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Caedo v.

Yu Khe Thai
G.R. No. L-20392. December 18, 1968.

Petitioners: Marcial T. Caedo, Juana Caedo and their children, riding in the Mercury Car
Respondents: Yu Khe Thai (owner of car), Rafael Bernardo (driver), in a Cadillac

Facts:

At 5:30 in the morning, on Highway 54 (now EDSA) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village, Marcial Caedo was
driving his Mercury car from QC to the airport (southbound) to bring his son who was going to Mindoro.

Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven by Bernardo, going to Wack Wack
from Paraaque (northbound.) Considering there was no traffic at that time, both cars were traveling a fairly
moderate speedsCaedo at 40-50kph, Bernardo 48-56kph. In front of the car of Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai was
a carretela going in the same direction.

The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the carretelas post. The carretela
had two lights, one on each side.

Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did,
his car caught the rim of the carretelas left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded to the
other land, colliding with Caedos car. Caedo, tried to avoid the collision by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful.

Caedo and the members of his family were injured because of the accident, so they filed this suit for recovery of
damages from Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai.

Issue/s:

1. Who was responsible for the accident?


2. If it was Bernardo, was his employer, Yu Khe Thai solidarily liable with him?

Held:
1. Bernardo in the Cadillac. The collision was directly traceable to Bernardos negligence. He tried to beat Caedos
car or squeeze between Caedos car and the carretela. He should have known that passing the carretela was a risky
maneuver, but he still took a gamble. The first clear indication of his negligence was his claim that he was almost
upon the carretela when he saw it in front of him, only 8 meters away. The carretela had two lights, one on each
side, which should have given him sufficient warning to take necessary precaution. Even if he claims he didnt
see the lights of the carretela, the carretela should have been visible to him if he had been careful, as it must have
been in the beam of his headlights.

2. No, Yu Khe Thai cannot be held solidarily liable with Bernardo.

Art 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.

Under Art. 2148, if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

However, in the case of Chapman vs. Underwood: (important)

An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the
chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner
having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates
the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must
be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

In this case, Bernardo has been Yu Khe Thais driver for around 20 years prior to the accident and Bernardo has
had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed by him at all may
be imputed to his master. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. Yu Khe Thai had reason to rely on
the skill and experience of his driver. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu
Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. According to Yu Khe Thai, he thought that
if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make this driver nervous and make the situation worse.

The test of imputed negligence under Art. 2184 is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not
held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The test of his (the car
owners) negligence, within the meaning of Art. 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his
own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident.

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