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Partosa-Jo vs CA

GR 82606, December 18, 1992

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to
have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial
separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision
was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal
property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the
separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was
not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support
her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.


SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the
case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights,
with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention
of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to
Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal

Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal
property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after
the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have
been illegally registered in the name of the persons.

Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987


Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage
against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which
was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation
and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction
or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for


Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on
the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right
to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of

Furthermore. as a remedy. If in case. the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence. motion for reconsideration denied CA: ISSUE: Do the husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights and 1 day despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts? DECISION OF SC: order appealed from is AFFIRMED RATIO: 1) CONDONATION: forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. he and his wife came to an agreement that leonila would stay with his sisters who later moved to sampaloc. CONDONATION Art 56(1). but before the latter left to report back to duty. can be availed of in an action for legal separation. conditional forgiveness or remission by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed 2) The facts appearing on record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery or infidelity amounting to adultery 3) Consider plaintiff’s line of conduct under the assumption that he really believed that his wife is guilty of adultery—looked for wife lived with her for 2 nights and one day . 1952: filed complaint for legal separation against wife (CFI Pangasinan) 11) Wife denies the averments and setting up affirmative defenses 12) Motion to dismiss predicated on the ff grounds: a) assuming truth of allegations cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations b) the acts charged have been condoned by the plaintiffhusband c) the complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action CFI: ordered the dismissal of the complaint—ground of condonation (ART 100). 1956 Plaintiff and appellant: Benjamin BUgayong Defendant and appellee: Leonila Ginez Nature of the case: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Pangasinan Ponente: Felix. manila 3) July 1951: Benjamin BUgayong began receiving letters from valeriana polnagco and other anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of wife 4) Plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her 5) Oct 1951: he sought advice of the navy chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation between him and his wife on account of latter’s alleged acts of infidelity and he was directed to consult the navy legal dept 6) August 1952: went to Pangasinan and sought his wife whom he found in defendant’s grandmother’s house (Mrs. Malalang) 7) She came along with him and proceeded and stayed for 2 nights and one day as husband and wife in a cousin of plaintiff-husband 8) Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the info he received that she committed adultery but wife packed up and left—took as confirmation 9) Plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her went to Ilocos norte 10) Nov 18. 1949 2) Lived with the sisters of the husband. FACTS: 1) Benjamin bugayong (serviceman in the US) married to Leonila Ginez on aug 27. FC CASE: BUGAYONG v. the support pendente lite. he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. and granted at the discretion of the judge. GINEZ No L-10033 Dec 28. where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. J.

Manila (march 1949) 6) She prayed for issuance of a decree of legal separation—and that Eufemio be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits 7) Eufemio counterclaimed filed petition for declaration of marriage as void ab initio of the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go hiok (Ngo hiok) 8) But before the trial could be completed petitioner died in a vehicular accident on may 31. macario lapuz. counsel for eufemio opposed the motion JDRC: dismissed case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff which occurred during pendency of the case. 1972 Petitioner-appellant: Carmen Lapuz Sy represented by her substitute Macario lapuz Respondent-appellee: Eufemio S. abated the cause of the action itself ISSUE: 1) WON the plaintiff’ s cause of action has survived 2) when an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for declaration of nullity of a marriage. JBL. J. EUFEMIO NO L. Eufemio alias Eufemio Sy Uy Nature of the case: petition for review by certiorari of an order of the JDRC of Manila Ponente: reyes. 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on 2 grounds: a) filed beyond the one-year provided for in Art 102. Shackleton) —it implies forgiveness 6) Condition is not to commit the offense again—a breach of condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce 7) The conduct of the plaintiff despite his belief that wife was unfaithful. 4) Detailed examination of the testimony of plaintiff clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband 5) Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity (Shackleton v. does the death of a party abate the proceedings? . 30 Sept 1934: canonically— lived together as husband and wife until 1943 when her husband abandoned her 4) They had no child. after the commission of the offense and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation—but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence LAPUZ vs. Facts: 1) Macario Lapuz. 1969 9) June 9. 1953 Carmen Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio 3) 21 sept 1934: civil wedding. heir of deceased (petitioner) sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment 2) August 19. 30977 January 31. CC and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation 10) Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased carmen by her father. acquired properties during their marriage 5) She discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go HIok at sisa St. deprives him of any action for legal separation against the wife because his said act comes within the restriction of art 100 of the CC 8) GENERAL RULE: AMJUR: any cohabitation with the guilty party.

LERMA v. will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? DECISION OF SC: The appealed judgment of the Manila JDRC is AFFIRMED RATIO: 1) Although defendant. 1969: respondent filed with the lower court a complaint against petitioner for legal separation and or separation of properties. hence. generally believed to be dead. so that before the finality of a decree. custody of their children and support with an urgent petition for support pendent elite for her and their youngest son Gregory 4) The respondent’s complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life 5) Petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent’s application for support: defense: adultery charge he had filed against respondent . L-33352 Dec 20. their source being the decree itself. 1974 Petitioner: Teodoro Lerma Respondents: CA and Concepcion Diaz Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of CA Ponente: Makalintal. stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a degree of legal separation already rendered 4) Being personal in character. 1969: petitione filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez 3) Nov 18. CC)—requiring that action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any of the parties involved. they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree 8) The property rights are mere effects of a decree of separation. H acquiesced to the dismissal by praying for affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the eufemio- lapuz marriage to be null and void 2) The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition 3) An action for legal separation is purely PERSONAL (involves nothing more than bed and board separation)— the spouses can by their reconciliation. it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself— actio personalis moritur cum persona 5) Marriage is automatically dissolved by death—it deprives the court of jurisdiction 6) The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance 7) A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio. it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter. death producing a more radical and definitive separation and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn 10) As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen. in an action for legal separation. CA No. still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the 3 persons involved had died (art 87 par 2. filed counterclaims. and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise.3) does the death of a plaintiff before final decree. and herein respondent Eufemio S. abate the action? If it does. he did not pursue them after the court dismissed the case. CJ FACTS: 1) Lerma and Diaz married on May 19 1951 2) August 22. no decree can be forthcoming. that automatically dissolved the questioned union 11) The bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under art 83. par 2 of the CC—second marriage contracted with first wife having been absent for 7 consecutive years. without the decree such rights do not come into existence. these claims are merely rights in expectation 9) If death supervenes during the pendency of the action.

CFI: granted the respondent’s application for support pendent elite amended: amount from 2. such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal sep at the instance of the other spouse. has committed some act which gives rise to his disinheritance” 11) Art 921: one act is when a spouse gave cause for legal separation—the loss of the substantive right to support in such situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite . teodoro Ramirez.820 6) petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition w/ preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders—grave abuse of discretion CA: issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders 7) respondent court then set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court (oct 8) 8) respondent moved to reconsider decision on the ground that petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court 9) respondent court set a side oct 8 decision. That is support of the wife by the husband from his own funds.addressed to judge luciano and reps 12) respondent filed opposition w/ a prayer for immediate lifting of the TRO issued ex parte: grounds of motion. a legal sep cannot be claimed by either of them 6) Probable failure of the respondent’s suit for legal sep can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse.second adultery case with Jose Gochangco ISSUE: Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent’s claim for support pendente lite DECISION OF SC: Resolution of respondent CA (jan 21. 1971) and the orders of the respondent court (JDRC) are all SET ASIDE and their enforcement enjoined. without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal sep between the parties RATIO: 1) adultery is a good defense (Art 292) 2) it is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support. although interlocutory is immediately executory even if appealed unless enjoined b) dismissal of petition by CA rendered functus oficio the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued c) under Art 292 of the NCC: during the proceedings for legal sep or for annulment of marriage. the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property— such support is mandatory even if there be showing that the wife is guilty of adultery” Note: CFI of Rizal decided the adultery case and found her guilty together with her co-accused. cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support 10) Art 303: obligation to give support shall cease” when the recipient. dismissed the petition—now subject of instant proceeding for review (jan 20. Where both spouses are offenders. it is not a defense when support is taken from the conjugal partnership property 3) during the pendency of the of the legal sep proceeding (support is taken from the conjugal partnership) it does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases 4) the said article contemplates the pendency of the court action and inferentially at least a prima facie showing that action will prosper 5) ART 100 of CC: legal sep may be claimed only by innocent spouse…. sentencing them to a term of imprisonment . be he a forced heir or not. a) an order granting support pendent elite.250 to 1. having been convicted of adultery by the CFI 7) The right to separate support or maintenance even from the conjugal partnership property presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately 8) Art 104 of the CC: after the filing of petition for legal sep the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other 9) A petition in bad faith. 1971) 10) petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order 11) court resolved to issue a TRO effective immediately and until further orders from the Court.

1956—filed out of time and for that reason the action is barred ART 100 of the NCC: legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse. 1948: they entered into an agreement—both relinquishing their rights over the other as legal husband and wife (including support. J. provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery of concubinage—in here we see that plaintiff consented to the concubinage of her husband—her consent is clear— having consented she cannot claim legal separation DECISION OF SC: the decision appealed from is in accordance with the evidence and the law on the matter. 1943: married legally at iriga. the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court’s sympathy Property relations Art 63(2). getting another mate and claims) 6) January 1955: defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado—sept 1. cam sur 4) For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife. 1955—gave birth to a child CFI: holding that acts of defendant constituted concubinage. It however. J. the couple on may 30. PRAXEDES No. CA GR NO. 63. RATIO: 1) The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by Art 102 of the NCC: “ an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred” 2) Condonation and consent on the part of the plaintiff are necessarily the import of the agreement (par 6 (b)) the condonation is not only implied by expressed 3) Art 100 of the NCC: having condoned and or consented in writing. 1944 agreed to live separately from each other until the present 5) April 3. L-11766 Oct 25. Sabalones Respondents: CA and Remedios Gaviola. 1960 Plantiff and appellant: Socorro Matubis Defendant and appellee: Zoilo Praxedes Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Sur Ponente: Paredes. 107. dismissed the complaint REASON: plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband in Jan 1955—complaint was fied on april 24.Sabalones Nature of the Case: petition for review of a decision of the CA POnente: Cruz. FACTS: 1) Plaintiff Socorro filed a complaint for legal separation and change of surname against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes—alleging abandonment ad concubinage 2) Defense interposed that it was plaintiff who left the conjugal home 3) January 10. FC Art 106(1). The same is AFFIRMED. a ground for legal separation. 1994 Petitioner: Samson T. FACTS: . CC CASE: SABALONES v. 106169 Feb 14. MATUBIS v.

left to his wife. QC with Thelma Curameng and their three children 6) Asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of the conjugal properties with forfeiture of her husband’s share therein because of his adultery 7) She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from: a) disturbing the occupants of the forbes park property b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties CFI: decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner’s share in the conjugal properties. 1) petitioner –member of diplomatic service. Greenhills San Juan MM belonging to conjugal partnership—claims he is weak now and sick needs it for hospitalization 4) Private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal sep—the house in greenhills was being occupied by her and their children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property )a building and lot in forbes park which was on lease to nobuchimi izumi) 5) Despite husband’s retirement he never came back to them had a separate residence in Don Antonio heights Fairview. appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as administrator 4) Designation was implicit in the decision of trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties and thus disqualifying him to be administrator—affirmed by CA 5) Wirt may be issued to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated 6) Court notes that wife has been administering the properties for almost 19 years 7) Harassment of husband to tenant and husband’s custody of other conjugal properties real and personal 8) These shows that injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent dissipation of the conjugal assets—it is prudent not to allow husband for the meantime to participate in management 9) Writ allowed wife to continue administering the properties for the meantime w/o interference of husband pending . respondent the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years 2) sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to phils but no to wife and their children 3) 4 years later. ART 124—no injunctive relief could be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated—admin belong to spouses jointly—husband’s decision prevails in conflicts –if one is incapacitated the other spouse assumes sole powers of admin . declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife 8) wife filed a motion for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the admin of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes park—since husband had been harassing the tenant of the leased property 9) she complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal properties in the US in favor of his paramour to the prejudice of legitimate wife and children CA: granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by the wife ISSUE. he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St. failure to appoint admin Art 61 of CC DECISION OF SC: petition is DENIED for lack of merit RATIO: 1) pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets. the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration 2) correct that in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife’s administration pending resolution of the appeal 3) Art 61: states that after a petition for legal sep has been filed the trial court shall in the absence of a written agreement between the couple.

they become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans) 2. ISSUES: 1. stemming from the fault of the husband. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction HELD: 1. and lived in Iloilo City. and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife. at best. “When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off. and render conjugal rights to. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. No sufficient cause was present. and separation must be necessary.ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921) FACTS: Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Said order. Other countries. would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. a liquidation of their conjugal partnership. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation. In the case of property rights. the other. also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights. 1920. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible. such an action may be maintained. defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home 2. She is also not entitled to support. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. She is under obligation to return to the domicile. . On July 4. such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.