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G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three
weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts
can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments
to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national
elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued
that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the
issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their proposals to amend the
Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot
be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted
to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being,
when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a
constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.

II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in
this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The
circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to
submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the amended

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials
by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,
b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to
assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA
6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The
two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for
initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.

RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover
that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide
for the implementation of the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for
whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate
enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when the Decision herein
was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.


PUNO, concurring and dissenting

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to
dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit
that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did
not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.

[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held to
cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the
signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written
ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin

(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through initiative, there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.

I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures
in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public
funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the
Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majoritys two other rulings.

G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971

After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which
seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved
to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971.
Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to
the resolution be null and void.

1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because
the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV
of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover,
the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the
Constitution, not separately but together.

In Re: Laureta and Maravilla

GR No 68635 12 March 1987

Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all
members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on
the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice
Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez.
On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap
inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of
exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed
petitioners Complaint

1. WoN the Justices of the First Division acted in bad faith
2. WoN Ilustres and Lauretas actions violate the principle of separation of powers

1. NO. (Ratio: Ilustre has lost three times in court, and by virtue of res judicata, the Escolin Decision and the Javellana Resolution,
which bar her from acquiring Maravillas properties, serve as final judgment of the case.) SC gave ample time and consideration to
her petitions, but ultimately held that they had no merit (as stated in their Banc Decision). Justice Yap clarified that he was not
aware that his former partner Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez was the counsel for the respondents, and inhibited himself immediately upon
finding out. Court is not duty bound to issue signed Decisions all the time, if it deems it unnecessary.
2. YES. (Ratio: In their persistence to overturn detrimental decisions, their threats of exposing the supposed corruption of the SC to
the media, and their unfounded complaint to the Tanodbayan, Ilustre and Laureta attempted to subject the judiciary to the
executive, which is unjustifiable under separation of powers.) Independence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing
the supremacy of the Constitution. Reciprocity: The decisions of the SC, whether en banc or division, are as credible as the enrolled
bills of the legislature, and therefore beyond investigation or inquiry; applicable also the the executive.

Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional
misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith
and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature.
The supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and
checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of government are each supreme
and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)as concerned
citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as
taxpayerson the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public
moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for
approving appropriations.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the
government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also
alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by
the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General
Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only
disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities
render the provision in question null and void.

2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial
power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no
judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.

Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.


G.R. No. L-45081, July 15 1936

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of
the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation
governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from
the SC.

1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
2. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
1. The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

2. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and
perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.


GR No. 133064, September 16, 1999

1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA
No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that
practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an
independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They
also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the
Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a
political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the
President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their
right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in
RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004

This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of
1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by
the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty
over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of
the Filipino nation.
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance contained in
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and regulations insofar as
they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State retains the power to direct
overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that
which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial,
marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full
residual control of the business.

PACU vs Secretary of Education

GR No 5279 31 October 1955

Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers
and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2) They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to
prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. However, the Solicitor General on the other
hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are
actually operating by virtue of their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law and had no need for relief.

Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court

Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that,
it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that
judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited to the
decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the
permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.

Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba.
Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing
as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No.

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition
for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Montesclaros vs COMELEC
GR No. 152295 09 July 2002

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its membership
to youths at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age. On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from
COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the House of
Representatives and the Senate on 20 February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and
expressed support to postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated
Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but no
more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002
respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary
restraining order seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.

Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite
any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioners perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed
bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or
duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to
assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.

Atlas Fertilizer vs Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform

GR No. 93100 19 June 1997

Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13,
16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures
contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform as unconstitutional. They contend that R.A. 6657, by including the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including
fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and therefore void.

Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.

Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by Congress on 20 February 1995 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are
excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed
provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.

Lacson Vs. Perez

G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001

President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1
ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of
the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of
Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate
court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure
orders were issued against them.

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered
moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and
prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be
penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary
detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the
subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold
departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for
relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for
any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners
are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

SANLAKAS vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation,
command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of
the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place
and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion
to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et
al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they
contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners
contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel
v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation
of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

1. Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
2. Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

1. The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by
the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and
to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit
as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions
of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any
person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as
long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

2. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al.
and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Pimentel vs Ermita
GR No 164978, 13 October 2005

While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur
Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel
together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such
appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not
anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an
officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously
appointed in acting capacity.

Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused
hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial
appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also proves that
the president was in good faith.

It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the presidents to make and the
president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the
option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego
of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That person may or may not be
the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.

Joya vs Presidential Commission on Good Governance

GR No 96541, 24 August 1993

The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between
the Republic of the Philippines and Christies of 82 Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of
antique silverware in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the consignment was signed the
following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit submitted audit findings to the President the assets subject of
auction were historical relics and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists,
petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have legal personality to restrain respondent from acting contrary to preserving
artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the
Marcos administration was toppled and the said objects were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these were
already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the said objects that have become publicly owned.

Agan vs PIATCO
GR No 155001, 05 May 2003

Petitioners filed instant petitions for prohibition seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing the following agreements executed
by the Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO): (1)
the Concession Agreement signed on July 12, 1997, (2) the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated November 26,
1999, (3) the First Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated August 27, 1999, (4) the Second
Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated September 4, 2000, and (5) the Third Supplement to the
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated June 22, 2001 (collectively, the PIATCO Contracts).

Whether or not petitioning employees has legal standing to raise validity of the PIATCO contracts?

Petition granted and contracts declared null and void. Petitioners have direct and substantial interest to protect by reason of the
implementation of the PIATCO contracts. They stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property right which is protected by the
Constitution. Subsisting agreements between MIA and petitioners stand to be terminated by the PIATCO contracts. The financial
prejudice brought about by the PIATCO contract to petitioners is legitimate interests sufficient to give them legal standing to file the
G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004

Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable
to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution
No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for
said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM
secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a
memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval
of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file employees of the
CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that
the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.

CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the
upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal

1. Whether or not the petitioner has a locus standi on the case.
2. Whether or not the approval of the DBM is a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and
collapsing of plantillas in the CHR.

1. Petitioner which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR is in imminent danger of sustaining injury as a result of the
proposed scheme. Only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission will benefit from the said scheme, which when
found valid will eat up a big portion of the Commissions savings that can otherwise be allocated to Personnel Services, from which
the benefits of the employees are derived. The personality of the CHREA was also recognized by CSC when it took cognizance of the
petitioners request to affirm the recommendations from the CSC-NCR Office.

2. The court held that without the approval of the DBM, the resolutions issued by the CHR are disallowed. RA 6758, An Act
Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary
Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position
Classification System.

The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the
coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to administer means to
control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct
public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.

Wherefore the petition was granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside, and the ruling of
the CSC-NCR reinstated.

RA 6758 provides that the DBM shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
The coverage of this authority includes all positions in the government, government-owned and controlled corporations
and government financial institutions. Government refers to the Executive, Legislative, and the Judicial Branch and
even the Constitutional Commissions that supposedly have fiscal autonomy.

Jurisprudence also supports this power granted to the DBM. PRA vs Jesusito L. Bunag, Victorino Cruz vs Court of Appeals,
Intia Jr., vs COA

On the mistaken premise that CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions, the Constitution and Chapter 5
sections 24 and 26 Book II of the Administrative code mention only 3 constitutional commissions, the CSC, the COMLEC
and the COA. In fact, the CHR is considered as Other Bodies. Its being member of the CFAG does not grant it fiscal
autonomy because fiscal autonomy can only be granted by the Constituion.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, all government offices must, all the same kowtow to
the Salary Standardization Law, for which its administration has been given by Congress to the DBM.

Automotive Industry Workers vs Romulo

GR No 157509, 18 January 2005

Executive Order No. 292 was issued whereby the National Labor Relations Commission became an agency attached to the
Department of Labor and Employment for policy and program coordination and for administrative supervision. On 02 March 1989,
Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the
DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision was turned over to the NLRC Chairman.
Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 supervision of NLRC reverted to the Sec. of Labor and Employment. Petitioners,
composed of ten labor unions assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert the set-up prior to RA 6715 which only
Congress can do. Solicitor General contend that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in
their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
Even assuming that their individual members are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No.
185 does not require additional appropriation for its implementation.

Whether or not the ten labour unions have legal standing to assail the constitutionality of EO 185?

Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will
prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not
extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

Tanada vs. Tuvera (1)

G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.

WON publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and
Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed
lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles
(7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM

Subsequently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom
Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This
caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously
known as the mother of all scams).

Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale
of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA
and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the

YES. Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations
or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S.
Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB
official rate for a period of one (1) year.

This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that The existing
authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit
in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus
operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without
the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB
dismissed for lack of merit.

Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates based on the order of the LTFRB

The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of public services and the LTFRB is
likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. The
authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue
delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further
delegation of power would constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge
it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave
the riding public at the mercy of transport operators.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs Zamora

GR No 141284, 15 August 2000

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that
the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such
time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment
of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.

Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion?

IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing.
However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.
Executive Secretary vs. CA
GR No. 131719, May 25, 2004

The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 took effect on 15 July 1995 and its Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Act was published on April 1996. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a petition for declaratory relief to declare some parts as unconstitutional
and prayed for a preliminary injunction enjoining herein petitioners from implementing it. On 1 August 1995, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order effective for a period of only 20 days therefrom. After the Executive Secretary, et al. filed their
comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption
thereof 11 other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary
restraining order. Arco-Phil averred that the provisions of RA 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution (i.e. discrimination
against unskilled workers, discrimination against licensed and registered recruiters, among others). The RTC eventually granted the
writ so the ES filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, asserting that Acro-Phil is not the real party-in-interest as
petitioner in the trial court, as it was inconceivable how a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustain direct injury as a result
of the enforcement of the law. They argued that if, at all, any damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the
licensed and registered recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who would sustain
the said injury or damage, not Acro-Phil.

The CA dismissed this, hence the present petition.

WON ACRO-Phil has locus standi

Only insofar as the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended petitions but not for the unskilled
workers it was claiming for. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view
fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its
lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. The Court note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, ACRO-Phil
was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment
industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive
benefit of its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as
the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and
to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil is, thus, the appropriate
party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. However, with respect to
the unskilled workers, the Court finds that ACRO-Phil cannot file the petition on their behalf and that it even failed to implead such
unskilled workers in their petition.

Kilosbayan v. Guingona
GR No. 113375, May 5, 1994

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto.

Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It
submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.

Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of
wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the
petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid.

The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC is
declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners which was raised by the
respondents should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The
issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases.
The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of.

On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, is indisputably clear with
respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." Meaning,
the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. Thus, the challenged Contract of
Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore,
invalid for being contrary to law.

ITF vs Comelec
GR No 159139, 13 January 2004

RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to conduct nationwide computerized election system. Gloria Arroyo
allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated election system on 24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same
month and out of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC. Although DOSTs evaluation report states that the two obtained
a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Five individuals and entities protested the matter to COMELEC Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition

Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case?

The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, it is of paramount public interest and transcendental
importance. Taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or if public money is being
deflected to any improper use, or when petitioner seek to restrain wasting of public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional law.

On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens
respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly,
Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the
success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will
of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that
the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore,
public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."