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Ladera v. Hodges HELD: The equipments in question are movable.

So that movable equipments to be immobilized

G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374 in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or
Reyes, J.B.L., J. works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the
industrial purpose for which it was established." Thus, the Court distinguished those movable
FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in
with an area of 278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The the industry from those which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely
agreement called for a down payment of P 800.00 and monthly installments of P 5.00 each with incidental, not essential and principal.
interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085 is paid in full. In case of failure of the purchaser to make
any monthly payment within 60 days after it fell due, the contract may be considered as The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and
rescinded or annulled. principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by
motor trucks. They are merely incidentalsacquired as movables and used only for expediency
Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business
installment. Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera. may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The
transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling
The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
rights, interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Laderas house
was sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the house from Magno.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.
Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was G.R. No. L-58469, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 29
rendered in favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of De Castro, J.
Court regarding judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house,
being built on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable or personal property. FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from the Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation,
the Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables with them under a receivable
ISSUE: Whether or not Laderas house is an immovable property. purchase agreement. To secure the collection of receivables assigned, Wearever Textile
executed a chattel mortgage over certain raw materials inventory, as well as machinery
HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable described as an aero dryer stentering range. Upon default of Wearever Textile, the Makati
property the following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. Leasing petitioned for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. When the sheriff
The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. failed to enter Wearever Textiles premises to seize the machinery, Makati Leasing applied for a
Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories replevin. Wearever Textile contended that it cannot be a subject of replevin or a chattel mortgage
to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the because it is a real property as it is attached to the ground by means of bolts and that the only
principal thing. way to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or personal property.

Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer
G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197 HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if a house of
Labrador, J. strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel
mortgage, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and
FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility solely engaged in transporting becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao,
collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission. Respondent sought to assess the
following real properties of the petitioner; (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring
Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
Machine; (c) Lathe machine with motor; (d) Black and Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic
G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 401
Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungar charge machine) and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was
Concepcion, J.
alleged that these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms, and that petitioner is
the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks, a repair
FACTS: On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted a civil case for a sum of money. On the
shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries, which are placed therein.
same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on
Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4, 400 petitioner's above-
a land situated in Manila and leased to him. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of
mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax
Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of
Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. Respondents contend that said equipments,
execution issued in said case. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera
though movable, are immobilized by destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415
refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety &
of the New Civil Code.
Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on
May 10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to Alto Surety, as the
ISSUE: Whether the equipments in question are immovable or movable properties.
highest bidder at an auction sale held. Hence, Evangelista instituted an action against Alto
Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house, and securing
possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered
judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to Sergs Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October, 1952, until said G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499
delivery, plus costs. Panganiban, J.

ISSUE: Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should FACTS: Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
be dealt with, for purposes of attachment, as immovable property or as personal property. complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. A writ of replevin was
issued, directing the sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing
HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property after five days and upon payment of the necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to
not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Ladera vs. Hodges petitioner's factory and seized one machinery. Petitioner filed a motion for special protective
(48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control
property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. The its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of The motion was opposed by PCI on the ground that the properties were personal and therefore
said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in still subject to seizure and writ of replevin. In their reply, petitioners asserted that the properties
his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties' agreement to the
house from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public contrary notwithstanding. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an original action for
auction is untenable. certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the subject machines were personal property as
provided by the agreement of the parties.

Tsai v. Court of Appeals ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machines were personal, not real, property, which may be a
G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324 proper subject of a writ of replevin.
Quisumbing, J.
HELD: The contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
FACTS: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
three million peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
(PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present case, the lease agreement
Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located therein. On April clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal properties.
23, 1979, PBCom granted a second loan to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a chattel Clearly then, petitioners were estopped from denying the characterization of the subject
mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. After April 23, 1979, machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subject of the writ of
the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased seizure. Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
various machines and equipments. was affirmed.

Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On December 15, 1982, the first public auction was Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP
held where petitioner PBCom emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800
issued in its favor on the same date. On March 7, 1984, PBCom consolidated its ownership over Escolin, J.
the lot and all the properties in it. In November 1986, it leased the entire factory premises to
petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. On May 3, 1988, PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock, and barrel to Tsai, FACTS: On December 7, 1982, two search warrants where issued and the premises at 19,
including the contested machineries. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers were
On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and searched. Office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
rights over such assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets. and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.
HELD: No. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code, "machinery, receptacles, instruments or
HELD: Yes. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. In carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
the case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it
and equipment as chattels. Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, was said that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the
nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
of estoppel. It has been held that an immovable may be considered a personal property if there any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel owner. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building
mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar. on which the machineries were placed. The machineries, while in fact bolted to the ground,

remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
Yap argues that "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New
Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property, the pump
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc.
and its accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with character of
G.R. No. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 98
permanency (Art. 415, Civil Code).
Felix, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is an immovable property.
FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Orosa
approached Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre business he was
HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property,
forming, the Plaza Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, Lopez
among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it
agreed to supply the lumber for the construction of the theatre. Lopez further agreed that that
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The
the payment therefore would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex delivered the
pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises
lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre. However, of the total cost of
without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump
materials amounting to P62, 255.85, Lopez was paid only P 20, 848.50, thus leaving a balance
involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
of P 41, 771.35.

Due to Lopez demands, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock of the
Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Plaza Theatre, Inc. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and
G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954, 96 Phil. 70
Plaza Theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid
Concepcion, J.
balance, and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public
auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance, or that the shares of stock be sold in
FACTS: Petitioner Machinery and Engineering Supplies filed a complaint for replevin for the
public auction.
recovery of the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co. An order was
issued to seize and take immediate possession of the properties specified in the order. Upon
ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the
carrying out the courts order, Roco, the companys President, along with a crew of technical
building attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on which the building is
men and labourers, proceeded to the factory. The manager of Ipo Limestone Co. and Torres
adhered to.
protested against the seizure of the properties on the ground that they are not personal
properties. However, since the sheriff contended that his duty is purely ministerial, they all went
HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building
to the factory and dismantled the equipment despite the fact that the equipment could not be
constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the
dismantled without causing damage or injuries to the wooden frames attached to them.
land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thingthat
Consequently, they had to cut some of the supports of the equipment which rendered its use
a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of any specific provision to
the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure
and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. The lien so created attaches
ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery and equipment in question could be the subject of
merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was
incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the
construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the
HELD: No. Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery and equipment in
question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said
premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove the said
Yap v. Taada
outfit, it became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but also to cut some of its wooden
G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464
supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were intended by the owner of the tenement
Narvasa, J.
for an industry carried on said immovable. For these reasons, they were already immovable
pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code.
FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed a complaint against Yap and his
wife seeking recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of
a water pump in the latter's premises. Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by
Laurel v. Garcia
default was rendered by Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds the unpaid balance of the
G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797
pump purchased by him and interest of 12% per annum.
Gutierrez, J.
Thereafter, the water pump in question was levied by the sheriff and by notice dated November
FACTS: In view of the Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, four
4, 1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in view of the pendency of Yap's motion for
properties located in Japan were given to the Philippines. One of these properties is the
reconsideration, suspension of the sale was directed. It appears however that a copy of the
Roppongi property. The said property was formerly the location of the Chancery of the Philippine
order suspending the sale was not transmitted to the sheriff Hence, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Embassy until it was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. The Roppongi property has
went ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the
remained abandoned from the time of the transfer due to lack of funds to develop the said
highest bidder.
property. Consequently, Administrative orders were issued by the President authorizing the study
of the condition of the properties of the Philippines in Japan. Subsequently, Executive Order 296 disposition by the National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the
was issued by President Aquino allowing non-Filipinos to buy or lease some of the properties of resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as
the Philippines located in Japan, including Roppongi. an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1,
subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power
Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi property cannot be alienated as it is classified as to deal with state property.
public dominion and not of private ownership because it is a property intended for public service
under paragraph 2, article 420 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondents aver that it has
already become part of the patrimonial property of the State which can be alienated because it Macasiano v. Diokno
has not been used for public service for over 13 years. They further contend that EO 296 G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 464
converted the subject property to patrimonial property. Medialdea, J.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property still forms part of the public dominion hence FACTS: The Municipality of Paranque passed an ordinance that authorized the closure of J.
cannot be disposed nor alienated. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran,
Paranaque Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. Thereafter, the
HELD: Yes. The respondents failed to convincingly show that the property has already become municipal council of Paranaque issued a resolution authorizing Paranaque Mayor Walfrido N.
patrimonial. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation,
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Under Art. 422 of the maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. By virtue of this,
Civil Code, there must be a definite and a formal declaration on the part of the government to respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an
withdraw it from being public. Abandonment must be a certain and a positive act based on agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the
correct legal premises. The mere transfer of the embassy to Nampeidai is not a relinquishment aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal
of the propertys original purpose. government of Paranaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said
The Administrative orders authorizing the study of the conditions of government properties in
Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to Petitioner Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, then ordered
dispose of the properties. Likewise, EO 296 did not declare that the properties lost their public the destruction and confiscation of the stalls along the abovementioned streets. Hence,
character; it merely made them available to foreigners in case of sale, lease or other disposition. respondents filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages
Thus, since there is no law authorizing its conveyance, the Roppongi property still remains part and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his opposition to the issuance
of the inalienable properties of the State. of the writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance in

Rabuco v. Villegas ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution which authorizes the lease and use of public
G.R. No. L-24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658 streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
Teehankee, J.
HELD: No. The aforementioned streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore
FACTS: The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 whereby considered public properties of respondent municipality. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides
the Congress converted the lots in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate that that properties of public dominion devoted for public use and made available to the public in
are reserved as communal property into disposable or alienable lands of the State. Such lands general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
are to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration for government unit to private persons. Properties of the local government which are devoted to
subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on instalment basis public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs
to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific
of petitioners' homes under Section 2 of the Act. Respondent contends that the Act is invalid and authority is vested upon them by Congress.
unconstitutional for it constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law and without
just compensation.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3120 is constitutional. G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 639
Panganiban, J.
HELD: Yes. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental
capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as FACTS: Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag, Quezon, which was
distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which approved, provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of five
it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation. It is established years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Later on, the land was established to be a
doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary portion of Calauag Bay, which was five to six feet deep during high tides and three feet deep on
legislative power, which will not be interfered with by the courts. The Acts in question were low tides. The water level rose because of the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the storms
intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program that frequently passed through the area. Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of Lands
of land for the landless and that they were not intended to expropriate the property involved but from his investigation, that the land of Morato was leased to Advincula for P100 per month and it
merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for was also mortgaged to Co for P10,000. The Director of Lands filed a suit with the contention that

Morato violated the 5-year prohibitory period and thus the patent should be cancelled and the when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power
land should revert back to the State. to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, it
can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the prohibition of the patent, and thus, the subject funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did
land should revert back to the ownership of the State. with the lots in question.

HELD: Yes. The lease was an encumbrance included in the prohibitions of the patent because it
impairs the use of the land by Morato herself. As for the mortgage, it is a legal limit on the title Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
and if there will be foreclosure because Morato was not able to pay her debts, the property will G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
be auctioned. It is also a limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and possess the land for herself. Carpio, J.
Encumbrance, as defined, is an impairment on the use or transfer of property, or a claim or lien
on the property where there is a burden on the title. Thus, Morato clearly violated the terms of FACTS: In 1973, the Government through the Commissioner of Public Highways and the
the patent on these points. Moreover, the property became a foreshore land because it turned Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a contract to
into a portion of land which was covered most of the time with water, whether it was low or high reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. PD 1084 was issued, creating Public
tide. Foreshore is defined as land between high and low waters which is dry depending on the Estates Authority (PEA), and PD 1085, transferring the reclaimed lands under the MCCRRP to
reflux or ebb of the tides. In accordance with this land reclassification, the land can no longer be PEA.
subject to a pending patent application and must be returned to the State.
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to
develop the Freedom Islands, and the JVA was approved by President Ramos. However, PEA
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. A Legal Task Force
G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334 was created to look into the issue. The said task force upheld the legality of the JVA.
Bengzon, J.P., J.
In 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its
FACTS: On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga negotiations with AMARI, invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters
into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Republic Act 3039 was approved of public concern. He assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant
providing that all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of violation of the constitutional prohibiting in the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in private corporations.
favor of the said City of Zamboanga.
Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and AMARI signed an Amended Joint Venture
Plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Agreement (Amended JVA) in 1999, and such was approved by President Estrada. The
Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance Amended JVA seeks to convey to AMARI the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that Republic Act 3039 be declared Islands.
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just
compensation. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire the lands held by PEA.
sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playground.
HELD: No. Under the 1987 Constitution, private corporations such as AMARI cannot acquire
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties mentioned are properties for public use or patrimonial. alienable land of the public domain. Reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, which are
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
HELD: The subject properties are properties for public use. The validity of the law ultimately may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
depends on the nature of the lots and buildings in question. The principle itself is simple: If the lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Thus, the Amended Joint
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA was null and void.
the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress
has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation. Villarico v. Sarmiento
442 SCRA 110
Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations,
all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; Facts:
the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue hig
property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public hway by a strip of land belonging to the government.
education, public health, etc. Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the saidgovernment
land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks LitsonCorp.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do not In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villarico acquired a
disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. portion of the same area owned by the government.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936

He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents(Vivencio) on the
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of
government land closed his right of way tothe Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached
on a portion of his lot man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in the
definition provided by the dictionary.
Issue: Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by
No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way to the lot belongs to the CA with modifications.
the state or property of public dominion.
It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined toprivileged individuals but
is open to the indefinite public.Records show that the lot on which the stairways were ISSUE:
built isfor the use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property for public
dominion. I. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area.
Public dominion property is outside the commerce of man and hence, it cannot be:
Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matterof contracts II. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.
Acquired by prescription against the state
Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution
Be burdened by any voluntary easement HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favorof the petitioner
and petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself andhe cannot claim any right of respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the
possession over it.
term "foreshore lands" refers to:

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998 dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between

FACTS: the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International

chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, Dictionary)

filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden

construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include

municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could

and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the

of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

Estate Corporation for the said project.

Chavez v. National Housing Authority

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
Velasco, Jr., J.
RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of
FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161 approving and directing
man, it being a foreshore land.
the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste
Management Plan. Respondent National Housing Authority was ordered to conduct feasibility
studies and develop lowcost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA
resettlement/lowcost housing projects, particularly in the Smokey Mountain. It produced the
Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smoke
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project. The Project aimed to covert Smokey mountain
dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area. President
Aquino approved the said Project through MO 415. After President Aquinos term, President
Fidel Ramos, through Proclamation No. 39, authorized the NHA to enter into a Joint Venture
Agreement with R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) for the implementation of the project. Afterwards,
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation
across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. The petitioner Francisco Chavez contended that
the respondent NHA or respondent RBI has no authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent NHA has the authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged

HELD: Yes. The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a government agency not tasked to
dispose of public lands under its charter it is an end-user agency authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the
special patents are transferred to the National Housing Authority (NHA) by the Register of
Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold
to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The combined
and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598
is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Even if it is conceded that there was no
explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there
was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas are not necessary
anymore for public use or public service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the
same to the National Housing Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and related
commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain
beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the