Cryptography

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Cryptography

© All Rights Reserved

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Advanced Encryption Standard

1

Outline

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Substitution-Permutation Networks

3.3 Linear cryptanalysis

3.4 Differential cryptanalysis

3.5 The Data Encryption Standard

3.6 The Advanced Encryption Standard

3.7 Modes of Operation

2

3.1 Introduction

A commonly used design for modern-day block

ciphers is that of an iterated cipher:

The cipher requires the specification of a round

function and a key schedule, and the encryption

of a plaintext will proceed through Nr similar

rounds.

random key K: used to construct Nr round keys (also

called subkeys), which are denoted K1,,KNr.

key schedule (K1,,KNr): constructed from K using a

fixed, public algorithm.

round function g: takes two inputs: a round key (Kr)

and a current state (wr-1). wr=g(wr-1,Kr) is the next state.

plaintext x: the initial state w0.

Ciphertext y: the state after all Nr rounds done.

3

Introduction

Encryption operations: Decryption operations:

w0 x w Nr y

w1 g ( w0 , K 1 ) w Nr 1 g 1 ( w Nr , K Nr )

w2 g ( w1 , K 2 )

w1 g 1 ( w2 , K 2 )

w Nr 1 g ( w Nr 2 , K Nr 1 ) w0 g 1 ( w1 , K 1 )

w Nr g ( w Nr 1 , K Nr ) x w0

y w Nr

Note: function g is injective

(one-to-one)

4

3.2 Substitution-Permutation

Networks (SPN)

Cryptosystem 3.1: SPN

l, m and Nr are positive integers

S : {0,1}l {0,1}l is a permutation

P : {1,..., lm} {1,..., lm} is a permutation.

P C {0,1}lm , and K ({0,1}lm ) Nr 1 consist of all

possible key schedules that could be derived from

an initial key K using the key scheduling algorithm.

For a key schedule ( K 1 ,..., K Nr 1 ) , we encrypt the

plaintext x using Algorithm 3.1.

5

Substitution-Permutation

Networks

Algorithm 3.1: SPN ( x, S , P , ( K 1 ,..., K Nr 1 ))

w0 x

for r 1 to Nr 1 ur is the input to the S-

boxes in round r.

u r wr 1 K r vr is the output of the S-

boxes in round r.

for i 1 to m

do r r wr is obtained from vr by

do v( i ) S (u ( i) ) applying P .

wr (v r ,..., v r ur+1 is constructed from

P (1) P ( lm ) )

wr by xor-ing with the

u Nr w Nr 1 K Nr round key Kr+1 (called

for i 1 to m round key mixing).

The very first and last

do v(Nri) S (u(Nri) )

operations are xors with

y v Nr K Nr 1 subkeys (called whitening).

output ( y )

6

Substitution-Permutation

Networks

Example 3.1:

Suppose l m Nr 4 . Let S be defined as follows,

where the input and the output are written in hexadecimal:

particular SPN, where Sir means i-th round, r-th S-box.

7

x

u1

v1

w1

u2

v2

w2

u3

v3

w3

Figure 3.1: A substitution-

u4 permutation network

v4

y

8

Substitution-Permutation

Networks

Key schedule: suppose we begin with a 32-bit key

K (k1 ,..., k32 ) {0,1}32 . For 1 r 5 , define Kr to consist of

16 consecutive bits of K, beginning with k4r-3.

K= 0011 1010 1001 0100 1101 0110 0011 1111

Round keys:

K1= 0011 1010 1001 0100

K2= 1010 1001 0100 1101

K3= 1001 0100 1101 0110

K4= 0100 1101 0110 0011

K5= 1101 0110 0011 1111

9

Substitution-Permutation

Networks

Suppose the plaintext is x= 0010 0110 1011 0111.

Then the encryption of x proceeds as follows:

w0= 0010 0110 1011 0111

K1= 0011 1010 1001 0100

u1= 0001 1100 0010 0011

v1= 0100 0101 1101 0001

w1= 0010 1110 0000 0111

K2= 1010 1001 0100 1101

u2= 1000 0111 0100 1010

v2= 0011 1000 0010 0110

w2= 0100 0001 1011 1000

10

Substitution-Permutation

Networks

K3= 1001 0100 1101 0110

u3= 1101 0101 0110 1110

v3= 1001 1111 1011 0000

w3= 1110 0100 0110 1110

K4= 0100 1101 0110 0011

u4= 1010 1001 0000 1101

v4= 0110 1010 1110 1001

K5= 1101 0110 0011 1111, and

y= 1011 1100 1101 0110

is the ciphertext.

11

3.3 Linear Cryptanalysis

We want to find a probability linear relationship

between a subset of plaintext bits and a subset of

data bits preceding the last round. This relation

behaves in a non-random fashion.

The attacker has a lot of plaintext-ciphertext pairs

(known plaintext attack).

For each candidate subkey, we partially decrypt the

cipher and check if the relation holds. If the relation

holds then increment its corresponding counter. At

the end, the candidate key that counts furthest from

is the most likely subkey.

12

Linear Cryptanalysis

3.3.1 The Piling-up Lemma

Suppose X1, X2, are independent random variables from

{0,1}. And

Pr[ X i 0] pi , i 1,2,... Hence,

Pr[ X i 1] 1 pi , i 1,2,...

The independence of Xi, Xj implies

Pr[ X i 0, X j 0] pi p j

Pr[ X i 0, X j 1] pi (1 p j )

Pr[ X i 1, X j 0] (1 pi ) p j

Pr[ X i 1, X j 1] (1 pi )(1 p j )

13

Linear Cryptanalysis

Now consider X i X j .

Pr[ X i X j 0] pi p j (1 pi )(1 p j )

Pr[ X i X j 1] pi (1 p j ) (1 pi ) p j

The bias of Xi is defined to be the quantity

i pi 12

And we have

12 i 12 ,

Pr[ X i 0] 12 i ,

Pr[ X i 1] 12 i .

14

Linear Cryptanalysis

Let i ,i ,...,i denote the bias of

1 2 k

X i1 X ik .

the bias of the random variable X i X i . Then

1 k

k

i ,i ,...,i 2 k 1 i .

1 2 k j

j 1

random variable X i X i . Suppose that i j 0 for

1 k

15

Linear Cryptanalysis

3.3.2 Linear Approximations of S-boxes

m n

Consider an S-box S : {0,1} {0,1}.

Let the input m-tuple be X=(x1,,xm). And the output n-tuple be

Y=(y1,,yn).

We can see that

Pr[ X 1 x1 ,..., X m xm , Y1 y1 ,..., Yn yn ] 0

if ( y1 ,..., yn ) S ( x1 ,..., xm ) ; and

Pr[ X 1 x1 ,..., X m xm , Y1 y1 ,..., Yn yn ] 2 m

if ( y1 ,..., yn ) S ( x1 ,..., xm ).

Now we can compute the bias of the form

X i1 X ik Y j1 Y jl

using the formulas stated above.

16

Linear Cryptanalysis

Example 3.2: We use the S-box as Example 3.1.

17

Linear Cryptanalysis

Consider X 1 X 4 Y2 . The probability that X 1 X 4 Y2 0

can be determined by counting the number of rows in which

X 1 X 4 Y2 0 , and then dividing by 16.

It is seen that

1

Pr[ X 1 X 4 Y2 0] 2

Hence, the bias is 0.

If we instead analyze X 3 X 4 Y1 Y4 , we find that the

bias is 3/8.

18

Linear Cryptanalysis

We can record the bias of all 28=256 possible random

variables.

We represent the relevant random variable in the

form 4 4

ai X i biYi

i 1 i 1

where ai {0,1}, bi {0,1}, i 1,2,3,4 .

We treat (a1,a2,a3,a4) and (b1,b2,b3,b4) as

hexadecimal digit (they are called input sum and

output sum, respectively)

19

Linear Cryptanalysis

Let NL(a,b) denote the number of binary eight-tuples

(x1,x2,x3,x4,y1,y2,y3,y4) s.t

( y1 , y2 , y3 , y4 ) S ( x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 )

and 4 4

ai X i biYi 0

i 1 i 1

The bias is computed as (a, b) ( N L (a, b) 8) / 16 .

The table of all NL is called the linear approximation

table (Figure 3.2).

20

Example

3.2

NL(a,b)-8

21

Linear Cryptanalysis

3.3.3 Linear Attack on an SPN

Linear cryptanalysis requires a set of linear approximations

of S-boxes that can be used to derive a linear approximation

of the entire SPN (excluding the last round).

Figure 3.3 illustrates the structure of the approximation we

will use.

Arrows are the random variables involved in the approximations

and the labeled S-boxes (active S-boxes) are used in the

approximations.

22

x

u1

v1

w1

u2

v2

w2

u3

v3

w3

Figure 3.3: A linear

u4 approximation of an SPN

v4

y

23

Linear Cryptanalysis

The approximation incorporates four active S-boxes:

In S12, T1 U 51 U 71 U 81 V61 has bias

In S22, T2 U 62 V62 V82 has bias -

In S32, T3 U 63 V63 V83 has bias -

In S34, T4 U143 V143 V163 has bias -

T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 have biases that are high in absolute value.

Further, we will see their XOR will lead to

cancellations of intermediate random variables.

24

Linear Cryptanalysis

Using Piling-up lemma, T1 T2 T3 T4 has bias equal

to 23(1/4)(-1/4)3=-1/32.

Note: we assume the four r.v are independent.

Then T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 can be expressed in terms of

plaintext bits, bits of u4 (input to the last round) and

key bits as follows:

T1 U 51 U 71 U 81 V61 X 5 K 51 X 7 K 71 X 8 K 81 V61

T2 U 62 V62 V82 V61 K 62 V62 V82

T3 U 63 V63 V83 V62 K 63 V63 V83

T4 U143 V143 V163 V82 K143 V143 V163

25

Linear Cryptanalysis

XOR the right side and we get

X 5 X 7 X 8 V63 V83 V143 V163

K 51 K 71 K 81 K 62 K 63 K143 (3.1)

V63 U 64 K 64 V83 U144 K144

V143 U 84 K 84 V163 U164 K164

Now substitute them into 3.1:

X 5 X 7 X 8 U 64 U 84 U144 U164

K 51 K 71 K 81 K 62 K 63 K143 K 64 K 84 K144 K164 (3.2)

26

Linear Cryptanalysis

The expression above only involves plaintext bits, bits

of u4 and key bits.

Suppose the key bits are fixed. Then

K 51 K 71 K 81 K 62 K 63 K143 K 64 K 84 K144 K164

It follows that

X 5 X 7 X 8 U 64 U 84 U 144 U164 (3.3)

has bias -1/32 or 1/32 where the sign depends on

the key bits (=0 or =1).

27

Linear Cryptanalysis

The fact that (3.3) has bias bounded away from 0

allows us to carry out linear attack.

Suppose that we have T plaintext-ciphertext pairs

(denoted by ), all use the same unknown key, K.

The attack will allow us to obtain the eight key bits,

K 55 , K 65 , K 75 , K 85 , K135 , K145 , K155 , K165

There are 28=256 possibilities for the eight key bits.

We refer to a binary 8-tuple as a candidate subkey.

28

Linear Cryptanalysis

For each ( x, y ) and for each candidate subkey, we

compute a partial decryption of y and obtain the

resulting value for u(42 ) ,u(44) .

Then we compute the value

x5 x7 x8 u64 u84 u144 u164 (3.4)

We maintain an array of counters indexed by the 256

possible candidate subkeys, and increment the

counter corresponding to a particular subkey when

(3.4) has the value 0.

In the end, we expect most counters will have a

value close to T/2, but the correct candidate subkey

will close to T/2T/32.

29

Linear Cryptanalysis

The attack is presented as Algorithm 3.2.

L1 and L2 are hexadecimal value.

S 1 is the inverse of the S-box.

The output, maxkey, contains the most likely subkey.

In general, it is suggested that a linear attack based

on a linear approximation having bias will be

successful if the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs

2

is approximately c for some small constant c.

30

for ( L1 , L2 ) (0,0) to ( F , F )

1

do Count[ L1 , L2 ] 0 Algorithm 3.2: LINEARATTACK( , T , S )

for each ( x, y )

for ( L1 , L2 ) (0,0) to ( F , F )

4

v( 2 ) L1 y( 2 )

4

v( 4 ) L2 y( 4 )

u 4 1 (v 4 )

( 2) S ( 2)

do 4 1 4

do u( 4 ) S (v( 4 ) )

z x x x u 4 u 4 u 4 u 4

5 7 8 6 8 14 16

if z 0

then Count[ L1 , L2 ] Count[ L1 , L2 ] 1

max 1

for ( L1 , L2 ) (0,0) to ( F , F )

Count[ L1 , L2 ]|Count[ L1 , L2 ]T / 2|

do if Count[ L1 , L2 ] max

then maxCount[ L1 , L2 ]

maxkey( L1 , L2 )

output (maxkey) 31

3.4 Differential Cryptanalysis

The main difference from linear attack is that

differential attack involves comparing the XOR of two

inputs to the XOR of the corresponding outputs.

Differential attack is a chosen-plaintext attack.

We consider inputs x and x* having a specified XOR

value denoted by x' x x * .

We decrypt y and y* using all possible key and

determine if their XOR has a certain value. Whenever

it does, increment the corresponding counter. At the

end, we expect the largest one is the most likely

subkey.

32

Differential Cryptanalysis

Definition 3.1:

m n

Let S : {0,1} {0,1} be an S-box. Consider an

(ordered) pair of bitstrings of length m, say (x,x*).

We say that the input XOR of the S-box is x x *

and the output XOR is S ( x) S ( x*) .

For any x' {0,1}m, define the set (x' ) to consist

of all the ordered pairs (x,x*) having input XOR

equal to x.

33

Differential Cryptanalysis

It is easy to see that any set (x' ) contains 2m pairs,

and that

( x' ) {( x, x x' ) : x {0,1}m }

For each pair in (x' ) , we can compute the output

XOR of the S-box. Then we can tabulate the

distribution of output XORs. There are 2m output

XORs which are distributed among 2n possible values.

A non-uniform output distribution will be the basis for a

successful attack.

34

Differential Cryptanalysis

Example 3.3:

We use the same S-box as before. Suppose we consider

input XOR x=1011. Then

(1011) {(0000,1011), (0001,1010),..., (1111,0100)}

We compute the following table, where

x x* 1011,

y S ( x), y* S ( x*),

y' y y *

35

x x* y y* y

0000 1011 1110 1100 0010

0000 0 1000 0

0001 1010 0100 0110 0010

0010 1001 1101 1010 0111 0001 0 1001 0

0011 1000 0001 0011 0010

0010 8 1010 0

0100 1111 0010 0111 0101

0101 1110 1111 0000 1111 0011 0 1011 0

0110 1101 1011 1001 0010 0100 0 1100 0

0111 1100 1000 0101 1101

1000 0011 0011 0001 0010 0101 2 1101 2

1001 0010 1010 1101 0111 0110 0 1110 0

1010 0001 0110 0100 0010

1011 0000 1100 1110 0010 0111 2 1111 2

1100 0111 0101 1000 1101 Number of output

1101 0110 1001 1011 0010

1110 0101 0000 1111 1111

1111 0100 0111 0010 0101 Distribution table for x=1011

36

Differential Cryptanalysis

In Example 3.3, only 5 of the 16 possible output

XORs occur. It has a very non-uniform distribution.

We can compute all possible input XORs as Example

3.3.

Define

N D ( x' , y ' ) | {( x, x*) ( x' ) : S ( x) S ( x*) y '} |

x and output XOR equal to y. (Figure 3.4)

37

Example

3.3

38

Differential Cryptanalysis

An input XOR is computed as

u(ri ) (u(ri ) )* ( w(ri)1 K (ri ) ) (( w(ri)1 ) * K (ri ) )

w(ri)1 ( w(ri)1 ) *

Therefore, the input XOR does not depend on the subkey

bits used in round r; it is equal to the (permuted) output

XOR of round r-1.

output XOR. (a,b) is called a differential.

39

Differential Cryptanalysis

propagation ratio Rp(a,b):

N D ( a ' , b' )

R p ( a ' , b' )

2m

Rp(a,b) can be interpreted as a conditional probability:

Pr[output XOR b' | input XOR a ' ] R p (a ' , b' )

We combine differentials in consecutive rounds to

form a differential trail. A particular differential

trail is shown in Figure 3.5.

40

x

u1

v1

w1

u2

v2

w2

u3

v3

w3

for a SPN

v4

y

41

Differential Cryptanalysis

The differential attack arising from Figure 3.5 uses

the following propagation ratios of differentials:

In S12 , R p (1011,0010) 1 / 2

In S 23 , R p (0100,0110) 3 / 8

In S32 , R p (0010,0101) 3 / 8

In S33 , R p (0010,0101) 3 / 8

differential trail of the first three rounds of the SPN:

3

1 3 27

R p (0000 1011 0000 0000, 0000 0101 0101 0000)

2 8 1024

42

Differential Cryptanalysis

In other words,

x' 0000 1011 0000 0000 (v 3 )' 0000 0101 0101 0000

with probability 27/1024. However,

(v 3 )' 0000 0101 0101 0000 (u 4 )' 0000 0110 0000 0110

Hence, it follows that

x' 0000 1011 0000 0000 (u 4 )' 0000 0110 0000 0110

with probability 27/1024.

43

Differential Cryptanalysis

Algorithm 3.3 presents the attack algorithm.

The input and output are similar to linear attack,

except that is a set (x,x*,y,y*), where x is fixed.

Algorithm 3.3 makes use of a certain filtering

operation. Tuples (x,x*,y,y*) for which the

differential holds are often called right pairs, and

allow us to determine the key bits.

A right pair has the form

(u(41) )' (u(43) )' 0000

Hence we consider those y(1) ( y(1) ) * and y(3) ( y(3) ) *.

44

for ( L1 , L2 ) (0,0) to ( F , F ) Algorithm 3.3:

do Count[ L1 , L2 ] 0

DIFFERENTIALATTACK( , T , S 1)

for each ( x, y, x*, y*)

if ( y(1) ( y(1) )*) and ( y( 3) ( y(3) )*)

for ( L1 , L2 ) (0,0) to ( F , F )

v(42 ) L1 y( 2)

4

max 1

v( 4 ) L2 y( 4)

4

1 for ( L1 , L2 ) (0,0) to ( F , F )

u ( 2 ) S (v(42) )

4 1 if Count[ L1 , L2 ] max

u( 4 ) S (v(44) )

do

4 max Count[ L1 , L2 ]

(v( 2 ) )* L1 ( y( 2) ) *

do then maxkey ( L , L )

4 1 2

then do (v( 4 ) )* L2 ( y( 4) ) *

4 1 4

output (maxkey)

(u ( 2 ) )* S (( v( 2 ) )*)

4 1 4

(u ( 4 ) )* S (( v( 4 ) )*)

4 4 4

(u ( 2 ) )' u ( 2 ) ( u ( 2) ) *

4

(u( 4 ) )' u(44 ) (u(44) ) *

if ((u 4 )' 0110) and ((u 4 )' 0110)

( 2) (4)

then Count[ L1 , L2 ] Count[ L1 , L2 ] 1

45

Differential Cryptanalysis

A differential attack based on a differential trail

having propagation ratio equal to will often be

successful if the number of tuples (x,x*,y,y*), which

1

we denote by T, is approximately c , for a small

constant c.

46

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