08/12/15

Combus'on, Flammability and

Explosion Iner'ng and Limi'ng Oxygen for Explosion Protec'on.

Lecture A3

Dr Bill Nimmo
Room 1.09 Arts Tower

Combus'on Stoichiometry Calcula'on spreadsheet

Flue gas composition
Coal combustion calculations C + O2 ----------> CO2
H2 + 1/2 O2----> H2O CO2 = 6.131

S + O2 ----------> SO2 O2 = 1.42

Low ash S
American coal N2 = 32.02
Basis: 100 kg coal; assuming complete combustion NO= 0.088
SO2 = 0.012

Fuel CombusKon Chamber CO2, N2, H2O, O2 Composition M.W kmols kmol O2 kmol kmol kmol kmol Tot. Dry= 39.674

% by mass required CO2 H2O NO SO2 H2O = 2.843

Tot. Wet= 42.517
C 73.57 12 6.131 6.131 6.131 Dry %
H 5.04 2 2.52 1.26 2.52 CO2 = % 15.5

Reactants Products O (diff)

N
11.31
2.47
32
28
0.353
0.088
-0.353
0.044 0.088
O2
N2
=
=
%
%
3.6
80.7 sheet
S 0.37 32 0.012 0.012 0.012 NO ppmv -
Air

Ash 1.43 SO2 = ppmv 302.5

Moist 5.81 18 0.323 H2O = % 0
Total 100 7.094 6.131 2.52 0.088 0.012

CxHy +z(O2+3.76N2) bH2O+cN2+dO2

Wet %
CO2 = % 14.4
Theorat.O2 = 7.094 kmol/ 100kg coal O2 = % 3.3

Theor.O2 flow = 142.123 m3/min at 20 C NO ppmv -

N2 = % 75.3
Theorat.Air = 33.78 kmol/ 100kg coal SO2 = ppmv 282.2

For Stoichiometric combus'on, d =0 Air Flow = 676.77 m3/min at 20 C H2O = % 6.7

Reqd.Excess Air= 20 %
Coal feed = 5000 kg/hr

Actual Air is 40.537 kmol/ 100kg coal Fuel CV (net) 29MJ/kg

Air Flow = 812.1 m3/min at 20 C

containing 8.5128 kmol of O2/ 100kg coal Burner Output (net) 40.3 MWatts thermal
3 and 32.024 kmol of N2/ 100kg coal 4

Explosion Preven'on Using Iner'ng

Inert gases such a carbon dioxide, nitrogen, water vapour, argon etc. act as
a coolant on the ame.
Explosion Preven'on Using Iner'ng This reduces the ame temperature and the reac'vity of the ame.

If sucient inerts are added then no ame can propagate and no explosion
can occur.

The eec'veness of an inert gas depends on its ability to absorb heat i.e.
on its specic heat, Cp.

The displacement of air and reduc'on of oxygen is a consequence of the
use of inerts it is NOT the prime cause of the ame ex'nguishment.

1
 08/12/15

Explosion Preven'on Using Iner'ng

For the same T the eec'veness of an inert gas is propor'onal to
Energy to heat inert gas = mCp T = (Cp/R) (PV/T) T Cp/R or to the product of Cp and MW.
This allows the inert gases to be ranked in order of eec'veness as:
Where T= temperature reduc'on required to ex'nguish a
stoichiometric ame (~1400K). Rgas MW Cp Cp/Rgas
Inert Gas KJ kg-1K-1 KJ kg-1K-1

Specic or individual gas constant
Carbon Dioxide 189 44 834 4.41

Rgas = R/M.W. kJ kg-1 K-1 (Tabulated on next slide) Water Vapour 462 18 2020 4.37
(Steam at 373K)
R = Ideal gas constant = 8.314 kJ Kmol-1 K-1 Nitrogen 297 28 1040 3.50

Helium 2079 4 5240 2.52
Argon 208 40 524 2.52

kerosene
Measurement of limi'ng oxygen
These flame
temperature
calculations are
Related to iner'ng is the limi'ng oxygen measurement. This is the oxygen in
for 300K inlet the air plus fuel plus inert gas mixture that occurs when a stoichiometric
air temperature ame will not propagate an explosion.
and 1 bar.
At 15% O2 the
The limi'ng oxygen in the mixture is:
peak temperature
Inert Gas
Is ~1800K which O2 = 20.9 (1- inert)
% where the inert gas is the decimal propor'on.
---- 0 Is still flammable.
------ 9.5
---- 19
If 1400K is the
---- 29 critical lean limit Limi'ng oxygen measurements also use standard ammability equipment
temperature and hence the values of limi'ng oxygen depend on the method used as well
then this shows as on the inert gas used. The new European ammability standard means
the flammable that all the historic data of limi'ng oxygen for dierent gases will have to be
range narrows as repeated on the new equipment.
inerts are added.

Triangular Composi'on Diagram

Triangular Composi'on Diagram with Typical Combus'ble Regions
with Typical Combus'ble Regions
F, O, and I - represent pure fuel, pure oxygen, and pure inert gas,
F Pure
A Fuel
respec'vely.
Red triangle combus'ble region
C I Stoichiometric line
Flammability diagrams created A-F air line
from experiments of mixtures L - The intersec'on of the stoichiometric line and the air
containing fuel, Air and inert (eg B line denes the stoichiometric composi'on in simple air
N2, CO2) using Hartmann N limi'ng or minimum oxygen conc. (MOC) where dofed
green line is tangen'al to 'p of combus'ble region.
apparatus. A - represents simple air (21 mole% oxygen, 79 mole%
Stoichiometric
A/B tes'ng Line C inert, and 0 mole% fuel
A- ame D - lower ammability limit for the fuel in pure
B-no ame or igni'on oxygen (LFL O2) at the specied temperature and
pressure
K M - lower ammability limit of the fuel in
CombusKble region air
J K - upper ammability limit of the fuel in
L N
D M
air
M
I
O
Pure Oxygen A G Pure Inert
Air line
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

2
 08/12/15

The minimum oxygen concentra'on (MOC) or the maximum safe oxygen

concentraKon for the fuel is dened by a line that is parallel (doSed green line) to the
fuel-inert axis (line F-I) and tangent to the combusKble region. The Kp of the peninsula, There are three common scenarios for iner'ng/purging opera'ons.
designated as point N in the Figure above, is the MOC point (note that the MOC is
dened by a line and the MOC point is one point on that line). This is the point where 1. A vessel containing air is to be placed in service and, ul'mately, to be lled with
the line (dofed green line) parallel to the fuel-inert axis and tangent to the combus'ble pure fuel.
region intersects the boundary of the combus'ble region. The minimum oxygen
concentra'on is the maximum concentra'on of oxygen that will be safe 2. A vessel lled with pure fuel is to be taken out of service.
(noncombus'ble) in any unknown mixture of fuel, oxygen, and inert gas. All oxygen
concentraKons at or below the MOC (regardless of the fuel/inert concentraKons) are in 3. The composi'on of the gas in the vapor space of a vessel containing fuel is to be
the noncombusKble region. All points in the combusKble region have oxygen maintained in the noncombus'ble region (liquid fuels).
concentraKons greater than that of the MOC. In the Figure above, the MOC for the fuel
is approximately 9.5 mole% (the concentraKons at point N are approximately 8 mole%
fuel, 9.5 mole% oxygen, and 82.5 mole% inert). The minimum oxygen concentraKon for a
fuel depends on the inert gas used. Table below gives values of the minimum oxygen
concentraKon for a number of fuels in arbitrary mixtures of air and diluent gas.

Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000 Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

Triangular Composi'on Diagram with Typical

Combus'ble Region for a Gaseous Fuel
Scenario 1

A Scenario 1 - In-Service Oxygen Concentra'on

F Fuel -Pure
If the vessel originally contains air and the air is
assumed to be simple air, then the composi'on is
that designated as point A on the Figure.

B If pure fuel is added to the vessel, the
Inlet valve Outlet valve
composi'on of the vessel will be a mixture of
fuel and air (on the air line F-A). The vessel will
AIR Stoichiometric contain a ammable mixture when sucient
Line C fuel has been added to reach the lower
ammability limit of the fuel in air (point M) and
Scenario 1 un'l sucient fuel has been added to reach the
upper ammability limit of the fuel in air (point
K K).
CombusKble region
J
Fuel gas supply Process vessel L N
D M

I
O
A G Inert - Pure
Oxygen - Pure Air line
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000 Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

Triangular Composi'on Diagram with Typical

Combus'ble Region for a Gaseous Fuel

A
F Fuel -Pure
Scenario 1 - In-Service Oxygen Concentra'on

In-Service Oxygen Concentra'on for Scenario 1
However, if inert gas is added to the
B vessel containing air (moving from point
A towards point I on the Figure ) un'l The concentraKon of oxygen at Point G is the in-service oxygen concentraKon
point G is reached, then fuel may be (ISOC) for the fuel. The in-service oxygen concentraKon is dened by the
Stoichiometric oxygen concentraKon at the intersecKon of a line from the pure fuel (point F)
added to the vessel (moving from point
Line C G on a line towards point F) and the that is tangent to the ammable region with the oxygen/inert axis. Of course,
composi'on will never be in the the ISOC is the limiKng case and has no margin for safety. If inert gas is added
to the vessel such that the oxygen concentraKon is less than the ISOC (a point
ammable region.
K between points G and I on the oxygen/inert axis), then fuel can be safely
CombusKble region added.
J
L N
D M

I
O
A G Inert - Pure
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000
Oxygen - Pure Air line
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

3
 08/12/15

Scenario 2

There are three common scenarios for iner'ng/purging opera'ons.

1. A vessel containing air is to be placed in service and, ul'mately, to be lled with
pure fuel. Inlet valve Outlet valve

2. A vessel lled with pure fuel is to be taken out of service. Fuel

3. The composi'on of the gas in the vapor space of a vessel containing fuel is to be
maintained in the noncombus'ble region (liquid fuels). Scenario 2

Inert gas supply Process vessel

Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

Triangular Composi'on Diagram with Typical Triangular Composi'on Diagram with Typical
Combus'ble Region for a Gaseous Fuel Combus'ble Region for a Gaseous Fuel

A A
Scenario 2 - Out-of-Service Fuel Concentra'on
F Fuel -Pure F Fuel -Pure
Scenario 2 - Out-of-Service Fuel However, if inert gas was added to the fuel in the
Concentra'on vessel (moving from point F towards point I on the
inert/fuel axis) un'l point J is reached, then a
combus'ble composi'on will not occur should air
B If a vessel that contains pure fuel is to B inltrate the vessel. The fuel concentra'on at point J
be taken out of service, it is most likely is the out-of-service fuel concentra'on (OSFC) for the
to be surrounded by air. The danger fuel.
Stoichiometric Stoichiometric
arises from a combus'ble composi'on If sucient inert gas is added to the fuel in
Line C Line C
that would be created by the the vessel such that the concentra'on is
inltra'on of air (moving from point F that of point J and, then, air inltrates into
towards point A on the air line). the vessel, the concentra'on in the vessel
K K will move along the line from point J
CombusKble region CombusKble region
towards the air point (point A).
J J
L N L N There will never be a
D M D M
combus'ble composi'on in the
I I vessel.
O O
A G Inert - Pure A G Inert - Pure
Oxygen - Pure Air line Oxygen - Pure Air line
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000 Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

Triangular Composi'on Diagram with Typical

Combus'ble Region for a Gaseous Fuel

A
F Fuel -Pure
Scenario 2 - Out-of-Service Fuel Concentra'on

There are three common scenarios for iner'ng/purging opera'ons.
The OSFC is dened by the intersecKon of a line
from the air point (point A) that is tangent to
1. A vessel containing air is to be placed in service and, ul'mately, to be lled with
B the ammable region with the inert/fuel axis. pure fuel.
As with the ISOC, the OSFC is a limiKng case
with no margin for error. 2. A vessel lled with pure fuel is to be taken out of service.
Stoichiometric
Line C In pracKce, the fuel composiKon should be
3. The composi'on of the gas in the vapor space of a vessel containing fuel is to be
reduced to a value below the OSFC maintained in the noncombus'ble region (liquid fuels).
(between points J and I) before it is safe
K for air to inltrate the vessel.
CombusKble region

J
L M N Note that for many fuels, the
D OSFC is as low as 2-3 mole%.
I
O
A G Inert - Pure
Oxygen - Pure
Air line
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000 Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

4
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Triangular Composi'on Diagram with Typical

Combus'ble Region for a Gaseous Fuel
Scenario 3

P A
F Fuel -Pure Scenario 3 - Inert the Vapor Space (liquid fuels eg
kerosene)

The composiKon of the gas in the vapor space of a
Fuel vapour vessel containing fuel is to be maintained in the
B noncombusKble region and avoid inltraKon of air.
Inlet valve Outlet valve

A common method to avoid inltraKon

Stoichiometric of air is to maintain a pressure greater
Liquid Fuel
Line C than atmospheric in the vessel. This
scheme is easily implemented with a
pressure regulator on the inert gas
Scenario 3 supply to the vessel. If the pressure in
K
CombusKble region the vessel drops below the regulator set
J pressure, the regulator will open and
Inert gas supply Process vessel L N
D M supply inert gas to the vapor space.
I
O
A G Inert - Pure
Oxygen - Pure Air line
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000 Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000

Minimum Oxygen Concentration in Mixtures of Fuel,

Air, and Diluent Gas at Room Temperature and Air Plots
Atmospheric Pressurea

Fuel Minimum Oxygen ConcentraKon in Fuel-Air-Diluent Gas Mixtures Book, SiSon, Ludlow,

N2d N2 CO2
(Volume %)
H2Oc Ar CCl2F2 CCl3F
Chemical Process Safety,
2000
Flammability plots for all
Hydrogen
Hydrogenb
4 5.0
5.1
5.9e
7.6e
possible oxygen levels are of little
Carbon monoxide
Methane
2.9
12
5.6
12.1
5.9
14.6








practical interest as the main interest is
Methaneb
Ethane 11.2
11.9
11.0
14.6
13.4
13.7

9.8
a the minimum oxygen in the inerting of flammable atmospheres
Propane
Propaneb
11.6 11.4
11.7
14.3
14.1
concentra'on is the maximum with air as the oxidant or pure oxygen and
Butane 12.3 12.1 14.5 concentra'on of oxygen that will be intermediate cases are of little interest.
n-Pentane 11.8 safe in any unknown mixture of
Hexaneb 11.8 12.1 14.5
Ethylene 9.9 10.0 11.7 combus'ble with air and diluent
Propylene
2-Methylpropene
11.5
12
11.5

14.1









gas

Thus inerting data is more often given as
1-Butene
3-Methyl Butene
11
11.5












b values extracted from graphs
c temperature adjusted to give required vapor
the proportion of inert gas added to air.
Cyclopropane 11.7 13.9
pressure of water
Butadiene 10.5 10.4 13.9 d Mashuga, C. V., and Crowl, D. A., Process
Acetylene 6.2
Safety Progress, 17, 176 (1998).
Benzene 11.5 11.2 13.9
e cannot explain large dierence in values from Minimum oxygen
Methyl Alcohol 9.9
Ethyl Alcohol 10.5 table and graph
Dimethyl Ether 10.5 Lewis, B., and von Elbe, G., Combus4on,
Diethyl Ether 10.2 Flames, and Explosions of Gases, 3rd EdiKon,
Isobutyl Formate 12.5 Academic Press, (1987).
Methyl Acetate 11
Methyl Ethyl Ketone 11
Carbon Disulde 5 Zabitakis
Natural Gas 12 US Bureau of Mines
Gasolineb 11.6 12.2 15.0 18.4 18.7 Bulletin 627 , 1965
Jet Propulsion-4 11.5

Methane air system vs inert gas Required diluent and ammability limit
ame temperatures.
CO2 H2O N2 Ar
21 % O2,% 0 % Note that the ranking CFCs are
of the effectiveness banned
15 %

Less CO2 required

of the inert gases than water than N2 than Ar
Methane % in air

found experimentally
is the same as that
predicted. All the inerts ex'nguish
Methane %%

the ame at dierent

Methane,

Each inert gas has a Limit of temperature, TL,

Sto different limiting of ~1530K- 1660K.
ich
. oxygen content. Diluent, %
Hence, it is NOT the
CO2 Ar
H2O N2 depletion of oxygen H2O
He CO2
TL, oK

that puts out the flames N2

0 %

Mullins and Marley

Coward and Jones, 1952 Ar In Mullins and Penner 1959
Flammability, Explosion and
US Bureau of Mines
Detonation
Bulletin 503. Fig. 24
Iner'ng gas percent, % Pergamon

5
 08/12/15

Maximum safe percentage of O2

Note that the oxygen in the limiting mixture is:

O2 = 20.9 (1- inert)

where the inert gas is a decimal proportion.

e.g For nitrogen many HCs require ~40% and then the limiting O2 is
12.5%.

For CO2 many HCs require ~25% and then the limiting O2 is 15.7%.

For argon, ~50% is required and the O2 is then 10.5%.

Note that all HCs apart from Ethylene have
similar limiting oxygen 13.4-14.6% for CO2
and 12.1-10.4% for N2
Clearly the limiting O2 depends on the inert used whereas the limit flame
temperature does not.
Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames
And Explosion of Gases, 2nd Ed., 1968, p. 698
Academic Press

Calculated adiaba'c ame temperature

At Limi'ng Oxygen Concentra'on (LOC)

Examples of iner'ng
diagrams for a range
of fuels

Razus et al., Chem. Eng. Zabetakis (1965) LOC data

& Processing Vol. 43 CAFT = Calculated Adiabatic Flame
p. 775-784, 2004 Temperature at the LOC.

Propane/air
Methane/Air

Coward and Jones, US Bureau of Mines, Bulletin No. 503, 1952 Coward and Jones, US Bureau of Mines, Bulletin No. 503, 1952
Also Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames and Explosion of gases, 1968, p.696. Also Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames and Explosion of gases, 1968, p.697.

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Butane -Air

Hexane/air All hydrocarbons

Limiting N2 = 29%
<Note Limit HC (Tci) = 2.7% have similar
Limiting O2 = inert gas
0.209(61-2.7) = 12.2% requirements
(apart from
acetylene and
ethylene).
Kerosene vapours
will behave in a
Zabetakis, US Bureau of similar way to
Mines, Bulletin No. 627, hexane.
1965

Coward and Jones, US Bureau of Mines, Bulletin No. 503, 1952

Also Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames and Explosion of gases, 1968, p.697.

Avia'on Gasoline Gasoline Air

1 bar

0.54 bar
27oC
CO2 N2
CO2 Inerting with
Nitrogen CO2 and N2 CFCs

Lewis and Von Elbe, 1968, Combustion, Flames and Explosions of Gases,
Academic Press. Also US Bureau of Mines Report Investigation No. 3871, 1946

CO/Air Ethylene/Air

Coward and Jones, US Bureau of Mines, Bulletin No. 503, 1952

Also Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames and Explosion of gases, 1968, p.696. Zabetakis, US BM, 1965

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Acetylene/Air Hydrogen/Air

Note that 66% N2 added to air

+ acetylene to prevent any
explosions.

The O2 concentration or
limiting O2 for acetylene is
thus

0.209 x (34 - 5)% = 6.1%

Coward and Jones, US Bureau of
Mines, Bulletin No. 503, 1952 Also
Lewis and Von Elbe, combustion,
Flames and Explosion of gases,
1968, p.697.
Zabetakis, US Bureau
of Mines, Bulletin No.
627,p.58, 1965

Eect of pressure on iner'ng levels

Pressure increases
the rich limit with
little effect on the
lean limit.
26oC
The effect is to require
Pressure eects more inert gas on the

(132 Bar)
rich side as the pressure
increases.
This increases the level of
inert required to prevent
any explosion as the
pressure increases.
Thus, for lower pressures
the required
inerting will decrease.

Zabetakis, US Bureau of Mines, Bulletin 627, 1965,

Eect of pressure on limi'ng oxygen

concentra'on, LOC
The reduction of the limiting
oxygen concentration as pressure
increases Pressure eects
is a result of the strong influence of
pressure on the rich flammability
limit for all hydrocarbons. What happens in aircram fuel tanks?
Pressure increases the stoichiometric
flame Temp. due to the reduction of
dissociation.
Pressure decreases with increase in al'tude.

This requires more inert to be
added as pressure increases.
The effect of pressure on the rich
side is due to the flame kinetics.
Zabetakis US Bureau of Mines
Bulletin 627, 1965, Fig. 41

8
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JP4 with nitrogen inerting JP4 (50/50 ker./petrol) with CO2

iner'ng.
ReducKon in P

In Mullins and Penner 1959

Flammability, Explosion and
Detonation Pergamon
The limiting
oxygen level increases
with altitude (lower
Pressure).
Limiting oxygen
Increase in LOC

Explosion will occur at Increases with

higher O2 levels this is bad increase in altitude.

In Mullins and Penner 1959 Flammability,

Explosion and Detonation, Pergamon

On July 17th 1996 TWA Flight 800 to Paris from JFK,

a Boeing 747-131, blew up at 8.31 pm over the
Aircram fuel tank explosion Atlan'c ocean at an al'tude of 13,800 m. This
occurred 11.5 minutes amer an 8.19pm take o
case study from New York John F. Kennedy (JFK) airport,
runway 22.
All 18 crew and 212 passengers were killed.

AviaKon Week and Space Technology July 29 1996
p.26-28
51 52

gate hold
For a fuel tank to explode criteria have to be sa'sed.
ascent
ascent descent
Fire Triangle
1. Air (O2) (in or out from vents in the wing)
cruise explosion
2. Fuel in sucient quan'ty (around 200 litres of avia'on kerosene
in empty tank.

3. Igni'on source (electrical fault) or heat

The last 16 hours of service of the TWA Boeing 747.

It had own in from Athens (10 hours). The fuel in the Centre Wing Tank (CWT) was used rst However, for a gas or dust explosion to occur we need correct
and was then empty for most of the ight. The CWT was not relled in New York and hence stoichiometry
the residual fuel in the CWT was that lled in Athens.
53 54

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 08/12/15

The key factor to understand in the TWA Flight 800

From evidence found in wreckage it was explosion is why a ammable mixture in the fuel
concluded that a kerosene vapour tank tank occurred. A spark is only a hazard if there is a
explosion had occurred in the near empty ammable mixture present.
central wing tank (CWT) and that this ripped
apart the aircrams structure, leading to the
disintegra'on of the aircram. Poten'ally a hazard in all aircram!

55 56

12,240 US Gals

4,420 1.98m
12,000 US Gals Access
US Gals Door
Blown Explosion 1.22m
out sec'on
500
US Gals

6.48m 6.15m
Total Fuel
46,320 US Gals Vol. ~ 60 m3
Mass Kerosene ~ 48 tonnes

57 The centre wing tank (CWT) of a Boeing 747 58

For a fuel tank to explode criteria have to be sa'sed.

Fire Triangle
But the centre wing tank was empty 1. Air (O2) (from vents in the wing)
apart from approx. 200litres of fuel
2. Fuel in sucient quan'ty (around 200 litres of avia'on kerosene
in empty tank.

3. Igni'on source (electrical fault) or heat

However, for a gas or dust explosion to occur we need correct

stoichiometry
60

10
 08/12/15

Aircrai Accident Report, NTSB, Aug. 23rd 2000

www.ntsb,gov

Air vents

Air Vents Air can leave the CWT at lower exterior pressure
on climbing amer take -o

Air can enter the CWT as the aircram
Fuel tank air ven'ng
descends into higher exterior air pressure
system

Vent outlet
Fifed with a ame trap
61

TWA ight 800 remained on the ground for 5 hours in New York.
For a fuel tank to explode criteria have to be sa'sed. ambient temperature of 22oC.

Fire Triangle The air condi'oning was on, driven by the Auxiliary Power Unit
1. Air (O2) (in or out from vents in the wing) (APU). This dissipated heat into the CWT and it has been
2. Fuel in sucient quan'ty (around 200 litres of avia'on kerosene
es'mated that this heated the residual fuel in the CWT to ~37 -
in empty tank. 50oC.

3. Igni'on source (electrical fault) or heat
The bofom oor of the CWT was concave and the residual fuel
would collect in the centre. Under climb condi'ons at a 6o nose
However, for a gas or dust explosion to occur we need correct angle, this residual fuel would have collected in the rear of the
stoichiometry central por'on of the CWT.
63 64

Shepherd, J., Jet A Explosion

Air Condi'oning System Experiments, Cal. Inst. Tech.
Nov. 21, 1997
www.galicit.caltech.edu
The air condi'oning modules (ACM) are located
below the CWT and can increase the temperature
in the CWT by 65.5oC. This is due mainly to the
poor heat insula'on on the underside of the CWT. Air vent
Also the seven sec'ons of the CWT result in non-
uniform hea'ng. The heat from the ACM is
concentrated in one compartment of the CWT. Cold Air
Wing
The ACMs are located to the ends of the CWT and tanks Fuel vapour/air
this is where most of the heat will be cold mixture
Hot fuel layer
concentrated. fuel
60oC
Fuel
65 46oC 66

11
 08/12/15

The air condi'oning units created a condi'on where fuel

vapour was created in the tank but not in sucient
concentra'on to fall within the igni'on limits. Very hot
fuel and vola'le fuel (low ash point) is required for a
The Boeing 747 has three ACMs and their job is to reduce
the temperature and pressure of the hot bleed air from the
fuel tank vapour/air explosion at an airport.
aircram engine compressors to provide pressuriza'on of
the cabin, ven'la'on and cabin temperature control.
The heat from the hot compressed air is mainly rejected However, this contributed to later events.
into the fuel in the CWT, immediately above the ACMs.
The bofom of the CWT is heated by the ACMs, but the top
is cool as the ACMs outlet is fed in pipes across the top of
the CWT and the side walls are cooled by the wing fuel tanks.
67 68

Electrical Wiring in the CWT and the Fault that Caused the Spark
that Ignited the Explosion.
For a fuel tank to explode criteria have to be sa'sed. www.planesafe.org
Electrical wiring in the fuel tank is common throughout aircram
Fire Triangle design, as many opera'onal systems need to pass through the
1. Air (O2) (in or out from vents in the wing) tanks or take readings from the tanks. The power input into
such things as electrically driven pumps, quan'ty measuring and
2. Fuel in sucient quan'ty (around 200 litres of avia'on kerosene
in empty tank. indica'on systems are kept extremely low so that a spark
cannot be crated that would have sucient energy to cause an
3. Igni'on source (electrical fault) or heat explosion of the fuel vapour. The electrical energy is 10 'mes
below the minimum igni'on energy (typically 0.25 mJ).
Electrical equipment in fuel tanks are also bonded to the aircram
However, for a gas or dust explosion to occur we need correct structure so that no charge on the components could cause an
stoichiometry electrosta'c spark.
69 70

Fuel Quan'ty Probes and their Electrical Wiring

Fuel quan'ty probes are located in all avia'on
fuel tanks and were found to be the entry point
for the current that created the spark, which
ignited the fuel vapour in the CWT on TWA
Flight 800.
The following slides show the loca'on and
construc'on of the fuel quan'ty probes.
Aircrai accident report, NaKonal TransportaKon Safety Board (NTSB), Aug. 23rd,
2000. www.ntsb.gov.
An example of the complexity of electrical wiring in aircram
fuel tanks. (Swain, R., InvesKgaKon in TWA 800, Aug. 23rd 2000) 71 72

12
 08/12/15

One of the compartments

of the CWT. The arrows
indicate the wiring and fuel
quan'ty probe. The probe
is ver'cal and passes
through the vapour space.
An electrical fault in this
could ignite a fuel/air
mixture in the vapour space.

NTSB, Public Hearing Exhibit Items,

Nov. 1997-Oct. 1999
7 Fuel quan'ty probes
in the CWT
Fuel quan'ty probe 73 74
Wiring

NTSB, public hearing

exhibit items
Nov.1997-Oct.1999

75 76

3 main criteria sa'sed.

Flight deck recorder recorded comments from Fire Triangle
pilots on strange fuel level readings 1. Air (O2) (from vents in the wing)

2. Fuel in sucient quan'ty (around 200 litres of avia'on kerosene
Instruments recovered from wreckage indicated in empty tank.
signs of electrical shor'ng
3. Igni'on source (electrical fault) or heat

However, for a gas or dust explosion to occur we need correct

stoichiometry
77 78

13
 08/12/15

So why not explode on the ground

at JFK before take-o?

Shepherd, J. Jet A Explosion Experiments, Cal. Inst. Tech, Nov. 21, 1997 79
www.galicit.caltech.edu

This fuel had a ash

The ash point of kerosene is from 38 65oC and the Athens point at 1 Atm. of 43oC
fuel was towards the lower end of this, possible around 45oC. Ground but at 13600 m a fuel
Bara
temperature of 35oC is
climb

Al'tude
only required for lean
As the plane climbed and gained al'tude the pressure dropped <TWA 800 limit igni'on. This is
and this was transmifed to lower pressure in the centre wing Close to the TWA Flight
Pressure

800 explosion condi'ons

tank through the tank air vents at the wing 'ps.
LEAN RICH

LIMIT LIMIT
The lower pressure allowed more fuel vapour to be produced
and at 13,600m the pressure was low enough for the ash point Zabitakis and Richmond
to be achieved and enough vapour was present for the electrical 4th Symp. Int. on Comb.
fault to ignite the mixture and blow up the plane. 30 40 p.121-126, 1953
Temperature oC

Flammability limits approached from the lean side.
81 82

Conclusions
As the plane climbs the ambient pressure decreases and this
The plane ew in from Athens where the centre wing tank had decreases the pressure in the vapour space of the fuel tank.
been lled. The return ight was to Paris and the centre wing This reduces the mass of air in the tank, but has no inuence on the
tank needed no fuel for this shorter ight and it was nearly mass of fuel that is present as liquid plus vapour.
empty. The plane was delayed on the ground with the air The net eect is that the overall mixture in the tank becomes richer
condi'oners on (ACM). These dissipated heat into the centre as the aircram climbs and at a par'cular al'tude for a given star'ng
wing tank. The external temperature was 21C and the fuel was fuel temperature will enter the ammable range from the lean
side.
es'mated to have been heated to around 37C by the ACM.
The reduc'on in air pressure as the aircram climbs makes it more
There was an electrical fault thought to be in a fuel level gauge, likely that a ammable mixture will form as the mass of air is
but this did not ignite the vapour on the ground. reduced so that less fuel needs to vaporise.
Outside lean ammability limits. The eect of the reduced pressure is to make more fuel vaporise
and so there are two factors that make an explosion more likely at
al'tude.
83 84

14
 08/12/15

Boeing produced design modica'ons for exis'ng aircram to

reduce the CWT hea'ng from the ACMs.
1. Insula'on of the CWT skin panels 400 sq m. This would be Ques'on
done by installing 22 insula'on blankets xed together with Why did the explosion not occur on the trip from Athens?
Velcro. This added 26 pounds of weight, which was minimal.
2. Insula'on of the air bleed ducts 93m of 7 inch dia. Bleed
ducts beneath the CWT. This would be achieved by placing 16
blanket sec'ons and tying them to the circumference of the
ducts with bre glass tape. This added 13 pounds of weight.
3. Cooling of the CWT panel surface with the use of ouvlow
exhaust air from the ACMs. Fibreglass panels would be used to
direct the ow of the cool air under the CWT. This would add
100 pounds of weight.
85 86

gate hold
Ques'on ascent
Why did the explosion not occur on the trip from Athens? ascent descent

cruise explosion

The last 16 hours of service of the TWA Boeing 747.

It had own in from Athens (10 hours). The fuel in the Centre Wing Tank (CWT) was used rst
and was then empty for most of the ight. The CWT was not relled in New York and hence
the residual fuel in the CWT was that lled in Athens.
87 88

Example of test rig for

studying explosion
Explosion tes'ng in spherical vessels behaviour



169 ml vessel
Dahoe et al 2005.
Very small.

89 90

15
 08/12/15

Explosion Pressure Rise in Closed Vessels

Pm/Pi Why does the pressure rise not occur un'l the ame is roughly half
This shows
the pressure
way across the vessel diameter?

rise in a The previous pressure 'me diagram shows a period of low pressure
9.5
sphere with rise for roughly half the 'me of the explosion.
central
igni'on. If it is assumed that the ame propagates at a constant rate then
About half Methane/Air
half the ame travel 'me occurs with lifle pressure rise.
the total Stoichiometric If the ame is half way across the sphere it has burned 1/8 of the
Explosion dP/dtmax
'me is
KG = dP/dtmax.V0.33 volume and the density of the burned gases is at constant pressure
25oC
at low ini'al
= 40 bar/s 2.94 about 1/7 of the unburned gases. Thus the mass of the original
= 118 bar m/s mixture burned in half the travel @me is 1/(8 x 7) or 1/56 or about
pressure.
3.65m dia.
2% of the original mass. The pressure rise in a closed vessel is
Sphere directly propor@onal to the mass of the original mixture that has
25.5 m3 burned and hence only 2% of the adiaba@c pressure rise will have
occurred.
91 92

If all the pressure rise occurs in the last half of the vessel radius
then the @me to burn this, assuming that the burning velocity Note that the peak pressure only achieves the adiaba'c
remains constant is: theore'cal value if there are no heat losses. This
(D/4)/Ss = (D/4) / UL E, where E is the adiaba@c expansion ra@o means that only a sphere can achieve this with
which is the density ra@o. central igni'on, as in all other shapes the ame will
Thus KG ~ [Pm UL E / (D/4)] V1/3 ~ 4 x 0.806 Pm UL E touch the wall before all the mixture has burnt.
Note that V = /6 D3 Wall Impingement
Now for methane Pm ~ 8bar, UL = 0.4 and E ~ 7 before complete combusKon
IgniKon

KG ~ 4 x 0.806 x 8 x 0.4 x 7 ~ 72 bar m/s

The experimental value in the 3.65m3 sphere was
118 bar m/s which is signicantly higher, but the Bartknecht
value for KG is 55 bar m/s (see later). 93 94

KG , explosion constant for a gas

KG=(dP/dt)maxV0.33

Also, near the ammability limits where the ame
rises under buoyancy the ame is distorted and is no (dP/dt)max = maximum rate of pressure rise during explosion
V = vessel volume
longer a sphere. Also it touches the top of the vessel
well before it has burnt all the mixture and the KG is used to characterise the reac'vity of a gas explosion
adiaba'c pressure is never achieved. in the USA NFPA 68 explosion ven'ng guidance. It was
developed by Bartknecht in Germany and is the basis of the
new European standard on explosion ven'ng.
So, even in spherical vessels there con be wall eects
It is an alterna've fundamental parameter that reects the
on combus'on and pressure mixture reac'vity. It is directly related to UL.
In explosion protec'on KG is being used in preference to UL
and you should be aware of this.
95 96

16
 08/12/15

Zabetakis
Sketch the varia'on of pressure with 'me for a spherical vessel
US Bureau Mines
BylleKn 627, 1 965
constant volume explosion. Explain why ini'ally there appears to be
lifle pressure rise un'l about half the total explosion 'me has A cylinder has a lower
elapsed. peak pressure than
Dene the explosion characterisa'on parameter KG and give its a sphere due to the
ame contac'ng the
recommended value for methane/air.
wall before all the
Es'mate KG from the burning velocity UL in a spherical vessel, state mixture is burnt. The
your assump'ons. explosion is then not
adiaba'c due to heat
losses.
See the previous slides for this proof.

97 98

Explosion Pressure Rise in Closed Vessels


Adiaba'c closed vessel explosion peak/ini'al pressure ra'os

Methane Propane Ethylene Hydrogen

10% 6% 4.5% 2.7% 7.5% 3.2% 40% 10%
Pm/Pi 8.9 6.8 9.6 7.6 9.7 6.4 7.8 3.7

Note that just inside the lean limit the adiaba'c

pressure rise is very high. This is not achieved in
prac'ce due to heat losses from the slow buoyant
99 ames near the limits. 100
Zabetakis, US BM, 1965

Explosion Pressure Rise in Closed Vessels G.E. Vanderstraeten et al., J. Hazardous Maaterials, Vol. 56, p. 237-246, 1997
Andrews Checkel et al., J. Loss PrevenKon Process Ind., 8, 215, 1995
PhD 1972 Bartknecht, Explosions, 1993.
8 U.Leeds

Claessen et al., Proc. 5th Int. Symp. Loss Prev., Cannes, 1986 Spherical bomb
8 litres
305mm 248mm dia.
Pm/Pi Dia.
Cylinder
L/D=1
4 Vessel 2

Equivalence Ra'o
0.5 0.6 1 1.5
1

% methane in air
Maximum pressure/ini'al pressure ra'o as a func'on
of the mixture strength. 101 102

17
 08/12/15

5 litre sphere the basis for the use of a 5 litre

sphere for ammability measurements.
Bartknecht, Explosions, Springer-Verlag, 1993, p.52

Note that the 20 and 120 litre spheres

have dierent max. KG at ~60 and
~90 bar m/s respec'vely. This
illustrates that this so called
constant is not a constant and yet
the European ven'ng standards
assume that it is with a value of 55
For the Bartknect 5 litre sphere!
Note also that near the limits the
Smaller vessel has higher pressures
e.g. at 5% and 16% the 20 litre vessel
has a 1 bar overpressure. Limit is
4.5% for 20 litres and 5% for 120 litres.

Cashdollar et al.,
J. Loss PrevenKon in the Process 103
Industries 13, 327-340, 2000

105

18