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1.) Caltex v. Palomar


In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its Caltex Hooded Pump

Contest. The mechanics of the contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the
nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine
Postal Office. However, then acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied
the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a violation
of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code

According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications

pertaining thereto cannot be mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts
thru a petition for declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their contest is
not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery consists of the
following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element,
consideration, is missing. Said element is missing because participants
are not required to pay anything theres no consideration on the part
of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper.
He insisted that he was merely applying the law and that there is no
legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts to call for a
construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that
even if the said contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery,
the same is considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited by
the Postal Law to be mailed.
1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is
in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in a
certain law. As defined in Blacks Law Dictionary: Construction is the
art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
2. No.
The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e.,
the first element is lacking (no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to
discuss that under prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well
as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit definition
as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term
gift enterprise was used in association with the term lottery. As
such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory
construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is only logical that
the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning
than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only
if it involves a consideration, so also must the term gift enterprise be
so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a
consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should
be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service.

2.) Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with theMunicipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the
adoption of minors Quirino Bonillaand Wilson Marcos. However,
minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said
adoption. Theycontended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy
had a legitimate daughter namedEstrella Agonoy, oppositors mother,
who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses weredisqualified
to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those
who havelegitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted,it changed the
word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New
Civil Codewas patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned
have a clearly defined meaning in lawand do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effectthat a
statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The
rule is that onlystatutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may
be the subjects of statutory construction. Inthe present case, Roderick
and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy andAmanda
Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos bythe Agonoys.The Supreme Court denied the petition,
and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

3.) Amores v. HRET

Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as
representative of CIBAC for being overage to representyouth. Change of
affiliation must be made six months before elections. Youth sector is
represented by 25 30.


5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office

of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva asrepresentative of CIBAC in the

Petitioner argues:

Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age

limit of 30 which was the limitimposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector".

Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families

not affected six months priorto elections.
Respondent argues:

RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only

applicable to first three electionsafter the party list act.

There was no resultant change in affiliation.


Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to

respondent Villanueva


Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing



Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of

youth sector, should be between 25to 30.

Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation

should be changed SIX MONTHS priorto elections.

4.) Republic Flour Mills, Inc. V. Comm. Of Customs

From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills
(petitioner) exported Pollardand/or bran which was loaded from
lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade whileanchored near
the breakwater. The Commissioner of Customs and The Court of Tax
Appeals(respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues
on the said exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment was
paid by petitioner under protestIn this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc.
would want the Court to interpret the wordsproducts of the
Philippines found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code,as
excludingbran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as
they do from wheat grain which isimported in the Philippines, they are
merely waste from the production of flour. Another mainargument of
the petitioner is that no government or private wharves or
government facilitieswere utilized in exporting such products. In that way,
it would not be liable at all for the wharfagedues assessed under such section
by respondent Commission of
Customs.O n th e oth er h and, the sta nd of r espondent Com m i
s s i o n er of Cu stoms w as tha tpetitioner was liable for wharfage
dues upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by avessel
engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of
government-owned or privatewharves. Respondent Court of Tax
Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs
under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law
As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There
shall be levied,collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the
Philippines, and on products of thePhilippines exported from the
Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a
feef o r wh arfag e." appear s to be q uite pr ecise. Section 2802
r e f e rs to wh at i s i mported a nd exported.The objective of this act
must be carried out. Even if there is doubt to the meaning of thelanguage
employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be
attained. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the
same desire to be excluded
fromt h e operati on of th e Tariff a nd Customs Code would li
k e w i s e be en ti tl ed to sy m pa thetic consideration. It was desirable
then that the gates to such efforts at unjustified restriction
of thecoverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end
result would be not respect for, butdefiance of, a clear legislative
mandateThe decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November
27, 1967 is affirmed withcosts against petitioner.

5.) Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company

6.) Radio Communication of the Phil. V. NTC

RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under
legislative franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036 (1957). The
petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon
(1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman, Samar (1983).
Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the NTC
to operate radio networks in the same areas.
RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit Kayumanggi
Radio to operate in the same areas. The NTC ruled against the RTCs
favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the operation of radio
telegraphs in the three areas.
RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied.
In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had sections
that was still in effect even if the Public Service Commission was
abolished and the NTC was established.
These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision,
and control over all public services and their franchises
S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commissions authority
except with respect to the fixing of rates
And S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines without
possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service
Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience,"

Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative

franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a certificate
of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its
radio stations including radio telephone services in the aforementioned

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was
abolished and its functions were transferred to three specialized
regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board of
Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The
functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations provided in
sections 14 and 15 of the PublicService Law, as amended.
The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of Communications
and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their
functions were transferred to the National Telecommunications
Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of
particular operators of public service communications; and determine
and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of
such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges
or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which
the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the
Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone
and telegraph systems and radio communication
systems including amateur radio stations and radio and
television broadcasting systems;
The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of
the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no
longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law
and implementing executive orders.
The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive
Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since
1957 cannot be sustained.
Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the
sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is
subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power
through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.-
statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper
exercise by the State of its police power, are applicable not only to
those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in operation .
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I
insofar as it amends the Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended)
is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise
under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio communications
system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers
thereunder be exercised by the grantee until the Secretary
of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee
the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee
a license for such case.
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a precondition
before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it
desires to operate.
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications before the
petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose,
Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone
services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983.
No certificate of publicconvenience and necessity appears to have been
secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such
certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations.
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in
nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to
amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when
the common good so requires.

7.) Republic v. Toledano

Fact of the Case:

On February 21, 1990 Alvin Clouse, a natural born citizen of

America and hiswife Evelyn A Clause, Filipino at birth who later became
a natural citizen of the UnitedStates petition to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala. On June 20, 1990 the judge decree saidFilipino minor be their
child by adoption.
Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner here, appealed that the
lower courterred in granting the petition for adoption for the spouses
are not qualified to adopt underthe Philippine Law.

Whether or not the spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse being an alien are
disqualified to adopt under the Philippine law.

Yes. The spouse are disqualified to adopt the Filipino child Solomon.
Article 184,
paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the
persons who are not

qualified to adopt, viz:

An alien, except:
(a)A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
(b)One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c)One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly the
Alvin Clause is not qualified being a natural born citizen of the
United States ofAmerica. On the other hand Evelyn Clouse may seem to
be qualified on Article 184,however adoption cannot be granted in her
favor alone for the Family Code requires thatthe husband and wife
must jointly adopt as stated on Article 185.

8.) Tanada v. Tuvera

The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws, presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, executive orders, and
administrative orders being enacted to be publishedfirst in the Official
Gazette as well as a fifteen day period before said law can be made valid
inaccordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official
Gazette is a requirement forits effectivity.
For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about
certain laws or decrees beingenacted by their government, sufficient
appropriation of time and publication is necessary. According toArticle
2 of the Civil Code, all laws must be given 15 days upon its publication
in the Official Gazette for itto be enacted. This is to give sufficient time
for the people to learn of such laws as well as to respecttheir right to be
informed. The respondents however brought up the fact that the Official
Gazette maynot be the most effective medium for the people to
be educated of certain new laws given its erraticpublication dates as
well as its limited number of readers, with lieu of more potent mediums
of instructions such as newspapers of general circulation because of its
wide readership and regular datesof printing. The court nevertheless
rules that such periodicals are not what is required by the
Civil Codeand such amendments are left to the legislative branch of the
government. Having said this, the courtfinds in favor of publishing all
laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders,executive orders, and administrative orders with a 15 day
leeway, or unless stated, for them to take intoeffect.

9.) Floresca v. Philex Mining

Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the
cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the
deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission.
They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for
additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen
negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for
the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex
invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act,
which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection
between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code
for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers
by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they
may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the
benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because
they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its
contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or
a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in
their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the
Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages
that may be decreed in their favor.

10.) Republic v CA and Molina

Roridel and Reynaldo got married in 1985 in Manila. During the early
years of their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility, observed from his tendency to spend time with his
friends and squandered money with them, his dependency from his
parents for financial aid and dishonesty in matters involving finances.
Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the family. She then resigned her
job in Manila and went to Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a week
later. The couple is separated in fact for more than 3 years.

Roridel filed a petition to have their marriage void under Article 36, citing
Reynaldo's psychological incapacity. She presented evidence consisted of
her own testimony, of her two friends, a social worker and a psychiatrist.
Reynaldo did not present any evidence and appeared only during the
pre-trial. The RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage void.
Solicitor General appealed to the CA. CA denied the appeals and ruled in
favor of the trial court.

Whether or not opposing or conflicting personalities constitute
psychological incapacity.

No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the interpretation and

application of Article 36 of the Family Code: 1) The burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff; 2) the root cause of PI
must be (a) medically or clinically identified (b) alleged in the complaint (c)
sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the decision; 3) it
must be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; 4) it must
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; 5) it must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the marital
obligations of marriage; 6) the marital obligations must be embraced by
Articles 68 to 71, and Articles 220, 221 and 225 in regard of parents and
their children; 7) interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of Catholic of Church of the Philippines, although not binding,
should be given great respect; and 8) the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State.

11.) Paras v. COMELEC

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election.A petition
for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay, which was approved by theComelec. Petition signing was
scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed thepetition, well above the 25% requirement provided by
law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but
which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioners opposi
tion. To prevent the holding of the recall election,petitioner filed before
the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding
Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trialcourt issuing a restraining order.
After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed thepetition and required petitioner and his
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting thatthe barangay recall election was without Comelec
approval.In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the
third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996;hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The
petitioner contends that no recall can take placewithin one year
preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections
slated on the first Monday of May 1996.He cited Associated Labor
Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the Court
in which case considered the SKelection as a regular local election.

Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed

as a regular local election in a recall proceeding

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute

must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,that every part of
the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent ofthe whole enactment. Further, the
spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence,
a statute must beread according to its spirit and intent. The too literal
interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court
cannotcountenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That
intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit
that vivifieth. In the present case, Paragraph
(b) ofSection 74 construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
subjectof a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections
cannot be considered a regular election, as this would render inutilethe
recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be more in
keeping with the intent of the recall provision of theCode to construe
regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held
by the local elective official soughtto be recalled will be contested and be
filled by the electorate.The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss
the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next regular
electionsinvolving the barangay office concerned were seven months
away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12
January1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.

12.) China Bank v Ortega

Tan Kim Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is
a deposit inthe China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest
Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same
intact and not allow any withdrawal until furtherorder from the Court.
Petitioners in this case refuse to comply with a court processgarnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of
RepublicAct No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly
prohibits the disclosure of any information concerning to bank
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with
a court processes garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by
invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into
deposit of B & BForest Development Corporation, as contemplated in
the law. It merely required Tan KimLiong to inform the court whether or
not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit
in the China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of
thegarnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same
intact and not allow anywithdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently
clear that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank
deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its beinggarnished to insure
satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such acase,
and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to theexecution process. WHEREFORE, the orders of the
lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972,respectively, are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.

13.) People v Jabinal

People vs. Jabinal

February 27, 1974

On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in
possession of a revolverwithout the requisite license or permit. He
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,a lthough he ha d
n o l i cen se or permi t, h e ha d a ppointments
a s S e cret A g en t from the P r o v i n c i a l G o v e r n o r o f B a t a n g a
s a n d a s C o n f i d e n t i a l A g e n t f r o m t h e P C P r o v i n c i a l Co
m m a n der, an d th e sai d a ppointments expr essly ca r r ied wit
h t h e m th e au th ori ty topossess a nd ca r r y the sa id f ir ea r m.
The accused furt her contended that in view of
h i sappointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Courts decisions inPeople vs. Macarandang and in People vs.
Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal
possession of firearm andammunition on the ground that the rulings in
Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversedand abandoned in People
vs. Mapa**. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the
Supreme Courtsrulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.
The appellant was acquitted.Decisions of the Supreme Court, although
in themselves not laws, are neverthelessevidence of what the law
means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil
Codeprovides that, Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the
laws or the constitution shallf or m pa r t of the legal system . The
i nt e r pretati on up on a l a w by the S upreme Court constitutes in
a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed,
since thecourts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the lawthus construed intends to effectuate. The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities isa restatement of the
legal maxim
legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet
the interpretationplaced upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The doctrine laiddown in Lucero and in
Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of
thel a nd, at th e
t i m e appel l an t w as fou nd in possession of the f ir ea r m a nd
w h e n h e w asarraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, thenew
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had reliedon the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.C on si deri n g th at the appella nt possessed a f ir ea r m
p u r s uan t to th e prevai l ingdoctrine enunciated in Macarandang
and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability wouldattach to his
possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The
appellantmay not be punished for an act which at the time it was done
was held not to be punishable. _____________________ *The accused
were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret
agent theywere
to be peace officers. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying
firearmswithout license.**Mapa was convicted although he was a
secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that thelaw
did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential agents are
among those who areexempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm.

14.) DIR. Of Lands v CA


On 8 December 1986, private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a

petition for originalregistration of his title over 648 sq.m. of land under
PD 1529 however during the pendency ofthe petition, Teodoro died
hence his heirs were substituted as applicants, represented by
theiraunt, who was appointed as their guardian ad litem.2.

The Land registration court dismissed its petition for want of

jurisdiction stating that theapplicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring theApplicants to
publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation in thePhilippines and was only published in the Official
Gazette and thus the court has not legallyacquired jurisdiction over the
instant petition for want of compliance with the mandatoryprovision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of

The case was appealed by the private respondents in the CA, which set
aside the decision ofthe trial court and ordered the registration of the
title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. Themotion for reconsideration
was denied, thus this petition.
: Whether or not publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original
land registration caseis MANDATORY or DIRECTORY in relation to
Section 23(1) of PD 1529.
: The Supreme Court held that provision of the law is
MANDATORY. The law used the term
denotes an IMPERATIVE and thus indicates the mandatory character of
a statute, itsimportance ultimately depends upon its context in the
entire provision, and the Court holds that thepresent case must be
understood in its normal mandatory meaning.Land registration is a
proceeding in rem and as such is validated essentially in publication
this beingso the process must be strictly complied with, in that the one
who is instituting the action must beable to prove his title against
the whole world. Hence, before the claimed property is taken
fromconcerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said
parties must be given notice andopportunity to oppose, the reason of
which is DUE PROCESS.In the present case, there was failure to
comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law.The Court
has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no roomfor interpretation; there is only room for
application and there is no alternative. Thus, the case wasdismissed
without prejudice to reapplication after all the legal requisites shall
have been dulycomplied with

15.) Pascual v Pascual


Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any
issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter
being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. the
Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued
an order, the dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this motion
reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion for reconsideration was
also denied. Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, but
like the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration was also
dismissed. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend
that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
(and acknowledged) natural children as their illegitimacy is not due to
the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under


Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance
of the deceased.


NO. Petition is devoid of merit.


The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
where this Court ruled that under Art.992 of the Civil Code, there exists
a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestado between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
[T]he interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that
when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal,
their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate

children and the term illegitimate refers to both natural and spurious.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX

16.) People vs Mapulong


The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the
accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license
permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license.
The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed
evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating
that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to
municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.


Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of


The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated that the law is explicit that
except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the accused
is not exempted.