posledice perfidne asimilacije, .
je, 4/11/2010, http://www.pecat.co.rs/2010/11/srbi-u-makedoniji-pogubne-posledice-
perfidne-asimilacije/ (Retrieved on 11. 05. 2015).
4
Duan Veljkovi Professor and long-time chairman of the National Union of the
Serbs in Macedonia.
5
, , 831833.
6
, 17/11/1991, http://www.sobranie.mk/ustav-na-
rm.nspx (Retrieved on 14.12. 2015).
7
In the Macedonian Constitution of 1974 the republic is called as state (). The
Constitution mentioned also about sovereignty but parallelly underlined (in art. 1st and i.
a. 5th) that Republic of Macedonia is a part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In
present time sovereignty is identified with independence of state.
8
, 25/02/1974, http://www.
slvesnik.com.mk/Issues/0AF2E0456C964935B7705FB5BF6F31F9.pdf, 8 (Retrieved on 14.
12. 2015).
9
.

33
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

Vlachs and Romas were mentioned beside Albanians and Turks as more
prominentminorities,while other national or ethnic groups were groupedin the word
others,but the lack of gradation of the status was characteristic and noticeable.
Therewas no difference between national minority and ethnic minority, and all of them
were equal and defined as citizens.Framed in this way the regulations represented
the Macedonian state as a programmatic multi-ethnic state, where all the people
were equal10. It also solved the eventual question of the status of other ex-Yugoslav
nations. During the autumnof 1991 the question of independence for theex-Yugoslav
republics (besides Slovenia, Macedonia and also Croatia) was still unresolved in the
meaning ofthe law. Moreover, in Croatias case itstill was aquestion of the shape of
the state borders, because of the ongoing war.
Anyway, the situation of Macedonian Serbs (born within Republic of Macedonia)
was complicated because of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The firstproblem was
related to citizenship: they had neither Yugoslav, nor Serbian citizenship. Some of
them have Macedonian and thus automatically Yugoslav citizenship (in accordance
withart. 6th of the Macedonian Constitution of 197411) but after the declaration of
the independence therewas a deadline for submittingan application for citizenship
(or for confirmation). Part of the Serbian population missed this deadline and their
situation became complicated, because they did not have any citizenship (SFRY
as a state no longerexisted) and they had no civil rights. After that they could still
apply for citizenship but thiscame under other regulations and they would haveto
pay a fee of 100 dollars,whichwas beyond their financial capabilities (there were
7474 Serbs in thissituation in 1994). Anotherproblem relatedto theapplication for
Serbian citizenship. In 2004 only a few hundred Serbs had this citizenship, but a
few thousand still wanted to get it. Another part of the Serbian minority applied for
double citizenship. These were persons of whom one of the parents had Yugoslav
citizenship or the parents had Serbian origins (but were born in Macedonia or lived
there duringtheSFRY period)12.
Some of the problems were resolved by signing theFramework Agreement in
2001. Direct interference bywestern diplomats contributed to changes inMacedonian
laws, first of all with changes in the Macedonian Constitution made immediately
in 2001. The notation about the multi-ethnic state was saved, as was that about
equality of citizenship (1.3. of Framework Agreement). In accordance with thenew
regulations Parliament (mac. Sobranie) establishedthe Council for National Relations
for national issues and for resolvingof any problems in this area. The Council was
composed of 19 members, among whom7 representatives belonged to Macedonians,
7 to Albanians and 5 representatives belonged to the so called others(there were:
Turk, Vlach, Rom, Serb and Bosniak)13.
10
Analysis around this topic see also: Irena Stawowy-Kawka, Albaczycy w
Macedonii,208214.
11
, 9.
12
, , 839 and 840.
13
See. Annex A. Constitutional amendments to Art. 78 of Constitution; Framework
Agreement, Republic of Macedonia. Agency of Information, Council of Europe, http://web.
archive.org/web/20070113074850/www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_

34
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues

Moreover, changes in regulations included also employment politics in public


administration and in public enterprises. The new policy promoted equal and non-
discriminatory treatment of minority representatives and their access to public finances.
(art. 4.2. of Framework Agreement). Additionally, new regulations about employment
gave minority representatives means, which included measures forrealization, of
equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and
at all levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning
competence and integrity that govern public administration14. Proper regulations
were adopted in the field of judiciary and administration at alocal level.
From Serbian (and other minorities) point of view, regulations on education
and possibilities of using of native language werevery important. Part 6. of the
Framework Agreement, named Education and Use of Languages guaranteed the
useof languages (as an official language) of minorities in the municipalities, where
a minority comprises at least 20% of the population. In caseswhere thenumber is
lower than 20% local authorities could decide democratically about the useof other
languages (6.6. of Framework Agreement)15.
Regarding education, point 6.1. of the Agreement said that the instructions will
be provided in the students native languages but did not describe more precisely
whichmeasures would implement these regulations. However, the following two
points (6.2. and 6.3.) referred to state funding of university education, where the
languages of minorities were used (a minority should comprises more than 20% of
the population of Macedonia; so, in practice only Albanian could be used)16.
Relationships between the Republic of Serbia and Serbs living outside the
homeland were regulated in the Serbian Constitution of 2006 (art. 13), the Law
on Diaspora and Serbs In the Region of 2009 and in theStrategyofprotecting and
strengtheningthe relationships between homeland and diaspora and between
homeland and Serbs in the region,of 2011. Serbian and Macedonian authorities
also signed a bilateral agreement on the Serbian minority in Macedonia and the
Macedonian minority in Serbia. This document was signedin Skopje in July of 2004
and confirmed in Serbia after 200617.

and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp;
; See more: Krzysztof Krysieniel, W cieniu Dayton. Bonia i Hercegowina midzy
etnokracj i demokracj konsocjonaln, Warszawa 2012, 226, Irena Stawowy-Kawka,
Porozumienie ochrydzkie z 13 sierpnia 2001 roku, Prace Komisji rodkowoeuropejskiej
PAU, vol. XI, (editor in organizer Jan Machnik and Irena Stawowy-Kawka), Krakw, 2003,
115 and next.
14
Framework Agreement, see more: Irena Stawowy-Kawka, Albaczycy w
Macedonii, 334 and next.
15
According to these regulations the Serbian language could be used only in Staro
Nagoriane on the North of Macedonia, where Serbs comprise more than 20% of the
population. The Turks are the biggest minority, after the Albanians, and they comprise more
than 20% in 3 municipalities: Mavrovo, Rostua Plasnica and Centar upa.
16
Framework Agreement.
17
Regulations on minorities are very often regulated in multilateral international
agreements apart from constitutions or other state or international acts. This agreement

35
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

The institution concerned withthe situation of Serbian people outside the


Republic of Serbia was the Department for Cooperation with Diaspora and Serbsin
the Region. Thiswas established under the reform of ministries in 2014 and came
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs18. The list of responsibilities was not clearly
defined, because of other Ministries cooperating with the Serbs abroad (for example,
the Ministry of Culture) but the Department indicated the Law on minorities (of 2009)
as the main document defining its activity. Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs conductedother projects related to the Serb diaspora or Serbs in the region
(for example, this Ministry funded scholarships for children and youth through the
project Serbia for Serbs in the Region)19.
The Department focused particular attention on Serbs in the region. As a
priority the institution indicated popularisation of information on institutions, people
and objects thatwere significant for Serbian science, culture and art. An example
was encouraging Serbian scientists, living abroad, to present lectures in Serbian
universities or undertakeresearche on Serbs and Serbia. In the Strategy could also be
found the opinion that Serbs who lived abroad should support, in different ways, the
accession process of the Republic of Serbia to the EU. Such activitiescould also be
related to another important thing: restoration of the image of Serbs and the Serbian
state in the world, something thatwas ruined during the wars in the 90s, and which
problem Serbs have been patiently tryingto retrievesince200020.
Regarding the Republic of Macedonia, the Strategy paid attention to thelack of
fulfilment of obligations in minority politics, where such problems as lack of financial
support and problems with freedom of religion could be noticed. As concerns the
Macedonian Serbs, they were receiving funds from the budget of the Republic of
Serbia with the annotation that it was one of many financial supporting sources.
The Minority Act of 2009 had notationin art. 36 about other forms of financial
support, such as: donations or just other financial sources. Serbian organizations,
which included government, could grant financial support only to those Serbian
organizationsthatappeared on the ministerial list, whose activitieswererelated
to protecting and strengtheningthe relationships with the homeland on various
levels. Aside fromthese basic amounts, the Department organized twice-yearly
competitions, supporting additionally activities connected with science, language
teaching, economical cooperation, protection of Serbian tradition and identity21.

between Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia was adopted 29th of June 2005. After the
Serbian and Montenegrin state split in 2006 Serbia respected these regulations.
18
Before 2014 there were other government institutions for minority issues.
19
O nama, Ministarstvo Spoljnih Poslova. Uprava za Saradnju s Dijasporom i Srbima
u Regionu, http://www.dijaspora.gov.rs/lat/o-nama/, Projekti, Ministarstvo Spoljnih
Poslova Republike Srbije, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/konzularni-poslovi/dijaspora/
projekti-dijaspora?lang=lat,
a , .
, http://dijaspora.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/12/2012/strategija_mvd2011.pdf
(Retrieved on 8. 05. 2015).
20
, 26, 28 and 29.
21
Zakon o dijaspori i Srbima u Regionu, Sl. Glasnik RS, No 88/2009, http://demo.

36
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues

Macedonian Serbs statedthat financial support from theMacedonian state was


insufficient. They also emphasisedthat the Macedonian minority in Serbia, much
less numerous, was supported by the Serbian government to the tune of150,000 euro
every year.The Serbs also tried to win financial support in other ways. There were,
for example, financial investments for projects. One example would be the Dutch
investment of 700,000 euro or 1 million euro for renovation of the antique church of
St. George in Staro Nagoriane22.

THE EDUCATION QUESTIONS

In the middle of the 1980s in Macedonia, 6,500 primary school pupils were
learning Serbian (but until the end of 80s all Serbian languages secondary schools
were closed). Between the years 1991-1993 fourschools with Serbian language were
functioning and with 1209 of pupils, but this number of children decreased to 681
and atthe beginning of the 21stcentury oscillated around 300. For the first few years
after theFramework Agreement was signed, and after the census of 2001, there was
no information about the percentage of Serbian children in primary level education.
There was no secondary school either teaching Serbian, but the Framework
Agreement provided for teaching in native languages. Moreover, in Macedonian
schools there were no optional subjects about Serbian culture or language. In 2004
the number of children between the ages of 7 and 14 was estimated at 7000. There
were fiveprimary schools teaching the Serbian language with 270 pupils in Skopje
only fourpupils learned this language23.
After 2010 only a fewdozen pupils were taught Serbian, but only atprimary school
level. In school year 2009/2010 in Macedonian schools there were23,000 pupils and
only 30 of them were taught in Serbian. The decreasing number of children was a
consequenceof bad conditions in teaching and lack of Serbian language textbooks.
Pupils had to learn this language from Macedonian books, which were translated
by teachers during the school year. Irena Stawowy-Kawka indicated a significant
decline in interests textbooks in Serbian language, in relation to the growing
popularity of such a books for example in Albanian or English24. Gordana Jovi-
Stojkovska chief of the Serbian publishing house blamed Macedonian authorities
for obstructionism inthissubject. In her opinion her publishing house and several
people from Serbia declared a willingness to produce non-commercial translations
of textbooks.In the school year of 2013/2014 the number of pupils grew to 180-
190 (in Staro Nagoriane, Tabanovac and Skopska Crna Gora). In effect, Serbian
children born in Macedonia after 1991 spoke the Serbian language very poorly, using
a rather mixed Serbian-Macedonian language. It shouldbe noted that there were also
paragraf.rs/combined/Old/t/t2009_10/t10_0340.htm (Retrieved on 27. 04. 2015).
22
Ljubia Stoiljkovi, Srbi u Makedoniji.
23
Irena Stawowy-Kawka, Obraz stanu owiaty mniejszoci narodowych w Republice
Macedonii w latach 1945-2000, Prace Komisji rodkowoeuropejskiej PAU, vol. IX, (editor
in organizer Jan Machnik and Irena Stawowy-Kawka), Krakw, 2001, 206 and 214,
, , 834.
24
Irena Stawowy-Kawka, Obraz stanu owiaty, 216.

37
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

attempts to create classes in secondary schoolsin Skopje and Kumanovo but these
ended in failure because of a lack of candidates. In Milutin Stanis opinion the
main causesweredisinterest among parents, lack of support from the authorities and
inadequate teaching stuff. On the Philological Faculty of the University in Skopje, in
the same school year, a 15-person group started a Serbian field of study with only a
few persons of Serbian origins (but even these Serbs did not have Serbian language
education in primary or secondary school)25.
At the same time the Serbian government financed, as an optional subject,
a free education programmeforthe Serbian language, which started in the school
year 2011/2012 in the villages Reica (near Kumanovo) and Kuevite. There
werealso plans to organize it in Skopje, in acentreforforeign languages, but because
of financial problems lessons were held only in Reica, where 20 children were
taught in school year 2014/2015. The scope of study included grammar, spelling,
language culture, learning to express in this language (based on Serbian fairy tales
and legends), knowledge about Serbian writers, singersand the most of important
holidays and dates related to Serbian culture, tradition and history. Because of their
parents encouragement pupils also learnt about the most important Serbian people
of culture, science, music and sport, as well as about Serbian cities and monuments26.
The Serbs native languagesaw as a basisforprotecting their identity.
TheFramework Agreement gave them the right to learn their own language but these
regulations were general and did not give them more measures to help achieve this
aim. In effect, all depended on theinitiative and good will of the teachers, as well as
the parents, who had to help in protecting theirmother tongue.In Duan Veljkovis
opinion, the deterioration in thesituation of Serbian people started in the 1970s and
1980s. The main cause was the inability to protect their rights under acommunistic
political system. As Veljkovi said: Serbs could not protect their education system,
cultural and information heritage, and national traditions, which was decisive in them

25
Spona centar Srba u Makedoniji, Radio Televizija Vojvodine, 15/04/2010, http://
www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/region/spona---centar-srba-u-Makedoniji_183883.html?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed % 3A + RtvSveVesti + % 28
RTV+poslednje+vesti%29 (Retrieved on 22. 04. 2015).
26
It could be mentioned, for comparison, that at the same time within Croat minority (which
make 2700 of people) 45 of pupils were taught in three places, for example in Skopje. Spona
se spotie, RTS, 4/04/2012, https://translate.google.pl/#sr/pl/se%20spoti%C4%8De (Retrieved
on 22. 04. 2015), ,
, ,, 21/04/2015, http://www.srbi.org.mk/sr/srbia-makedonija/1014-
casovi-srpskog-u-recici-ustaljenom-dinamikom-kroz-smeh-glumu-i-igru, see also Organizacija
hrvatske nastave u nadlenosti Ministarstva znanosti, obrazovanja i sporta Republike Hrvatske
po dravama, Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i sporta, http://public.mzos.hr/Default.
aspx?sec=2117 (Retrievedon 24. 04. 2015), Zatvoren Kulturno-informativni centar Srba u
Makedoniji, Politika RS, 25/07/2013, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Kultura/Zatvoren-Kulturno-
informativni-centar-Srba-u-Makedoniji.lt.html, (Retrievedon 24. 04. 2015 r.), Samo 183 aka u
Makedoniji ui srpski jezik,RTS, 27/05/2013, http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/Dijaspora/story/1522/
Otvorena+tema/1331456/ Samo+183+%C4%91aka+u+Makedoniji+u%C4%8Di+srpski+jezik.
html (Retrievedon 11. 05. 2015).

38
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues

losing their identity27. It should be taken into account the different circumstances
pertaining between 1970 and 1990, and those after 2001. In the communist period
Serbian or Serbo-Croatian were used all over Yugoslavia. It made no exclusion toany
professionalgroup or caused employment problems. Now we have a completely
different political situation. The Republic of Macedonia is an independent state,
where Macedonian is the official and constitutive language. Serbs, whowere the
dominantnation in Yugoslavia, are no longer dominantin present-day Macedonia
and they constitutea small percentage, which doesnt inspire anyone to learn their
language. Moreover, Macedonian Serbs, who wishto participate in Macedonian
publishingor social life,haveto speak Macedonian. Protectionof identity could only be
a matter of individual initiative and acting on a personal or ethnic community level.
Part of the Serbian community has fought for language education, and they
have various ways of publicisingthat problem. They have writtenabout it in the
media (mainly in Serbian media) or organized demonstrations with slogans on
minority rights. For example, in 2011 and 2012 there were demonstrations in Tetovo,
organized by the Association of Serbs and Macedonians in Macedonia. Days of
Serbian Language were organized in 2013 in Kumanovo. Another way in which
attention could focused on language issues wasfestive meetings with prominent
public persons. Oneexample is the conference, also organized in Kumanovo by
Association of Serbs and Macedonians in Macedonia, entitled: We are writing and
created in Serbian language, which took place in 2011, with the participation of the
ambassador of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav urin, consul Dragica Janji and
representatives of Serbian organizations in Macedonia28.

CULTURAL ORGANIZATION AND CONFESSING QUESTION

In 1991, after the proclamation ofindependence by Macedonia, Serbs (and


Montenegrins) immediately organized a non-governmentalorganization thatcould
make an impression of great entrepreneurship and solidarity in a frame of nationality
and hope for well-functioning cultural autonomy in accordance withEuropean
standards (the Republic of Macedonia declared a will to process accession to theEU).
The Association of Serbs and Montenegrins was created, and followingyear (1992)
saw the appearance of thepolitical group Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia
(DPSM).
However, it turned out very quickly that these early initiatives had not generated
any successful results, something thatwas connected with many factors. Lack of
internal solidarity was one of theseand thisled to many divisions in the structureof
the Association between 1998-2001, from which emerged 15 minor communities,
associations, clubs etc.29

27
, , 832.
28
Samo 183 aka, Literarni susret u Makedoniji, RTS, 10/10/2011, http://www.
rts.rs/page/rts/sr/Dijaspora/story/1518/Vesti/970152/Literarni+susret+u+Makedoniji.html
(Retrieved on 11. 05. 2015).
29
, , 835836.

39
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

In October 2001 the United Serbian Community in Macedonia (Ujedinjena


srpska zajednica u Makedoniji)was established, which took brisk steps to improve
the bad conditionsforSerbian people within the state. Itsactivitiesincluded social
communities as well as state politics, also taking into account cooperation with the
Republic of Serbia. This Community was special, in Veljkovis opinion, because of
wider, nationalcoverage, whichdrewwidespread interest and commitment frompeople
who had hitherto avoided identifying with similar communities, because of internal
conflicts and divides, which paralysed any essential activity. Moreover, specific tothis
Community was decentralisation of authorities into9 local cells, whichcould inspire
members in various aspects of public and social live. The central authorities were
solely responsible for coordinatingcooperation between all cells in the regions30.
In accordance with thedeclaration programmethe most important aims were:
defining theindividual and collective rights and interests of the Serbian community
in the Republic of Macedonia, political representation in front of Macedonian
authorities, activity of organizations and social institutions, protectionof
minority rights (including education in their native language, too), cultural and
religioustraditions and strengtheningof ties with Serbia in economic and cultural
terms. Moreover, USCM indicated the necessity for renovation of historical graves
and monuments, recognitionof important dates in theSerbian tradition and culture as
holidays in the Macedonian public calendar, reactivation of the registered but non-
activeBranislav Nuitheatre, and opening of libraries and bookstores with Serbian
language literature in Skopje and Kumanovo. Itwas also important to publish
Serbian literature (including those Serbian writers who were living on Macedonia)
and Veljkovi appealed to Serbian publishing houses to do this. At the very least, it
was necessary to open a cultural and information centre in Skopje31.
This initiatives activities wereachieved successfully in the first few years.
By2004 the Community had gathered over 3500 members. Additionally, there were
two societies of Serbian-Macedonian friendships, one of cultural and artistic profiles,
two womens societies and two clubs: one relating to economical profilesand the
second tosecurity researches. Moreover, there was a Community bulletin.Regarding
political activity, Macedonian Serbs prepared projects thatincluded changes to
thetext of the preamble to theMacedonian Constitution to include aphrase about
theSerbian national community as a part of the Serbian nation, whichwas supported
by Belgrade and accepted by Macedonian authorities.The next step was the creation
of private Serbian television and local radio stations, similar to those of other
minorities (Albanians, Turks or Romas). So far, onpublic television there was only
the thrice-weeklyVidik program of 30 minutes, but thiswas shownat 3.00 p.m. and
thus could onlypractically be watched by pensioners and unemployed people32.

At the turn of first and second decade of the 21stcentury there were about 20
organizations, three cultural and information centres and two political groupsoperating
in Macedonia. The main groups are the Central Union of Serbian Organizations in
30
The same, 831.
31
The same, 837 and 844.
32
The same, 838 and 844, Irena Stawowy-Kawka, Albaczycy w Macedonii,208214.

40
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues

Macedonia and Serbian Community in Macedonia (Srpska Zajednica u Makedoniji).


Neither have sites on theinternet, but the second of the twois the oldest non-
governmentalorganization, acting in Skopje since 1991, and known earlier as
Skuptina of Serbian Community. Its chairman Gordana Jovi-Stojkovska is owner
of publishing-house Slovo-ljubve33.
Organizations sometimes have insufficientfunds even for possession of an internet
website, which hasinspired other solutions; for example, some of them have created
their website on social networks (e.g. Facebook), oneexample of this method being
the Serbian Community St. Sava, althoughher profile is rarelyactualized. Regarding
this 20 organizations and communities it had to be noticed that none of them even
had a website, something thatmight be related to theirfinancial situation. But these
organizations acted and still are acting on their own way, not regularly and sometimes
by joining forces in joint ventures (among others, regional competitions). There are
also initiatives with particular aimsand it could be noted, for example, organizations
for the protectionof Serbian monuments of culture, or humanitarian organizations
such as the Association of Serbian Women in the Republic of Macedonia, which is
a continuation of the activitiesof the Circle of Serbian Sisters at thebeginning of the
20thcentury. The Association was created in 1992 and in the beginning was helping
refugees from Croatia who were settled in Kosovo. In the present time they set up a
foundation for Serbian children in Macedonia, organizing excursions or rewards for
the most capable pupils. There was also the Football Club Reica, which actually
played in the third Macedonian league34.
After 2010 the most recognized Serbian institution was the Centre of Culture
and Information Spona, operational since 2006. The basic aim of its activitieswas a
system of connections between all Serbian organizations in Macedonia andthe creation
of organic Serbian-Macedonian relationships. Spona was financed bya donation from
theMinistry of Foreign Affairs but was also involved with Macedonian administrative
units (e.g. the Ministry of Culture). In 2010 the Centre received a new headquartersin
the centre of Skopje. The openingceremony featured the participation of the Serbian
ambassador in Macedonia Tomislav urin, Mlaan orevi advisor to the President
of Serbia and Secretary of Council for Serbs in the Region. From the Macedonian
side there were Deputy Minister Dragan Nedeljkovi and other representatives of the
Serbian community in Macedonia (intellectuals, sportsmen, etc.)35.

33
Ljubia Stoiljkovi, Srbi u Makedoniji.
34
Osnovan fond za podrku srpskoj deci u Makedoniji, RTS, 28 / 08 / 2012, http://
www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/Dijaspora/story/1518/Vesti/1163694/Osnovan+Fond+za+podr%C5
%A1ku+srpskoj+deci+u+Makedoniji+html, Konkursi Regiona. Konkursi iz oblasti kulture
i umetnosti na jednom mestu, http://konkursiregiona.net/category/zemlja/makedonija/,
Srpsko-makedonska drutva Bitolja i Kruevca zapieli zaradnju,Grad Kruevac,
22/12/2012, http://krusevac.rs/sr_lat/ks-info/vesti/2900-krusevac-i-bitolj.html, Kruevac
dobija kancelariju za dijasporu, Radio Televizija Kruevac, 22/12/2012, http://www.
rtk.rs/?p=15189 (Retrieved on 12. 05. 2015), https://www.facebook.com/szm.svetsava
(Retrieved on 20. 10. 2015).
35
Milutin Stani, Spona u novom domu, online, 15/04/2010,

41
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

The range of activities was very wide and included: organized literary workshops
and songs, exhibitions of Serbian artists living in Macedonia, lectures, an edition
of the bulletin Slovo and running a website,book promotions, film screenings, a
free-to-use library, andalso periodically Serbian language learning36.Yet in thespring
of 2012, the chairman of Spona publicly spoke of the Centresdifficult financial
situation and also about problems with staff for teaching Serbian. In the middle of
2013 Spona was closed and teaching of Serbian language as well as activity of library
were suspended (Serbian Ministry of Culture and Information partly supported the
functioning of Sponas website)37.
Another problem was related to religious issues, in whichthe Serbian minority
in their opinion was discriminated. Macedonian regulations guarantee freedom
of confession under theConstitution and the Law. Additionally, the Republic of
Macedonia is asignatory to theEuropean Convention of Human Rights. The problem
was more difficult, because of the schism between theMacedonian Orthodox Church
and the Serbian Orthodox Church38, after 1991, when MOC took over the most of
church buildings, the Serbs did not have their own places of worship. Activities
of Serbian clergy were banned, apart from Archbishopric of Ohrid, which came
under the Serbian Orthodox Church. The best solution was, in the opinion of Milutin
Stani, using MOC buildingsthatwere not used (or used very rarely) by Macedonian
clergy (an example being the Church of St. George in Staro Nagoriane)39.
Ambitious plans, created by Serbs after 2001 and the beginning of theFramework
Agreements order, were only partly achieved, but all the activitiesof representatives
of this minority have shown that achievement of minority rights first of all depend
on good human will. In second place isfinancial support.

http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/kultura.71.html:270778-Spona-u-novom-domu, Spona se
spotie, RTS, 4/04/2012, https://translate.google.pl/#sr/pl/se%20spoti%C4%8De (Retrieved
on 22. 04. 2015).
36
Tihana Pavievi, Spona uvar srpske kulturne batine u Makedoniji, Meunarodni
radio Srbija, 29/06/2013, http://vesti.krstarica.com/dijaspora/spona-cuvar-srpske-kulturne-
bastine-u-makedoniji/ (Retrieved on 22. 04. 2015).
37
Spona se spotie, Milutin Stani, Kulturno-informativni centar Srba u
Makedoniji Spona opstaje uprkos problemima, Meunarodni Radion Srbija, 24/07/2012,
http://www.glassrbije.org/%C4%8Dlanak/kulturno-informativni-centar-srba-u-makedoniji-
%E2%80%9Espona%E2%80%9C-opstaje-uprkos-problemima, o-
, , 25/07/2013, http://www.
politika.rs/rubrike/Kultura/Zatvoren-Kulturno-informativni-centar-Srba-u-Makedoniji.
lt.html (Retrieved on 22. 04. 2015).
38
This conflict has a long story. Disputes about interdependence and autocephaly have
been taking place since the Middle Ages. Only after the Second World War did the communist
authorities legitimize the institution of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which was not
recognized by other canonical orthodox churches, also this Constantinopolitan.
39
Mirna Jasi, MilutinStani: Taoci smo.

42
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues

ACTIVITIES OF SERBIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

On the political scene there are two active political groups: the Serbian
Progressive Party in Macedonia (Srpska Napredna Stranka u Makedoniji - SNSM)
and the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia (Demokratska Partija Srba u
Makedoniji - DPSM). The last of thesewas created inMarch 1992 and it entered the
Macedonian Parliament (Sobranie) one decade later, after general elections in 2002,
in coalition withthe Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (Socijademokratski
Sojuz na Makedonija). After elections lost in2006 it was inopposition. In 2008 DPSM
entered the government again, but this time in coalition with VMRO-DPMNE. The
party has won at least two important successes: establishing the Serbian Holiday 27th
of January Day of St. Sava40 and participation in works on regulation of minorities
rights and the opening of an Agency for Minority Rights. DPSM applied also for
a change of election regulations in accordance withwhich Serbs could enter two
representatives to Parliament (thusfar they had hadonly one), something thatwas
accomplishedsuccessfully with there at present being two Serbian representatives in
Sobranie. Serbs have also held some offices in the government, for example, Dragan
Nedeljkovi was Deputy Minister of Culture, but it would be an exaggeration to
say that these politicians have had a significant impact onpolitical decisions by
theMacedonian government41.
In first decade of the 21stcentury, the Kosovo question radicalized the attitude
of Serbs towards politics in the region. In effect this established another political
group: the Radical Party of Serbs in Macedonia (Radikalna Stranka na Srbite vo
Makedonija), but in the general elections in 2008 it got less than 0.5% of votes
and did not enter the Macedonian Parliament. In these elections the Democratic
Party of Serbs entered into a coalition with VMRO-DPMNE, which recognized
theindependence of Kosovo, but DPSM underlined its individual position onthat
question, emphasising thelack of this recognition.
2006 saw the establishment of the Serbian Progressive Party in Macedonia
(SNSM), which was a counterpart of the same party in Serbia. In the general
elections in 2008 this political group did not enter Parliament, so it had to look for
a coalition, as did DPSM, creating an agreement with the socialists of SDSM. In
fact, SNSM had centre-right views, but it claimed that SDSM had more adequate
programmatic demands than right-wing VMRO-DPMNE, which promoted, in Serbs
critical opinion, ethno-historical revisionism. After defeat in the general elections
40
27th of January 2013 in Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts was held
celebration dedicated to Rastko Nemanji (St. Sava Serbian medieval head and reformer
of Orthodox Church, also philosopher, who had a huge influence on shape of relationship
between church and state authorities).The importance of this event could provide presence
of Prime Ministers of Serbia and Macedonia and greetings from Serbian President Tomislav
Nikoli, passed on the hands of head of Macedonian government Nikola Gruevski. Thanks
to positive decision of authorities in Skopje this day became Day of Serbs (named Day of St.
Sava) in Republic of Macedonia and this is a holiday in regions inhabited by Serbs, and at the
schools with Serbian teaching language.
41
, , http://www.dpsm.info/index.
php/features (Retrieved on 12. 05. 2015).

43
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

of2011, the party stayed in coalition with socialists as parliamentary opposition. It


should be noticed that Dragia Mileti leader of SNSM held various positions
in parliamentary groups for international cooperation and other parliamentary
committees. In 2014 there was a deep crisis within the party, whichwas related to
the election of a new leader. There were two competing congressesorganized: first
in Kumanovo, where Vane Velikovi was elected as new chairman and the second
in Banjanje (Skopska Crna Gora), where Dragia Mileti (elected there for partys
leader) questioned the legality of the other congress42. In March 2014 he joined the
political coalition comprising: party GROM established by ex-SDSM politician
Stevo Jakimovski, TitosLeftist Forces of Slobodan Ugrinovski and Party of Free
Democrats of Kiro Getakovski.
Serbian politicians actively participate in Macedonian political life, but this
activity is appraised differently. In 2012 the Serbs already had two representatives in
Sobranie but they did littleto improve the situation of their minority and were badly
thought ofby part of Serbian society. In their opinion they did not show sufficient
enthusiasmfor promoting Serbs interests in Macedonia or there were other reasons
they could not do more for their countrymen. The example was that Deputy Minister
of Culture Dragan Nedeljkovi had promisedin 2012 that bythe end of this year there
wouldbe all Serbian-language textbooks printed,but the problem was not resolved.
Milutin Stani gave a more severe opinion, in accordance to which any activity and
support of authorities could be possible thanks togood connections with a political
group, which were in a current coalition. Stani said openly that qualification,
education or abilities did not often have any value, referring to employing people
in public administration, where in accordance withregulations and the quota
system minoritieshad the proper percentage of representatives. In practice,
employed candidates had connections with the above-mentioned parties, and often
theirqualifications were definitely inferior to other, non-connected candidates43.

42
, , http://sobranie.mk/
default.asp?ItemID=81DCBC8FF75D8A48A1A27BDE4DF00D38,
, , , , 2014/03/9,
http://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/partii/sns-odrzha-dva-kongresa-vo-banjani-e-izbran-
miletikj-vo-kumanovo-velichkovikj (dostp 12. 05. 2015 r.).
43
Ljubia Stoiljkovi, Srbi u Makedoniji, Mirna Jasi, MilutinStani: Taoci smo.

44
Serbian minority in the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 main issues

***

Evenin the first years after entering into theFramework Agreements order,
Duan Veljkovi regarded the situation of the Serbian minority as unsatisfactory. As
the main problems, he highlighted:spreading assimilation of the Serbian community
within Macedonia, the lack of greater involvement of the Serbian state and the so-
called international community. One decade later his accusations against the Republic
of Serbia as well as the Republic of Macedonia havenot changed. This long-term
chairman of the National Union of Serbs in Macedonia underlined the lack of
commitments to theSerbian question byMacedonian Serbs themselves, and indicated
that probably if they had more funds for activities, the number of volunteers would no
doubt be higher. However, he also repeated accusations about assimilation of Serbs,
the lack of Serbian-language cultural institutions despite themany initiatives towards
theMacedonian authorities. Another problem was that Serbs still did not have their
own private television and the program Vidik was broadcast atthe same timeas a
decade before plus a one-hour monthly programme. Serbs had access to the Serbian-
language TV channels from Serbia, but Veljkovi emphasisedthat private television
in Macedonia already catered forminorities such as Albanians, Bosniaks or Romas44.
The question is, who and how could fundsbe ensured for the activitiesof
institutions that might gather the greater number of activists. The point is that
the regulations did not define this precisely. The Macedonian Constitution, the
Framework Agreement andthe bilateral agreement between Macedonia and Serbia
all mention therights of a minority to realisation of their rights (as described above)
and about theMacedonian stateallowing these realisations. The regulations donot
give guarantees of achievement, which wouldprobably betterallow for assertion of
their rights.
Maybe the question should be directed to Serbian politicians and political
groups in Macedonia. They arenot anonymous persons and, additionally, good and
intensive cooperation can be recognised between Serbian and Macedonian states
in many areas45. Moreover, it could be noticed in Serbian media last year there
were commentaries with accusations towards the Macedonian state of leading
anti-Serb policy or politics of assimilation. Recently there seems to be fewer such
commentaries46.
However, the picture of the Serbian community, described above, may promptone
sad reflection. Veljkovi once underlined that the Serbs in Macedonia earlier made
a significant contribution to theprogressive development of the Macedonian state,
being a part of social elites such as professors of universities, doctors, lawyers,

44
, , 839, Ima li mesta za srpski jezik u
Makedoniji?, Blic online, 19/02/2015, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/ima-li-mesta-za-
srpski-jezik-u-makedoniji/j5hdk1c (Retrieved on 28. 12. 2015).
45
Vlade Srbije i Makedonije potpisale sedam sporazuma, RTV, 16/02/2015, http://www.
rtv.rs/sr_lat/politika/vlade-srbije-i-makedonije-potpisale-sedam-sporazuma_568881.html,
see also: http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/pdf/zakoni/2015/925-15%20
lat.pdf (Retrieved on 28. 12. 2015).
46
Samo 183 aka.

45
60 2 2016 Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska

economists, () writers, artists or prominent businessmen47, in a word, influential


people, who could have had an impact on the situation of the Serbian community in
the Republic of Macedonia. Analysing the present situation of this community could
give the impression that Serbs position and ethnic autonomy is something separate
from the history of this nation, as much in the past as in the present.

47
, , 834.

46
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

314.15-054.72 (4-11+4-15:=163.318/19

THEMACEDONIAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION IN EASTERN


AND WESTERN EUROPE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR:
PARALLELS

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present the organizational development and paralels of the
Macedonian political emigration in Eastern and Western Europe in 1950s and 1960s. In
chronological order the activities of organizations: Ilinden, Egejska zora and Macedonian
community in Eastern and Macedonian National Front, Macedonian National Committee,
Macedonian cultural association Jane Sandanski and Liberation Committee of Macedonia
in Western Europe, and their similarities and differences in their goals, are shown.

Keywords: Macedonia, Macedonians, emigration, Eastern Europe, Western Europe.


XIX XX
- .
,
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, (:), 46/1, 2002, 89.

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52
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

930.85 (497.7+438) 19


70- 80-

CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE`S REPUBLIC


OF POLAND AND SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN
THE 1970S AND 1980S.

Abstract

The article elaborates the issue of cultural, educational and scientific relations between
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the Peoples Republic of Poland in the last two
decades before the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Based on original archival
documents, it gives an overview of the cooperation between related institutions and
associations not only in the field of culture, science and education, but also in introduction
with folk traditions and folklore of the two countries.

Keywords: SR of Macedonia, PR of Poland, relations, culture, science, education, folk


tradition.


() ()
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65
60 2 2016 ,

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66
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

930.85 (497.711+438.11)

: ,
,

SKOPJE AND WARSAW: REPRESENTATION OF HISTORY,


SYMBOLS AND IDENTITY

Abstract

The social and political changes occurred after the collapse of socialism, led to significant
reconfigurations in spatial symbolization in the capitol cities. In this context, it occurred
intensive reshaping of social identities and the construction of new memories, which have
their reflection in the public space. The paper focuses on the capital Skopje and Warsaw,
considered as polygons for inscribe of images from the past and public manifestations of
collective / social memory. Analysis of monument iconography in both cities shows the ways
in which the phenomena of memory, identity and history interact in space. Simultaneously
with the comparison data I determine differences and similarities between the two capitals,
in particular domains.

Keywords: collective memory, identity, monuments, urban place.

,

/ .

,
,
. ,
,
.1 , ,

: ,
1

(
). , Jeffery K. Olick
:

67
60 2 2016

, ,
.
: , , ,
, ., ,
,
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,
. ,
,

. ,

.3 ,
, ,
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, ,
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, ,
, , ,
,
.
-
, ,

,
. - (
)
, .6

( ) ( / )
, , .
,
, ,
, .
: Astrid Erll, Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction, : Cultural Memory Studies:
An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Eds. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nnning, in
collaboration with Sara B. Young), Medien und kulturelle Erinnerung 8/ Media and Cultural
Memory 8, Berlin / New York: de Gruyter 2008, . 4; , ,
, , , 2015, . 23.
2
. , , ..., . 2425.
3
.
4
Astrid Erll, Cultural Memory Studies..., . 5.
5
: Sran Radovi, Grad kao tekst, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd, 2013.
6
: Todor Kulji

68
: , ,


, ,
,
, . ,
/
, .
,

,

, ,
. ,
,
- .

/ ,
-
. , ,

. , 1989 1998
11 ,
(
1993 , 2000).7
,
.. .8
, ,
,
. ,
,
1989 2007 , 80 ,
,
.9
(23),

.10 ,
,

2006, : Jelena Vasljevi, Kultura seanja i medijska narativizacija sukoba u Hrvatskoj,
, .. .3, . 1, 2008.
7
Katrin Van Kant, Historical Memory in Post-Communist Poland: Warsaws
Monuments after 1989, Studies in Slavic Cultures, . 91-92. : http://www.
pitt.edu/~slavic/sisc/SISC8/docs/vancant.pdf.
8
,90.
9
,94.
10
.

69
60 2 2016

.
(Armia Krajowa), -
,
,
63 ,
.11
1989
,
, ..
(19441956).
1993 .
2001 ..12
II, ,
(1992,1994) ,
.13
2009 , 30-
.14
Volhynia
19421944 , 10 000
, ,
,
, .15
,

, ,
.
1989 .16

,

. ,
,
, 17 ,
(16741696),
.17

11
,95-96.
12
, 103.
13
.
14
Ks. Ryszard Krupa SCJ, The Cross. Victory Square monument of John Paul II in
Warsaw, http://fjp2.com/en/news/world/7011-the-cross-victory-square-monument-of-john-
paul-ii-in-warsaw
15
. Van Kant, Historical Memory in Post-Communist Poland..., . 100101.
16
.
17
, 104.

70
: , ,

,
, ,
.18
,
,
, ,
, ,

. , (
)
,
nation-building .
, ,

,
,

.


.
, ,

,
, ,,
1944 1991
.19
7144-
, , ,
,
.
, .
,
/ ,

,
.
,
, ,
/ /.

18

.
: . , , ....
19

, , 7 , 2014.

71
60 2 2016

,
,
.

.

.



.
,
- ,

,
.
,
, : ?,
: ?


,
.

,
.20
, , ,
,

,
.
,
.


/ ,
.
, ,

20

.

,
. : Ewa Ochman, Post - Communist Poland
Contested Pasts and Future Identities, Routlage, Jul.18, 2003.

72
: , ,


.21 ,

,

, . , ,
,
, ,
.22 ,
,

.
,
,
, , /
,
, .

21

, : . , , ....
: . Ochman, Post - Communist Poland....

,
, ,
.
19451995 : Adam Milobedzki, Monuments, Politics and Society:
Polish Experiences (19451995), : Memory & Oblivion. Proceedings of the XXIXth
International Congress of the History of Art held in Amsterdam, 17 September 1996(ed.
A.W. Reinink, Jeroen Stumpel), Springer Science & Business Media, Dec. 6, 2012, 369371.
22
Alaida Asman, Rad na naconalnom seanju, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd, 2002,
. 49-60.

73
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

349.9.024.072.6 (497.7)

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS IN


COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING IN POLAND AND
MACEDONIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Rafa Wonica
Jagiellonian University

,

.
, .


.

, ,


.
.

.

.

: , ,
, , .

The underlying reason for conducting research into the functioning of the
systems for combating money laundering in Poland and Macedonia is the fact that
organised crime constitutes one of the most serious threats to modern democracies

75
60 2 2016 Rafa Wonica

founded on supremacy of law. Macedonia and Poland belong to the group of modern
states, which are particularly vulnerable to this form of pathology due to the political
transformation both countries have undergone only relatively recently. It seems
justified to make a rather conservative claim that this new threat calls for urgent
involvement on the part of institutions from both countries in question, aimed at
preventing threats brought about by organised criminal groups.
One of the approaches to establishing a system for preventing and combating
organised crime provides for actions that would result in the leaders of criminal
groups facing forfeit of any benefits gained1. This approach has come into play also
in Poland and Macedonia. The institutionalised reaction of the state covers two basic
areas of activity: prevention and combating (legal prosecution).
Prevention includes a set of legal regulations as well as the entire scope of duties and
activities of state institutions and private entities, whose aim is to make it impossible for
criminal organisations to legitimise proceeds of criminal activity as well as to convert
and transfer any such funds by means of various products and entities. The system
for combating money laundering must be viewed as reflecting the function of penal
prosecution, which includes identification of crime, detection of money laundering
practices together with its perpetrators and finally proving them guilty.
Money laundering prevention and combating should be considered not only in
the context of combating organised crime but also as an element of a wider system
underlying state security. By this I mean in particular economic security which
should be understood as the ability of the state to protect its economic interest as
well as to guarantee fair rules of business trading among all market units operating
on its territory. Money laundering takes advantage of activities pursued by various
economic entities. This can lead to financial instability or loss of trust on the part of
foreign partners with regard to the countrys economy. Seen in this way, prevention
of money laundering could be perceived as a factor contributing to financial stability.
Money laundering may dynamise other categories of criminal activity, these being
in particular fiscal and organised crime. Tolerance for such dealings or inefficiency
of law enforcement and inspection bodies may stimulate the process of solidifying
alternative centres of power, created and managed by criminal structures, which are
particularly grave as threats to the state and its citizens. Thus, when analysing complex
institutional systems created with a view to preventing money laundering one must be
well aware of the threats and dangers such dealings engender in relation to state security.
As a result, in both countries one can observe independent systems of complex
regulations and institutional solutions, whose aim is to make the legitimation of
proceeds of crime more difficult. These systems involve, to a varying extent, entities
representing both public and private sector. One of the key elements behind the
systems for money laundering prevention and combating is the introduction of
regulations requiring that financial institutions and other designated legal entities
report transactions which are suspected to be linked to criminal or terrorist activity.
Owing to the traditional confidentiality of data related to financial transactions
and the fact that reporting entities have no means to substantiate their suspicions, it is
necessary that the governments set up specialised agencies which will focus their efforts
1
Brigitte Unger, Johan den Hertog, Water always finds its way: Identifying new forms
of money laundering, Crime Law and Social Change, 57/2012, 289301.

76
The Role of Fin. Intell. Units in Comb. Money Laund. in Poland and Macedonia

on processing financial information. Such bodies being financial intelligence units are
becoming core entities within national systems for combating money laundering2.
In November 1996 the Egmont Group, which is an international organisation
providing a forum for discussing issues and problems related to effectively combating
money laundering adopted the following definition of a Financial Ingelligence Unit (FIU):
A central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted,
requesting), analyzing, and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures
of financial information (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) required
by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering3.
Expanding on this definition, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) requires that
countries set up financial intelligence units that would serve three major functions: the
collector or repository of reported information, analysis and financial information
sharing, for detecting and countering money laundering and terrorist financing.
The FATF also has a general requirement that all national authorities exchange
information and co-operate with their domestic and international counterparts4.
In their simplest form, FIUs are agencies which receive from financial institutions
and other organisations reports of suspicious transactions to be thoroughly analysed
while the results of such investigations are communicated to law enforcement bodies
and (if applicable) to financial intelligence units abroad for the purpose of countering
acts of money laundering. They are therefore a buffer between the private financial
sector and law enforcement and judiciary bodies.
This paper presents practical aspects of financial intelligence units functioning
in Poland and Macedonia. Its main focus will be legal grounds and execution of
essential functions enabling identification and prosecution of money laundering acts
by these institutions.

TYPES AND BASIC FUNCTIONS OF FIUS

Establishing a financial intelligence unit is a milestone in the process of


combating financial crime. The basic features of a FIU to be created should factor in
the penal policy characteristic of a particular country as well as fit in with the countrys
legal and administrative framework5. When establishing financial intelligence units,
the state may decide on a choice of one of four models6:

2
Statement of Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, The Hague,
13 June 2001, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/EGstat-2300106_en.pdf
(Retrieved 18.12.2015).
3
Definition of a Financial Intelligence Unit as adopted at the plenary meeting of the Egmont
Group in Rome in November 1996, Interpretive Note Concerning the Egmont Definition of a
Financial Intelligence Unit, Draft 5/28/02, http://216.55.97.163/wp-content/themes/bcb/bdf/
int_regulations/egmont/egmont_final_interpretive.pdf (Retrieved 18.12.2015).
4
International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terorism
& Proliferation. The FATF Reccomendations, Paris 2012, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (Retrieved 18.12.2015).
5
Same quote.
6
On the typology of FIUs, see:

77
60 2 2016 Rafa Wonica

- the Administrative Model where the FIU is an independent intermediary


between the private and the public sector; while providing a proper level of
secrecy with regard to the information provided, it is first and foremost an
analytical centre. As a result, the unit through its operations - increases
the level of trust on the part of the financial sector which becomes more
willing to get involved in counteracting money laundering practices. The
unit constitutes an element of executive or supervisory bodies such as a
ministry of finance or a central bank.
- the Law Enforcement Model in which the FIU not only collects information
but also decides as to whether the evidence obtained in a given case justifies
launching an investigation. Such a unit has been properly authorised
to independently carry out penal investigations. In this model, the FIU
constitutes a specialised police unit.
- the Judicial Model in which the FIU is closely connected with the
Prosecution Service. The information gathered is communicated directly to
the Prosecutors Office and any undertaken actions are supported by powers
of courts already at the stage of preliminary proceedings.
- the Hybrid Model the last category includes financial intelligence units
which are various combinations of the three models described above. Such
hybrid systems attempt at obtaining consolidated advantages offered by
the other types. Some FIUs combine the features of administrative and law
enforcement types whereas others incorporate the competencies of customs
and police services.

Directorate for Money Laundering Prevention (MLPD) established in September


2001 was an internal body within the structures of the Ministry of Finance which
carried out the functions of a financial intelligence unit in Macedonia. The new Law
on Prevention of Money Laundering and Other Proceeds of Crime and Financing
Terrorism, which came into effect in September 2014 changed the name of the
organisation into Financial Intelligence Office (mkd.
)7. The unit remained part of the Ministry of Finance, even though the
new act established the body as a legal person.
Article 40 of Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Other Proceeds
of Crime and Financing Terrorism sets out essential competencies of the Financial
Intelligence Office which in general cover basic functions of a financial intelligence
unit. The most important of these include:
- to seek, collect, process, analyse, keep and provide data obtained from the
reporting entities;
- to collect financial, administrative and other data and information necessary
in performing its duties;

http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/financial-intelligence-units-fius (Retrieved 18.12.2015).


7
,
, . 130 03.09.2014 , . 40.

78
The Role of Fin. Intell. Units in Comb. Money Laund. in Poland and Macedonia

- to prepare and submit reports to the competent state authorities, whenever


there are grounds for suspicion of commission of money laundering or
financing terrorism;
- to issue written postponement orders;
- to submit order for monitoring of the business relation to the entity,
- to cooperate with relevant domestic and international bodies etc8.

The analysis of basic competencies and responsibilities of the Office clearly


points out to the administrative character of Macedonian FIU, which, as a result, has
no investigative or prosecution powers.
Section 2 of the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Prevention
Act (AML/CFT) adopted by the Polish Sejm on 16 November 2000 defines bodies
responsible for money laundering prevention while setting out the legal framework
for the office of the Inspector General for Financial Information (IGFI) as one of
these institutions9. The office being a governmental body is central to the prevention
of legitimisation of assets obtained from illegal sources. The Inspector General for
Financial Information performs their duties assisted by the Department of Financial
Information, which is an organisational unit established for this purpose within the
structures of the Ministry of Finance10.
The Inspector General for Financial Information together with the Department
of Financial Information constitute Polands financial intelligence service. The scope
of the Inspectors responsibilities set out in Article 4 of the AML/CFT Act includes,
among other things:
- obtaining, gathering, processing and analysing of information pursuant to
the AML/CFT Act as well as transactions suspected to derive from illegal or
undisclosed sources;
- performance of transaction suspension or of account blocking procedures;
- transmitting to obligated institutions the information on entities towards
which there exist a well-founded ground, that they are connected with
commitment of terrorist acts;
- preparation of documents justifying the execution of criminal act suspicion
and forwarding them to competent authorities;
- initiating and taking other serving to prevent the use of the Polish financial
system to legalize revenues derived from illegal or undisclosed sources;
- co-operation with foreign institutions, working with AML/CFT11.
The Polish unit responsible for financial intelligence like its Macedonian
counterpart - is an official body of administrative nature. Hence FIUs in both countries

8
Same quote.
9
Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziaaniu praniu pienidzy oraz
finansowaniu terroryzmu (Dz. U. z 2014 r., poz. 455), art 3.
10
Same quote.
11
Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada...., art 4 (1).

79
60 2 2016 Rafa Wonica

have similar responsibilities. The units investigate specific cases based on gathering
and connecting facts provided by all interested parties. Once there are substantiated
suspicions of money laundering practices, relevant information will be communicated
to the Prosecution Service and courts of law. It should be noted that both FIO as well as
IGFI notify the Prosecution Office of suspected crimes and not of crimes as such.
In addition to the functions mentioned above, Polish financial intelligence unit
provides training courses for the staff of reporting institutions, law enforcement
officers and supervisory bodies. The high quality of training provided by the
unit should contribute to the generally favourable impression of IGFI among the
representatives of participating institutions.

INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

Basic functions defined for the administrative-type financial intelligence units


require that these entities exercise objectivity when issuing decisions as well as
ensure seamless transfer of information while securing full protection of sensitive
data. Given that the exchange of information between FIUs and financial institutions
is based on trust, it is important to consider already at the time of establishing an FIU
that the key to successful cooperation will be trust the latter will have in the unit. In
order to ensure their problem-free functioning, financial intelligence units must be
provided with operational autonomy, which will enable them to perform their roles
without unnecessary interference from the outside.
A number of factors affect the scope of autonomy and responsibility of FIUs. One
of such factors is the exact position of the unit within the administrative structures
or more precisely whether the unit constitutes part of an already existing ministry
or agency, or it is anchored outside the existing administrative structures. Legal
provisions may also protect the autonomy of FIUs by defining the conditions of
appointing and dismissing directors of such units12. In addition to all these factors of
legal and institutional nature, the actual scope of an FIUs autonomy may be affected
by e.g. the amount and mode of distribution of budgetary funds earmarked for the unit.
Article 4 of the AML/CFT Act states that FIO is managed by a Director who is
appointed and dismissed by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, upon the
proposal of the Minister of Finance, for a mandate of 4 years. In case of his/her absence
or unavailability, the Director may authorise a civil servant to sign acts referred to
FIOs activity13. The act also stipulates that the Director shall be appointed on the
basis of his/her professionalism and competencies, yet so far no formal procedure
for evaluation of professionalism and competencies of candidates competing for the
position of FIOs Director has been adopted. In practical terms, the Minister of Finance
appoints the Director by nominating one of the staff employed by FIO.
According to the act, the Directors mandate shall expire for one of the following
reasons: death, resignation, dismissal if officially convicted of crime with a prison
sentence exceeding a period of six months or if banned from managerial positions by

Guy Stessens, Money Laundering. A New International Law Enforcement Model,


12

Cambridge 2000, 189190.


13
..., . 42.

80
The Role of Fin. Intell. Units in Comb. Money Laund. in Poland and Macedonia

order of a court14. The Director may also be dismissed on grounds of: involvement in
illegal activities, incompetence or gross negligence as well as generally unsuccessful
performance in the role as FIO Director. Dismissal is also possible at the Directors
request or if a prolonged illness hinders normal performance of duties15.
IGFI can be appointed and dismissed only by the Prime Minister, upon a motion
filed by the minister in charge of financial institutions. The Inspector General serves
as an Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance16. It must be noted that IGFI
fulfils some other roles, these including fiscal inspection as an under secretary of the
state; however, these additional obligations do not affect the operational autonomy
and independence of IGFI. The Department of Financial Information which supports
IGFI in the execution of their statutory duties has been set up as a separate entity
within the structure of the Ministry of Finance. The Departments Director and deputy
directors are appointed and dismissed pursuant to the Civil Service Act. According to
Polish authorities, IGFI has complete operational autonomy and independence and is
free of any influence from the Minister of Finance17.

FIU FINANCING

In order to effectively execute their official duties, financial intelligence units


require funds which should be allocated in proportion to their size and the amount of
data that the unit gathers and processes. This, in turn, is related to the size and number
of financial and non-financial entities obligated to report to the FIU. Also, other duties
defined for financial intelligence services should be factored in when determining
the units financial needs. Establishing the FIU as part of a ministry or government
agency (as it is the case in Poland) may reduce some operational costs, such as staff
management and maintenance, which are covered by the Ministry or shared between
many units within the Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, IGFI as a financial
intelligence unit within the structures of the Ministry of Finance, has no independent
budget. As a result, each year the Inspector General must reserve funds in the budget
of the Ministry of Finance to cover ongoing expenses which include purchase of
software, hardware and other equipment, data security management, staff training
as well as meeting certain obligations resulting from membership in international
organisations. This can lead to a certain amount of dependence on the Minister of
Finance, who decides on the amount of funds allocated for the Inspector General.
As regards financing, Macedonian FIO is in a much more favourable situation
compared to its Polish counterpart. Funds for financing financial intelligence operations
are allocated from the central state budget. FIO enjoys full independence in managing
the units funds. The amount of funds received by FIO has been increasing steadily over

14
Same quote, . 42 (3).
15
Same quote.
16
Ustawa o przeciwdziaaniu....., art 3.
17
Report on Fourth Assessment Visit, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism, Poland, Strasbourg 2013, 91, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/
Evaluations/round4/PL4-MERMONEYVAL%282013%292_en.pdf (Retrieved 18.12.2015).

81
60 2 2016 Rafa Wonica

the past few years18. In addition to funds allocated within the state budget, FIO receives
support from the European Union and the Nordic Fund for the purpose of financing
particular activities, such as technical improvements (purchase of hardware and software),
increased administrative performance (FIO staff training) and raising awareness among
bodies and institutions involved in money laundering prevention and intervention19.

PERSONNEL AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The internal structure and organisation of financial intelligence units is obviously


determined by the functions they are required to perform. Units of administrative
nature (examples of which are Polish and Macedonian services) include departments
responsible for collecting and analysing reports. As this function is of significant
importance, a separate organisational section has been created to address these issues.
The FIO internal organisation and structure, presented in fig. 1 below, is organised
in two main sectors: the Sector for Regulation and Development of the System (which
includes: the Department for Legal and Administrative Affairs; the Department for
International Cooperation and System Development and IT Department) and the
Sector for Prevention of Money Laundering and Inspection Supervision (which
includes the Department for Prevention of Money Laundering; the Department for
Prevention of Financing of Terrorism; the Department for Inspection Supervision
and the Department for Analytics). The HR Department and the Financial Issues
Department operate under direct mandate of the Director.

Director (1)

Department for Human


financial resources
matters (2) Department (1)
Sector for prevention of
Sector for regulation and
money laundering and
system development
inspection audit
Head of sector (1)
Head of sector (1)

Department for Department for Department for


Department for Department for
legal and IT Department Analytics prevention of prevention of
international inspection
administrative (2) Department (3) money financing of
cooperation (3) audit (3)
matters (4) laundering (5) terrorism (5)

Figure 1
Financial Intelligence Office Organisational Structure
(with number of employees shown in brackets),
source: ufr.gov.mk

18
The FIO Budget in 2008 was 22,368,000 MKD, in 2010 was 28,000,000 MKD, the
FIO Budget in 2013 was 35,500,000 MKD out of which 38% is foreseen for the staff salaries,
source: http://ufr.gov.mk/?q=node/5 (Retrieved on 18.12.2015).
19
Same quote.

82
The Role of Fin. Intell. Units in Comb. Money Laund. in Poland and Macedonia

Macedonian financial intelligence service employs the total of 51 staff members,


yet only 16 analysts are employed in the sections responsible for carrying out the
Units core functions. It should be noted that the majority of the staff employed in
the Sector for Prevention of Money Laundering have economic or legal background.
The organisational structure of Polish financial intelligence unit has been
presented in fig. 2. The Department of Financial Information at the Ministry of
Finance employs 51 persons.

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Director of the Department

Sekretariat
(2 persons)

Unit of Data Processing and IT


Infrastructure
(6 persons) Deputy Director 1 Deputy Director 2

Analytical Unit Control Unit


International Cooperation Unit (6 persons) (8 persons)
(4 persons)
Domestic
Unit of Complex
Cooperation
Analysis
Unit
(6 persons)
Team for legal issues (4 persons)
(4 persons)
Data Modeling Unit
(5 persons)

Team for
Qualifications
(4 persons)

Figure 2
Organisational structure of the Department of Financial Information
(with number of employees shown in brackets),
source: mf.gov.pl

However, I am of the opinion that the current staff figures are insufficient,
given the substantial number of STRs (Suspicious Transaction Reports on Money
Laundering) received20. The problem is particularly acute in the analytical section
20
Total number of STRs in year: 2012 31 395; 2013 26 925, 2014 24 868, http://www.
mf.gov.pl/en/ministerstwo-finansow/dzialalnosc/giif/publikacje/-/asset_publisher/8KnM/
content/sprawozdania-roczne-z-dzialalnosci-generalnego-inspektora-informacji-finansowej

83
60 2 2016 Rafa Wonica

with a staff of 22 persons. Investigation in large cases is an extremely resource


consuming task for analytical departments. This leads to considerable backlogs
which have a negative impact on the effectiveness of analytical work in less serious
cases. The Supreme Audit Office21 in their inspection report concluded that due to
the inadequate staffing, the Inspector General in 2010 limited the number of audits
in obligated institutions and failed to verify incorrect or incomplete suspicious
transactions reports, which carries the risk of minimizing the preventive effect of
the Inspectors role and may consequently lead to vulnerability of the system for
prevention of money laundering22.

(Retrieved 18.12.2015).
21
The Supreme Audit Office, or NIK (previously used English translation of the name of
the institution was the Supreme Chamber of Control), is the top independent state audit body
whose mission is to safeguard public spending. For over 90 years, NIK has looked into the
way the Polish state operates and how it spends public funds.
22
Informacja o wynikach kontroli realizacji przez Generalnego Inspektora Informacji
Finansowej obowizkw w zakresie przeciwdziaania praniu pienidzy oraz finansowaniu
terroryzmu, LZG-4114-02/2010, Zielona Gra 2010, 1024.

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The Role of Fin. Intell. Units in Comb. Money Laund. in Poland and Macedonia

***

Over the recent years money laundering prevention systems meeting


internationally accepted standards have become one of requisites for a countrys
financial security. As financial intelligence units constitute a key element of these
systems, they have been already established in over 90 countries, while several
other governments are in the process of creating such units within their institutional
systems.
Polish and Macedonian financial intelligence services were set up several
years ago. This paper analyzes a number of aspects related to their organisation and
functioning.
Both units function as independent intermediaries between the private and public
sector. Their main roles include gathering, collecting, processing and analysing
information on suspicious transactions obtained from obligated institutions. Thus,
they are first and foremost centres for data analysis, which is reflected in the structure
of both units, where analytical departments function as separate organisational
segments.
Financial intelligence units in both countries have not been authorised to
undertake operational surveillance or investigation and intelligence work, which is
typically a responsibility of law enforcement agencies. Lack of capacity to undertake
investigative operations results in limited possibilities of determining whether the
transactions which are subject to the units investigation are actually connected
with the criminal activity of money laundering. Provisions contained in AML/CFT
acts adopted in Poland and Macedonia support FIUs in this respect by obliging the
Public Prosecution Service and units coordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs
to immediately notify the FIU of all instances where obtained information points to
cases of money laundering.
The administrative character of Polish and Macedonian FIUs has been reflected
in their position within the countries administrative structures. Considering several
years history of financial intelligence units operating in both countries, the decision
to establish them as administrative bodies rather than police-type service should be
viewed in positive terms. Money laundering can be related to a variety of illegal
activities in fact, any such activity which, once committed, may result in substantial
material gains. In both countries operate services whose activities target selected
areas of criminal activity and threats to the countrys security. If the FIUs had been
established as yet another autonomous investigative agency, their operational areas
would overlap with other law enforcement agencies. If, on the other hand, the two
units had been created as specialised sections within structures of a larger service
we might see problems connected with exchange of information with other state
services.

85
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961


8142

THE PROCESSES OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION IN THE BALKAN


AND MACEDONIAN DISCOURSES
- LINGUISTIC APPROACH

Maciej Kawka
Jagiellonian University in Krakow

XX XXI
, ,
.
.

() ,

.

: , , , , ,
.

INTRODUCTION
Republic of Macedonia is a multinational (dominated by Macedonian and
Albanian population), multiethnic (with different ethnical groups), multilingual
(dominated by Macedonian and Albanian language) and multi-religious (dominated
by Orthodox Christianity and Islam) country. In this country with population of
two million live Macedonians and Albanians, Turks, Roma, Aromanians and other
national and ethnical groups. Macedonian is the official language used by the majority
of the population in the Republic (70%). Albanian (25.17% of the population) ,

87
60 2 2016 Maciej Kawka

Turkish, Serbian and Croatian language (during the reign of J. Broz Tito - Serbo-
Croatian language) as well as other languages are also in use. -
) . Orthodox Christianity is the dominant religion (67%
of the population), however, there is also a significant number of Muslims, who
represent less than one third of the society. The Macedonian language belongs to
the group of South Slavic languages along with the Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian
and Slovenian language. It is estimated that the Macedonian language, including
dialects, in Republic of Macedonia is spoken by 2 million out of 2.5 million people
together with the Macedonian emigration.
In the postwar history of the Macedonian language, the need for regulation of
its legal and grammatical status, and hence the destiny of a literary standard, was
expressed by the highest legislative bodies that strived towards its establishment.
State committees that determined the Macedonian alphabet and the basis for language
development were created. Non-linguistic factors involved in codification processes
were obvious right after the World War II, when the Macedonian standards was
established under the influence of the not so great but highly influential elites. This
was not so difficult when it came to this, at the time, Yugoslav republic, subordinate
to Belgrade until 1991.
A large part of the population - according to some estimates, more than 30 percent
of the increasing trend - are Albanians, of whom the majority are Muslims, a small
number includes Catholics, however both these religious groups are characterized
by fast population growth and increase of political aspiration. Even in the early
phases of Macedonians road to independence, dissatisfied by their current situation,
Macedonian Albanians asked for changes especially concerning the Albanian
language, i.e. its agreement with the Macedonian language.
A peace treaty - the Framework Agreement - was signed after the end of the
Macedonian-Albanian conflict on 13 August 2001. Besides concerning important
political questions, the Treaty also refers to the Albanian language in Macedonia, which
gain the status of an official language in the Parliament, the State Administration and
the municipalities where the number of Albanian population was 20% or over 20%.
These processed were not neutral towards the development of the contemporary
Macedonian language. Postwar efforts of Macedonian intellectuals and other elite
groups led to success in for of basic codification of the language and publishing
of the : (Dictionary of Macedonian Language)
(with Serbo-Croatian interpretation), as well as
(Grammar of the Macedonian
Literary Language).1 Thus, year after year, editions in contemporary literature,
poetry and prose, started to increase, and in the eyes of the citizens of Macedonia the
literary standard was born.
In these circumstances, national identity is being created alongside the srugle
for independence and survival of the people, but it is also being created through
the language, within the linguistic image of the world, within scientific discourses

1
, . Part I and II Skopje
1976.

88
The processes of self-identification in the Balkan and Macedonian discourse

and discourses created and led by Balkan states2 as well as historians, linguists,
politicians, sociologists and regular people through their colloquial speech. This
way, the self-identification process, the creation or reconstruction of the cultural or
national identity functions as a socio-political discourse taking part in all forms of
the social life and all discourse formation - linguistic, cultural, religious, political,
cognitive, media etc.
The language of Balkan national and cultural discourses is presented and
comprised not only of grammatical structures of different Balkan languages (the
Balkan League), but also of its creation through the language and within the language
of different types of cognitive processes including:
1. Creation of linguistic image of Macedonia and the Balkans by Europe or by
Balkan countries themselves.
2. Determination of the language in which main linguistic images of Macedonia
were created - which of those were common and what was their influence on
Balkan conflicts and misunderstanding.
3. Determination of the period during which the Balkan will remain a
multicultural and multilingual mystery for its European neighbors. It seems
that the most important, but not the only reason for this is the regions cultural
heterogeneity.

1. DISCOURSES - MACEDONIAN, BALKAN AND EUROPEAN


DISCOURSES - DEFINITIONS AND LINGUISTIC DETERMINATIONS

The notion of discourse, which today is largely present in humanistic (history,


philosophy) and social sciences (sociology, law) as well as in media science, a
category which still has lots of meanings, became a subject of linguistic researches,
especially those with tendencies in communications - communications grammar.
This derives from the fact that current description of text semantics and syntax did
not include pragmatic perspective, which implies the presents of: speaker, receiver
(listener), intentions, speakers emotions, context, base of communication act ,
space, time etc. Use of all these elements in discourse analysis led to definition of the
basic units of this kind of communication, as are speech acts, divided in microacts
and macroacts and qualified as discursive genres, for e.g., literary, political, medium
(radio, television, printed media, internet discourse etc.).

Methodology used for discourse analysis provides for three solutions situated
on three levels:
1. linguistic - discourse is a verbal structure i.e. a form of language use (a system).
Functional perspective dominates these researches (who?, how?, why?, for
whom?, how is text generated?) This is a purely linguistic approach;
2. communicational and interactive - discourse is an action by means of
words - interaction created within a specific social and cultural context by

2
, , 1903.

89
60 2 2016 Maciej Kawka

inclusion of situation elements as an important condition for successful


communication (pragmalinguistic approach);
3. cognitive - discourse is a form of communication within the frame of a
certain determined system of notions and values (worldview) and ideas.
Semantic, and even formal text structure is modeled in accordance with this
mental image of the world and the cognitive processes established for the
purpose of its command and understanding (cognitivism).

At the end of 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, furthering the so called
conception of critical discourse analysis (CAD), discourse is suggested to be a social
and institutional norm, convention, rules and strategies used in the process of text and
expression creation. Discourse analysis, i.e. critical discourse analysis, is comprised
of a wider interdisciplinary research perspective mainly deriving from disciplines as
are linguistics, semiotics, sociology, psychology and philosophy.
Cultural and societal patterns are the bases for formation of discursive expression
and texts with determined genre traits are their effect. Hence, each discourse should
be considered as a norm, a strategies, a convention used in the creation of text within
a context and this is the reason why it can be defined in accordance with contextual
properties and strategies based on societal and cultural patterns, not in accordance with
linguistic structures typical for discourse in linguistic sense of the word - marked with
internal deixes and shifters3 In addition, discourse is updated in a number of genres,
as are, for example, conversation, plea, complaint, prayer and more complicated -
debate, expose, decision, declarations, resolutions, recommendations and conclusions.
Larger part of these genres are characteristic not only of everyday life but can also be
found outside of it, in official situations linked to patterns building political, national,
religious, linguistic, historical and other norms and strategies exploited in different
kinds of discourse by means of which authority and power over others is created and
maintained. Those who know how to employ the game of discourses can also manage
others and rule over them in form of a global discourse.
Regarding social studies, discourse analysis can be defined as a method for
qualitative and quantitative research subject to all kinds of spoken words (radio,
television) and writen words (press, internet) and their social influence. Accordingly,
from this perspective, language can be considered not only as a means of communication
but also a construction of the social reality, a sort of a common practice.

In discourse analysis, linguistically treated and seen from intertextual and


metatextual perspective, discourses belong to the sphere of texts . Therefore, we are
mainly speaking about the form of scientific texts, less about their content, about
historical events, their interpretation and scientific conceptualization. The notion of
conceptualization implies a process of notion creation based on general knowledge of
the world and the definition of a given word found in all texts analyzed (text corpora).
When it comes to discourse of neoliberalism, the ever more popular meaning

3
Roman Jakobson, Szyftery, kategorie czasownikowe i czasownik rosyjski, w: W
poszukiwaniu istoty jzyka. Wybr pism. Wybr pism redakcja naukowa i wstp Maria
Renata Mayenowa, Warszawa 1989, s. 257281.

90
The processes of self-identification in the Balkan and Macedonian discourse

of the terms informal use in media and some social sciences is becoming more
frequent. In this case discourse refers not only to the manners of speaking, used by
neoliberal thinkers and politicians, but also to the concepts and ideas they propagate;
and researches done in the field of neoliberal discourse does not necessarily have to
include or deal with language use.
Linguistics became dominated by the perspective of common determinates
for both types of description - theoretical and empirical - rather late. Traditional
system differentiation - language, competence (language - parole), expression - use
(competence - performance) - is advocated by a dynamic network of interconnections
between authentic language information, data (data bases and corpus information)
and their conditionality in communication processes - discourse. Interdisciplinarity,
empirical orientation and social conditionality of language use strengthens the
procedural interaction character of discourse as a sum of instructions (rules) or
strategies used in communication game so as to achieve, primarily, understanding.
Polysemantics of the notion discourse also raised difficulties in the methodology
used for linguistic description derived mainly from the absence of corresponding
method in accordance with which texts, thanks to special corresponding indicators,
can be ascribed and can have built in not only grammatical and semantic information,
but also culturological, political, societal, traditional tradition. Within this framework,
alongside structural methods (linguistic discourse analysis), cognitive and related
disciplines as are anthropology, sociology, logics, semiotics (critical discourse
analysis), a special place belongs to corpus linguistics as a discipline that can make
great changes in methodology used for analysis of text and discourse as a language
database integrating thus far divided research fields.
Modern linguistics of communication represents a scientific discipline that
deals with the functioning of natural languages within an environment of culturally
marked, highlighted social relations. The term discourse is in the center of these
relations. Thus the term discourse points out the text/language in use as well as the
idea that every model for extra-contextual consideration of expression is doomed to
failure. In consequence thereof, language analyzed without a context ceases to be a
language at all. As a consequence, it can be admitted that a large part of theoretical
linguistics lacking a suitable research subject is - literally said - pointless.

2. BALKANISM, BALKANIZATION AND HOMO BALCANICUS


IMAGINARY BALKAN

Since the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, the question of cultural
and national identities of Balkan people has been discussed several times, and it
still remains a popular topic and source of controversies and challenges for many
historians, sociologists, anthropologists, politologists, linguists etc. Balkan discourse
can be considered to have started even then. Within the framework of that research
process, new notions and solutions were established, essentially, representing not
only credible challenges, but were also creators of language stereotype for Balkanism
and the Balkan.

91
60 2 2016 Maciej Kawka

Marija Todorova in her bookImagining the Balkans4


wrote the following:
In relation to domination and constant presence of Western discourse, which is
discrediting the Balkan and witnesses politisation of essential cultural differences - it
is very difficult to realistically expect for the Balkans to create liberal, tolerant and
diverse identity that would serve as respect to polysemantics and deny essentialism.5
Although there are many unknowns regarding criteria used for defining the
notion of Balkan identity, here, Balkan is understood as a cultural - historical and
political community in which cultural traits decide whether or not a certain country
belongs to the Balkan. These traits include: Language - which belongs to the Balkan
linguistic union, some folklore elements, societal traits - multiethnicity, cohabitation
of Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims as well as the historical annexation
to the Byzantine empire, the Slavic settlement and the Ottoman rule.
Notions Balkanism, Balkanization and Homo Balkanicus (homo balcanicus) as
discursive mechanisms for ghettoization have been verified and today they function as
basic elements creating the negative image of the Balkan in discourses - in the Polish
as well as in discourses of other Balkan countries and Europe. Research of imaginary
stereotypes in the Balkans in context of the Balkan drama concerning post-communism
mirrored in linguistic slogans and phraseologisms as are ,
, (Balkan Cauldron, sick man of Europe, Powder keg) etc. can be
conducted not only from comparative Balkan perspective - Balkan states have always
been interested in themselves - but also from more objective one, in larger European
context. Power languages are being created, different from older conversational and
colloquial languages, which were largely due to oblivious processes resulting from
explosive interaction between technology and linguistic diversity.

3. GENERAL TYPES OF CULTURAL AND NATIONAL DISCOURSES

National and ethnical relationships proceed all others but they also change
through history, transform through time, fall apart, form again or merge with
others depending on historical situation. Every person must belong to some ethical
group or nation - national property is the most important, ethnical affiliation is the
strongest - but the sense of belonging in a certain ethnical or national group can
disappear, quench and come to life again, it can be instigated from outside etc. Basic
mechanisms for this are:
1) Discourse of Multilingualism - in which different ideologies are often
represented by heterogenic (unrelated) languages, and different ideological codes
aspire overcoming of socio-political polyphony due to reproduction of meanings in
discourse and through discourse to creation of dominant ideology. Multicomponent
and polyfunctional relation between language and authority leads directly to
emergence of semiosis, which becomes a codifier of ideological convictions.
4
Maria Todorova, Imagining The Balkans, Oxford University Press, New York 2009.
5
Maria Todorova, Bakany wyobraone. Przeoyli P. Szymor i M. Budziska, Woowiec
2008, p. 133.

92
The processes of self-identification in the Balkan and Macedonian discourse

Many connections can be found in the process of societal and cultural projection
of the national idea. They can be differently interpreted thus creating a discourse
of rivalry in meaning comprised of permanent construction of new meanings and
their contexts (lexical, syntactic, stylistic, phraseological and genre-related) together
with their axiological associations and connotations to persuade the receiver of their
arguments, and with their repetition (reproduction), further distribute this conviction.
Most obvious effect of this rivalry between languages is the elimination of
dialects and certain ethnic languages in favor of literary and international languages.
However, one of its undesired consequences is the defensive reaction of aware
speakers comprised of support of multilingualism and multiculturalism.
Media are a weapon used and abused in different discourses - political, medial,
literary as well as discursive analysis of the work of contemporary Macedonian
writers (historical texts, literary texts, handbooks and other texts) as an expression
and a manner for creation of linguistic image of the world. For e.g.: Luan Starova
and his novel Balkan Babylonians ( ) is an example for the
literary discourse on memory.
2) Convincing (rhetorical) discourse on values In relation to different questions,
it can be articulated in different ways, and the choice of discourse and its genre implies
the code users ideological (political) standpoint and his choice of his world of values,
in which, by use of determined rhetorical means, he is convincing us himself. From
this aspect, the analysis will primarily include political (parliamentary) discourse,
public speeches, exposes, religious texts, sermons, political parties manifests and
societla non-governmental groups. This analysis concerns linguistic - lexical and
syntactic, textual - means of expression of positive and negative values - hate speech
in public communication - public communion.
3) Cognitive models in language analysis of Macedonian and Balkan discourses
The most important basis for conceptualization of the linguistic image of the world
is lexis, understood as a collection, an inventory of notions, relevant not only from
historical, societal and cultural aspect, but based on associative subjective relations,
often, hidden in our subconsciousness. This collection of notions is altered depending
on certain historical conditions, cultural changes, increase of knowledge and societal
needs. Some relations and notions have already been defined - they receive linguistic
determinations different from the once thus far used.
In addition, connotation of many key words, needed for understanding of
societal processes and historical changes, is being altered. This concerns the manners
of defining (nomination) as well as their ontological bases, discovered through
structural and etymological analysis and associative researches (usually in form of
surveys with certain number of stimuli) thanks to the different meaning witnessed
in sentences (for e.g. Macedonians - South Slavic nation that lives in the state of
Macedonia and Macedonians - Ancient people - genetically linked to nations that
used to inhabit the conquered lands.
4. Types of discourses in accordance with certain disputes concerning national,
historical, cultural and political identity: Serbian and Croatian, Bulgarian and
Macedonian, Greek and Macedonian, Serbian and Kosovo etc.

93
60 2 2016 Maciej Kawka

4. SELF-IDENTIFICATION DISCOURSES - METHODOLOGY

Subject to linguistic analysis i.e. to language image of the world, when it


comes to Macedonian and Balkan discourses concerning national and cultural self-
identification, is to prove the all existing differences related to same events, views,
stereotypes and myths depending on the country as well as the role each of the
counties plays in creation of contemporary language image of the Balkan - related to
the national feeling in certain Balkan countries and their comparison, for example,
with Polish national discourse and other European national discourses. Serbian,
Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, Bulgarian, Slovenian discourse.
Separate national discourse can be considered from different aspects through:
1) National myths transformed in political myths through discursive processes
thus fulfilling a very important role in creation of the identities of certain
Balkan peoples.
2) Balkan national discourses found on local level (regional - state national
discourses), bilateral level (Macedonian - Bulgarian, Serbo - Croatian,
Macedonian - Greek discourse) as well as multilateral level - European and
international together with European discourses including Turkey, Russia
and USA.

Linguistic (semantic) analysis of cultural and national discourses and their types
can show us how they create or modernize the cultural and national identity of current
and newly formed (Kosovo) Balkan states as well as the differences in the perception
of same events, texts, standpoints, stereotypes and myths depending on the country
and study the role of each and every one of them (discourses: Macedonian, Serbian,
Bosnian, Bulgarian, Montenegrin) in the process of building the language image
of the Balkan. Processes of modernization and transposition can ultimately lead to
stable societies and nations. However, multiethnic states are prone to internal strives
because they do not dispose of unique and universal national idea.
Cognitive analysis of perception regarding self-identification processes by
European neighbors and Europe, Russia, USA and other countries from former
Yugoslavia, with special accent on Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Hertsegovina,
Croatia and Albania that is generally conducted on the basis of materials from
newspapers and other media will show what kind of language images have been
created in discourses and which parts of these images are mutual as well as what is
their influence on Balkan conflicts, challenges and misunderstandings.
Study of language image of the world, semiotic analysis of discourse (quantitative
and qualitative) and associative researches that will result with, for e.g.: Polish,
Serbian and Macedonian associative sentences. In relation to languages, association
is useful for reconstruction of mental dictionary by using the semantic differential
method by Charles Osgood.
In ethno-linguistic researches on identity, basic material for identification of the
so-called national concepts i.e. notions as are: Serbian, Croatian, Macedonian etc., is
comprised of the following groups of facts:
a) Dictionary data (word definitions);

94
The processes of self-identification in the Balkan and Macedonian discourse

b) Textual data from current texts taken from a given public discourse;
c) Corpus data found in the biggest textual corpora in a given language (national
language corpora - Polish National Corpus, Croatian National Corpus,
Russian National Corpus, Internet Corpus - WebCorpLive, Corpus Gralis etc.
d) Data obtained as a result of associative researches and other survey researches.
e) Date and documents taken from official speeches and public addresses by
political actors (leaders?!), international and regional statements by influential
world and local intellectuals and international related institutions for public
opinion can be analyzed.

***

The essence of creating national and cultural identity, i.e. self-identification, is


contained in discourses and through discourses taking place at various levels of social
communication. This process of creation or reconstruction of the cultural or national
identity functions as a socio-political discourse taking part in all forms of the social
life and all discourse formation - linguistic, cultural, religious, political, cognitive,
media etc. Thus, in the late twentieth and early twenty first century, the beginning
of the self-identification process of Balkan peoples, including Macedonian people,
was created. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, processes of self-identification created
new images and new perspectives. These changes taking place in the Balkans and
in Europe led to actualization and modernization of the language (code) of national
and cultural discourses of Balkan countries (including Macedonia) for the purpose
of forming their own or reconstructing the current identity through self-identification
or partially, in confrontation with similar discourses belonging to their neighbors.

95
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

811.163.3:811.162.1
811.162.1:811.163.3



(- )

ASSOCIATION METHOD AS OPPORTUNITY FOR PERCEPTION


OF DIFFERENCES
(MACEDONIAN-POLISH ASSOCIATIONS)


, .

Abstract

The impetus to investigate association fields originated from the need to define semantic
fields in terms of lexical analysis as well as the way these fields, through a systematical
regrouping, build nests of semantemes that are related and cognate yet distinct from each other,
thus creating communicative situations and acts adequate to the language needs of certain
cognitive processes. The association method of analysis particularly shows the experience of
the speaker and, through that research, can perform a description of the semantic fields build
by lexemes. The language world picture can be seen with the help of the comparative method
of research covering associations derived by materials from the association dictionaries of
some languages. Here merely illustratively we take up two lexemes (house and work) from
the Polish, the Serbian, the Bulgarian, and the Macedonian language.

Keywords: associations, Macedonian language, Polish language, language world


picture, stimuli, mental lexicon.


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dom rodzina kua krov 12; dom - 118; 32;
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106
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

811.163.3373.7:811.162.1373.7
811.162.1373.7:811.163.3373.7

MACEDONIAN POLISH-PARALLELS IN PHRASEOLOGY

Abstract

The point of interest of this article is the contrastive review of the idioms in the
Macedonian and Polish languages. Due to the notable volume of the materials available,
the analysis shall be limited to examples of two different lexems of somatic phraseology
heart (serce/srce) and soul (dusza/dusha), such as (co) ley (komu) na sercu / mu lezhi na
srce; (kogo) boli serce / srceto go boli. Our intention is to delve into the semantic aspect
of the idioms, their structure, as well as their stylistic marking and, especially, to present
those which are both semantic and lexic-structural equivalent. The goal of this comparative
methodology is to show the degree of commonness of these idioms in a typical representative
corpus of the Macedonian and Polish phraseology.

Keywords: phraseology, Macedonian, Polish, idioms with lexemes heart and soul.

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).
, , , ,
.,
, , , , ,
. ,
( , , )7.
1
,
, , 2006, ,
, ,
2002, , ,
, 2008; , ,
j, -J, , 2003; ,
, II (-), 2008; III (-), 2009; Stanisaw Karolak, -
, -, -, Widawnictwo Energeia, Warszawa 1998;
Sownik frazeologiczny, Opracowanie, Anna, Kosiska, Wydawnictwo, Naukowe PWN,
Warszawa 2008 ( SF); ,
, Studia linguistica
Polono-Meridiano-slavica, Toru 1998, 106.
2
Edupedia.pl. http://www.edupedia.pl/words/index/show/474367_slownik_frazeologiczny.
3
, ... , 106.
4
, , ..., 293.
5
, ..., 197.
6
( ) I, 2003, 560.
7
, ,

108
-


( ),
, 8.
,
- , ,
,
, : (kogo) boli serce9
/ . : Serce si ciska - isno komu / w kim od czego10
(, , ) /.
, ,
. ,
, ,
, , , . (
11),
, , , . ,
,
, ,
, ,
,
.
, .
/ ( ),
, .
12, 13; :
, 14; :
!15;
. ,
!16. ,

,
, 2000, 157.
8
, 546547.
9
SF, 410.
10
SF, 410.
11
. 3 , 7 (
), . , , 2010, 681.
12
.
13
: http://ekipa.mk/mzt-ostavi-srtse-na-teren-no-nemashe-sili-za-chudo-
protiv-tsrvena-zvezda/( 22.5.2015).
14
: http://ekipa.mk/i-pokraj-porazot-selektorot-ristoski-gord-sum-na-
moite-igrach-go-ostavija-srtseto-na-teren/ ( 22.5.2015).
15
http://sportmedia.mk/gvardiola-momtsite-go-ostavija-srtseto-i- zasluzhija-
polufinale/ ( 22.5.2015).
16
: http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp? ItemID = D236 DF4572 FFF5478
DB014A31DFF37EF&commentID=519200&pLikeVote=1 ( 22.5.2015).

109
60 2 2016 ,

:
,
.17
ja : Trener Energetyka:
Oni zostawili na boisku serce, a my nie18; Bkitni to bohaterowie, zostawili
swoje serce na boisku, a nawet troch wicej19; Zostawili serce i zdrowie na
boisku20;Zostawi na boiskucaeserce.; Zostawimy na boisku sercei puca.
Maciej Pawliski: Rywalezostawili na boiskuwicejserca; Woch podzikowa
swoim zawodnikom za walk iserce, ktrezostawili na boisku.; Anastasi: Moi
chopcy zostawili na boisku serce i pasj.

. ,
, . :
I ragazzi hanno dato l anima21, 22:
Bettinelli: Essere in classifica, vedere i ragazzi che danno lanima lottando su
ogni pallone e contro chiunque.; Varela: Peccato perch ci mettiamo il cuore;
: Lamas: Dejaron el corazn23; :
Pasche: Cest primordial dtre l dans la tte, de tout lcher, son coeur et ses
tripes sur le terrain, pour essayer de faire tourner le match en notre faveur24; .
: Theres nothing for us to lose. Were going into it to leave
our hearts on the field and hopefully come out with a win, said senior goalkeeper
Chealsey Baxter, whos from McMinn Central High School in the same county as
the Athens college.25 : Blue Jays Leave Their
Hearts, and Few Tears on the Field in Sulphur26.
,
,

17
: http://www.mkd.mk/21051/sport/gino-strezovski-devojkite-go-ostavija-
i-srceto-i-dusata-na-terenot ( 22.5. 2015).
18
: http://www.sportslaski.pl/info/trener-energetyka-oni-zostawili-na-
boisku-serce-a-my-nie.html ( 22.5.2015).
19
: www.sport.pl Pika nona Pika nona ( 21.5.2015).
20
:
h
ttps://www.facebook.com/.../posts/86020532401163 ( 21.5.2015).
21
.
22
: http://www.varesesport.com/2015/bettinelli-dato-lanima-varela-messo
-il-cuore-birighitti-ringrazio-il-mister/ ( 21.5.2015).
23
: http://www.diariouno.com.ar/ovacion/Lamas-Dejaron-el-corazon-
20140830-0050.html ( 22.5.2015).
24
:
h
ttp://www.servettefc.ch/fr/actualite/article-6495.html ( 21.5.2015).
25
: http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/sports/story/2010/nov/20/twc-
leave-hearts-field-lee/35129/ ( 25.5.2015).
26
https://www.jesuitnola.org/2014/05/17/blue-jays-leave-hearts-tears-baseball-field- sulphur/
( 22.5. 2015).

110
-

: ; ;
; , :
...chopaki z obu skadwzostawili na boiskumassercai zdrowia27,
: ... .
,
: 28,

, , .

, ,
, :
. like this29.
, 30

.
,
104 (
), ,
,
36 , 19
.
, ,
:
; (z serca31):
, .
( , 22/15)32; I rzek do nich: dajc daem tego
baranka je z wami, pierwej nibym cierpia.(ukasz 22/15).
, ..
33.
() (caym sercem, z caego serca szczrze, serdecznie,
cakowicie, bez zastrzee): , ,

27
: http://www.sportslaski.pl/info/trener-energetyka-oni-zostawili-na- boisku
-serce-a-my-nie.html; ( 22.5.2015).
28

h
ttp://vecer.mk/sport/srcata-gi-ostavija-vo-soblekuvalnata ( 22.5.2015).
29
:
http://on.net.mk/shortcut-link/1169/najdobroto-od-tviter-vcera ( 22.5.2015).
http://vecer.mk/sport/srcata-gi-ostavija-vo-soblekuvalnata (
22.5.2015).
30
: http://www.dnevnik.mk/ ?ItemID = 196D00846 4B7 BE448 EF 2C 20 D
59237C10; ( 22.5.2015).
31
Stanisaw Karolak, -..., 1033.
32
: http://agapi.mk/sveto-pismo/nov-zavet/; ( 22.5.2015).
33
: http://biblia-online.pl/biblia-otworz.html ( 22.5. 2015).

111
60 2 2016 ,

, ,
! . ( , 12/30);
Przeto bdziesz miowa Pana, Boga twego, ze wszystkiego serca twego, i
ze wszystkiej duszy twojej, i ze wszystkiej myli twojej, i ze wszystkiej siy
twojej; to jest pierwsze przykazanie (Marko 12/30)34.
(bra, wzi (sobie) co do serca przejmowa si,
przej si czym, silnie odczuwa, odczu co):
? , ! (
5/4). C ci sklonio do tego, e t rzecz dopuci do serca
swego? Nie ludziom skamaes lecz Bogu? Biblia Warzsawska, Dz, 5/4.35



. , ,
,
: 1) dusza czowiek czowiek bardzo szczery,
serdeczny, dobry. To by dusza czowiek.36 37; 2) Nie ma (nigdzie) iwej
duszy, ani iwej duszy38 39; 3) Bratnia, pokrewna, przyjazna
dusza czowiek bliski komu pod jakim wzgldem, podobny do niego40
41.

: . ( /
)
,
-, , 42.

.
() 43,
, .

: http://www.wordplanet.org/pl/41/12.htm#0 rozdzia 12
34
(
22.5. 2015).
35
: http://biblia-online.pl/szukaj,do+serca+,2,1.html
(
22.5. 2015).
36
SF, 80.
37
, , ..., 291.
38
SF, 80.
39
, , .., 291; .
, ..., 155.
40
SF..., 80.
41
, , .., 291.
42
, ..., 59.
43
, ..., 155.

112
-

, ,
, , .: woy w co cao dusz/cae serce
/ ; twiera przed kim dusz/serce44 /
/ 45.

: (kogo) boli
serce / ; serce si ciska isno komu/ w kim od czego
(, , ) / ; komu robi si mikko
koo serca46 47 / ,
48 .
dusza posza, ucieka komu w pity49 kto
zacz si ba, zlk si / /
, , ,
, .

:
1) zajcze serce 50;
2) serce si ciska- isno komu/w kim od czego (,
, ) /;
3) serce si kraje (krwawi, rozdziera si, rwie si w kaway) komu
;
4) z serca51 ;
5) kto ma mikkie serce ;
6) kamie spad komu z serca ;
7) bra, wzi (sobie) co do serca przejmowa si, przej si czym,
silnie odczuwa, odczu co ;
8) caym sercem, z caego serca szczrze, serdecznie, cakowicie, bez
zastrzee ;
9) (przestarz., a poet.) dama, pani, wybranka czyjego serca czyja
ukochana ;

44
, ..., 106; SF, 293.
45
, , ..., 293.
46
, ,
: SF, 408411.
47
, ,
: , , ..., 282.
48
, ..., 22.
49
SF, 80.
50
, ...., 2122.
51
Stanisaw Karolak 1998, -..., 1033.

113
60 2 2016 ,

10) serce skacze - podskoczyo z radoci komu/ serce wyskakuje -


wyskoczyo z piersi komu52 / 53;
11) serce zamaro komu z powodu czego54
;
12) (co) ley (komu) na sercu .

,
nema serca ,
: 1. , ; 2. , ,
. ( .:
, .).
. 55 . a56 a
, ,
,
; .
, ,
wutroba57.

52
, 1034.
53
, ..., 93.
54
Stanisaw Karolak 1998, -...., 1034.
55
, ...., 21-22.
56
, ..., 93, 142.
57
: http://tatoeba.org/eng/sentences/show/1553912 ( 20.5.2015).

114
-

***



. ,



. , , ,
.

, ,

.

,
,
. , ,
(puca, zdrowie, pasj,
),
. ,
, ,

( :
!!!).
,
,
,

. ,

, ,
.

115
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

811.163.1367.622.17:[091:003.349.8]
811.163.337:811.162.137
811.162.137:811.163.337

NOMINA INSTRUMENTI
(- )

ABOUT THE CATEGORY NOMINA INSTRUMENTI


(MACEDONIAN-POLISH PARALLEL)

Abstarct

Macedonian Church Slavonic texts contain rich lexical material which are an unavoidable
indicator of the core and nature of the material character and national culture. The paper
considers lexemes of the lexical category nomina instrumenti in the Macedonian Church
Slavonic Texts or lexical fund confirmed in old literacy, which is an essential indicator for
character on material culture and its historical development. The continuant in this lexemes
will be seen in frames of contemporary Macedonian and Polish language. The focus of
interest is the same, narrowed or expanded semantics on this lexemes.

Keywords: nomina instrumenti, Church Slavonic texts, semantics, Macedonian, Polish


language.

nomina instrumenti
..
, .. ()
1.
nomina instrumenti

.
Nomina instrumenti
2
1
, : , ,
1995, 38.
2
, : Nomina instrumenti
, , , . 57, 2008.

117
60 2 2016


, nomina instrumenti,
,

,
3.
,

XII XVI ,
.
,
.
29 .
, ,
, , ,
.
, 12 16 ,

, ,
.
,
, 4.

5.
,
, ,
.
. ,
, . : dikel6,
kosa, lopata, mot7yka, oralo, ralo, sr7p7; : brad7y, pel6ka,
pila, sek7yra, s5=ivo; : kl5]a, mlat7, nakoval6na no6, souliga;
: oskr7d7; : britva .
,

.

. . orati, kopati, niva, goum6no, snop7, eti, 3tel6 .

. , . ralo, .

milauer, Vladimr: Novoesk tvoen slov, SPN, Praha 1971, 4048.


3

, . I, , ,
4

2003, 28.
5
, , . 2, , ,
1959, 221.

118
nomina instrumenti (-

.
ralo . .: r<e>=e
e emou niktoe v6zlo6 r4k6y svo3 na ralo L9,61 Rad; d<a>v<6y>d6 i k8pi goumno wno i
p[enic8 ie vr7[e[e oorna1 i volov5 i ralo 232v16Krn.
L9,62
oralo: v7zloit7 r4k7y svo3 na wralo 38r15 Dbj.
.
oralo ralo
Staro-cerkiewno-soviaskie oralo- neologizm
kodeksu Assemaniego6,
oralo,
ralo.
oralo,
,
, nomnina instrumenti
-*dlo.
*ordlo (. , .
, . ralo, . rdlo7).
8
: 1. , ; 2.
; 3.
; 4. , .
9 : 1. , 2. ,
3. ,
, 4. .
, oralo,
: 1. 2.
.
.
dikel6 r7ylo .
dikel6, ,
: i v7ze[e dikelYe i iskopa[e
i potwm<6> da[e em8 i \ vod8 wn8 pit6 245r10Krn.
.
.
10
6
Moszyski, Leszek: Staro-cerkiewno-soviaskie oralo- neologizm kodeksu
Assemaniego, Symbolae Philologicae in honorem Vitoldi Taszycki, Wrocav-Warszawa-
Krakw 1968, 223228.
7
Skok, Petar: Etimologijski rjenik hrvatskoga ili srpskago jezik, . II, Kponi, HAZU,
Zagreb 1972, 564.
8
..., . V, , 2011, 68.
9
Sownik jzyka polskiego, . Witold Doroszewski, . VII, PriR, Panstwowe
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1965, 795.
10
..., . I, 447.

119
60 2 2016

, ,
, ( , ,
,
, )11.
,
. ( ) / /
/ 12, :
( )
13. .
r7ylo ,
: imou]ou r6yla i ko[e i
... povel5 kopati rov6 gl6bok6 25r7Stan.
.
14 15
.
*rydlo,
, 16.
17
: 1. , : 2. o
.

.

. rydel18 ,
,
, ryj19.
, , . sr7p7,
:
sr6pom7 pon4h6 klas6 3r27Zag; poslite sr6p6y ko prisp5 4
tva Jl3,13 Lobk; egda e

11
, . I, , , 1971, 388.
12
, . II, , ,
1987, 84.
13
, : . 1,
, 1999, 333.
14
Miklosich, Franz: Lexicon paleoslovenico-graeco-latinum, emendatum auctum,
Scientia verlag aalen, Wien 1963, 810.
15
, : -
, . III, rw, ,
1903, 211.
16
, : , . III, ,
, 1971, 528.
17
..., . V, 241.
18
Sownik jzyka polskiego, ..., . VII, 1426.
19
Sownik jzyka polskiego, . M. Szymczak, . III, R, Warszawa 1981, 151.

120
nomina instrumenti (-

s6birat6 plod6 abi poslet6 sr6p6y ko nastoit6 4 tva Mc4,29 Rad.


,
.. : i re=e
b<og>7 emou sr7p8 ishod5]8 \ lica b<o>Ya i v7hodit<6> v7 dom<6> wnogo kl7ne]om8
se im5nem6 b<o>Yem6 263v15 Krn.
20. sr7p7
*srp21.
22 ,
23 : 1. 2.
: (
).
brad7y
, . ,
,
. .: i se sotona bradv4 dr64 na=3t6 prokopavati st5n4 kelii
ego 106v11Les; izbi vs5m6 gol5ni bradvami wvi wt<6> nih6 oumr5[4 269r7Stan.
. *bardo24. , ,
25 (
, ),
.
, . britva .
, . .: britv8 da ne v7zlo8 na glav8
otro=et8 231r20Krn; britvo z6yk6 go our5za[4 262v13Stan; s7 britvam6y
ree]e t7in6ye =esti oud6y ego 218v24Krn. .*briti
-tva26.

, .

britva,
( ).
27 britva, brzytva,
, .
mlat7 .
, . .: i kova=6
20
, : ..., . III, 884.
21
, : ..., . III, 609.
22
..., . V, 545.
23
Sownik jzyka polskiego, . M. Szymczak, . III, 213.
24
, : ..., . I, , 1964, 205;
..., . I, 78.
25
..., . I, 173.
26
, ,
. , . , . 3, , 1976, 32.
27
Sownik jzyka polskiego, . Witold Doroszewski, . I, A , Warszawa 1958, 698.

121
60 2 2016

8dar54 mlatom6 proklepa3 Is41,7 Lobk; v6z3t6 mlat6 i v6nide v6 hramin4


idol6sk4 i s6krou[i vs5 kapi]a 278r18Stan.
*moltiti, , ,
28,
: 1. 2. ( ).

29 ( . , ()).
, ,
,
mlat7.
30
31, ,
- (Tolovski, D., illic-Svityc, V.M.,
Tolstoj, N.J. Makedonsko-russkij slovar, Moskva 1963).

,
, , ,
.
mlat7 , mot,
: 1. ;
2. . . ; 3.
( ) 4. , motowate
sphyrnidae, ( , ).

pel6ka . :
i naznamenouet6 koe s7 pelko s5=e[e dr5vYe 34v3Krn.
.
32.

oskr7d7 , . : dvri
go v7koup5 s5=ivom7 i wskr7dom7 raz7drou[i[4 i Ps73,6 Bon. a
*o(b)-skrd33.
,
, oskard, oskarda,
.

Skok, Petar: Etimologijski rjenik ..., . II, 441.


28

29
, : , ,
, . 3, 1962, 257.
30
Etimologick slovnk jazyka staroslovnskho, . 8, lunamrcati, . Adolf Erhart,
Nakladatelstv akademie vd esk Republiky, Praha 1998, 481.
31
..., . 19, 1993, 197.
32
, : , ,
, . 29, 1998, 214.
33
Etimologick slovnk ..., . 10, obrstipatna, Praha 2000, 596.

122
nomina instrumenti (-

nomina instrumenti

.
, , ,

.
, ,

.
, ,
. , , , .

. , , ,
.
: , , , ,
,
. ,

( ),
.


,

.

123
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

8138

STYLISTICS INTERNET STYLISTICS

Abstract

The subject of analysis in this article will be internet stylistics. Stylistics and internet
stylistics are not scientific disciplines in contradiction. Internet stylistics should be understood
as a scientific discipline that comes from the stylistics, which got a new communicative frame
and which accepted functional stratification of language.

Keywords: stylistics, internet stylistics, functional styles, Macedonian language, St. Gajda.

,

, .
, , ,

, ,
, ,
, .
.
, ( )
, ,
,
. ,
, ,
, XIX XX ,
1,
(1856 1947), ,
, Trait de stylistique franaise

1
.

125
60 2 2016

(Gneve Paris19092) XX .

,
. ,
, ,
( 1935 )
, .
, ,
(, , /
)3 , . ,

, (
, ),
, ,
,
.
,
, , ,
: -,
. 4. ,
,
. , ,
5,
. ,
,
, : ,
, , , ,
.
6.

, , .
, ,
,

(: 1909, 1936,
2

1951, 1983), http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/lfr_0023-8368_2002_


num_135_1_6465 ( 2. IV 2015).
3

.
4
-, .
, 2003; , . , 2002 .
, , , 2002.
5
1992 (Stylistyka I,
Opole, 1992) 23 .
6
http://www.stylistic-mks.com/index.php/sostav-komissii ( 20. V 2015).

126
-

. 7. . : I
, II , III
19 IV 20 .
I
(, ),
: / (), /
. ,
: 1. ,
; 2. : , ,
; 3. ;
; 4. (); 5. .
,
. , (
, .), (
, . ) .
II , ,
( XV ), , ,
.. : ,
. , ,
, : , ,
, , .,
, .
,
, .
III , ,
XIX .
,
, ,
.
, ,
, , ,
, , ,
,
. XVI XVII
,
XVIII XIX .
(
XVIII ), (,
, ,
, .
XIX , ,
.

7
Stanislav Gajda, Przewodnik po stylistyce polskiej. Opole 1995, 12 19.

127
60 2 2016

IV ,
XIX XX . ,
, : 1)
( . , . . ;
2) ,
. ; 3) 20 ,
; 4) ,
: . , . , . , . , . ,
. .,
; 5) ( ),
: . , . , , , . ., ,
, , 1929 ,
; 6) XX ,

8. ,
( 90-
), : ,
, ; ,
(); ,
- .
, .
, , XX
(-, )
,
, ,
.
:
, , ,
, , :
? -
, , 9, ,

, :
, 2014

, 2015
( ).
-10,
.
8
Stanislav Gajda, Stylistyka funkcjonalna, stylistyka pragmatyzcna, stylistyka
kognitiwna , Stylistyka a pragmatyka WU. Katowice 2001, 15.
9
-,
( ).
.
10
, -, , 2015.

128
-


11, :
, ,
-
. -
,
, c
.
( )
,
( ). ,

( : ).
, , -
( -)
, ()
, , () ,
, ( ),
. (
).
, -
-, : 1)
- 2) ,
12, ,
, -
,
...13
, ,
. , , :
1. ,
. (
), ,
,
,
-.
: -, -, -

11


, , 2015 ( ,
,
. , 2015 .
12
, -, .
. 2012, 483
13
, -, .
. 2012, 484.

129
60 2 2016

, , ,
-.
2. ,
,
, ,

. , ,
, ,
: , ( ), ,
, , .,
( , pdf-). ,
,
- http://imj.
ukim.edu.mk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106&Ite
mid=18614 :

14
http://imj.ukim.edu.mk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106&
Itemid =186, ( 2. IV 2015).

130
-

- ( -)
: , , ,
. : http://school.con.mk/index.php/ucebnicii; http://e-
ucebnici.mk/; http://bro.gov.mk/?q=mk/priracnici-za-nastava-po-izbornite-predmeti;
http://bro.gov.mk/?q=mk/osnovno-obrazovanie; http://www.matura.gov.mk/data_
files/state_graduate/mk/1212_makedonski%20jazik-2012-juni.pdf15, -
: , , ,
() , .
, ,
/ ,
.
, , -
, , .,
,
. : www.pravda.gov.
mk; www.slvesnik.com.mk; www.mtsp.gov.mk/zakoni; www.customs.gov.mk; 16.
, , .
(1988), , ,
PDF-,
.
-
, , -,
-17. ,
. ( : :
www.e-books.mk/sodrzini04_all.asp?lang=mac18). ,
,
(http://www.maccinema.com; www.soprevod.com)19.

, . ,
,
, /
, ,
,
15
http://school.con.mk/index.php/ucebnicii; http://e-ucebnici.mk/;
http://bro.gov.mk/?q=mk/priracnici-za-nastava-po-izbornite-predmeti;
http://bro.gov.mk/?q=mk/osnovno-obrazovanie; http://www.matura.gov.mk/data_files/state_
graduate/mk/1212_makedonski%20jazik-2012-juni.pdf ( 2. IV 2015).
16
www.pravda.gov.mk; www.slvesnik.com.mk; www.mtsp.gov.mk/zakoni;
w
ww.customs.gov.mk; ( 2. IV 2015).
17
- ( 15 ) ,
, (https://www.youtube.com), 10 (
2. IV 2015).
18
: www.e-books.mk/sodrzini04_all.asp?lang=mac (
2. IV 2015).
19
http://www.maccinema.com; www.soprevod.com ( 2. IV 2015).

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60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

342.1 (438:497.7) 1945-

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF NATION -


BUILDING IN POLAND AND MACEDONIA IN THE
POST-WAR PERIOD.

Katarzyna Kropiak


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60 2 2016 Katarzyna Kropiak

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POLITICS OF NATION-BUILDING, SELF-DETERMINATION AND


NATIONAL MINORITIES

The right of nations to self-determination is one of the cardinal laws in the


modern international law. Its full form was established Woodrow Wilson followed
his famous fourteen point speech:
National aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and
governed only by their own consent.Self-determinationis not a mere phrase; it is an
imperative principle of action..1
Disintegration of the continental empires in the beginning of the 20th century
has caused the emergence of new national states for these groups, which have raised
their political demands. In Europe after the Balkans War and the First World War
came to an end the period of hegemony of the then great empires: Austria-Hungarian,
Russian, Germany and Ottoman. In place of multi-ethnical conglomerates new
national states were created. The scenarios of each former empires Nation-Building
politics were different in each region and depended of the various factors. It is
important to point out that in the interwar period the decisions about new European
order and delimitation of the borders were taken by consensus in the international
conferences. Self-determination was supposed to be the cardinal rule of creating
new a new European map but often two or more groups have reported claims to
same territory. On the other hand in the interwar period strong nationalist movements
were become too exposed. The pre-modern paradigms of the creation of nations was
replaced by the modern definitions of the creation of a nation and then replaced again
by the ethno-symbolism paradigm in the studies of the nationalism.
In the modern definition nations are created in the result of the industrial era2.
In the Ernest Gellners theory a nation is created either by two men, who shares
a common culture, understandings, meanings etc; or the acknowledgement that
the other is a fellow national and the recognition of mutual rights and duties to
each other in virtue of shared membership in it3. His theory was criticized by his
student, Anthony D. Smith, author of The EthnicOrigins of the Nations. Smithagreed
with the others that nations are a modern phenomenon, but he also insisted that
nations also have pre-modern origins. In the creation of the nation, which has clear
political demand the common myth of the origin plays a crucial role constitutive
myth, term popularized by A.D. Smith mythomoteur(from the compound of the two
French world myth and engine).4 However, his best-known theory is the clear
1
President Wilsons Address to Congress, Analyzing German and Austrian Peace
Utterances (Delivered to Congress in Joint Session on February 11, 1918), February 11,
1918, http://www.gwpda.org/1918/wilpeace.html,(date of access:12/05/2015)
2
E.Gellner. Nations and the Nationalism, Cornell University Press, p.42,57.
3
Ibidem, s. 7.
4
A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Orgins of Nations, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 1986, p.229.

136
Comp. anal. of the polit. of Nation - Building in Pol. and Maced. in the post-war period

distinguishment between the nation and the ethnic-groups ethnies. The founder
of the ethnic-symbolic approach defines nations as a named population sharing a
historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a
common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members5. On the
other hand ethnies has also their clear boundaries and are defined as: named units
of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of
shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at
least among their elites.6 The most visible difference between these two described
phenomenon is the lack of the political culture in the case of the ethnical groups.
In other words a given ethnie actually reached towards establish the nation it has to
formulate a political demand of the own nation state.
The other important category which was the result of delimitation of the
borders in the way of consensus was the problem of national minorities. As a result
of disintegration of highly homogeneous empires different ethnical, religious and
languages groups were coexisting in the same territories for decades. There isnt
any clear definition of national minorities. According to some sociologists, the
distinguishment between ethnic minorities and national minorities is based on the
existence of the national homeland now or in the past for the second category7.
The problem with defining national minorities is based on the different history and
political conditions for each of the contemporary states. The status is not codified
in the any international acts. TheFramework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities, the multilateral convention of the Council of Europe came into
effect 1998. This was signed by 39 countries and is the codification of the laws
and rights of the national minorities. Despite this however there was no consensus
for the common definition of the National Minorities. What is more, some of the
European countries still havent signed up or ratified the Framework Agreement,
or have instead hedged around with many phrases including as far as possible.
Furthermore, some countries introduced objections to the way of defining e.g. the
United Kingdom signed up the convention in the applicationwith reference to racial
groups within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the Race Relations Act 19768. Each
country recognized different groups as national minorities or ethnic minorities.
Sometimes language or ethnicity was taken into account as the decisive factor. It is
conditioned by the domestic law of each state.
In the Republic of Poland there is no clear definition of the national minorities
in the Constitution from 1997. However, in the article 35. stands that The Republic
of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities
the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and
5
A. D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge, 1995, p. 57.
6
Ibidem.
7
See more: M. Budyta-Budzyska,Socjologia narodu i konfliktw etnicznych,
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2010.
8
Website of the UK Parliament, Commons Debates, Daily Hansard - Written Answers,
6 Mar 2007 : Column 1872W, Andrew George to Meg Munn, http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070306/text/70306w0015.htm, (access:
10/12/2015).

137
60 2 2016 Katarzyna Kropiak

traditions, and to develop their own culture.9 A further part the Constitution also
gives minorities right to establish educational and cultural institutions, institutions
designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolution of
matters connected with their cultural identity.10 The definition of the national
minorities in the Republic of Poland was codified in the Act on National and Ethnic
Minorities and Regional Language, dated on January, 6, 2005. In article 2. the legislator
listed six criteria, which given groups need to fulfil in order to be recognized as a
national minority. Next to criteria about common culture and language, there is also
the necessity of awareness of its own historical, national community, and orientation
towards its expression and protection. It is also mentioned as a requirement that
ancestors inhabited the present territory of the Polish Republic for at least 100
years and that group identifies itself with a nation organized in its own state, so as
previously given definition claims as having the area as a national homeland.11
In the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia there is no reference to
national minorities. In the preamble of the Constitution adopted by the Parliament
of Macedonia on 17 November 1991 with Amendments IV through 2011 there is the
statement Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people,
in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian
people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities
living in the Republic of Macedonia, and intent on: ()the guaranteeing of human
rights, citizens, freedoms and ethnic equality.12 According to the statement in the
preamble and the Ohrid Framework Agreement the Republic of Macedonia is the
multiethnic state.
In the contemporary political sciences and international studies the important
factor in the politics of nation-building and policy towards national minorities is the
external powers, such as international institutions, NGOs, transnational corporations
and other states, which have an interest in the region.
In his theory, Harris Mylonas, the author of the The Politics of Nation-Building.
Making Co-Nationals, Refugees and Minorities, introduces the geostrategic and
international factor into the studies of the nation-building and policies toward
national and ethnic minorities. The author argues that the choice of scenario does not
depend on group cohesion or the ability or the desire to assimilate, but the external
support for the demands of the group. External support can be expressed through the
actions of elites in their homeland, support of international organizations and world
powers or neighboring countries, though his theory doesnt specify who peruses
the nation-building politics and in what fashion. As Anthony D. Smith claims: the
role of the state is simply to act as a handmaid of history, whose goal is a world
9
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 2 April 1997, Dz.U. z1997r. Nr78,
poz.483, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19970780483, (access: 10/05/2015).
10
Ibidem.
11
The Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, Dz.U. 2015 poz.
573, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20150000573, (access:20/12/2015).
12
The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, adopted on November 17, 1991,
published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.52/1991, Amendments
from IV to XVIII, No.91/2001.

138
Comp. anal. of the polit. of Nation - Building in Pol. and Maced. in the post-war period

of large-scale nation-states or regions13. Many scholars argue that the elites in the
national homeland make a credible commitment to their co-ethnical abroad. Non-
core groups, may be recognized as a national-minority having support of the diaspora
or the neighbor co-ethnical states. Harris Mylonas draws attention to the policy of
nation-building geostrategic interests of the international hegemonies that plays a
crucial role. In his theory there are three important actors: a host-state, the non-core
group and external power. Different variations in the politics of nation-building are
dependent on the correlation of those three denominators.
It is in the interests of the host state (which may be referred to by other authors
as the nationalizing state) to want to reproduce its power among the ruling elites, due
to protection of the state sovereignty and territorial indivisibility. In this theory there
is assumption that the non-core group seeks the right to the self-determination. The
weak version non-core group is aiming to maximize its rights to avoid host-state
oppression. This depends on the distinctness of identities and the inner cohesion of
the groups demands whereas the minority would be going to improve its situation
within the borders of the host-state, or even the secession. External power often
focus their actions on the destabilization of the host-state, in order to increase their
bargaining power in the region. There is often the possibility to subordinate their
geostrategic position, especially when the support of the non-core group contributes
to the destabilization of the competitive international power14. Such situations often
took place after the Cold War, when the support given to the post-soviet countries
ensured protection of US interests in the region and later became a stage for competing
interests of the big powers.
The given example shows that the involvement of the external powers affects not
only the strengthening of the interest of the non-core group but also the mobilization
of the host-state. It may also cause the change in the perception of the non-core
group among the political elites and corrections of the foreign policy goals of the
nationalizing state, interstate relations and in the long run, choice of nation-building
towards minorities15.
The last set of the relations, between the host state and external power, ultimately
shapes the policy towards non-core group and its situation in the host state. It is
determined by the international blocks of alliances and the most often revealed
in the two forms, rivalry or alliance. Domestic factors in the hoststate also plays
important role, the foreign policy goals can take the form of the revisionist or the
status quo16. State revisionism often occurs in countries which have lost territory or a
dominate position in the region and want to regain them. This may also occur in the
situation where an ideological struggle or a rapidly improving economic situation in
comparison to the other competitors.
The variance of the relations between the non-core group, the host state and
external power causes the scenario of the Nation-Building Politics towards a non-
13
A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Orgins, p.232.
14
H. Mylnas, , The Politics of Nation- Building. Making Co-Nationals, Refugees and
Minorities, Cambridge University Press, 2012. p.5.
15
Ibidem.
16
Ibidem, p.6.

139
60 2 2016 Katarzyna Kropiak

core group. If there is no support for the external power the non-core group will be
the aim of the assimilation policy of the host-state. The situation is more complicated
when a non-core group is supported by any external power. This maybe the
support of the elites in the national homeland, neighbor state or great power or any
international organization that has an interest in the region. When an external power
is supporting the non-core group, but is also an ally with the host state at the same
time the most possible scenario is the accommodation of the minority. In this case the
accommodation needs to be understand as developing the distinct political identity
of the group. The host state provides the non-core group convenient conditions
to preserve and cultivate their national identity, traditions, history and language.
This is the most optimal condition to build a multiethnic society. The politics of
accommodation most often occurs in the regions with the stable status-quo, good
economic situation of the host state and support of external power both for the host
state and non-core group.
The most uncommon scenario is the politics of exclusion. This may take the
form of restrictive regulations towards non-core groups, not taking into account the
fundamental rights of minorities even up to ethnic cleansing. According to this theory
the existence of the exclusion policy occurs when the interstate relations between
external power and host state are hostile, and the foreign politics goal of the host state
is revisionist. This most frequently happens in post conflict regions when the host
state were in the conflict with the external power and has most likely lost. The non-
core group might be treated as a scapegoat both by political elites and the citizens of
the host state. Non-core group might be compromised with the hostile attitudes and
actions by the other inhabitants of the nationalizing state and a new internal conflict
might occur. The exclusion policy can also take the form of a population exchange
between states. This does not always proceed in the peaceful form according to
multilateral or bilateral acts, and often occurs in the drastic action, as separation of
families, confiscation of property etc. This occurred after the Balkan Wars, where
the interest in the region was highly complicated, and the non-core groups very often
still hadnt developed a clear distinctiveness of the ethnical identity and was easy
aim of the assimilation and exclusion.

CASE OF POLAND

In 1772, 1793 and 1795 the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth waspartitioned


in three stagesby the neighboringRussian Empire, theKingdom of Prussia, and
theHabsburg Monarchy. The Kingdom, which had a territory of 1,153,465 km2 in
1650 was completely erased from the map of the Europe in 1795. The insurrections
didnt bring any effect and the political and intellectual elites were persecuted and
often emigrated from the country, mostly to France, Great Britain and United States.
This included individuals such as Kazimierz Puawski, Tadeusz Kociuszko or
Ignacy Jan Paderewski. The politicians and military commanders courted support
for the Polish cause in different circles starting with Napoleon Bonaparte, ending
with President Woodrow Wilson. Polish soldiers also took an active part in I World
War on the different fronts. Thanks to these actions the Polish case was resurrected
in the famous speech delivered by Woodrow Wilson on the January 8, 1918 where

140
Comp. anal. of the polit. of Nation - Building in Pol. and Maced. in the post-war period

he listed the Fourteen Points, which created new world order after World War I. In
addition to mentioning the right of the nations to the self-determination the thirteenth
point was about Polish independent state:
Anindependent Polish stateshould be erected which should include
theterritories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured
afree and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence
and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.17
Poles, which in the Russian Empire, theKingdom of Prussia, and theHabsburg
Monarchy were a non-core group exposed to the various manifestations of the politics
of the nation-building of the host state. During the 123 years of not having their own
state they courted the external powers for support. Simultaneously they developed a
strong and well-organized diaspora remaining from the forced emigration to different
countries. The Polish elites then created a strong lobby in the countries in which they
were housed.These actions led to the creation of the strong external support in the
France, Great Britain, United States and others countries where Polish immigrants
carried out the steps towards gaining support.
After the first World War the domestic situation of the three countries where the
Polish non-core group were living under occupation played a role of the host states
or nationalizing states was complicated and inauspicious. The Austro-Hungarian
Empire was destabilized after World War I in the effect of the nationalist reveal in
South-Eastern Europe. On October 14, 1918 the government agreed to a conditional
capitulation under the project proposed by US President Wilson and on November
3 warfare ceased. As a result of the war about 1,290,000 citizens of the Austro-
Hungarian empire were killed and the country stood on the verge of disintegration.
November 11 Charles I resigned from running the country but did not abdicate. On
September 10, 1919 in the Saint-Germain-en-Laye the treaty between the Triple
Entente and the Republic of Austria was signed. The Treaty was followed by the the
USAustrian Peace Treaty of 1921 due to the Covenant of the League of Nations. This
Treaty dissolved the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The former territory was divided into
separate countries. The Republic of Austria recognized the independence of Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. According
to article 177, the Austrian side accepted responsibility for causing the war along
with the Central Powers.18 Article 88 contained Austrias special commitment to not
compromise on independence, except with the consent of the League of Nations.19In
this way the Entente Powers wanted to ensure the inability to connect to the Weimar
Republic by Republic of Austria, which was compromised by the Anschluss in 1938.
It is likely that because of the large losses of war, a weak position compared to
neighboring countries, and inefficient government Austria has not led the revisionist

17
President Woodrow Wilsons 14 Points (1918), http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.
php?flash=true&doc=62 (access: 26/12/2015).
18
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol,
Declaration and Special Declaration(St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919), Australian
Treaty Series 1920 No 3, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html,
(access:28/12/2015).
19
Ibidem.

141
60 2 2016 Katarzyna Kropiak

policy in the region in the interwar period. The Treaty of Saint-Germain allotted to
Poland the lands of Galicia and north-eastern part of the Teschen Silesia. Austria
ceded to the Allies the right to dispose of the areas not mentioned in the Treaty. On
the August 10, 1920 in Sevres, treaty between the Principal Allied and associated
powers and Poland, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Czech-Slovak
State was signed. The Treaty did not come into force20. The Entente Powers formally
recognize the affiliation of the eastern Galicia to the Polish on March 15, 1923, due
to the decision of the Council of Ambassadors.
The German Reich had suffered even bigger lost after World War I. The last
German Emperor and King of Prussia abdicated on November, 8 1918 and thereafter
Germany become a federal republic. The Kingdom of Prussia was abolished on
November 28, 1918. As one of the Central Powers Germany was made to sign the
peace treaty and agreed for the severe economic, political, military and territorial
sanction. The Treaty was signed in Versailles on June 28, 1919. Article 231, known
as War Guilt clause, required Germany (to) accept the responsibility of Germany
and her allies for causing all the loss and damage21 of the World War I. It imposed
on the country huge contributions, forced to recognize substantial territorial losses,
included the important industrial centers, and limited army to 100,000 soldiers,
deprived of aviation, heavy artillery and tanks. Germany recognized the treaty as
prejudicial and the contribution as incommensurably huge, especially as the country
lost the important economical areas as Silesia, the Saar coal mines and the Ruhr
district. Additionally tariff war with Poland exacerbated the economic situation
and led to a deep crisis. The political scene of the Weimar Republic was extremely
unstable, due to the emergence of many radical socialist groups. During the first
years of the inter war period there was several upheavals such as the Beer Hall
Putsch. As a result of the crisis and the difficult economic situation the Nazi party
had been strengthened and confirmed, especially among war veterans. This resulted
in increased revisionist sentiment in Weimars Republic and breaking the conditions
of the Treaty of Versailles in the following years. Revisionist policy was directed
against the lost territories and neighboring countries - initially Slovakia, the Czech
Republic and Poland.
Although the Russian Empire was one of the founders of the Triple Entente, it
didnt take part in the Paris conference and wasnt among the signatories of the peace
treaties ending World War I. In 1917 an armed insurrection to place in Petrograd.
Later called the October Uprising or the Bolshevik Revolution this uprising was
followed by the struggles of the Russian Civil War (191722). The Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk was signed between the new Bolshevik government of Soviet Russia and
the Central Powers on March 3, 1918. Russia renounced important territorial claims,

20
Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania,
the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Czech-Slovak State relative to Certain Frontiers of
those States, (Svres, August 10,1920) Treaty Series 1921, no 20., http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/
docs/pdf/1921/TS0020.pdf, (access:18/12/2015).
21
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, (Versailles
on June 28, 1919) Australian Treaty Series 1920 No 1, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/
dfat/treaties/1920/1.html, (access:28/12/2015).

142
Comp. anal. of the polit. of Nation - Building in Pol. and Maced. in the post-war period

although the territory of the Kingdom of Poland was not mentioned in the treaty22.
The treaty recognized the Ukraine state by the Central Powers, and caused the
serious uproar of Polish public opinion, because provisions of the lands given to the
Ukrainian Peoples Republic, which historically had been connected with Poland
in an exchange for a huge supply of cereals to the Austria and Germany. Between
1917-1922 there was a very unstable political situation in Russia. The winning
coalition didnt recognize the government and did not hold any diplomatic relations
with the Bolshevik government. Because of this fact there was no international
delimitation of borders between Poland and Russia. Between the reviving after 123
years of occupation independent Republic of Poland and Russia there had not yet
been acknowledgement the state border. The status of territories located between the
Polish ethnically area and Russian area - the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania and
the right bank of Ukraine, remained uncertain. Consequently there was inevitable
clashes of the Polish army and the Bolsheviks to determine the political status of the
pre-partition lands through a fait accompli. The war lasted between 1919-1921 and
led to the signing of the Treaty of Riga on March 18, which partitioning the disputed
territories in Belarus and Ukraine between Poland and the RSFSR, and ending the
conflict. The Treaty consisted of 26 articles. Additionally Poland was supposed to
receive monetary compensation for its economic input to Russian Empire during the
partition. Article 7 consisted of a mutual guarantee that all nationalities would be
allowed to free intellectual development, the use of their national language, and the
exercise of their religion23.

22
Peace Treaty Between Ukraine and Central Powers, Brest-Litovsk 9 February 1918,
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/ukrainianpeacetreaty.htm (access:28/12/2015)
23
M. Palij, The Ukrainian-Polish defensive alliance, 1919-1921: an aspect of the
Ukrainian revolution,CIUS Press 1995, pp.165168, Peace Treaty Between Ukraine and
Central Powers, Brest-Litovsk 9 February 1918, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/
ukrainianpeacetreaty.htm (access:28/12/2015)

143
60 2 2016 Katarzyna Kropiak

MAP 1: Map of the II Republic of Poland 1922-1939

Source: http://banknoty.republika.pl/rzeczpospolita_polska_1919/PKKP_waluta_markowa/
rzeczpospolita_polska_1918_1939_historia.htm (access: 28/12/2015)

Between 1918-1922 Russia implemented a policy of revisionism in relations


with the Republic of Poland. As in the case of Weimar Republic the economic crisis,
unstable government were a substrate to revise their claims to the Polish nation
and lands. The rivalry in the authority structures has increased the importance of
revisionist and anti-Polish slogans and become a factor that conciliated citizens
around a common case, and regain the influence in Ukraine and Belarus.
According to the theory of Harris Mylonas, there is a correlation between
foreign policy goals of a host state, external power support to the non-core group
and relations between host state and external power, which influence the politics of
nation-building towards the non-core group. In the case of Poland after World War
I it can be concluded that Poles had very strong support of external powers (in this
case the Triple Entente). The foreign policy goals among the countries which took
part in the partitioning of Poland were for the Republic of Austria status quo, for
Russia and for the Weimar Republic revisionist. The relations between external
power (States of the Entente) and host states (Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russian
Empire and German Empire) were hostile. This variation, according to previously
described pattern should cause the policy of exclusion (in case of revisionist policy)
or assimilation (in case of status quo). This pattern is correct for the case of Poland in
the final period of partitioning, the Polish-Russian War 1919-1921, a secret protocol
of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 1939, and the outbreak II War World. What is more, the
theory of Mylonas claims that the geostrategic interest of external power are crucial
in the efforts for independence of non-core group. The strong external support for

144
Comp. anal. of the polit. of Nation - Building in Pol. and Maced. in the post-war period

the Polish case in the 1918 resulted in formation of the Republic in Poland II, which
existed between 1918-1939.

CASE OF MACEDONIA

The case of Macedonia is different and more complicated. In the interwar period
Macedonia was divided between Greece (Aegean Macedonia), Bulgaria (Pirin
Macedonia) and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Vardar Macedonia).
It was the division of Macedonia that caused the outbreak of the second Balkan
War. Macedonia, with her geostrategic position was supposed to guarantee of status
quo in region. The Treaty of Bucharest divided Macedonias land between three
countries, under the pressure of Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires concerning
northern territories and France and German Empires concerning the Aegean part.
Geopolitical significance of the region was substantial and all of the parties that
took part in the struggle had their own particular interest. Traditionally there was
an alliance between Greece,Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Romania
which corroded in the interwar period. Bulgaria was in the alliance with Central
Powers during the I World War and struggled with the strong separation after.
After the two Balkan Wars and the first World War the decision about a
population exchange between Balkans states was made in order to remove ethnical
and national tensions in the region. The matter was regulated by the provision
of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 192324. Between 1923 - 1930, the
Greek part of Macedonia left the Islamic Turkish speaking population and 146,000
Slavs, mainly advocating as Bulgarians. These immigrants were mostly resettled in
Bulgaria. 35,000 Greeks came from Bulgaria to Greece. The part of Slavic speaking
minority of Greece was aimed by obligatory Hellenization of names.

24
Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, The Treaties of Peace
1919-1923, Vol. II(New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924.), http://
wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne, (access: 14/05/2015).

145
60 2 2016 Katarzyna Kropiak

MAP 2: The territorial gains of the Balkan states after the First Balkan War and the line of
expansion according to the pre-war secret agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria April
1913

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Balkan_War#/media/File:Occupied_territories
_in_the_Balkans,_end_of_April_1913.png (access: 29/12/2015)

The authorities in Greece treated the Macedonian nationality issue purely as an


instrument in foreign policy towards neighbor states. They tried to avoid putting
this issue under international consideration and also tried to resolve conflict in the
bilateral relations. Despite this in the Versailles order - in the treaty of Neuilly-
sur-Seine and Svres the Macedonian minority issue was recognized. The Slavic
speaking non-core group living in Greece was targeted by Bulgaria and by Kingdom
of Serbia as a significant part of the interstates relations. The crucial matter in the
Balkan relation in the interwar period is the fact that relation between states changed
rapidly. In 1924 the Politis Kalffof Protocol was signed in Geneva and concerned
the protection of the Greco-Bulgarian minority living in Greece and respectively
Greeks in Bulgaria. According to the agreement, two signatories consented to the
control and possible intervention by the League of National in interstates relations in
instances of violation of the provisions of the Protocol against referred minorities25.
The authorities in Belgrade immediately criticized the protocol for the non-explicit
claims that the Slavic speaking population in Greece is ethnically Bulgarian without
any exceptions. The protocol also allowed the League of Nations to intervene due
to protect the interests of national minorities, which in the ethnic mosaic of the

25
P.Kissoudi, The Balkan Games and Balkan Politics in the Interwar Years 19291939.
Politicians in Persuit of Peace, Routledge 2009, p.22.

146
Comp. anal. of the polit. of Nation - Building in Pol. and Maced. in the post-war period

Balkans was inevitable. In the face of clear objections the Yugoslavia protocol failed
in 1925. By the late 1928 no significant progress was made in the matter of the
intransigence position in the recognition of Slav minorities in the Pirin Macedonia.
In 1929 the negotiations between the government in Belgrade and government in
Sofia had begun, which resulted in the Pirot agreement between states26. In March
1929 in one of Bulgarian newspaper the agreement between Yugoslavia and Greece
from earlier the same year was criticized as directed against in Bulgaria. Together
with the amnesty issue of Bulgarian leaders taking part in actions against Yugoslavia
during World War I27this raised a strong friction between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
JdrzejPaszkiewicz had raised the thesis that this system of mutual negotiations,
agreements, failures of the agreements and rapid changes of allies become a
guarantor of the Balkan security system28.
Testing the theory of politics of nation building toward Macedonians, who were
non-core group in the Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the interwar period we
can find some inconsistencies. It is also a dynamic process, changing together with
the change of allies. In the case of Greece the foreign policy goals was in the first
period revisionist and then status quo. It was in hostile relations with Bulgaria and
beginning from 1929 in an alliance with Yugoslavia. Greece was also in conflict with
Turkey and had an influential alliance with Germany, whose Kaiser Wilhelm II was
brother-in-law to the Greek King and France. The Greek politics of nation-building
towards Macedonian non-core group according to the variation was exclusion and
assimilation. Although the timelines of each policy are not clear the pattern of nation-
building proceeded according to theorys predictors. In the instance of Bulgaria
the foreign policy goals were revisionist. Because Bulgaria was in an alliance with
Central Powers during World War I, there was a strong separation of the country
in the interwar period. The relations with Yugoslavia changed them from an ally
to the enemy after the fiasco of Pirot agreement. In this case also the predictors
of the theory are verified. The Bulgarian politics of nation-building towards the
Macedonian non-core group was mostly assimilation. In this case the Yugoslavia
foreign policy goals can be recognized as status quo. Yugoslavia had an alliance with
Greece and described change in the relation with Bulgaria. The politics of the nation-
building according to the theory supposed to be an assimilation and accommodation,
but in this case the assimilation of Macedonian non-core group in Yugoslavia was
scenario, which was used by government in Belgrade.

26
Ibidem, p.45.
27
Ibidem.
28
Macedoski problem narodowociowy w greckiej polityce zagranicznej w latach
dwudziestych XX wieku, in: Macedoski dyskurs niepodlegociowy, ed. I. Stawowy-
Kawka, M. Kawka, WydawnictwoUniwersytetuJagielloskiego 2011, p. 191203.

147
60 2 2016 Katarzyna Kropiak

POLITICS OF NATION-BUILDING IN THE CONTEMPORARY


INTERNATIONAL RELATION

In the contemporary international studies and security studies the activities of


external powers are described slightly different. In the post conflict regions actions
towards the non-core group are taking the form of state-building and nation-
building. The concept of the state-building is related to development cooperation
and the activities of the third countries or international organizations in post conflict
regions29 (eg. UN peacekeeping interventions or interventions of US troops and
associated countries, and stabilization missions). On the other hand the term of the
nation - building is defined as the use of armed force in the aftermath of conflict
to ensure and support the transition towards democracy30. In this context, these
terms overlap in their meaning. In common understanding these are often used
interchangeably, however, in political science there should be a clear distinction
between state-building and nation-building. While the first of the terms refers to
build the institutions and infrastructure of the state, the second draws attention to the
aspect of evolution of identity. Both terms describe the planned action of the foreign
forces in the creation of state institutions and introduce mechanisms of political life
based on the pattern that is used by these forces. Actions can take the character of
foreign investment and aid programs, military occupation or the introduction of a
stabilization or humanitarian for instance.
Harris Mylonas in his theory analyzes not only internal factors such as the activity
of political elites to organize national or ethnic, heterogeneous groups living in the
country. He also devoted attention to the external factors, which in his opinion play
a crucial role in determining which of the described script is going to be applied to
each group31. In theory international conditions are introduced to the policy towards
relations between national and ethnic minorities. The author argues that the factor
which determine the scenario, whether a group should assimilate, accommodate or
exclude is not groups cohesion or the ability or the desire to assimilate, but the
external support for the demands of the group.
The starting point to analyse the nature of external support are the works of Myron
Weiner, who stressed the importance of the trilateral relations between nationalizing
state, a national minority and national homeland32. Developing Weiners theory,
Roger Brubacker argued that if the minority does not have the national homeland,
it becomes an easy target for assimilation33. Brubacker support his hypothesis by
29
V. Fritz, A. R. Menocal,State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective:
An Analytical and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for
International Engagement, 2007; Overseas Development Institute, http://www.odi.org/
resources/details.asp (access: 10/05/2015).
30
J. Dobbins, Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the Worlds Only
Superpower, RAND Review, Vol. 27, no. 2/2003, p.17.
31
H. Mylonas, ThePolitics, pp. 1822.
32
M. Weiner, Bad Neighbors, Bad Neigborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee
Flows, International Security 17(I)/1971, pp. 542.
33
R. Brubacker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and National Question in the New

148
Comp. anal. of the polit. of Nation - Building in Pol. and Maced. in the post-war period

the importance of the interest of the newly formed nationalizing state. In the case
where a minority has the support of his homeland, the Nationalizing state bears a
disproportionately high risk of entering the assimilation policy and those minorities
in comparison to the probability of failure of their actions. In this case, the more
likely scenarios are deportation, exchange of population or ethnic cleansing. What is
more Pieter von Houten, in his theory emphasizes the role of the ties between ethnic
minority and elites (political, cultural, economic, etc) in their homeland34. Due to
the support of a credible elites in the country of origin, ethnic or national minority
becomes more assertive policy of assimilation. At the same time the decision-making
elites (core-group) in the nationalizing state are not willing to provide sufficient
conditions to accommodate minorities. Such a situation may lead to the Civil War.
The threaten of the launching armed conflict between the state and subgroups or
competing subgrups was also emphasized by other author, Erin K. Jenne. According
to her calculations during in the 1990s, only eight out of one hundred and ten armed
conflict went on between states35. Most of the rest of those conflicts were related to
ethnic or national minorities, whose demands were not met.
Harris Mylonas theory complements the mentioned scenarios that focus
mainly on opposition inclusive and exclusive policies towards national minorities
and ethnic groups. In the variance created by Mylonas, he examines the impact
of both internal (government policy nationally oriented) and external factors in
the launching of nation-building policy model: assimilation, accommodation and
exclusion. The author also raises the problem of different kinds of motivation to
engage external forces and its consequences. The involvement can be clandestine,
covert or overt. External forces may be either mentioned by previous authors the elite
in the homeland or the diaspora. It may also be a neighboring country, power having
interests in the region, any international organizations or any other configuration of
these factors36. Nowadays this is an increasingly important role played by non-state
actors, i.e. diaspora of refugees, terrorist organizations, NGOs, religious groups and
multinational corporations. Non-state actors have become important stakeholders
particularly noticeable in small countries where external force is often associated
directly or indirectly with the obligations and interests of the state.. An external force
can be in an alliance or be hostile to the nationalizing state. This condition is also not
a constant value and can vary over time.
LIST OF MAPS:
MAP 1: Map of the II Republic of Poland 1922-1939
MAP 2: The territorial gains of the Balkan states after the First Balkan War and the
line of expansion according to the pre-war secret agreement between Serbia and
Bulgaria April 1913
Europe, New York 1996, pp. 6667.
34
J. D. Fearon, Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethic Conflict, in: D. Lake, D.
Rothchild (ed.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation,
Princton N.J, 1998, pp. 114126.
35
E. K. Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining: The of Minority Empowerment, New York 2007, p. 1.
36
H. Mylonas, The Politics,pp. 29,30.

149
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

316.344.5 (348:497.7)

CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS: THE


EXAMPLES OF POLAND AND MACEDONIA

MA Daniel Wilk
Doctoral student at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the
Jagiellonian University in Krakow


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CIVICUS, TACSO, OFOP, MCIC, USAID.

INTRODUCTION

The term of a civil society became the subject of lengthy discussion among
scholars of social phenomena at the end of the twentieth century. The concept,
rich both in republican and liberal philosophical traditions, triumphantly returned
to the political discourse after the turbulent years of late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, when political, sociological and philosophical considerations were shaped
by a dichotomous debate on the nature of societies in democratic and totalitarian
countries. The concept of civil society returned to theory and political philosophy in
the 70s of the twentieth century, became a subject of criticism for some, for others

151
60 2 2016 MA Daniel Wilk

a direction of policy or even a social idea, a role model. Civil society was supposed
to be a Europes democratic alternative to the totalitarian regime of the USSR, the
consent of the state for its citizens to take civil matters into their own hands1.
The social transformation related to the development of a civil society, beside
the political and market transformation, is one of three main factors in the process of
systemic transformation towards the creation of a democratic state. Ralf Dahrendorf
stated that the development of institutions of a civil society and the following change
in social attitudes, acceptance of new rules of the game is a much more difficult process
than installing a free-market economy or institution of a democratic state of law2.
In the twenty-first century the term of civil society is inextricably linked to the
concept of the third sector, derived from the theory of the division of a modern
democratic state into three main sectors: state, market and civil. The civil sector is
also called the non-governmental sector or non-profit sector. That division has both
a certain degree of interdependence and a set of distinctions which allow to separate
tasks and objectives pursued by individual sectors. The civil sector, unlike others, is
to change and improve the political, social and economic situation inside the civil
community with the active participation of individuals forming task communities,
who do not await the help of state institutions3.
In connection with the discussion of political and social sciences researchers
on what a civil society is and what it is not, the author adopts a definition proposed
by the London School of Economics: Civil society is the sphere of institutions,
organisations and individuals located among the family, the state and the market, in
which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests4.
The aim of this article is to make a comparative analysis of the civil societies in
the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Poland. In particular, of such aspects
of functioning of a civil society as a relationship between the civil sector and the
state sector and citizens.
The author hypothesizes that the civil societies in Poland and in Macedonia, in
the process of forming, faced a number of problems and limitations that influenced
their development in both countries. Auxiliary hypotheses are the assertions that
there are some similarities and differences that are characteristic for post-communist
countries, which distinguish Polish and Macedonian civil societies from civil societies
in Western countries, where the culture of civic participation is more developed.
This analysis of civil societies meets comparative analysis requirements,
including four necessary conditions:

1
Jerzy Szacki, Ani ksi, ani kupiec: obywatel. Idea spoeczestwa obywatelskiego w
myli wspczesnej, Krakw, Warszawa 1997, 562.
2
Ralf Dahrendorf: It takes six months to create new political institutions, to write
constitution and electoral laws. It may take six years to create a half-way viable economy. It
probably take 60 years to create a civil society, W. Outhwaite, The Future of Society, Oxford
2006, 102.
3
Peter Drucker, The Essential Drucker, Oxford 2001, 358.
4
Salif. Alqadhafi, The Role of Civil Society in the Democratisation of Global Governance
Institutions: From Soft Power to Collective Decision-Making?, London 2007, 42, http://
www.motherjones.com/files/saif_dissertation_lse.pdf (Retrieved on 23.03.15).

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Civil society in the Transformation Process: the Examples of Poland and Macedonia

1. Condition of the conceptual comparability: (concepts of civil society, the


third sector, non-governmental organizations are similarly defined in both
countries)
2. Condition of the interpretative comparability.
3. Condition of the statistical comparability: the condition ensured through the
analysis of existing data, containing the same variables for both countries.
4. Condition of time comparability: given the fact that both countries are
undergoing the transformation process in an almost parallel time frame
(Poland after 1989, Macedonia after 1991).5

Article is based on publications and reports drawn up by national and international


organizations involved in monitoring the condition of civil societies in the countries
subject to this analysis:
Klon/Jawor - Association of Non-Governmental Organizations operating
in Poland
OFOP - National Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations
MCIC -Macedonian Center for International Cooperation
USAID - TheUnited States Agency for International Development
CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation
TACSO - Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations

In preparing this analysis, the author uses a four-dimensional perspective of civil


society research applied by CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation)6,
which, monitoring the state of development of civil society sorts out four main
dimensions of operating of organizations:
Structure (size, degree and manner of organizing NGOs).
Environment (social and political-economic factors surrounding the
civil society and its organizations and the environment in which social
organizations operate).
Values (values practised in the civil society, manner of implementation of
the common good idea).
Impact (impact of operations of NGOs on political decision-making by state
institutions, impact on members of the society)

The subject matter of the analysis is the environmental aspect of functioning of


civil society and its social and political-economic influence.

5
Marek Nowak, Micha Nowosielski, Jak bada spoeczestwo obywatelskie?:
dowiadczenia, Pozna 2008, 1218.
6
Monitoring the enabling environment for civil society. An overview of CIVICUS
activities in 2012 and 2013, http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/civicus_note_to_oecd-_
monitoring_the_enabling_environment_for_civil_society.pdf (Retrieved on 23.03.15).

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60 2 2016 MA Daniel Wilk

1. LEGACY OF COMMUNISM:

The legacy of communism stamped an imprint on the position of the emerging


civil society and on the development of the third sector in post-communist countries
in transformation7. At the same time, it created a large field for activities of all
kinds of non-governmental organizations focused on social change. Both in Poland
and Macedonia, the negative consequences affecting the development of the civil
societies in the initial phase of the transformation included:
1. Active citizenship in the social sphere related both to the formal participation
of NGOs as well as incidental and spontaneous, informal civil activity were
on a much lower level than in countries with established democracies8.
2. Lack of trust between political elites and members of non-governmental
organizations reflected by marginalizing the role of NGOs by ruling politicians
(the relevant legislation for establishing framework and functioning of non-
profit organizations in both countries was created relatively late9) and lack
of ability and willingness to engage in a dialogue with political elites by
representatives of social organizations10.
3. A marginal level of help from intellectual elites in the form of a clear, personal
support for activities of specific social organizations, which in turn made it
difficult reaching the media in Poland and Macedonia.
4. Consumerism, commercialization and mediatisation, phenomena that are
characteristic for a developing democratic society cause social anomie,
activities that foster an individualistic attitude and decline of collectivist
attitudes in society11.
5. Low level of social participation associated with the lack of faith in the
effectiveness of grassroots activities undertaken by members of the
community12.
6. Social stratification, as a result of capitalism and the following rivalry of
members of the society related to the access to resources as well as other
consequences, including social exclusion or social pathologies13.

7
Piotr Gliski, Die Zivilgesellschaft in Polen, Polen-Analysen No. 25, 15.1.2008, 2.
8
How Civil Society Influences Policy: A Comparative Analysis of the CIVICUS Civil Society
Index in Post-Communist Europe, L. Fioramonti, V. F. Heinrich (ed.), London 2007, 2326.
9
Sao Klekovski, Daniela Stojanova, Gordana. Jakovleska, Emina Nuredinoska, Civic
Engagement - Long Road to Go, Civicus Society Index Report for the Republic of Macedonia,
Skopje 2011, 47.
10
Zofia Klinowska, Kondycja spoeczestwa obywatelskiego w Polsce, Infos,
No. 22(136), 6.12.2012, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/WydBAS.nsf/0/9789F55A271ABAC6C
1257AC9004D8BE0/$file/Infos_136.pdf (Retrieved on 20.03.2015).
11
Marta Gumkowska, Jan Herbst, Justyna Szoajska, Jakub Wygaski, The Challenge of
Solidarity: CIVICUS Civil Society Report for Poland, Warsaw 2006, 43.
12
The same, 45.
13
The same, 46.

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Civil society in the Transformation Process: the Examples of Poland and Macedonia

When comparing social and political-economic factors, the distinguishing


characteristics of the civil sector in both countries should be considered.
The most important difference is the ethnic structure of society. Poland, as a
country with an ethnically homogeneous structure, has much simpler conditions
for building an efficient civil society. The heterogeneous Macedonian society is
polarized based on differences in religion and nationality.
The second important factor distinguishing the processes of building civil
society in both countries is the involvement of international organizations and
Western political actors in the process of creating foundations of the civil sector in
the 90s. The Polands accession to the European Union pressured the preparation of
effective foundations for the activity of civic institutions. In the case of Macedonia,
the cooperation of international organizations with Macedonian government began
only after signing of the Ohrid peace agreement in 2001.

2. SOCIAL FACTOR:
Analysing the environment surrounding the Polish third sector, a special attention
should be paid to one conclusion. The civil society as groups of self-organizing and
associated citizens, striving for a particular social objective seemed to be in a better
shape than it is in the age of transformation14.
This difference is closely linked to the phenomenon of ethical civil society in
Poland in the 80s. The phenomenon of ethical civil society is characteristic for a
non-democratic system of government regulating the public sphere, in which people
build social ties when searching for alternatives to the initiatives controlled by the
regime. Citizens seek legitimacy for their actions in the sphere of moral standards,
not in the area of group interests, which is characteristic for civil societies in countries
of well-established democracy15.
The Macedonias exit from socialist Yugoslavia did not face strong resistance of
communist dissidents, directed against the citizens. There did not evolved elements
that were necessary to create an ethical model of a civil society. In the context of this
model, a particular attention should be paid to events related to the protests against the
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization Democratic Party of Macedonian
National Unity (WMRO/DPMNE) and the Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, which
took place in 2015 in connection with the phone hacking scandal relating to the illegal
recording of about 20,000 of Macedonians, coming from different social groups.
Macedonian citizens organizing i.a. the May protests in front of the Macedonian
parliament, effectively get organized in associations such as Solidarnost16or CIVIL
MK17striving for the goal of replacing the political elite in the country.
14
Stephan Raabe, Transformacja i spoeczestwo obywatelskie w Polsce. Koci,
jako sojusznik spoeczestwa obywatelskiego, Raport Fundacji Konrada Adenauera, No. 9,
Warszawa 2009, 912.
15
Irena Sodkowska, Spoeczestwo obywatelskie na tle historycznego przeomu: Polska
19801989, Warszawa 2006, 7887.
16
Statute of the Solidarnost organization, http://www.solidarnost.mk/statut-2
(
Retrieved on 1.04.2015).
17
Website of the organisation, http://civil.org.mk/ (Retrieved on 20.04.2015).

155
60 2 2016 MA Daniel Wilk

At a time when in Poland, a process of transformation began, there were


unfavourable conditions for the development of a civil society related to the legacy
of communism and disappointment by the process of the democratic transformation.
In Poland, there was particularly bad adopted the transformation from the ethic to a
democratic model of a civil society. Disappointment by the new political elite that
emerged from the activists of Solidarno, was one of the causes of apathy of the
Polish society. Politicians of the new, post-Solidarno camp, divided by internal rifts
refrained from the dialogue with citizens. For Poles, the process of transformation
was associated with a shock. As a result of losing their jobs and livelihoods, large
group of citizens withdrew from the political and social life. Most of Poles, in the face
of the economic crisis, adopted a paternalistic attitude towards the state. Social work
raised negative connotations with the policy pursued by the communist authorities.
Grassroots organizations or social initiatives operated faced enormous problems.18
In Macedonia, the construction of an active civil society also took place in such
difficult conditions. The social, economic and political crisis that affected Macedonia
Macedonia in the 90s of the last century caused a huge problem for a smooth conduct
of social transformation. There clearly dominated lack of faith in the efficacy of
grassroots initiatives. The first decade of independent Macedonia was a period of
unstable operation of social organizations. There were a large number of registered
associations that did not have the appropriate number of members. The turning point
for the development of civil society organizations was the cooperation of Macedonia
with the European Union in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
The main characteristics of Polish and Macedonian civil society include one
of the lowest in Europe proportions of social participation in the creation of the
third sector. According to the latest statistics compiled by the MCIC in Macedonia
and OFOP in Poland, the active participation in non-governmental organizations is
declared by 25% of Macedonians and 35% of Poles19. In both countries, members
of non-governmental organizations are, in the vast majority, citizens aged 18-29
years (in Poland 63% are representatives of this age group, in Macedonia 69%).
Taking into account the level of public confidence in the activities of public benefit
organizations, 63% of Poles trust in the intentions and modus operandi of Polish
NGOs20. In Macedonia, the level of public confidence in social organizations is
lower 54%21. According to the latest report from USAID (United States Agency
for International Development) concerning the development of the civil society
in Macedonia, the public opinion defines the activities of NGOs as low. Among
the Macedonians, there is a belief that civil society institutions are only to satisfy
18
Irena Sodkowska, Spoeczestwo obywatelskie, 9293.
19
Emina Nuredinoska, Simeona Ognenovska, Report on the enabling environment for
civil society development in Macedonia, MCIC Report, Skopje 2014, 1214, http://www.
ymcabitola.org.mk/download/en_report_for_enabling_environment_of_the_development_
of_civic_sector_in_macedonia.pdf (Retrieved on 23.03.15).See also: Aktywnosc spoleczna
Polakow, Raport CBOS, No. 60/2014, Warszawa 2014, 37, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.
POL/2014/K_060_14.PDF (Retrieved on 23.03.15).
20
The same.
21
The same.

156
Civil society in the Transformation Process: the Examples of Poland and Macedonia

individual needs and interests. The relationship between political elites and members
of non-governmental organizations are characterized by a high degree of mutual
distrust, as it is in Poland22.
In Macedonia, the ongoing political crisis, which resulted from the governance
of the VMRO-DPMNE party contributed to the suppression of the civil society
development. According to the report prepared by Eurometer in 2014, before the
escalation of the current political crisis, answers to the question: In your opinion,
are the citizens of Macedonia able to freely express their opinions? were as follows:
53% of Macedonians responded negatively. 73% of citizens believe that There are
no spontaneous protests and they are co-organized by the authorities23.

3. POLITICAL-ECONOMIC FACTOR:

Due to the complex internal and external political situation of Macedonia in the
period 1991-2001, the issue of development of the third sector was not a particular
concern of politicians. A feature of the relationship between the public and civil
sectors in first decade of the political transformation was a distrust of ruling elites
towards NGOs. At the beginning of the transformation, the SDSM post-communist
party (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia), governing the country in 1992-
1996, introduced a legal definition and concept of a civil society. The government
feared that NGOs will be used to promote and spread nationalistic slogans and ideas
related to the ethnic conflict between Macedonians and the Albanian minority being
a part of the Macedonian society24.
Ethnic conflict in 2001 caused an interference of international organizations in
internal policies as well as ethnic and religious relations in the country. The European
Union relied the possible Macedonias joining the ranks of the European Union on
the progress of the democratization process associated with the transfer of certain
powers to local government units and the creation of legal and financial conditions
for operating in the NGO sector25.
The development of the civil society in Macedonia was made possible thanks to
the creation of legal conditions for more efficient operating in the third sector. The
regulatory environment for NGOs is formed by four major pieces of legislation.

22
CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia 17th Edition,
June 2014 , http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/E%26E%202013%20
CSOSI%20Final%2010-29-14.pdf (Retrieved on 22.04.2015).
23
The Political Culture, Europeization and Fears in Macedonia, Survey Research:
Eurometer Macedonia 2014, , http://www.mcet.org.mk/en/dokument.asp?cnd=98
(Retrieved on 22.04.2015).
24
Report: Civic Practices No. 12 Civic Engagement, Dejan Misevski, Darko Buldioski,
Boris Ristovski, Marko Trosanovski (red.), http://www.mcms.org.mk/images/docs/2011/
civic-practices-12-civic-engagement-2011.pdf (Retrieved on 26.04.2015).
25
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT LONG ROAD TO GO CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report
for the Republic of Macedonia Macedonian Center for International Cooperation,
http://civicus.org/downloads/CSI/Macedonia.pdf (Retrieved on 23.04.2015).

157
60 2 2016 MA Daniel Wilk

Art. 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia guarantees its


citizens the freedom of association in order to realize and protect their political,
economic, social, cultural rights and beliefs. The only limiting condition is the
impossibility to create an organization whose aim is to destabilize the state
by encouraging aggressive action, racial or religious hatred and intolerance26.
The Law on Citizens Associations and Foundations of 1998 is an important
step in terms of the development of the third sector in Macedonia. It regulates
the functioning of associations and foundations, allowing citizens to create
civic associations and enabling non-governmental organizations to operate.
It imposes a constraint; foundations cannot carry out political activities or
use acquired resources and funding in activities of political parties27.
The Law on Donations and Sponsorships adopted in 2006 introduced tax
reliefs for businesses and individuals who exercise patronage or financially
help organizations from the civil society sector28.
Law on Volunteering of 2007 introduced a legal definition of volunteering
differentiating it from other types of employment. It systematized the work
of volunteers by determining their legal rights and obligations29.
In Macedonia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for the development
and cooperation with civil society organizations. The strategy and development
objectives of the civil sector, as well as the form of cooperation between the
government and NGOs is defined in the Strategy of Supporting the Development of
the Civil Society in the years: 2012-201730.
The political factor of civil society in Poland in the transformation process can
be divided into two periods. The dividing line may be the years 2003-2004. In 2003,
fourteen years after the start of the transformation, Sejm passed a law on public
benefit activity and volunteer work31. By 2003, when the OFOP (National Federation
of Non-Governmental Organizations) was established, there was no institution
representing interests of the Polish third sector in dealing with the public and market
sectors. The organizations could not reach a common position i.a. in lobbying for the
introduction of a beneficial NGO law.
26
Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia,
http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/macedonia.html (Retrieved on 21.03.2015).
27
,
http://www.pravo.org.mk/document Detail.php?id=176 (Retrieved on 21.03.2015).
28
,
http://www.pravo.org.mk/documentDetail.php?id=674 (Retrieved on 21.03.2015).
29
,
http://www.pravo.org.mk/documentDetail.php?id=733 (Retrieved on 21.03.2015).
30
,
http://nvosorabotka.gov.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/strategijaa_20122017.pdf
(Retrieved on 23.03.2015).
31
The Act on Public Benefit Activity and Volunteerism (Journal of Laws of 2010, No.
234, item 1536), http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20030960873 (Retrieved on
23.03.2015).

158
Civil society in the Transformation Process: the Examples of Poland and Macedonia

Joining the European Union helped to improve the financial condition and
increase of the role of the third sector in the strategy of the social policy of the state.
The Act on Public Benefit Activity introduced, necessary for the operation of NGOs,
definitions of volunteer work, association and foundation, separated economic
activities from non-profit activities and allowed for a paid activity of NGOs when
the revenue is used only for running this particular activity32.
A huge political problem is the attitude of many governments discriminating
against non-governmental organizations as an equal partner in the management of
local communities. In the districts and provinces, there is realised the model of self-
governance without participation33, driven by a party-dependent and centralized
nature of the local bureaucracy. Under the policy of the government, aimed at
stimulating the development of the civil society in Poland, there is implemented
a Strategy for the Development of Civil Society for 2009-201534 by the Ministry of
Labour and Social Policy.
A significant barrier to the development of the civil sector in Poland and
Macedonia is a problem with financing of civic initiatives. In both countries, civil
society institutions depend on financial assistance from the state or funds coming
from the European Union. In Poland, the state budget is the main or only source of
income for 36% of all non-governmental organizations35. Therefore, there is a serious
risk of interference of ruling politicians in the attitudes and actions of social groups.
In Macedonia, a large number of organizations depend on a single domestic
or foreign donor. 71% of all funds of the civic sector come from international
development programs, 12% of funding come from the state budget, 5% of the funds
come from individual donations36.
Piotr Gliski indicates that the main financial problem of the Polish third
sector is the concentration of financial resources. In 2012, 4% of the richest non-
governmental organizations have accumulated 80% of all funds for civic activities
of the sector37.

***

During the past two decades of transformation, the civil societies in Poland and
Macedonia have encountered a number of problems and constraints characteristic
for young democracies. The legacy of communism stamped an imprint on civic
awareness and treatment of grassroots community initiatives. In both countries, the
process of transformation, also in the social dimension is not over yet.
32
The same.
33
Zofia Klinowska, Kondycja spoeczestwa obywatelskiego w Polsce, Infos: Biuletyn
Biura Analiz Sejmowych, No. 22 (136), Warszawa 2012, 13.
34
Strategia Wspierania Rozwoju Spoeczestwa Obywatelskiego na lata 2009-2015, http://
www.mpips.gov.pl/userfiles/File/pozytek/SWRSO%2020092015.pdf (Retrieved on 22.03.2015).
35
Zofia Klinowska, Kondycja spoeczestwa..., 3.
36
Civil Society Organizations in Macedonia, TACSO and IPSOS Report, 2014, 1718,
http://www.tacso.org/doc/ipsos_report_mk.pdf (Retrieved on 17.03.2015).
37
Stephan Raabe, Transformacja i spoeczestwo obywatelskie..., 7.

159
60 2 2016 MA Daniel Wilk

In the relationship between the state sector and the civil sector, there dominates
a mutual distrust. An important part in building the civil sector in both countries have
been played by international organizations. The European Union is committed to the
creation of the civil society in both countries, relying the accession of Poland to the EU
structures and the possible future accession of Macedonia on the development of the
third sector in both countries. Currently, the biggest problem of non-governmental
organizations is lack of non-governmental sources of financing for the third sector.
In the relationship of NGOs citizens, in both countries, there is a noticeable
lack of faith and basic knowledge on the benefits of participating in civic affairs.
One of the main reasons for such attitude is disappointment by the process of social
transformation. The statistics indicate that today's young generation aged 18-29
years is more willing to drive its civic activity to operate in non-profit organizations
than previous generations of twenty-somethings.

160
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

339.564:663.991 (497.7:4) 1919-1941


(19191941)

EXPORTS OF THE MACEDONIAN OPIUM TO EUROPE


(1919-1941)

Abstract

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Opium Convention of 1912 each year was
obliged to submit to the Secretariat of the League of Nations reports on opium production
and traffic. Statistical traffic data on Macedonian opium of the Kingdom very often did not
correspond to the statistical data in disposal of the European states. Inconsistencies of the
statistical data resulted from the fact that in the first years after the end of the World War First
the main traffickers of the Macedonian opium were trade firms from Thessaloniki without any
control by the state authorities and due to fact that the Kingdoms statistics was not accurate.
As a result the volume of traffic in Macedonian opium in Europe in that period could not be
precisely determined. The following options were provided as causes for that occurrence:
repacking, resorting and re-trafficking in opium in the states as final destinations. Indications
of final closure of the misunderstandings due to various statistical data appeared by the end
of 1929 when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ratified the Opium Convention. Nevertheless, the
reports on opium quantity trafficked by domestic traders did not correspond to the foreign
statistical data.

Keywords: Macedonian opium, International Opium Conventions, the Kingdom of


Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, export of the opium, trading companies-exporters
of the opium.



.
(26,1%)

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165
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

614.2 (497.711) 1918-1939

INSTITUTE OF HYGIENE IN SKOPJE AND ITS ACTIVITES IN


THE KINGDOM OF SCS/YUGOSLAVIA

Abstarct

This article refers to the work of the Institute of Hygiene in Skopje in the Kingdom of
SCS/Yugoslavia. The overall maintenance of the population`s physical health was conducted
by the Institute of Hygiene, which began working in 1925. Within its scope of work, the
Institute of Hygiene tested the drinking water for the population of the city of Skopje, which
in many premises was not drinkable. The Institute worked on improving the general health of
the people and studied pathology of the illnesses especially regarding malaria. The Institute
provided free medical exams, laboratory analyses and medications.

eywords: Hygiene Institute, prevention of infectious diseases, control of drinking


water.

,
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168
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godine, Sarajevo, 1932. Definitvni rezultati popisa stanovnitva od 31 mart 1931 godina,
Knjiga I, Prisutno stanovnitvo, broj kua i domainstva, Opta dravna statistika, Dravna
tamparija, Beograd, 1937.
8
, , 1937, 38.
9
Ljuba Dimic, Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 19181941, Beograd, 1996, II
deo, 229-247.
10
Maks Ajling, Glasnik Ministarstva narodnog zdravlja, vanredni broj, Radovi
antimalaricne komisije u Makedoniji 1921 god., II god., Beograd, 1922, 24-25.
11
Glasnik Ministrastva narodnog zdravlja br. 1-2, oktobar 1919 g. donosi sledece: 1. Glavni
pravci nase zdravstvene politike dr. M. J. Batut (1-7) 2. Princip jedne zdravstvene politike, Uros
Krulj (7-14), Ministarstvo narodnog zdravlja i njegovi zadaci, B. J. Nikolic (14-17).

169
60 2 2016 ,

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Ljuba Dimic, Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941, Beograd, 1996, II
deo, 229-247.
14
Maks Ajling, Glasnik Ministarstva narodnog zdravlja, vanredni broj, Radovi
antimalaricne komisije u Makedoniji 1921 god., II god., Beograd, 1922, 24-25.
15
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http://vest.com.mk/default-mk.asp?ItemID=5FDD0F54225D8F4E939DC373F9CFCF85
( 31.08.2015);
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockefeller_Foundation ( 14.04.2016).

172
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174
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175
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

929 , .

.
(1872-1903)

FROM THE LIFE OF THE POLISH ILINDEN UPRISING FIGHTER


JULIUS CAESAR ROZENTHAL (1872-1903)

Abstract

Julius Caesar Rozenthal (Irkustk, Siberia, 14. 07. 1872 Lukovo, Macedonia, 12. 08.
1903) was an anarchist, a student at law, a teacher and a poet, who tragically lost his life
during the battle at the village of Lukovo, during the Ilinden Uprising. After his tragic death,
Anton Strashimirov collected all Rozenthals work, about 90 poems, and published them in
a poetry book in Sofia in 1904. When reading this poetry book one can easily see that the
recurring topics in his poems are the struggle for liberation by the occupied people as well
as the struggle for the people to live in harmony. Among these poems, there are two poems
dedicated to Macedonia.

Keywords: Julius Caesar Rozenthal, Ilinden Uprising, village of Lukovo, Macedonia.



. 1903 ,

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177
60 2 2016

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183
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

628.1:911.375 (497.7) 18


19

COMMUNAL CONDITION IN MACEDONIAN CITIES AT THE


END OF THE 19TH CENTURY

Abstract

Macedonian cities in the 19th century were different from modern European cities.
Socio-political and economic position which European cities had in 16-17 century, cities in
Macedonia began to have even in the 19th century. The changes were caused by the political
and social reforms introduce in the Ottoman Empire. In the military and administrative
centers as Thessaloniki, Bitola and Skopje are occurred changes to the communal plan. The
cities have improved the appearance thanks to their mayors. One of them was mayor of Bitola
Abdul Kerim Pasha.
Smaller cities in Macedonia and beginning of 20th century were without waterworks,
system of sewage and other necessary edifice.

Keywords: Macedonia, Ottoman Empire, communal, cities, reforms, occasions, edifice,


appearance, mayors.


- -1.
,
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189
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

339.3/.5 (497.7:=411.16) 17/18


XVIIIXIX

CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRADE ACTIVITY OF JEWS IN


MACEDONIA IN XVIII AND XIX CENTURY

Abstract

The wide usage of different trade and legal forms in the trade activity of the Jews
ensures the performance of trade deals and the increase of the acquired capital. The
position that the Jews filled in the trade of the Balkan Peninsula to a great degree
was due to the manner of organizing their trade. The Jewish merchants had completely
arranged organization of trade. With their widespread branches, this organization was
a trade network where the major merchants that lived in all the larger trade centers
on the Balkan Peninsula were the main knot. The major merchants were a type of
regulators of the entire trade, i. e. the exchange of the import and export goods was
performed by them. The Jews traded with a large amount of different goods at the
internal and external market. In order to successfully perform the trade activity, they
had to know the consumers needs both of the external and the internal market.
That was a close connection with the manufacturers of goods on one hand and an
active stimulation of the production on the market on the other hand. In that way the
Jews indirectly helped the development of the commodity monetary relations in the
Ottoman Empire.

Keywords: trade, Jewish merchants, Macedonia, Salonika, consuls, Balkan Peninsula,


Ottoman Empire.

191
60 2 2016

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201
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

343.575:341.24 19


(
)*
INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTIONS IN THE INTERWAR
PERIOD (PARALLELS THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA -THE
REPUBLIC OF POLAND)

Abstract

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Poland as a members of the League
of Nations since its inception, were been involved in the international implications for
control of production and trade with the opium in the world. These two countries were been
actively involved in the implementation of the international opium conventions that had been
adopted in the period between the two world wars. Although Republic of Poland signed the
opium conventions of 1912, 1925 and 1933, and Kingdom of Yugoslavia only the first two
conventions, both countries were participated in their implementation.

Keywords: Macedonian opium, the League of Nations, International Opium Conventions,


the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Poland, restriction on production of the opium,
control of the opium derivatives.



XX .
,1
23 1912 .
, ,
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,
*
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, 2011 .
1
Arhiv Jugoslavije- Beograd (: ): 65-209-641.

203
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4
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNT Ser/1928/231.html/League of Nations Treaty
Series ( 6.12. 2010)

204



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206
60 2 2016 ISSN 0583-4961

338 (497.711) 1918-1941

THE CONDITIONS OF THE CITY ECONOMY IN THE SKOPJE


REGION DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Abstract

The city economy in the Skopje district during the interwar period is very important
because it directly affected the subsistence of the population in the city and the area. The
economic development of the city of Skopje in the interwar period can be followed by
studying the city economy. Conditions for the development of the city economy in the Skopje
area were created in the period 1918-1941, but the specific economic and political conditions
did not allow that.

Keywords: city economy, Skopje district, Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia.


, ,
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