Law 100: Persons and Family Relations

Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
I. Introduction
A. Intersection of Modern Constitutional Developments and Traditional Family Law
 Article III, Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
 Article II, Section 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
 Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
 Article II, Section 14: The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.
 Article XV, Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
 Article XV, Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
 Article XV, Section 3. The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of
the family to a family living wage and income; and (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
 Article XV, Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of
social security.
 Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
o Griswold v. Connecticut
Facts: Appellants were convicted of violating a Connecticut statute which makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article
to prevent conception.
Held: The statute is unconstitutional because it violates the right to marital privacy which is a right under the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights.
o Eisenstadt v. Baird
Facts: Appellee convicted of violating a Massachusetts statute which made it a crime for persons that are not physicians to sell, lend,
or give away any contraceptives to unmarried persons.
Held: There is no fit between the statute and the goal of the state. In prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons, the state irrationally and unwittingly imposes unwanted pregnancies from unsafe sex as a form of punishment, and violates
the equal protection clause by providing dissimilar treatments to married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated.
II. Civil Personality
A. Concept and Classes of Persons
 CC, 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost
 CC, 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided
it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
 CC, 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb.
However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within 24hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb
 CC, 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by
law, by contract, and by will.
 CC, 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first,
whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the
same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to other.
 CC, 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) the State and its political subdivisions; (2) other corporations, institutions, and entities
for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3)
Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
 CC, 45. Juridical persons in 44(1) and 44(2) are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. Private Corporations are regulated
by laws of general application on the subject. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of the CC concerning partnerships.
 CC, 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 CC, 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in 44(2), their
property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this
point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purpose for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality
which during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same.
 Geluz v. CA
Facts: Wife had abortion three times; the first two known to the husband, but he didn’t know of the third. Husband sued for damages
against the physician.
Held: Husband cannot be awarded for damages in behalf of his unborn child because the child did not acquire juridical capacity.
 People v. Tirol
Facts: During the pendency of the appeal, one of the accused died.
Held: The death of the accused extinguished his juridical personality. As such, he cannot be held liable criminally. However, the civil
liabilities incurred by him remains to be determined which can be recovered from his estates.
 Joaquin v. Navarro
Facts: The son was shot dead while his mother was trapped inside the burning building. The question is who outlived who?
Held: The mother outlived the son: this theory is more tenable since this is based on facts. The theory that the son outlived the mother
is merely presumptive. As such, inference that is based on evidence prevails over presumptions made by law [Rule 123 , Rules of Court]
B. Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon
1. Presumption of Capacity
 Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas
Facts: One of the surety’s wife was pleading that the mental incapacity of her husband at the time of the assumption of the
obligation to pay, and as such, should be relieved from compliance with the earlier decision of the court to fulfill the obligation.
Held: For insanity to be a valid restriction on the capacity to act, it should meet the ff. requirements: (1) that the insanity is
habitual; (2) that the person was insane at the time the act was done; (3) that the act done directly arose from the person's
insanity. Otherwise, the person is presumed to be capacitated. In this case, the facts do not prove that Villanueva did not possess
the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
2. Restrictions on the Capacity to Act
 CC, 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
 CC, 38. Minority, insanity, or imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on
capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.
 CC, 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being
deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this code, other codes, the Rules of Court and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on
account of religious belief or political opinion. A married woman, twenty-one [eighteen] years of age or over, is qualified for all
acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.
 Minority
o Effect on Contracts
 CC, 1327 (1). The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors
 CC, 1390 (1). Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to
the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract
 CC, 1403 (3). Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (3) those where both parties are
incapable of giving consent to a contract.
 CC, 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can
those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon
these flaws of the contract
 CC, 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not
obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.
 CC, 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving the
modifications contained in the following articles. Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person
without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefore. Necessaries are those referred to in Article 290
 CC, 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a contract without the consent
of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received,
notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned
 CC, 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation,
there shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Mercado v. Espiritu
Facts: The appellants, when they entered into a contract of sale of estate with the appellee, actively misrepresented
themselves as having reached the age of majority, when in fact they were still minors.
Held: The sale of the estate is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment.
 Bambalan v. Maramba
Facts: Bambalan, when he was still a minor, was coerced and intimidated by his mother to sign the sale of the land he
inherited from his deceased father.
Held: The minor did not pretend to be of age (as opposed to Mercado), and his minority was well known to the purchaser
(defendant). When this is the case, the contract is voidable.
 Braganza v. de Villa Abrille
Facts: At the time that the transaction (loan) was made, two of the parties were minors. They did not make it appear in the
promissory note that they were not yet of age.
Held: Minors have no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In order for them to be liable, the fraud must be actual and not
constructive. Mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute fraud. Though not liable, minors should
make restitution to the extent that they profited from the money they received (the money they got were used for their
support during the Japanese occupation.
o Effect on Marriage
 FC, 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not other any of the impediment mentioned in Articles 37
& 38, may contract marriage
 FC, 35 (1). The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) those contracted by any party below eighteen years
of age even with the consent of parents or guardians.
o Effects on Crime
 RPC, 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability: (2) A person
under years of age. (3) A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which
case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is
adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph,
shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise,
he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
 RPC, 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen
years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over
fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in
the proper period.
 RA 9344
 Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission
of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
 Insanity
o Effect on Contracts
 CC, 1327 (2). The following cannot give consent to a contract: (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not
know how to write.
 CC, 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a
hypnotic spell are voidable.
 CC, 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not
obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.
o Effect on Crimes
 RPC, 12(1). Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. an
imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission
of the same court.
o Effect on Marriage
 FC, 45 (2). A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) that either
party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.
 FC, 47 (2). The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein: (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either
party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity.
 Deaf-mutism
o CC, 1327(2). The following cannot give consent to a contract: (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not
know how to write
o CC, 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate
two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof.
o CC, 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and
write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code.
 Civil Interdiction
o RPC, 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental
authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his
property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
 Family Relation
o RPC, 11(2). Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: Anyone who acts in defense of the
person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the
person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
o RPC, 13(5). Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances: That the act was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees.
o FC, 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties
be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters,
whether of the full or half blood.
o FC, 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall
also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
o CC, 1109. Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even though there be a separation of property agreed upon in
the marriage settlements or by judicial decree. Neither does prescription run between parents and children, during the minority
or insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the continuance of the guardianship.
o CC, 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under Article 191.
 Absence
o CC, 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
o CC, 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A
person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or airplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
o FC, 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Prodigality
o Martinez v. Martinez
Facts: The son was asking for a declaration of prodigality against his father, on grounds that his father had been squandering
nd
the estate by making donations to his 2 wife and her parents
Held: Acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste and lessen the estate to such an
extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.
While evidence state that wife’s possession increased greatly, there is no showing that there has been any perceptible
diminution of the defendant’s property; it is inferred then that the father is still in the full exercise of his faculty to look over the
estate.

III. Pre-marital Controversy
A. Breach of Promise to Marry
 CC, 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
 CC, 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
 CC, 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
 CC, 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 Wassmer v. Velez
Facts: Two days before the wedding, Velez wrote Wassmer a note saying that he could not push through with the wedding. The
following day, he sent another note saying the wedding would continue. Velez did not appear on the wedding ceremony.
Held: Velez is liable for the cost of the wedding preparations spent by Wassmer. While mere breach is not an actionable wrong, Article
21 of the Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom, he shall compensate the latter
for the damages. It is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages.
 Tanjanco v. CA
Facts: Tanjanco succeeded in having sexual intercourse for a year with Santos after he promised to marry her. When Santos got
pregnant, Tanjanco refused to marry her.
Held: Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. There was no seduction involved. Sexual intercourse for a year does not
constitute seduction but mutual passion.
 De Jesus v. Syquia
Facts: Syquia promised to marry de Jesus. The latter conceived a son. Syquia refused to marry her when she got pregnant the second
time because he suspected the child was not his. De Jesus filed for breach of promise to marry.
Held: Award for breach of promise to marry is denied. As long as no cost was incurred because of the breach of promise, no
compensation can be awarded. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable.
 Piccininni v. Hajus
Facts: the result of fraudulent representations made by Hajus to Piccininni to the effect that she would marry him and they would live
in her house, Piccininni was induced to spend a considerable amount of money in the renovation of the would-be conjugal home.
Held: Denial of recovery of property transferred in contemplation of marriage is not necessary to the accomplishment of the object of
heart balm legislation and to hold so will have the undesirable effect of placing it within the power of the recipient to renounce a
promise and yet retain property bestowed in anticipation of performance. Plaintiff was asserting the defendant wronged him in
fraudulently inducing him to transfer property to her [renovation of the house]. The complaint was based on this and not on her failure
to marry him.
IV. Definition and Nature of Marriage
- FC, 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code
- Consti, Art. XV Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development
- Consti, Art. XV Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State
- Consti, Art. XV Section 3. The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of
the family to a family living wage and income; and (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them
- Loving v. Virginia

5
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Plaintiffs were married couple: one was white, the other black. They assail the constitutionality of a Virginia statue banning
interracial marriages.
Held: The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. The 14th Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
- Zablocki v. Redhail
Facts: Persons wanting to marry, but who have minors not under their custody and which is under obligation to support, shall have to
secure permission from the court. Permission is granted on grounds of the person having fulfilled obligation to support illegitimate child
before marrying.
Held: Right to marry is of fundamental importance. It is recognized as one of the basic civil rights of man fundamental to our very
existence and survival. It is a central part of liberty protected by the Due Process clause. Statutory classification in the case is overly
inclusive: new spouse may actually better the applicant's financial situation by contributing income from a job. Preventing the marriage
may only result in the children being born out of wedlock.

A. Marriage Models
1. Traditional
 Graham v. Graham
Facts: Wife and husband signed an agreement that wife shall pay husband $300 a month, and that husband shall accompany wife
in all her travels which withholds him from getting a job.
Held: A private agreement between persons married or about to be married whereby they attempt to change the essential
obligations of the marriage contract, as defined by law, is contrary to public policy. In this case, In this case, where the husband
was stipulated not to work because of the wife's great wealth.
 Bradwell v. Illinois
Facts: Illinois refused to grant a married woman a license to practice law. Woman assails the constitutionality of the decision.
Held: Such decision violates no provision of the Constitution, since the WIFE'S PRIMARY ROLE is the provider of household and
child-care services, thus preventing a married woman's entry into the Bar. Also, the inherent legal incapacities of a wife makes the
entering of contracts difficult, thus making the legal profession also difficult.
2. Challenges to the Traditional Marriage Model
 Changing Status of Women: Dunn v. Palermo
Facts: Palermo retained using her maiden name even after she got married. The Registrar asserts that she is required under
Tennessee statute to assume the name of her husband.
Held: Woman upon marriage may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and the choice
is hers. So long as a person’s name remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribed manner, and in
absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to name used.
 By private contract: When valid, when void
o In re Santiago
Facts: Atty. Santiago prepared a document which authorized the husband and wife to marry again and where each waived any
right of action one may have against the other.
Held: The agreement is not valid because it is contrary to laws and morals and subverts the vital foundation of the family.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution that cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the parties.
o Selanova v. Mendoza
Facts: Judge Mendoza prepared and later ratified a document liquidating extra-judicially the CPG of Selanova and his wife. A
condition imposed was that the spouses would waive the right to prosecute each other for acts of infidelity.
Held: The contract was invalid. Marriage is a special contract. The law provides that any contract of personal separation
between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement during marriage for the dissolution of conjugal property are
void.
B. Requisites
- FC, 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
- FC, 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age.
1. Essential
 Legal Capacity, Male and Female
o Jones v. Hallahan
Facts: Two females contend that they were deprived of their constitutional rights to marry, of association and to free exercise
of religion when the clerk failed to issue a marriage license to them.
Held: Two females are incapable of entering into marriage. There is no constitutional protection of the rights of marriage
between two persons of the same sex.
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
o Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
Facts: Same-sex couples were denied marriage licenses by the Commissioner of Public Health.
Held: (1) Marriage licensing statutes were not susceptible of interpretation permitting qualified same sex couples to obtain
marriage licenses. (2) Limitation of protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacked
rational basis and violated state constitutional equal protection principles
o Silverio v. Republic
Facts: Silverio underwent a surgical procedure of sex reassignment in Thailand. He now wants his name and sex changed in his
birth certificate. He is about to get married to a foreigner male.
Held: The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is
a privilege, not a right. A change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. Before a person can legally change
his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason to justify such change. "Status" refers to
the circumstances affecting the legal situation of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. It is more
or less permanent in nature and not ordinarily terminable at his own will. A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and
family relations. It is a part of a person's legal capacity and civil status. Birth certificate is a historical record of facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Sex is the sum or peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female. No
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
 Consent freely given
o FC, 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in
the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
o FC, 45(3). A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: That the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the Facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife.
o People v. Santiago
Facts: Santiago raped his niece Felicita. He married her the same afternoon before a protestant minister. Santiago then gave
her a few pesos and sent her home.
Held: The marriage is void because the man’s consent to marry his niece was absent. The marriage was a ruse for him to escape
criminal liability.
o Buccat v. Buccat
Facts: woman was 6 months pregnant at the time of marriage]
Held: Non-concealment that she is no longer a virgin is not a ground for annulment. In marriages during bride's advanced state
of pregnancy, it is presumed that groom knows about pregnancy.
 Eigenmann v. Guerra
Facts: Eigenmann filed an action to annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between the ages 16-20 at that
time and his mother did not give her consent to the marriage.
Held: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmann’s mother was present at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. She did not raise any objection and her consent can be gleaned from such acts. Eigenmann is
estopped from asserting that he was a minor at the time of celebration of the marriage, having represented himself to be over
25.
2. Formal
 FC, 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38.
 CC, 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive
laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.
 Authority of Solemnizing Officer
o FC, 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in
the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable
o FC, 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; (2) Any priest,
rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the
civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that
at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect; (3) Any ship captain or
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airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31; (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in
the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; (5) Any consul-general,
consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10
o FC, 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic
of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer
with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.
o FC, 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call
o FC, 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in
articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians
o FC, 35 (2). The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so
o CC, 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
o Navarro v. Domagtoy
Facts: Judge Domagtoy solemnized a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction.
Held: Marriage may be solemnized by, among others “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”
Solemnization outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage. What results is an irregularity in the
formal requisites of a valid marriage. The judge is administratively liable, though.
o Arañes v. Occiano
Facts: A judge solemnized a marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the marriage license being presented to
him. He explained he did this out of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their license the
afternoon after the wedding.
Held: The marriage was void. The respondent judge was faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license and for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction.
 Marriage License
o FC, 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.
o FC, 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the
Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing
officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.
o FC, 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following: (1) Full name of the contracting party; (2) Place of
birth; (3) Age and date of birth; (4) Civil status; (5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled; (6) Present residence and citizenship; (7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties; (8) Full name,
residence and citizenship of the father; (9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and (10) Full name, residence
and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor mother and is
under the age of twenty-one years. The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence
certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license.
o FC, 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original birth certificates
or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly attested by the
persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be
sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of the person issuing the
certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity. If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or
baptismal certificate or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit
of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has
been required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may
furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil registrar
concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two
witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her
parents, if known, and the place and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred
as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality. The presentation of birth or
baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil
registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local
civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or
both of them have the required age.
o FC, 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead
of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
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marriage. In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and
his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse.
o FC, 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil
registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears
before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before
any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for
marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications
o FC, 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian
for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not
be issued till after three months following the completion of the publication of the application therefore. A sworn statement by
the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any, shall be
attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be
stated in the sworn statement.
o FC, 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the
requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize
marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect
that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling shall
suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the
application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage. Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or
parental advice, the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
o FC, 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the applicants for a
marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin
board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the
general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the period of publication. (63a)
o FC, 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after
the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any
interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order.
(64a)
o FC, 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance of the
marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It
shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose income
is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a)
o FC, 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of issue,
and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not made use of
it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (65a)
o FC, 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a
marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective
diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a)
o FC, 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also
State: (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party; (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence; (3) The
date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law,
except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the
parental consent in appropriate cases; (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal
requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if
any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
o FC, 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the
marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original
of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage
in place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

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o FC, 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to
all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for
marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n)
o FC, 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book
strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which
the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary. (n)
o FC, 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38. (17a) where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
o FC, 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (72a)
o FC, 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a)
o FC, 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before
the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo
mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary
steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
(72a)
o FC, 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the marriage
contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was
performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (75a)
o FC, 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
o FC, 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in
articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
o FC, 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the
necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)
o FC, 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing Facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
o PD 965. the additional requirement of FAMILY PLANNING INSTRUCTIONS to marriage licenses

WHEREAS, the Government has adopted a national population program to achieve and maintain levels of population most
conducive to the national welfare;

WHEREAS, an essential element of the population program is to inform and instruct the people on family planning and
responsible parenthood; and

WHEREAS, an effective mode of implementing the program would be to require all applicants for marriage license to receive
instructions and information on family planning and responsible parenthood before they are issued the marriage license, and to
create the administrative machinery for giving such instructions and information;

o Republic v. CA
Facts: Marriage license was missing; Civil Registrar was not able to find the marriage license in its records.
Held: Senior Civil Registry Officer wrote, "Said license number does not appear from our records. The certification of ‘due
search and inability to find,’ unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Rule 132 of the rules of court,
sufficiently proves that the marriage license was not issued.
o Moreno v. Bernabe
Facts: Respondent Judge married Moreno even without marriage license. He claims to have done it in good faith, “as he was
only moved by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant”
Held: The absence of any of the essential requisites, even if accompanied by good faith, shall generally render the marriage void
ab initio.
o People v. Borromeo
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Facts: Borromeo killed his wife and was convicted of parricide. He appealed that he should have been convicted of homicide
since he and the deceased were not legally married.
Held: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of marriage. Persons living
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of the marriage does not invalidate said
marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.
o Seguisabal v. Cabrera
Facts: Seguisabal filed a case against Judge Cabrera for solemnizing the marriage of Sayson and Jagonoy without the requisite
marriage license. Respondent Judge reasoned that he presumed that the papers were in order.
Held: The parties were not issued a marriage license because of their failure to attend the required family planning seminar.
Absent the license the marriage is void. Thus, despite attestations of good faith, the judge was fined equivalent to 3 months
salary for deliberately dispensing with legal requirements.
o Alcantara v. Alcantara
Facts: The marriage license procured for the spouses are a sham since it was procured from Cavite which is the domicile of
neither of the parties, and the marriage license number in the Registry does not match the number in the marriage contract by
one number.
Held: The marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and the petitioner had not presented any evidence
to overcome the presumption. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the state's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which, the general public is interested. To be
considered void on the ground of absence of marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts. Church ceremony was
confirmatory of the civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. The
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar.
 Ceremony
o FC, 3(3). The formal requisites of marriage are: (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
o FC, 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for
the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage
certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. In case
of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be
sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the
solemnizing officer.
o FC, 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple,
or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect
o FC, 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
o FC, 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before
the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo
mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary
steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
o FC, 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also
State: (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party; (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence; (3) The
date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law,
except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the
parental consent in appropriate cases; (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal
requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if
any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
o FC, 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the
marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
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issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original
of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage
in place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)
o FC, 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to
all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for
marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax.
o Martinez v. Tan
Facts: Martinez and Tan appeared before the Justice of the Peace and signed a statement that they agreed to get married. They
signed another document, along with the justice and 2 witnesses, stating they appeared before the justice and ratified all the
contents of the instrument. The justice pronounced them as man and wife.
Held: The marriage is affirmed. The declaration of the contracting parties does not have to be verbalized. The very act of signing
a statement that declares that they take each other as husband and wife is sufficient. There was a proper ceremony. There is no
particular form of marriage ceremony required.
o Madrilejo v. de Leon
Facts: Madrilejo and Perez got married in articulo mortis. The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
Held: The marriage was valid. Failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of the
marriage.
3. Presumption of Marriage
 CC, 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or Facts leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression.
 Trinidad v. CA
Facts: Petitioner alleges that he is a legitimate child of his father by virtue of his father’s marriage to his mother; however,
marriage contract could not be procured because it got burned during one of the fires during the War.
Held: In the absence of marriage contract, Marriage can be proved by relevant evidence such as 1) testimony of witnesses to the
marriage, 2) couple’s open and public cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, 3) birth and baptismal
certificates of children born in such union and 4) mention of marriage in subsequent documents. Preponderant evidence means
that as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. To determine this, court considers (1)
facts and circumstances in the case, (2) witnesses' manner of testifying, (3) their intelligence, (4) means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, (5) nature of the facts, (6) the probability or improbability of their testimony, (7)
their interest or want thereof, and (8) their personal credibility.
 Vda. de Jacob v. CA
Facts: Vda. de Jacob claiming to be the surviving spouse of the deceased. Their marriage was solemnized by a priest, but said
priest lost the original marriage contract. In lieu of the original, a reconstructed Marriage Contract was issued in 1978.
Held: Even without a marriage license, petitioner and deceased have been living together for five years as stated in affidavit. The
marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license. The contents of a document may be proven by
competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent
loss or destruction. Execution of the contract can be proven by witnesses and solemnizing officer.
 Sevilla v. Cardenas
Facts: Certification of Civil Registrar stated that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license number is registered for
the reason that the employee handling is already retired. Our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem."
Held: The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his
office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof
of lack or absence of record. In this case, the wordings of the Civil Registrar belie the claim of diligent search. Therefore, if a
marriage certificate is missing, and all means HAVE NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED to find it, then the marriage is presumed to exist.

V. Void and Voidable Marriages
A. Void
1. Grounds
a. Ordinary
 FC, 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

12
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of
age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
 FC, 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and
sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
 FC, 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood
relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3)
Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the
surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and
the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same
adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his
or her own spouse.
 FC, 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
 FC, 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
 FC, 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse
 CC, 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening
his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
 CC, 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A
person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or airplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known
for four years
 People v. Mendoza
Facts: During the subsistence of Mendoza’s marriage to his first wife, he contracted a second marriage. After the death of the
first wife, he contracted a third marriage. Mendoza was prosecuted for bigamy on his last marriage.
Held: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for his third marriage. He contracted this marriage after the death of his first wife. The
second marriage is void because it was contracted during the subsistence of a prior marriage. It is the second marriage that is
bigamous. He need not ask for judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage since before the Family Code, it was not
required.
 Tolentino v. Paras
Facts: Tolentino served sentence for bigamy. After serving his sentence, he went back to his second wife and continued to
live with her. It was the second wife’s name that appeared as the surviving spouse in Tolentino’s death certificate.
Held: The first wife has the right to seek judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse. The admission of the man
that he committed bigamy is the best proof of the validity of the first marriage. The second marriage is void ab initio.
 Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
Facts: Wiegel and Olivia got married under the belief that Olivia’s prior marriage to Maxion was void because the latter
forced Olivia to marry him.
Held: Olivia’s first marriage is merely voidable, her consent being vitiated by force. Her second marriage is void because it
was contracted while a prior marriage was subsisting.
 Terre v. Terre
Facts: Terre, a law student, married Dorothy. Dorothy was already married but Terre convinced her that the first marriage to
her first cousin was void. After their first child was born, Terre abandoned Dorothy and contracted a second marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy’s
marriage to Terre is void for being bigamous. Terre demonstrated grossly immoral conduct. He should have known that a
declaration was essential. Terre was disbarred.

13
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Atienza v. Brillantes
Facts: Judge Brillantes married Ongkiko twice. In both instances, the couple failed to secure a marriage license. After more
than 20 years, Judge Brillantes married another woman in California. He said he is single because under the Civil Code, his
first marriage is void.
Held: the marriage is void but Brillantes has to get a judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage. Even if the
first marriage was contracted before the Family Code, remarriages after the Family Code are covered by Art. 40.
 Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez
Facts: In 1993, Judge Sanchez solemnized a marriage between Manzano and Payao despite the fact that they indicated in the
affidavits sworn before the judge that they are both separated. Manzano’s widow who he married in 1966, filed a case
against the judge.
Held: Sanchez should have known that the marriage was void for being bigamous since Manzano had a previous subsisting
marriage. The fact that they had been living apart from their respective spouses for years did not dissolve the marriage
bonds. Although the law exempts individuals who have freely and voluntarily cohabited for at least 5 years from securing a
marriage license, they must be legally capacitated to marry each other. Manzano and Payao’s marriage is void for being
bigamous, not because of the absence of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance
of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
 Apiag v. Cantero
Facts: the 1st marriage was only dramatized, for the families of the man and first wife to save face. Boy did not seek judicial
declaration of nullity. 2nd marriage happened before effectivity of Family Code.
Held: Old law will apply to petitioner since both marriages were celebrated under the old Civil Code. Thus, no judicial decree
of nullity is needed to establish the invalidity of void marriages.
b. Psychological Incapacity
 FC, 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
 Santos v. Bedia-Santos
Facts: After giving birth, Julia Bedia-Santos left for the US and did not contact her husband anymore. Leouel filed for the
nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Held: Art. 36 of the FC cannot be taken independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts and laws on
marriage. “Psychological incapacity” refers to the mental capacity of a party to the marriage to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants [gravity, jurisprudence, incurability]. The facts were not enough to show psychological incapacity.
What was shown was lack of willingness to comply with marital obligations.
 Molina v. CA
Facts: Roridel and Reynaldo were estranged. Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity because her husband was
“highly immature and habitually quarrelsome who thought of himself as a king to be served.”
Held: There is no psychological incapacity. What exist are mere irreconcilable differences.
MOLINA GUIDELINES:
a. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff
b. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified; (b) alleged in the
complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
c. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
d. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
e. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage
f. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Art. 220, 221, 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and children
g. Interpretations given by the Nat’l Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respects by our courts
h. The trial court must order prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless SolGen issues a certification.
 Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA
Facts: After 9 months of marriage, there has been no sexual intercourse or any attempt at it between Tsoi and his wife.
Neither party is impotent. The wife wanted to annul the marriage but the husband did not.
Held: Abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder.
It demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
 Choa v. Choa
Facts: Alfonso Chua filed a petition for annulment on the basis of psychological incapacity. He cited his wife was immature,
inattentive to their children and lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.
14
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Held: it was not proven that Leni Choa was psychologically incapacitated. At most, the parties were incompatible. Mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts are not acceptable causes of psychological
incapacity. Evidence merely showed that he and his wife cannot get along with each other. There must be a natal or
supervening factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage.
 Antonio v. Reyes
Facts: Wife persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things.
Held: A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature
of the marital bond and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect.
 Republic v. Melgar
Facts: wife complained of husband's immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional
laziness and abandonment of his family. In this case, wife alone testified.
Held: In order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than
Norma's lone testimony should have been adduced. While an actual, medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not
a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened Norma's claim of
Eulogio's alleged psychological incapacity. Norma's omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no
conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the "defects" were already present at the
inception of marriage or that they are incurable.
 Paras v. Paras
Facts: wife complained that husband (1) dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(2) lived with a concubine and sired a child with her; (3) did not give financial support with his children; (4) has been remiss in
his duties both as husband and as father
Held: The totality of evidence must be sufficient to prove that the spouse is psychologically incapacitated. "Defects" should
be present at the inception of marriage. Sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity absent
a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of marriage. Article 36 should not be equated with legal
separation, in which grounds need not be rooted on psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity and abandonment and the like. At best the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Also, one's unfitness as a lawyer
does not automatically mean one's unfitness as a husband or wife - the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive
on an action for declaration of nullity for marriage.
 Tongol v. Tongol
Facts: husband says their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break
up their union. Examining psychiatrist concluded that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder [does not
function in the way that she feels or she is confident; very much in doubt of her own capabilities; exaggerated emotional
reactions; feeling of rejection].
Held: The behavior exhibited by the respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Art. 36.
Psychological incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In this case, the testimonies revolve around disagreement
regarding the management of their business. Disagreement on money matters is not a sufficient ground to declare the
marriage null and void.
 Dimayuga-Laurena v. Laurena
Facts: Wife alleges that husband was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. Husband
gave priority to parents, would come home very late, tried to convert her to his religion, womanizer – such manifest
husband’s psychological incapacity.
Held: Petitioner fails to prove psychological incapacity of husband, much less its existence at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. (failed to conform with Molina guidelines)
 Te v. Te
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married at a young age. They became estranged because the girl was too overbearing
while the boy was too meek to stand up to his wife and make his own decisions. Psychological examinations show that boy is
suffering from dependent personality disorder, and that girl is afflicted with antisocial personality disorder.
Held: Marriage was void under Art. 36. The disorders suffered by both petitioner and respondent makes them both incapable
of assuming the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity, etc.
 Ting v. Ting
Facts: Husband has been having drinking and gambling problems, and has violent outbursts against his wife. Doctor
concluded that such behavior of husband are clear indications that petitioner suffers from personality disorder. Second
opinion was contrary to first, Doctor stating that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering latter’s
good relations with coworkers.
15
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Held: Wife’s testimony as well as the totality of evidence presented is too inadequate to declare husband psychologically
unfit under Art. 36.

2. Period to File Action or to Raise Defense
 FC, 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive
Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and
falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect" has been deleted by
Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]
3. Effects of Nullity
 FC, 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The
children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community
of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent
spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
 FC, 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
 FC, 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases
to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
 FC, 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final
judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask
for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the
properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
(n)
 FC, 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
 FC, 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding
Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
 FC, 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has
become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article
53 shall likewise be legitimate.
 Niñal v. Badayog
Facts: Niñal and Bellones were married in 1974. Niñal shot Bellones in 1985, causing her death. After a year and a half, Niñal
contracted a second marriage with Badayog without a marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that they have
cohabited for at least five years. Niñal died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Niñal’s marriage with
Badayog.
Held: Second marriage was void for lack of marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring marriage license because their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years they had cohabited,
only 20 months were without any legal impediment. For purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
 Domingo v. CA

16
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Delia Domingo filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity and Separation of Property. Her husband filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the petition was unnecessary since their marriage was void ab initio because of Roberto’s previous marriage.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the
effects of judicial declaration of nullity.
 De Castro v. Assidao-de Castro
Facts: couple applied for marriage license. Marriage license was granted but already expired when they were planning to get
married. They executed an affidavit stating they had been living together as husband and wife for at least 5 years
Held: Trial court may declare the marriage void ab initio in the case filed by the wife for support of their illegitimate child. The
Court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. Also, the falsity of an affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisite of marriage.
B. Voidable
1. Grounds
 FC, 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in
whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the
party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the Facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That
the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable
of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party
was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
 FC, 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: (1) Non-
disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) Concealment by
the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; (3) Concealment of
sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or (4) Concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. No other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage. (86a)
 FC, 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (1)
For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five
years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time
before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse,
who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any
time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity; (3) For causes
mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud; (4) For causes
mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue
influence disappeared or ceased; (5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
after the marriage. (87a)
 FC, 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of Facts or confession of judgment.
 RPC, 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes
of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall
have consented or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
 Moe v. Dinkins
Facts: Petitioners not allowed to marry by virtue of state statute prohibiting marriages between minors without parental consent.
Held: It is the state’s interest to protect the minors from immature decision-making and preventing unstable marriages. The law
presumes that the parents possess what the child lacks in maturity, and that parents are more capable to act in their best
interests, thus the parental consent requirement. Besides, there is no denial to marry. Marriage is only delayed
17
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Katipunan v. Tenorio
Facts: Marcos Katipunan and Rita Tenorio had been married for seven years. Tenorio suffered a mental ailment. Katipunan
wanted to annul their marriage on the ground of insanity.
Held: there is no ground to annul the marriage. Insanity occurs after the celebration of the marriage does not constitute a cause
for nullity. The wife was mentally sound at the time of the marriage.
 Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay
Facts: Emilio Suntay was suffering from schizophrenia which had been manifest prior to his marriage to Isabel. The trial court
declared their marriage null and void.
Held: The marriage is voidable. Being of unsound mind is a ground only for annulment and not for declaration of nullity. When
dispositive part is not clear, the body of the decision may be referred to give light to the ruling.
 Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
Facts: Mangonon de Buccat gave birth 89 days after her marriage. Her husband filed for annulment on the ground that she
concealed her non-virginity.
Held: It is not believable that the wife could have concealed that she was six months pregnant at the time of marriage. She was at
an advanced stage of pregnancy and the husband should have observed her advanced physical condition. There is no ground for
annulment.
 Aquino v. Delizo
Facts: Aquino wants the marriage annulled because his wife, Delizo concealed that she was four months pregnant with the child
of another man at the time of their marriage.
Held: Concealment of pregnancy is one of the recognized forms of fraud that may be a reason for the annulment of a marriage.
Since Delizo was naturally plump, Aquino could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant
at the time of the marriage.
 Anaya v. Palaroan
Facts: Anaya wanted her marriage annulled because of Palaroan’s non-disclosure of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman prior to their marriage.
Held: there is no ground for annulment. Fraud as a vice of consent is limited exclusively to those exclusively to those enumerated
by law. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute fraud.
 Ruiz v. Atienza
Facts: Ruiz impregnated Atienza. Atienza’s father, along with some other companions, went to the boarding house of Ruiz and
convinced him to marry Atienza. After the marriage, Ruiz claims that he was intimidated into marrying Atienza.
Held: There is no ground for annulment. Neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Threat cannot come from
lawful actions such as threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar based on immorality. He was also not kidnapped by the wife’s
relatives. He had many occasions to escape.
 Jimenez v. Canizares
Facts: Jimenez claims that Canizares cannot copulate because her vagina was too small. Canizares refused to undergo physical
examination despite repeated orders by the court.
Held: Impotency of the wife cannot be presumed. The defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required
by law. Lone testimony of the husband that his wife is incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband and wife.
 Sarao v. Guevarra
Facts: Sarao and Guevarra were unable to copulate because on pains on the part of Guevara. Upon physician’s advice, Guevara
had her uterus and ovaries removed so she could copulate. After the operation, Sarao claimed to have lost any desire to have
intercourse with his wife after her operation and filed for annulment.
Held: Impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. It must not be confused with sterility. Impotency must
exist at the time of marriage. It must also be permanent and incurable. Temporary and occasional incapacity for copulation is not
a ground.
 People v. Santiago
Facts: Santiago raped his niece Felicita. He married her the same afternoon before a protestant minister. Santiago then gave her a
few pesos and sent her home.
Held: The ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress and would make it voidable had it not been already
considered void.

2. Marriage when One Spouse is Absent
 FC, 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary

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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
 FC, 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)
 FC, 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The
children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community
of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent
spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
 FC, 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
 CC, 83(2). Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: The first spouse had been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles
390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases, until declared null and void by a competent court
 CC, 85(2). A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: In a subsequent
marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with
such former husband or wife was then in force
 CC, 87(2). The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows: For causes
mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the
subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other.
 RPC, 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
 Jones v. Hortiguela
Facts: Jones went abroad. His wife, Escano, did not hear from him again. Escano instituted proceedings to declare Jones an
absentee. Escano married Hortiguela before seven years has passed after effectivity of court’s order.
Held: The marriage is valid. Seven years of consecutive absence is counted from the date of abandonment and not from date of
effectivity of the order.
3. Effects of pending Action/Decree
 FC, 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses,
the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish
to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
 FC, 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases
to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
 FC, 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final
judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask
for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the
properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
(n)

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
 FC, 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding
Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
 FC, 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has
become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article
53 shall likewise be legitimate
 CC, 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
 CC, 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she
is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another
person.
 Yu v. Yu
Facts: Spouses battling for custody of minor child during pendency of declaration of nullity case.
Held: petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage automatically submitted the issue of the custody of the
child. The custody issue in the declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
4. Jurisdiction: Tamano v. Ortiz
Facts: parties were Muslims
Held: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. Petitioner and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code; hence, Civil Code is applicable to the case. Assuming that they likewise married under Muslim laws,
the same would still fall under the original jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations.
VI. Legal Separation
A. Grounds
 FC, 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral
pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or
habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the
respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
 CC, 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the
husband as defined in the Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.
 People v. Zapata and Bondoc
Facts: Bondoc filed a complaint of adultery against his wife Zapata and her paramour in 1947. The wife pleaded guilty. After a
year, Bondoc filed a second complaint for adultery committed between 1947-1948.
Held: The offenses are considered separate. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery.
 Muñoz v. del Barrio
Facts: Jose del Barrio physically maltreated his wife three times. She was hit in the abdomen and face, her hair was pulled and her
neck twisted.
Held: There is no ground for legal separation. The husband’s action must be calculated to produce death of his wife. Intent to kill
must be established with clear and convincing evidence. Maltreatment does not constitute an attempt to kill. [Case wad decided
under Civil Code. Under Family Code, there is ground for legal separation under Art. 55(1)]
 Gandionco v. Peñaranda
Facts: Peñaranda filed a case for legal separation against Gandionco on the ground of concubinage. Several months later, she filed
a criminal case for concubinage.
Held: The civil action may proceed. The civil action is not one to enforce civil liability but is aimed at conjugal rights of the spouses.
No criminal conviction is necessary to issue a decree of legal separation. In legal separation, preponderance of evidence is enough.
 Lapuz v. Eufemio
Facts: Lapuz filed for legal separation on the ground of abandonment. Eufemio filed a counterclaim for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Before trial was completed, she died in a vehicular accident.
Held: Death of the plaintiff before decree of legal separation abates the action. There is no more need for legal separation
because the marriage is already dissolved by the death of one of the parties. (1) The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. Legal separation

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
was not converted into declaration for nullity by a counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the
petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition. (2) An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal
in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. Death abates the action for
legal separation.
 De la Cruz v. de la Cruz
Facts: de la Cruz began to live away from his wife and six children. He never visited the conjugal home for three years.
Held: There is no abandonment but only physical estrangement. Abandonment consists of financial and moral desertion in
addition to physical estrangement. Husband continued to give support to his family even while he was away. In this case, there
was no voluntary act to forsake the marital vows or to cause perpetual separation.
 Ong v. Ong
Facts: Husband seeking for a decree of legal separation on grounds of abandonment by his wife.
Held: Girl leaving husband due to his abusive conduct does not constitute abandonment. Abandonment referred to by the FC is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
B. Defenses
 FC, 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned
the offense or act complained of; (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of
legal separation; or (6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
 People v. Sansano and Ramos
Facts: Ventura left Sansano for 3 years without writing to her or sending support. Sansano began to live with Ramos. When Ventura
returned, he filed adultery charges against Sansano and Ramos. Both were convicted. After serving sentence Sansano asked Ventura to
take her back but he told her to do what she wanted. She again lived with Ramos. Ventura went abroad for 7 years. When he returned
to the Philippines, he filed a second charge of adultery and filed a case for legal separation.
Held: Ventura consented to the adulterous relations of his wife. He is therefore barred from instituting a case for adultery. The sole
purpose of filing the charge is to use it as a ground for legal separation.
 Ocampo v. Florenciano
Facts: de Ocampo and Florenciano were married in 1938. De Ocampo discovered that his wife was maintaining illicit relations. He sent
her to Manila but she continued going out with other men. In 1955, de Ocampo caught Florenciano in the act of having illicit relations.
Held: There was no collusion despite the confession made by the guilty spouse outside the court. What is prohibited is a decree of legal
separation based solely on such confession. In this case, there was other evidence to prove adultery.
 Sargent v. Sargent
Facts: Sargent charged his wife with having committed adultery with unknown men and their black driver. The wife denied the charge
and alleged that her husband conspired with detectives and servants to falsely accuse her of adultery with the driver. She said that
husband solicited driver to commit adultery with her, and afforded him opportunities to do so.
Held: Sargent’s acts amount to consent and connivance. He had reason to suspect that his wife was inclined to commit adultery but he
did nothing to prevent it. Instead, he connived with the servants and detectives to bring about the adulterous act. A man may not
actually participate in a course of action leading to his wife’s downfall.
 Brown v. Yambao
Facts: Brown filed for legal separation on the ground that Yambao begot a child from an adulterous relationship. Yambao failed to
submit answer on time. During cross-examination, it was revealed that Brown also lived with another woman with whom he has
begotten children.
Held: Legal separation cannot be claimed where both spouses are offenders. One must come to court with clean hands. Moreover,
failure of wife to raise a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between her and her husband. Lastly, the CC,
action for legal separation should be filed within one year from the time the time the plaintiff becomes cognizant of the cause and
within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. [Under FC, an action for legal separation shall be filed within five
years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.]
 Willan v. Willan
Facts: Willan claims that his wife physically and verbally abused him. She also often demanded sexual intercourse even when her
husband did not want it. Before Willan left his wife for groom they had sexual intercourse.
Held: The last sexual intercourse with the wife constitutes condonation. Willan was free to submit or to resist his wife’s pleadings. He
may have been reluctant to submit himself to his wife but this does not mean that he acted involuntarily.
 Bugayong v. Ginez
Facts: Ginez committed adultery. After finding out [only through letters from relatives], Bugayong cohabited with his wife for two
nights and one day. He then filed for legal separation.
Held: Any cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the guilty party after the commission of the offense and with knowledge of the
offense, is evidence of condonation.
 Matubis v. Praxedes

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Matubis and Praxedes made an agreement waving the right to sue for adultery/concubinage among others.
Held: There was consent to the commission of the marital offense. The condonation and consent are not only implied but expressed.
Legal separation cannot be claimed.
C. When to File or Try Actions
 FC, 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102)
 FC, 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
 FC, 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully
satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)
 FC, 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of Facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
 Ocampo v. Florenciano, supra.
Facts:
Held: Petition should be filed within 5 years of occurrence and 1 year of cognizance of the ground.
 Contreras v. Macaraig
Facts: Wife had been hearing of rumors regarding husband’s infidelity since Sept. 1962. She sought for a decree of legal separation
only after she saw her husband’s paramour and child and when husband admitted infidelity, which was December 1963.
Held: The only time the legal period of one year must be deemed to have started is the time when husband admitted infidelity, when
wife really became cognizant of the ground.
 Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta
Facts: Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground of concubinage and attempt on her life. She also sought the issuance of a
writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction for the return of her paraphernal and exclusive properties. Ramos opposed, stating that
the court cannot try cases within the 6-month cooling off period.
Held: The 6-month cooling off period is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion of preliminary injunction prior to the expiration
of the period. The law remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself.
D. Effects of Filing of Petition
 FC, 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in
the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute
community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those
of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
 FC, 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of the common children.
 De la Vina v. Villareal
Facts: Geopano filed for legal separation on the ground of concubinage by her husband, de la Vina
Held: a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband, where the husband has given cause
for divorce or consents. In an action for divorce, a wife can seek an injunction to curtail the husband’s power of administration over the
conjugal property to protect her interest.
 Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
Facts: Reyes filed for legal separation on the ground that her husband attempted to kill her. She was granted alimony pendente lite by
the judge. Husband claims that wife is not entitled to support because she is facing a charge of adultery.
Held: Mere allegation will not deprive the wife of her right to receive support pendente lite. Adultery must be established by
competent evidence. Support pendente lite comes from the conjugal funds and not the personal funds of the husband.
E. Effects of Decree
 FC, 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); (3) The custody of the minor children
shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and (4) The offending spouse shall be
disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)
 FC, 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in
favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the
properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for
revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary
shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought
within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become final.
 Insurance Code, 11

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Bañez v. Bañez
Facts: there was an action pending for legal separation; petitioner contends that multiple appeals are allowed.
Held: (1) Execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result
from the issuance of the writ. (2) The effects of the decree, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children follow from the decree of legal separation. They are
not separate or distinct matters, rather they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
 Dissolution and Liquidation of ACP or CPG
o La Rue v. La Rue
Facts: Wife sought and was granted divorce. Marriage was a traditional one in that husband works while wife stays at home.
Held: Wife was entitled to equitable distribution in a no-fault divorce especially since she contributed her earnings during the early
years of marriage to conjugal property and since her homemaker services were contributed over a considerable period of time,
which also contributed to the economic well-being of the family unit. According to the theory of equitable distribution – homemaker
services are valid contributions to the conjugal properties, subject to the following conditions: (1) that it is NOT LIMITED to the
possessory interest of a real estate; (2) that it depends on the QUALITY of the services rendered, whether the wife has been frugal or
excessive in her expenses; (3) the age and health of the wife, as well as the LENGTH of the marriage.
 Custody
o FC, 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
 Other Effects
o CC, 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation
o Matute v. Macadaeg and Medel
Facts: Husband brought action for legal separation against wife and brother on grounds of adultery. The action was granted and the
father was given custody of four minor children. Father went abroad and left children under care of sister. Upon his return, mother
asked permission to bring children to Manila for two weeks. Mother did not return children and is no custody now asking of them.
Held: Even though children wish to be with their mother, the children's choice of parent is overruled because the parent is UNABLE
TO SUPPORT HERSELF.
o Laperal v. Republic
Facts: Laperal and husband has been legally separated.
Held: A woman’s married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. Thus she
should continue to use the name employed before legal separation.
F. Reconciliation
 How Done: FC, 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed
with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation.
 Effects
o FC, 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation
proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set
aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the
spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil
registries.
o FC, 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and
shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of
each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of
revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both
furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of
creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of
property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to
satisfy the creditor's claim.
VII. Divorces
A. Foreign Divorces
 CC, 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
 FC, 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Van Dorn v. Romillo
Facts: Upton, a US citizen, divorced his Filipina wife with the representation that no community property existed. Later on, he filed a
suit claiming that the business of Alice was a conjugal property.
Held: A divorce obtained abroad by aliens from their Filipino spouses may be recognized in the Philippines provided that it is valid
according to the alien spouse’s national law. The husband is stopped by his own representation that there is no community property.
 Quita v. CA
Facts: Quita and Padlan married in 1941. She sued Antonio for divorce in 1950. The decree was granted in 1954. She contracted a
second marriage, but also ended in divorce. She then married the third time. When Arturo died, he left no will. The question therefore
is who the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo is.
Held: There is a need to determine the factual issues of the case, mainly the issue on the citizenship of the petitioner when she
acquired the divorce because it will determine whether the divorce will have legal effect in the Philippines. a Filipino expatriate, upon
obtaining a foreign citizenship AT THE TIME OF THE FOREIGN DIVORCE, is no longer bound by the laws of the Philippines, thus making
the divorce VALID, provided that the divorce is also valid where they obtained it. In this case, it should be determined whether Quita
was already a US citizen by the time she divorced Arturo.
 Llorente v. CA
Facts: deceased and petitioner were married. Deceased was admitted to US Citizenship and became a naturalized American. When
deceased learned of petitioner’s infidelity, he refused to forgive her and acquired a decree of divorce when he returned to the US.
Deceased remarried, and stated in his last will and testament that his properties be bequeathed to his second wife.
Held: The divorce obtained was valid and recognized in the Philippines since petitioner is already an American citizen when divorce was
decreed. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from the foreigner are issues best proved by foreign law, which
must be pleaded and proved.
 Garcia v. Recio
Facts: Recio, a Filipino, married an Australian citizen. They separated and obtained a divorce in Australia. Recio became an Australian
citizen. he subsequently married Garcia, a Filipina.
Held: The divorce between Recio and Samson was not proven to be sufficient to enable Recio to contract a second marriage. Divorces
are of different types. One is absolute divorce, which terminates the marriage. The second is limited divorce that suspends that
marriage and leaves the bond in full force. In this case, it was not proven that the divorce obtained by Recio and Samson was an
absolute divorce.
B. Muslim Divorces
 Code of Muslim Personal Laws, 45. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted
only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of the
wife by the husband (talaq); (b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila~); (c) injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
(d) Acts of imprecation (1i'an); (e) Redemption by the wife (klan'); (f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwid);
or (g) Judicial decree (faskh).
 Yasin v. Sharia District Court
Facts: Yasin filed a petition to resume the used of her maiden name. Yasin has been granted a decree of divorce under Muslim laws.
Held: Yasin may revert to the use of her maiden name. the marital ties no longer exist between her and her former husband. There is
no need for judicial confirmation for this as the use of her former husband’s name is optional and not obligatory for he

VIII. De Facto Separation
 FC, 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse
who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent
of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the
absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The
spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific
separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
 FC, 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse
who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent
of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the
absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the
family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific
separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
 FC, 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a
transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition
may be filed in court alleging the foregoing Facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if
none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the
final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.

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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said
petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial
conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse
concerned.
 FC, 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits,
documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses
to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. (n)
 FC, 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory
 Perez v. CA
Facts: Ray and Nerissa Perez are separated in fact. They both want custody of their three-year old son. Both have ample means to support
their son.
Held: Custody is given to the mother. A child under seven years of age should not be separated from his mother without justifiable reason.
 Estrada v. Escritor
Facts: Escritor and her husband are separated in fact for almost twenty years. She and another man are living together as husband and wife.
Estrada alleges that Escritor is immoral for living with a man not her husband. Escritor alleges that she is not immoral and her living with her
current partner has the blessings of her Church, Jehovah’s witness.
Held: Despite the presence of a Jehovah Witness "pledge of faithfulness" amounting to marriage, each of the spouses are PRESUMED to be
separated in fact without a decree of legal separation stating otherwise.
IX. Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and Respect
 RPC, 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who having surprised his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them
physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same
circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living
with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article
 Anti-Rape Law (RA 8353). Art. 266-A: RAPE: WHEN AND HOW COMMITTED – rape is committed: (1) by A MAN who shallhave carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. (2) by ANY PERSON who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. Art. 266-C: EFFECT OF PARDON – the subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed. [2] In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife
as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the
penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
 FC, 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
 CC, 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to
life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefore. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action
 RA 9262, Section 6. ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN – the crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts: (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (b) threatening to cause
the woman or her child physical harm; (c) attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (d) placing the woman or her
child in fear of imminent physical harm; (e) attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited
to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct: (1) threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family; (2) depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support; (3) depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; and (4)
preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money
or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties. (f) inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on
oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; (g) causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in
any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against

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Janz Hanna Ria
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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; (h) engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts: (1) stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;(2) peering in the window or
lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or
her child against her/his will; (4) destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or
her child; and (5) engaging in any form of harassment or violence. (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
 RA 9262, Section 26. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE – victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code
 Narag v. Narag
Facts: Wife is asking for husband’s disbarment because he used his position as a professor to lure a former student into becoming his
concubine.
Held: obligation to cohabit is NOT PUNISHABLE, but failure to do so constitutes immorality
 Goita v. Campos Rueda
Facts: Goita left the conjugal home because Campos wanted her to perform lascivious acts with his genital organ. When she would
refuse, he would maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her.
Held: Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourse only. The husband has to provide support for wife since she left the conjugal
home with just cause.
 Warren v. State
Facts: Husband is charged with rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife.
Held: There is no implicit marital exemption existed within rape statutes. Marital rape is a violation of the wife's INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
and cannot be justified based on the status of marriage.
 Thurman v. City of Torrington
Facts: Wife and her son brought civil rights action against city and police officers thereof, alleging that plaintiff’s constitutional rights
were violated by the nonperformance of official duties by the officers in regard to threats and assaults by the wife’s estranged
husband.
Held: POLICE PROTECTION is a right afforded to all persons under the Equal Protection Clause. A man is not allowed to physically abuse
a woman merely because he is her husband. Police who discriminates against women abused by their husband are guilty of failing to
provide protection. Right to life must prevail over privacy of family relations
 People v. Liberta
Facts: Liberta convicted of rape and sodomy against his estranged wife
Held: Marital exemption for rape is unconstitutional. Besides, court order for separation makes marital exemption not applicable. It is
the act of rape that disrupts the marriage and not the seeking of protection of the wife. Statutes with MARITAL EXEMPTIONS are
irrationally underinclusive as there is no fundamental difference between married and unmarried victims of rape
B. Fixing the Family Domicile
 FC, 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one
spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family
 Tenchavez v. Escaño
Facts: Escaño left Tenchavez, obtained divorce in US and married another man. He seeks award for moral damages on grounds of
refusal to perform wifely duties, denial of consortium and desertion.
Held: Divorce was invalid since wife was still a Filipino when it was sought and granted. A spouse's refusal to stay with the other does
not give rise to moral damages. The award for damages is merely incidental to the petition for legal separation.
Cohabitation/consortium should be from the SPONTANEOUS ACT of the spouses, and not from compulsion.
 Dadivas v. Villanueva
Facts: Dadivas was forced to leave conjugal home because of Villanueva’s extra marital relations with four women in ten years. He is
also abusive of his wife, physically and verbally.
Held: Dadivas is entitled to support and custody of their children. She left with just cause. A husband cannot by his own wrongful acts
relieve himself of the duty to support his wife as imposed by law.
 Garcia v. Santiago
Facts: Santiago’s son impregnated the daughter of his spouse, Garcia, by her first marriage. Garcia left the conjugal home.
Held: Garcia is entitled to support. She left with just cause. Her husband threatened her with violence if she would return. Separation is
necessary.
 Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng (1958)

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Chua and Atilano lived with Chua’s parents. They went to Zamboanga to visit Atilano’s parents. Atilano asked to stay behind.
After two years, she still did not return. She filed a case for support, saying she cannot return because she cannot get along with her in-
laws.
Held: Misunderstandings with a third-party is not seen by the law as a just cause to leave the conjugal home. The wife cannot be
compelled to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spouse who left. In this case, the husband has option whether to
support her or not. The husband has expressed that he is willing to establish a conjugal home separate from his parents.
 Del Rosario v. del Rosario (1949)
Facts: Wife and mother-in-law could not get along. Her husband does not want to live apart from his mother
Held: Genoveva is entitled to support. Although a wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he establishes his residence, the wife
cannot be compelled to live with her mother-in-law if they cannot get along. The marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for
the in-laws. There is legal justification for her refusal to live with her husband.
C. Mutual Help and Support
 FC, 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
 FC, 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations
shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case
of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties
 FC, 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order
herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The
brothers and sisters. (294a)
 FC, 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them
in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of
them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter
not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent
obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred
 CC, 111. The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met first from the
conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case there is a separation of
property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute proportionately to the family expenses.
 McGuire v. McGuire
Facts: Plaintiff brought action to recover suitable maintenance and support money from her husband, even while she still cohabits with
her husband.
Held: Separate maintenance can only be awarded when the wife lives separately or is divorced from husband. The living standards of
the family are a matter of concern for the household and not the courts.
 Pelayo v. Lauron
Facts: The parents-in-law called a doctor to treat their daughter-in-law. The doctor sued the in-laws for payment. They refused to pay,
arguing that is the husband who is liable.
Held: The husband is liable. The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness comprises one of the natural obligations to which
spouses are bound by way of mutual support.
D. Management of the Household
 FC, 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
 CC, 115. The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the
conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum.
The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband,
or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property.
 Hector v. Young
Facts: Husband is an architect; wife is a lawyer. When they moved their domicile from one state to another, wife flourished in her
profession while husband became jobless. Mother is considered the primary residential parent, since the father had been away for
about three years.
Held: The court should allocate custodial responsibility based on the parents' past caretaking roles. A parent's financial resources
should not be a determining factor in deciding which parent should be the primary residential parent. The fact that one parent is the
primary caretaker should always outweigh the fact that the other parent is more financially stable. Both or either spouse may manage
the affairs of the household, but it should be out of MUTUAL AGREEMENT rather than unilateral action by one spouse whenever it is
convenient for him or her
E. Exercise of Profession
 FC, 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The
latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
objection is proper; and (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the
objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The
foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
 CC, 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may object, provided: (1)
His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and (2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In
case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be consulted. If no
agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family.
 RA 7192, Section 5. EQUALITY IN CAPACITY TO ACT— women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and
enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances. [2] In all contractual situations
where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. To this end: (1) women shall have the capacity to
borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangement under the same conditions as men; (2) women shall have equal
access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy
equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; (3) women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and
enter into insurance contracts; and (4) married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport, secure
visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. [3] In all other similar contractual relations,
women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar
circumstances.
 RA 7192, Section 6. EQUAL MEMBERSHIP IN CLUBS — women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, civic and
recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to public purpose. They shall be entitled to the
same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same organization.
 RA 7192, Section 7. ADMISSION TO MILITARY SCHOOLS — any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with
the needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for appointment, admission, training, graduation and
commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than
the fourth academic year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men except for those
minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes.
F. Use of Surname
 CC, 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first
name and her husband's surname or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs.”
 CC, 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
 CC, 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other relief.
 CC, 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.
 Silva v. Peralta
Facts: Peralta married Silva although the latter had a valid subsisting marriage. Peralta represented herself as Mrs. Silva
Held: Peralta should stop using the surname Silva. No valid marriage took place between her and Silva. Doing so constitutes usurpation
of name and will give rise to damages, even if good faith is alleged
 Tolentino v. CA
Facts: Tolentino and David got married in 1931. They divorced in 1943, when divorce was valid during the Japanese occupation. David
continued to use the surname of Tolentino. Tolentino remarried.
Held: A woman who has been legally divorced from her husband can still use the surname of her former husband. The effects of
absolute divorce are similar to the effect of the spouse where the widow may still use the surname of her deceased spouse.
 Yasin v. Sharia, supra
G. Relief from Courts
 FC, 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor
or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
 Perez v. Perez
Facts: the husband petitioned to have his wife declared a prodigal and be placed under guardianship.
Held: the trial court has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which has jurisdiction. Material injury pertains
to personal injury and not patrimonial or financial. It pertains to personal relations between husband and wife [under Family Code,
“injury” is given a broader definition to include even financial injuries]
 Arroyo v. Vasquez
Facts: Vasquez left the conjugal home and then filed for support. Arroyo asked the court to compel her to return.
Held: the court may not compel the wife to return to the conjugal home. However, since she left without just cause, she is not entitled
to support.
X. Property Relations Between Spouses
A. General Provisions
 FC, 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements
executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and (3) By the local custom.

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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of
gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon
is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
 FC, 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
 FC, 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the
celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the
marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties.
 FC, 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid
only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the
provisions of Title IX of this Code.
 FC, 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be
made a party thereto.
 FC, 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by
Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. This rule shall not apply: (1) Where
both spouses are aliens; (2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
executed in the country where the property is located; and (3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the
Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
 FC, 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage,
including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place.
However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid
 Collector v. Fisher
Facts: Spouses Stevenson, both British citizens, were married in Manila. In 1945, they established permanent residence in California.
Husband died in 1951 and instituted his wife as heiress to their Philippine property.
Held: In determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, ½ of the net estate should be deducted as the share of the surviving
spouse in accordance with our law on CPG. Under the old CC, where one spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial agreement,
it is the national law of the husband that becomes the dominant law in determining property relations. Since both are British citizens,
British laws should apply; however, in the absence of proof of what English law is, court is justified to indulge in “processual
presumption" in presuming that the law of England is the same as our law.
1. Requisites for Donations
 FC, 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in
favor of one or both of the future spouses.
 FC, 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar
as they are not modified by the following articles.
 FC, 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each
other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. Donations
of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills.
 FC, 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the
encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for
the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess.
 FC, 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: (1) If the marriage is not celebrated
or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81; (2)
When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law; (3) When the marriage is
annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith; (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; (5) If it is with a
resolutory condition and the condition is complied with; (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by
the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general.
 FC, 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
 Domalagan v. Bolifer
Facts: Domalagan agreed to pay a certain amount to Bolifer for the marriage of his son to Bolifer’s daughter. Payment was given
but the marriage never took place.
Held: The amount constitutes a donation propter nuptias. It may be revoked under FC, 86(1). The law does not render oral
contracts invalid. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the case, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to
support contracts and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties
as if it had been reduced to writing.
 Serrano v. Solomon
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Solomon executed a Deed of Donation prior to his marriage to Feliciano. The deed stated that if his marriage is childless and
if Feliciano predeceases him, half of his properties will belong to his siblings and the other half to the person who reared his wife
(Serrano). Feliciano predeceased Solomon
Held: Solomon’s donation cannot be considered donation propter nuptias. Marriage was not the only condition for the donation
since other conditions were imposed. Even if it was in consideration of the marriage, it was not in favor of one or both of the
spouses but in favor of a third person.
 Solis v. Barroso
Facts: Spouses Lambino and Barroso made a donation propter nuptias (land) in favor of their son Alejo and his fiancée Fortunata.
One of the conditions is that in case of death of one of the donees, ½ would revert to the donors, while surviving donee keeps the
other half. Lambino and Alejo died, Barroso reclaimed lands.
Held: The donation propter nuptias by the spouses were made in a private, not public, instrument. It is not valid and does not
confer any rights. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to
give birth to the obligation. The marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such,
presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of
the obligation.
 Mateo v. Lagua
Facts: Spouses Lagua made a donation to their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Mateo. Alejandro’s younger
brother, Gervacio, filed a suit for annulment of donation on the ground that it prejudiced his legitime.
Held: A donation propter nuptias may be revoked if inofficious. Marriage is merely the occasion and not the cause of a donation
propter nuptias. It is subject to being inofficious if it infringes on the legitime of the donor’s heirs.
2. Donation Propter Nuptias of present or Future Property
 FC, 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each
other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. Donations
of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills.
 FC, 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the
encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for
the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess.
3. Grounds for Revocation of Donation Propter Nuptias
 FC, 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: (1) If the marriage is not celebrated
or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81; (2)
When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law; (3) When the marriage is
annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith; (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; (5) If it is with a
resolutory condition and the condition is complied with; (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by
the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general.
 CC, 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases: (1) If the
donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under
his parental authority; (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under
his authority; (3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
4. Void Donations
 FC, 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
 Nazareno v. Birog
Facts: Rodriguez and Braganza were married. They did not have any children. Braganza donated a parcel of land to Bonifacio, a
grandson of Rodriguez from a previous marriage.
Held: The donation is void. It is an indirect donation to Rodriguez because it is possible for her to inherit from her grandson.
 Matabuena v. Cervantes
Facts: Matabuena and Cervantes lived as common law spouses. Matabuena made a donation inter vivos to Cervantes. They
eventually got married. The sister of Matabuena assails the donation.
Held: The donation is void. The prohibition against donation inter vivos between spouses during the marriage applies to common
law relationships.
 Harding v. Commercial Union
Facts: Harding’s car burned. The insurance company refused to pay. It assailed the donation of the car to Harding by her husband,
alleging it was a void donation.
Held: The prohibition against spouses donating to one another can only be taken advantage of by persons who bear such a
relation to the parties making the transfer interfere with their rights or interests. The insurance company is not related to the
husband and may not assail the validity of the donation

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Sumbad v. CA
Facts: George and Maria were common-law spouses. George donated a parcel of land to Maria.
Held: The donation is valid. There was no evidence to support the allegation that George was married to Maria. There was also no
evidence that the two were still living as common-law spouses at the time the donation was made.
 Ching v. Goyanko, Jr.
Facts: Joseph and Epifania were married and had 7 kids. Goyanko executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of his
common-law wife Ching.
Held: The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. The law emphatically
prohibits selling of property and donations between common law spouses. If transfers or conveyances between spouses were
allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to
prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is
the cornerstone of family law.
B. System of Absolute Community
1. General Provisions
 FC, 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void.
 FC, 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in
case of judicial separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage
has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The
creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient
to cover the amount of their credits.
 FC, 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not
provided for in this Chapter.
2. What Constitutes Community Property
 FC, 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the
property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
 FC, 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous
title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
grantor that they shall form part of the community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse.
However, jewelry shall form part of the community property; (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
 FC, 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those
excluded therefrom.
3. Charges Upon the ACP
 FC, 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of
the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges
and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation
made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to
commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of
either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both
spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; (9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under
paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment
of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community;
and (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is
insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties.
 FC, 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings
therefrom shall form part of the community property.
4. Ownership and Disposition of the ACP
 FC, 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offeror.
 FC, 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property.
 FC, 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may,
without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family
rejoicing or family distress.
5. Dissolution
 FC, 99. The absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138.
 FC, 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The
spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2)
When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given
judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds
thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
 FC, 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to
the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
6. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities
 FC, 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be
prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) The
debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51. (6) Unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
 FC, 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the
lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the
terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the
subsequent marriage.
 FC, 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before
the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be
determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the
existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration
of each.
 Oñas v. Javillo

32
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Javillo married Levis. Upon her death, Javillo contracted marriage with Oñas without liquidation of the properties of his first
marriage. Upon Javillo’s death, he left 31 parcels of land wherein 20 parcels were acquired during his marriage with Oñas.
Held: The property corresponding to the first marriage consists of 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels were acquired
during the marriage. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during the marriage and
agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as the spouses are united.
Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the
acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his or her
heirs, can claim no share.
 Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo
Facts: Delizo contracted a second marriage after the death of his first spouse. Upon Delizo’s death, his children from his first
marriage filed an action for partition of conjugal properties. The children allege that the Caanawan property belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
Held: The property belongs to the second marriage. The decisive factor in determining which partnership the homestead belongs
to is the time of registration and not the issuance of the homestead patent. It was only during the second marriage that the land
was registered. As for other properties, Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be
determined w/ mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the 2 conjugal partnerships
in proportion to the duration of each partnership
C. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
1. General Provisions
 FC, 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern
their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of
this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article
256.
 FC 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance,
and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be
divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.
 FC, 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains.
 FC, 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
2. Exclusive Property
 FC, 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter
or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the
wife or of the husband.
 FC, 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Either spouse
may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public
instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the property is located.
 FC, 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the
consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same.
 FC, 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the
administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
 FC, 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the
donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to
the right of accretion when proper.
 FC, 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee spouse,
whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of gains.
 FC, 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on
gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case.
 Lim v. Garcia
Facts: Lim died intestate, leaving his widow and 9 children. The children contend that certain properties should not be included in
the conjugal property because Lim brought these into the marriage. The children also allege that the trial court erred in excluding
from the inventory three parcels of land which Lim’s widow claim to be paraphernal property acquired by exchanging properties
exclusively belonging to her.
Held: The three parcels of land were acquired by the widow through exchanging properties which she inherited from her father.
The three parcels of land are paraphernal property. The evidence presented by the children was not sufficient to overcome the

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
presumption that the properties included in the conjugal property belong there. Unless it is proven that the property is part of the
separate estate of one of the spouse, it will be considered conjugal property.
 Rodriguez v. dela Cruz
Facts: Rodriguez inherited a parcel of land from her father during a subsisting marriage. When she contracted a second marriage,
she allowed her second husband to administer the property.
Held: The land belongs to Rodriguez. She is allowed to retain ownership of the property she brought into her second marriage.
 Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Register of Deeds
Facts: Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property; People’s Bank as trustee was
to redeem mortgage and collect rents while lot remains unsold.
Held: Wife, as owner and administratix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her property. The
fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the
paraphernal property. Either spouse may transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to a 3rd person instead of
the other spouse.
 Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat
Facts: Wife executed in favor of her husband a general power of attorney, which, among other things, authorized him “in her
name, place and stead, and making use of her rights and actions,” to borrow money and execute a mortgage over her properties.
Loan secured by husband signed merely in his own name and not as attorney-in-fact. Loan unpayed, property auctioned.
Held: The husband may have had authority to borrow money and mortgage real property of wife but the law specifies how and in
what manner it should be done. In this case, husband executed mortgage in his personal capacity, not as the atty-in-fact of the
wife. Husband signed the mortgage but it does not appear that he signed it for his wife. To make the mortgage valid, it should
have been signed by the husband in his own proper person and by him as attorney in fact for his wife. In order to bind the
principal by a deed executed by an agent, the deed must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name of the
principal.
 Castro v. Miat
Facts: Spouses Moises and Corcodia bought a piece of land on installment basis in 1977. Concordia died in 1978. It was only in
1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance. He secured his title over the property in his name as widower.
Held: Since the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, CC applies. The records show that the Paco
property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of common fund. It is clearly conjugal. CC, 160 provides that “all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife.” The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
3. CPG
a. Presumption that property is conjugal
 FC, 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
 Jocson v. CA
Facts: Emilio sold to his daughter, Augustinia, majority of his properties. Emilio’s son, Moises, claims that it cannot be validly
sold since the properties form part of Emilio’s community property with his wife Alejandra.
Held: Registration of a property under the name “Emilio Jocson married to Alejandra Poblete” does not prove that the
property belong to the community. It, at best, merely conveys the civil status of the owner. Sufficient proof must be shown
to prove that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.
 Francisco v. CA
Facts: Petitioner contends that certain properties are part of the CPG of the her marriage to Eusebio. Children from Eusebio’s
first marriage contends that such properties were their father’s exclusive property from the first marriage.
Held: The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable with strong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. The fact that the
person is the applicant or the licensee [as to the building permit] is not determinative of this issue as to whether or not the
property is conjugal.
b. Properties that compose the CPG
 FC, 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) Those
obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses; (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or
civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of
each spouse; (4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the
property where the treasure is found; (5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting; (6) Livestock existing
upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be
borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Zulueta v. Pan Am
Facts: Zulueta sued Pan Am for breach of contract on carriage and quasi-delict when Pan Am off-loaded Zulueta and family
without just cause.
Held: The award for damages is part of the conjugal partnership. The presumption is that when Zulueta entered into the
contract of carriage with Pan Am, he used conjugal funds to buy the plane tickets. It is also presumed that the trip was for the
common benefit of the family.
 Mendoza v. Reyes
Facts: Julia Reyes sold 2 parcels of land without the consent of her husband. She alleges that the properties were
paraphernal.
Held: Properties brought during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. Since the funds used to acquire the properties
came from loans obtained by the spouses, it made the funds conjugal in nature and the property bought using conjugal funds
is conjugal as well.
 Villanueva v. IAC
Facts: Modesto Aranas owned a Lot. Both he and his wife died intestate, wife predeceased him by two years. There were no
legitimate children but two illegitimate children. Illegitimate children borrowed money from Bernas with the Lot as collateral.
Villanueva contends that Lot was hers by virtue of wills of Modesto and his wife.
Held: Since the land was inherited, it is the exclusive property of the husband. Since the wife died ahead of the husband, she
has no successional rights over husband's property.
c. Property purchased by installment
 FC, 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal
funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such
ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
 Castillo v. Pasco
Facts: Castillo and Pasco got married in 1931. They purchased a fishpond. The first installment was paid with the exclusive
funds of Pasco. The next two installments were paid using conjugal funds.
Held: The property is 1/6 paraphernal and 5/6 conjugal. The first installment was purchased using Casco’s exclusive property.
The subsequent payments were paid through a loan by spouses (ownership to two patrimonies)
 Lorenzo v. Nicolas
Facts: Clemente purchased 2 parcels of lands. Even before her marriage to Lorenzo, she already paid 116.84 for one parcel
and 169.16 for the other. She continued paying for these lots during the marriage. One of the parcels was conveyed while
Lorenzo was still alive, while the other parcel was conveyed 4 ½ years after Lorenzo’s death. Both lots were registered under
her name.
Held: Both lots are paraphernal properties of Clemente. However, what were paid during coverture are considered useful
expenditures for which the conjugal partnership must be reimbursed.
d. Rules on Improvement
 FC, 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at
the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal
partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules: When the cost of the improvement made by the
conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement
of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained
in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In either case, the
ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
 CC, 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through
advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal
partnership. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
 Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun
Facts: Canullas inherited his father’s house. He later abandoned his family to live with his concubine. Canullas sold the land to
his concubine.
Held: The sale is void. The husband cannot alienate conjugal property without his wife’s consent. (CC, 158: both land and
building belong to CPG but CPG is indebted to husband for value)
e. Charges upon the CPG
 FC, 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit

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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All
taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6)
Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-
improvement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The
value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of
litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
 FC, 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall
the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. however, the payment of personal
debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the
support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been
paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
 FC, 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property.
 Javier v. Osmeña
Facts: Collantes, husband of Javier, contracted a debt with Osmeña as a commission merchant. Collantes assumed this debt
as he succeeded Javier’s fathere in the business. The exclusive property of the wife consisting of 2 parcels of land and
usufructuary interest was auctioned to cover the debt.
Held: The fruits of the exclusive property of the wife belong to the conjugal partnership and are liable for the payment of the
debt. The debts contracted by Collantes during the marriage, for and in exercise of his industry or profession are not his
personal and private debts. It is through his industry that Collantes contributes toward the support of his family.
 Cobb-Perez v. Lantin
Facts: Perez acquired debt in his shoe manufacturing business. The court ordered shares of stock registered under the name
of Perez levied. Cobb-Perez opposed, arguing that the shares of stock are community property and cannot be held liable for
the personal debt of her husband
Held: Perez is stopped from claiming that the shares of stock are conjugal property since he represented himself to be the
sole owner from the start of litigation. Even if the stocks were conjugal, which the spouses failed to prove, it must be proven
that the debt was a personal obligation for which the husband alone must be held liable. The debts in this case were incurred
for the purpose of exercising the husband’s profession through which he supports his family.
 DBP v. Adil
Facts: Spouses obtained a loan from DBP in the amount of 2,000 payable in 10 years. Because the debt remained outstanding
even after the lapse of the 10-year period, the husband executed a second promissory note.
Held: The husband bound the partnership for the promissory note he signed. The loan is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership and the partnership is liable for the obligation.
 Luzon Surety v. de Garcia
Facts: Vicente Garcia guaranteed a surety bond. The principal debtor defaulted. A writ of garnishment was issued against the
sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses.
Held: The conjugal partnership cannot be made liable for the surety executed by the husband to accommodate a third party
in the absence of proof that it was done to benefit the family.
 Ayala Investment v. CA
Facts: Ching, as the VP of Philippine Blooming Mills, signed as a surety to the company’s loan to AIDC. Upon faulre of the
company to pay the loan, a writ of execution was issued against the conjugal properties of Ching and his wife.
Held: The loan contracted by Ching as surety is purely a corporate debt. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of Ching’s
industry or profession. The obligation was not obtained gor the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ching’s conjugal property
is not liable.
 Carlos v. Abelardo
Facts: Honorio Carlos is suing his daughter and son-in-law, spouses Abelardo, to pay the US$25,000 he lent them to purchase
a house and lot.
Held: The conjugal partnership is liable. The defendants never denied that the check was used to purchase their house and
lot. Said house served as their conjugal home, thus benefited the family.
 Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: de Guzman contends that part of the payment for the subscription of stocks of the Carandang spouses were paid by
him. CA held that Carandang spouses are jointly and severally liable for their loan.
Held: Spouses were married before the effectivity of the FC. CPG governs their property relations. All property acquired
during their marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits loaned during the time of marriage
are presumed to be conjugal property.
f. Administration and Disposition of the CPG
 FC, 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
 FC, 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other. However, either
spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity
or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
 Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon
Facts: Almosara and Maximo acquired several parcels of land during their marriage. Wife sold the lots without the consent of
husband.
Held: The sale is void. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership by selling conjugal property without the consent of her
husband.
 Tinitigan v. Tinitigan Sr.
Facts: The husband sold a conjugal property without the wife’s consent to answer for a conjugal liability.
Held: The sale was valid. The husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wife’s consent if it is for a conjugal
liability which could endanger the family’s social standing. The husband sold the property for the benefit of the family
 Guiang v. CA
Facts: Over the objection of Gilda and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to Guiang spouses
one-half of their conjugal property, consisting of their house and lot.
Held: Any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband without the consent of the wife would be considered as null and
void.
 Relucio v. Lopez
Facts: Angelina filed a petition for appointment as sole administratix of conjugal partnership of properties with forfeiture and
a demand for an accounting against her husband and his concubine, Relucio.
Held: The administration of the property of marriage is entirely between the spouses to the exclusion of other persons. The
concubine has nothing to do with the administration of conjugal properties.
 Jader-Manalo v, Camaisa
Facts: The Manalo spouses offered to buy a property of the Camaisa spouses. The offer was made to the husband in the
wife’s presence. The contract was signed by the husband only. Later on, the husband told the Manalo spouses that they were
backing out. The Manalos filed a suit to compel Norma to sign the contract.
Held: The properties subjects of the contracts in this case were conjugal. Hence, the consent of both the husband and the
wife must concur for the contracts to sell to be effective. The wife may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of
their conjugal properties but being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. Court authorization under the said article is
only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In the absence of proof showing the
wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
 Villanueva v. Chiong
Facts: Spouses are separated in fact. During their marriage, they acquired a certain parcel of land. In 1985, Florentino sold ½
of the lot to Villanueva spouses. After last installment payment, Villanueva spouses demanded execution of deed of sale.
Elisera refused to sign deed of sale.
Held: Lot was conjugal. Separation in fact does not affect conjugal partnership. Sale is void; Elisera’s consent required.
g. Dissolution of the CPG
 FC, 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal
separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
 FC, 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1)
The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be
supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property
of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
 FC, 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The
obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities
 FC, 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall
be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2)
Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be
credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has
been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of
the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (5) Whatever remains of the
exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified
from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. (7) The net remainder of the
conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless
a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver
or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.
 FC, 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death
of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a
subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of
property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
 FC, 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same
person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each
partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt
as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in
proportion to the capital and duration of each.
 FC, 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale
of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter.
 FC, 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the
liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that
amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
 Santero v. CFI of Cavite
Facts: Pablo Santero had two common-law wives. Of the first he had 3 children and of the second, 7 children.
Held: Even if some children have already reached majority or is married is immaterial. It is not a determining factor of their
right to allowance under A. 188. Allowance will be considered as advances from their shares in inheritance from dad.
However, illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from legit children & relatives of dad/mom & vice-versa.
D. Separation of Property and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse
1. Judicial Separation of Property for Sufficient Cause
 FC, 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for
sufficient cause.
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the
petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been
judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4)
That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided
for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power;
and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or
absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
 Garcia v. Manzano
Facts: Spouses live separately from each other. Wife assumed complete management and administration of the conjugal
partnership.
Held: (CC) The wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with the consent of the husband. In the event of such
maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the husband doesn’t lie in a judicial separation of properties but in revoking the
power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the communal property & the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal
property.
 Partosa-Jo v. CA
Facts: Partosa-Jo filed a claim for support and judicial separation of property. Jo admitted to have cohabited with three women
and sired 15 children.
Held: Physical separation coupled with the husband’s refusal to support wife constitutes abandonment. The spouses have been
separated for more than a year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Judicial separation of property is justified.
 Dela Cruz v. dela Cruz
Facts: de la Cruz began to live away from his wife and six children. He never visited the conjugal home for three years.
Held: Since there was no abandonment by the husband, there is nothing to justify a separation of conjugal partnership properties.
2. Voluntary Separation of property
 FC, 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or
of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of
the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest.
 In re: Voluntary Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Spouses Bernas
Facts: Spouses Jose Bernas Sr. and Pilar Manuel Bernas agreed to dissolve the community property believing it would be more
advantageous to everyone, including the husband’s children by a previous marriage.
Held: Voluntary dissolution of community property is subject to judicial approval. All creditors shall be notified. The children by a
previous marriage should be given notice. The CPG of the previous marriage shall be dissolved before the voluntary dissolution of
the CPG of the second marriage
 Lacson v. San Jose
Facts: The spouses have been separated in fact for more than 5 years. They had an amicable settlement wherein they agree to
dissolve their CPG subject to judicial approval.
Held: The propriety of the dissolution of the CPG is manifest. The spouses have had a lengthy separation. Separation of property
between the spouses & the dissolution of the CP since is allowed by law provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Such
approval was obtained & it doesn’t appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the arrangements. Separation in
fact for at least 5 yrs makes it proper to sever their financial & proprietary interests. However, in so approving the regime of
separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this court does not hereby accord
recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.
 Maquilan v. Maquilan
Facts: Wife convicted of adultery. Husband filed for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. During pre-trial, spouses entered into a
compromise agreement (partial settlement of CPG), which was given judicial imprimatur.
Held: Voluntary separation of property may take place while other cases are pending. Proceedings for the same do not require the
intervention of the Solicitor General. Final judgment of adultery is not punished with civil interdiction, thus it is not a ground for
judicial separation of property.
3. Liquidation and Dissolution of Property
 FC, 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be
liquidated in conformity with this Code. During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children.
 FC, 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of
property shall apply.
 FC, 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local
civil registries and registries of property.
 FC, 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors.

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree
reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances: (1)
When the civil interdiction terminates; (2) When the absentee spouse reappears; (3) When the court, being satisfied that the
spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the
resumption of said administration; (4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation
resumes common life with the other; (5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof;
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or (7) When after
voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint
petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may
thereafter be granted. The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67.
 FC, 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other
spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3)
When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive
from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict
of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.
4. Sole Administration of Other Spouse’s property
 FC, 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other
spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3)
When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive
from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict
of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.
E. Regime of Separate Property
 FC, 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed
by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.
 FC, 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the
property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community.
 FC, 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent
of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial
or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property.
 FC, 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the
current market value of their separate properties. The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be
solidary.
F. Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage
 FC, 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
 FC, 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
 Yaptinchay v. Torres
Facts: Yaptinchay, a married man, cohabited with Teresita. Upon Yaptinchay’s death, Teresita sought to repossess the lot in Forbes
Park that served as her and Yaptinchay’s home.
Held: Teresita was not able to show that she had actually contributed in the acquisition of the property. Hence, the rules on co-
ownership cannot apply. The property belongs to Yaptinchay’s conjugal partnership with his wife.

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Juaniza v. Jose
Facts: Jose was the registered owner of a passenger jeepney that was involved in a vehicular accident. He and his common-law wife,
Arroyo, were both ordered to pay damages by the trial court
Held: Arroyo is not liable. Since Jose is married to Ramos, it is the conjugal partnership that owns the jeepney. The conjugal partnership
is liable for damages.
 Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS
Facts: Consuegra contracted two marriages. Upon his death, the two wives wanted to get his retirement insurance benefits.
Held: The equitable solution was for the 2 wives to each be given ½ of the benefits. The first wife was the wife recognized by law. the
nd
second wife, on the other hand, married Consuegra in good faith. It was also the 2 wife and her children who were acknowledged
beneficiaries of the insurance.
 Maxey v. CA
Facts: Maxey and Morales lived as common-law spouses from 1903 to 1918. They were first married in 1903 but the marriage was void
because military weddings were not yet recognized then. They were validly married in 1919. Morales died shortly after. Morales was a
housewife all those years.
Held: Co-ownership arises even if a common-law wife is not gainfully employed. Morales ran the household and held the family purse.
It would be unjust if a woman who is a wife in all aspects except for a valid marriage will be required to earn a living or engage in
business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. The Filipino woman traditionally holds the purse and runs the household.
 Valdes v. RTC
Facts: Valdez and Gomez sought for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36, which the court granted.
Held: Co-ownership is the property regime between the two since their marriage is void ab initio.
 Cariño v. Cariño
Facts: Cariño contracted 2 marriages. Upon his death, both women filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance.
Held: Both marriages were void. The first marriage is void for lack of marriage license. The second marriage is void for being bigamous.
Article 147 governs the first marriage while Article 148 governs the second. One-half of the subject ‘death benefits’ under scrutiny shall
go to the first wife as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs, his
children with the first wife.
 Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva
Facts: From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage. Villanueva was married
to another until her death in 1963.
Held: The relationship of Villanueva and Gonzales was adulterous until the death of Villanueva's legal wife, that was from 1927-1963.
No co-ownership between the parties existed during this time. It is necessary for each of the parties to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
 Saguid v. CA
Facts: Gina and Saguid cohabited with each other while Gina was separated in fact with her husband. Gina worked abroad.
Held: Their property regime is governed by Article 148. Proof of actual contribution is required. The burden of proof rests upon the
party who asserts an affirmative issue. in the absence of proof of extent of the partners' respective contributions, their shares are
presumed equal. If there is proof, then shares are limited to the proven amount.
 San Luis v. San Luis
Facts: San Luis contracted 3 marriages in his lifetime: #1 died, #2 divorced, #3 current. Children from first marriage moves to dismiss
case on grounds that San Luis is only a mistress, Gov’s marriages still subsisting.
Held: Since respondent cohabited with the man [deceased], she is qualified as an interested person. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and man's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was performed under the laws of the USA, then
she may be considered as a co-owner.
XI. The Family
A. Members of the Family
1. Nature and Scope of Family Relations
 FC, 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect.
 FC, 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and
sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
 FC, 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
2. Support

41
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent
set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and their legitimate
children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
 FC, 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other
to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a
cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.
 FC, 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether
legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable
provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially
capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the
absolute community or of the conjugal partnership.
 FC, 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the
spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After
the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal
separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.
 FC, 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
 FC, 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between
them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order
only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due
from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it,
should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed,
unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be
preferred.
 FC, 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means
of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
 FC, 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
 FC, 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it
for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand. Support pendente lite may be
claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or
when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance.
 FC, 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or
by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
 FC, 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied
upon on attachment or execution.
 FC, 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right
to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed.
 FC, 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter,
any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give
support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to
support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed.
 FC, 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be
subject to levy on attachment or execution. Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever
modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.
 Lacson v. Lacson
Facts: father was ordered to pay children a specific sum which represented support in arrears
Held: The requisite demand for support has been made sometime in 1975. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support is
no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. This happened when mother of children went to their paternal
grandmother’s house and asked for support. Father also acknowledged his obligation when he wrote a note stating that he will
sustain his 2 daughters "as requested by their mother."

3. Funerals

42
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 CC, 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order
established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall
be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
 CC, 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.
 CC, 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his
religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by
the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
 CC, 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in
articles 294 and 305.
 CC, 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the
deceased for damages, material and moral.
 CC, 310. The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable
to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
 Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp. v. City of Brewer
Facts: Petitioner, a non organization that provides housing to retarded citizens, alleges that their home is included in the definition
since the requirement for a domestic bond has been met by the relationship forged among residents as they lived and worked
together in their ‘family environment‘.
Held: Family: single individual or a collective body of persons doing his/their own cooking, living upon the premises of a separate
housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship based upon birth, marriage, or other domestic bond. Concept of "domestic bond"
implies the existence of a traditional family-like structure of household authority. It includes resident authority-figures charged with
the responsibility of maintaining a separate housekeeping unit and regulating the activity and duties of the other residents. There
should also be a quality of cohesiveness and permanence in the relationship of residents. Extensive outside aid in the management
and operation of a household detracts from the family nature of the home.
 Mendoza v. CA
Facts: Husband left for US and refused to support wife. Alleges that complaint contained no allegation that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made before filing of suit.
Held: Future support can't be subject of a valid compromise. Thus, a showing that efforts have been made to compromise is not
required for the case to prosper
 Mendez v. Eugenia
Facts: Mendez, et. al. argue that the court erred in dismissing their complaint against the Biongsons for lack of earnest efforts being
exerted by the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement before the action was instituted, the parties being members of the same
family.
Held: The litigants are not family members within the contemplation of the law. the parties are collateral relatives who are not
brothers and sisters. Only members of the same family are required to exert efforts to arrive at a settlement before an action is
instituted.
 Guerrero v. RTC
Facts: Hernando and Guerrero, brothers-in-law, both claim ownership of a lot. The RTC judge ruled that the parties should have
alleged in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise was exerted since they are members of the same family.
Held: Brothers-in-law are not members of the same family. No earnest efforts toward a compromise are needed.
 Hontiveros v. RTC
Facts: Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Augusto’s brother Gregorio and the latter’s wife
Teodora. The trial court held that complaint was not verified as required by FC, 151 and therefore, it did not believe that earnest
efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.
Held: Whenever a stranger is a party to a case, FC, 151 will not apply. Maria, a sister-in-law of Gregorio, is considered a stranger
since the law does not consider in-laws as members of the same family. Teodora, a sister-in-law of Augusto, is also a stranger.
B. The Family Home
 FC, 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
 FC, 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
 FC, 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in
the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
 FC, 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.

43
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own
property. Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor
only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home.
 FC, 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. In
any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family
home shall be the basis of evaluation. For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and
municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas.
 FC, 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written
consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the
court shall decide.
 FC, 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period
of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
 FC, 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may
apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so
order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of
the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home
shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the
judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
 FC, 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the
beneficiary of, only one family home.
 FC, 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.
 Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan
Facts: Parcels of land of Lucasan were sold at a public auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against him. Lucasan opposed with
respect to one parcel. He contends that the lands is where he and his wife extrajudicially constituted a family home hence the land is
exempt from execution.
Held: A family home constituted after a debt has been incurred is NOT exempt from execution. Otherwise, debtors who aim to
circumvent the law may prejudice creditors.
 Modequillo v. Breva
Facts: Modequillo incurred liability for a vehicular accident in 1976. The judgment was rendered in January 1988. Modequillo claims
that the land executed to satisfy the judgment is a family home.
Held: The law that governs is the Civil Code where a public instrument is needed to constitute a land as family home. The Family Code
became effective only on August 3, 1988 after liability was incurred and after judgment was rendered. Prior to the effectivity of FC,
land was not a family home. FC, 153 cannot be given retroactive effect.
 Taneo v. CA
Facts: As a result of a judgment against them, two of petitioners’ properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. Subject
properties were auctioned and subsequently conveyed to private respondent. One of the properties was the family home of the
petitioners.
Held: Since money judgment/debt was rendered/incurred before the house was erected and instrument constituting it as family home
was registered, the family home is not exempted from execution or forced sale. Besides, house should be constructed on land not
belonging to another.
 Versola v. Madolaria
Facts: Private respondent, Dr. Ong Oh loaned P 1,000,000 to Dolores Ledesma. Ledesma promised to execute a deed of real estate
mortgage over her house and lot. Ledesma subsequently sold the property to petitioners, for 2.5 M. Petitioners paid 1M as down
payment agreeing on 75,000 monthly to cover the balance of 1.5 M. However, even before the monthly installments were due
Ledesma demanded that petitioners pay the balance. Petitioners sought a loan from Asiatrust Bank, which was granted.
Held: The right to exemption of forced sale under Article 153 of the FC is a personal privilege granted to a judgment debtor and as
such, it must be claimed by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from claiming exception. Petitioners did not set forth any evidence to substantiate their
claim that the property to be sold at the execution was indeed exempt for having been constituted as a family home.
 Patricio v. Dario III

44
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Marcelino died intestate. Marecelino Marc extrajudicially settled the deceased’s estate. Marcelino Marc formally advised Dario
III that they want to partition the properties and terminate the co-ownership. Respondent refused. CA dismissed case on ground that
family home should continue despite death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The minor
beneficiary is the grandson of the deceased.
Held: To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationship enumerated in Art.
154 of the FC; (2) they live in the family home; (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Grand child
satisfies 1st two requisites. However, the head of the family in the family home in this case is the grandparent. The law first imposes
the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation
imposed on the grandparents. Therefore, he cannot be considered a beneficiary of the family home. Important to note on this case are
the ff: (1) occupancy of the family home by the owner or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual [something real or actually existing].
(2) Legal support has the ff. characteristics - personal, intransmissible, cannot be renounced, cannot be compromised, free from
attachment or execution, reciprocal, variable in amount. (3) We have to follow the order of support in Art. 199.
 Veneracion v. Mancilla
Facts: Wife secured a loan and mortgaged residential lot. The title states that she was single; children are claiming that the residential
property is their family home
Held: Petitioners are required to allege with particularity in their petition the facts and the law relied upon for annulment as well as
those supporting their cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Such requirement, as well as the requirement for the petitioners
to attach to the original copy of their petition the affidavits of their witnesses and documents supporting their cause of action or
defense, are designed to convince the appellate court of the substantive merit of their petition to avoid its outright dismissal; or for the
CA to make a finding of a prima facie merit in their petition and give due course thereto and order the service of the petition and
summons on the respondents. Unless petitioners append to their petition the appropriate documents, the appellate court might
dismiss the petition outright or deny due course to the petition.
 Arriola v. Arriola
Facts: Decedent’s child from first marriage filed for partition of properties of decedent against children from second marriage.
Held: Subject house was built by the decedent on his exclusive property. Said house has been the residence of petitioners [2nd family]
for 20 years. House is therefore the family home. This being so, it is shielded from partition under Article 159 of FC [family home shall
continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.] The family home cannot be partitioned this time, even if it has
passed to the co-ownership of the heirs, parties herein.
 Spouses Kelly v. Planters Product Inc.
Facts: Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent PPI in 1989. Due to
Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed action for sum of money and won. Sheriff sold a property of Kelley spouses to pay for
the amount.
Held: Nueva Vizcaya RTC has jurisdiction over case since only Auther is a party to the Pasig RTC case. Wife and children are strangers to
that case involving the sheriff selling on execution the alleged family home. Case remanded to RTC to determine W/N property is
family home (must concur with requisites in FC)
 Albino Josef v. Santos
Facts: Petitioner failed to pay respondent for shoe materials he brought on credit. Petitioner contends that one of the properties is the
family home and thus exempted from execution.
Held: Petitioner is meritorious; writ of execution void. CA should have earnestly determined petitioner’s allegation that property is
family home. The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling
place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain
with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
XII. Paternity and Filiation
A. Legitimate Children
1. Kinds of Filiation
 FC, 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.
 FC, 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial
insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband
and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the
child.
a. Biological-Natural
 Perido v. Perido
Facts: Perido’s children by his first marriage claim that Perido’s children by his second marriage are illegitimate.
Held: The children are legitimate. There was no legal impediment for Perido to marry at the time of the birth of his eldest
child by his second marriage. Perido’s first wife died long before.
 Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao

45
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo. William Liyao, Sr. was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Corazon cohabited
with Liyao and begot a son. Son claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao, Sr.
Held: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. Liyao, Jr. cannot choose his own filiation. If
Corazon’s husband, Yulo, does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed and the child
cannot choose to be the child if his mother’s alleged paramour.
 SSS v. Aguas
Facts: Husband died. Surviving spouse claimed for death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo is likewise
survived by his minor child Jeylnn
Held: Only Jeylnn was able to establish her right to a monthly pension because the photocopy of her BC which bears the
signature of Pablo. A BC signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity. However, this cannot extend to Janet
because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Her BC was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a
mere photocopy. A record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Witnesses in this case said
that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. There's also no proof the she was legally
adopted, hence the court cannot consider her a dependent.
b. Biological-Assisted Reproductive Technology
 In Re Baby M
Facts: A woman agreed for a certain fee, to be artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman’s husband, to carry
the child so conceived to term, and, after its birth, to surrender it to the natural father and his wife. After the child’s birth,
surrogate mother and her husband wished not to go through contract.
Held: The surrogacy contract conflicts with laws and public policy. The mere fact that a child would be better off with one set
of parents than with another is insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent’s rights. While custody was properly
granted to the natural father since evidence clearly proved such custody to be in the best interest of the infant, termination
of the surrogate mother’s parental rights in the adoption of the child by the wife of the natural father must be voided.
 Johnson v. Calvert
Facts: Husband and wife brought suit seeking declaration that they were the legal parents of child born of woman in whom
couple’s fertilized egg has been implanted.
Held: Although Uniform Parentage Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing
mother and child relationship, when the 2 means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate child - that
is, who intended to bring about birth of child that she intended to raise as her own is the natural mother. Gestational
surrogacy contract did not violate public policies on the grounds that (1) it runs afoul constitutional prohibitions on
involuntary servitude and (2) it tend to exploit or dehumanize women of lower economic status.
 In Re Adoption of Anonymous
Facts: Former husband of petitioner’s wife refused consent on adoption of child.
Held: A child born of consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a
naturally conceived child of the same marriage. Therefore the father of such child is the “parent” (contemplated by law,
which, in this case is Domestic Relations Law Section 111) whose consent is required to the adoption of such child by
another.
 Field, “Do New Reproductive Techniques Threaten the Family?”
o Fears about commercialization of childbearing and childrearing + fears of exploitation of women and of the poor
o Fear that surrogacy involves an attack on our concept of family.
 The picture of a mother handing over her child and getting paid for it does not fit easily with current values or with
conventional notions of the family
o Destructive to families
 It must inevitably harm the older children whom most surrogates have: how a mother explains to her children that she
is giving away or selling their newborn sibling
 Often, the surrogate’s parents and even her in-laws are also very upset that their grandchild is being given away or sold,
and the conflict can cause a permanent rift in the family
o Surrogacy and other new reproductive techniques tend to undermine our concept of family
o Artificial insemination
 Oldest and simplest of reproductive techniques other than sexual intercourse
 Procedure: involves depositing ejaculated sperm in a woman’s uterus with a needleless syringe
 MORAL OBJECTIONS
 To beget, without the possibility of a continuing father-child relationship, would be to withdraw bioloigical potential
from personal potential – to reverse the long process of evolution by which biological capacities have been
humanized
 SOCIAL ISSUES  Whether AID should only be availed of by married couples.
o In vitro fertilization
 Process by which a doctor stimulates a woman’s ovaries, removes several eggs (laparoscopy) and fertilizes them in a
Petri dish
46
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
o Ovum donation
 procedure to transfer the fertilized ova to the uterus of a woman other than the egg donor
 Issue
 Meaning of genetic tie that are even more pressing than in the classic case in surrogate motherhood.
 When the egg is donated by one woman and incubated in another, the intention might either be that the egg donor
would be the child’s mother
 Roman Catholic Church
 It threatens the sanctity of the traditional family unit for a third party to have any role in donating or in gestating the
child  objectionable because one of the genetic parents will not be part of the child’s family unit.
 Threat to the nuclear family
 They challenge not only what remains of the traditional nuclear family as a norm, but even our ways of thinking about
ourselves and our families.
 Problems
 How to regulate the embryo conceived in vitro or the newly conceived embryo that has been flushed out of the egg
donor
- What limits should society place upon how the embryo developing in a Petri dish can be kept alive outside the
womb? If there were none, scientists may develop the technological capability that they will be able to create
people in this way. (alters our conception of human life)
 Moral obligation to transfer all ova to a receptive uterus
- Each of the fertilized ova represents life  those who oppose abortion would oppose death of these embryos 
they should not be created unless transfer is assured.
 Abortion issues
- doctors generally consider it risky for a woman to bear more than 3 or four babies at a time
- Many of those doctors will abort “the excesses” on the ground that this ‘selective abortion’ would preserve the life
of the remaining fetuses.
 Embryo research per se re: birth defects, genetic diseases, cancer, etc. can save other people – woman could be
motivated to conceive and abort for commercial purposes.
 Embryo research w/ intention to develop to term – possibility for broad genetic experimentation and manipulation –
may allow parents to select the gender or to diagnose hereditary diseases before implantation.
 Determining the reason for the creation of embryos – for research or for implantation
 Future research and implantation a.k.a. indefinitely freezing the fertilized egg for future use – creation of a market for
frozen embryos.
 The possibility is that parent/s might have died already ‐ question on survivorship & succession, custody, support, etc.
 Robertson, Legal Issues in Human Egg Donation and Gestational Surrogacy (see Summary)
2. Impugned Legitimacy
 FC, 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth
of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That
in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
 FC, 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
 FC, 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such
termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one
hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one
hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
 FC, 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be
proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
 FC, 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined
in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three
years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in
the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should
die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
 Andal v. Macaraig
Facts: Emiliano became sick with TB. Felix, his brother, came to help with the farm. Felix had sexual intercourse with Emiliano’s
wife starting May 1942. Emiliano died on January 1, 1943. On June 17, 1943, the wife gave birth to a boy.
Held: The son was born within 300 days from the death of Emiliano hence presumed to be the legitimate son of the latter. The
fact that Emiliano was suffering from TB does not prevent sexual intercourse between him and his wife.
 Jao v. CA
Facts: Jao filed petition for recognition and support against Perico. Based on the Blood Grouping Test, Janice could not have been
the possible offspring of Perico.
Held: There is almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity. the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and the alleged father
does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents. But if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type
when the bloods of the parents are cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
 Macadangdang v. CA
Facts: Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. She had an affait with Antonio Macadangdang in March 1967; Mejias and
Anahaw separated after that. In October 1967, Mejias gave birth to a boy named Rolando Macadangdang as reflected in the
baptismal certificate. Mejias sued Macadangdang to recognize Rolando as his son.
Held: Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child of Mejias and Anahaw. The child was born within 300 days after the spouses
separated. No proof was presented to show that sexual intercourse between the spouses was impossible. Only the husband can
impugn the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
 Chua Keng Giap v. IAC
Facts: Petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao. Sy Kao denies that petitioner is their son.
Held: Who better than the mother herself would know if the person was really her son? More than anyone else, it was the mother
who could say who could say that petitioner wasn’t begotten of her womb. Mothers can deny filiation only with respect to herself
and the putative child.
 Cabatbat-Lim v. IAC
Facts: Violeta is claiming to be the only child of the late Dra Esperanza Cabatbat.
Held: Factual findings indicate that child is not born of the deceased; she is only a ward (ampon) without formal adoption
proceedings. The action is not impugning legitimacy since the claim is not that child is illegitimate but that she is not the
decedent's child at all.
 Republic v. Labrador
Facts: Gladys Labrador filed for a petition for correction of entries in her niece’s Birth Certificate. She contends that niece’s
parents are not married, thus she can’t use the father’s sername.
Held: A petition for substantial correction/change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar as
well as all other persons who have an interest that would be affected thereby; a full hearing and not just summary proceedings
must be conducted. The change of surname is substantial since it will affect her legitimacy and successional rights
 Tan v. Trocio
Facts: Tan seeking to disbar Trocio on ground of immorality. Tan contends that Jewel is Trocio’s son.
Held: An unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be called “Jewel.” Pictures of father and son
showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other, and showing unusual closeness between the two are inconclusive evidence
to prove paternity.
 People v. Tumimpad
Facts: Tumimpad and Prieto raped a child with Down Syndrome. Child got pregnant.
Held: Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child.
 Benitez-Badua v. CA
Facts: Benitez-Badua claiming that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente. Evidence points out that she is not the child of the
deceased.
Held: Proof of filiation cannot be used in a situation where the child does not belong to either spouse in the first place, as marked
by the absence of a record of birth.
 De Aparacio v. Paraguya
Facts: Priest impregnated woman. Woman married off another man to save face. Priest died and instituted child as sole heir.
Held: A child born 192 days after the celebration of the mother's marriage is still presumed to belong to that marriage. 180-day
rule only applies to when there is a previous marriage, and not to premarital relationships. In this case, It is not necessary to
determine paternity since the priest has no other compulsory heir. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all of his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
B. Proof of Filiation
1. How to Prove Filiation
 FC, 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 129. Sec. 4: JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS – An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 7: EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE WHEN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC RECORD — when the
original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 36: TESTIMONY GENERALLY CONFINED TO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; HEARSAY EXCLUDED —
a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 39: EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE – ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE — the act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts
of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 40: FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE — the reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 41: COMMON REPUTATION — common reputation existing previous to the controversy,
respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given
in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.
 CC, 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression.
 Constantino v. Mendez
Facts: Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgement, support of her child, and damages against Ivan Mendez. Mendez
denied having sexual intercourse with Constantino
Held: Filiation was not ptoven by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof to establish the allegation is on Constantino.
Constantino’s testimony as to when she had intercourse with mendez is contradicted by evidence.
 Mendoza v. Mella
Facts: Paciano Pareja donated a lot to his son, Gavino. Gavino disappeared and was presumed dead, leaving behind his common-
law wife, Catalina, and son. Pareja sold the land. Catalina claims ownership for her son.
Held: Catalina’s son cannot be considered an acknowledged natural son of Gavino. The only evidence is a certified copy of the
boy’s birth certificate, the original not signed by the parents. The birth certificate is not a public document because Catalina and
Gavino did not write an acknowledgment.
 Lim v. CA
Facts: Lim and Uy are both alleging that they are heirs of deceased Susana.
Held: Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with formalities required by law.
Marriage contract presented by petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the CC of
1889. Marriage contract is a mere declaration of the contracting parties, in the presence of the solemnizing officer and 2 other
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband or wife. It does not possess the requisite of a public document of
recognition. It is not a written act with the intervention of the notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary
and certified by him.
 Heirs of R. Bañas v. Heirs of Bibiano Bañas
Facts: Raymundo Bañas was the child of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father. Bibiano Bañas shouldered his education. Upon
Raymundo’s death, his heirs filed for partition or recovery of hereditary share against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that
Raymundo was a recognized natural child of Bibiano.
Held: There was no voluntary recognition. The note signed “Su padre, B. Banas” is not sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition. It
is merely indicative of paternal solicitude and not acknowledgement of paternity.

49
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Uyguangco v. CA
Facts: Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco. Graciano admits having no
documents to prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
Held: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred. Since Graciano seeks to ptove filiation based on FC, 172(2), it should take
place during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
 Mariategui v. CA
Facts: Lupo Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three marriages with three different women and sired three sets of children.
st nd rd
He died intestate and the children from his 1 and 2 marriages excluded the children from the 3 marriage in the extra-judicial
partition of deceased’s properties.
rd
Held: The children from the 3 marriage continuously possessed status of legitimate children. Filiation of legitimate children may
be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar, a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child.
 Acebedo v. Arquero
Facts: Edwin Acebedo claims that Eddie Arqureo, and not he, is the father of his wife’s daughter. Acebedo alleges that the
Baptismal Certificate of the child reflects the name of Arqureo as father.
Held: A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered. It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to
its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the
statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized.
 Herrera v. Alba
Facts: In May 1998, Rosendo filed fo compulsory recognition against petitioner. Rosendo agreed to DNA paternity testing but
Herrera opposed.
Held: DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive
proof of non-paternity. If the value of Probability of Paternity (W) is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be
considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is a refutable presumption of paternity. This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards - how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test.
2. Action to Claim Legitimacy
 FC, 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which
to institute the action.
3. Rights of Legitimate Children
 FC, 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their
brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other
successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.
 Republic v. CA and Vicencio
Facts: Cynthia Vicencio was the legitimate child of Pablo and Fe. Pablo abandoned them and was eventually declared an absentee.
Fe married Ernesto who has constantly treated Cynthia as his own daughter. Cynthia filed petition for change of surname with
consent of Ernesto.
Held: There was no proper and reasonable cause to warrant a change of name. a legitimate child shall use the surname of his or
her father.
 De Asis v. CA
Facts: Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her son, brought an action for support and maintenance against the alleged
father de Asis. De Asis denied filiation. Vircel agreed to a compromise that she would not pursue the case if Manuel will withdraw
his counterclaim. After 6 years, Vircel filed an action for support and maintenance for her son.
Held: The right to support cannot be the subject of compromise. The action for support cannot be barred by res judicata. The ratio
behind the prohibition against waiving the right to future support is the need to maintain one’s existence.
C. Illegitimate Filiation
1. Proof of Filiation
 FC, 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
 Leuterio v. CA
Facts: Petitioner claims that she is the natural daughter of Ana and Pablo.
Held: Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence needed to prove dad’s involuntary recognition of child. Birth & baptismal
certificates and photos don’t bear father’s signature expressing his acknowledgment of the child. The continuous possession of

50
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
the status of a natural child, tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence
of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him.
 Uyguangco v. CA
Facts: Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco. Graciano admits having no
documents to prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
Held: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred. Since Graciano seeks to ptove filiation based on FC, 172(2), it should take
place during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
 Rodriguez v. CA
Facts: Alarito Agbulos filed an action for compulsory recognition and support against Rodriguez. At the trial, the plaintiff
presented his mother to testify as regards Alarito’s paternity.
Held: Mother’s testimony should be allowed. FC allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way as legitimate
filiation. The prohibition against the identification by the parent acknowledging of the identity of the other parent refers to
voluntary recognition provided for in Art 278 and not to compulsory recognition.
 Aruego, Jr. v. CA
Facts: Antonia and Evelyn filed petition to declare them as illegitimate children plus acknowledgment as compulsory heirs on the
basis of open and continuous possession of status.
Held: Giving FC retroactive effect and at the same time prejudicing or impairing vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
CC or other laws is prohibited by Article 256 of the FC. The fact of the filing of petition already vested in the petitioner her right to
file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at that time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. The right was already vested when she filed her action under the
regime of the Civil Code.
 Jison v. CA
Facts: Monina alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. Franscisco denied paternity.
Held: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Her witnesses
established her claims. However, Monina cannot rely on her birth certificate in the Local Registrar where Francisco is named as
her father. Neither can she rely on her baptismal certificate naming Francisco as her father. There was no showing that Francisco
had anything to do with the filing of said certificates.
 Alberto v. CA
Facts: Ma. Teresa Alberto claims that she has been in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of the late Juan
Alberto and is entitled to a share in his estate.
Held: Theresa was able to prove her open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Juan allowed her to use
the surname Alberto since birth, Juan gave money as support and he also openly introduced Theresa as his daughter to family and
friends.
 Guy v. CA
Facts: Private respondents allege that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of deceased Sima Wei. Guy contends that
the action already prescribed.
Held: Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the family code took effect and whose putative parent died during
their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age. This vested right
was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the FC. The court before which a petition for letters of administration were
filed is not precluded from receiving evidence on a person's filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to
the exercise of the recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
 Agustin v. CA
Facts: Prollamante sued Agustin for support and support pendente lite.
Held: Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt modern and scientific ways available. DNA
testing is now available for identification and parentage testing. Courts should not hesitate to apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
 In re: Intestate Estates of Deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
Facts: Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: (1) A claim for compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate child, (2) Voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
Held: Although child possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of putative father, this did not
constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. This
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia. The claim of voluntary recognition should likewise fail. An authentic writing for
purposes of voluntary recognition is a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent. This includes a public instrument or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his. This does not include the report card from UST even though putative father's name
appears as her parent/guardian. The report card did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia and he did not participate in its
preparation. Similarly, published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted
as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by
him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary.

51
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz
Facts: Diaz filed complaint for compulsory recognition. Mother was married to a Japanese but had a relationship with another
man, Rogelio Ong
Held: This presumption, however, is not conclusive and may be overturned by evidence to the contrary. With DNA testing, we can
determine with reasonable certainty the filiation of the child. Death of the father does not ipso facto negate the application of
DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of DNA. "Biological sample" means any organic material
originating from a person's body, even if inanimate objects that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and
other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. The death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. Any physical residue of
the long dead parent could be resorted to.
2. Rights of Illegitimate Children
 FC, 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
 RA 9255
 David v. CA
Facts: Ramon Villar, a married man, had three children with his secretary David. Ramon recognized the children as his. Ramon
refused to return Christoper, his youngest child, after a trip.
Held: Christopher, as an illegitimate child, is under the parental authority of his mother. The fact that Ramon recognized the child
may be a ground for ordering him to give support but not for giving him custody of the child.
 People v. Namayan
Facts: Namayan convicted of rape. Victim got pregnant.
Held: The crime of rape committed by Namayan carries with it among others the obligation to acknowledge the offspring if the
character of its origin does not prevent it and to support the same. There are also no legal impediments for both parties.
 Mossesgeld v. CA
Facts: Elezar Calasan, a married man, signed the birth certificate of his illegitimate son, Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. The local
civil registrar refused to register the birth certificate of Jonathan using the surname Calasan.
Held: Illegitimate children must use the surname of their mothers regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by
their fathers in the record of birth. The father may however choose to legally adopt the child. Once adopted, the child may use the
father’s surname.
 Republic v. Abadilla
Facts: Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot 2 children during their common law relationship. The children’s birth
certificates indicated their surname as Abadilla.
Held: Illegitimate children should use the surname of their mother. The surname of the children in their birth certificates should
be changed to Celestino.
 Gonzales v. CA
Facts: Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and brother of Ricardo alleged that they are the only heirs of the deceased.
Empaynado siblings filed a motion, alleging that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo.
Held: The evidence pre ented proved that the 3 sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo. Hence, they are entitled to inherit
Ricardo’s estate. Article 988 of CC provides that “in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, illegitimate children
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.”
 Republic v. Vicencio
Facts: Cynthia Vicencio was the legitimate child of Pablo and Fe. Pablo abandoned them and was eventually declared an absentee.
Fe married Ernesto who has constantly treated Cynthia as his own daughter. Cynthia filed petition for change of surname with
consent of Ernesto.
Held: There was no proper and reasonable cause to warrant a change of name. a legitimate child shall use the surname of his or
her father.
 Gan v. Reyes
Facts: Bernadette Pondevida wrote August Caezar Gan demanding for support of their ‘love child’, in order that she may send the
child to school. Gan denied paternity of the child, prompting Bernadetter to institute in behalf of her daughter a complaint for
support.
Held: In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in
view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains
finality.
 Tonog v. CA
Facts: Dina and Daguimol had a child. When Dina went abroad to work, she left her daughter with Daguimol and his parents.
Father requested for and was granted petition for legal guardianship of child.

52
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Held: Art. 176 of the FC [illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother] and Art. 213 [no child shall be
separated from the mother unless there are compelling reasons] do not intend to denigrate the important role fathers play in the
upbringing of their children. Court recognized that both parents complement each other in giving nurture and providing that
holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social, and spiritual needs of the child. The
case was over the guardianship of the child whose mother is working in the US. The Court is being asked to rule on the temporary
custody over the minor while the guardianship case has not been terminated. Since the welfare of the minor is the controlling
factor, the Court awards the temporary custody to the father. The child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings,
and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment to.
 De Guzman v. Perez
Facts: Roberto and Shirley had a child but never married. After a while, Roberto married another woman and had 2 children with
her. Other than 3 instances (2 for education and 1 for hospitalization), Roberto never provided for financial support.
Held: Neglect of child is a felony punished under Art. 277 (2) of the RPC. It is also known as "indifference of parents." This being
so, petitioner cannot be punished under RA 7610 [Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act]
 Zepeda v. Zepeda
Facts: child seeks damages from his father because he is an illegitimate child - he seeks damages for the deprivation of his right to
be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal
ancestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard
Held: An illegitimate child has no cause of action for the genuine and severe emotional distress resulting from the shame of being
an adulterous bastard. In short, illegitimate children cannot claim damages arising from their illegitimate status.
 Alba v. CA
Facts: Hererro wanted Rosendo’s surname from Hererra to Alba.
Held: An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother's surname. The
name of the unrecognized illegitimate child indentifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his
father's surname, reflecting his status as an illegitimate child. In this case, the minor is an illegitimate child not recognized by
father as evidenced by his strong assertion that he is not the father of the child.
 Republic v. Capote
Facts: change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores as she is an illegitimate child. She wants to go to US
Held: Child is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while her mother always recognized him as her
child.
D. Legitimated Children
 FC, 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
 FC, 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not
affect the legitimation.
 FC, 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.
 FC, 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth.
 FC, 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
 FC, 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of
action accrues.
 Estate of de los Santos v. Luciano
Facts: Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra lived as common low spouses and begot Tomasa. They subsequently got married and had two
children, Antonio and Fortunato. Tomasa had a legitimate daughter, Maria Luciano. Antonio took care of Maria when Tomasa died.
Upon Antonio’s death, Maria alleges that she is entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of Antonio, who has no other heirs.
Held: Maria is the legitimate niece of Antonio Escobar. Tomasa was legitimated by the marriage of her parents hence a legitimate sister
of Antonio. Maria is entitled to inherit from Antonio.
 Ramirez v. Gmur
Facts: Samuel, a Swiss, lived and died in Iloilo, leaving a valuable estate which he disposed by will. His widow Ana Ramirez was named
executrix. The will effectively ignored the possible claims of two sets of children born of his natural daughter Leona Castro. According
to a baptismal certificate, she was born of one Felisa Castro and an unknown father. However, there was a document exhibiting
Samuel Bischoff’s recognition of her.
Held: Leona was in an uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of natural child & treated as such by Samuel. Furthermore, she was
recognized in a public instrument, which was corroborated by the priest in charge. Her legitimate children are entitled to inherit from
Samuel. Her children from second marriage, which was bigamous since divorce was invalid, are not entitled. The right to inherit is
limited to legitimate, legitimated & acknowledged natural children, excluding kids of adulterous relations.
 In re: Julian Wang
Facts: change of name from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. They want to drop the middle name since they plan to stay
in Singapore and Carulasan sounds funny there

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Held: Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father
and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes filiation, in which case
they may bar the father's surname.
XIII. Adoption
A. Pre-Adoption and Adoption Procedures
 Adopted
1. Biological parent signs a Deed of Voluntary Commitment. Rescissible within 6 months.
2. Voluntary Commitment: Declaration of Availability for Adoption
3. Involuntary Commitment: (1) Announcement of Missing Child in tri-media, (2) Declaration of Abandonment, (3) Declaration of
Availability for Adoption
4. Case Study Report
 Adopter
1. Inquiry
2. Attendance of Adoption Fora and Seminars
3. Case Study Report Application for Adoption
4. Matching
5. Placement
6. Supervised Trial Custody
7. Home Study Report
8. Recommendation and Consent
9. Petition for Adoption
10. Adoption Decree
 FC, 184. The following persons may not adopt: (1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation; (2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt
the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law.
 FC, 187. The following may not be adopted: (1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her
spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child
during minority. (2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and (3) A person who
has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded.
B. Who may adopt/be adopted
 RA 8552, Sec. 7: WHO MAY ADOPT – (a) any FILIPINO [1] of legal age, [2] fully capacitated, [3] of good moral character, [4] not
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, [5] emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, [6] at least 16
years older than the adoptee, [7] and who is in a position to support and care for children in keeping with the means of the family; (b)
any ALIEN with the same qualifications as above, provided: [1] country of origin has diplomatic relations with the Philippines, [2] living
in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the application and maintains such residence until the decree is entered, [3] certified by
his or her consul to be capacitated to adopt, [4] and the adoptee is allowed entry to the country as his or her child. #3 may be waived
for aliens, provided: (i) the alien is a former Filipino adopting a relative within the 4th civil degree, (ii) or the alien seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, (iii) or the relative within the 4th civil degree of his or her Filipino spouse; (c) the
GUARDIAN with respect to the ward, after the termination of guardianship and the clearing of financial accountabilities. [2] Spouses
MUST JOINTLY ADOPT, except: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other; (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his or
her own illegitimate child, provided that the other has consented; (iii) if legally separated. If spouses jointly adopt, parental authority
shall be exercised by them jointly.
 RA 8552, Sec. 8: WHO MAY BE ADOPTED – (a) any person BELOW 18 who has been judicially declared as available for adoption; (b) the
LEGITIMATE CHILD of one spouse by the other spouse; (c) ALL ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN by a qualified adopter to improve his or her
status to that of legitimacy; (d) a person of LEGAL AGE, provided that he or she has been treated as if the adopter's own child since
minority; (e) a child whose adoption has been PREVIOUSLY RESCINDED; (f) a child whose parents HAVE DIED, provided that no
proceedings shall be instituted within 6 months of the death.
 FC, 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position to support and
care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family. Only minors may be adopted, except in the
cases when the adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title. In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years
older than the person to be adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate
parent of the person to be adopted.
 FC, 184. The following persons may not adopt: (1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation; (2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
turpitude; (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt
the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law.
 FC, 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
 FC, 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.
 FC, 187. The following may not be adopted: (1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her
spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child
during minority. (2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and (3) A person who
has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded.
 In Re: Adoption of Edwin Villa
Facts: Luis and Edipola Santos, a childless couple, file a petition for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa, a full-blooded brother of
Edipola. The Solicitor General opposed.
Held: There is no provision of law that prohibits relatives by blood or affinity from adopting one another. No dual relationship shall
result because filiation is limited between the adopter and the adopted.
 Republic v. CA and Bobiles
Facts: Petitioner seeking that CA erred in not giving retroactive effect to FC provision on adoption. Adoption proceedings started
February 1988. FC took effect on August 3, 1988.
Held: The woman has already acquired vested right to adopt, thus the FC should not be retroactively acquired. Family Code provisions
on adoption are not retroactive in so far as they do not impede on the expediency of the adoption, because the prime consideration is
the child's welfare, and should not be delayed. Husband's consent in an affidavit annexed to petition is also enough to make him co-
petitioner
 Republic v. Toledano
Facts: Spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse filed a petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn’s minor brother. Alvin is a natural born American
citizen while Evelyn was a former Filipina who became a naturalized American citizen. Solomon and his mother consented to the
adoption.
Held: The Clouse spouses may not adopt Filipino children. Alvin is not qualified to adopt under the Family Code because he is not a
former Filipino citizen and Solomon is not his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Evelyn, as a form Filipino
citizen, is qualified to adopt but the Family Code requires spouses to jointly adopt. Hence, spouses may not adopt Solomon (NB:
RA8552: qualified resident aliens may adopt Filipino children)
 Republic v. Miller
Facts: In July 1988, spouses Miller filed petition to adopt Michael. Trial court granted petition. Solicitor General opposed, saying FC
should be given effect in this case and not PD 603.
Held: The enactment of Family Code will not impair the right of alien respondents to adopt a Filipino child because the right has
become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one
whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.
 In Re petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim
Facts: Spouses Lim took care of Michelle and Michael since they were little. They acquired the children by simulated birth. When
husband died, wife remarried. By this time, children were of age. Wife decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
provided for in RA8552 for those who simulated the birth of a child. Everyone whose consent was required gave their consent
(Michelle’s husband, Michelle and Michael, and petitioner’s husband)
Held: Wife must jointly adopt the children with her new husband, as stated in ArtIII(7) of RA 8552.
C. Nature of Adoption Proceedings
 Lazatin v. Campos
Facts: Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in the probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child.
Held: Renato has not established his status as an adopted child. Secondary evidence is not admissible unless the existence of the
records is proven along with the contents of the records and its loss. Adoption is a juridical act and the statutory requirements must be
strictly carried out.
 Santos v. Aranzanso
Facts: Paulina and Aurora are adopted. Their adopter died intestate; first cousins assailed the validity of adoption on grounds that no
consent was given by the parents of the adopted.
Held: Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their kids, consent by
the guardian ad litem suffices.
 DSWD v. Belen

55
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo, naturalized American citizens, filed a petition to adopt their minor niece. The
petition was granted. When travel clearance was being sought from DSWD, it was discovered that DSWD was not informed about the
commencement of the adoption proceedings nor was it given notice of the petition being granted.
Held: The DSWD has to be notified of the adoption proceedings. A Home and Child Study Report is mandatory before adoption is to be
finalized. Adoption is a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child.
D. Consent Necessary for Adoption
 RA 8552, Sec. 9: (a) the ADOPTED CHILD, if at least 10 years old; (b) the BIOLOGICAL PARENTS of the child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the government instrumentality or institution that has custody over the child; (c) the adopted or LEGITIMATE CHILDREN of
the adopter, if at least 10 years old; (d) theILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN of the adopter, if at least 10 years old; (e) the SPOUSE of the
adopter or the adopted.
 FC, 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or
over, (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and
adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of
the adopting parent, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
 Duncan v. CFI
Facts: A 3-year old baby was given by his unwed mother to Atty. Velasquez. Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses
to adopt the child.
Held: Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required to give consent to the adoption. The father’s consent is not required because the
child is illegitimate. The mother’s consent is not necessary either, because she is deemed to have abandoned the child and has given
the child to Atty. Velasquez for guardianship. (NB: If under RA8552, Velasquez is not a proper party. Provision says legal guardian)
 Cang v. CA
Facts: Spousess Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally separated. The brother and sister-in-law of Clavano wanted to
adopt the 3 children of the spouses Cang. Their 14-year old son signed the petition for adoption along with Clavano.
Held: The adoption may not be granted. Cang’s consent as the father is necessary. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his children, it
was proven that he continued to send support for the family from the US. It was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment.
 Landingin v. Republic
Facts: Landingin filed for adoption of her 3 nieces. There was no written consent obtained from the mother of the children, who is in
Italy.
Held: The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not anchored solely on the best interests of the child, but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. The natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. Also, merely permitting the
child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not abandonment by the parent to the child. Mother in this case still
sends financial support for her children. When mother left for Italy, she did not intend to sever her relationship with her children. She
was merely impelled to leave the country for financial constraints.
 Ratterman, “Adoption and the Rights of Putative Fathers”
o Putative fathers who have established a relationship with their children are considered to have parental rights equal to those of the
mother. Problem arises when a nonmarital child is placed for adoption. In instances where the mother has surrendered a non-
marital child or had her parental rights terminated, the legal status of the putative father may create additional delays in finalizing
an adoption.
o 3 Groups of Nonmarital Fathers (In New York “putative statute”)
1. Fathers with full substantive rights – unwed fathers who have maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with
the child have the same rights as unmarried mothers with respect to their children, and must execute a voluntary surrender or
have their parental rights terminated before the child can be adopted. This is based on the age of the child.
a. Children under 6mos old – a nonmarital child under 6mos old cannot be placed for adoption without the father’s consent
if the father has
i. Openly lived with the child/child’s mother for a continuous period of 6mos prior to the placement of the child for
adoption
ii. Openly held himself out to be the father of the child for 6mos prior to the placement of child for adoption
iii. Paid/offered to pay medical expenses in connection with mother’s pregnancy/birth of the child
New York law evaluates his commitment to raising the child by looking at his relationship with the child’s mother, willingness to
acknowledge the child, and his payment of medical expenses

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
b. Children over 6mos old – father’s consent required if he pays a fair and reasonable sum according to his means toward the
support of the child
Either visit the child monthly, maintain regular communication >> excused if the father if not physically and financially able to
visit or if he is prevented from doing so by the actions of the mother/agency
Openly held himself to be the father and openly lived with the child for 6mos in the 1yr period immediately preceding the
child’s placement for adoption >> substantial and continuous contact with child
Father’s intention alone is not sufficient if not supported by evidence that he supported the child.
2. Fathers with due process rights – putative fathers who do not meet the statutory criteria may still qualify to be “notice
fathers,” given due process rights with respect to voluntary surrenders and termination of parental rights involving nonmarital
children
- Do not include men convicted of rape and child was conceived as a result of rape
Those entitled to due notice are those:

- Adjudicated by court
- Filed timely and unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity
- Recorded on the child’s BC as father
- Openly living with the child and the child’s mother at the time proceeding was initiated
- Identified as the child’s father by the mother in a written, sworn statement
- Married to child’s mother within 6mos prior to execution of a surrender or initiation of termination proceeding
- Filed an instrument with the putative father registry acknowledging paternity of the child
 Sole purpose of notification: Enable him to present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of the child. There
is no presumption in favor of the putative father. He will only be given custody if it will be for the best interest of the child.
 He may waive his right to notice by signing a written instrument acknowledged or proved under the same procedure as a
voluntary surrender.
3. Fathers without rights – fathers who have not made efforts to establish a relationship with nonmarital child
o Fathers unable to meet the rights criteria
 Domestic violence – fathers legally prevented from visiting or contacting the child because of a court order to protect mother
from domestic violence
 Incarcerated fathers – consent still needed
 Drug addiction – court rejects this excuse
 Father unaware of child – court also does not excuse, but it infringed constitutional rights
 Mother’s actions – when a mother intentionally prevented a putative from establishing a relationship with the child
 Relative’s actions
o Delays in adoptions – child’s rights must be considered, not those of putative fathers
E. Effects of Adoption
 RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 33: (1) SEVER ALL LEGAL TIES between the biological parents and the adoptee, except if the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a LEGITIMATE CHILD of the adopter; (3) give the adopter and adoptee RECIPROCAL
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS arising from the relationship of parent and child, including: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name
the child is to be known; (ii) the right of the adoptee and the adopter to be the legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
 FC, 189. Adoption shall have the following effects: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; (2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall
terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and (3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents
and other blood relatives.
 FC, 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules: (1) Legitimate and
illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession; (2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the
other half, by the adopters; (3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they
shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the
other half, by the adopters. (4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they
shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse,
and one-third by the adopters; (5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and (6) When only collateral
blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
 CC, 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
 Tamargo v. CA

57
Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
Facts: Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the ten-year old minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the petition was
granted, Adelberto shot and killed Tamargo. The parents of Tamargo sued Adelberto’s natural parents for damages.
Held: Adelberto’s natural parents are liable for damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred prior to the adoption. Adelberto was
in his natural parent’s actual custody at the time of the accident. The effects of adoption on parental authority cannot be given
retroactive effect.
 Sayson v. CA
Facts: Teodoro and Isabel Sayson died, leaving behind 2 adopted children and one legitimate child. The siblings of Teodoro claims that
they are entitled to the intestate estate of Teodoro. The adopted children claim that they are entitled to inherit from the estate of
Teodoro’s parents by right of representation.
Held: The adopted children are entitled to Teodoro’s estate. Legally adopted children have the right to inherit from the adoptive
parents. However, the adopted children may not represent their adoptive parent. Adoption creates a relationship only between the
adoptive parents and the adfopted. It does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
 Johnston v. Republic
Facts: Isabel Johnston filed a petition to adopt a 2-year old from an orphanage. The petition was granted and the child was given
Isabel’s maiden surname. Isabel filed a motion to change the child’s surname to Johnston.
Held: Isabel’s husband did not concur in the adoption. Hence, the child should use Isabel’s maiden name or it may lead to confusion.
 Republic v. CA and Wong
Facts: Maximo Wong was adopted by the Wong spouses when he was 2 years old. Upon reaching majority, he started a furniture
business. Maximo petitioned to change his surname to Alcala, the name of his natural parents. The Wong spouses consented.
Held: Maximo may change his name. it was proven that the using of the surname Wong was detrimental to his business. It also caused
him embarrassment and isolation in the Muslim community where he resides. Moreover, the change of Maximo’s surname was not
done to defraud anyone. Use of adoptive parent’s surname is not the main objective of adoption but merely one of its effects.
 Republic v. CA and Caranto
Facts: CA granted Caranto spouses’ petition for adoption of Midael with prayer for the correction of the minor’s first name from
Midael to Michael.
Held: The notice for correction of entry must also be published. While there was notice given by publication, it was only a notice for
adoption. The local civil registrar, an indispensible party to the case was not notified. Thus correction of entry must not be granted.
 Republic v. Hernandez
Facts: The Munson spouses adopted Kevin Earl Moran. Simultaneous with the adoption was the change of name of Kevin Earl to Aaron
Joseph
Held: The proceeding for adoption and for change of name should be done separately. The adoptive parents can only change the
surname of the adopted but not the first name save in cases where the first name falls under the causes allowed by the court for
changing first names. (NB: rule is no longer applicable. RA8552 Sec13 allows adopters to change the full name of the adopted and no
longer just the surname. Section 7 of the SC 2002 en banc resolution likewise requires the petition to “specifically state at the heading
of the initiatory pleading when the petition contains an application for change of name.)
F. Rescission
 FC, 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon petition of any person
authorized by the court or proper government instrumental acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss or
suspension of parental authority. If the adopted is at least eighteen years of age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the adoption
on the same grounds prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant.
 FC, 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases: (1) If the adopted
has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or (2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the
adopters during minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption
 FC, 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the court in the
same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in
which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or
mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both. Judicial
rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted arising from the
relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his
surname prior to the adoption. The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries.
 RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 35: GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION – not subject to rescission by the adopters. The adoption may be rescinded ONLY
UPON THE PETITION OF THE ADOPTEE with the assistance of the DSWD, if a minor, or over 18 but incapacitated on any of the ff.
grounds committed by the adopters: (1) repeated physical and verbal MALTREATMENT despite having undergone counseling; (2)
ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE of the adoptee; (3) SEXUAL assault or violence; (4) BANDONMENT or failure to comply with parental obligations.
 RA 8552 IRR Sec 37: EFFECTS OF RESCISSION – (1) restoration of PARENTAL AUTHORITY to the adoptee's biological parents if known, or
to the DSWD if still a minor or incapacitated; (2) the RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS are extinguished; (3) cancellation of the
new BIRTH CERTIFICATE and restoration of the old certificate of the adoptee; (4) SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS revert to its status at the time
of the adoption decree; (5) VESTED RIGHTS acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.

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A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
G. Rectification of Simulated Birth
 RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 41: [1] A person who has under his or her care and custody a child whose birth certificate has been falsified to make
it appear that the child is his or her own son or daughter shall file in the appropriate court a PETITION FOR CORRECTION of the birth
certificate and of adoption of the child. [2] Provided, that the person initiates the said proceedings WITHIN 5 YEARS from the effectivity
of this Act, and shall thereafter complete the said proceedings wherein he or she shall prove that the simulation of birth was for THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, and that the child has been consistently considered and treated as his or her own child. [3] The DSWD
shall conduct its own Child and Home Study Reports to determine if said conditions exist. [4] In all cases of rectification, the standard
procedures for adoption shall be followed.
H. Adoption Decree
 Reyes v. Sotero
Facts: Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon Chichioco, her niece, along with others, filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of the estate of Elena Lising. Ana Joyce Reyes opposed the petition claiming that she was an adopted
child of spouses Elena Lising and Serafin de los Santos.
Held: The adoption decree cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent's estate. Contrary proof can
be presented only on a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. Absent a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, and the facts
stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real.
I. Inter-Country Adoption

 RA 8043 (Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995), Sec. 4: THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD — there is hereby created the Inter-
Country Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to act as the central authority in matters relating to inter-country
adoption. As such, it shall: (a) protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in
connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child; (b) collect, maintain, and preserve confidential
information about the child and the adoptive parents; (c) monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the child through
authorized and accredited agency; (d) prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and deter improper
practices contrary to this Act; (e) promote the development of adoption services including post-legal adoption; (f) license and accredit
childcaring/placement agencies and collaborate with them in the placement of Filipino children; (g) accredit and authorize foreign
adoption agency in the placement of Filipino children in their own country; and (h) cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-
caring and placement agency or adoptive agency involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of violation of any
provision under this Act.
 Same, Sec. 7: INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION AS THE LAST RESORT — the Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child
under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the
Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child is placed for
intercountry adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six
hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years.
 Same, Sec. 8: WHO MAY BE ADOPTED — only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child
may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board: (a) Child study;(b) birth
certificate/foundling certificate; (c) deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents; (d) medical
evaluation/history; (e) psychological evaluation, as necessary; and (f) recent photo of the child.
 Same, Sec. 9: WHO MAY ADOPT — an alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country
adoption of a Filipino child if he/she: (a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to
be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such
parent; (b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption; (c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and
responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited
counselor in his/her country; (d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) is eligible to adopt under his/her
national law; (f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his
children, including the child to be adopted; (g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act; (h)
comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and
accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and (i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine laws.
 Same, Sec. 10: WHERE TO FILE APPLICATION — an application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an
authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with
the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board. The application shall be
supported by the following documents written and officially translated in English: (a) Birth certificate of applicant(s); (b) Marriage
contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable; (c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years
of age, in the form of sworn statement; (d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and
psychologist; (e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the applicant(s); (f) Police clearance of
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Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
applicant(s); (g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant's employer and a member of the immediate
community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5) years; and (h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his
immediate family; The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings.
 Same, Sec. 11: FAMILY SELECTION/MATCHING — no child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it is satisfactorily shown
that the child cannot be adopted locally. [2] The clearance, as issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings, shall
form part of the records of the child to be adopted. [3] When the Board is ready to transmit the Placement Authority to the authorized
and accredited inter-country adoption agency and all the travel documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any one of
them, shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines.
 Same, Sec. 14: SUPERVISION OF TRIAL CUSTODY — the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency in the country of
the adoptive parents which filed the application for inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the
child. It shall also provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody shall be for a period of 6 months from the time
of placement. Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption be issued in the said country a copy of which
shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of the child. During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the
governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a progress report of
the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of
adoption.
J. Adoption Issues
 Ziegler, International Adoption on the Best Interest of the Child (see summary)
XIV. Parents and Children
A. Parental Authority
 FC, 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
 FC, 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law.
 FC, 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect
and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
 FC, 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of
the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.
 FC, 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit.
 FC, 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the
preceding article, shall exercise the authority.
 CC, 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it
acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility
treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
 PD 603, Art. 58.
 Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable
o Best interest standard – indeterminate standard dependent upon the subjective values and life experience of the fact finder and
psychological experts  In a large and pluralistic society, it is hard to reach a social agreement about what kind of adults we want
children to become, what methods will produce such adults
o History of allocations of child custody
o Discretionary standard
a. Paternal preferences – derived from ancient Rome where pater-familias ruled and dominated all aspects of domestic as well as
public life

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Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
American colonial era – father as the economic head of the household was awarded custody due to importance of children as
an asset to the economy with a deficient labor force
b. Transitive period – the children will be best taken cared of and instructed by the innocent party; origination of maternal
preference rules
c. Maternal preference and tender years doctrine – women came to be recognized as being better able to care for children as a
result of “maternal instincts”
- Women as having superior morals and nurturing skills, better suiting them for the care and rearing of the children
o Family law transformed  Emergence of feminism led to demise of maternal preferences for custody
o Best interest standard
 Unpredictability of results encourages parents to engage in strategic behavior, take chances in litigation, and hire expensive
experts to highlight each other’s shortcomings than work together to make the best of the inevitable
o 3 primary objections of the Law Institute on BIS
1. Indeterminacy and predictability – BIS must necessarily be open-ended because each individual child and family situation is
unique
 Predictable standards – encourage settlement, expedite resolution of custody cases and constrain both conscious and
subconscious rogue and subjective rulings based upon fact-finder biases
 When a judge relies on the BIS, he is not applying law but is exercising administrative discretion. BIS provides little concrete
guidance in determining what is in a child’s best interest.
 “The custody case effectively becomes a combination of beauty contest and circus sideshow with both parents attempting to
woo the judge with their respective strengths and the concurrent weaknesses of their spouse.”
 Can science quantify a child’s best interest?
- The courts seem to demand psychological expert testimony to effect what they see as a reasonable resolution to problems
with no single correct solution.
- Psychological experts are as prone to bias as any fact finder.
- Legal process is protracted since it is not simply a case of deciding whether one parent is unfit.
- “An irony of the best interest standard is the burden imposed on the children who are its designated beneficiaries.”
2. Difficult to adjudicate
 Adjudication – custody litigation usually requires the determination of past acts and facts, not a prediction of future events.
Applying BIS requires an individualized prediction. The imposition of the burden on a court to predict the future is daunting
and effectively impossible.
 BIS is people oriented instead of fact oriented. Acts are determinate and are a concrete basis for courts to rely on. A person-
oriented rule requires an evaluation of the whole person viewed as a social being
3. BIS is unjust
 Litigation is literally invited due to the indeterminacy of the possible outcome
 It would expose the child to “split the baby” shared custody arrangement that may be deleterious to their emotional welfare,
forcing them to commute between 2 warring homes
 Litigation costs are increased
 The role of attorney becomes more significant due to imprecise standards, to persuade the court of the correctness of the
client’s position
o Other alternatives to BIS
a. Sex-based standards – universally rejected, with constitutional considerations, unfair way to adjudicate child placement;
Arbitrary placement based upon sex makes no sense in the light of society’s evolution and the realignment of formerly static
parenting roles
b. Primary caretaker preferences – relationship criteria such as the amount of time spent with children and the stability of the
child’s relationships
- Question arises on whether presumptive reliance on implicit considerations of past caretaking responsibilities would
enhance the BIS
3 justifications for PCP
1. Protection of the child’s most vital parent-child relationship
2. Avoidance of error, litigation and abusive threats of litigation
3. Compatibility with gender neutrality and the child’s many interests
However, there is lack of definition of primary caretaking, which is necessary to achieve any of the standard’s asserted
benefits.
By focusing on historical conduct as opposed to the more determinative future ability to parent, the PCS requires a dull
exposition of virtually all contributions by both parents, despite their often marginal relevance in future parenting
responsibilities.
Other problems of PCP
1. Results in disguised biases in favor of women who are usually the caretakers
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Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
2. Relies on mechanical standard (anu ba…)
3. Definitional problems
c. Least detrimental alternative standard
Speedy action is necessary to avoid further harm being done to his chances of healthy psychological development
Sets the standards of parents too low, avoiding harm instead of attempting to inspire parenting excellence
d. Comparisons of various standards
Literature suggests that there is no better alternative to BIS
Indeterminacy of BIS is a necessary component of litigation that needs to take into account all the intricacies of human nature.
o Practical solutions to theoretical problems
 Litigation controls
1. Expedited litigation – closure for the family at the earliest practicable time, local court rules to micromanage custody
litigation; conclude within one year from the filing of the petition for dissolution
Financial issues must be bifurcated from the custody issues – to disallow a party to attempt to use financial issues as a
bargaining chip on custody considerations
2. Less reliance on conclusions of custody evaluators – scrutiny of credentials; court’s reliance on them is misplaced and should
be reevaluated
3. Better appellate review – criteria relied upon needs to be set forth clearly in the findings in order that the appellate court
has a guidepost in which to measure the court’s ultimate findings and conclusions
Written and detailed findings force a trial judge to confront his own biases and predispositions
4. Enhanced trial skills for practitioners and jurists – true expertise on rules of evidence, presentation of evidence, knowledge
of effective expert impeachment necessary in custody litigation
Certification must be required for lawyers

Panel of 3 judges with diverse backgrounds – alternative to traditional use of one judge to try custody cases
1. Custody
a. Determining the Best Interest of the Child
 Gender and Tender Years Presumption
o Rules of Court, Rule 99. Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated; Appeal. - When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the question as to the care, custody, and control of a child or
children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding,
the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as
will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age,
unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty. If, upon such hearing, it appears that both parents are improper persons to have the care, custody,
and control of the child, the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest
brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to any suitable asylum,
children's home, or benevolent society. The court may in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code order either or
both parents to support or help support said child, irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may make any order that
is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to visit the child or have temporary
custody thereof. Either parent may appeal from an order made in accordance with the provisions of this section. No child
under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.
o Ex Parte Devine
Facts: Custody of spouses’ 2 children were given to the mother by virtue of the “tender years” presumption.
Held: The tender years presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification which discriminates
between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex.
o Cervantes v. Fajardo
Facts: child was given up for adoption; biological mother reclaimed child and demands money in exchange for the child.
mother cohabits with a man who is not her husband. she also has a child with another man.
Held: The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years will not apply when the court finds
compelling reasons to do otherwise. Moreover, adoption terminates parental authority, thus a parent cannot demand
custody of the child given up for adoption.
o Espiritu v. CA
Facts: child wanted to be with father. child saw mother kissing a "bad man"
Held: The prime consideration is the child’s best interest. The tender Years Presumption provides that if the child is under
seven years of age, the mother is the best custodian. However, the presumption is not absolute and may be overcome by
compelling reasons. When a child is over seven, his or her choice of parent is paramount. Child's best interest would be
better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. No
record show that father is unfit. Besides, the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values. She was also convicted for a crime of bigamy.
This amount to compelling reasons.
o Celis v. Cafuir
Facts: Cafuir after giving birth to Joel (John) Cafuir turned over custody to Soledad, fearing the extreme displeasure and
anger of her father. Soledad provided for all the needs and comforts of the child, including a nurse hired to care for the
child. There was a document stating that the child was “entrusted” to respondents while the second stated that Soledad is
the “real guardian” of the child and no one may adopt the child except for Soledad.
Held: Documents presented does not amount to renunciation of custody. The mother must have her child back now that
she has the means of supporting him. Adopting parents should be indemnified for the amount spent to support child. The
relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. Flesh and blood count.
o Gamboa v. CA
Facts: Husband wants to stay in Boracay, wife wants to stay in Makati. Wife brought daughter to Makati with no intention
of going back to Boracay.
Held: The so-called tender-age presumption may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The
mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or
affliction with communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for
her minor child. No compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother's custody.
o Sy v. CA
Facts: mother was driven away because of religious differences (praying outdoors in the rain)
Held: The law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may not only
receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mother's love and devotion for which
there is no substitute.
 Parental Unfitness
o Feldman v. Feldman
Facts: Custody of children transferred from wife to husband on grounds of wife’s sexual deviance.
Held: Peculiar sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. Evidence upon the hearing established
that the mother's private sex life in no way involved or affected the children.
o Santos, Sr. v. CA
Facts: CA granted custody to child’s maternal grandparents and not to his father. Santos is an army lieutenant.
Held: In case of absence of either parent, the present parent shall continue exercising parental authority unless he is
proven to be unfit. The PROFESSION of the father, by itself, does not constitute unfitness. Same with previous lack of
interest and failure to provide support, as those can be attributed to financial circumstances. Only when both parents are
dead or absent can parental authority be substituted by grandparents.
o Pablo Gualberto v. Gualberto V
Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn
w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her
from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
Held: This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, FC, 213 governs the custody of their child.
Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care, custody,
education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child
under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”
b. Role of the Child’s Preference
 Pizarro v. Vasquez
Facts: Pizarro and children instituted suit to obtain support from Vasquez. Children’s custody placed under Vasquez’s
grandparents as per lower court’s decision.
Held: Alleged adultery not having been established, wife should be given support. Wife should also be granted custody of
children because it is stipulated in the contract of separation and because it would be for the best interest of the children.
 Goldstein v. Goldstein
Facts: child wants to go with father to Israel
Held: Since the factors favoring the awarding of custody to one or the other of the parents were so nearly in the state of
equipoise as to make it difficult for the trial justice to decide between them, substantial weight may be attached to the
child's preference.
 Laxamana v. Laxamana
Facts: Custody of the 3 children was given to Lourdes because Reymond had drug-related problems.
Held: The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere
technicality in resolving disputes which involves the family and the youth. While Reymond may have a history of drug
dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. Although he is not completely cured
of his drug dependence, there is no evidence showing that he is unfit to provide the children with adequate support,
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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
education and moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15at the
time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choices as to which parent they want to live
with.
c. Presumption for Primary Caretaker
 Garska v. McCoy
Facts: Circuit Court awarded custody to putative father of child.
Held: if both parents are equally fit, and the child is within tender years, then the PRIMARY CARETAKER, in this case the
unwed mother, must be presumed to have custody.
d. Flip of the Coin
 Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication
2. Other Rights and Duies in Exercise of Parental Authority
 FC, 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards
the following rights and duties: (1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example,and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (2) To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding; (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance
with the duties of citizenship; (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to
their health, studies and morals; (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (6) To demand from them respect
and obedience; (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and (8) To perform such other
duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
 FC, 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the
acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
 FC, 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so
requires.
 FC, 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may
petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The
child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be
conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner
at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation
or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper.
 FC, 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days
in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The
parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his
support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and
proper.
 FC, 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%)
of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall
be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations
referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely
suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried,
in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
 FC, 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title
shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or
transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to
the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
 Salientes v. Abanilla
Facts: Because of in-law problems, husband left wife and son. Then on, he was prevented from seeing his son.
Held: Habeas corpus may be resorted into in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person thereto. Husband and wife
have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Although the couple are separated de facto, the issue
of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still
entitled to the custody of their child.

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Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Cabanas v. Pilapil
Facts: Florentino had a child with a married woman. In his insurance he stated as beneficiary his daughter with his brother
Francisco to act as trustee during her minority. Mother Cabanas complained.
Held: The insurance proceeds belong to the minor beneficiary. She is under the custody and parental authority of the mother. For
the best interest of the child, trusteeship should go to the mother and not the uncle
 Libi v. IAC
Facts: Ex-couples Julie Ann and Wendell died by gunshot wounds. Julie Ann’s parents filed for damages against Wendell’s parents.
Held: Parents are primary liable for damages caused by minor children from quasi-delicts and criminal offenses except when they
exercised due diligence. In this case, parents did not exercise due diligence since the son gained access to the key of the safety
deposit box where gun was, they did not know of his job, and the picture of him with a gun.
 Lindain v. CA
Facts: When plaintiffs were minors, their mother sold parcels of land whose title was under their names.
Held: Sale of minor children's property executed by the mother is void. Judicial approval is necessary because the powers and
duties as legal administrator are only powers of possession and management; no power to mortgage, encumber or dispose
 People v. Silvano
Facts: Silvano alleged of raping his daughter. He contends that it is punishment for her going home late.
Held: Sex with one's own child is per se abhorrent and can never be justified as a form of parental punishment
 Shields v. Gross
Facts: Shields suing Gross for distributing her nude pictures to other magazines. Shields’ mother signed a contract on her behalf,
since at that time she was 10 years old.
Held: The parent's consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the
legislative intent. Inasmuch as the consents in this case complied with the statutory requirements, they were valid and may not be
disaffirmed.
 Silva v. CA and Gonzales
Facts: Silva and Gonzales cohabited without the benefit of marriage. They had 2 children. They got separated, mother has custody
of children. Mother married a foreigner.
Held: Provisions on the natural and primary rights of parents over their children are not limited to legitimate relationships. Even in
the declaration of nullity, visitation rights are granted to the parents who do not have custody of the children. Besides, a few
hours spent by the father with his children will not be detrimental to the latter
 Eekelaar, “Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for their Children?” (see Summary)
 The Doctrine of Family Integrity: Protecting the Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers… (see Summary)
B. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
 FC, 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over
the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall
be observed.
 FC, 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall
be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the
proper government agency.
 FC, 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and
responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
 FC, 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not
covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
 CC, 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it
acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility

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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
 Palisoc v. Brillantes
Facts: Palisoc was shot be a fellow student in the laboratory room of their school.
Held: President and instructor are jointly and severally liable since incident could have been prevented if they gave proper supervision.
So long as students are in their custody, they stand in loco parentis and must exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child
 Amadora v. CA
Facts: Amadora shot by Daffon in the auditorium of their school.
Held: Art 2180 applies to all schools, academic or non-academic. In academic schools, teacher in charge is liable for student's
misconduct. In non-academic schools, the head is liable. Custody is not coterminous with semester. As long as student is under the
control and influence of school and within its premises in pursuance of legitimate right, obligation or privilege, he is considered under
school custody
 St. Mary’s Academy Carpitanos
Facts: Capistrano died because the car Daniels was driving lost control. They were doing a school event at the time.
Held: For the school to be liable, there must be a showing that the act or omission was the proximate cause of the injury
 Vancil v. Belmes
Facts: Vancil, as grandmother of Belmes’ children, was appointed legal and judicial guardians of Valeria and Vincent. Natural mother
Belmes opposed.
Held: Mother has preferential right over grandparent to be the guardian of the child. Substitute parental authority should only be
conferred if both parents are dead or the parent present is unfit
C. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
 FC, 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order
to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned
shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of
the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition
for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign
country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a
summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second
paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the
child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply.
 FC, 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall
belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer
provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
 FC, 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net
proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less
than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the
child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime.
 FC, 228. Parental authority terminates permanently: (1) Upon the death of the parents; (2) Upon the death of the child; or (3) Upon
emancipation of the child.
 FC, 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: (1) Upon adoption of the child; (2) Upon
appointment of a general guardian; (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose; (4) Upon
final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or
incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.
 FC, 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with
it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of
the offender.
 FC, 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person
exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty; (2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. The grounds enumerated
above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental
authority. If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of
parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be
revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause
therefor has ceased and will not be repeated.

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Janz Hanna Ria
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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 FC, 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person
shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority.
 FC, 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict
corporal punishment upon the child.
 RA 7610
 Chua v. Cabangbang
Facts: Pacita Chua had a number of sexual liaisons without the benefit of marriage. She eventually cohabited with Sy Sia Lay and bore
two children, Robert and Betty Chua Sy. After she separated with him, she later met and had another kid with Victor Tan Villareal.
Without means to support the child, Pacita gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.
Held: Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority. In certain cases, the custody of the child may be
awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother or against both.
 Abiera v. Orin
Facts:
Held: The right of representation is attached to parental authority or guardianship. It is extinguished with the death of the parent and
could not be transferred
 Cortes v. Castillo
Facts: wife convicted of adultery, but was condoned by husband. Upon husband’s death, wife does not have sufficient means to
support children
Held: Parents can be deprived of parental authority for the best interests of the child. A showing that the mother tended to corrupt her
children is enough to deprive of parental authority
D. Rights and Duties of Children
 CC, 356. Every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall receive at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic
training by the parents or guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual
development.
 CC, 357. Every child shall: (1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian; (2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding
substitute parental authority; (3) Exert his utmost for his education and training; (4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make
for the good of the same
 CC, 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are respected
and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with highmindedness, love of country,
veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.
 CC, 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish,
whenever possible: (1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of the
curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian; (2) Puericulture and similar centers; (3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.
 CC, 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among other
functions: (1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality; (2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents; (3) Protect
and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans; (4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency; (5) Adopt measures for the
health of children; (6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds; (7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to
the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.
 CC, 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.
 CC, 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper case be judicially
admonished.
 CC, 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother
shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
 CC, 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
 CC, 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word "Junior" can be used only by a son.
Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either: (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or (2) Add the Roman
Numerals II, III, and so on.
 CC, 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
 FC, 213.
 FC, 226.
 PD 603, Art. 3. RIGHTS OF THE CHILD – all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or
illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. (1) The right to be born well. (2) The right to a
wholesome family life. The dependent or abandoned child shall be provided with the nearest substitute for a home. (3) The right to a
well-rounded development of his personality. The gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement to develop his special
talents. The emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted shall be entitled to treatment and competent care. The physically or
mentally handicapped child shall be given the treatment, education and care required by his particular condition. (4) The right to all the
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Janz Hanna Ria
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Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
basic physical requirements of a healthy and vigorous life. (5) The right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for
the enrichment and the strengthening of his character. (6) The right to an education commensurate with his abilities. (7) The right to
full opportunities for safe and wholesome recreation. (8) The right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, and
hazards. (9) The right to live in a community and a society that can offer him an environment free from pernicious influences. (10) The
right to the care, assistance, and protection of the State. (11) The right to an efficient and honest government that will deepen his faith
in democracy. (12) The right to grow up as a free individual, in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal
brotherhood, and with the determination to contribute his share in the building of a better world.
 PD 603, Art. 4: RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHILD – every child, regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status,
political antecedents and other factors shall: (1) strive to lead an upright and virtuous life; (2) love, respect and obey his parents; (3)
extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness, and helpfulness; (4) exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for
service, in order that he may become an asset to himself and to society; (5) respect not only his elders but also the customs and
traditions of our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of our country, and the principles and
institutions of democracy; (6) participate actively in civic affairs; and (7) help in the observance of individual human rights, the
strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common aspirations for
programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of world peace.
 Convention on the Rights of the Child
 Sawyer, The Child is Not a Person
o Family Law
 Basically the author is saying that in the perspective of family law, where children’s rights are usually seen, children’s legal
personality is suppressed. This is because under this paradigm, the idea of the child is dependent on the family and the child rarely
has a positive legal identity separate from his family. The author emphasizes that childhood should not mean their exclusion fro
the legal fabric; instead, it should entitle them to a legal personality that accommodates their youth as can be seen in other areas
of law.
 This assertion is also true internationally. The author sees The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) more
of rights for parents and families rather than the children. (Ex: Art 5 speaks of respect for parental guidance, Art 9 on right of
children to live with parents, Art 18 on parental responsibilities, etc.) Only Art 12 resembles a particular assertion of the individual
legal personality of the child, proclaiming children’s right to be heard in proceedings affecting them.
 Despite the enumeration of rights of children, there are only few that are actually attainable in practice. Moreover, children can
rarely vindicate their rights without the assistance if adults since, even if they are capable of finding and instructing solicitors, they
may not have the resources.
 The author says the tendency to conflate children’s identity with that of their parents, as emphasized in family law. Obscures and
pathologies childhood.
o Alternative Construction of the Child
 Property Law: Children are absent in this legal structure since children cannot own a legal estate in land.
 Tort: Children are more positively accommodated by tort since the position of children in this aspect is broadly the same as that of
adults though a lesser standard of responsible behavior is expected from them. Basically parents are not responsible for their
children’s torts just because of their parenthood; only in cases where there is lack of parental supervision.
 Obiter: So it’s different in our jurisdiction  here parents are automatically liable subject to defense. So the parents have the
burden of proof to show that they have observed the diligence of a good father. Here, the one claiming for damages has the
burden of proof to show that parents lacked supervision over their child. Contract Law: Children are more disabled by Contract
Law since children have no contracting capacity independent of their parents. Ex: children are not suable in their contracts unless
they are for necessaries; valid contracts (by them) cannot easily be enforced.
 Obiter: It’s the same here. Since minors generally cannot give consent (CC Art 1327) and when necessaries are delivered to him,
he must pay a reasonable price therefore (CC Art 1489).
E. Parents v. Children – When Rights Clash
 Strunk v. Strunk
Facts: Tommy needs kidney transplant; Jerry, his brother, is a perfect match; however, Jerry is mentally incapacitated.
Held: The right to act for the incompetent has become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad
enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the ward.
 Conservatorship of Valerie N.
Facts: Woman with mental problem; parents want her to undergo tubal ligation.
Held: True protection of procreative choice can be accomplished only if the state permits the court-supervised substituted judgment of
the conservator to be exercised on behalf of a conservative who is unable to personally exercise this right. However, in this case, the
record is bereft of information regarding Valerie's capability o conceive or other methods which could prevent conception.
 Johnson v. Calvert
Facts: surrogate
Held: "parent and child relationship" means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident
to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the
father and child relationship."
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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
 Gillick v. West Norwalk
Facts: contraceptive aids given to children under 16 without parents' involvement and/or consent
Held: The welfare of children is our first and paramount consideration and, if a declaration of the court will serve to promote that
welfare, it is not useful to investigate the distinction between "rights" and powers. Parental rights to control a child do not exist for the
benefit of the parent. They exist for the benefit of the child and they are justified only as so far as they enable the parent to perform
his duties towards the child, and towards other children in the family. "The power of parents over their children is derived from their
duty."
 Curtis v. School Committee
Facts: program of condom availability for junior and senior high schools
Held: Parents do possess a fundamental liberty interest to be free from unnecessary government intrusion in the rearing of their
children. But the parents in the case have failed to demonstrate how the interests are burdened by the condom-availability program.
The type of interference necessary to support claim based on an alleged violation of parental liberty appears to be that which causes a
coercive or compulsory effect on the claimants' rights. Coercion exists where the governmental action is mandatory and provides no
outlet for parents, such as where refusal to participate in a program results in a sanction or in expulsion. Mere exposure to program
offered at school does not amount to unconstitutional interference with parental liberties without the existence of some compulsory
aspect to the program.
 Roe v. Doe
Facts: Daughter moved out of dorm without father’s consent.
Held: If the parent has no fault and gives reasonable demands, yet child voluntarily does not comply, parent may withhold support. The
child's right to support and the parent's right to custody and service are reciprocal.
 In Re Edward C.
Facts: Children physically abused by father. Mother consents to abuse because of religious reasons.
Held: Evidence of actual psychological and physical harm support findings that children were "dependent" children without parents
willing to exercise or capable of exercising proper and effective parental control, and that their return to the physical custody of the
parents would be detrimental to their welfare
 Prince v. Massachusetts
Facts: Jehovah's witnesses and Child Labor Law
Held: Liberties involved: parents' freedom to bring up the child in the way he should go/teach him the tenets and the practices of their
faith; child's freedom to observe these/ to preach the gospel by public distribution of "Watchtower" and "Consolation" in conformity
with the Scripture. The state has a wide range of power for limiting religious freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare; and that includes, to some extent, religious freedom.
 Parental Constent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors ::: The importance of a minor’s right of access to contraceptives and
the interest of the family unit in freedom from state interference appear to outweigh any state interest in restricting access, incl.
reinforcing parental choices.
 Recognizing Adolescents’ evolving capacities ::: The Convention requires governments to 'respect the responsibilities, rights and
duties of parents [or others acting as parents] ellipsis in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. Many
adolescents gain capacity to make decisions for themselves concerning reproductive and sexual health services, and to decide issues of
confidentiality. Immature adolescents must be given usual protections. The Convention sets a legal limit on parental power to deny
capable adolescents reproductive and sexual health services. The question whether an adolescent is a 'mature minor' must be decided
by health service providers independently of parental judgment. The specific duties of government and health service providers to
implement adolescent rights regarding their reproductive and sexual health needs are examined.
F. Summary Procedure
 FC, 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental authority shall be verified.
 FC, 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides.
 FC, 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individuals, entities or
institutions exercising parental authority over the child.
 FC, 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are applicable.
 RA 8369 Sec. 5: JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURTS – the Family Courts shall have EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION to hear and
decide the following cases: (a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than
nine (9) years of age but not less than 9 years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the
accused may have incurred, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to PD 603; (b) Petitions for
guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; (c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation
thereof; (d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property
relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains; (e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment; (f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions
of the Family Code; (g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for
voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority. (h) Petitions for

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Janz Hanna Ria
A2013
Law 100: Persons and Family Relations
Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan
A.Y. 2009-2010
the constitution of the family home; (i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended; (j) Violations of
RA 7610; and (k) Cases of domestic violence against: (1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to
result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats
and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and (2) children - which include the commission
of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their
development. [2] If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the
corresponding penalties. [2] If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the
regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
 Reyes v. Tabujara-Reyes
Facts:
Held: Both the SC and the CA still retain their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases despite the passage of RA8369 - the law conferring
upon the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of the minor
they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without a remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997.
 Madrinan v. Madrinan
Facts:
Held: RA 8369 [Family Courts Act of 1997] did not divest [deprive of authority] the CA and SC of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving the custody of minors. The statute must be read in harmony with RA 7029 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA] and
BP 129 [Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] in that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for
habeas corpus where custody of the minors is at issue. The writ filed with the Family Court shall be enforceable within the judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs. Petitions filed with the SC, CA or with any of its members shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where petitioner resides
or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on merits.

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