PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E.

Santos | UP Law B2012

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Professor E. A. Pangalangan

Karichi Santos |UP Law B2012

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

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Beware of false knowledge; it is more dangerous than ignorance. - George Bernard Shaw

Caveat lector.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

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A. Intersection of Modern Constitutional Developments and Traditional Family Law
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
Sec 12, Art II The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection Cases
GRISWOLD v CONNECTICUT (1964) 381 U.S. 479 Griswold, Executive Director of the planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and its medical director as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife s use. Griswold said the statute violates the 14th Amendment (due process clause) Purpose of the statute was to discourage extra marital relations and it only prohibits distribution of contraceptives and not manufacture or sale ISSUES: 1. WON the appellants have the standing to assert constitutional rights of people to marital privacy 2. WON the contraceptive ban statute violates right of marital privacy (from the right of liberty) HELD: Although not stated in the Bill of Rights, it is included in the penumbra of rights afforded to the citizens. It also sweeps unnecessarily broadly and does not prove to be a sufficient method of family planning. It deprived married people the due process of law by including people who are not meant to be included. Statute struck down as unconstitutional. * What if the couples intention for using contraceptive was for medical purposes and family planning? * Does it mean that people only use contraceptive when they are having extra-marital affairs? And that if they don t have access to contraceptives, they will no longer engage in extra-marital affair? EISENSTADT v BAIRD (1971) 405 US 438 Baird was arrested for violation of Massachusetts law by exhibiting contraceptive devices and giving a contraceptive foam to a woman when he ended his lecture at Boston University. The statute prohibited the sale, lending or giving away of contraceptives unless prescribed by a physician to married people. Its purpose is to discourage fornication (pre-marital sex) and prevent spread of sexually transmitted disease. However, the medical policy was a mere afterthought, amended after the Griswold decision in 1966 ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for denying equal protection to unmarried people HELD: Yes. It violates due process clause by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated. The deterrence of fornication cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute since it is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely

Sec 14, Art II The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Art XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution Sec 1 The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. Sec 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Sec 3 The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. Sec 4 The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security.

Sec 1, Art III No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

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available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope and penalty structure is inconsistent with that purpose. The protection of public health cannot also be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the statute since if this were the case, it would be discriminatory and overbroad. It would appear that only married people are protected from the evil which it intends to suppress i.e. STD. - Depriving unmarried people with contraceptive devices is tantamount to punishing them with the risk of having illegitimate children for fornication. So all the more that unmarried people should be given access to contraceptives. 2 TESTS THAT JUSTIFY LAWFUL STATE INTRUSION INTO THE FAMILY 1. 2. Is there a compelling state interest in regulating people s rights? Is there a fit between the state interest and the measure taken?

*In both Griswold and Eisenstadt cases, there was no fit between the state interest and the measure taken. The means employed are not sufficient deterrent of the evils sought to avoid.

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STATUS the legal condition or class to which one belongs in society; the legal or juridical position of the individual in the society; determines the nature and number of his rights and obligation KINDS OF STATUS A. as a member of society - resident or non-resident - alien or non-citizen B. as a member of family - single, married or divorced - parent or child; brother or sister - legitimate, illegitimate or adopted C. as himself - age - sex - mental condition - occupation (not a status because not inherent) CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS 1. inalienable 2. imprescriptible 3. can t be renounced 4. can t be subject to compromise 5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by creditors

relations Indivisible and inherent Can exist without capacity to act

effects Conditional and voidable Requires both (1) intelligence and (2) will. Capacity is always presumed

KINDS OF PERSONS NATURAL - human beings - products of procreation Natural Persons
CC, Art 40 Birth determines personality; but the conceived shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.

JURIDICAL - artificial, abstract - product of legal fiction

CHARACTERISTICS OF FETAL PERSONALITY 1. limited because it only has rights for purposes favorable to it 2. provisional/conditional because it should be born alive later before the rights can be claimed. But when is it considered born alive? Refer to Art. 41, CC Birth = total separation from the mother or removal of fetus in from mother s womb by cutting off the umbilical cord 3. But it can enjoy rights like inherit from will or intestacy and be given donations even before birth
CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within 24 hours after its complete delivered from the maternal womb.

A. Concept and Classes of Persons
CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL PERSONALITY 1. not a being, but a quality of certain beings 2. not a physical element, but a juridical concept 3. not an object of contract, or of possession, cannot be impaired by agreement 4. matter of public interest PERSONALITY v CAPACITY (These two concepts are intimately related but not identical) Personality is: is product of capacity in law external manifestation of capacity synonymous to juridical capacity Generally, cannot be limited Specifically, may suffer limitations because it s merely the result of capacity to act
CC, Art 37 Juridical capacity, which is fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. Juridical Capacity <- CIVIL CAPACITY -> Capacity to Act Art 37 Aptitude to holding and Aptitude to exercise of rights enjoyment of rights Fitness to be subject of legal Power to do acts with legal




If intrauterine life < 7 months, then the fetus must live for 24 hours (even if life is machine sustained only) Otherwise, even if death is by accident without which fetus could have survived (e.g. the janitor accidentally tripped on the incubator or life support s plug and caused the fetus death), kahit 22 hours pa yan, it will not be considered alive No special sign of life required. Though complete respiration may be indicated by crying or floating of lungs (which you can only do in case of death) Viability (complete and independent functioning of internal organs) not required In case of doubt, there is presumption that the child was born alive

GELUZ v CA (1961) 2 SCRA 801 - Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio Geluz which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of - Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art 2206 which CA sustained

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ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for the death of the unborn fetus? HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. *According to Ma am: In the Philippines, people who seek pecuniary damages for loss of relatives are seen in a negative light. It gives the impression that you re just after the money. But it should not be the case.
CC, Art 42 Civil personality is extinguished by death.

CC, Art 43 If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

Rule 123 of Sec 60 of Revised Rules of Court resorted to only if there are no inferential/circumstantial evidences to be inferred from 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Both under 15 Both over 60 Under 15 and over 60 Between 15 60 Under 15/over 60 & bet older younger younger male or if same sex, older between the 15 and 60

y Applicable only when (1) calamity & (2) involves succession y Weakness of Rule 123 according to Ma am: Since this presumption is based on strength, age and sex of individuals discrimination between close ages is not accurately represented e.g. who will survive between 12 and 15 years old considering they have approximately the same level of strength?


Death means natural or physical death, as there no such thing as civil death in the Philippines Rights and obligations are completely extinguished, while others are transmitted to his successors After the death, personality is deemed to continue to estate

PEOPLE v TIROL (1981) 102 SCRA 558 Kosain Manipol and his family were sleeping when he heard the dog bark. When he went to investigate, two persons have already come up to their house, asking if they can borrow his land. After he gave his consent, Kulas arrived, flashed the light in his face and punched him. When he fell, the assailant s companions (more than 10 armed men) came in hacked him and his wife and 7 children. His wife and six of the kids died. Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons, they filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died. ISSUE: WON Baldesco can still be held liable for his offense HELD: Court dismissed the criminal case since Baldesco is already dead. However, Baldesco s personality is continued in his estate (Art 42) hence the civil liabilities will be recovered from his estate.

JOAQUIN v NAVARRO (1953) 93 Phil 7 Summary proceeding to resolve the order of deaths of Joaquin Navarro, JR and his mother Angela Navarro Setting: World War II. Battle of Manila is considered as a calamity. Also mentioned in the story was the neighbor Francisco Lopez and three other daughters who were shot while trying to escape It is necessary to establish succession because if JN Jr. died first, his heirs are not entitled to inherit from their grandparents. Refer to the case for explanation of the probable causes and speculated circumstances of their death (too many to enumerate here, refer to original!) ISSUE: Who between the mother and the son died first? HELD: Inference can be derived from the evidences so no need to use presumption. That the mother (Angela) died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art 43 speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.

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Juridical Persons
Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) and laws governing them (CC, Art 45) 1) state and its political subdivisions governed by the laws creating or recognizing them 2) other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest created by laws governed by the laws creating or recognizing them 3) corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member stock or non-stock governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnership


not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of executing a bond such as that in question. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue for so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in this case.

2. Restrictions
CC, Art 6 Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

CC, Art 47 Dissolution of No 2 - in pursuance of law or the charter creating them

B. Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon
1. Presumption of Capacity
STANDARD OIL CO. v ARENAS (1911) 19 Phil 363 1908 Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety for Codina Arenas in favor of plaintiff 1909 The plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in default. Wife appeared when judgment was about to be executed and asked that he be relieved from the bond and the judgment because he was insane (declared insane by July 24, 1909) with his wife as his guardian. Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed that Villanueva executed the bond with full understanding of the nature and consequences of the act performed by him although he was suffering from a monomania of great wealth. He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence appealed to the SC. ISSUE: 1. WON monomania of wealth necessarily warrants that the person does not have capacity to act 2. WON Villanueva was actually incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed HELD: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. It would have been necessary to show that 1. such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient; 2. that the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was not, or could there have been any other cause for the contract than the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of wealth; 3. that the monomania existed on the date the bond in question was executed. Monomania of wealth does

CC, Art 38 Minority, insanity/imbecility, state of being deafmute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restriction on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts of from property relations.

still civilly liable although criminally not liable can have obligation except for contracts SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS (obligations arise from ) 1. law 4. crimes/delicts 2. contracts 5. quasi-delicts 3. quasi-contracts 6. torts REINTEGRATION OF CAPACITY 1. upon reaching age of majority 2. civil interdiction, extinction of principal penalty 3. judicially determined competence without guardian (for the first two, no need for court proceeding) An incapacitated person is not exempt from obligations civilly liable but not criminally liable. This is kind of confusing because he is excluded from all except contracts , BUT what exactly is not a contract
CC, Art 39 Modify, limit or restrict 1. age (minority) 2. insanity 3. imbecility 4. state of being deaf-mute 5. penalty 6. prodigality capacity to act 7. alienage 8. absence 9. family relations 10. trusteeship 11. insolvency

A. Minority
RA 6809 - Lowers the age of majority from 21 to 18 Contracts Art 1327 (1) unemancipated minors cannot give consent to contract no more concept of uneman-cipated minors because age of emancipation = majority Art 1390 (1) if one is incapable of contract, valid unless courts says otherwise VOIDABLE

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Art 1403 (3) if both is incapable UNENFORCEABLE unless ratified Art 1397 capacitated party cannot allege the incapacity of other parties Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not benefited MERCADO v ESPIRITU (1917) 37 Phil 215 Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado were minors (under the Civil Code), 18 and 19 years old respectively, on the date the instrument (sale of land to their uncle) was executed so they seek for annulment of contract. However, in the deed of sale they stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it; and they made the same manifestation before the notary public when the document was prepared. ISSUE: WON the dead of sale was invalid because the contractors are minors HELD: No. The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors who have already passed the age of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age, when they pretend to have already reached their majority, while in fact, they have not, is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. Their misrepresentation estopped them from claiming the invalidity of the contract. Art 1390, CC binding at the discretion of the Court. It does not favor the offender, come to Court with clean hands. BAMBALAN v MARAMBA (1966) 51 Phil 417 Isidro Bambalan, a minor, executed a deed of sale of a piece of land to the defendant, Genoveva Muerong. Bambalan made no representation as to his age, which was well known to the defendant, inasmuch as the latter was the one who purchased the plaintiff s cedula to be used in the acknowledgement of the document before a notary public. Plaintiff now seeks to annul the sale. ISSUE: WON a minor s non-representation of his age and knowledge of the other contracting party as to the incapacity of the minor may render the sale void HELD: Yes. The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. Mercado v Espiritu doctrine is not applicable in this case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him to be a minor. BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE (1959) 105 Phil 456 Rosario along with her two sons (Guillermo and Rodolfo) loaned 70,000 Mickey Mouse money from respondent saying they ll pay him equivalent amount after the war.


They did not disclose the age of the sons so the respondent willingly gave them the amount they were asking for.

ISSUES: WON non-disclosure of a minor s age may render the deed void and WON the recipients are obliged to restitute what they earned HELD: There was no misrepresentation of age, so it cannot constitute fraud. But since they benefited from the amount, they should return it because of Art 1399, CC. Marriage Art 35 (1), FC void ab initio Art 5, FC male or female of the age of 18 may contract marriage


Art 12, RPC Periods of responsibility 9 and below* absolute irresponsibility 9 to 15* conditional responsibility *raised to 15 such that age of discernment is 15-18 -- unless with discernment: (a) manner of committing (b) conduct of the offender -- for mitigated responsibility, penalty is one degree lower

B. Insanity
Contracts Art 1327 (2) insane/demented cannot give consent to contract Art 1328 (1) contracted in a lucid interval is valid, but burden to prove lucid interval on prosecution Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not benefited Crime Art 12(1) not exempt from criminal liability if lucid interval PRESUMPTION OF SANITY a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient b) insanity must prove to precede the act

C. State of being deaf-mute
Art 1327 Art 807 deaf-mute who are no read, no write cannot give consent to contract deaf-mute may write a will but if no read, no write can designate two (2) persons who would communicate to him the contents deaf-mute cannot witness a will because he won t be able to testify properly in court if ever the need arises

Art 820

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D. Prodigality
Art 92 (2), RC wanton waste of one s estate; without regard for family exposing them to want and depriving inheritance; morbid state of mind and disposition to spend

F. Family Relations
Art 37, FC incestuous marriage Art 87, FC donation inter vivos not allowed bet spouses Art 215, FC disqualified to testify against each other unless indispensable to crime against him/another grand/parent Art 1109, CC prescription does not run between husband and wife, parent and child (minority or insanity), guardian and ward Art 1490, CC spouses cannot sell property to each other unless: (a) separation of property in marriage settlement (b) judicial separation of property

MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ (1902) 1 Phil 182 Pedro Martinez Ilustre appeal after CA rejected his petition for declaring his dad, Francisco, a prodigal He was given by dad special powers of attorney but dad revoked it because son is mismanaging their estate Son accused dad of splurging and squandering their properties by giving donation to his second wife and her family ISSUE: WON Francisco should be declared prodigal HELD: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. The testimony of the plaintiff was insufficient to support his allegations against his father. There was no evidence to show his father has been transferring by sale or mortgage any property, which will reflect in the city record of public deeds. The court found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate. In fact, the father has increased profit while the son himself possesses propensity to be prodigal.

G. Absence
Art 390, CC after 7 years a person is presumed dead for all purposes except succession; if 75, 5 yrs only Art 391, CC if there is a danger of death (4 yrs only) (a) vessel lost at sea or missing airplane (b) member of military or armed force in war (c) other circumstances of danger of death Art 124, FC if one spouse is incapacitated, other spouse may assume power of administration

E. Civil Interdiction
Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Art 54, CC Any male of the age of sixteen years upwards, and any female of the age fourteen years or upwards, not under any the impediments mentioned in Articles 80 84, may contract marriage. (2) or of of to

Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements executed by any person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced, the presence and participation of the guardian shall be indispensable, who for this purpose shall be designated by a competent court, in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. Art 11.2, RPC Art 13.5, RPC Justifying circ: in defense of family Mitigating circ: immediate vindication

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Breach of promise to marry
CC Art 19 Every person must, in exercise of rights and performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone else his due, and observe honesty and good faith. CC Art 20 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. CC Art 21 Any person who willfully causes loss o injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. CC Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter.

assured returning soon. But he never returned and was never heard from again. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable HELD: This is not the case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 NCC. Defendant is liable for actual damages, as well as to moral and exemplary damages. Judgment affirmed with modifications (on amount of damages). TANJANCO v CA (1966) 18 SCRA 994 Arceli Santos and Apolinario Tanjanco are sweethearts. Because of the man s promise to marry the woman, they continually had sexual relationship with each other for a span of one year with the woman s consent. When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child to give her support plus moral and exemplary damages of P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFI decision. ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21 HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts stand out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. If she had been deceived, she would not have again yield to his embraces, much less for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better. Hence no case is made under Art 21. DE JESUS v SYQUIA (1933) 58 Phil 866 Cesar Syquia courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20 years old. Amorous relations resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived together for one year until Antonio got pregnant again after which Cesar left to marry another woman. Cesar recognized his paternity of first child in writing with a letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession of natural child status for one year Woman files for action for damages for breach of promise and recognition of the child. ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages for breach of promise to marry and kids to paternal support

BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE (1) property (2) expectation (cultural and societal) they used to value marriage as the only goal. Impairs honor and purity of the deserted party Why is there no success in claiming damages for breach of promise to marry? No source of obligation because marriage is purely voluntary and not compulsory. It should be freely entered into without any threat. People marry because of love, so it cannot be imposed and thus there is no legal basis for action. In the olden days, women are seen as used merchandise when their sweethearts abandon them. Their chances of getting married after being rejected become slimmer. Marriage was the only goal of women. Things are different now, especially since women can have careers. No more pressure to marry!

Breach of promise to marry is a quasi-delict (refer back to Sources of Obligations in Restrictions on Capacity to Act)

WASSMER v VELEZ (1964) 12 SCRA 648 Two days before the wedding (meaning everything about the wedding was already set, as well as bridal showers and gifts) the groom Francisco Velez suddenly flew to his home in Cagayan de Oro, leaving the bride, Beatriz Wassmer, only this note: will have to postpone wedding my mother opposes it. The next day (day before the wedding) he sent this message through telegram: Nothing changed rest

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HELD: Promise to marry not satisfactorily proved so the trial court was right in refusing to grant De Jesus prayer. Also, action for breach of promise to marry has no standing for civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such action. - Antonia de Jesus only entitled to the support of the first child because of Cesar s prior recognition. No support for the second child because no proof of paternity or recognition presented. PICCININNI v HAJUS (1980) 180 Conn. 369 Marie Hajus fraudulently induced Robert Piccininni (yes, the tennis player) to transfer properties to her name for their mutual benefit and enjoyment as future husband and wife. Husband does not sue for her not marrying him but for cajoling him into transferring property in her name ISSUE: WON the property is recoverable under Heartbalm statute because the wife did not marry him HELD: Yes because marital gifts are conditional until after marriage so recoverable. Ban on Heartbalm statutes only for issues of the heart like anguish, moral damages, failed expectation of financial and social gains. In this case, the petition is for recovery of unjust enrichment of deferring wife.

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FC, Art 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with the law, for the establishment of family and conjugal life. It is the foundation of family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by the law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

HELD: Unconstitutional for many reasons. As for the state interests: 1) Counseling also is not even an assurance of permission 2) Protect welfare of out custody children to compel collection and incentive to delivery of money to prior children but there are also other means like wage assignment, civil contempt proceedings or criminal penalty 3) Prevent incurring of new obligation under inclusive because new marriage is not the only way people spend their resources, over inclusive because they could be marrying to a better financed couple. Also it only adds more children out of wedlock. *According to Ma am Beth: implication of the ban only those economically stable may marry and this violates equal protection clause

COMMIT TO MEMORY!!! LOVING v VIRGINIA (1967) 388 US 1, 12 Mildred Loving (of African and Native American descent) marries Richard Perry Loving (a Caucasian) in violation of Virginia s Racial Integrity Act which is an anti-miscegenation statute that prohibits Whites from marrying into other races Interesting phrase: Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, Malay and red and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. The statute fuels White Supremacy because only Whites are forbidden to intermarry, other races can marry anyone ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for violation of both the equal protection and due process clauses of 14th Amendment HELD: Yes. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. Decisions SC and CA of Virginia are reversed. ZABLOCKI v REDHAIL (1978) 434 US 374, 384 Thomas Zablocki was denied marriage license because of non-support to prior children. Even if he marries outside their state, it will still not be valid. The state interest of this statute was to protect the welfare of out of custody children and prevent incurrence of new obligation by the illegitimate parent. The parent must first prove that he can sustain his two families and should undergo counseling. ISSUE: WON statute is unconstitutional for violation of equal protection and due process clauses

A. Marriage Models
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE 1. civil (independent of any religion) 2. institute of public order and policy 3. natural (organic perpetuation of man) PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE 1. emancipation from parental authority 2. personal and economic relations between spouses 3. personal and economic relations between parent & child 4. family relationship 5. legitimacy of sexual union and family 6. modification of criminal liability 7. incapacity to make donations to each other 8. disqualification to testify against each other MARRIAGE ORDINARY CONTRACTS Only between man and May be same sex woman Specified duties and rights of Have the force of law spouses between them May not be subject to Can be terminated at the stipulation or terminated agreement of parties Breech of obligation not Breach of contract gives rise actionable to action for damages *In both marriage and ordinary contracts, party s consent is necessary TERMS OF A TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1) husband as head of family name and domicile (2) husband responsible for support (3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare services GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) (pronounced as /grahm/) 33 F. Supp. 936 James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his former wife, Margrethe, defendant, to recover what he was allegedly entitled by a written agreement wherein defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain some of money.

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The agreement was that the wife asked husband to quit his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to which he agreed as long as she will pay him $300 each month. The monthly payment is to be in force until the parties no longer desire the agreement.



Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares separated for 9 consecutive years, want to remarry so they sought the aid of Atty. Roque Santiago He instituted a document that waives whatever right of action one might have against each other but realized mistake after 19 days and cancelled the document

ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the wife to continue paying her husband the $300 HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriage contract specifies that it s the husband s duty or obligation to support and live with his wife, and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in his choice of domicile. Also, a private agreement between persons married or about to be married whereby they attempt to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract is contrary to public policy. BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872) 93 US (16 wall) 130 Myra Bradwell was denied license to practice law JUST BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE. That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action and that it belonged to men to make, apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth Amazing they were able to talk to God directly. Prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment DUNN v PALERMO (1975) 522 S. W. 2d 679 Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes. Tennessee had a state-wide compulsory Registration Law. Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that she was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged from the registration list. Upon her refusal to so register, her name was purged from the registration list. Hence this action. ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to change name upon marriage HELD: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and the choice is hers. So long as a person s name remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribed manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to name used. *According to Ma am Beth the legal name of any person is the one written on the birth certificate (CC, Art 370) IN RE SANTIAGO (1940) 70 Phil 66

ISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses legitimately terminated the marital tie between them. HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be stipulated by the parties. Santiago guilty of malpractice and suspended for 1 year. SELANOVA v MENDOZA (1975) 64 SCRA 69 Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of Saturnino Selanova and Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit against the other. This document was also acknowledged before him as City Judge and Notary Public Ex Officio. Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law. ISSUE: WON marriage is valid HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221. Even before the enactment of the NCC, this court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage without judicial approval secured beforehand was void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they shall remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law and consequently not judicially recognizable. Respondent is severely censured. ASSUMPTIONS OF FAMILY LAW (Weitzman article) 1. Marriage is a permanent, indissoluble, lifetime commitment 2. First marriages (young & no previous marriages) 3. Main reason is procreation 4. Strict division of labor 5. White middle-class family (property and inheritance) 6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy)

B. Requisites of Marriage
A. Legal capacity
a. b. c. Sex (must be between man and woman) Age 18 and above (Art 5) No impediment which means: intrinsic (Art 2)

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(1) no previous marriage (2) family relations (not incestuous) JONES v HALLAHAN (1973) 501 S. W. 2d 588 Marjorie Jones and her female partner were not issued a license to marry each other in the state of Kentucky. They contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the marriage license deprived them of three (3) basic constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of association; and the right to free exercise of religion. Appellants also contend that the refusal subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment. ISSUE: WON same sex marriage violates constitutional rights to marry HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally protected right. Two females cannot marry for marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman. It appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by the statute of Kentucky but rather by their own incapacity of entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of entering is a nullity. Definition of marriage says, union of a man and a woman. Thus, in the court s opinion, there is not constitutional issue involved, since there is no constitutional sanction which protects the right of marriage between persons of the same sex. GOODRIDGE v DEPT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003) 440 Mass. 309 14 individuals (7 couples) were deprived of marriage license because they were the same sex They are professionals and active in socio-civic activities, there was longevity in the relationship and defendants were involved (adopted children and parents) They met all facial qualifications, list of impediment was not presented by civil registrar (to prove that same sex marriage is one of them) LEGISLATIVE RATIO: 1. favorable setting for procreation 2. optimal setting for child rearing 3. conserving scarce state and private financial resources ISSUE: 1. WON licensing law treats same sex as impediment presented by the plaintiff 2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate exercise of the State s authority to regulation conduct Court HELD: Marriage is a secular institution. No religious ceremony is required. There are only 3 partners (2 spouses and the State who defines the entry and exit terms) PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT: 1. law does not distinguish children s family background so why deprive children the rights



when they did not choose to be born/grow up in such a family (coitus v non coitus, e.g. adoption or assisted), failed to address the changing realities of American society 2. best interest of the child parent s sexual orientation 3. homosexuals are well off and economically independent, anyway, the same is not condition/requirement for heterosexual couples. IMPLICATION OF PROHIBITION: deprivation of protection, benefits, obligations and rights exclusive to married people same reason why these couples want the benefit of marriage They do not undermine marriage, In fact, they appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by asking for it! Statute declared unconstitutional

SILVERIO v REPUBLIC (2007) 537 SCRA 273 Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change his name to Mely and sex entry in his birth certificate from male to female because of his sex reassignment (transgender). RTC granted in 2003 CA reversed in 2006 ISSUE: WON he is entitled to the change of name action HELD: NO! 1. Names are for purposes of identification: Art 376, CC (no change of name without judicial declaration), RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), Rule 103 (change of name) and Rule 108 (Cancellation of Correction of Entries; substantial change) 2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048) a. Difficult and ridiculous, dishonorable name b. Habitual and continual use c. To avoid confusion 3. Petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause and does not show that his name may prejudice him 4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary 5. Change of sex not allowed because civil status is immutable and inherent 6. No special law yet for sex change, until then sex is determined by the sex at the time of birth as resulted by visual inspection of medical attendant. 7. Though we get your point and sympathize with you, it s not within the province of the Court to amend laws. You re barking at the wrong tree. Go to the Congress and ask them to pass a bill for you.

B. Consent freely given in the presence of solemnizing officer
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927) 51 Phil 68 Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wife s niece Felicita Masilang, 18, to accompany him on an errand Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality of San Leonardo, Satinago expressed his sexual desire to

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which girl declined, but he persisted on with force against her will The two proceeded to accused s uncle house, Agapito Santiago who called a Protestant minister to conduct a wedding. After the wedding, Santiago sent home the girl with some money to buy bread.


extrinsic (Art 3)

A. Authority of solemnizing officer
- Who may authorize the marriage (Art 7) a. incumbent member of judiciary b. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any religious sect - duly recognized by the religion, - registered in Civil Registry - acting within the limit of his authority - at least one of the spouses is member of the sect c. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31 d. military commander to which chaplain is assigned in Art 32 e. consul-general, consul, vice-consul for Filipinos abroad *Mayors are authorized by LGC to solemnize marriage NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996) 259 SCRA 129 Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court s jurisdiction. He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, but the marriage was solemnized in Dapa which does not fall under his jurisdictional area. Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this administrative complaint. ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable, and whether this will render the marriage void. HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court s jurisdiction. Solemnization outside the judge s territorial jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage. What results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid marriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FC as defense for the exercise of his misplaced authority, acted in gross ignorance of the law and was therefore held administratively liable suspension of 6 months. - Irregularity in formal requisite no effect in marriage validity ARAÑES v OCCIANO (2002) 380 SCRA 402 Petitioner Mercedita Arañes charged respondent judge Salvador Occiano for gross ignorance of the law. Occiano solemnized the marriage between herein petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Couple lived together as husband and wife until the death of Orobia. But then since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner s right to inherit the vast property left by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained that he solemnized the marriage out of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their license the afternoon after the wedding. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administratively liable.

ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him from criminal liability HELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiago s behavior before and after the marriage, there is no serious intention to marry the girl except for to avoid criminal liability for the rape case. - Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of consent (essential requisite) which makes the marriage void BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941) 72 Phil 19 Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a virgin. 89 days after the marriage celebration, Luida gave birth. Her husband Godofredo herein appellant filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her non-virginity. ISSUE: WON marriage is valid HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of marriage. Court refuses to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such condition must have been patent to the husband. EIGENMANN v GUERRA (1964) 5 C.A. Rep. 836 Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on 1957. Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between ages 16-20 at that time and his mother did not give her consent to the marriage. ISSUE: WON there was parental consent, the absence of which could render the marriage void. HELD: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmann s mother was present at the time of the celebration of marriage and did not object thereto, such that consent can be gleaned from such act. - Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a minor at the time of the marriage celebration, having represented himself to be over 25 years of age. Art 4 Absence of any essential or formal void, except Art 35(2) Defect in the essential requirement voidable (Art 45) Irregularity in the formal requirement no effect in validity, but the parties responsible will be civilly, criminally or administratively liable

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HELD: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license and for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a stern warning by the SC that repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt more severely. The absence of a marriage license made the marriage void. And even if the plaintiff retracted her complaint, that s not how it is done. Withdrawal of complaint exoneration

Art 19 Art 20 Art 21

Art 22

B. Valid marriage license except for marriages of exceptional character
ML obtained in habitual residence of one of the parties Art 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages abroad settled in the consular office which will take over the duties of local civil registry Art 11 Two separate application for one marriage license which shall specify the following: 1. full name 2. place of birth 3. age and date of birth 4. civil status 5. if previously married, how, when, where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled 6. present residence and citizenship 7. degree of relationship of the contracting parties 8. full name, residence and citizenship of the father 9. full name, residence and citizenship of the mother 10. full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian, person having charge, in case orphaned Art 12 Proof of age a. original or certified copy of birth certificate b. original or certified copy of baptismal certif c. residence certificate witnessed by 2 witnesses preferably next of kin Proof of age dispensed with if: a. parents appear personally b. local civil registrar convinced by mere looking (read: mukhang matanda na) c. previously married Art 13 If previous marriages, not birthcert is required but: a. death certificate of deceased spouse if no death certificate is available, affidavit about circumstance and civil status b. judicial decree of absolute divorce/judicial decree of annulment/declaration of nullity c. declaration of presumptive death Art 14 if 18-21, then parental consent Art 15 if 21-25, then parental advice Art 16 if anyone is required with parental consent or advice, both shall undergo marriage counseling. Failure to attach certificate of accomplishment suspends issuance for 90 days. PD 965 (1976) mandatory family planning and responsible parenthood Art 17 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin board Art 18 impediments noted in the application for marriage Art 9

Art 23

Art 24

Art 25 Art 26

pay for issuance of ML; indigents exempted valid for 120 days anywhere in the Philippines, automatically cancelled at expiration Either or both are foreigners: certificate of legal capacity to marry from consular officials Stateless persons or refugees: affidavit showing capacity to marry Marriage certificate should state the following: a. full name, sex and age of each contracting party b. citizenship, religion and habitual residence c. date and precise time of the celebration of marriage d. marriage license number e. secured parental consent if needed f. complied with parental advice if needed g. if entered into marriage settlement, attach copy Duties of solemnizing officer a. furnish couple with original marriage certificate b. furnish local civil registrar with duplicate and triplicate within 15 days after the marriage c. keep with him the original marriage license, quadruplicate of the marriage certificate and affidavit of the contracting party to hold marriage elsewhere as said in Art 8 Duties of local civil registrar a. prepare documents required by this Title b. administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge c. exempt from documentary stamp tax log in registry book every marriage and details marriages validly solemnized in other countries are valid here except for the following: 35 (1) under 18 35 (4) bigamous/polygamous except for Art 41 35 (5) mistake of identity 35 (6) void under Art 53 36 psychological incapacity 37 incestuous 38 public policy

The following are exempted from obtaining marriage license Art 27 When either or both of the parties are in articulo mortis, even if the ailing survives (e.g. screenplay Walang Sugat) Art 28 If the residence of either party is in a remote location and transportation is impossible (horse ride and distant walking does not count) Art 31 Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crews by ship captain or airplane chief, whether in sea, in flight or stopovers Art 32 Military commander of a unit, in articulo mortis, between civilians or members of armed forces within the zone of military operations Art 33 Among Muslims and ethnic communities as long as in accordance with their custom law Art 34 Man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for five years and no legal impediment

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REPUBLIC v CA and Angelina Castro (1994) 236 SCRA 257 Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo Malvar. Their marriage was unknown to Castro s parents aka secret marriage. Defendant Cardenas was personally responsible for the processing of the documents, including the procurement of marriage license. Couple did not immediately live together, but only until Castro became pregnant. They parted ways after 4 months, thereafter she gave birth. Baby was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas, and is now in US. In trying to put into marital status in order before leaving to the US to follow her daughter, she sought a judicial declaration of nullity, having discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to marriage celebration. As proof Castro offered in evidence a certification (due search and inability to find despite diligence) from Pasig Civil Register that license number does not appear in the records. Cardenas failed to answer the complaint, thus was declared in default. ISSUE: WON proof of absence of marriage license presented by Castro as evidence is sufficient to render marriage void. HELD: Yes. 1. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. It was then sufficiently proved that civil registrar s office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. 2. The failure of Castro to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case secret marriage. 3. For his failure to answer despite notices, Cardenas was declared in default. Private respondent Castro cannot be faulted for her husband s lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. MORENO v BERNABE (1995) 246 SCRA 120 Marilou Moreno filed this administrative complaint against Judge Jose Bernabe for grave misconduct and ignorance of the law. She and Marcelo Moreno were married before Judge Bernabe. She averred the Bernabe assured her that the marriage contract will be released 10 days after October 4, 1993. She found out that she could not get her marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claimed that respondent judge connived with relatives of private respondent Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid and judge liable HELD: The marriage was void due to the absence of a marriage license. The Court affirmed the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator which investigated on

the case that respondent judge was liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. It also said that the respondent judge s claim of good intentions could never justify violation of the law. PEOPLE v BORROMEO (1984) 133 SCRA 106 Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide, claiming that he should only be charged with homicide since he and his partner were not legally married, there being no marriage contract executed during their church wedding. ISSUE: WON the absence of a marriage contract is sufficient to render a marriage void. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative, for the fact that no record of the marriage existed in the registry is not enough to invalidate the marriage. For as long as all the requisites for the marriage were present in the celebration thereof, the marriage subsists. Presumption is always for the validity of the marriage. - Also, during the trial, Elias Borromeo admitted that he was married to the victim. The Court took cognizance of this fact and articulated that there was no better proof of marriage than the admission of one of the parties of the existence of such marriage. Furthermore, the accused and victim have lived together as husband and wife and even had one child. Since the presumption of law is in favor of the marriage, all evidence points to Elias Borromeo's conviction of parricide. SEGUISABAL v CABRERA (1981) 106 SCRA 67 Judge Cabrera charged with gross ignorance of the law for having solemnized the marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without a marriage license. Judge's story: Contracting parties and their families came to him bearing a marriage contract. Their request to have the marriage officiated was of such urgency that the judge conceded after making them promise to deliver the marriage license that same afternoon. Unfortunately, no marriage license was delivered. About a year later, Marlyn Jagonoy went to see the judge, telling him she needed proof of her marriage to Jaime Sayson in order to secure the benefits accorded to Jaime's family after his death as a soldier. The judge gave a copy of the marriage contract to Jagonoy and told her to present the same to the local civil registrar and to have them issue her a marriage license. Local civil registrar naturally refused to issue said license ("for the reason that the parties have not attended the Family Planning seminar") HELD: Absent the formal requisite of a marriage license, the marriage was void. Judge should not have solemnized the marriage without first securing said license. Despite the assertions of good faith, the judge was fined an equivalent of his three months salary. ALCANTARA v ALCANTARA (2007) 531 SCRA 446

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Restituto and Rosita Alcantara went to the Manila City Hall in 1982 to look for someone who could "fix" the marriage for them, as they had not then secured a marriage license. A fixer conducted the ceremony right then and there and also contracted a priest who solemnized the marriage in 1983. ML was issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite to which neither of them resides. The parties were given a marriage contract bearing a marriage license number that, obviously because of a typographical error, did not accurately coincide with the original marriage license number.




Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan sent a petition to the justice of the peace stating that they wanted to enter into a contract of marriage. The justice of the peace, the two contracting parties, and two witnesses of legal age, then signed a document ratifying the above petition and affirming that the signatories were actually present on the day indicated in the justice's office. Martinez and Tan were then issued a certificate of marriage. The justice pronounced them man and wife. Martinez and Tan did not live together as husband and wife after the ceremony because Martinez parents were against the relationship.

ISSUE: WON the irregularities in the issuance of the marriage license are sufficient to render the marriage void. HELD: Since the marriage was contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 53 of the Civil Code applies. It states that "no marriage shall be solemnized the following requisites are complied with: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2) their consent, freely given; (3) authority of the person performing the marriage; and (4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. In this case, a marriage contract bearing the marriage license number and a certification from the civil registrar were presented as evidence. - The inconsistency between the number (7054033) in the license indicated in the certification of the municipal civil registrar and the number (7054133) typed onto the marriage contract was considered a typographical error and therefore had no bearing. - The fact that neither of the contracting parties was a resident of Carmona, Cavite was seen as an irregularity that cannot invalidate the marriage. - Plaintiff should not be made to benefit from his own action and be allowed to extricate himself when situation is no longer palatable to his taste/lifestyle (he has three children with mistress and chargeable of concubinage) - They contracted second marriage (religious) after less than a year which used the same ML and marriage contract

ISSUE: WON the ceremony herewith described fulfilled the formal requisite of a marriage ceremony. HELD: Yes. There was a proper ceremony: signing a statement that declares that they take each other as husband and wife is sufficient. In short, the declaration of the parties need not be verbal. Article 6 of the Family Code clearly articulates that no particular form of marriage ceremony is required. For as long as the contracting parties personally appear before a solemnizing officer and make a declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife, the formal requisite of ceremony is complied with. MADRIDEJO v DE LEON (1930) 55 Phil 1 Flaviana Perez was married to Pedro Madridejo in articulo mortis. She died the day after the wedding. The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. ISSUE: WON the failure to send the copy of marriage certification would render the marriage void. HELD: No. The failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate is a mere irregularity. Consequently, the marriage was valid.

C. Ceremony
- No prescribed form of ceremony, what matters is: (Art 6) a. personal appearance of spouses (No proxy allowed. Marriage via webcam, unlikely to be valid.) b. take each other as husband and wife in presence of solemnizing officer c. sign marriage certificate d. at least two witnesses of legal age - Where can the marriage be solemnized? (Art 8) a. chambers of judge, open court, church, chapel or temple b. office of consul-general, consul, vice consul c. EXCEPT - articulo mortis (Art 27) - remote place, no means of transportation (Art 28) - both parties written request, sworn statement (Art 8) MARTINEZ v TAN (1909) 12 Phil 731

CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. Sec 3 (aa), Rule 131 of Rules of Court That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; Marriage contract is only of evidentiary value, there are also other means to prove the existence of marriage:

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a. b. c. d.

birth or baptismal certificate of children bearing the name of the spouses as parents couple s public cohabitation as spouses testimonies from witnesses documentary photos and videos of the wedding

TRINIDAD v CA, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad (1998) 289 SCRA 188 Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four parcels of land. Arturo Trinidad, born July 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of Inocentes making him a compulsory heir. Lourdes and Felix, on the other hand, denied Arturo's claim, contending that Inocentes died single. Arturo now has to prove that Inocentes and his mother were validly married and that he was born during the subsistence of said marriage. ISSUE: WON Inocentes and Arturo s mother were validly married HELD: The Court cited a particular case which ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by (a) the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, (b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, (c) the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and (d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. For his part, Arturo was only able to present a certificate from the local civil registrar that all documents of birth, marriage, and death (in Aklan) were either burned, lost, or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of the municipality. In place of the marriage contract, petitioner presented two witnesses, one testified that she was present during the nuptials, and the other that the couple cohabited as husband and wife. This last witness also stated that she visited the couple's house at the time of petitioner's birth. Tolentino's annotation to Article 23 of the Family Code might prove relevant to this case: There is a prima facie presumption that a man and a woman living maritally under the same roof are legally married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they held themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. The presumption of marriage is rebuttable only by cogent proof to the contrary. Since Arturo's witnesses attested to his parents' public cohabitation as husband and wife, marriage can be presumed. The other party then bears the burden of proof in contesting the marriage of Arturo's parents.

VDA. DE JACOB v CA and Pedro Pilapil (1999) 312 SCRA 772 Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claims to be the surviving spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratrix of his estates by virtue of a reconstructed marriage contract between them. Pedro Pilapil, the doctor's alleged adopted son, claims that the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob was void since (1) no marriage license and (2) only a reconstructed marriage contract. HELD: Regarding the first issue, the Court recognized that the contracting parties have been living together as husband and wife for more than five years before the solemnization of the marriage so that they were exempt from the marriage license requirement. In answer to the second issue, the Court explained that though the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract, secondary evidence proving the same is admissible provided that (1) due execution of the document and (2) subsequent loss of the original instrument are first proven. Both (1) and (2) were in fact established from the preponderance of evidence presented during the trial; photographs of the wedding, letter of the solemnizing officer, statement of the officer that the marriage certificate was lost, etc. Also, the testimony of one of the parties to the marriage has been held admissible as proof of the fact of marriage. Furthermore, the presumption in cases like this is always in favor of marriage. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. SEVILLA v CARDENAS (2006) 497 SCRA 428 Sevilla asks for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Cardenas on the ground that the marriage was solemnized without the parties' first securing a marriage license. Cardenas argued to the contrary, saying that they were married in civil rites with Marriage License No. 2770792. The local civil registrar was asked to furnish evidence affirming the existence of said marriage license. The representative who appeared in court claimed that they could not find the registry book supposedly containing the relevant information to this case because the person in charge has already retired. Irrelevant but interesting facts: Intertuhod sex and knee fetish. Guy s mom sent guy to Spain to go to med school, but while he was there he didn t really study HELD: Loss of the registry book cannot be taken as proof of the non-issuance of a marriage license. No certification like in Alcantara case saying that due search was conducted. Instead, the letter said that no full attention given bec of loaded work - The presumption of the law is in favor of the validity of the marriage so that in the absence of sufficient evidence against it, the marriage subsists.

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A. Void Marriages
I. Art 4 Absence of formal or essential requisite Marriages void ab initio
Age essential requisite Solemnizing Officer formal requisite

Panlilio, his marriage with De Asis was no longer subsisting by reason of the latter's death. TOLENTINO v PARAS (1983) G.R. No. L-43905 Serafia Tolentino files for rectification of deceased husband s death certificate to place her as surviving spouse Tolentino contracted a marriage with Maria Clemente during the subsistence of a prior marriage. He was convicted of and served sentence for bigamy. After completing the term for his conviction, he went back to his second wife. Tolentino's death certificate had the name of the Maria Clemente as the surviving spouse instead of Serafia. HELD: Serafia, the first wife, is Tolentino's surviving spouse. Tolentino's conviction for bigamy is the best proof that his second marriage was void. WIEGEL v SEMPIO-DY (1986) 143 SCRA 499 Karl Wiegel files for annulment of marriage with Lilia Olivia because she previously married Eduardo Maxion. However Lilia says that the marriage was contracted under duress. Although woman believes the marriage is void, when the husband learned about Olivia's previous marriage, he filed for a declaration of nullity. HELD: Olivia's first marriage is merely voidable, her consent being vitiated by force. Her second marriage is void because it was contracted while a prior marriage was subsisting. Although the marriage is void, Sempio-Diy says that there should be legal declaration of nullity for void marriages or final judgment of annulment for voidable marriages SC dismisses case saying marriage is not a matter of private contract and personal adventure. *The decision laid down in this case had NO LEGAL BASIS. The Civil Code does not require a final judgment of nullity in marriages void ab initio. To quote Ma am Beth: Inimbento lang yan ni Sempio-Diy! TERRE v TERRE (1992) 211 SCRA 6 Dorothy and Jordan Terre met when the latter was in law school. Jordan was persistent in asking for Dorothy's hand in marriage, even explaining to her that her marriage to a certain Mercelito Bercinilla was void ab initio because they were first cousins. enveigled the woman He further reiterated that there was no need for Dorothy to secure a court declaration regarding the nullity of that marriage. Convinced with Jordan's word, the two entered into a contract of marriage. Years later, Jordan suddenly disappeared. It was found out that he married a certain Vilma Malicdem, giving Dorothy a ground for filing against him a case of bigamy. Btw, Dorothy spent for his law school expenses and even gave him allowances.

II. Art 35

1. one is under 18 years old 2. solemnized by a person not authorized to perform marriage, except when either or both spouses believe in good faith that he has the power to do so 3. solemnized without a valid marriage license 4. bigamous or polygamous except under Art 41 5. mistake of identity 6. subsequent marriage void under Art 53

Marriage License formal requisite Legal impediment essential requisite Consent essential requisite

FC, Art 40 Absolute nullity of the previous marriage for the purpose of remarriage may be invoked only through a judicial declaration of nullity



This provision is retroactive, regardless when the marriage was celebrated. (See Atienza v Brillantes.) Judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage protects the spouse and prevents a subsequent marriage contracted by him/her from becoming bigamous. Also, so that everything will be crystal clear between the two ex-spouses. Other uses of judicial declaration of nullity of marriage: o Liquidation, partition and distribution o Separation of property between spouses o Custody and support of children o Delivery of children s presumptive legitime

PEOPLE v MENDOZA (1954) 95 Phil 845 1936 Arturo Mendoza married Jovita De Asis 1941 Mendoza married Olga Lema, with subsisting marriage 1943 Jovita died in 1943 1949 Mendoza married Carmencita Panlilio, it was for this last marriage that he was prosecuted for bigamy. HELD: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for the third marriage because marriage with Lema was void for bigamy, being contracted when De Asis was still alive. When he wed

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ISSUE: WON Jordan may be charged of bigamy HELD: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy's marriage to Terre is void for being bigamous. Even if the court were to assume for the sake of argument that Jordan Terre held in good faith the mistaken belief that Dorothy's marriage to Bercenilla was void ab initio, a case of bigamy will still follow. His first marriage to complainant Dorothy must be deemed valid and his second marriage to Vilma Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous. Even if void marriage, it still needs judicial declaration. *Ma am Beth: Jordan is very inconsistent. Whatta lousy lawyer. ATIENZA v BRILLANTES (1995) 243 SCRA 32 Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony solemnized by a town mayor and without a marriage license. They went through another marriage ceremony, again without securing the necessary marriage license. Judge Brillantes then married Yolanda De Castro, saying that he was free to marry because under the Civil Code his first marriage was void. HELD: Judge's marriage to Ongkiko was void, but using Article 40 of the Family Code, he should have first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage. Judge Brillantes argued that the provision does not apply to him since his first marriage was contracted in 1965 and was still governed by the Civil Code (which came into effect August 30, 1950; the Family Code became effective August 03, 1988). The Court answered this by stating that Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code, regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Judge Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. BORJA-MANZANO v SANCHEZ (2001) 354 SCRA 1 Complaint filed by lawful wife of late David Manzano whom respondent wed with Luzviminda Payao despite status of separated HELD: That the contracting parties have been living apart from their respective spouses for years did not dissolve those marriage bonds. Even free and voluntary cohabitation cannot severe the ties of a subsisting previous marriage. Furthermore, marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It cannot serve as a justification for

solemnizing a subsequent marriage. Manzano and Payao's marriage is void for being bigamous. Respondent judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. APIAG v CANTERO (1997) 268 SCRA 47 Maria Apiag and Judge Cantero were married in a ceremony supposedly set up by their parents. Two children were born out of their union. The judge then left Apiag with no financial support whatsoever for her and the children. Maria learned later on that the judge had contracted a second marriage. She then filed a case of bigamy and falsification of document against the judge. HELD: The Court reiterated the rule that a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party thereto can marry again, otherwise the second marriage will also be void (Article 40 of the Family Code). However, Judge Cantero's second marriage took place before the promulgation of Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy (1986) and before the effectivity of the Family Code (1988). Hence, the doctrine in Odayat v. Amante, where no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages, is applicable to his case. The judge was free to contract a second marriage without court declaration of the nullity of the first marriage. And since the charge of falsification is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge, failure of the bigamy aspect would likewise render the falsification angle invalid. The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of court standards. However, this mistake should not totally destroy his career and deprive him or his heirs of the fruits of his labor. For such conduct, the court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death, dismissal of the case was ordered. It turns out Apiag and Cantero were only childhood sweethearts and married to save face because the woman got pregnant. Speculatively, the Apiags were after their share in Cantero s retirement benefits. Interesting phrase: Youthful mistake should not forever haunt judge. Man is not perfect. III. Art 36 Psychological incapacity

An innovation of the Family Code, derived from Art 1095 of the Canon Law Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. In fact, a psychologically incapacitated party does give a valid consent. The problem lies in his or her inability to fulfill the obligations arising from that consent. An example of vice of consent is insanity. No examples given of psychological incapacity because doing so would limit the applicability of Article 36 under the principle of ejusdem generis. The psychologically incapacitated person is not disqualified from marrying again, especially if he/she can find a partner who would be able to accept



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his personality. The fact of his or her psychological incapacity would be revealed anyway in the application for a marriage license for the second marriage and the other party is thus placed on guard to conduct discreet investigation about the matter. The following grounds may be mentioned as manifestations of psychological incapacity, according to Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila; (1) homosexuality or lesbianism, (2) satyriasis or nymphomania, (3) extremely low intelligence, (4) immaturity, (5) epilepsy, (6) habitual alcoholism, and (7) criminality. Other manifestations, according to other experts on church annulment, would be (1) refusal of the wife to dwell with the husband after the marriage, (2) compulsive gambling or unbearable jealousy, (3) sociopathic anomalies like sadism or infliction of physical violence, constitutional laziness or indolence, drug dependence, or some kind of psychosexual anomaly. Either party to the marriage can file for a declaration of nullity. A spouse's psychological incapacity does not bar him or her from initiating the action for the declaration of nullity.



Leouel tried to locate her when he was assigned in US for training (he wa member of the Armed Force) but his search was to no avail. Leouel then filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage, arguing that Julia's failure to return home and communicate with him for more than five years clearly shows her being psychologically incapacitated.

ISSUE: WON Julia is psychologically incapacitated HELD: NO. The facts were not enough to show psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack of willingness to comply with marital obligations. Through dicta, the Court also explained that: (1) There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (2) That the provision is open to abuse. To prevent this, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent the collusion between parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (3) In deciding the case, the judge must be guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. REPUBLIC v CA and Roridel Molina (1997) 268 SCRA 198 Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. She claimed that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility (i.e. spent all his time with his friends, depended on his parents for support, was dishonest about their finances, was habitually quarrelsome). He also lost his job and from then on Roridel became the family's breadwinner. The couple had been living separately for more than three years as of the commencement of this hearing. HELD: What existed in this case were irreconcilable differences or conflicting personalities, which in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. Court further said that it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness. Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and

GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN REPUBLIC v MOLINA 1. burden of proof is on the plaintiff, subject to investigation for collusion 2. root cause must be medically/clinically identified, alleged in the complaint and explained in the decision 3. exist at the time of the marriage 4. incurable 5. grave enough to bring about the incapability to fulfill marital obligation 6. cannot perform Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225 7. decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic Church should be observed 8. state participation to protect sanctity of marriage through the fiscal or prosecuting attorney MAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 1. juridical antecedence (prior to the marriage) 2. incurability 3. gravity SANTOS v BEDIA-SANTOS (1995) 240 SCRA 20 Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia contracted a marriage in 1986. They often had quarrels because of their living arrangement. They lived with the wife s parents who always intervened in their conjugal affairs. Julia then left for the United States as a nurse. After seven months, she called her husband to tell him she will return the following year. She never went home though.

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thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. TSOI v CA (1997) 266 SCRA 324 The case of the two incher Chinese (3 in when erect) Ten months after marriage, Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao still did not engage in sexual intercourse even if neither party is impotent. The wife wanted to annul (instead of declaration of nullity?) the marriage but the husband did not. HELD: The Court first explained that the action to declare a marriage void can be initiated by either party, even by the one who's incapacitated. This makes it immaterial to determine which spouse refuses to have sex with the other. It then went on to articulate that "one marital obligation is to procreate based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage." Insofar as the case presented a breach of marital obligation, there is psychological incapacity. *According to Ma am Beth: Abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder. It demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. *Also: Tsoi s love for his wife is exceptional. He doesn t mind the risk of divulging to the public his package size to be discussed by law students in perpetuity if only to save their marriage. Poor guy. MARCOS v MARCOS (2000) 343 SCRA 755 Both spouses are members of AFP and PSG for Marcos Brenda married Wilson Marcos and had five children with him. Marcos was discharged from his job and this led to a series of quarrels with his wife, in which he did her physical harm. He was also wont to mistreating his own children. The couple then started living separately. At one time, the wife went to her husband's house to look for their son. He was gravely angered by this ran after her with a samurai. For failing to find work and treating his family violently, the Regional Trial Court found the husband psychologically incapacitated. This decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, reasoning that, taking the totality of the pieces of evidence presented, psychological incapacity was not manifest. HELD: Supreme Court referred to the guidelines laid out in Republic vs. Molina. It ruled the case in the negative, stating that (1) (based on juridical antecedence) there was absolutely no showing that Marcos' defects were already present at the inception of the marriage. It was only after

he lost his job that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Also, (2) (based on incurability) there was no showing that his defects were incurable, especially now that he's been gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Through dicta, the Court further articulated that Republic vs. Molina included the "medical and clinical identification" of the root cause of the psychological incapacity. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The Court even declared that Article 36 should not be equated with a divorce law or legal separation. It is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It is not legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted on psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. (At best, the evidence presented by the wife in this case refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.) CHOA v CHOA (2002) 392 SCRA 198 Case of the incompetent psychologist; incompatibility Alfonso Choa filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage based on his wife's psychological incapacity. The case went to trial with the Alfonso presenting evidence. To this the wife replied with a Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer to Evidence (which is an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue). The RTC and CA denied the wife's Motion to Dismiss. ISSUE: WON wife's (1) immaturity, (2) lack of attention to their children, and (3) lack of intention of pro-creative sexuality constitute psychological incapacity. HELD: The evidence adduced by Alfonso merely shows that he and his wife could not get along. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. The Court here is of the opinion that a medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity - the lack of medical, psychiatric or psychological examination only worsens the situation.

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ANTONIO v REYES (2006) 484 SCRA 353 Case of the pathological liar Antonio filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Reyes, whom he alleged is psychologically incapacitated, as manifested in her habitual lying (that one brother-in-law attempted to rape and kill, that she was a psychiatrist and free-lance voice talent who's distinguished performer, etc.) There were psychiatrists who testified for both parties. One used the Comprehensive Psych-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) and said that Reyes passed the test and so was not psychologically incapacitated. The doctor from the opposing party countered the finding, saying that the test was not reliable. TC declared the marriage null and void. Before its announcement of its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of petitioner and respondent on the ground of lack of due discretion of both parties. This decision was upheld by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal but stipulated that only Reyes was impaired by a lack of due discretion. Same decision was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. CA held otherwise, saying there was insufficient evidence. HELD: (1) The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts (there was no personal examination, but Court cited Molina ruling saying that the personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required), and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. (2) That the psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of the marriage. (3) That the gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The lies attributed to the respondent indicate a failure on her part to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. (4) That the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. Through dicta, the Court also draw a distinction between the wife's pathological lying and the implications of Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifying that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by Reyes and misrepresentation under Articles 45(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying

spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of Reyes point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36. REPUBLIC v CUISON-MELGAR (2006) 486 SCRA 177 The wife filed for declaration of nullity of marriage based on her husband's psychological incapacity as manifested in his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, continual laziness, and abandonment of the family. HELD: The totality of evidence presented by the wife was completely insufficient to establish psychological incapacity. (1) The wife alone testified in support of her complaint. (2) She failed to establish the fact that at the time of the celebration of the marriage her husband was already suffering from a psychological defect. (3) There was no evidence showing that the husband was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. At best, the circumstances relied upon by the wife are ground for legal separation. *Ma am Beth points out the inconsistency in the rules: No need for expert psychological opinion but presenting such will strengthen your case, as the court decision said something like could have increased her chances of winning PARAS v PARAS (2007) 529 SCRA 81 Rosa Paras filed for a declaration of nullity of her marriage to Justo Paras on the ground of psychological incapacity as manifested in his infidelity, failure to support his children, abandonment of the family, and falsification of documents. Death of their two children, the family flew to States to recover. When they family return, Justo said that Rosa became cold to him They had a gasoline station which the husband usually gives for free for the city government since he used to be the mayor The existence of an illegitimate child Cyndee Rose Paras with an alleged concubine named Loida Ching. HELD: While the above allegations were true, there was nothing in the records showing that they were caused by psychological incapacity. Justo's acts appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between him and his wife caused by the death of their children and his failure in his professional endeavors. There was then no evidence that Justo's defects were present at the time of the marriage and only after he lost the mayoralty election. TONGOL v TONGOL (2007) 537 SCRA 135 Husband filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage based on his wife's psychological incapacity as manifested in her being given to tantrums, irritability, and want of dominance.

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A certain Dr. Villegas examined the wife and concluded that she was suffering from an Inadequate Personality Disorder with hysterical coloring which rendered her psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

FC, Art 39 The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by RA 8533, approved Feb. 23, 1998)

HELD: Dr. Villegas failed to link the wife's personality disorder to a conclusion of psychological incapacity since (1) he was not able to satisfactorily explain if her personality disorder was grave enough to bring about disability to comply with marital obligations, (2) there was no evidence that such incapacity was incurable. Also, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses - here, the spouses' differences and misunderstandings basically revolve around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. In sum, it was not disputed that the wife was suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the totality of the evidence presented did not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated in Article 36. IV. Art 37 Incestuous marriage 1. between ascendants and descendants 2. between brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood V. Art 38 Violation of public policy 1. between collateral relatives up to the 4th degree, illegitimate or legitimate 2. between step-parent and step-children 3. between parent-in-law and child-in-law 4. between adopter and adopted 5. surviving spouse of adopter and adopted 6. between surviving spouse of adopted and adopter 7. between legitimate children of adopter and adopted 8. between adopted children of same adopted 9. if one kills own or other wife with the intention to marry another or the victim s spouse


Under E.O. 277, for marriages contracted before the Family Code took effect, the action for the declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity prescribed in ten years - that is, ten years after 1988, or 1998. But R.A. 8533 now makes all actions under Article 36 imprescriptible. It s gonna be here forever, at least, until this law gets repealed. Mere lapse of time cannot give effect to marriage or any other contract that is null and void.


*For provisions refer to the table in the appendix NIÑAL v BADAYOG (2000) 328 SCRA 122 Niñal and Badayog were married in 1974. Niñal shot his wife Bellones in 1985, causing her death (why didn t they convict him of parricide???). After a year and a half, Ninal contracted a second marriage with Badayog without a marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at least five years. Ninal died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriage with Badayog. It is assumed that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect the children's successional rights. HELD: Niñal and Badayog's marriage is void for lack of marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring a marriage license because their five-year cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years that they had cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal impediment. Other than for purposes of remarriage (see Article 40 of the Family Code), no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. * This is weird Niñal should have been disqualified to marry Badayog because of Art 38 Par 9 (kills own or other wife with the intention to marry another or the victim s spouse)

*Stepbrothers and stepsisters are not included in the list. Reasons why above mentioned marriages contravene public policy: 1. Recessive genes of families get expressed 2. Causes confusion in the family tree (what is the relationship of a father to his child with his daughter?) 3. Legit child and adopted child are presumed to have been raised as real siblings 4. For Par 9 -> complete moral perversion. Ethics! VI. Art 41 subsequent marriage UNLESS there is a declaration of presumptive death of spouse in appropriate cases VII. Art 44 if both spouses contracted remarriage from absence in bad faith (as to absence of one spouse)

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DOMINGO v CA and Delia Soledad Avera (1993) 226 SCRA 572 Soledad Domingo filed for separation of property and declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto Domingo. They were married 1976, but unknown to Soledad, Roberto was previously married to a certain Emerlinda de la Paz. She came to know of the first marriage only after Emerlinda sued them for bigamy. Roberto claimed that Soledad's petition for a declaration of nullity was superfluous in that their marriage was void ab initio. On the other hand, Soledad insisted on the necessity of the judicial declaration of nullity, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture. HELD: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the effects of judicial declaration of nullity. The Court further asserted that a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged of bigamy. *Emphasis on the word ONLY / SOLELY in Art 40, FC *Ma am Beth thinks this is a weird case because usually it s the first wife that files bigamy against husband. Here, it s the second wife. DE CASTRO v ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO (2008) GR No. 160172 Reinelle Anthony De Castro impregnated Annabelle Assidao, a government dentist. Their marriage license expired so they (falsely) executed an affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for five years. By virtue of this affidavit, they contracted a marriage. The parties, however, lived separately after the marriage's celebration. Assidao filed a complaint for child support, asserting that she was validly married to De Castro and that her daughter was De Castro's legitimate child. HELD: The execution of the false affidavit stating that the parties had been living together as husband and wife cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. They

were married without a valid marriage license and so their marriage was void ab initio. - The child born to them was illegitimate; however, it does not free De Castro from the duty of providing financial support since he has been declaring her as a dependent in tax exemption and even signed in her birth certificate.

B. Voidable Marriages
Valid until annulled by a competent court Can be convalidated (ratified or annulled) either by free cohabitation or prescription Cannot be impugned upon death of either party

1. Grounds for Annulment
FC, Art 45 Grounds for voidable marriages 1. 18-21 yrs old but no parental consent 2. any party of unsound mind 3. consent obtained by fraud 4. consent obtained by force, intimidation, undue influence 5. incurable physical incapacity to consummate the marriage (impotency) 6. incurable and serious STD, existing at the time of the marriage (like AIDS and herpes, since syphilis and gonorrhea are curable)

For Par 4: Violence use of serious or irresistible force to wrest consent (Art 1335, CC) Undue influence improper advantage of power over the will of the other, depriving the latter of reasonable freedom of choice, threat to enforce a legal claim does not invalidate consent to a marriage Reverential fear fear of causing distress, disappointment or anger on part of the victim For Par 5: IMPOTENCY is different from STERILITY. Impotency cannot harden up, so no sex is possible. Sterility, on the other hand, is characterized by low spermatozoa count. However, the fact that intercourse is possible, there remains a possibility, no matter how low or tiny, for the husband to sire a child. Old age is not a ground because one who marries an old person should have been prepared for the other s impotence. DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION: If wife remains a virgin after three years of living together, the presumption of impotency commences unless proven otherwise.
FC, Art 46 What do you mean by fraud in Art 45 (3)? Concealment of: 1. final conviction of moral turpitude 2. pregnancy by man other than husband 3. STD 4. Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism

*for Nos 3 and 4:

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- Incurability of the STD does not factor in because the main issue is the concealment of the fact of having an STD - Can be a ground for Art 36 if proven to exist at the time of marriage Art 47 Who may file the action and when (see Table) RATIFICATION cures defect existing at the time of marriage and validates the marriage PRESCRIPTION bars the remedy because of the lapse of the period provided by the law for bringing the action to annul
FC, Art 48 The need for a prosecuting attorney to prevent collusion or suppression/fabrication of evidence between parties. Stipulation of fact or confession of judgment not to be accepted.


There was no proof that Tenorio was insane at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

HELD: No ground for annulment. Insanity that occurs after the celebration of the marriage does not constitute a cause for nullity. SUNTAY v COJUANGCO SUNTAY (1998) 300 SCRA 760 Emilio Suntay married Isabel Cojuangco. Prior to the marriage, Emilio was already suffering from schizophrenia. The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of Emilio's insanity. Now, Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay wants to assert her claim as Emilio's legitimate heir. HELD: The marriage was voidable, unsound mind being a ground for annulment and not for declaration of nullity. Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay should thus be accorded the same rights as acknowledged natural children. She was a legitimate heir of Emilio and their grandmother. - There was a difference in the dispositive (fallo) and the body of the court decision. In case of discrepancy (voidable and not void), the decision should be read as a whole. BUCCAT v BUCCAT (1941) SUPRA Godofredo Buccat married Luida Mangonon with the belief that she was a virgin. Luida gave birth 89 days after the celebration of the marriage. Godofredo then filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her nonvirginity. HELD: It was not believable for the husband to not have known his wife's state, her pregnancy being in the advanced stage (sixth month). The Court refused to annul the marriage, saying that there was no misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the wife. AQUINO v DELIZO (1960) 109 Phil 21 Fernando Aquino married Conchita Delizo, four months after the celebration of the marriage, Delizo gave birth. Aquino then filed for annulment on the ground of fraud or concealment of pregnancy. HELD: Since Delizo was naturally plump, Aquino could not have known that she was four months pregnant at the time of the marriage. According to medical opinion, even on the fifth month of pregnancy, the enlargement of the woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus and hardly noticeable. It is only on the sixth month of pregnancy that the roundness of the woman's abdomen becomes apparent. REMANDED FOR RETRIAL ANAYA v PALAROAN (1970) 36 SCRA 97 Aurora Anaya wanted to annul her marriage to Fernando Palaroan on the basis of his failure to disclose his relationship with another woman prior to their marriage.

FC, Art 49 a. b. c.

Pendency of the decree support of the spouse (pendent elite) custody and support of the children visitation rights of the other parent

RPC, Art 344 Prosecution of the crimes adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness

MOE v DINKINS (1981) 533 F. Supp. 623 Maria Moe and Raoul Roe, together with their child Richard Roe sought the declaration of a New York Domestic Relations Law requiring parental consent as unconstitutional. Relevant portions of the said law provides that all male applicants for a marriage license between 16 and 18, and all female applicants between 14 and 18 must obtain the written consent of both of their parents. Maria was 15 and Raoul, 18, when this case was initiated. They continue to be prevented from marrying because Marias' mother refuses to give her consent to their union. Plaintiffs contend that the NY Law was unconstitutional since it deprived them of liberty guaranteed to them by the Due Process Clause. HELD: The constitutional rights of children cannot be equated to that of adults because of: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner, (3) the importance of parental role in child-rearing. Court also explained that the State interests espoused in the NY Law are the protection of minors from immature decision-making and the prevention of unstable marriages. The law also assumes that parents naturally act in the best interest of their children, so that parental consent cannot be dispensed with. KATIPUNAN v TENORIO (1937) 38 OG 71 Marcos Katipunan sought annulment of his marriage to Rita Tenorio on the ground of latter's insanity.

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Only married her to evade a premarital affair with a close relative and no intention to become husband and wife.


ISSUE: WON disclosure of previous relationship is fraud HELD: NO because fraud as a vice of consent in marriage is limited to those enumerated by law, which in this case would be those mentioned in Article 86 of the Civil Code. If we were to read the later provision of the Family Code into this scenario, the clause "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity" of Article 46 would bar Anaya's action for annulment. RUIZ v ATIENZA (1941) 40 OG 1903 Jose Ruiz impregnated Pelagia Atienza. He was fetched from his residence by Atienza's relatives who allegedly intimidated him into marrying her. An uncle of Atienza was even said to have threatened to file immorality charges against Ruiz that would prevent his admission to the Bar. HELD: There was no ground for annulment. Neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Also, threat cannot come from lawful actions such as threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar based on immorality. He was also not kidnapped by his wife's relatives, there being many occasions for him to escape. - If guilty of seduction, a man cannot avoid marriage by duress (come to Court with clean hands) MARRIAGE NOT ANNULLABLE. JIMENEZ v CANIZARES (1960) 109 Phil 273 Joel Jimenez filed for annulment on the ground of his wife's impotency, claiming that her vagina was too small to allow penetration. Remedios Canizares refused to have physical exam despite repeated orders by the court contempt of court for noncompliance and constitutes collusion HELD: Since the only evidence presented was Jimenez's testimony, there was no sufficient basis to establish the wife's impotency. For all intents and purposes actually, because only the testimony of the husband, the presumption of the law is in favor of potency. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SARAO v GUEVARRA (1940) 40 OG 15 Supp 263 In the afternoon of their wedding, Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening. When night came, he again approached the wife, but through he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently large of his organ, she complained of pains in her private parts and he noticed oozing there from some matter offensive to the smell. -


Because of this, coitus had not been successful, and after the first night every attempt the plaintiff s part to have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure, because she complained of pains in her genital organs and he did not want her to suffer. Upon the advice of a physician and with the plaintiff s consent, an operation was performed in which the uterus and ovaries were removed. The surgery rendered her incapable of procreation, but she could copulate. Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the operation, lost all desire to have access with his wife. Now, he asks for annulment.

ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled based on the defendant s incapacity to procreate HELD: The incapacity for copulation was only temporary. The defect must be lasting to be a ground for annulment, because the test of impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, but the capacity to copulate. ANNULMENT DENIED. PEOPLE v SANTIAGO SUPRA

2. Marriage when one spouse is absent
FC, Art 41 Is null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse absent for four consecutive years, the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

*In CC, seven years is required for presumptive death and four years if there is presence of danger of death. Period of time decreased in FC because of modernized and faster means of communication technology. There is virtually little or no excuse for a spouse not to contact his family for a long time. *In CC, there has to be a general belief which includes the belief of one s community regarding the whereabouts of one spouse. Now in the FC, it is only well-founded belief because people today no longer care much about their neighbors like in the yesteryears.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 42 The subsequent marriage automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.

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CC, Art 83 Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

No matter how long it took the spouse absent to appear, the subsequent marriage will still become void. Because you only presumed him/her to be dead, and that is a rebuttable presumption. If the reappearing spouse did not file the affidavit of reappearance he/she cannot remarry because he is dead until he declares he s alive. (So the two spouses couldn t possibly come to an agreement to not file an affidavit so the subsequent marriage may subsist.) FC, Art 43 Effects of termination by reappearance: (1) children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination are legitimate (2) ACP/CPG dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the ACP/CPG property shall be forfeited in favor of: a) common children b) if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage c) in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if stipulated as irrevocable (5) The spouse in bad faith disqualified to inherit from innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.

CC, Art 85 May be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;

FC, Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.

JONES v HORTIGUELA (1937) 64 Phil 179 Step-daughter versus step-father Marciana Escaño died and a proceeding regarding her estate was commenced. Her second husband Felix Hortiguela), the petitioner and daughter of her first marriage, Angelita Jones, the respondent, were appointed as the heirs. The partition of her estate was approved by the court. A year later, AJ filed a motion to declare her the only heir, since she claims that the marriage between ME and FH was null and void. Jan 1918 ME s first husband, Arthur Jones (Arthur), went abroad and was never heard from again. Oct. 1919 ME asked her husband to be judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of the said month, the court issued and order declaring that Arthur is an absentee and the declaration will not take effect until 6 months after its publication. It was then published in the succeeding months. April 1921 Court issued another order, saying that the judicial decree has taken effect. May 1927 FH and ME got married. AJ now contends that the decree should be understood as not having taken effect from Oct 1919, the date it was first published, but in April 1921, the date the court held that the decree has taken effect. Therefore, from that date until the time of the second marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in accordance with sec 3 par 2 of GO no. 68, their marriage was void. ISSUE: WON the second marriage was void. HELD: No. For the celebration of marriage, the law only requires that the former spouse be absent for 7 consecutive yrs at the time of the 2nd marriage. The date that should be

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considered therefore, is Jan 1918, when Arthur left and was never heard from again. Therefore, when the 2nd marriage was celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than 9 yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesn t appear in the register does not affect the validity of the marriage. Furthermore, the court also pointed out that ME and even AJ herself believed Arthur was dead, as evidenced by her treating FH as her step father. YU v YU (2006) 484 SCRA 485 Custody of child pending annulment case Eric Jonathan Yu files for an annulment case in Pasig RTC for wife s psychological incapacity Caroline Yu seeks custody of their child, Bianca, in Pasay RTC litis pendentia (pending case) Pasig RTC has jurisdiction because of Art 49 (incidents of a pending decree shall be specified by court wherein the declaration for nullity was filed) Custody goes to father because mother is unfit TAMANO v ORTIZ (1998) 291 SCRA 584 1958 Senator Mamintal Abudul Jabar Tamano married Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano in civil rites. 1993 Tamano married Estrelita Tamano in civil rites too 1994 Tamano died - Zorayda and son filed for the declaration of nullity because of bigamy - Misrepresentations of Tamano as divorced (they never divorced) and Estrelita as single (annulment was not final and executory for non-compliance with Art 53) indicates lack of intention to invoke Muslim practice of polygamy - Estrelita contends that RTC has no jurisdiction because they were Muslims, hence jurisdiction belongs to Shari a Courts HELD: Shari a Courts have jurisdiction only over marriages solemnized in Muslim rites. Law is silent as to marriages performed both civilly and Muslim. On the other hand, exclusive jurisdiction of all kinds of marriage (civil and Muslim) belongs to RTC. Besides, they did not perform wedding ceremony in accordance to Muslim customs.

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A. Grounds for Legal Separation
FC, Art 57 1. Repeated physical violence against a. petitioner b. petitioner s child c. common child of petitioner and respondent 2. Moral or physical pressure to convert religious or political beliefs 3. Attempt to corrupt or induce (a) petitioner, (b) petitioner s child and (c) common child of petitioner and respondent into prostitution or connivance in such a practice 4. Respondent s final judgment of conviction for more than six years, even if pardoned 5. Habitual alcoholism, drug addiction 6. Lesbianism or homosexuality 7. Bigamous marriage, here or abroad 8. Sexual infidelity or perversion 9. Attempt at the life of the petitioner 10. Abandonment without justifiable cause for one year

shouldn t have tolerated her when she approached him for the second time. MUNOZ v DEL BARRIO (1955) 51 OG 5217 Jose del Barrio maltreats the wife Judge attempts to reconcile but wife declines, she pushes for her petition for legal separation on the ground that husband attempted at her life HELD: Petition of legal separation not granted because there was intent to kill was not established. The man only used his bare hands/fists. *Ma am Beth finds this ruling ridiculous because Arnold Schwarzenegger s bare hands are in itself lethal weapons. Likewise, what about martial artists? GANDIONGCO v PEÑARANDA (1987) 155 SCRA 725 May 1986 Teresita filed petition for legal separation on the ground of husband Froilan s concubinage, petition for support and payment of damages Oct 1986 Teresita filed a criminal suit For which Froilan files certiorari that civil and pendente lite should be suspended because of criminal charges. That they should wait until the decision in criminal case comes, before civil can proceed. HELD: Denied Froilan s certiorari. 1986 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that civil may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with criminal charge. Likewise, no criminal proceeding is necessary in the action for legal separation. All that is needed for legal separation is preponderance of evidence. LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO SY (1972) 43 SCRA 177 Carmen filed petition for legal separation against husband Eufemio Eufemio Discovered that he cohabits with Go Hiok Eufemio countered that marriage with Carmen is void ab initio because he was married to Go Hiok first, under Chinese customs Carmen died and her father took over the case in her place HELD: Carmen s death extinguished the claim for nullity of marriage. Action for legal separation is purely personal even if property relations are involved. These rights are mere effects of a decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968) 22 SCRA 333 Case of the mahjongera wife and overworked husband Estrella files petition of separation of property against husband Severino because of mismanagement of business enterprise

CC, Art 97 1. adultery (wife) or concubinage (husband) 2. attempt at the life of the other

*Compare CC with FC grounds. The FC expanded the grounds for legal separation and liberated the bias in concubinage by changing it to sexual infidelity. PEOPLE v ZAPATA AND BONDOC (1951) 88 Phil 688 Andres Bondoc filed against wife Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio Bondoc Wife and paramour repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse during 1946 Wife pleaded guilty and served sentence Husband filed another case, which defendants allege as double jeopardy HELD: Adultery not a continuous crime. Each commission is a different count which can be punished separately. 1) plurality of facts performed during separate period of time 2) unity of penal provisions infringed upon 3) unity of aim or purpose What Andres forgave/condoned was the previous acts and not the subsequent acts. Besides excuse of the paramour that he doesn t know the woman is already married is untenable because they were previously reprimanded. He

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Husband never slept in conjugal dwelling, would rather stay in his office alleged abandonment Wife even alleged that husband has concubine named Nenita Hernandez RTC grants Nenita s petition for legal separation and division of conjugal assets

B. Defenses against Legal Separation
FC, Art 56 1. Condonation (forgiveness) 2. Consent (permission) 3. Connivance (involvement of 3rd party and active participation of spouse) employment of detectives not considered as connivance 4. Recrimination (both has given grounds for legal separation, come to court with clean hands) 5. Collusion (agreement between spouses) 6. Prescription (Art 57)

HELD: Mere physical separation does not constitute abandonment. Husband continues to support wife and children despite absence. She was even able to play mahjong from the husband s sustenance. Abandonment defined in Art 178 & in Gay v State: for desertion of one spouses to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to resume or claim one s rights or interests. Concubinage and mismanagement of business was not established either because he actually increased the assets. ONG ENG KIAM v ONG (2006) 505 SCRA 76 Lucita files a petition for legal separation against Chinese husband on the grounds of repeated physical abuse. He would usually beat her up or utter abusive language to her in front of customers. After 20 years of marriage and 3 kids, she decides to separate from her husband and went to her family. Husband retorted: Denied all allegations of Lucita, they only fight over the discipline of children Ulterior motives of Lucita s family was to encumber their conjugal properties It was her who abandoned them when she left the conjugal home His son, Kingston and other of his employees testified for him To which wife answered: Positive identification is always stronger than mere denial She would not sacrifice/trade her comfortable life and love of her children with the interests of her family if nothing s really wrong she left with justifiable cause, because if she didn t, the beating will continue Kingston has been with his father since he was child while the other witnesses livelihood depends on the husband. PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION GRANTED.

*Ma am Beth s mnemonics: 4C and RP (Raul Pangalangan) STIPULATION OF FACTS v CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT Stipulation of facts is the agreement between spouses of certain details and circumstances. It is not accepted because it can be tantamount to collusion Confession of judgment, on the other hand, is when one party admits guilt from which decision is solely based PEOPLE v SANSANO & RAMOS (1933) 58 Phil 73 1919: Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano got married and had a child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared to Cagayan and abandoned his family. Wife did not have any means of survival so she resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos. 1924: Mariano returned and filed for adultery, to which both Sansano and Ramos were sentenced After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and for Mariano to take her back. The latter denied and told her to go do what she wants to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to Hawaii. Mariano went back to file for divorce (under Act 2710) ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore barred from action HELD: YES. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever she would like to do. OCAMPO v FLORENCIANO (1960) 107 Phil 35 1938 - Jose de Ocampo and Serafina got married 1951 - Serafina Jose Arcalas Husband sends wife to Manila to study cosmetology for a year where she also had relationship with other men. 1952 - Left the husband and lived separately 1955 - Husband caught wife in the arms of Nelson Orzame and then told her he wanted legal separation to which the wife agreed as long as she will not be criminally charged ISSUE: WON there had been collusion in the form of confession of judgment by the wife HELD: Though the wife admitted her guilt, which constitutes confession of judgment, the husband also presented other evidences to support the allegation. Refusing to

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answer is not necessarily collusion. Also, the husband had no duty to search for wife because it was her who left the house and so it was her duty to return or at least inform the husband of her whereabouts. Hence, collusion may not bar the action for legal separation. SARGENT v SARGENT (1920) 114 A. 428 Husband suspects the wife to be committing adultery with their driver, Charles Simmons. To support his allegations, he hired several detectives and enjoined his servants to keep a close eye on the actions of his wife. They staged a raid to catch the wife red handed of the crime alleged of her. ISSUE: WON the husband connived with his employees to set-up his wife s adultery HELD: YES. Petitioner could have taken steps which would prevent him from casting doubts on the fidelity of his wife but instead it appeared that he even facilitated his wife s wrongdoing. It is to be inferred from his conduct that he did desire his wife to commit the offense in his absence, and that helping as he did to afford the opportunity which brought about the desired result, he was consenting thereto. *What could have Mr. Sargent done to prevent occurrence of connivance? He could have just fired Simmons or brought his wife with him on his business trips. BROWN v YAMBAO (1957) 102 Phil 168 William Brown files a petition for legal separation against his wife Juanita Yambao who got pregnant by a certain Carlos Field while he was interred in Intramuros (ground: adultery) Wife did not reply, so fiscal intervened and found that there was no collusion. However, the fiscal also found that the petitioner was barred from filing the action because he had a concubine (Lilia Delito) himself Petitioner says that the fiscal s only duty was to ensure no collusion took place and not stand in place of the wife Fiscal further added that petitioner was also prescribed from action because he learned about the cause in 1945 but only file ten years later. COURT DENIED LEGAL SEPARATION. WILLAN v WILLAN (1960) 2 A11 E.R. 463 Case of the battered husband Demobilized military man files a petition for legal separation against his wife for her cruelty and abusive behavior He says she tortures him at night, forcing him to have sex with him and if he declines, she would resort to ear pinching, hair pulling and using of obscene language This deprived him of rest and sleep so he had no choice but to give in to her wishes ISSUE: WON having sex constitutes condonation

HELD: YES. Because in his case, everything was done voluntarily. Sharing the same bed and continual sexual relations is a conclusive evidence of condonation. Decision would have been different if he was the wife because of physiological difference in the strength of man and woman. BUGAYONG v GINEZ (1956) 100 Phil. 620 Benjamin was a US serviceman, he left his wife Leonila in the care of his sisters as she goes to school Valeriana Polangco wrote to him about rumors of wife s adultery; wife then goes away from the sister-in-law s house and stayed at her mom s place Leonila wrote to Benjamin as well about a certain Eliong who kissed her in school Benjamin went home and searched for her They stayed together for 2 nights and 1 day at his cousin, Pedro s house Verified the truth which made her pack up and walk away ISSUE: WON Benjamin s act of searching for and sleeping with his wife constitutes condonation HELD: Yes. Because even if not yet proven, he had a belief in mind that his wife was already unfaithful yet he still tried to take her back. The ponencia relied mostly on US cases. COURT DENIED PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION. MATUBIS v PRAXEDES (1960) 109 Phil. 789 Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes agreed to live separately from each other, they even instituted a document that allows them to get themselves a new mate without the intervention of the other. Jan 1955: Man cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado April 1956: Wife filed for concubinage TC dismissed because of prescription and consent the decision appealed from in the SC HELD: SC affirmed RTC because there was express consent, hence she deserved no sympathy from the court. Also, the action was not instituted within a year of cognizance.

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C. When to file/try actions
REQUISITES FOR LEGAL SEPARATION Art 57 The petition must be filed within 5 years from the time of occurrence of cause (as compared to the double period of CC) Art 58 6 months cool off (but does not override provisions of Art 49 regarding pendency of decree i.e. support pendente lite, support of spouse and children and visitation rights) Art 59 steps taken towards reconciliation Art 60 stipulation of facts and confession of judgment should not be accepted in court or participation of fiscal or prosecuting attorney to prevent collusion CONTRERAS v MACARAIG (1970) 33 SCRA 222 1952 Elena and Cesar were married, had three children 1961 Cesar met Lily while working for his father s business Sept 62 Lubos, the driver, told her that husband was living with a woman in Singalong Apr 63 More rumors about her husband being seen with a pregnant woman May 63 Husband was usually away and back for only 2-3 days; Elena declined to raise the issue lest it drive her husband away more Asked father-in-law and sister-in-law to talk top and convince her husband to come back to her Employee saw him with a baby on his arms Elena talked to Lily who said that it was Cesar who refuses to leave her Apr 63 Elena, with of their two children, tried to convince Cesar to go home, the latter refused to return to legitimate family Dec 63 Plaintiff filed petition for legal separation RTC said that wife became cognizant of husband s infidelity on Sept 1962 (Lubos report) SC granted legal separation because wife was only cognizant of husband s infidelity when she confronted him and got told that he doesn t intend to return to them anymore. Hence, there was no prescription. SOMOSA-RAMOS v VAMENTA (1972) 46 SCRA 11 Lucy Somosa Ramos files petition for legal separation concubinage and attempt on her life by husband Clemente (1972 so CC was applicable) She seeks preliminary mandatory injunction to recover her paraphernal and exclusive property ISSUE: WON Art 103 bars judge from such an action HELD: No. It is not an absolute bar. Management of property may be decided right away especially if the other spouse may encumber or alienate the petitioner from her rightful share in the assets.

D. Effects of Filing of Legal Separation
Art 61 a) b) entitled to live separately third person may be appointed to manage their ACP/CPG

Art 62 pendency of the case, Art 49 applies a) support of the spouses b) support and custody of children c) visitation rights for children DE LA VINA v VILLAREAL (1920) 41 Phil 13 Narcisa Geopano files divorce complaint against husband who committed concubinage with Ana Calog and booted her out of the conjugal home in Negros Occidental She lived with her daughters in Iloilo, and now seeks divorce (this case is in 1920), partition of property and alimony Husband rebuts that the court has no jurisdiction over the case since their domicile was in Negros Occidental invokes husband s right to fix the marital domicile and wife s duty to follow. Likewise, the husband s right to administer marital assets (since wife wants separation of property) WON the wife s domicile is still the same with husband s. No. Husband abolishes this right the moment he furnishes cause for the wife to leave him and ground for divorce. She may acquire separate domicile from her husband. Also, he displaced her from the conjugal dwelling in the first place. Thus, court had jurisdiction over the case. WON the wife can obtain preliminary injunction against husband s encumbering and alienating of their conjugal property. Yes. The husband s administrative power must be curtailed to protect the interest of the wife. Even though wife doesn t have the right to administer, she has the right to share. REYES v INES-LUCIANO (1979) 88 SCRA 03 Celia Ilustre-Reyes files petition for legal separation on husband Manuel Reyes on the ground of attempt to her life. (Attacked twice, would have been dead if not saved by father and driver.) Husband does not want to give her pedente lite because he allege that she has adulterous relationship with her physician and the price she was asking was too high HELD: Wife not asking for support from husband s personal funds, rather from the conjugal properties. Also, the allegation of her adulterous relationship was not sufficiently established. It is enough for the court to ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other documentary evidence appearing in the records. It was also shown that he was capable of providing the said amount.

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BAÑEZ v BAÑEZ (2002) 374 SCRA 340 RTC granted legal separation to Aida and Gabriel for husband s sexual infidelity, dissolution of CPG and division of conjugal assets Wife kept on asking things and damages from her husband through the court RTC denied the damages but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. CA set aside the RTC ruling for husband to vacate the residential house and surrender the motor vehicle. HELD: Legal separation is not subject to multiple appeals. Its effects are incidents of the final judgment and not distinct matters. LA RUE v LA RUE (1983) 304 S. E. 2d 312 - Plain housewife s contribution to the CPG - 1950 husband and wife got married, wife worked for the first seven years but stopped at the request of her husband - Married for 30 years, housewife performed her duties like caring for the children and attending to husband s needs until the relationship went sour - Obtained divorce but wife was awarded only with alimony and health insurance - Court denied her claim to one half of the conjugal assets because she made no contributions thereto ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to equitable distribution HELD: Yes, because she contributed her earnings in the early days of the marriage and then her service as a frugal homemaker in the subsequent years.



Rosario did not return them but instead filed for civil case for custody grant, because he is already living with another woman and the kids want to stay with her RTC orders her to return the kids to him within 24 hours

HELD: Custody of children is never final and always subject to review for the best interest of the children. However, until decision is modified, the custody is to the fathers. Besides, Rosario is just living in the charity of her brothers. LAPERAL v REPUBLIC (1962) 6 SCRA 357 Elisea obtained legal separation decree from husband Enrique Santamaria, so now she wants to revert to her maiden name. She is a businesswoman and afraid that confusion as to the name will lead her finances to the dissolution of conjugal property. Art 372 mandates that woman retains the name used prior to legal separation, because it is indicative of status and legal separation affected no change to her status. HELD: SC denied her petition because she relied on the fact of her legal separation and that there was no conjugal property to fear of because it has been dissolved with the decree of legal separation. Likewise, they cannot allow easy circumvention of Art 372. CASE DISMISSED.

F. Reconciliation
There should be voluntary and mutual consent of the spouses to reconcile. CPG not automatically revived. Art 67 applies.

E. Effects of Legal Separation Decree
Art 63 1) 2) Live separately from each other ACP/CPG dissolved; offender no right to any share in the net profits, forfeit in favor of common children, children of guilty, and innocent spouse 3) Custody of minor children goes to innocent spouse (subject to Art 213) 4) Guilty spouse disqualified as intestate heir Art 64 revoke all donations, beneficiary in any insurance policy within 5 years

Art 65 Joint manifestation under oath in the same court as legal separation Art 66 Consequences of reconciliation: 1) legal separation proceedings shall be terminated if still pending 2) final decree set aside, but the separation of property and forfeiture remains, unless they revive former regime Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify: 1) what to contribute anew to restored property regime 2) what to retain in separate property 3) names of all the creditors

MATUTE v MACARAIG (1956) 99 Phil 340 Armando files petition for legal separation against wife Rosario because of adultery with brother and brotherin-law Legal separation granted; custody of four minor children to father Father left them in sister s care in Davao and then went to US; Rosario lived with them there Upon his return, he took them to Cebu Rosario asked permission to bring them to Manila for grandfather s funeral, were given 2 weeks

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Is there divorce in the Philippines?
There is just relative divorce. BUT BUT! It recognizes two kinds of divorce: foreign divorce and Muslim divorces.

QUITA v CA & DANDAN (1998) 300 SCRA 592 1941 Fe and Arturo got married, no children 1954 Fe got final judgment of divorce with Arturo; woman remarried twice 1972 Husband dies without will - Blandina Dandan and her six children with Arturo Padlan presents themselves as heir of the decedent - Ruperto Padlan intervened - RTC grants succession to Quita and Padlan HELD: RTC failed to establish Quita s citizenship which is material to the resolution of case. If proven that she was no long a Filipino citizen, then she was no longer the wife of Padlan and divorce decree binding on her (application of Van Dorn) Time of divorce is the most material and not the time of the marriage Remanded the case to determine the citizenship of Quita at the time of divorce LLORENTE v CA & LLORENTE (2000) 345 SCRA 592 1927-57 Lorenzo enlisted as US Navy 1937 Paula married Lorenzo 1943 Lorenzo s naturalization in the US 1945 Lorenzo went home to find out that Paula got pregnant by his brother Ceferino 1945 birth of Crisologo Llorente who was illegitimate and fatherless in his birth certificate - Lorenzo refused to lived with Paula and instead drew a written agreement witnessed by her dad and stepmom that they will dissolve the marital union and she will have no claims to the conjugal assets, without charges for criminal act 1952 1958 1981 1985 RTC CA SC Divorce decree became final in the States Lorenzo married Alicia who s unaware of his previous marriage with Paula; begot 3 children Lorenzo drafted his last will and testament Lorenzo died Assigned Paula as administratrix, she being the legal surviving wife Alicia declared as co-owner Remand for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will. There were four significant point in time: 1) divorce 2) marriage to Alice 3) execution of will 4) death Citing Quita, once proven that Lorenzo s citizenship is American at the time of divorce, then the divorce will be valid and should be recognized Validity of the will is governed by laws of the country in which they are executed remand to the court for further clarification SC recognizes the divorce decree and upholds the marriage of Alice and Lorenzo

A. Foreign Divorces
FC, Art 15 Nationality theory applies in the Philippines. Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go.

FC, Art 26 Marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere except when 1) one is below 18 2) bigamous, not under Art 41 3) mistake as to identity of other party 4) void under 53 for non-compliance 5) psychological incapacity 6) incestuous 7) public policy

PROOFS FOR FOREIGN LAWS TO APPLY/ BE RECOGNIZED IN OUR JURISDICTION 1) Provision of the foreign law 2) Celebration of marriage in accordance to those provisions VAN DORN v ROMILLO (1985) 134 SCRA 139 Alicia married Upton, US citizen in Hong Kong. Later on in 1982, they obtained divorce in Nevada. Shortly after that, Alicia contracted another marriage with Van Dorn. 1983 Upton files suit in Pasay RTC for non-application of divorce decree to Alicia and hence his right to administer the conjugal property in Ermita, the Galleon Shop Alicia files for dismissal which the RTC denied decision assailed in SC HELD: Upton is estopped from the claim because he declared in Nevada that there were no conjugal assets. He is American and US law applies to him, therefore, Alicia is no longer his wife. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. Petition of Alicia granted. Upton s case dismissed. Prevents the situation wherein you are married to your husband but your husband is no longer married to you. *Ma am Beth likes this decision because it proves that we don t need new laws. We only have to think out of the box. A change of focus is all we need. Philippine laws apply to Filipino, ergo, foreigners cannot use our laws against our citizens. Their own laws shall apply to them. Bravo!




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GARCIA v RECIO (2001) 366 SCRA 437 Rederick and Editha Samson married in Australia in 1987, then divorced in 1989 1992 Rederick became US citizen 1994 Rederick married Grace 1995 Grace and Rederick lived separately and then Grace files for nullity on ground of Red s bigamy RTC recognized the divorce obtained in Australia and did not question respondent s lack of capacity to marry HELD: Respondent s legal capacity to marry cannot be determined because he failed to produce the foreign law as well as the decree proving his capacity to marry. Not sure if he was granted absolute or probationary divorce.

B. Muslim Divorces
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Governed by Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1083) Divorce or Talaq (Chapter 3) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq) Vow of abstinence by the husband (ila) Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar) Acts of imprecation (li an) Redemption by the wife (khul ) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwid) judicial decree (faskh)

YASIN v JUDGE, SHARI A (1995) 241 SCRA 606 Hatima Yasin seeks to use her maiden name again after being divorced to Hajin Idris Yasin, who has already remarried. Shari a court dismissed her petition because there has to be change of name. HELD: No need to have court proceedings for change of name because her legal name is the one entered in the civil register. When the marriage ties no longer exists as in the case of death of husband or Muslim divorce, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.

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FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of ACP except that: 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported 2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding 3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter s share FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of CPG except that: 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported 2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding 3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter s share FC, Art 239 When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouses is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction and if none shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. FC, Art 242 Upon filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in the said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned.

FC, Art 246 If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses.

FC, Art 247 The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

PEREZ v CA and Ray Perez (1996) 255 SCRA 661 1996 Ray and Nerissa got married in Cebu. 1992 After 6 miscarriages, 2 operations and a high risk pregnancy, she finally gave birth to Ray Jr. 1993 The family went to Cebu but only Nerissa went back to the US although they all had round trip tickets because Ray had to stay behind and take care of ill mother. - She came back no longer in good terms with husband RTC followed tender years presumption CA reversed and gave custody to father Art 213 can be taken to mean separation (legal or de facto) and should take into account all relevant info (material, social, moral) shall not be separated from mother is mandatory unless unfit to exercise sole parental authority financial capacity not determinative as long as both have ample means of support When husband questioned wife s nature of work and it s incapability to care for child: It s nothing that can t be handled. Shifts can be adjusted so she can attend to the child. There are also daycare centers and she could always take a leave until the child can manage on its own. Petitioner also invites mother to join them in the States so she could look after the child. Husband will also just leave the care of the child to his mother because of the nature of his work as a doctor Besides, nothing can be more heart rendering that the wife s situation who waited so long to have a child only to be deprived from her before the first year. PETITION GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. RTC REINSTATED. For immediate execution. ESTRADA v ESCRITOR (2006) 492 SCRA 1 Administrative case against an employee of the Supreme Court who is living with a man not her husband Declaration of Pledge of Faithfulness practice of the Jehovah s Witnesses immunized them from being considered as immoral and gross misconduct


The only thing resolved in this case is that they cannot be considered immoral in the eyes of their own religious group but it does not deny the fact that the relationship is still not legally binding on them.

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A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and Respect
RPC, Art 247 Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: (f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; (g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. Sec 26 Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. Victimsurvivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code. In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists. Sec 28 Custody of children. The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from battered woman syndrome.

FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

CC, Art 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) The crime of rape Sec 2 Rape as a Crime Against Persons. shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. RA 9262 (Anti VAWC Act of 2004) Sec 5 Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

NARAG v NARAG (1998) 291 SCRA 451 Dominador was a teacher at St. Louis College of Tuguegarao when he met Gina Espita, a 1st year 17 yo student. They had a relationship and Dominador abandoned his family to live with Gina. Dominador used power as Sangguniang Panlalawigan to secure employment for Gina at the DTI.

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2.

3. 4. 5.


7. 8. 9. -


Dominador s wife instituted a disbarment proceeding against him for immorality, but after one year she wanted to withdraw her complaint saying She fabricated allegations in complaint to humiliate and spite husband Love letters between two guilty were forged She suffered from emotional confusing due to extreme jealousy Denied Gina and Dominador ever had a relationship Dominador never left the family But a year later, Julieta filed the same case again due to her husband s continuous threat. Dominador filed his answer He never threatened, harassed, or intimidated her He never abandoned family, he loves them. He protected & preserved family. Julieta and two sons drove him out of their house. Julieta is emotionally disturbed incurably jealous and possessive, violent, vindictive, scandalous. Julieta s rich and she abhors poor, he is poor he was beaten, battered, brutalized, tortured, abused and humiliated by Julieta in public and at home so he filed for annulment because they cannot exist together She has disgraced, shamed and humiliated him by telling everyone everywhere that he s worthless, goodfor-nothing, evil and immoral Denied relationship with Gina. No kids either. Love letters: inadmissible as evidence He is old thus, unfit to do things alleged by Julieta. Investigating officer: indefinite suspension from practice of law. He never denied love letters, didn t disprove adulterous relationship. Denying two kids (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) ground for disciplinary action. IBP: affirmed investigating officer s recommendation & granted disbarment

companionship, understanding, moral & spiritual guidance) and to his wife (observe mutual love, respect & fidelity & render help and support). He failed to fulfill these duties. He was away most of the time because of his paramour not because of work as he alleges. Son s testimony proved that he abandoned his family which even affected his son s own family. Dominador did not merely contract a marriage, he should have been a partner who lived up to his promise to love & respect his wife & remain faithful to her until death. GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA (1916) 35 Phil 252 Elisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married on January 7, 1915. They established their residence, where they lived together for a month after which plaintiff returned to her parents. She alleged that defendant demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals. She refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Defendant continued demanding such acts from her. Her continued refusal exasperated him, inducing him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, face and different body parts. Thus, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and is now asking for support. CFI held that defendant cannot be compelled to support wife, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant. ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to support outside conjugal abode HELD: Yes. The rule established in Art. 149 of the Civil Code is not absolute. The doctrine that neither spouse cannot be compelled to support the other outside the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting them a divorce or separation is not controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. The nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforceable in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation. A judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. Moreland, concurring: A husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relation and repudiate his duties thereunder. Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourse only. Husband has to support wife because she had just cause for leaving. *Who determines what is acceptable form of sex? The spouses! Not the judge nor the society!

ISSUE: WON Dominador should be disbarred HELD: Yes. A lawyer should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral (shameless showing indifference to opinion of good members of society) or deceitful conduct, should not behave in scandalous manner, in public or in private to the discredit of the legal profession. These are continuing requirements/qualification of all members of bar. This includes prohibition against adulterous relationships. Burden of proof of gross immorality for abandoning his family proved when Julieta presented witnesses who attested to adulterous relationship between Gina & Dominador. Even Gina s brother admitted that Gina and Dominador had two children. Even though Julieta has burden of proof, he needs to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of bar. His denials without proof are insufficient. His accusations against Julieta were not proven. Providing for his family, giving them a comfortable life, his being a successful lawyer and seasoned politician do not necessarily mean that he s morally fit. He has duties to his children (support, educate, instruct according to right precepts and good example, give love,

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* Why is missionary position prescribed by the church? Because it gives the least satisfaction. Sex is not meant to be for pleasure but for procreation only. WARREN v STATE (1985) 255 Ga. 151 Daniel Warren was convicted for rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife while they were living together as husband and wife. He appealed to dismiss the indictment. His grounds: 1. Rape statute implies marital exclusion thus husband cannot be guilty of raping wife. 2. Aggravated sodomy statute provides for marital exclusion, too. 3. Interpreting the above-mentioned laws otherwise would be tantamount to new interpretations & application of such would deny him of his due process rights. ISSUE: WON marital exclusion is implied in the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes HELD: No. There has never been an express marital exemption in Georgia rape statute. Theories/bases for thinking that marital exclusion exists in rape statute: (a) Lord Hale by giving matrimonial consent, wife gave up herself in this kind unto husband and she can t take that back (b) Subsequent marriage doctrine of English law - if marriage between a rapist and his victim extinguishes criminal liabilities then corollary, rape within marital relationship should be given that immunity (c) Medieval time wife is husband s chattel or property thus rape, thus man is merely using his own property (d) Unity of person theory husband and wife become one, with wife incorporating her existence to that of the husband, thus husband cannott be convicted of raping himself. Justifications: (a) prevent fabricated charges (b) prevent wives from using rape charges for revenge (c) prevent state intervention so as not to thwart possible reconciliation All of these theories and justifications are passé. Equal protection of the laws is being practiced now. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge with a female forcibly and against her will. It violates the moral sense and personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim. Implied consent to such in marriage conflicts is absurd and against the constitution. During era of slavery, rape was seen negatively and not acceptable even to chattels. Sodomy is the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature by man with man or in same unnatural manner with woman. There has been no implied marital exemption under this statute even in earlier times. Consent is not a defense unlike in rape. Anyone who voluntarily participates is guilty.

There is due process. Due process merely requires that law give sufficient warning so men may avoid what is forbidden. Statutes concerned are plain and broadly written. This may be the first application to this particular set of facts but it is not an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of criminal statutes that are narrowly drawn. There is no marital exemption in rape. A person commits rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. THURMAN v CITY OF TORRINGTON (1984) 595 F. Supp. 1521 Between early October 1982 and June 10, 1983, Tracey Thurman notified the police officers of the City of repeated threats upon her life and the life of her child, Charles Thurman, Jr., made by her estranged husband, Charles Thurman. This includes breaking her windshield while she was in the car, where he was convicted of breach of peace, and stabbing her repeatedly. Attempts to file complaints by wife against husband based on threats of death and maiming her were ignored and rejected by the police because of an alleged administrative classification that affords lesser protection when the victim is a woman abused by a spouse or boyfriend, or a child abused by a father or stepfather. ISSUES: WON the administrative classification violates the equal protection clause HELD: Yes. A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman merely because he is her husband. A police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in such violence, and may not automatically decline to make an arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other. Whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intra-family controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. SUB-ISSUES 1. Dismissal of claims of son - Correct. Condition to stay away from son is not one of the conditions after arrest. There is failure to adequately allege denial of equal protection 2. Allegation of custom or policy - A pattern emerges that evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the police department to the complaints of Tracey and its duty to protect her. Such indifference raises an inference of custom or policy on the part of municipality. 3. Unidentified police officers - Okay because case was dismissed even before plaintiff had an opportunity to discover identity of unidentified defendants. 4. Pendent Jurisdiction over plaintiff s state law claim- The court has discretion to exercise this power. At the instant case, court declines to exercise because needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.

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PEOPLE v LIBERTA (1984) 64 NY 2d 152 Mario and Denise were married but when he started beating her she sought temporary protection from her husband. The order was granted and Mario was directed to move out, stay away from the family home, stay away from Denise and he may only visit their child once a week. Mario wanted to visit son but Denise did not allow him to go the house so they met instead in the motel where Mario was staying on the condition that they be accompanied by a friend. However, the friend left upon their arrival at the motel. Mario then attacked Denise, threatened to kill her and forced her to perform fellatio on him and to engage in sexual intercourse w/him. 2 ½ year old son was there all the time and Mario even forced Denise to tell their son to watch what was happening. They were allowed to leave afterwards. Mario was convicted for rape and sodomy both in their 1st degrees. However, Mario contends that: o They are married thus he is covered by marital exemption to rape and sodomy. o Rape and sodomy statutes are unconstitutional because it treats married and unmarried persons differently. ISSUES: 1. WON Mario is covered by the marital exemption 2. WON the statutes are unconstitutional for violating equal protection clause HELD: 1. NO. Male guilty of rape when he engages in sexual intercourse with female by forcible compulsion. Female is any female person not married to actor. Sodomy means engaging in deviate sexual intercourse (sexual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact between penis and anus, mouth and penis, or mouth and vulva. Not married phrase means there is marital exemption for both. But it has exemptions. One of which is when spouses are living apart pursuant to a valid and effective (a) order issued by court of competent jurisdiction requiring such living apart (b) decree of separation (c) written agreement of separation, they are considered to be not married. Thus, forcible rape or sodomy in this instance would be punishable. In this case, Denise and Mario were technically, not married, by virtue of the temporary order of protection. 2. Constitutionality of Marital Exemption - Married man ordinarily cannot be convicted of forcibly raping or sodomizing his wife (marital exemption). State is allowed to make classifications as long as there is a rational basis for doing so and it does not arbitrarily burden a particular group. No rational basis for distinguishing between marital and non-marital rape. Rationales are archaic. (See People v Liberta explanations on theories). Imposing a marital exemption does not further the cause it purportedly

protects which is marital privacy (e.g. Prevent state interference to protect privacy not justified by allowing husband to forcibly rape his wife; Disrupt marriage the act of rape/sodomy in itself would disrupt the marriage and reconciliation is quite impossible; wife will present fabricated info criminal justice system can take care of this). Marital rape is more violent and traumatic than non-marital one. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 3. Constitutionality of Exemption for Females Only males can be convicted of rape in the 1st degree. Reason: It aims to protect chastity of women and their property value to father/husbands. Treating people differently based on gender can only be justified by its substantial relation to the achievement of an important governmental obligation. State defense: (a) only females can become pregnant it s not the main purpose (b) female faces probability of medical, sociological and psychological problems unique to her gender archaic and overbroad generalization (c) women cannot actually rape men or if it happens, it s rare not tenable either. They need to present an exceedingly persuasive justification for classification. Show that gender-based law serves the government s interest better than a gender-neutral one. As it is, only females who forcibly rape males benefit from the present statute. LIKEWISE, IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 4. Strike out only the unconstitutional parts since the statute is of major importance. It s not entirely void anyway. Due process is observed. His act was already criminal when he attacked Denise.


B. Fixing the Family Domicile
FC, Art 69 The husband and the wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO (1966) 17 SCRA 674 Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño were married in 1948. In 1950, defendant Escaño obtained a foreign divorce in Nevada. She further sought papal dispensation of the marriage although no document proving the same was presented. Escaño s marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran in the US in 1954, which was later blessed with three children ISSUES: 1. WON divorce is valid 2. WON Court may then compel Escaño to cohabit with Tenchavez HELD: 1. Divorce is invalid for a foreign divorce decree cannot be recognized in the Philippines especially if it was granted by court of the place which was not the parties bona

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fide domicile and on a ground not recognized by our law, which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in private international law, foreign decrees (especially those confirming or dissolving a marriage) cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. No. It is not within the province of courts to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to the other. However, a spouse who unjustifiable deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support.

DADIVAS v VILLANUEVA (1929) 54 Phil. 92 Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva married Rafael Villanueva and they had three children. (18, 10, 9) After 22 years, Aurelia filed a case for separate maintenance due to infidelity and cruelty. 10 years prior to the institution of the case, Rafael was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four different women. Even after the institution of the case it was shown that he has had an illicit relation with another woman. The incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations with other women coupled with his lack of consideration and even brutality caused Aurelia to leave the conjugal home and for her to establish her own abode. Their final separation occurred on April 1947. There was no sufficient evidence to establish the cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband. ISSUE: WON the wife is entitled for separate support from her husband. HELD: YES In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from the husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the home. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside the conjugal home are sufficient grounds. Ruling in Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo is not applicable because in the Arroyo case the only grounds that were alleged was cruelty and that charge was not proven. In the present case, the charge of cruelty was also not proven but the Aurelia also accused her husband of infidelity and that charge has been proven (repeated acts of conjugal infidelity) and the husband appears to be a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This fact gives the wife an undeniable right to relief. Goitia v. Campos Rueda husband cannot by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife. When he drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties. GARCIA v SANTIAGO (1928) 53 Phil. 952 1910 Cipriana Garcia Isabelo Santiago married 1925 Cipriana compelled to leave conjugal dwelling: 1. continued family dissensions 2. Alejo, Isabelo s son by his first wife seduced Prisca Aurelio, Cipriana s daughter by her first husband.



Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of requiring his son to marry Prisca, refused to interfere and he seemed to tolerate their illicit relationship. 3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latter s whims and caprices and thus, damaging and prejudicing Cipriana s rights. Some of these properties include lands acquired during their marriage with money belonging to the conjugal partnership. Land annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at P4.00/cavan. Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court: 1. Their separation is necessary to avoid personal violence. She could not live in the conjugal dwelling due to the illicit relationship of Alejo and Prisca tolerated by Isabelo. 2. She is entitled to P500 pendente lite monthly pension from conjugal partnership. However, Isabelo refused to provide for her support despite her demands. 3. She should be in-charge of the administration of the property of their conjugal partnership because Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct and acts by publicly maintaining an illicit relationship with Geronima Yap. Isabelo answered with a general denial. CFI dismissed

ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the house and threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Prisca s situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Prisca s pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further quarrels. 2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal - NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidences even show that it was acquired by him before their marriage. 3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly maintenance = NO. That s too much. P50 is enough. ATILANO v CHUA CHING BENG (1958) 103 Phil. 255 Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married Chua Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on May 1951. They lived in Manila with the parents of the Ching Beng. In October of that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a vacation in Pilar s parents. She stayed behind, telling the defendant that she would go back to him later. On September 1953, however, she filed a complaint of support against her husband, alleging estrangement since October 1952, incessant bickering and his inability to provide a home for them without his parents. Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support; however, he expressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns to Manila and lives with him in a domicile separate from his parents. As the husband, he claims the right to fix the

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residence of the family. After plaintiff filed a petition for pendente lite with the CFI. CFI granted a monthly allowance of P75. The defendant then filed a petition wherein he elected to fulfil his obligation as fixed by the trial court to receive and maintain plaintiff at his residence in Pasay City. CFI denied the petition. CA presented to SC for Adjudication. ISSUE: WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with him on account of some misunderstanding she had with the husband s immediate relatives. HELD: No. Defendant-appellant gave the option to support wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his parents home. Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no obligation to give any support. The wife cannot be compelled to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spouse who left. DEL ROSARIO v DEL ROSARIO (1949) 46 OG 6122 Plaintiff Genoveva del Rosario, a widow with 2 kids and defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic, widower with a son got married. They lived together in the house of defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942. ISSUE: WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to support RATIO: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal justification for wife s refusal to live with husband, taking into account the traditional hatred between wife and her mother-in-law (nyahaha). It is true that wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish the residence (Art 58, CC), but this right does not include compelling wife to live with mother-in-law, if they cannot get along together. Alimony will be set according to husband s ability to pay.

CC, Art 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute proportionately to the family expenses.

FC, Art 199 Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the ff persons in the order herein provided: 1. spouse 2. descendants in the nearest degree 3. ascendants in the nearest degree 4. brothers and sisters

FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim form the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding Article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obliges should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred.

C. Mutual Help and Support
FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to: 1. live together, 2. observe mutual love, 3. respect and fidelity, 4. render mutual help and support

FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence thereof, form the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties.

MCGUIRE v MCGUIRE (1953) 157 Neb. 226 Lydia (66) and Charles (80) McGuire were married. They have known each other for 3 years and wife knew of husband s extraordinary frugality. She has two daughters from previous marriage, whose education was supported by the second marriage. They are now married and living in different states. They inherited an 80-acre farm from first husband and Lydia transferred her interest to her daughters but she can have the rent money which she uses to visit her daughters. Wife testified that she used to raise chickens and her profits were used to buy clothing and groceries because husband gave her very little money, did not give her clothes except for a single coat and never took her to a movie. Their house was not equipped with a bathroom and kitchen was not modern. The furnace was not in good condition and she had a hard time scooping coal for it. The car did not have an efficient heater. She could not raise chickens anymore due to the 3 abdominal operations she went through which her husband paid for. Because of these, wife filed an action for equity to recover suitable maintenance and support money, and for costs and attorney s fees. District Court decreed that wife was legally entitled to use the credit of the husband and obligate him to pay for certain items in the nature of improvements and repairs, furniture, and

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appliances for the household; purchase a new automobile with an effective heater in 30 days; pay travel expenses of wife to visit each daughter at least once a year; wife be entitled in the future to pledge the credit of the husband for what may constitute necessities of life; personal allowance of wife of $50 a month; awarded $800 for wife s attorney; and as an alternative, buy a modern house elsewhere. ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to relief HELD: No. To maintain an action such as the one at bar, the parties must be separated or living apart from each other. Parties are not living apart and wife has been supported in the same manner without complaint. As long as home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage is being carried out. As for attorney s fees, it is only allowed to the successful party in litigation only where allowance is provided by the statute. PELAYO v LAURON (1909) 12 Phil 453 Arturo Pelayo is a physician who was called on by the defendants (parents of the husband) to attend to their daughter in law who was about to undergo labor. Plaintiff tried his best to help her deliver, but she died due to childbirth. Plaintiff is now asking for due compensation for his services amounting to P500. Defendants claim that her delivery at their domicile was only incidental, and that it was her husband who should pay for the services rendered by the plaintiff. ISSUE: Who between the parents-in-law and the husband is liable for the payment of Pelayo? HELD: The husband, because rendering of medical assistance in case of illness comprises one of the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. It is improper for plaintiff to have brought action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff. The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff. They are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support.

D. Management of the Household
FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses shall for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Art 70.

CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property.

YOUNG v HECTOR () 740 So. 2d 1153

E. Exercise of Profession
FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: 1. the objection is proper 2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

CC, Art 117 The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may object, provided: 1. His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and 2. His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family.

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RA 7192 Women in Development and Nation-building Act
AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN DEVELOPMENT AND NATION BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 1. Title. This Act shall be cited as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act." Sec 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provided women rights and opportunities equal to that of men. To attain the foregoing policy: 1. A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to support programs and activities for women; 2. All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development programs and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development process; and 3. All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein. Sec 3. Responsible Agency. The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) shall primarily be responsible for ensuring the participation of women as recipients in foreign aid, grants and loans. It shall determine and recommend the amount to be allocated for the development activity involving women. Sec 4. Mandate. The NEDA, with the assistance of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, shall ensure that the different government departments, including its agencies and instrumentalities which, directly or indirectly, affect the participation of women in national development and their integration therein: 1. Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside development programs or projects, provide income and employment opportunities to women in the rural areas and thus, prevent their heavy migration from rural to urban or foreign countries; 2. Include an assessment of the extent to which their programs and/or projects integrate women in the development process and of the impact of said programs or projects on women, including their implications in enhancing the self-reliance of women in improving their income; 3. Ensure the active participation of women and women's organizations in the development programs and/or projects including their involvement in the planning, design, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation thereof; 4. Collect sex-disaggregated data and include such data in its program/project paper, proposal or strategy; 5. Ensure that programs and/or projects are designed so that the percentage of women who receive assistance is approximately proportionate to either their traditional participation in the targeted activities or their proportion of the population, whichever is higher. Otherwise, the following should be stated in the program/project paper, proposal or strategy; (a) The obstacle in achieving the goal; (b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and (c) To the extent that steps are not being taken to overcome those obstacles, why they are not being taken.

Assist women in activities that are of critical significance to their self-reliance and development. Sec 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances. In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. To this end: 1. Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangement under the same conditions as men; 2. Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and nonmaterial resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; 3. Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and 4. Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances. Sec 6. Equal Membership in Clubs. Women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, civic and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same organization. Sec 7. Admission to Military Schools. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men except for those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes.

Sec 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. Married persons who devote full time to managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the working spouse's consent, be entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the working spouse. The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and regulations necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this section. Sec 9. Implementing Rules. The NEDA, in consultation with the different government agencies concerned, shall issue rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6) months from its effectivity. Sec 10. Compliance Report. Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act and every six (6) months thereafter, all government departments, including its agencies and instrumentalities, shall submit a report to Congress on their compliance with this Act. Sec 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 sections or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Sec 12. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. Sec 13. Effectivity Clause. The rights of women and all the provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

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1. 2.

WON appellant s deception and fraud justified award of damages to defendant - Yes WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs. Silva - Yes

F. Use of Surname
CC, Art 370 A married woman may use: 1. 2. 3. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname (e.g. Miriam Defensor-Santiago) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname (e.g. Loi Ejercito) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." (e.g. Mrs. Francis Pangilinan)

HELD: 1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never have agreed to be with appellant. Esther s loss of employment in the Girl Scout s Davao Council was ultimately a result of Silva s deception and she should be indemnified therefor. His concealment of his real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He should then stand solely liable for any and all damages arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther acted in good faith since Silva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his name. 2. Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had really taken place. It is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a married woman is authorized to use husband s surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise. TOLENTINO v CA (1988) 162 SCRA 66 Private respondent Consuelo David Arturo Tolentino (yes, the one who annotated the law) in 1931. Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years. Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters). RTC: Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino CA: reversed RTC ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioner s cause of action has already prescribed 2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced. HELD: 1. Yes Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.

CC, Art 373 A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.

CC, Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other relief.

CC, Art 378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.

SILVA v PERALTA (1960) 110 Phil 57 Defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger sister Florence in the latter s arrest and investigation. There, defendant met plaintiff Saturnino Silva, a US citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva then started courting Esther and she later accepted his proposal of marriage having been made to believe that he was single. They started living together as common-law husband and wife and bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However, no documents of marriage were prepared nor executed. The only evidence offered was testimonies of the defendant and her counsel. Appellant Silva, however, was married to one Priscilla Isabel of Australia during such time. It was only after May 1945, when he was sent back to US for medical treatments of his battle wounds, did he divorce Priscilla. To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another marriage with co-plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.


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Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues. The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951. She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge. No Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law. Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband s surname. She cannot be prevented from using it, but neither can she restrain others from using it (bias much?). Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. of the husband even if he has remarried. If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. There is no usurpation of the petitioner s name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity Element of usurpation o Actual use of another s name o Use is unauthorized o Use of another s name is to designate personality or identity of a person None of these elements were present in the case Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case is not applicable. In Silva, it was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendant s representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the wife.

G. Relief from Courts
FC, Art 72 When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.

2. -


PEREZ v PEREZ (1960) 109 Phil 657 Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a civil case against defendant Angela Tuason de Perez at the CFI Manila. He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place under guardianship based on the following allegations: o she was squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloix o she was spending the conjugal partnership of gain o defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass her husband CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction ISSUE: WON the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court. HELD: RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction. Material injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations between man and wife) and not patrimonial or financial. ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921) 42 Phil 54 Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife. ISSUES: 1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home 2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction HELD: 1. On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her






YASIN v SHARI A DISTRICT COURT (1995) 241 SCRA 606 - SUPRA No need to file petition to revert to use of maiden name after divorce since marital ties have been completely severed.

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husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile. When people understand that they must live together they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wives necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans) 2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

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MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT is an agreement entered
into before marriage and, in consideration thereof, between an intended husband and wife, by which the enjoyment or devolution of property is regulated. A contract entered into by those who are to be united in marriage, in order to establish the conditions of their conjugal partnership with respect to present and future property.

FC, Art 77 The form of marriage settlement: 1. in writing 2. signed by the parties 3. before the celebration of the marriage Prejudice against third persons: registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of property.

FC, Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of the Title IX of this Code.

A. General Provisions
FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: 1. by marriage settlements executed before the marriage 2. by the provisions of this Code 3. by the local customs FC, Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete separation of property or any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community property as established in this Code shall govern.

* Art 14 FC father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them * Title IX Parental authority * By applying principles of statutory construction, Art 14 which is specific provision for marriage shall prevail
FC, Art 79 For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto.

FC, Art 80 In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. This rule shall not apply: 1. Where both spouses are aliens 2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located 3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.

FC, Art 76 In order that any modification in the marriage settlement may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Art 66, 67 , 128, 135 and 136. Art 66 Reconciliation after legal separation: Separation of property and forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse shall subsist, unless spouses agree to revive their former property regime Agreement to revive former property regime shall be executed under oath and specify 1. Properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime 2. Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse 3. Names of all their creditors, address and amount owing to each If spouse without just cause abandons the other OR fails to comply with his/her obligations to the family: Petition for judicial separation of property or authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership Sufficient causes for voluntary judicial separation of property Spouses joint filing of petition for voluntary dissolution of ACP/CPG/separation of their common properties

Art 67

FC, Art 81 Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriage shall be valid.

Art 128

Art 135 Art 136

COLLECTOR v FISHER (1961) 110 Phil 686 Walter and Beatrice Stevenson, both British citizens were married in Manila where they lived until they established permanent residence in California in 1945. Walter died in 1951 and instituted his wife as sole heiress to real and personal properties in the Philippines, which were assessed for estate and inheritance tax. ISSUE: WON in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, the net estate should be deducted as the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership.

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HELD: Yes. It should be deducted from net estate. It is a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. WHARTON S PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTIONS apply. Property relations of the Stevensons should be determined by the rational laws of the husband. Under Art 1325 OCC, one spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial agreement, it is the national law of the husband that becomes the dominant law in determining the property relations of such spouses. But since both spouses are foreigners, it is British law that should apply. However, as there is no proof of what the law of England is in this matter and the court is justified to indulge in processual presumption, that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law.

FC, Art 83 These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in CC, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles.

FC, Art 85 Donation by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance, and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess.

B. Donation Propter Nuptias
1. Requisites for donations
FC, Art 82 Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.

DOMALAGAN v BOLIFER (1916) 33 Phil. 471 Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a verbal contract wherein the former was to pay defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of the former s son Cipriano Domalagan with the defendant s daughter, Bonifacia. Jorge Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus P16 as hansel or token of future marriage. However, the Bonifacia married one Laureano Sisi. Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded return of the said sum of P516 plus interest and damages arising from the fact that he was obliged to sell his real property in Bohol to come up with the sum. Defendant denied complaint and alleged that it did not constitute a cause of action. RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered any addtl damages. Ruled in favor of plaintiff for the return of P516 plus 6% interest from Dec 17, 1910 plus costs. ISSUE: WON Domalagan can demand his P516 since no marriage took place HELD: YES. The amount constitutes DPN since it fulfills all the requirements, thus it may be revoked. Verbal contracts are valid even if it not clothed in the necessary form. SERRANO v SOLOMON (1959) 105 Phil 998 Melchor Solomon executed a supposed deed of DPN, stating among others that if there are no children and wife dies first, all of his properties and all properties acquired during the union will be inherited by those who reared the wife. The wife Alejandria Solomon died less than 9 months later without issues, upon which Estanislao Serrano, the uncle who reared her instituted this action to enforce the deed. CFI: Donation was not a donation propter nuptias because it was not made in consideration of marriage and it was not made to one or both parties of the marriage ISSUE: WON the donation made by Melchor can be considered as a donation propter nuptias. HELD: NO and the alleged donation is null & void. CFI decision affirmed. Estanislao won t get anything. Whether you apply Art 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 of the new CC,

REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS (DPN) 1. made before celebration of the marriage 2. made in consideration of the marriage 3. made in favor of one or both of the future spouses DONATIONS EXCLUDED 1. in favor of the spouses after the marriage (ordinary wedding gifts) 2. in favor of future spouses, made before the celebration of marriage, but not in consideration 3. in favor of persons other than the spouses, even though they may be founded on the marriage * governed by provisions on ordinary donations WHO MAY DONATE 1. the spouses to each other 2. the parents to one or both of the spouses 3. by third persons to one or both of the spouses
DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS Does not require express acceptance May be made by minors (Art 78) If present property is donated and property regime is not ACP, limited to 1/5 Grounds for revocation in Art 86 ORDINARY DONATIONS Express acceptance necessary Cannot be made by minors No limit to donation of present property provided legitimes are not impaired Grounds for revocation are found in law on donations

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the result would be the same, donations propter nuptias are only those bestowed (1) before the celebration of marriage, (2) in consideration of the same and (3) upon one or both of the spouses. Melchor s donation violated conditions 2 and 3. It was not in consideration solely of the marriage, it had additional terms like the marriage had to be childless and one of the spouses had to die before the other. Also, it was not in favor of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her parents and those who raised her. Based on Manresa s commentary, donations granted to persons other than the spouses even though founded on the marriage are excluded. It s not a donation inter vivos (during their lifetime) either, because donee never accepted it by same instrument of donation or in separate document as required by law. It s not a donation mortis causa (upon death) either. It has to be governed by provisions on the disposition execution of wills to be appreciated as such. Besides, donor is still alive. It will only be operational upon his death. SOLIS v BARROSO (1928) 53 Phil 912 Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a DPN of certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case one of the donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After Juan s death, Maxima recovered possession of the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and demanded: 1. the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law, 2. transfer of one-half of the donated property to her 3. to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits CFI granted the plaintiff s prayer, basing its judgment on Art 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. ISSUE: WON the private document is valid as DPN HELD: NO. DPN is governed by laws on donation. Art 633 provides that for a donation of a real property to be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. The only exception to the rule are onerous and remuneratory contracts, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts. Because the DPN by the spouses were made in a private instrument, it is not valid and does not confer any rights.

MATEO v LAGUA (1969) 29 SCRA 864 Spouses Lagua donated half of their owned land to their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. This was executed in a public document. Alejandro died so his son would succeed in the ownership of the land. The father in law continued tending the farm and giving the wife her share in the fruits. Until the sustenance stopped and the wife discovered that the father-in-law sold the land. The wife successfully moved for the annulment the sale in a court proceeding. However, the Laguas subsequently filed for the annulment of the donation because it neglected their own support as well as the legitime of their other son. Alejandro s younger brother, Gervacio, filed a suit for annulment on the ground that it prejudiced his legitime. Bonifacia (the wife) appealed the decision raising the following errors: o Validity of the DPN have been determined in a previous case o Action to annul the donation has already prescribed since the case was filed 41 years after the donation o DPN is revocable only for any grounds enumerated in Art 132 of the New Civil Code o Determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers in the hereditary estate of Cipriano the CA should have applied the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 and not Art 888 NCC ISSUE: WON an onerous DPR may be revoked HELD: YES, DPN is without onerous condition and based on liberalities are subject to annulment due to inofficiousness. If proved that the value of the DPN exceeds the disposable free portion of the donor, it may be revoked. However, in this case, no evidence was adduced as to the burdensome nature of the DPN.

2. Donation propter nuptias of present or future property
FC, Art 84 If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than 1/5 of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on the testamentary succession and the formalities of wills.

DONATIONS OF present property takes effect upon celebration of marriage future property takes effect upon death (by will or mortis causa)

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3. Grounds for revocation of DPN
FC, Art 86 Donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: 1. if the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Art 81 2. when the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law 3. when the marriage is annulled and the donee acted in bad faith 4. upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse 5. if it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with 6. when the donee has committed and act of ingratitude as specified in the provisions of CC

4. Void donations
WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS 1. between spouses during marriage 2. direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of the other spouse and a person whom the spouses is presumptive heir at the time of donation) REASONS FOR PROHIBITION 1. donation inter vivos is dictated by principle of unity of personality of spouses during marriage 2. prevent weaker spouses from being abused by stronger spouse, whether by abuse of affection or threats of violence 3. protect creditors 4. prevent indirect modification of the marriage settlement PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO 1. common-law marriages 2. parties living in a state of adultery or concubinage * Reasons: possibility of undue influence and that if ruled otherwise, those living in guilt would be better off than those in legal union NAZARENO v BIROG (1947) 45 OG 11 Supp 268 Andrea Rodriguez Juan Aben Alberta Aben Daughter Alberta Mariano Meleno Nazareno Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff) When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had no offspring. Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to his then sixyear old step-grandson Bonifacio. The donation was accepted in the same deed by Alberta and Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the land. Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land: 1930 71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for 1, 100 (paid) 1933 2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially with remaining balance of 300, later paid 275, wrote promissory note for 25) 1934 1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600 (balance of 600, promissory note for that sum payable at end of Feb or March 1935) These two buyers immediately took possession of the land and cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff wrote him a letter demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected balance of 25 from Birog in March 1935). ISSUE: WON plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title and possession of a parcel of land described here? HELD: NO. Not only did he lose ownership of the two portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas possess, he

* What does Par 2 mean? The donor is not the parent who did not give consent. * What is a resolutory condition? The DPN is already received which enjoyment is subject to termination upon happening of the future and uncertain event. In other words done is forbidden to do something. (E.g. Car is given but it will be revoked if you use it anywhere outside NCR.) * Grounds of revocation in this article is not by operation of law. Those which revokes by operation of law are the ff: 1. if the DPN is stipulated in the marriage settlement and no marriage took place (Art 81) 2. for void ab initio and subsequent marriages in a spouse s presumptive death, provided the donee acted in bad faith (Art 43 (3) in relation to Art 50) * Art 765, CC Acts of ingratitude (1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority; (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority; (3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.

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signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the third and last portion; therefore, he is estopped from claiming the land. More importantly, appeal must be dismissed since plaintiff has no cause of action. The deed of donation upon which he bases his claim to land is null and void since it is made by the donor to a grandchild of his wife by the wife s previous marriage. The donation falls under the prohibition in Art.1335, CC. Neither has the plaintiff acquired the land by prescription for there is no evidence that he ever possessed it or claimed it against his grandfather (as evidence in deed in favor of Ariola, signed by Nazareno as witness). MATABUENA v CERVANTES (1971) 38 SCRA 284 While Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes were living as common law spouses, the man donated to her a parcel of land. They eventually got married and Felix died, leaving behind his properties to his wife Petronila. Felix s sister Cornelia questions the validity of the donation and claims ownership over her brother s estate. ISSUE: WON the ban on donation inter vivos applies when the donation was made during common law relationship HELD: Yes, common law spouses fall within the prohibition hence the donation is null and void as contrary to public policy. HARDING v COMMERCIAL UNION (1918) 38 Phil 464 Mrs. Harding bought an insurance policy for the car her husband gave her. A few days later, the car was totaled in a fire. The insurance company refused to pay saying that the donation of husband to the wife was void. ISSUE: WON the car was validly donated by the husband to the wife HELD: YES. The car may be considered as a moderate gift. Whether a gift is moderate or not would depend upon the circumstances of the parties, in this case, nothing was disclosed by the record. Also, the insurance company is not the proper party to question the moderateness of the gift. It can only be raised by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer interfere with their rights or interest. SUMBAD v CA (1999) 308 SCRA 75 Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agata s husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of the private respondents who purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the property in question.


In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are the children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim that after the death of their mother, their father sold the Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at property to private respondents without their knowledge and consent. They further alleged that although the private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria they still purchased the lots from Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at property so the deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private respondents. During the trial, petitioners and defense presented several witnesses.

ISSUES: 1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to the forgery of the deed of donation should be given credence. NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate court s decision that Eillenger s testimony is vague and incredible and incapable of impugning the validity of the public document. Forgery should be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillenger s testimony difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she anticipated the questions of petitioner s counsel. Petitioner s should have presented handwriting experts to support their claim that George s signature on the deed of donation was indeed a forgery. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art 749 CC, which requires a public instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property. NO. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However, the acknowledgment clause states that the person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted for and in the absence of the clerk of court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In accordance with the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the deputy clerk of court who notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court. 3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC NO. Art 133 provides that every donation between spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. This prohibition extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v Cervantes). In fact, Art 87, FC provides that every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate 2.

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gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. However, this point is being raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George was married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not married to George, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, George and Maria were still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Tait s (one of the witnesses presented) testimony is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George and Maria continuously maintained common-law relations until the date when the donation was made (April 2, 1974). * In short, the donation was valid because there was no evidence to support the allegation that George was married to Maria. There was also no evidence that the two were still living as common-law spouses at the time the donation was made. CHING v GOYANKO JR. (2006) 506 SCRA 735 Joseph Goyanko Sr Epifania dela Cruz had seven children who are the respondents in this case Respondents claim that their property was named after their aunt Sulpicia Goyanko because their father was a foreigner so Sulpicia had to sell it to Joseph first before Joseph was able to sell it to his common law wife petitioner herein Maria Ching Ching claims to be the owner who purchased the property for a certain price RTC and CA dismissed the case because of overwhelming evidence that she was concubine ISSUE: WON the sale to the concubine was valid HELD: NO. It falls under the prohibited donation between spouses.

C. System of Absolute Community
1. General Provisions
FC, Art 88 The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void.

FC, Art 89 No waiver of rights, interests, shares and effects of the ACP during the marriage can be made except in a case of judicial separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Art 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.

FC, Art 90 The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the ACP between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter.

2. What constitutes community property
FC, Art 91 Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

FC, Art 92 The ff shall be excluded from the ACP: 1. acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property 2. for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the ACP 3. acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property

FC, Art 93 Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community; unless it is proved that it is one of the excluded therefrom.

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3. Charges upon the ACP
FC, Art 94 The ACP shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; (9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

7 antenuptial debts
of either spouse insofar as benefited the family (no consent of other spouse needed)

10 litigation
between spouses, unless groundless

8 value
donated/promised to children for commencement and completion of education - no age limit

9 antenuptial debts,
that do not benefit family, for support of illegitimate children or crime/quasi-delict in case of insufficiency of separate property, deductible for his share upon liquidation

* Example of ante-nuptial debt in Par 9: amortization of conjugal dwelling or family vehicle * Difference between Par 1 and Par 2 * Difference between Par 4 and Par 5
FC, Art 95 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property.

* To discourage gambling, giving double loss to the gambler reflection of Catholic virtues * If the winning ticket in a lottery/sweepstakes given to spouse by a friend, it is considered a donation under Art 92 (1) and winnings will not form part of ACP unless expressly provided by donor.


2 incurred by:
- administratorspouse, - both spouses, or - by one spouse with the consent of the other

4 including minor or
major repairs upon community property

1 of spouse,
common children, legitimate children - For illegit: exclusive/ separate OR ACP advance, subject to reimbursement upon liquidation


incurred by one without the consent of the other to the extent that family may have been benefited (E.g. failed business which was initially ok)

mere preservation of separate property used by the family


6 commence or
complete education (professional or vocational) e.g. language, speech power, leadership, law, culinary - by either spouse

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4. Ownership and disposition of the ACP
FC, Art 96 The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within 5 years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

5. Dissolution
FC, Art 99 The ACP terminates 1. death of either spouse (Art 103) 2. legal separation (Art 63 & 64) 3. annulled or declared void (Art 50 to 52) 4. judicial separation of property during the marriage (Art 134 to 138)

* Ma am Beth thinks this is wrong because it does not take into consideration the expertise of the husband and the woman. What if the wife is a BA major while the husband does not know a damn thing about economics, shall his economic decision still prevail? * Okay, you say that it s not totally unfair because she can go to Court and assert her views. But is that sufficient remedy for the wife? Unless you really want to escalate the fight, resorting to judicial settlement is like raging a war. It will only turn minor agreements into major brawl. Plus the cost of lawsuit, it just makes matters worse!
FC, Art 97 Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property.

FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of ACP except that: 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported 2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding 3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse-present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter s share

FC, Art 101 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition to the court: 1. receivership 2. judicial separation of property 3. authority for sole administration of ACP, subject to precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to: 1. marital 2. parental 3. property relations A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.

FC, Art 98 Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.

* Remedies of spouse present in case of abandonment (Art 101) 1. receivership 2. judicial separation of property 3. authority to be the sole administrator of ACP * Presumption of abandonment - Absent from conjugal dwelling for three months - Failed to inform other of whereabouts for three months

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6. Liquidation of assets and liabilities
FC, Art 102 Upon dissolution of the ACP, the following procedure shall apply: 1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse. 2. The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. 3. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. 4. The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. 5. The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51. 6. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.

FC, Art 103 Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.

* Liquidate CP within 1 year from death of spouse. How? 1. judicial settlement in testate or intestate proceedings 2. judicial action, or ordinary action for partition 3. extra-judicial agreement (only if there are no debts) * 1 year prescription period is not practical. Filipinos have a tradition of one year of mourning (babang luksa). * Who may challenge validity? Heirs of the deceased spouse * If no liquidation, any encumbrance or disposition is void (you can t sell it, you keep it forever) * Mandatory for subsequent marriage to be separate property no logical reason for this according to Tolentino
FC, Art 104 Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each.

* How to apply the forfeitures in Art 43(2) and Art 63(2) NET ASSETS what remains after payment of community debts and obligations NET PROFITS in Par 4 above, shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution How to compute net profit: Market value debt of community net assets or remainder market value at marriage

* The clause before the effectivity of this Code is there because simultaneously liquidation of two or more marriages is no longer legally possible under FC which imposes a mandatory requirement for marriages subsequent to an unliquidated marriage to have complete separation of properties. ONAS v JAVILLO (1934) 59 Phil 733 Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5 children. After Ramona s death, he married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children. During his first marriage 11 parcels of land were acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of land were acquired. Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were products of the first marriage. Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was made by the administrator of the estate of her husband. She alleges the following errors:


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All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the properties of the first marriage. TC erred in approving the partition dated September 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the same did not include all properties of the deceased.

This was modified in consideration of the fact that, only the Caanawan property (67 hectares) was shown to be acquired during the first marriage and only 20 hectares of which was made productive during this time. However, it is from the fruits of this property that enabled the spouses in the 2nd marriage to acquire all other future property. 1. Caanawan property and on P.Campa 8/39 (1/6 + 1/26) to each of the children from the 1st marriage; 1/26 to each of the children of the 2nd marriage 2. All other properties acquired during the 2nd marriage 19/195 to each children of the 1st marriage; 2/65 to each children of the 2nd marriage; 28/65 to the surviving spouse HELD: Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership 1. 2. 3. 1st conjugal partnership entitled to 18/64 of the whole estate (18 yrs) 2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of the whole estate (46 yrs) The share of Nicolas Delizo is of the net remainder of CPG of both marriages or 32/64, divided into equal shares among all his heirs (all 13 of the kids)

ISSUES and RULING: 1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased husband or wife - NO When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought about the community ceases, for the principles of an ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is governed by special rules. Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any effect for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a recompense for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death of one of the partners. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as the spouses are united. 2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the properties of the first marriage NO Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share. 3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid - NO Was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second marriage were produced by the properties of the first marriage. ** The property corresponding to the first marriage consists of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels of land were acquired during the second marriage. VDA DE DELIZO v DELIZO (1976) 69 SCRA 216 This is about two cases involving the partition of the conjugal properties two marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. He first married Rosa Villasfer which lasted for 18 yrs (1891-1909) and they had 3 children. He then married Dorotea de Ocampo which lasted for 46 yrs (1911-1957) and they had 9 children. In 1957 Nicolas died (90 yrs old). Court originally adjudicated of the land to the 3 children from the 1st marriage, to the surviving spouse and in equal shares to the children of both marriages.

Thus the final sharing scheme is 1. Rosa s share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be divided among their 3 kids (142/1664 each) 2. Dorotea s share: 23/64 of the whole estate + her share in Nicolas estate (662/1664) 3. Nicolas share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be divided into 13 equal parts (64/1664 each)

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D. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
1. General Provisions
FC, Art 105 In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.

2. Exclusive Property
FC, Art 109 The following shall be exclusive property of each spouse: (BY DIRECT ACQUISITION OR ORIGINALLY EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY) 1. brought to the marriage as his or her own 2. acquired during marriage by gratuitous title (BY SUBSTITUTION) 3. acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses 4. purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or the husband

FC, Art 106 . Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.

FC, Art 107 The rules applied in Art 88 and 89 also apply to CPG.

Art 88 Art 89

ACP begins at precise moment of celebration of marriage prohibition on waiver of rights, interest, shares and effects of ACP during marriage

E.g. of OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE 1. property owned before the marriage 2. acquired prior to marriage under defective title where defect was cured during the marriage 3. those alienated by spouse prior to marriage but reacquired during due to annulment, rescission or resolution of the contract, or revocation of donation, by virtue of which it was alienated 4. property actually delivered to spouse during marriage where cause or consideration came from such spouse prior to the marriage 5. property bought by installment prior and fully paid only during marriage but ownership already vested on buyer-spouse prior to the marriage; amount paid by CPG must be reimbursed upon liquidation E.g. of ACQUISITION BY GRATUITOUS TITLE 1. property acquired during marriage through testate (heir, devisee or legatee) or intestate succession or by donation 2. proceeds of insurance where received as beneficiary of another person s policy 3. gratuity given as bounty or out of pure liberality by employer for long dedicated service (distinguished from pension which is conjugal property under Art 117, FC) 4. unearned increment (increase in value due to ordinary course of time e.g. modernization of a parcel of land) 5. moral damages awarded for personal injury sustained E.g of OTHER SEPARATE PROPERTY 1. collection of credits belonging to one spouse exclusively 2. money through mortgage, if not used for benefit of CPG 3. properties in co-ownership

NATURE OF INTEREST 1. There is no co-ownership, instead partnership 2. Each spouse has mere inchoate rights or expectancy over partnership property during marriage
FC, Art 108 The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 110 The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. strict dominion Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his/her exclusive property to the other by means of a public instrument (notarized) which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place where the property is located.

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property is part of the separate estate of one of the spouses, it will be considered conjugal property. RODRIGUEZ v DELA CRUZ (1907) 8 Phil 665 Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez is second wife of Hilarion dela Cruz while defendants are Hilarion s children by his first wife; this is an action to recover parcels of land in question from defendants. Matea claims that property given to her by her deceased father but in prior action by defendants for partition of Hilarion s property, lower court adjudged lands in question to them on theory that such lands were acquired during Hilarion s first marriage. HELD: The land belongs to Rodriguez. She is allowed to retain ownership of the property she brought into the second marriage (Art 36 CC). She merely had Hilarion administer her property for her. There is no law that prohibits this but it cannot be concluded that the wife s property that he is administering becomes his simply because he has done so for a long time. PEOPLE S BANK AND TRUST CO v REGISTER OF DEEDS (1934) 60 Phil 167 Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled Agreement and Declaration of Trust in which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee was to redeem mortgage constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof, grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived from said property while remained unsold. ISSUES: 1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the wife s property which therefore belongs to CPG, 2. WON management belongs to husband 3. WON contract is null and void since husband did not give consent HELD: Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the paraphernal property. She may likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such contract merely voidable or void. PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES v POIZAT (1925) 48 Phil 536 Gabriela Andrea de Costen executed in favor of her husband, Juan Poizat a general power of attorney which among other things authorized him in her name, place and stead, and making use of her rights and actions to borrow money and execute a mortgage over he properties now in question. Defendant secured a loan of P10,000 from plaintiff to pay a mortgage; however mortgage executed by

FC, Art 111 A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of his/her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same. FC, Art 112 The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the ownerspouse.

FC, Art 113 Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouse as his or her own exclusive property and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.

FC, Art 114 If the donation are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee-spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the CPG.

FC, Art 115 Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case.

LIM v GARCIA (1907) 7 Phil 320 Hilario Lim died in 1903 leaving a widow (defendant) and 9 children (plaintiffs) and an interest in P50000 estate. The children contend that certain properties should not be included in the conjugal property because Lim bought these into the marriage. The children also allege that the RTC erred in including from the inventory three parcels of land which Lim s widow claim to be paraphernal property acquired by exchanging properties exclusively belonging to her. There is a presumption in Art 1407 CC that all estate of the married couple will be considered CPG property unless it is proven that is was part of the separate estate of husband or wife. HELD: The three parcels of land were acquired by the widow through exchanging properties which she inherited from her father. Thus they are paraphernal. The evidence presented by the children was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the properties included in the conjugal property belong there. Unless it is proven that the

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husband signed merely in his own name and not as attorney-in-fact. For failure to pay loan, property foreclosed and later sold at auction to plaintiff. Wife opposes confirmation of auction sale on ground that mortgage was null and void since husband was unauthorized.

3. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
a. Presumption that property is conjugal
FC, Art 116 All property acquired during the marriage whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Important points regarding conjugal nature of properties: 1. presumption applies even if manner in which property was acquired is not shown 2. the party invoking this presumption must first prove that the party was acquired during the marriage 3. proof of acquisition during marriage is a condition for the operation of this presumption 4. presumption of prevails over ordinary rules of accession 5. presumption is rebuttable by strong, clear and convincing evidence 6. presumption is stronger when creditors are involved 7. the burden of proof is on the party asserting that the property is exclusively owned by a spouse In overthrowing the conjugal character y RECITALS IN DEED OF SALE is not sufficient because to permit such would make a spouse a sole arbiter of character of property acquired during marriage y PROPERTY IN NAME OF ONE SPOUSE is likewise not enough to dispute the conjugality of a property BUT if there is no date of acquisition, the fact that the title is named after the spouse makes the property exclusive o That s why you should keep not only the title but also the deed of sale y PROOFS OF PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY o possession of some paraphernal funds under her administration and available for investment o sufficiency of such funds for price of property o investment of such funds in property in question y SOURCE OF FUNDS is not material to the conjugality or exclusivity of property because it is rather difficult to determine y ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE SPOUSE that the property in question is conjugal is a strong evidence against the party making admission or his/her heirs

HELD: The husband exceeded the scope of his authority. Defendant may have had authority to borrow money and mortgage real property of wife but law specifies how and in what manner it should be done, which was not duly complied with in this case. Mortgage in question executed by him only and not on behalf of wife, thus it is not binding on his wife. * One word could have changed everything: for or by CASTRO v MIAT (2003) 397 SCRA 271 Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought a piece of land in Paco on installment basis on May 17, 1977. Concordia died the following year. However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance because he went to UAE to work. He secured his title over the property in his name as a widower. There was also a dispute to the ownership of the two children (Romeo and Alexander) of the property. HELD: Since the spouses were married before the effectivity of the FC, the provisions of CC apply. Records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund, hence it is clearly conjugal. Art 160 of CC provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains to the husband or the wife. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.

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JOCSON v CA (1989) 170 SCRA 333 Emilio Jocson Alejandra Poblete Moises Jocson & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. The mother Alejandra died intestate, and so did the father Emilio in 1972. June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their father) during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null and void and that the properties involved be partitioned between him andhis sister: 1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilio s manifestation that the lands were sold at a low price because it was his loving, helpful and thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says his son possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did not violate any law and that he did not touch his wife s properties. He acknowledged receipt of payment. 2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too. 3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio and Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio sold his share to Agustina. All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 and 2 were registered with the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled and new certificates issued in the name of Agustina. Moises allegations: 1. #1 is null and void because his father s consent was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure, influence and other illegal machinations. He also alleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that his sister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is fictitious, simulated and fabricated. 2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with additional allegation that he was deliberately excluded and they intended to defraud him of his legitimate share. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents business and they must have used business earnings or simulated consideration in order to purchase the properties. 3. No real sale between dad and daughter living under same roof. 4. Dad didn t need money since sold properties were all income-producitng. 5. #1 and #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio can t validly sell. 6. #3: he only questions sale of dad s share to sister but not extrajudicial partition. RTC decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated and fictitious because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices were grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises.




RTC further declared #1 and #2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers which declared: Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. Ordered registration of propertiy to two children. CA reversed. Nos. 1 and 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contract based on fraud must be filed 4 years from discovery of such which begins on the date of the registration with the Register of Deeds. All documents actually and intended to be binding and effective against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition with sale in Number 3 is valid since it was done in accordance with New CC Art. 996 on intestate succession and Moises 1/3 share has not been prejudiced.

ISSUES & RULING: 1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription. NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consent s obtained by fraud is voidable (CC, Art. 1330) and action for annulment must be filed within 4 years from time of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the time when contract was registered with Register of Deeds (Gerona v. De Guzman). If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he further assailed that sale was without consideration since amount paid were merely simulated. Contracts witho cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC, Art 1352). A sale with simulated price is void (CC, Art 1471 and 1409[3]) and action for declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (CC, Art 1410). 2. WON sales were without consideration. NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations, especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of price and they are notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcome the presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his own witness contradicted his claim that his sister and her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina and Ernesto were into buy and sell of palay and rice. Even he himself said that he didn t know if his sister had other businesses. Agustina testified that she was into buy and sell even prior to her marriage. 3. WON prices were simulated NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher than assessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs. P24,840.00). Besides difference between market value and purchase price is understandable considering father s filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of defective consent. 4. WON sale is improbable.

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NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not relevant considering that all essential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object and cause.

5. WON properties in #1 and #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio and his wife. NO. CC, Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CP unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage (Cobb-Perez v Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in question were indeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can invoke the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Doesn t say when properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different from registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor and only registered such after marriage. Married to phrase is a mere description of Emilio s civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner, property registered in his name alone and that he is married. Consistent with the principle that registration of property in name of only one spouse doesn t negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy v Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear and convincing proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have presented sufficient proof to show that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus, properties are considered exclusive to Emilio. FRANCISCO v CA (1998) 299 SCRA 188 Case of the sickly man Teresita (petitioner) is Eusebio s (private respondent) legal second wife. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private respondents) are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Teresita s allegations: 1. Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they have acquired properties in Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal which were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them. 2. Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal. Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thus enjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute. RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show that said properties were


acquired during the second marriage, or that they pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that: 1. CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has already been repealed by art. 253, FC 2. It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC However, issue in Teresita s reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4

ISSUE: WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. HELD: YES. Petition denied. Arts 158 and 160 CC have been repealed by the FC, specifically by Art 254, FC (not Art 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158 and 160 does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued and vested while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be resolved based on provisions of CC. Art 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. As regards land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebio s testimony that he inherited the same from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the property should be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant to Art 148, CC. Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative title.

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As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as her documents all described Eusebio as the owner of the structures (Art 1431, CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence). Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (Art 158(2), CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on the source of funding (Art. 160, CC) cannot be invoked because there is also lack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage. Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title already existing and the phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio. Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as to incapacitate him to administer property.

b. Properties that compose the CPG
FC, Art 117 The following are CP properties 1. acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership or for only one of the spouses 2. labor, industry, work or profession of either or both 3. fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property AND the net fruits from the exclusive property 4. share of either spouses in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found 5. occupation such as fishing or hunting 6. livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse 7. by chance, e.g. winnings from gambling or betting. Losses shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse, though.

ONEROUS TITLE TEST: origin of the money invested in the purchase, e.g. if it came from the conjugal fund, the property acquired is conjugal SPECIAL RULES ON LIFE INSURANCE: If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his estate o If the premiums were paid with the conjugal funds, the proceeds are conjugal o If the premiums were paid with separate funds, proceeds are separate o If the premiums were paid partly with conjugal funds, and partly with separate funds, the proceeds will be partly conjugal and party separate If the beneficiary is the other spouse o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as beneficiary himself and the other spouse: Proceeds belong to the other spouse even if the premiums are paid out of conjugal funds but he/she should also reimburse half to the conjugal partnership o If spouses are insured, the surviving spouse gets the proceed with no obligation to reimburse (considered reciprocal donations) o If the insurance comes from a third person, exclusive property of the beneficiary-spouse Reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says that onerous titles are separate property even if CPG funds were used, subject to reimbursement. LABOR, INDUSTRY, WORK OR PROFESSION OF EITHER OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES includes all income whether in form of wages, pensions or retirement pay, honoraria, salaries, commission, bonuses, back pays, practice of profession, income from business even if capital comes from the exclusive properties of one of the spouses teacher s gratuity under special law is not conjugal because it is remuneratory FRUITS FROM COMMON AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY Only net income or fruits of exclusive property of the spouses become conjugal. Expenses for production, administration and preservation should be taken from

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the gross fruits and the owner-spouse is entitled to retain the gross income until these expenses are paid. Circumstances under Art 119 FC

cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husband s consent, except in cases provided by law. ISSUE: WON the award for damages is part of the conjugal partnership HELD: YES. The damages arose from a breach of the Zulueta s contract of carriage with PanAm from which they paid their fare with funds presumable belonging to the conjugal property. The damages therefore, fall under Art 153 CC, the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The damages do not fall under Art 148 CC as exclusive property of each spouse. Further, that which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belong to only one of the spouses and that which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or husband belong exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that what is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. MENDOZA v REYES (1983) 124 SCRA 154 Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes who executed a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements in favor of (petitioners) spouses Mendoza. The land in question was bought on installment basis from JM Tuazon & Co. represented by G. Araneta. Since the spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the said land because of lack of money, they had to borrow from RFC (Rehabilitation Finance Corporation). Thus, they loaned money for purposes of completing the construction of a one-storey building and paying balance of price of lot. A corresponding deed of absolute sale, in which Julia Reyes was named as vendee and her husband signed under the phrase, with my marital consent, was executed by Araneta on Nov 1948. From thereon, the spouses secured another loan for the payment of balance of lot and additional security, for the defrayment of the expenses incurred in the repairs, etc. As a result the transfer certificates of said lots issued by Registry of Deeds were in the name of Julia Reyes married to Ponciano Reyes. The mortgage contracts executed by spouses in favor of RFC were duly registered as well. Spouses put up a school and a camarin in the lots. When the school was transferred someplace else, the camarin was leased to Mendoza spouses in 1952 for ten years. The contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor with marital consent of Ponciano. Because of failure to pay their obligations to RFC, spouses asked for extension on their obligation and was granted such. On March 1961, while they were separated in fact and her husband was in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots to the Mendoza spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. Thus, he filed a case for the annulment of the deed of sale, stating that the properties were conjugal properties and that she sold them without his knowledge or consent.

SHARE OF SPOUSES IN HIDDEN TREASURE hidden treasure found by the spouses on the property of either of them is conjugal if property where the treasure is found is owned by one of the spouses and found by a stranger, one-half share of the owner of the property goes to the conjugal partnership if property where treasure is found owned by stranger and found by one of the spouses, one-half share of finder is conjugal
FC, Art 119 Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belong to one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installment on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse. However, the interests falling due during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership.

* Illustration of Art 119: The wife lent money to another before her marriage at interest, payable in installment for 10 years. The interests falling due during the marriage are conjugal, but the installment payments on the principal loan belong to the wife exclusively. ZULUETA v PAN-AM (1973) 49 SCRA 1 Spouses Rafael and Carolina Zulueta together with their daughter were passengers of Pan Am. Mr. Zulueta left the terminal and went to the beach in search for a place where he could relieve himself (where it would not be visible for the people in the plane and in the terminal). He came to a place abound 400 yards away from the terminal. He was gone for almost one hour (but before the plane left) and PanAm was contending that it could have not taken him that long relieve himself and that there were eight commodes at the terminal toilet for men. Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been offloaded due to drinking and belligerent attitude but according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to off-load all Zuluetas, their luggage and overcoats and other effects hand-carried by them came as a result of the altercation that happened between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner. After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the intention of keeping him stranded for a minimum period of one week at a cost of $13.30 per day. In an action for damages against PanAm, the Zuluetas were awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney fees. This was based on a breach of contract of carriage coupled with a quasi-delict. Pending appeal, the spouses separated and Mrs. Zulueta entered into a compromise agreement with PanAm, wherein she settled for P50,000. She filed for the dismissal of the case which was denied since a wife

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ISSUES: 1. WON the deed of sale was null and void on grounds that the property is conjugal property, which means Julia is prohibited from selling such without consent of spouse. 2. WON issue of estoppel can be raised against Ponciano. HELD: 1. YES. Property is conjugal following the presumption found in Art 160 CC, which states that all property of the marriage must be presumed to belong to the CP unless it be proved that it pertains to exclusive property of spouses. This presumption is strong as stated in Art 153, CC, which provides that such presumption must be overcome by one who contends otherwise. The only character that they could come up with to rebut the presumption is Julia s testimony, which is contrary to Araneta s records as well as info on mortgage contracts (which are favorable to her husband). Precedent states that it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. That proof of acquisition of property in dispute during the marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. Thus, the property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The records show that the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements came from loans obtained by the spouses. Art 161 states that all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. Thus, the lands are conjugal properties of both spouses. 2. NO. The principle of estoppel rests on rule that whenever a party has intentionally led the other to believe a particular thing true to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising from his act, declaration or omission, falsify it. It can be invoked only between persons making the misrepresentation and person to whom such misrepresentation is addressed. There is no showing that Ponciano led the Mendozas to believe that the land wasn t conjugal. It cannot be considered to have acted in good faith because the RFC mortgages were already registered in Registry of Deeds by the time the contract of lease was registered. Moreover, they initially demanded Ponciano s consent when they leased the property but dismissed it upon sale. VILLANUEVA v TAC (1990) 192 SCRA 21 Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were owners in fee simple of Lot 13. Upon their death, their children, Modesto and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. North portion belonged to Federico, and south portion, described as Lot 13-C under Torrens title in Modesto s name. -






Modesto s wife Victoria died in July 1971. Modesto himself died in April 1973. They had no children. However, it appeared that Modesto was survived by two illegitimate children named Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro Aranas who borrowed P18,000 from respondent Jesus Bernas. In the loan, as security, they, as absolute co-owners, mortgaged to Bernas Lot 13-C. Raymundo Aranas, a relative was there as witness. The siblings failed to pay the loan. Bernas then acquired ownership over the land, cancelled the siblings title and issued another in his name. About a month later, witness Raymundo Aranas and his spouse Consolacion Villanueva filed a complaint with RTC of Roxas City asking that they be declared coowners of the land and title of Jesus Bernas over Lot 13-C be cancelled on the ground of their alleged discovery of 2 wills. Modesto s will: bequeathed to his illegitimate children all his own capital property and all interest in his conjugal partnership with his wife Victoria . Victoria s will: bequeathed to spouses Aranas and Villanueva, and to the illegitimate children of her husband all of her interests, rights and properties, real and personal, as her net share from conjugal partnership with husband.

ISSUES: 1. WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C improvements thereon by virtue of Victoria s will. 2. WON improvements on said lot was conjugal.


HELD: 1. NO, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her husband. She never inherited any part of Lot 13-C which she could bequeath by will to anybody. Moreover, even if Modesto s acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place during the marriage, the lot would still be regarded as his own exclusive, private property because it was acquired during the marriage by lucrative title. 2. NO. If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal, Villanueva may have acquired a right over them by succession. However, proof as regards when the improvements were made on the exclusive property and the source of funds used was not presented. Therefore, the presumption that it belongs exclusively to the husband stands.

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c. Property Purchased by Installment
FC, Art 118 Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner/s upon liquidation of the partnership.



SIMPLIFIED: FC does not look at the source of funds. In cases where the property is partly paid by either the CPG or exclusive property, the time of vesting ownership is what matters. Though under CC, the basis was who paid more . * How do you reconcile this provision with Art 109 (4) which that which includes anything purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or the husband in the exclusive property of the spouse? CASTILLO v PASCO (1964) 11 SCRA 102 Marcelo Castillo Sr., a widower Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived 2 previous husbands. 1932 The Gonzales couple, as co-owners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said property to spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco for P6,000 which was payable in 3 installments: P1,000 upon execution of the deed, P1,000 within 1 month without interest and P3,000 after 1 year with 11% interest. 1933 Marcelo died and his widow married her 4th husband, Luis San Juan in June 1934. The petitioners, children and grandchildren of Marcelo by his previous marriage, a filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the fishpond in CFI of Bulacan. LC declared the fishpond as paraphernal property, since even before the marriage, Macaria was a woman of means while Marcelo had a salary of only P80 a month. CA affirmed the CFI decision. Installments were paid in the ff manner: 1) paid by Macaria with her exclusive money 2) paid with proceeds from a loan from Dr. Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was mortgaged by both spouses 3) paid from a loan secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria ISSUE: WON the 2nd and 3rd installments were paid with conjugal funds. HELD: Under the Spanish CC, the law applicable here, the property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition, irrespective of in whose name the property was acquired.




The initial P1000 payment was paid exclusively with money belonging to Macaria. But the 2 other payments were paid by conjugal funds. The deeds show that the loans used to pay both installments were made out to both spouses as joint borrowers. Loans thus become obligations of CPG and money loaned is conjugal property. While the mortgage is on Macaria s paraphernal property, the mortgage to secure the loan is a purely accessory obligation that the lenders could waive if they so chose, without affecting the principal debt which was owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the creditors can enforce exclusively against the conjugal property if they so desired. Since the fishpond was purchased partly with conjugal and partly with separate funds, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price. An undivided 1/6 is paraphernal and the remaining 5/6 is conjugal. Payment by the widow of the mortgage debt after Marcelo s death does not result in an increase in her share in the property but merely creates a lien in her favor. Since the fishpond is undivided property of Macaria and the conjugal partnership with Marcelo, his heirs are entitled to ask for its partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into account: a) Macaria s 1/6 direct share b) Her half of the community property c) Her successional rights to a part of Marcelo s share pursuant to the governing law of succession when he died d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount advance by her in paying the mortgage debt.

LORENZO v NICOLAS (1952) 91 Phil 686 Magdalena Clemente Manuel Lorenzo Manuel died in 1929 and Magdalena died five years later. During their marriage, they had no children. However, they had children in their previous marriages. Plaintiffs are Manuel s kids from his first marriage, while the defendants are Magdalena s grandchildren from her first marriage. Subject of the petition is 2 parcels of land, the sale of which (to respondents) the petitioner prays to be declared null and void since they are part of CPG. These lots were friar land which Magdalena bought on an installment basis: a) Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage to Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in installment P25.32 on the 1st year and P42 each year after. b) Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage with Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable by installment of P52.32 on the 1st and P42 on each succeeding year. The receipts of the subsequent payment were made in the name of Magdalena only. CA found them to be her paraphernal property.

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ISSUE: WON Lots 5 and 6 are conjugal property. NO RATIO: They are her paraphernal property, thus petitioners are not entitled to the land. Lot 6 was purchased in her own name and for her own exclusive benefit before her marriage to Manuel. She paid the initial installment before the marriage and the balance was paid during the marriage. All the receipts for the installments paid, even during Manuel s lifetime, were issued in Magdalena s name and the deed of sale of Lot 6 was made in her name despite the fact that Manuel was still alive. The acquisition of Lot 5 was the same as Lot 6. Under Act No. 1120 of the alienation of Friar Lands, the certificate is only an agreement to sell and does not vest ownership of the land. Since the receipts for the installments paid were issued in her name and the deed of sale in her name, this shows that the property belonged to her; ownership had been vested on the buyer-spouse BEFORE the marriage. Since the installments paid during the marriage are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to Magdalena, such amounts should be reimbursed to the CPG. * Ma am Beth says that this is more correct than Castillo v Pasco

* CC has a rule for (1) ordinary improvements made by the spouses on separate property of each of them, and another rule if (2) the conjugal partnership constructs a building on land belonging to either spouse. Land which is separate property becomes CPG if conjugal funds built anything on it. ON THE OTHER HAND * FC provides for a uniform rule for the two circumstances. A. cost of improvement made by CPG on separate property + resulting increase in the value of improved separate property > value of the principal property at the time of the improvement @ entire property becomes CPG, CPG reimburses spouse at liquidation B. cost of improvement + resulting increase in value of the improved principal property < value of the principal property at the time of improvement @ principal property and improvement belongs to owner-spouse, subject to reimbursement
CPG ± accessory If improvement i.e. the house, is worth 2 M
Exclusive ± principal If the land is worth 5 M

d. Rules on Improvement
FC, Art 120 The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules: When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Then the estimated value of house and lot is at 10.5 M

Cost of improvement


Resulting increase in value of the improved principal property

Value of the principal property at the time of the improvement


10.5 M

(2 M + 5 M) 3.5 M

10.5 M 10.5 M

5.5 M @ Principal property and improvement belongs to owner-spouse

CC, Art 158 Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

* Ma am Beth s take on this: This is unjust (luge to use her term), because you only get the value of the property at the time of improvement. Plus the fact that the reimbursement happens at the liquidation of the CPG which is roughly 2040 years later, thus because of the delay of payment, the amount has already devaluated. * Nevertheless, later reimbursement is pragmatic in this case because when a person engages in any construction or improvement in properties, the cash is usually wiped out. CALIMLIM-CANULLAS v FORTUN (1984) 129 SCRA 675 Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas Fernando Canullas were married on Dec 19, 1962 and had 5 kids. They lived in a small house on a residential land in question located at Bacabac, Pangasinan. After

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Fernando s dad died in 1965, Fernando inherited the land. In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and was living with private respondent, Corazon Daguines. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on Oct 21, 1981 by the then CFI of Pangasinan which judgment has become final. On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the property with the house on it to Daquines, for P2000. In the document of sale, Fernando described the house as also inherited by me from my deceased parents. Unable to take possession of the lot and house, Daguines initiated a complaint on June 18, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against Mercedes. The latter resisted and claimed that the house where she and her kids lived, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and improvements to Daguines was null and void because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.


consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited all taxes, liens, charges and expenses including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property all taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse expenses to enable their spouse to commence or complete a professional , vocational or other activity for self-improvement ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouse shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS OF ACP AND CPG 1. Art 94 (5) and Art 121 (5): In obligation to taxes and expenses pertaining to preservation of separate property, ACP provides that it should be used by the family while CPG does not have such qualification. The reason behind this is that CPG has interest in the preservation of separate properties since its fruits belong to the conjugal funds. On the other hand, a separate property of the spouses is usually beyond the reach of ACP hence, the express requirement. Art 94 (9) does not have a counterpart in Art 121: Ante-nuptial debts, liabilities and support of illegitimate children. Spouse can only resort to a financially capable ACP in case of absence or insufficiency of exclusive property. CPG instead has Art 123.
FC, Art 122 The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership asset AFTER the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.

ISSUE: 1. WON the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of a conjugal property - YES 2. WON the sale of the land together with the house & improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction. HELD: 1. Under Art 158 CC, the land and building belong to the CPG but CPG is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor to the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Conversion of land from exclusive to conjugal property should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon; thus, the land and house are conjugal property and could not have been sold to Daguines without Mercedes consent. 2. The contract of sale is null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. Under the law, spouses are prohibited from selling property to each other, subject to certain exceptions. This prohibition also applies to common-law relationships.



e. Charges upon the CPG
FC, Art 121 The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: 1. support: spouse, common children, legitimate children of either spouse; support of illegitimate children governed by the provisions of on Support all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage a. by the designate administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, b. by both spouses c. by one of them with the consent of the other debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the


FC, Art 123 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of change, or in betting, sweepstakes or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the CPG.


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JAVIER v OSMEÑA (1916) 34 Phil 336 Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona Javier who inherited from her parents 2 parcels of land. To perfect her ownership, she acquired from her father s second wife the usufructuary right on properties for P3,000. Florentino (husband), who succeeded Petrona s father as a commission merchant in their family business in Manila, acquired the debt of Petrona s father and became indebted to Tomas Osmeña (one of the chief clients) in sum of P4,000-P5,000. Unable to pay, judgment was rendered in favor of debtor Osmena. The sheriff despite the protests of Petrona sold off the two parcels (separate property of Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmeña was the successful bidder. Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to recover her property. The defendant Osmeña contended that even though land was separate property of Petrona, the usufructuary right belongs to the CP since it was purchased using CP funds. Defendant prayed that the revenues from both properties, being CP, should be made liable for the debt. ISSUE: WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue of the parcels of land which belong to wife exclusively. HELD: Art 141 OCC says the fruits, revenues or interest collected or accrued during the marriage relation, coming from the conjugal properties or from that which belongs to one of the spouses, are community property. Art 1358 OCC states that the fruits of paraphernal properties form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and are liable for the payment of the expenses of the married couple. The conjugal properties shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband for the support of the family. The husband s creditor may bring his action not, as a general rule, against the paraphernal properties, but against the fruits and income of such property of the wife. Since the fruits of exclusive property belong to the CP. The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage, for and in the exercise of an industry or profession by which he contributes toward the support of the family are not his personal and private debts and the products or income from the wife s own property, which, like those of her husband s are liable for the payment of the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the payment of such debts. As to whether the defendant s prayer for an appointment of a receiver is to be granted, Art 1984 says that the wife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and (Art 1412) says that the husband is the administrator of the CCP. Thus, appointment of a receiver shall deprive the spouses of these rights; moreover, there is no need for it.

COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN (1968) 23 SCRA 637 Damaso Perez purchased leather materials from Ricardo Hermoso for his shoe manufacturing business. Unable to pay his debt to the latter, a civil case was filed by Hermoso. Consequently, the Sheriff of Manila levied upon the shares of common stock in Republic Bank registered in the name of Mr. Perez. Mercedes Ruth Perez claims that said shares are conjugal assets and that the debt acquired by her husband was a personal one, not being able to benefit the CPG. ISSUES: 1. WON the debt of Mr. Perez is a personal debt NO. 2. WON the CPG is liable for the said obligation YES. HELD: Fruits of the shoe manufacturing business went to the support of the family/benefit of the CPG. The debts incurred by the husband for and in the exercise of industry (shoe manufacturing, in this case) or profession by which he contributed to the welfare of the family cannot be considered as his personal debt. As the CPG benefited, the said shares are liable. (It was conceded that the shares are conjugal property even if they are registered under the name of Mr. Perez, having no evidence as to when they were acquired.) DBP v ADIL (1988) 161 SCRA 307 Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan of P2000 from Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB which is now DBP), which is evidenced by a promissory note payable in 10 equal yearly amortizations. After 10 years, they were still unable to pay the loan. Thus, Confesor, who was a member of Congress, issued a second promissory note acknowledging the loan and promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961. He further agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage if and when he fails to pay. Another stipulation is that if he secures a certificate of indebtedness from the government for his back pay, he will be allowed to pay amount out of it. The amount remained unpaid on the specified date. Thus DBP filed a complaint against the spouses on Sept. 11, 1970. The City Court of Iloilo decided in favor of DBP and ordered the spouses to pay the debt with interest. CFI of Iloilo reversed this decision and dismissed the complaint against the spouses. ISSUES: 1. WON the right of prescription may be waived or renounced - YES 2. WON the second promissory note it binding on the conjugal partnership - YES HELD: Yes on both issues. Art 1112, CC right to prescription may be tacitly renounced resulting from acts which imply abandonment of such right. The prescription with regard to

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the first promissory note had set it. However, the second promissory note acknowledged the debt and even promised to pay the same thus, the right to prescription was effectively and expressly renounced. In Villaroel v. Estrada the debt barred by prescription cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable. Prescription only bars the remedy, which is the payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt itself. The new promise made by Confesor constitutes a new cause of action. CFI claims the second promissory note is not binding pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift, serving civil interdiction or confined in leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber real property of the CP without her consent. Thus, the CFI held that in signing the new promissory note alone, Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife. HOWEVER, Art 165 CC states that the husband is the administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and obligations which he contracts for the benefit of the CP are chargeable to the CP. He, Confesor, signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable for obligation. LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969) 30 SCRA 111 Ladislao Chavez (as principal) and petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (as surety) executed a surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which it may incur. PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorney s fees, and costs of the suit. A third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by Luzon Surety. A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum of P8,839.97. Then a writ of garnishment was issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses, from their sugar plantation registered in their names. Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled in their favor. ISSUE: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, can be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3rd party in favor of a surety agreement. -NO HELD: A CP under Art 161 is liable only for such debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CP. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal property, however, only obligations incurred by the him that

are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. Thus, there must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. And in this case there is none. Nor can there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party Ladislao Chaves. Acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement is not an act that would benefit the conjugal partnership. While the husband, by signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community, such benefit even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. To make a CP respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the NCC which is to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. AYALA INVESTMENT v CHING (1998) 286 SCRA 272 Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan of P50,300,000 from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Alfredo Ching, the Executive VP of PBM signed a surety to the loan, making himself liable with PBM s indebtedness to AIDC. Upon PBM s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of money from PBM and Ching. A writ of execution was issued wherein the properties of Ching were to be levied and scheduled for auction. The 3 properties involved were conjugal properties of Ching and his wife; thus, Ching asked that the auction sale upon said properties be enjoined because such are part of the CPG and could not be held liable to answer for a loan that did not redound to the benefit of his family. The auction still took place and AIDC being the only bidder acquired the properties. As such, Ching instituted an action in the court to declare the sale null and void. RTC and CA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no legal effect. ISSUES: 1. WON the CP is liable for a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer. - NO 2. Was act of the husband, in securing the loan, part of his industry, business or career from which he supports his family? - NO HELD: 1. The execution of the surety agreement did not redound to the benefit of the family since it was a corporate loan extended and used by PBM. Art 161(1), CC and Art 121 (2), FC are clear in requiring that the loan obtained should be for the benefit of the partnership or should redound to the benefit of the CP in order for the CPG to

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be held liable. Burden of proof of showing that it does lies in creditor-party litigant and the AIDC presented no such proof. Moreover, actual benefits must redound to CPG and it s not enough that the transaction be one that would normally produce benefit for the partnership. It must do so, in fact where such benefits directly result from the loan; such are what is contemplated by the law. 2. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or profession of Ching. Neither is it an embarking in a business or an act of administration for the benefit of the family.


The acknowledgement of the loan made by the wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became their conjugal home. Pursuant to Art 121 No. 2 & 3, even with the alleged lack of consent of respondenthusband, defendant-husband and wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.

CARLOS v ABELARDO (2002) 280 SCRA 361 Oct 89: Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached the wife s father Honorario Carlos and requested him to advance $25,000 for the purchase of house and lot in Parañaque. Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount to the seller of the property to enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own July 91: Carlos inquired about the status of the loan. The spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet ready to settle it. Respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner s inquiries by making various threats against the petitioner. Aug 94: Formal demand was made by Carlos but spouses failed yet again to comply Oct 94: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the sum and damages against spouses in Valenzuela RTC Spouses having been separated in fact for more than a year prior to filing of complaint, submitted separate answers. Wife admitted securing a loan together with husband but claimed that loan was payable on a staggered basis. Husband claimed that sum was not a loan but his share of income on contracts in reviving the petitioner s construction business RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos CA reversed decision and dismissed the complain for insufficiency of evidence ISSUE: WON $25,000 or its equivalent PhP625K was in the nature of a loan. - YES WON loan is liability of both spouses. - YES HELD: 1. The petitioner was able to prove it as a loan by a preponderance of evidence in providing the check he issued, the acknowledgement of the wife of their accountability, and the petitioner s demand letter sent and received by respondent. Husband s claim that it is his rightful share as income, profit or salary is untenable because there is no showing that he is a stockholder, an employee or an agent of the corporation.

CARANDANG v HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN (2006) 508 SCRA 469 Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio and Luisa Carandang are corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS) MBS increased its capital stock and was subscribed by Arcadio and Luisa Carandang Quirino de Guzman claims that these subscriptions were paid by him, so he sent a demand letter to Arcadio and Luisa Arcadio and Luisa refused to pay claiming that they had a pre-incorporation agreement where Quirino promised to pay for stock subscriptions by Arcadio and Luisa without costs in exchange for Arcadio s technical expertise, etc. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered Arcadio and Luisa Carandang to pay Quirino ISSUE: WON the purported liability of Arcadio and Luisa Carandang were joint and solidary HELD: YES, for marriages governed by CPG, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is primarily bound for its repayment. When the spouses are sued for the enforcement if the obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors, such that the concept of joint and solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. Either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although the amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property

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f. Administration of the CPG
FC, Art 124 The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.


Felipe s claim: since deed is not a forgery, it authenticity and due execution is beyond question. This is a question of fact that SC cannot consider. They re only concerned with questions of law.

ISSUES: 1. WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid NO 2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for an annulment of contract - NO 3. WON petitioners have acquired the land by acquisitive prescription - NO 4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations - NO HELD: 1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. NO y Note the following elementary rules: 1. CC, Art 165: husband is administrator of CP 2. CC, Art 166: subject to certain exceptions, husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the CP without wife s consent 3. CC, Art 172: wife cannot bind CP without husband s consent except in cases provided by law y Since Gimena sold lands belonging to CP without husband s consent and such sale is not covered by instances except in cases provided by law , the sale is defective. Not invalid, as held by the CA, because that term is imprecise when used in relation to contracts because the CC uses specific names in designating defective contracts. It can either be: 1. rescissible (art. 1380) when all essential elements are untainted (Gimena s consent was tainted) 2. voidable (art. 1390) 3. unenforceable (art. 1403) 4. void/inexistent (art. 1409) y Deed of sale is a voidable contract. Under A1390 CC, among the voidable contracts are those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract. Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale since the consent of both spouses is needed. y This is further supported by CC, Art 173, which provides that contracts entered by husband without wife s consent when such is required, are annullable at her instance during marriage and within 10 yrs from questioned transaction. y The contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all the essential elements are untainted but Gimena s consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as unenforceable, since it does not fit any of those described in Art 1403 CC. Finally, it cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of those in Art 1409 CC. Thus, it must be a voidable contract. 2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for annulment of contract - NO y GIMENA - It s only subject to annulment of husband during marriage because he was the victim who had interest in contract, whereas Gimena was partly

FC, Art 125 Neither spouses may donate any conjugal property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.

FELIPE v HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON (1983) 120 SCRA 628 Maximo Aldon Gimena Almosara. They bought several parcels of land which were divided into 3. Gimena, sold an unregistered 16 ha conjugal land in San Jacinto, Masbate without the consent of her husband, Maximo, to Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe. Maximo s heirs filed an action for annulment of the sale in 1976, claiming they were the rightful owners of the properties. They claim that they orally mortgaged the lands to the spouses and an offer to redeem the mortgage was refused by the Felipes. The Felipes contend that they purchased the land and it was delivered to them. TC declared the Felipes as the lawful owners and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. CA reversed TC and declared the sale as invalid and ordered an accounting of the produce of the land since 1951 and payment of the net monetary value of the profits after deducting P1800. CA ratio: 1. if transfer was through an oral contract of mortgage: redemption allowed anytime upon repayment of P1,800.00 2. if it was done through sale: redemption is improper 3. what really transpired: Deed of Purchase & Sale executed by Gimena in favor of the Felipe spouses 4. sale was not forged but invalid since deed was executed without the consent of Maximo since the lots were conjugal (presumed as such because were purchased during marriage). This was properly raised in the pleading considering the fact that complaint alleges that lands were purchased from Gimena and Maximo.

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responsible for defect. Gimena is barred from doing this during and even after the marriage. CHILDREN While marriage was still subsisting, they could NOT seek for its annulment since their right to the lands was merely inchoate or expectant. But upon death of Maximo, they acquired the right to question the defective contract in so far as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their dad s share in lands. Maximo s share is ½ and they are entitled to 2/3 of such; remaining 1/3 belongs to Gimena.

HELD: Petitioners Teofista Tinitigan, et al, argue that the order authorizing Severino to sell the property is void, because he had no authority to sell it, they being under the administration of his wife Teofista. This has no legal basis. Art 165 CC states: the husband is the administrator of the CP, which is the general rule. Though Art 1658 states that the wife may be express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property. Other provisions in the Code also speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a judicial decree. However, such provisions are not applicable in this case. The judicial decree on Oct 29, 1975, appointing Teofista as administratrix of the CP cannot be treated as an exception because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal granted Severino the authority to sell the property. Besides, her appointment was not absolute since it was subject to certain conditions that were agreed upon. Thus, the conclusion is that Severino did not cease being the administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the motion for judicial approval of the sale was granted. Being the administrator, however, does not give him the outright authority to alienate or encumber assets. This would require the express or implied consent of Teofista subject to certain exceptions. Art 166 NCC states that unless the wife has been declared incapacitated, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any property of the CP without her consent wherein the court may compel her to grant it if she unreasonably refuses to give consent. This is why Severino sought judicial approval. The sale was necessary to answer for a big, conjugal liability which might endanger the family s economic standing. The case at hand actually is one wherein the wife s consent is not required and impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary. According to Art 171 NCC, the husband may dispose of the CP for the purposes specified in Art 161 and 162. In general, these articles deal with the obligations of the CP. Art 161, Par 1 provides that the CP shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CP, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the case where she may legally bind the partnership. GUIANG v CA (1998) 291 SCRA 372 Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to find a job as an Overseas Filipino Worker in June 1989 but she fell victim to illegal recruiters and had to stay in Manila. A year later she successfully found a job in the Middle East. Her husband Judie Corpuz since then rarely went home and stayed most of the time at his workplace. After hearing about her father s plan to sell the remaining half of the lot, daughter Harriet wrote to inform her mother. Gilda expressed her disapproval but Judie pushed through with the sale to the Guiangs.

3. WON petitioners have acquired land by acquisitive prescription - NO They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff instances: a. Vicente, son of the Felipe spouses, attempted to have Gimena sign a ready-made document purporting to sell the disputed lands to the Felipes in Dec. 1970. They knew land did not belong to them. b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining Gimena s consent to the construction of irrigation pumps on the lands. If they were the owners, why did they have to get her consent? c. Improvements were only being made in 1970 when sale was in 1951. d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974. e. No attempt to obtain Maximo s signature despite fact that Gimena and Hermogena were close relatives. Given that they did possess the lands, possession in bad faith is covered by extraordinary prescription which lapses in 30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 and case filed in 1976, 30 yrs had not yet lapsed. 4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations - NO Their right of action accrued from death of father in 1959 and they are given 30 yrs to institute it (CC Art. 1141). Action filed in 1976, thus still within allowed time. * CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSENT: merely voidable under CC, but under FC it is void (Art 125 FC) TINITIGAN v TINITIGAN (1980) 100 SCRA 619 Severino Tinitigan Sr, on Sept. 17, 1975 filed a motion in a pending case seeking judicial approval of the sale of a 2-storey residential house and lot which are conjugal properties located at Pasay City. Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000 to Quintin Lim, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue in the amount of P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal properties. CFI issued an order granting Tinitigan authority to sell the house and lot in Pasay City, in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for P300,000. CA upheld orders of respondent Judge that approves the sale of the conjugal property. ISSUE: WON the order to sell the conjugal property rendered by Judge Navarro is valid.

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When she returned, Gilda gathered her children who were staying in different households and stayed in their house in Negros. She also discovered that her now exhusband had another wife. Guiangs charged Gilda of trespassing for staying in their house wherefore the Corpuzes later agreed to leave the house in an amicable settlement. Gilda then instituted against seeking to annul the sale of land between Judie Corpuz and the Guiang couple. RTC ruled in Gilda s favor, declaring the sale null and void; the CA upheld this decision. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has cause of action (affected in anyway) by the respondent s petition for appointment as sole administratix of conjugal properties? HELD: NO! The petitioner (Alberto s mistress) is not an indispensable party nor a real party-in-interest because Alberto can fulfill the relief sought by Angela even without the participation of Relucio. The cause of action arises only between the husband and the wife who have right-duty obligation between each other. The mistress is a complete stranger to them. Any judgment would be valid and enforceable against Alberto. The administration of the property of marriage is entirely between the spouses to the exclusion of other persons. Or simply put: No need for Relucio to intervene, she has nothing to do with the affairs of the spouse. JADER-MANALO v CAMAISA (2002) 374 SCRA 498 Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across respondent spouses ad in Bulletin Today selling their 10-door apartment in Makati and another property in Taytay, Rizal. Interested in both properties, petitioner negotiated for its purchase through the spouses real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. After a visual inspection of the lots, petitioner met with both the spouses and made a definite offer to buy the properties. After negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner agreed upon the purchase price of P1.5M for Taytay property and P2.1M for Makati property. Agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. Purchase was on installment basis and down payment through checks was made by petitioner. The following day, Norma, the spouses and the real estate broker met to incorporate notations and revise contracts to sell. At yet another meeting, petitioner was surprised to learn that spouses were backing out of the agreement because they needed spot cash for the purchase price. Norma Camaisa refused to sign contract to sell. ISSUES: 1. WON sale of real properties of the spouses have already been perfected. - NO 2. WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without his wife s written consent. - NO 3. WON Court may intervene to authorize the transaction. - NO HELD: According to Art 124 FC, the law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife. Otherwise, the disposition is void. Even though Norma was aware of, even caused the advertisement in the newspaper, and participated in the negotiations for the sale, mere awareness of a transaction is not consent and her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.

ISSUE: 1. Whether Judie s execution of Deed of Transfer of Right for the Guiangs was void or merely voidable 2. WON Gilda ratified the said contract when she entered into the amicable settlement with the Guiangs. HELD: 1. The deed was void. The property was acquired during the marriage of Judie and Gilda Corpuz. When Judie offered to sell the remaining half, Gilda s consent was totally lacking, contrary to the claim of the Guiangs invoking Art 1390(2) CC that it was only vitiated hence merely voidable. The case at bar falls under Art 124, FC which states xxx the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void . 2. No, void contracts cannot be ratified. The entry into amicable settlement would not have any effect in the contract since it was void. **FC applied in this case since the sale was done in 1990 RELUCIO v LOPEZ (2002) 373 SCRA 578 Imelda Relucio, the mistress of Alberto Lopez, assails the appointment of Alberto s legitimate wife s (Angelina Mejia Lopez) as the sole administratix of conjugal partnership of properties, forfeiture, etc. Alberto allegedly abandoned Angela and their four children and had maintained illicit relationship with the petitioner, Relucio. In the course of their cohabitation, they have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and properties through the actual contribution of money, property, industry of Alberto and Relucio Angela, the wife and the four children did not benefit from the said properties Alberto has also sold, disposed of, transferred assigned, cancelled, removed, stashed away and alienated their conjugal properties from Angela, hence the petition to become the administratix of the said partnership Angela prays that Alberto do the following: o Account their conjugal partnership property o Give support to respondent and her children o Turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner (Relucio) o Dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent

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Art 124, FC also states that court authorization is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such, court authorization cannot be sought.

h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities
FC, Art 129 Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: 1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. 2. Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. 3. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. 4. The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. 5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. 6. Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. 7. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. 8. The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. 9. In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.

g. Dissolution of the CPG
FC, Art 126 The conjugal partnership terminates: 1. upon the death of either souse 2. when there is a decree of legal separation 3. when the marriage is annulled or declared void 4. in case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Art 134 to 138

FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of CPG except that: 1. spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported 2. consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding 3. absence or insufficient community property, the separate property shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter s share

FC, Art 128 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition 1. for receivership 2. for judicial separation of property 3. for authority for sole administration of ACP The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph: 1. marital 2. parental 3. property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.

When is inventory not necessary? (Tolentino, p. 472) 1. when one of the spouses, or his heirs, should renounce the benefits of partnership 2. when separation of property has preceded the dissolution of the marriage 3. when partnership is dissolved by death of one of the spouses and the deceased leaves no heir except the surviving spouse 4. when dissolution is caused by legal separation, and the share of the guilty spouse is forfeited to the innocent spouse, there being no children * Par 2 and 3 are called mutual restitution which cannot be found in the dissolution of ACP (Art 102)

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* Dissolution of CPG has 9 steps, while ACP only has 6, and it s all because of the mutual restitution part.
FC, Art 130 Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.

of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of Pablo Santero. ISSUE: WON the natural children Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel should be granted an allowance out of the hands of the property administrator of Pablo Santero? HELD: YES. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Article 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives support to the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to spouse , the same must be the legitimate spouse (not commonlaw spouses who are mothers of the children here).

FC, Art 131 Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each.

FC, Art 132 The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter.

E. Separation of Property and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse
1. Judicial separation of property for sufficient cause
FC, Art 134 In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.

FC, Art 133 From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.

SANTERO v CFI OF CAVITE (1987) 153 SCRA 728 Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Willy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Even before the Court could act on the instant petition, private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo to deliver the sum of P6,000 to each of the seven children

COMPLETE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY may be had thru: 1. conventional in the marriage settlement 2. judicial decree a. voluntary (Art 136) b. sufficient cause (Art 135) 3. compulsory by operation of law (Art 103 and Art 130) when there is no liquidation of property regime of first marriage

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 135 Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (BY PRESENTATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT) 1. civil interdiction 2. judicially declared an absentee 3. loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228 and 229) (PROOF OF CAUSE IS NEEDED) 4. abandonment or failure to comply with family and marital obligations 5. abuse of power of administration granted in the marriage settlement 6. de facto separation for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable In the cases provided for in Number 1, 2 and 3, the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis to grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.

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separation of properties but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resuming the administration of the communal property and the conduct of the affairs of the CP. He may enforce his right of possession and control of the conjugal property against his wife, and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or encumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, Art 167, 172 and 178 CC contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife against the abuses of her husband because normally, only the latter can commit such abuses. Therefore, he cannot claim that he should be entitled to the same remedies. PARTOSA-JO v CA (1992) 216 SCRA 692 Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he fathered 15 children. The petitioner in this case claims to be his legal wife (Prima) with whom he had a daughter named Monina Jo. Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City it was their agreement that she was temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her. In 1980 Prima filed an action for judicial separation of conjugal property and this was consolidated with her earlier petition for support. In the disposition of the trial court it was held that Prima was legally married to Jose Jo and therefore entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and Jose Jo was ordered to give a monthly support of P 500. There was no definite disposition as to the judicial separation of conjugal property. CA upheld the TC decision but complaint for the judicial separation of conjugal properties was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Art 178, CC. However, the penultimate paragraph of the decision provides: It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Art 178, Par 3 CC, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein. ISSUES: 1. WON a final judgment rendered by the LC may be modified if the dispositive portion did not contain the decision extensively discussed in the body of the decision. - YES 2. WON the separation of the parties was due to their agreement. - NO 3. WON Prima is entitled to judicial separation of property. - YES HELD: 1. The dispositive portion of the decision was incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.

GARCIA v MANZANO (1958) 103 Phil 798 Gonzalo Garcia filed an action against his wife, Consolacion Manzano, for the declaration of the separation of their conjugal partnership property on the ground that they have been living separately since 1948 and that all attempts at reconciliation between them have failed. As a result of their joint efforts, they accumulated real and personal properties. That since their separation, Consolacion assumed complete management and administration of the CP. He alleges mismanagement of the CPG since she was exclusively enjoying the fruits of it, she refused to turn over to Gonzalo his rightful share or allow him participation in the partnership, she conducted fictitious transfers and alienation of property to third persons and that she neglected to file income tax returns. TC dismissed complaint for failure to state a cause of action upon motion of Consolacion ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to a judicial declaration of separation of properties. - NO HELD: His complaint did not establish a case for separation of properties. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of complete separation as not harmonious with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the OCC and NCC require that separation of properties shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage; and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for the causes specified in Art 191, CC. In the system established by the NCC, the wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of the court and under its supervision with such limitations as the court may deem advisable. In the event of such maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial

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- The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court ruling should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. It was based upon the findings that Prima and Jose were legally married and the properties mentioned were acquired during the marriage although they were registered in the name of a dummy. 2. The CA ruling that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Art 221 of the CC and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Thus, the only remedy available was that of legal separation.



- However, the separation was due to abandonment. They merely agreed that she would live with her parents while she was pregnant, and when she returned, he refused to accept her. This clearly demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship; moreover, from 1968-1988 when the court finally decided to award support, Jose never gave financial support. 3. On the grounds of abandonment and also failure without just cause to comply with his obligations as husband and father; apart from refusing to admit Prima his lawful wife, to their conjugal home, she is entitled to a judicial separation of property. Court held that, abandonment is the departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one s family although able to do so. And the FC states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation when there is: Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse. The physical separation of the parties coupled with the refusal by Jose to give support sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. FC allows judicial separation of property when the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Since the LC found that Jose is the real owner of the properties, these must be divided between them on the assumption that they were acquired during their marriage.

In 1949, she claims that she already suspected that Severino was sleeping around which was only confirmed by a note she found in his shirt in 1951. She confronted him about it and he promised her to forsake his mistress which he failed to do Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling, but only paid short visits. She contends that he abandoned her and their children to live in Manila with his mistress, Nenita Hernandez. And that after 1955 until the time of the trial, he had never visited the conjugal abode and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied communication with him. RTC ordered separation and division of the conjugal assets (valued at P500,000), directing the Severino to pay to Estrella P20,000 as attorney s fees, with legal interest form date of original complaint until fully paid plus costs.

ISSUES: 1. WON separation of husband from his wife constitutes abandonment in law that would justify the separation of conjugal partnership property - NO 2. WON the husband s failure and/or refusal to inform his wife of the state of their business is an abuse of his powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets - NO HELD: 1) There was only mere physical separation and not real abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement, moral and FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was used in Art 178, in order for desertion of one spouse to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to resume or claim one s rights or interests. - Here, Severino did not seem to have the intention to leave his family permanently since he continued to give support despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to return and resume his marital duties and rights. - Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect the CP except if the husband abandons his wife without just cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the Estrella of concubinage on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her claim of abandonment which shall justify, under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets. There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he actually increased the value of their assets by over a million pesos. 2) For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts injurious to the partnership. There must be an act willfully performed and with utter disregard of the partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the wife, evidenced by the repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions. It is not condoning the husband s separation




DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968) 22 SCRA 333 - SUPRA Estrella Severino dela Cruz and blessed with six children. They acquired seven parcels of land at Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay Cadastre. These are all registered in their names. They are also engaged in various business ventures. She filed a complaint praying for the separation of property, monthly support and payment of attorney fees and costs.

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from his wife. Instead, is that there is an insufficiency or absence of cause of action. Remedies of Art 167 and 178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise restraint since they are trying to preserve union of spouses; a judgment ordering a separation of assets where there s no real abandonment may eradicate the possibility of reconciliation. Alimony increased from P2000 to P3000. Attorney s fees must also be borne by defendant since he left the conjugal abode and has given cause for plaintiff to seek redress in courts.


case of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the prop belonging to the respective spouses. The kids by first marriage should be notified of the proceedings and their names and addresses, as well as the names and addresses of the kids by second marriage, be furnished by them.

2. Voluntary separation of property
FC, Art 136 The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the ACP or CPG and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the ACP or of the CPG, as well as the listed personal creditors of the spouse shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interests.

IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERNAS (1965) 14 SCRA 327 Jose and Pilar Bernas were married in Dec 1932 and they had 2 kids. During the marriage they acquired 12 parcels of land and two buildings. 30 years later, they executed an Agreement for Dissolution of conjugal partnership and separation of property believing that this will redound to their mutual advantage, benefit and gain, and preserve peace and harmony and prevent friction, dissension and confusion between their heirs since Jose had 2 sets of children. After the execution of this contract, they filed with the court the aforementioned petition. LC denied the petition since under Art 192 CC, a CP can only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered, which can only happen upon civil interdiction, declaration of absence or abandonment (Art 191, CC). The spouses claim that Art 191 allows voluntary judicial separation or property during the marriage subject to judicial approval. ISSUE: WON voluntary separation of property during marriage is allowed by law HELD: YES. The CP may be dissolved by agreement of the spouse if it has judicial approval. But even though Jose has kids by his first marriage, their names were not included in the agreement or approval of the petition whereas his kids by second marriage and his second wife are. Neither were the kids by first marriage notified of such. In fact, no notice appears to have been given to the kids by second marriage, although the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem remote. Also, the dissolution of the CPG of the second marriage cannot take place without first dissolving the CPG of the first marriage wherein the kids of that marriage have an interest. The agreement may affect the rights of the kids by first marriage since Art 189 CC states that in

LACSON v SAN JOSE (1968) 24 SCRA 837 Alfonso Lacson Carmen San-Jose Lacson on Feb 14, 1953 with 4 children. On Jan 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home and began living in Manila. She filed a complaint on March 12, 1963, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for custody of the kids and their support. An amicable settlement was however reached between the spouses with regard to custody of the kids (wherein the 2 older kids go to their dad and the 2 younger ones to their mom), support and separation of property. This was later approved by the CFI, stating that it was conformable to law. Later, Carmen filed a complaint praying for the custody of all the kids. This was granted by the CA who declared the agreement null and void insofar as the custody of the kids was concerned. ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are conformable to law. - YES HELD: It is valid with respect to the separation of property between the spouses and the dissolution of the CP since this is allowed by law provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Such approval was obtained and it does not appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the arrangements. Further, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least 5 years and it is but proper to sever their financial and proprietary interests. Court cannot force them to live with each other and render conjugal rights to the other (Arroyo v Vasquez de Arroyo). However, in the approval of the regime and dissolution, the court doesn t accord recognition nor legalize de facto separation. It s abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). Spouses are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support (CC, Art 109). There s virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples to abandon each other merely due to whims and caprices. General happiness of married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, they become good spouses from necessity of remaining such. Necessity is a powerful master in teaching duties which it imposes. (Arroyo v Vasquez de Arroyo). With regard to the custody and support of the children: all the children, including the Enrique and Teresa, were below 7 year old then Art 363 CC specifically commands that no

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mother shall be separated from her child under 7 year old unless court finds compelling reasons for such measure. Ratio for Art 363: Avoid tragedy where mom has seen her baby torn away from her. Compelling reasons must be rare if mom s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If mom has erred such as in adultery, imprisonment and divorce will be sufficient punishment. Her moral dereliction will not affect the baby who has yet to understand situation. Provision is mandatory and the compromise judgment by separating 2 elder children who were below 7 year old from their mom was null and void for violating the provision. No compelling reason was given for taking away 2 children from Carmen. CFI decision on MFR regarding compromise judgment only presented a mere hint. Courts cannot proceed on mere insinuations. Enrique and Maria are now above 7 yo, thus issue regarding awarding their custody to their mom has become moot and academic. But, Court should still uphold their agreement regarding custody. Art 356 CC provides that every child is entitled to: 1. parental care 2. receive at least elementary education 3. moral and civic training by parents/guardians 4. right to live in atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development Child s welfare should not be subject to parents say-so or mutual agreement alone. Court should ascertain in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted by law. Evidence should be presented and court should not merely rely on compromise judgment in determining fitness of each parent to be custodian of children. Besides, Enrique (11), since he s now over 10, should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with. If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150 monthly support is insufficient considering that prices of commodities and services have increased and kids are now of school age. CFI may increase such amount according to need of each child. MAQUILAN v MAQUILAN (2007) 524 SCRA 166 DOCTRINE: Voluntary separation of property may take place while other cases are pending. Proceedings for the same do not require the intervention of the Solicitor General. Final judgment of adultery is not punished with civil interdiction, thus it is not a ground for judicial separation of property.

3. Liquidation and dissolution of property
FC, Art 137 Once the separation of property has been decreed, the ACP or the CPG shall be liquidated in conformity with this code (Art 102 and 129). During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the ACP or the CPG shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. FC, Art 138 After dissolution of the ACP or the CPG, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.

FC, Art 139 The petition for separation of property and final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property.

FC, Art 140 The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors.

FC, Art 141 The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances: 1. civil interdiction terminates 2. absentee spouse reappears 3. when the court is satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration 4. when the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other 5. when parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof 6. when the spouses who have been separated in fact for a least one year, reconcile and resume common life 7. when after voluntary dissolution of the ACP or CPG has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted. The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Art 67.

Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify: 1) what to contribute anew to restored property regime 2) what to retain in separate property 3) names of all the creditors

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4. Sole administration of other spouse s property
FC, Art 142 The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse (only acts as a trustee) 1. 2. 3. 4. guardian of the other judicially declared an absentee civil interdiction fugitive from justice or in hiding as an accused in a criminal case

KINDS OF SEPARATE PROPERTY 1. as to extent a. total b. partial 2. as to kinds of property a. present property b. future property c. both present and future property * Coexistence of CSP and ACP/CPG is possible. However, in default of a stipulation to the regime of properties outside the CSP, ACP shall apply.
FC, Art 145 Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without the need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business, industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property.

If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just case, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.

In previous cases (ACP/CPG), common property administration is given in case of incapacity. Exclusive property may be administered by the other spouse but court proceeding is required.

E. Regime of Separate Property
ADVANTAGES: 1. simple; no common properties hence no liquidation 2. neither spouse can be accused of being interested in other s properties DISADVANTAGES: 1. inconsistent with the community of life and interest which marriage is supposed to create 2. based on distrust and not favorable to the family 3. ordinarily unfavorable to the wife who usually is unemployed and dependent on the husband for support 4. may lead to constant disputes on sharing and family expenses 5. against Filipino custom which is trust and sharing in the spouses WHEN MAY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY EXIST? 1. by agreement in marriage settlement 2. decree by court in proper cases 3. separation of property cannot be converted to any other property regime during marriage
FC, Art 143 Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be of suppletory application.

FC, Art 146 Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties. The liability of the spouses to the creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary.

F. Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage
FC, Art 147 When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. (The next line was not in the CC, an innovation of FC in favor of housewives.) For purposes of this article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. (Unlike ordinary partnership) Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendant. In the absence of descendant, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.

FC, Art 144 Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the ACP.

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* Compared with Art 98 and Art 125, this Article does not provide for donations by reason of charity or occasion of family rejoicing or family distress. * Does not include fruits of their exclusive properties


This provision applies to: 1. live-in partners a. no legal impediment to marry b. hence, not applicable to concubinage and adulterous relationships c. exclusive to each other d. real continuous cohabitation e. the goal is to encourage future marriage 2. void marriages a. public policy b. absence of requisites c. except bigamous marriages
FC, Art 148 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married (void) to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.




then filed a petition seeking action for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during her cohabitation with Isidro. LC issued a restraining order to withhold the Virginia and Josefina from disposing any of the properties, specifically including a house in Forbes Park Virginia and Josefina resisted the restraining order and posited that Teresita was not entitled to the injunction because her right to the properties is still doubtful and is in dispute LC lifts the restraining order and orders Teresita not to divest Virginia her possession of the Forbes Park property; however it also enjoined Virginia from selling, disposing or encumbering said property in any matter pending resolution of the disputes Teresita alleges that the Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by her and Isidro and she even contributed using her own exclusive funds Josefina and Virginia dispute this claim and say the house was built with Isidro s funds alone and without Teresita s intervention. Teresita presents proof that she obtained loans when the Forbes Park house was under construction.

ISSUES: 1. WON the preliminary injunction could be granted in favor of Teresita 2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the house with Isidro by the fact that they were common-law spouses HELD: 1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although Teresita presented loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under construction as proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction work. Thus, assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported and may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on Isidro s lot at his instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the Virginia 2. Before a common-law spouse can claim co-ownership of their spouse s properties, there must be a clear showing that the common-law spouse had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. JUANIZA v JOSE (1979) 89 SCRA 306 Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appelant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 yrs. Jose was the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train resulting in the death of 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers.

YAPTINCHAY v TORRES (1969) 28 SCRA 489 Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay have been living together openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 years Isidro s alleged legitimate wife is Josefina Yaptinchay with whom he has a daughter named Virginia Yaptinchay. Isidro died intestate and upon his death, Teresita sought her appointment as special administratrix and then as regular administratrix of Isidro s estate A few days later, the lower court appointed Teresita as administratrix. Josefina then registered her opposition saying that Teresita is not a legitimate heir of Isidro and had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of Isidro s estate, much less procure the appointment as administratrix. At the same time, Josefina and her children sought the appointment of Virginia as special administratrix and Josefina as the regular administratrix. LC granted Josefina and her children s petition and appointed Virginia as special administratrix. Teresita

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In the resulting case for damages, the CFI rendered decision ordering Jose and Rosalia (the mistress) to jointly and severally pay. Rosalia filed MFR praying that she should not be liable to pay for damages since the decision was based on the erroneous theory that she was living together with Jose as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, are co-owners of the jeepney. The motion was denied. The court based their decision on Article 144 CC which provides that when a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership

It is just and fair to recognize the second wife it being that the marriage was done in GOOD FAITH. Provisions on retirement came when Com Act 186 was amended by RA 660 on 1951 which means that there was no intention for the life insurance beneficiaries to automatically be the retirement beneficiaries also. Besides, it is also required for the member to specifically write the name of the beneficiary. *Ma am Beth asks: When do you consider good faith in marriages? Only with regard to belief in the authority of the solemnizing officer. MAXEY v CA (1984) 129 SCRA 187 Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 in military fashion according to their children (which the courts did not recognize). They had 6 children: John Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties were acquired. They had their church marriage in 1919, and sometime after, Regina Morales died. The disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. This sale according to the petitioners was unknown to them until in 1961. Petitioners sought to annul the sale arguing that the properties were common properties of their parents. Trial court applied Art. 144 of the Civil Code stating that When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Trial court ruled in their favor annulling the sale and order the return of the land to them plus other costs. Court of Appeals reversed stating that lands in question were exclusive properties of Melbourne Maxey since Regina Morales was in no position to be able to contribute jointly to the acquisition of property. ISSUES: 1. WON properties were Melbourne Maxey s exclusive property 2. WON the phrase joint efforts was limited and pertained only to monetary contributions HELD: 1. NO. The said properties were products of the joint efforts and industry of Melbourne and Regina even if they were not legally married at the time of its acquisition. 2. NO. SC ruled contrary to CA, stating that CA limitedly construed the phrase joint efforts and confined them to mean financial effort. SC recognized that even without the benefit of marriage, Melbourne and Regina

ISSUES: 1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry - NO 2. WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages with the registered owner - NO HELD: 1. It has been consistently ruled that the co-ownership contemplated in Art 144, requires that the man and woman living together must not be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a coowner of the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose and Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers. 2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation, because only the registered owner is responsible. VDA DE CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971) 37 SCRA 315 Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st marriage was with Rosario Diaz where they had 2 children. 2nd marriage was with Basilia Berdin with 7 children. Later he died. Both marriages were contracted in good faith. As a member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a retirement insurance and life insurance. The life insurance was paid to Berdin and her children who were the designated beneficiaries named in the policy. The retirement policy did not designate a beneficiary. Hence, the petition. GSIS: ½ to Rosario (8/16) and ½ to Basilia (1/16 between Basilia and their seven children). CFI: Same with GSIS. ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the retirement benefits because she was just the second wife. HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted in good faith and so it is just and fair for them to receive it. Not just because the retirement does not name a beneficiary, means that it should follow what was written in the life insurance benefits.

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lived together and assumed the roles of husband and wife, Regina as administrator of their domestic affairs while Melbourne works in the colonial government. SC recognizes woman s contribution to the coownership of unmarried couples even if she is not working outside the home. SC said that this was the correct interpretation of the Civil Code because the woman cannot be expected to give up her role as homemaker and go out to earn an income.

VALDES v RTC (1998) 260 SCRA 221 Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on Jan 5, 1971. In 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage in the QC RTC, pursuant to Art 36, FC (mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations) which RTC granted. Ex-spouses were directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art 147, FC, and to comply with the provisions of Art 5052, FC, within 30 days from notice of this decision. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the direction of compliance with Arts 50-52 asserting that the FC contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." RTC thus clarified that considering that Art 147 explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, ex-spouses will own their family home and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the ex-spouses, the provisions on ownership found in the CC shall apply. And on the issue of disposing the family dwelling, considering that this Court has already declared the marriage as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership and provisions of Arts. 102 and 129 of the FC finds no application. Petitioner s MFR was denied and in his recourse to the SC, he submits that Art 50-52 should be controlling. ISSUE: WON provisions Art 50-52 are controlling NO.

industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Art 147 has clarified Art 144, CC and now expressly provides that: o Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and o In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation (Art 147) or declaration of nullity of the marriage (Arts 43, 50, 51, FC). When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the ACP or CPG, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the ACP or the CPG, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. NICDAO CARINO v LEE CARINO (2001) 351 SCRA 127 Case of the Susan-loving police 1969 Santiago Carino Susan Nicdao, had 2 daughters 10 Nov 1992 Santiago Carino married Susan Yee, no child after almost 10 years of cohabitation 23 Nov 1992 he passed away under the care of Susan Yee who likewise spent for his medical and burial expense Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and PAG-IBIG while Yee

HELD: TC correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by the provisions of Art 147 (a remake of Art 144, CC) or Art 148, FC. The particular kind of co-ownership in Art 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and

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received a total of P21,000 from GSIS Life and Burial as well as burial benefit from SSS. Yee filed a petition to order Nicdao to return to her ½ of the P146,000 collectively dominated as death benefits RTC find in favor of the petitioner based on the ground that the deceased marriage to Nicdao is void ab initio for wanting of a marriage license ordering the respondent to pay P73,000 and cost of litigation CA upheld RTC

ISSUE: WON the real properties acquired by Pacita and Romualdo were equally owned by them Depends on the date of acquisition (relative to Amanda s death) and proof of Pacita s contribution HELD: Because the cohabitation of Pacita and Romualdo from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 CC, which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married. According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose, no co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay v. Palang, Court expounded this doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumption of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. Here, the records show only four properties acquired by Pacita and Romualdo between 1927 and 1963 which they registered in both their names. The records are devoid of any evidence that Pacita contributed anything to the acquisition of these properties. None of these four parcels should accrue to the petitioners. There is only one parcel of land that is registered solely in Pacita s name. Because Romualdo never actually challenged the validity of the registration of this land under Pacita s name, this land should accrue entirely to her heirs. There is also one property acquired by both Pacita and Romualdo after Amanda s death in 1963. This must be governed by rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article 144 CC. Hence, half of it should pertain to Pacita s heirs and the other half, to Romualdo s. The rest of the properties registered in Romualdo s name were also acquired after Amanda s death, and therefore pursuant to Article 144 CC, half of it should pertain to Pacita s heirs, the other half, to Romualdo s. SAGUID v CA (2003) 403 SCRA 678 Gina was then 17 years old and legally married, when she met Jacinto. Since she was separated in fact from her husband, she cohabited with Jacinto. They lived in the house built on the lot of Jacinto s father. Jacinto worked as a patron of their fishing vessel. Gina first worked as a fish dealer (in Marinduque), then as an entertainer in Japan. After 9 years, the couple decided to separate. Gina asks that she be declared the sole owner of the personal properties (appliances, furniture), which she purchased with her income as fish dealer during their cohabitation, and that 70,000 be reimbursed to her as her share in the construction of their house. The latter s funding being fruits of her income as an entertainer. Jacinto, on the other hand, claims that the petitioner had no share in the construction of the house and that she couldn t have bought the mentioned personal properties as selling fish was just a pastime for her. It

ISSUE: WON Yee is entitled to half of the death benefits of Carino given to Nicdao HELD: No. Yee (second wife) is not entitled to the said share of the death benefits given to Nicdao. Since both marriages are void, the first marriage lacking marriage license and the latter characterized as subsequent marriage contracted without judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. The property regime applicable to both marriages is governed by Art 147 and 148 FC. Marriage to Nicdao: covered by Art 147 which covers unions of two parties and not barred from contracting said marriage but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void for other reason, such in this case when the marriage of the petitioner to the deceased is to be declared void due to lack of marriage license. Under the said provision the properties acquired during the subsisting cohabitation is deemed to be obtained by the parties joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. THUS: half of the disputed death benefits of the deceased shall be given to Nicdao and the other half shall pass by intestate succession to his legal heirs who are his children with Nicdao. Marriage to Yee: governed by Art 148 which refers to the property regime of unions between parties who are cohabiting without marriage and is likewise barred to contract marriage since a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Nicdao is not obtained before obtaining said marriage to Yee. In this property regime the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership, however wages, salaries earned by each party is regarded as his exclusive property; it follows therefore that since these benefits were accrued by the deceased through his contributions to these agencies while he was serving as a policeman then these benefits exclusively belong to him unless respondent Yee gives proof to the contrary and thus she claim these said benefits. RIVERA v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA (2006) 496 SCRA 135 1913 or 1914, Romualdo Villanueva Amanda Musngi Amanda died on April 20, 1963. While Romualdo s marriage with Amanda was still subsisting, he cohabited with Pacita Gonzales and both lived as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage from 1927 to 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, Pacita and Romualdo acquired several properties.

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was resolved that both parties contributed to their joint account (from which the funds for acquiring said properties came from), but there is no sufficient proof of their respective shares. ISSUE: WON the properties in dispute shall be adjudicated in favor of Gina alone - NO HELD: Gina is not legally capacitated to marry, but she nonetheless cohabited with Jacinto. As such, Art 148 of the FC shall apply to the properties acquired during their cohabitation. Their share in the common property shall be determined by the each of the parties actual contribution. Therefore, since the receipt presented as evidence only stated P11,413 was spent for the purchase of construction materials, then this is amount which shall be given to Gina. With regard to the personal properties, since there is an absence of proof, it is presumed that Gina and Jacinto s actual contributions are of equal amount. The amount of P111,375, said amount shall be divided equally. Thus entitling Gina to a reimbursement of P55,687.50 as her share. SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS-SAGALONGOS (2007) 514 SCRA 294 Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna, contracted three marriages in his lifetime. 1st: Virginia Sulit with 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel, petitioners). 5 years after his first wife s death, he married an American citizen named Merry Lee who begot him an only son. However, Lee obtained a divorce decree in Hawaii after five years of marriage. One year after the divorce decree was granted, he married the respondent Felicidad Sagalongos San Luis, they had no children. Upon Felicisimo s death, Felicidad applied for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership asset and the settlement of the decedent s estate with her as the administrator in Makati RTC. The children from the first marriage opposed this petition. Their contentions are as follows: o Case should have been filed at Sta. Cruz, Laguna o Marriage between them is null and void because it is bigamous, the marriage between their father and Merry Lee was still subsisting In response, Felicidad adduced the decree of divorce in order to prove Felicisimo s capacity to marry. She also invokes the Quita and Van Dorn ruling wherein divorce by alien spouses is likewise valid to the Filipino spouse. Notwithstanding the divorce decree she offers, the evidentiary value as laid down in the Garcia case was not complied with. ISSUE: WON pending the determination of validity of the foreign divorce, Felicidad has legal standing to apply for letters of administration. HELD: YES. She may request for letters of administration because she qualifies as an interested person by virtue of their cohabitation. If she proves the validity of Felicisimo s divorce and consequentially, his capacity to marry but fails

to prove the validity of their own marriage, she may be considered as a co-owner under Art 144 of CC (Art 147 FC). Likewise, if in the case she fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Art 148 CC (regime of limited co-ownership).

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FAMILY may be defined as a natural and social institution
founded on the conjugal union, binding together the individuals composing it, for the common accomplishment of the individual and spiritual ends of life, under the authority of the original ascendant heading it. (Tolentino, Sempio-Diy) BASES OF THE FAMILY 1. matrimonial union 2. relationship within the degree determined by law, whether illegitimate or legitimate 3. adoption IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY 1. the family is an essential factor in the general, social and even political life 2. constant living together of husband and wife, and of parents and children, contributes to the development of a strong sense of duty an aptitude for heroic sacrifice and of the love by future generations of the traditions and moral concepts of those who preceded them 3. it is an indispensable element of social cohesion and equilibrium 4. the vitality and strength of the State depends upon the solidarity of its nucleus which is the family

distribution of children s inheritance (although law provides
FC, Art 150 Family relations include: 1. Between husband and wife 2. Between parents and children 3. Among other ascendants and descendants 4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood

* Half-blood means having one common parent CLASSES OF FAMILY RELATIONS 1. Natural by consanguinity or affinity 2. Civil created by law e.g. adoption 3. Religious created by sacraments such as baptism and confirmation (ninong & ninang) Family relations exist even when they are not living together Other relatives living with the family are members of the household, but not of the family Nephews, nieces, cousins, aunts or uncles are not relatives inconsistent with the Filipino culture Illegitimate children are included at least in the family of their mother -> Sempio-Diy is wrong! Relatives include both the husband s and the wife s

2. Support
FC, Art 194 Support = everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some professional, trade or vocation, even beyond age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.

A. Members of the Family
1. Nature and Scope of Family Relations
FC, Art 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

It is only the external aspect of family relations that is governed by law 1. Internal aspect - sacred to the family and inaccessible to law - E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the spouses, career or profession that parents should choose for their children, practice or customs in the domestic life, distribution of children s inheritance (although law provides for equal legitimes of children) - BASIS: law must respect the freedom of action of man within his spheres 2. External aspect - BASIS: it is only here that third persons and public interest are concerned - E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the spouses, career or profession that parents should choose for their children, practice or customs in the domestic life,

* CC didn t include transportation, but FC did because it is possible for one to save up on other expenses like food and clothing but not on transportation expenses, especially if the place is not reachable by walking. * Full extent means indispensable and financial capacity . This phrase is also seen in the two succeeding provisions for support of family members and illegitimate brothers and sisters. * Even beyond age of majority

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art extent: 1. 2. 3. 195 Obligation to support each other to the whole spouses legitimate ascendants and descendants parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter (grandchildren) parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate or illegitimate children of the latter (grandchildren) legitimate brothers and sisters, whether full or halfblood

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FC, Art 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in this order: 1. spouse 2. descendants in nearest degree 3. ascendants in nearest degree 4. brothers and sisters



FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. In case of urgent need and by special circumstances, judge may order only one of them to furnish support, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. If two recipients claim support at the same time from one obligor, follow order in Art 199 UNLESS child vs. spouse wherein the child will be preferred.

* Rule on support is different from rule on inheritance
FC, Art 196 Brothers and sisters, not legitimately related, whether full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent EXCEPT only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to cause imputable to the claimant s fault or negligence.

* The exception does not apply to legitimate siblings so in a nutshell, if you have a lazy and irresponsible brother, he can lawfully ask for your support which you are obliged to give.
FC, Art 197 For the support of legitimate ascendants by: (1) descendants, legit/illegitimate; and (2) brothers and sisters, legit/illegitimate only separate property of person obliged to give support shall be answerable in default of separate property, ACP and CPG will advance support, deductible from the spouse obliged s share upon liquidation

* The spouse has better opportunity to look for other means to support him/herself than the child.
FC, Art 201 Proportion of support stipulated in Art 195 and Art 196: resources/means of giver and necessities of recipient.

FC, Art 202 Support may be increased or reduced according to the reduction/increase of necessities of recipient or resources of obligor.

What properties are liable for the support of the following relatives? 1. spouse 2. common children of spouse 3. children of spouse by another marriage 4. Illegitimate children of either spouse ACP/CPG ACP/CPG ACP/CPG (because they are still legitimate!) CPG: separate property of the parent-spouse, but if the same is insufficient, the CPG if financially capable (read: all legal obligations of the community are covered). The support paid to the child shall be deducted from the share of the parent-spouse at the time of liquidation of the partnership

FC, Art 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but is payable only upon demand.

* No obligation to pay arrears in support. Support is not retroactive. It is no longer indispensable since one has survived even without the support (although refer to Art 206 and 208). In other words, no reimbursement can be done with support. * Ma am Beth says: If you re a legitimate child, everything just trickles down to you. You don t have to ask for support or anything because you just go to the dining table and there s food waiting for you.
FC, Art 204 The supporter have the option to fulfill the obligation either by: 1. paying the allowance fixed 2. maintaining in the dwelling the person who has the right to receive support UNLESS there is a moral obstacle thereto

FC, Art 198 Pendente lite of legal separation, annulment or declaration of nullity: spouses and children are to be supported from properties of ACP/CPG. After final judgment, duty to mutual support between spouses ceases UNLESS (exception applies in legal separation only) court says guilty spouse should support innocent spouse, specifying terms of such order.

*Example of a moral obstacle: a wife does not want the husband to keep an illegitimate child with them stepbrother and stepsister has affair

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 205 The right to receive support under this Title shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution.

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HELD: 1. YES. As early as 1975, Lea already requested or plead for support from her husband, which was no less a demand. 2. YES. Pursuant to Art 207 FC, Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement. Failure on the part of the father is established. It is also necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. CA and RTC affirmed.

*Creditors cannot go after the support because it is indispensable, hence essential to survival of recipient.
FC, Art 206 When, without knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without any intention of being reimbursed.

3. Funerals
CC, Art 305 Duty and right to make funeral arrangement shall be in accordance with the order established for support. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have better right.

FC, Art 207 When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with a right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall apply particularly when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed.

CC, Art 306 Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.

FC, Art 208 In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes in circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.

* How would you reconcile CC, Art 25 (i.e. thoughtless extravagance in expenses for leasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency) with CC Art 306? Ma am Beth says they are in conflict but didn t explain any further.
CC, Art 307 The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same after consulting the other members of the family.

SPECIAL RULES ON CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT 1. by contract (inter vivos) or by will (mortis causa) 2. subject to modifications as circumstances may arise beyond the contemplation of the parties LACSON v LACSON (2006) 499 SCRA 677 - Edward (petitioner) Lea Daban-Lacson (respondent) legitimate children: Maowee and Maonaa - Father abandons the family but mother did not badger him for support, relying on his note in 1975 saying he would support his daughters - Despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, Edward did not support the family since 1976 - To provide for her daughters, Lea borrowed from her brother, Noel Daman the amount of P400K-P600K - In 1995, Lea filed an action for support and the RTC ordered Edward to compensate plaintiffs support of P2.496 M which is total of 18 years of support in arrears - CA dismissed Edward s appeal ISSUE: 1. WON the support should be computed from 1976 to 1994/WON his obligation began upon a legitimate demand in 1995 wherein the action for support was filed (Art 203 FC) 2. WON the amount advanced by Noel Daban should be reimbursed

CC, Art 308 No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in the support provision.

CC, Art 309 Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.

CC, Art 310 The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed part of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.

PENOBSCOT AREA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORP. v CITY OF BREWER (1981) 438 A. 2D. 14 Plaintiff wants to build a house for six retarded adults/older minors in an area zoned for a single family residential use The city prohibited the plaintiffs because six retarded adults do not fall within the definition of family According to the ordinance, the requirements for classification as a family are:

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1) does his own cooking according to Ma am Beth, this is significant because of the assumption that families have meals together 2) domestic bond exists which means a traditional familylike structure of household authority. The staff of the nut house cannot be considered as central figure of resident authority because they a. would not necessarily reside in the home b. would serve in a rotating basis 3) quality of cohesiveness and permanence a. the average stay of a resident would be one and one-half years b. they would not control the choice of who the incoming residents would be nor when other residents would leave *Ma am Beth s obiter: A house with six nuts in it in a middle of a peaceful suburbia would undermine the community s serenity. *Applicability of definition of family in the Philippines: The presence of a permanent figure of household authority may be problematic in families with OFW parents. (And then she goes on to tell stories about their family, with Dean Pangalangan being in HK now for some professorial tasks, she goes there almost every two weeks to visit him. That the airplane fare costs just as much as the ticket to Davao. Or roughly P12,000! Whoa!) And so the Congress should craft a definition that reflects our culture and the demand of the times.
FC, Art 151 No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under CC.

HELD: No valid compromise can be made with matters regarding future support. MENDEZ v BIONSON & EUGENIA (1977) 80 SCRA 82 - Mendez and 11 others argue that the court erred in dismissing their complaint against the Bionsons for lack of earnest efforts being exerted by the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement before the action was instituted, the parties being members of the same family. HELD: The litigants are not family members within the contemplation of the law. The parties are collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters. Only members of the same family are required to exert efforts to arrive at a settlement before an action is instituted. GUERRERO v RTC & HERNANDO (1994) 229 SCRA 274 - Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-inlaw because their wives are half-sisters. They both claim ownership of a lot. - RTC ruled that the parties should have alleged in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise was exerted since they are members of the same family. HELD: Brothers-in-law are not members of the same family as enumerated in Art 150. No earnest efforts toward a compromise are needed. HONTIVEROS v RTC (1999) 309 SCRA 340 Spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages in their land registration against Agustos s brother Gregorio and the latter s wife, Teodora Ayson. Teodora and Gregorio denied they are married. RTC: dismissed case because it did verify as required by Art 151 FC and therefore it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. HELD: Whenever a stranger is party to a case, Art 151 will not apply. Maria, a sister-in-law of Gregorio is considered a stranger since the law does not consider inlaws as members of the same family. Teodora, is also a stranger to Augusto. Remanded to RTC for further proceedings.

*CC, Art 2035 uncompromisable matters: a) civil status of persons (e.g. paternity and filiation) b) validity of a marriage or legal separation c) any ground for legal separation d) future support e) future legitime f) jurisdiction of courts because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. MENDOZA v CA (1967) 19 SCRA 756 Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (private resp) instituted the case against her husband Cecilio (plaintiff) When husband departed to US to further his medical studies and profession, he did not provide his pregnant and sickly wife with maintenance and support Wife filed action but husband moves for its dismissal on the grounds no efforts to compromise were made

B. The Family Home
FC, Art 152 The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife OR by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside and the land on which it is situated.

- Unmarried head can mean live-in partners, eldest sibling/child or widow - Cannot be a family home if you do not own the land it is situated on

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- Beneficiaries cannot constitute his own family home; otherwise they can migrate from one place to another and have lots of family home to the prejudice of creditors - There should be actual occupancy. It does not matter if a portion of the house is devoted for commercial purposes as long as the family resides on it.
FC, Art 153 The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by the law.

FC, Art 157 The actual value of family home shall not exceed P300,000 in urban (including chartered cities and municipalities) and P200,000 in rural, as may fixed by law.

* Considering this price tag imposed on family homes, realistically speaking, there is no family home in the Philippines anymore. The law must first seek actuarial computation to update the equivalent value in today s economy.
FC, Art 158 It may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner/s with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter s spouse and majority of beneficiaries of legal age.

* Difference between CC and FC rules on constitution of family home: CC requires judicial declaration (done by filing a petition and with the approval of the proper court) OR extrajudicial (done recording of a public instrument in the proper registry) for the constitution of a family home. But no one does that, so the FC makes the constitution of a family home automatic.
FC, Art 154 The beneficiaries of a family home: 1. husband & wife or an unmarried head of family 2. parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, illegitimate or legitimate, who are: a. living in the family home b. depend upon the head of the family for legal support

FC, Art 159 Family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary. Heirs cannot partition unless court finds a compelling reason. Rule shall regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

- All three requirements (family relations, actual residence and dependence for legal support) must be present to become a beneficiary - So if the wife dies, the mother-in-law becomes a stranger to the husband and is no longer considered as beneficiary of the family home.
FC, Art 155 The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except: 1. non-payment of taxes 2. debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home 3. debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution 4. debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building

FC, Art 160 When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Art 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than amount fixed in Art 157, he may apply to court for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Art 157 and results in subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person/s constituting the family home, by the owner/s of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for the family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall: 1 be applied first to the amount mentioned in Art 157 2 then to liabilities under the judgment and costs (A155) 3 delivered to the judgment debtor

* Judgment debtor is not a preferred debtor like in Art 155 * Ma am Beth does not think it s a wise move for creditors to go after the family home because he puts his debtor in a more financially precarious situation and the creditor is not a priority.
FC, Art 161 For the purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of only one family home.

* According to Tolentino, Par 4 may also apply to repairs and improvements done to the family home to avoid redundancy of Par 2 since construction of the home would always be before the constitution of the family home.
FC, Art 156 Family home must be part of the ACP or CPG or of the exclusive properties either spouse with consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of the family on his or her own property. Subject of conditional sale on installments: where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price, it may be constituted as a family home.

FC, Art 162 The provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provision are applicable.

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SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960) 109 Phil 294 Parcels of land owned by Filemon Lucasan were sold by the sheriff at a public auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against him. Lucasan opposed with respect to one parcel. He contends that the land is where he and his wife extrajudicially constituted a family home hence the land is exempt from execution. ISSUE: WON the property is a family home and exempt from execution for money judgment? HELD: NO. A family home constituted after a debt has been incurred is not exempt from execution. Even if the declaration of family home predates the money judgment, the family home may still be liable as long as it is for payment of a debt incurred before the constitution. Otherwise, debtors who aim to circumvent the law may prejudice creditors. MODEQUILLO v BREVA (1990) 185 SCRA 766 Jose Modequillo is to indemnify the relatives of Audie Salinas who died in a vehicular accident (1976 Mar 16) involving the former. In 1988 January 29, CA held that the damages are to be satisfied on his goods and chattels which include a parcel of residential land. Modequillo executed a motion to quash and/or set aside since the same residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Art 152 and 153 of the FC except for the liabilities enumerated in Article 155. Also, the said judgment debt is not one of those listed in Article 155. ISSUE: WON the said residential land has the characteristic of a family home and thus is exempted from execution HELD: NO. The plaintiff misinterpreted Art 162 of the FC which provides that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of FC are considered family homes and entitled to benefits of a family home to be retroactive. Art 152 and Art 153 cannot be applied retroactively. Art. 152, which pertains to the automatic constitution of family home by mere actual occupation, cannot be invoked by the plaintiff. Also, the debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988.

TANEO v CA (1999) 304 SCRA 308 Pablito Taneo filed an action against the conveyance of his land to private respondent. The money judgment of RTC was affirmed by CA. Taneo alleges that the lands in question are exempt from execution for being a family home (extrajudicially constituted by his father as early as 1964). ISSUE: WON the family home is exempt from execution HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes occupied prior to the effectivity of FC and exempted from obligations incurred prior to that same date (Aug 3, 1988). Art 162 is not retroactive considering that the debt preceded the FC (1964). Also, a family home should be erected on the land owned by the members of the family (owned by Plutarco Vacalares). VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006) 497 SCRA 385 Dr. Ong Oh granted P1M loan to Dolores Ledesma Ledesma sold her house and lot located in Tandang Sora to spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola for P2.5M. Spouses paid Ledesma P1M as downpayment with remaining balance in monthly installments Spouses Versola applied for a 2M loan with Asiarust Bank in order to raise the full amount that Ledesma demanded However, the spouses were not able to get the loan because Asiatrust Bank discovered a notice of levy on execution was annotated on the title in connection with Ledesma s obligation to a certain Miladay s Jewels, Inc., in the amount of P214,284. Because of this annotated encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate Mortgage and refused to release the P2M loan of petitioners. Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the RTC and CA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr. Ong Oh 1.5M with legal interest Dr. Ong Oh filed a Motion for Execution and because of this, the sheriff sold at public auction the property of spouses Versola. Spouses Versola failed to redeem said property, thus a Sheriff s Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of Dr. Ong Oh. Dr. Ong Oh filed and Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of spouses Spouses Versola opposed said motion on the ground that the property sold is the family home of petitioners which according to them is exempt from execution pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family Code. ISSUE: WON petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution? HELD: NO Court finds that petitioner s assertion for exemption is a mere afterthought. It was only after almost two years from the time of the execution of sale and after the Sheriff s Final Deed of

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Sale was issued did petitioners rigorously claim that the property in question is exempt from execution. Such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming exemption. There was also no showing that petitioners adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home. Instead of substantiating their claim, petitioners languidly presupposed that the sheriff had prior knowledge that the said property was constituted by them as their family home.



RTC ordered the partition: 1/6 to Marc and Marcelino III then 4/6 to Perla CA family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary Marcelino III has a minor son named Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV who is a grandson of Marcelino and Perla, hence, a minor beneficiary of the family home

ISSUE: WON a family home can be partition at the death of the head of the household notwithstanding the presence of a minor beneficiary (Art 154 and 159) HELD: YES. The minor beneficiaries of a family home contemplated in Art 159 must not only actually reside in the home but must also be dependent on the head of the family for legal support. Although a grandson is included in the family relationship required of beneficiaries stipulated in Art 154, the grandson cannot be viewed as dependent on his grandparents for support because his ascendants of nearest degree, the parents are capable of providing him support. The law imposes primary obligation of child support to parents, in default of which the grandparents take place. ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA (2008) GR No. 177703 Fidel Arriola had two marriages. After his death, his sons John Nabor Arriola (respondent son with the first wife) and Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioner son with the second wife, Vilma) wanted to partition his estate through public auction. Petitioner refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land because he says that it is their family home. ISSUE: WON the land on which the house stands may be included in the public auction HELD: NO. Although the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition postulated by the CA, suspensive proscription imposed by FC Art 159 shall be observed. Since Fidel built the house out of his exclusive properties and stayed there for 20 years, by operation of FC Art 153 the house is automatically constituted as family home. FC Art 152 extends the scope of family home not only to the dwelling structure but also on the lot on which it stands. Petitioners and respondents should not touch the house until 10 years has lapsed (2013). All other lands outside the family home are subject to immediate partition through public auction.

Note: A family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land in which it is situated and it cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. VENERACION v MANCILLA (2006) 495 SCRA 712 In 1995, Elizabeth Mendinueta secured a P1.2M loan from Charlie Mancilla. She mortgaged her residential house and lot. The title indicated that she was single Mendinueta failed to pay upon maturity so the property was foreclosed. She admitted her failure but claims that she secured a loan from Banco Filipino to pay Mancilla. All she s asking for now is the reduction of the monthly interest. It turns out that Elizabeth is cohabiting with a certain Geronimo Veneracion with whom she has three kids, one of whom is Mary Grace (petitioner). Mary Grace seeks the nullity of judgment against the mortgage based on the following facts: o Geronimo paid for the monthly installments of property since Elizabeth had no source of income o Family home is not liable for the execution bec Geronimo did not consent in mortgage (FC 154) o Decision of RTC prejudiced their right to their family home and hereditary rights ISSUE: WON the family home may be executed with the spouse s consent wanting HELD: NO. First there should be proof that it was indeed a conjugal home and that their father spent for the acquisition. They failed to append receipts of payments made by the father. Unsubstantial claim of mother s lack of source of income because she was able to borrow from Banco Filipino. Mother never alleged that said property was conjugal and was the family home, she only wanted reduction of accrued interests. PATRICIO v DARIO III (2006) 507 SCRA 438 Marcelino Dario died intestate. He survived his wife Perla (petitioner) and two sons Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III (respondent) who extrajudicially settled the estate of their father. Marc wants to partition the property and terminate coownership.

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A. Legitimate Children
1. Kinds of Filiation
FC, Art 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or legitimate.

ISSUE: WON the children by the second marriage are illegitimate HELD: No. No cogent proof that Lucio and Marcelina were not married, so the presumption of marriage shall prevail. There was no legal impediment for Perido to marry at the time of the birth of his eldest child by his second marriage. Perido s first wife died long before. LIYAO, Jr. v LIYAO et al (2002) 378 SCRA 563 Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo but living separately for 10 years, but had two children Bernadette and Enrique William Liyao Sr was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, with two daughters Tita Rose and Linda Christina Corazon cohabited with Liyao and begot a son, William Liyao Jr. in White Plains Liyao Jr. claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao Sr. and asks the latter s legal family for recognition as compulsory heir Proofs: a. Liyao Senior paid medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing during Junior s birth b. Liyao Senior asked his confidential secretary to secure a copy of Liyao Junior s birth certificate and open a bank account for him wherein he deposited amounts on a weekly basis c. Liyao Senior would bring Liyao Junior to the office and introduce him as the good looking son and had their pictures taken together d. Continuous possess and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledge child through direct and overt acts e. A note saying To Cora, Love From William f. Testimony of neighbors saying that he is the son of Cora and William RTC declared William as spurious illegitimate son for preponderance of evidence CA reversed because of presumption of legitimacy so long as marital intimacy between the husband and the wife was physically possible. Gave weight to the testimonies that Corazon and Ramon Yulo were seen together when she was supposed to be cohabiting with Yulo. Birth certificate and baptismal certificate saying Yulo as the father is not sufficient to establish paternity in absence of evidence that Yulo had direct involvement in placing his name there. There was no signature in the said documents even in the passbook of the bank account he opened for Corazon and Junior. HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. Liyao Jr cannot choose his own filiation. If Corazon s husband, Yulo, does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed and the child cannot choose to be the child of his mother s alleged paramour.



By nature a. Legitimate b. Illegitimate By adoption

FC, Art 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

Who are legitimate children? And what does conceived OR born mean? 1. conceived before M, born during M 2. conceived during M, born during M 3. conceived during M, born after dissolution of M

PERIDO v PERIDO (1975) 63 SCRA 97 LUCIO BENITA TALORONG Felix, Ismael and Margarita But Benita died, so Lucio remarried LUCIO MARCELINA BALIGUAT Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronio and Gonzalo Lucio died in 1942 and Marcelina died in 1943 Margarita is the only living child in the first marriage. Felix survived by his 8 children. Ismael had 5 children. they are the petitioners in this case Lucio Perido s heirs from both marriages executed an extrajudicial partition of his estate The first marriage heirs had second thoughts about the illegitimacy and successional rights of the second marriage heirs Their reason was that the children of the 2nd marriage were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio s first wife and that the land certificate did not indicate that Lucio is not married to another.



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SSS v AGUAS (2006) 483 SCRA 383 Pablo Aguas died so his wife Rosanna Aguas claims death benefits from SSS, stating as minor beneficiary their daughter Jeylnn. Leticia Macapinlac, Pablo s sister, objected to Rosanna s claim alleging that: a. Rosanna abandoned their family 6 yrs before b. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna c. Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña SSS suspended the pension benefits Rosanna and Jeylnn were receiving SSS, upon investigation, concluded that: a. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna & Jenelyn (Jeylnn) were Rosanna s children with Romeo b. Rosanna abandoned her husband more than six years before and lived with Romeo while pregnant with Jenelyn (Jeylnn) c. Pablo was not capable of having a child with Rosanna as he was under treatment SSS refused to resume pension benefits and ordered refunds from Rosanna Rosanna filed claim for restoration of pension benefits at the Social Security Commission (SSC) Rosanna added Janet Aguas to the petition for claims SSC summoned several people for clarificatory questions regarding the case. Further investigation, it upheld the order to suspend Rosanna s pension and have her refund the paid benefits due to their conclusion that Rosanna married Romeo during the subsistence of her marriage with Pablo, and that Jeylnn was her daughter with Romeo CA reversed the SSC decision and ordered resumption of Rosanna s pension benefits ISSUE: WON Jeylnn, Janet and Rosanna were entitled to the SSS death benefits of Pablo as Pablo s children and spouse HELD: YES to Jeylnn  Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. As proved by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the certified signature of Pablo and was certified by the civil registrar, she was born during Rosanna and Pablo s marriage. Art 164 provides that children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.  In the absence of proof to establish impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child, the presumption of legitimacy shall subsist and is conclusive. Doctor only treated Pablo for tuberculosis, he cannot say if he was infertile.  Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. NO to Janet  Janet s date of birth was not substantially proven  Civil registrar did not certify the presented birth certificate of Janet which could have proved that Janet

was born during the subsistence of Rosanna s marriage with Pablo NO to Rosanna  Rosanna passed the first qualifying factor for claims, that she is the legitimate spouse  Rosanna did not pass the second qualifying factor, that she was dependent on Pablo for support since they were separated in fact

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is the impregnation of a female with the semen from male without sexual intercourse. Even without the initial consent, the child can still be legitimated so long as the husband subsequently gives his consent BEFORE the child is born through AI Can be homologous (sperm of the husband), heterologous (sperm of a donor) or combined (a combination of the two) That the child was born of AI is not reflected in the birth certificate A child can have as much as FATHER 1. Biological (source of sperm) 2. Legal/Social five parents: MOTHER 1. Legal/social 2. Genetic (egg donor) 3. Gestational (not surrogate)

*Ma am Beth hates the word surrogate because it is a misnomer. IN RE BABY M. (1988) 109 N.J. 396 Mary Beth Whitehead agreed for a fee of $10,000 to be artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman s husband (William Stern), to carry the child so conceived to term, and after its birth, to surrender it to the natural father and his wife Surrogacy contract means absolute termination of parental ties to the gestational mother upon birth Elizabeth Stern was not infertile, like was was stated in the contract, rather she had multiple sclerosis which may have serious implication on her pregnancy After the birth of the child, the Whiteheads wished not to go through the surrogacy contract. The Sterns filed a complaint for possession and ultimate custody of the child. Lower court granted the Sterns custody and ordered termination of Whitehead s maternal rights Whiteheads immediately fled to different places to evade the surrendering Baby M for custody and named her Sara Elizabeth Whitehead ISSUE: WON the surrogacy contract was enforceable and valid

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HELD: No. The contract was in direct conflict with existing statutes and public policies regarding 1) involvement of money in connection with adoption (tantamount to babyselling) 2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or adoption is granted and 3) making surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions. Secondly, although the custody was properly granted to the father since evidence clearly proved it to be in the best interest of the child, the termination of maternal rights and visitation rights is contrary to law. *M stands for Melissa. Wiki tells us that Melissa Stern formally terminated Whitehead's parental rights and formalized Elizabeth Stern's maternity through adoption proceedings. JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993) 851 P.2d 776 Mark and Crispina was a married couple. Crispina had to undergo hysterectomy so she couldn t bear children anymore. The couple considered surrogacy. By a common friend, they were able to meet such person by the name of Anna Johnson who was a nurse. They entered into a contract wherein: o Anna would be implanted with an embryo containing the sperm and egg cells of the couple. o Anna will turn over all rights over the child. o Couple will pay 10,000 in installments. o Couple will pay 200,000 life insurance for Anna. o Relations deteriorated between the couple and Anna. Blood tests show that Anna IS NOT the genetic mother. TC ruled: Couple was the genetic, biological, and natural parents. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON Anna can claim custody of the child HELD: NO. Since both parties gave acceptable proof of maternity: Anna as the gestational mother. Crispina is the genetic mother. The case will be decided on the parties intention or from whom the mental concept of the child emanated. In this case, the couple was considered the prime-movers . The agreement was not inconsistent with Public Policy. Gestational surrogacy differs from adoption: - Child was not born. - Anna wasn t the genetic mother. - The payment was for the service Judgment of CA affirmed. IN RE ADOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973) 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430 During the first marriage, husband A and wife B had a baby born of consensual AID (Artificial Insemination Donor). Husband A and wife B were registered parents in the birth certificate. A and B separated and later divorced but their decree declared the child to be legitimate. Wife B and child got support while husband A had visitation rights. They were not remiss on their parental duties.


Wife B later remarried husband D. Husband D wanted to adopt wife B s daughter but husband a refused to give consent.

ISSUE: WON husband A s consent is required for husband D s petition for adoption considering that the child was conceived through artificial insemination from an unknown third party donor. HELD: YES. The Domestic Relations Law requires consent of both parents over the adoption of a child born in wedlock. The dispensary circumstances (abandonment, divorce due to adultery, insanity, etc.) were not present in the case. The term father is not limited to the biological or natural father, for what is considered is the legal relationship of father and child and vice versa. The child cannot be considered illegitimate since it was born during the marriage and not in circumstances of infidelity since it was a medically-assisted procedure where the husband and wife freely consented. LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN EGG DONATION AND GESTATIONAL SURROGACY Is it possible to ask a woman to carry a child in her womb for nine months without giving anything in return? Unless you can find someone whose hobby is to get pregnant and give birth, it is quite an impossibility to have free surrogacy. This is vulnerable to abuse of women in lower social economic classes. Ma am Beth tells about the travails of pregnancy and even asked a pregnant student in the class to share her prenatal experiences. What would be the relationship if a woman carries the embryo formed by her daughter and her daughter s husband? This was an actual case in an African country wherein the grandmother bore the child of her daughter.

2. Impugned Legitimacy
FC, Art 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: 1. physical impossibility for the husband to have sex with wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: a. physical incapacity (impotence) b. living separately c. serious illness 2. biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in Par 2 Art 164 3. conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence

What s so important about the first 120 days? It refers to the first trimester when it cannot be known if a woman is pregnant. She may not even be aware that she is

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pregnant. During the second trimester, the tummy begins to bulge and so pregnancy becomes evident. *The presumption is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Proof to the contrary would have to be clearly and convincingly established. *Serious illness of the husband in Par 1C must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his wife. *Biological reasons pertain to blood typing and DNA testing
Mother s blood type O O Father s blood type A B AB O O, A O, B A, B A O, A O, A O, A, B, AB A, B, AB B O, B O, A, B, AB O, B A, B, AB AB A, B A, B, AB A, B, AB A, B, AB

ISSUE: WON the son was Emiliano s legitimate child and thus entitled to inherit from his estate. HELD: YES. Mariano Andal was legitimate son of Emiliano, he having been born within three hundred days following dissolution of marriage. (January 1, 1943 June 17, 1943) Presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. According to Manresa, impossibility of access means: o Absence during initial period of conception o Impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable o Imprisonment, unless cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Also, the fact that wife committed adultery is not sufficient to overturn legitimacy. Husband still had access to the wife. His sickness does not prevent carnal intercourse. Further, cases show that tuberculous patients are inclined to be more sexually active (because they are bedridden ). JAO v CA (1987) 152 SCRA 359 Perico Jao (private respondent) and Arlene Salgado (petitioner) lived together as husband and wife. Arlene gives birth to Janice Marie and claims that Perico is the father. Perico denies paternity of the child. They both subjected to blood typing test which eliminated Perico as the possible father of Janice. However, RTC still ruled that Janice is child of Perico and entitled to support from him. CA reversed following the conclusive and indisputable evidence of Perico s non-paternity and discrepancies in the time when the two began cohabiting. What can be inferred from the dates is the possibility of Janice being conceived prior to cohabitation of Salgado and Jao. Jao also previously filed a complaint to delete his name as the father of the child. ISSUE: WON blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove non-paternity. HELD: Yes. Blood grouping test can establish conclusively that a man is not a father of the child, but not necessarily that a man is the father of a particular child. Cohabitation of the supposed father and the mother cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition, if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception of the child.
FC, Art 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced an adulteress.


Blood typing is conclusive only in non-paternity, wherein a child s blood type is not a possible product of the blood types of the mother and the alleged father. In regard to confirming paternal ties, it can only go as far as saying that a man is a possible father. *Ma am Beth s friends from UP Med thinks that the law that only fathers can impugn legitimacy despite scientific proof that he is not the father, is dumb. The law should do away with its presumptions if there is convincing proof to overturn it! Everybody knows what happened, but law is not about truth but what can be proven. Why is it all about paternity and not maternity ? Because mothers are with their babies since birth. Fathers are essentially unattached to their child, so there s a lot of room for doubts. There is no maternity because who will know better than the woman if a child is not hers. ANDAL v MACARAIG (1951) 89 Phil 165 The legitimacy of Mariano Andal is assailed by his paternal grandmother Eduvigis Macaraig. The action was to impugn the child s ownership as legitimate heir of the land given by defendant to the deceased father (Emiliano) of the child as donation propter nuptias. If the son was illegitimate, the land would revert back to Eduvigis. If legitimate, the land remains with the child. The grounds for said illegitimacy is as follows: o Emiliano was afflicted with tuberculosis such that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. o Wife had illicit sexual relationship with her husband s brother, Felix when the latter came to live with them and help Emiliano work his farm. o Eventually, Maria Dueñas eloped with Felix. o Emiliano died without the presence of the wife who didn t even attend the funeral.

*Why would a woman do that? Because she just wants to scorn or humiliate her husband.

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*The rule is to protect the children and secure their status from the passions of their parents. As long as there is access between husband and wife, mere fact that the wife was an adulteress or she was raped will not throw presumption of legitimacy. *Ma am Beth quote: Why would you do that to make your husband jealous? There must be some other way! Yes, you ll make him jealous but he ll kill you too! Congratulations! MACADANGDANG v CA & MEJIAS (1980) 100 SCRA 73 Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. She had an affair with Antonio Macadangdang in March 1967. Mejias and Anahaw separated after that. In October 1967 (or after 210 days), Mejias gave birth to a boy named Rolando Macadangdang as reflected in the baptismal certificate. Mejias sued Macadangdang to recognize Rolando as his son ISSUE: WON Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of Mejias and Anahaw WON Mejias may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard HELD: Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child of Mejias and Anahaw. The child was born within 300 days after the spouses separated. No proof was present to show that sexual intercourse between them was impossible. In fact, the wife continuously visits her four children in her mother s house where her husband also stays. Only the husband can impugn the legitimacy of the child.
FC, Art 168 If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within 300 days after such termination, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: 1. Born before 180 days after solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within 300 days after the termination of the former marriage. A child born after 180 days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the 300 days after the termination of the former marriage.

FC, Art 169 The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after 300 days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.

* State of Limbo, wherein the child is statusless
FC, Art 170 When to bring the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child: WITHIN: I. NO CONCEALMENT 1 year from knowledge of birth or recording in the civil register - if husband, or any of his heirs reside in the same place where the birth took place 2 years Not the same place but within the Philippines 3 years Abroad II. CONCEALED OR UNKNOWN TO HUSBAND OR HEIRS: period for filling of action shall be counted from discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child OR of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier

*Legitimacy of a child must be attacked in a direct action, not collaterally. Why did the law impose a time limit to impugn legitimacy of the child? Because it is in the best interest of the child to avoid putting his/her status in a state of uncertainty for a long time. *Ma am Beth gave a sample situation, when to start computing 2 Jan 1988 birthday 3 Feb 1988 fact of registration 4 Feb 1989 discovery of birth -- This is vague to me. -_What does it mean to be unknown ? the child is registered as the child of other persons the child is registered in other municipalities the child is given other names *Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. If the husband clearly didn t make use of such right or has desisted from such intention, the heirs cannot bring the action.
FC, Art 171 When can heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child 1. if the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action 2. if he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted 3. if the child was born after the death of the husband


1st 300 days 2nd


2nd marriage

180 days

So in a nutshell, the critical point is the 180 days after the subsequent marriage.

CABATBAT-LIM v IAC (1988) 166 SCRA 451 Dra. Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat s estate is fought over by her sisters and the children of her deceased

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brothers and her allegedly only child with Proceso Cabatbat, Violeta Cabatbat-Lim (petitioner) RTC: Violeta is not the offspring and hence, not the legal heir Esperanza s brothers and sisters allege that Violeta was merely a ward (ampun-ampunan), and neither a natural child nor legally adopted so she is not a legitimate heir entitled to own Calasiao Bihon Factory Evidence by Respondents 1. absence of any hospital record regarding Esperanza s giving birth 2. absence of Violeta s birth certificate in Pangasinan Provincial Hospital 3. certificate from the Civil Registry of the absence of Violeta s birth record 4. certificate of Principal that Proceso and Esperanza are registered only as guardians and not parents 5. testimony of the cousin of Violeta s biological mother Proofs by Petitioner 1. birth record stating that she is the legitimate child of Proceso and Esperanza 2. testimony of Proceso that she is his child 3. testimony of Benita Lastimosa (alleged bio mother) that she is not her child 4. marriage contract where Esperanza was the mother 5. Deed of Sale when Violeta was still a minor and represented by her mother Esperanza 6. Deed of Absolute Sale where Proceso represented her as father


The latter flatly and unequivocally declared that she was not petitioner s mother. Therefore he had no lawful interest in the estate of Sy Kao.

ISSUE: WON Sy Kao is the mother of the petitioner HELD: No. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else, it was her who could say that petitioner was not begotten of her womb. REPUBLIC v LABRADOR (1999) 305 SCRA 438 A child s birth certificate lists her name as Sarah Zita Cañon Erasmo, and her parents Rosemarie Cañon married to Degoberto Erasmo. On March 1998, her aunt Gladys petitioned the RTC Cebu to change Sarah s surname to Cañon, dropping Erasmo, and the first name of her mother to Maria Rosario since her parents were not married. Gladys said Sarah s mother, her sister, lived abroad with her foreigner husband. The RTC granted the petition based on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The solicitor-general appealed. ISSUES: 1. WON a change in the record of birth in a civil registry, which affects the civil status of the person, may be granted in summary proceedings 2. WON Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper action to impugn the legitimacy of the child, or change filiation HELD: No, only clerical mistakes can be made and significant changes may only be granted in direct, adversarial action. The change sought will result not only in the substantial correction in the child s record of birth but also in the child s status thereby affecting her rights which cannot be done in a summary action. Although Maria Rosario is the real name of the mother, Sarah will become an illegitimate child by virtue of the change. Also, adversarial proceedings are required in such allegations. Rule 108 may only be used to correct or change clerical or innocuous errors. Also, Sarah and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceedings. There is also no sufficient legal explanation why the Gladys, without appointment as guardian, was the petitioner. Effects: y Sarah s successional and other rights may change y Illegitimacy may bring social stigma and embarrass Sarah y Rights of her parents over her and over each other will be affected y A change of name will affect mother and creditors TAN v TROCIO (1990) 191 SCRA 764 School owner and directress, Felicidad Barañan Tan filed an administrative complaint seeking disbarment of

ISSUES: 1. WON TC and CA finding that Violeta is not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is concluding on SC 2. WON complaint is an action to impugn legitimacy and Art 263 CC (action to impugn legitimacy) can be applied HELD: 1.


YES. The factual findings of the courts are entitled to great respect. Moreover, the absence of a record of birth of petitioner Violeta in the Office of the CivReg General puts a cloud on the genuiness of her birth record. The records of the hospital show that only one woman by the name of Benita Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child on the date of Violeta birth. NO. Because this is an action to claim inheritance of the respondents as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that Violeta is an illegitimate child, but that she is not a child at all.

CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC & CHUA LIAN KING (1988) 166 SCRA 451 Petitioner insists that he is the son of deceased Sy Kao. As such, he filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter. Private respondent moved to dismiss, due to lack of action as well as petitioner s capacity to file such a case. It has been declared before that petitioner is not the son of Chua Bing guan and Sy Kao.

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Atty. Galileo Trcio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal counsel of the school overpowered her inside the office and against her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. And as a result, she begot a son whom she named Jewel Tan. She further alleged that he used to support Jewel but subsequently lost interest and stopped. She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years from the incident because Trocio threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband and due to the fact that she was married and has eight children. Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed a counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her family but denies he sexually assaulted her. He adds that the principal was a in a revenge trip when he declined her request to commit a breach of trust .



The accused moved that a blood test be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test showed that Jacob has a type O blood, Sandra type B , Prieto type A and Tumimpad type O . RTC convicted Tumimpad but acquitted Prieto. The acquittal of Prieto was on reasonable doubt stating that he has a different type of blood with the child Jacob.

ISSUE: WON it was impossible for Tumimpad to have committed the crime of rape because most of the time he and his co-accused were together with Col. Salcedo. HELD: No. It was proven that they were not always with Col. Salcedo. There were instances that they would even play with Sandra. Based on this it is not physically impossible for the accused to have access to Sandra. Tumimpad argued that his conviction was erroneously based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type O . In Jao vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. BENITEZ-BADUA v CA (1994) 229 SCRA 468 Vicente Benitez & Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. On April 25, 1982 Isabel died & her estate was settled extra-judicially. ON Nov. 13, 1989 Vicente died intestate. Private respondents, Victoria Benitez-Lirio (Vicente s sister) & Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente s nephew) filed a case in the RTC, praying for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente s estate in favor of Aguilar. They allege that Vicente is survived by no other heirs or relatives. That the spouses were w/o issue & without descendants whatsoever and that Marissa Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for by the spouses was not related to them by blood nor legally adopted, & therefore not an heir. On Nov. 2, 1990 Marissa opposed the petition stating that she was the sole heir of Vicente. If Marissa was really a biological and legitimate daughter, there would be no need for TC received evidence regarding the matter: y Marissa tried to prove she was the legitimate child of the spouses, presenting documentary evidence: o Her certificate of live birth o Baptismal certificate o Income tax returns & information sheet for membership w/ GSIS of Vicente, naming her his daughter o School records o She also testified that they raised her as their legit daughter y Private respondents presented testimonial evidence that the spouses failed to have a child & that Isabel was referred to Dr. Manahan (an ob-gyne) for treatment

ISSUE: WON Trocio had sexually assaulted Tan as a consequence of which the latter begot a child by him (and is thus a ground for Trocio s disbarment for immoral conduct) HELD: No. Disbarment complaint dismissed for insufficiency of basis of the allegations. The alleged threat to deport her husband could not hold because she admitted having lost contact with her husband when he learned of the respondent s transgression that very same evening. The fear had thus become inexistent. She also maintained her transactions with Tan as if nothing had happened. Such actions can be construed as condonation of his alleged immoral act. Physical likeness and unusual closeness between Trocio and Jewel is not conclusive proof of paternity, much less violation of Tan s person and honor. Jewel was born during the wedlock of Tan and her husband as such, the presumption of legitimacy prevails. *What s the big deal about naming the son Jewel? For all we know, the name is pronounced as Joel. *Why is there an expected reaction from sexually-abused woman? Different people have different ways of reacting! *If she aborts it, she s wrong. If she learns to love it, she wasn t raped. There s no option!!! PEOPLE v TUMIMPAD (1994) 235 SCRA 483 Moreno L. Tumimpad and Constable Ruel C. Prieto are charged with the crime of rape of Sandra Salcedo, a 15 years old, had a mind of a five year old child. The accused are two of the four security men assigned to the victim s father. Sandra first complained of constipation but after medical aid was sought, her condition did not improve. However, upon seeing Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen she told her mother Mama, patayin mo yan, bastos . The mother became suspicious so she brought Sandra to the hospital where they found out that she was pregnant. Nine months later, Sandra gave birtb to a baby boy who was named Jacob. Sandra was able to pick the pictures of Tumimpad and Prieto and in the police line-up she pointed to the accused.

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TC ruled in favor of Marissa, relying on Art 166 and Art 170 FC. CA however reversed their decision stating that Marissa is not the biological child of the spouses and therefore not a legal heir. The CA also held that the TC erred in applying Art 166 and Art 170 FC ISSUES: 1. WON Art 164, 166, 170 & 171 FC is applicable to the case, as the petitioner contends. 2. WON Marissa is the biological child of the spouses and therefore a legal heir. HELD: No. The following DO NOT contemplate a situation like the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple. These articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. The CA correctly refused to apply these articles to the case. Since this case doesn t contend that Marissa is not the child of Vicente by Isabel; but that she wasn t born to the spouses. Cabatbat-Lim v IAC is appropriate to the case. The totality of contrary evidence presented by the respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner s birth certificate. LUMAIN DE APARICHO v PARAGUYA (1987) 150 SCRA 279 Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with Reverend Father Felipe Lumain, a priest, and in the process she conceived. When she was 4 months pregnant, in order to conceal her disgrace from the public, she decided to marry one Anastacio Mamburao. Father Lumain himself solemnized their marriage in March 1924. However, the couple never lived together as husband and wife. Trinidad gave birth to daughter Consolacion Lumain in Sept, 192 days or 6 mos after the marriage. Father Lumain eventually died but he left a last will & testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. This was duly probated in CFI and on appeal was affirmed by the CA. After reaching age of majority, daughter Consolacion filed an action in CFI against one Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her father, the priest. Hipolito Paraguya was declared owner of portions A, B, H, F and G and all its improvements. The land in question is portion G. Hipolito assails also that Consolacion is not a natural child of the late Fr Lumain. TC: Bearing in mind the date of the birth of the plaintiff, it is evident that her mother Trinidad was still single at the time she was conceived. It is a legal presumption that plaintiff is the daughter of the spouses Anastacio and Trinidad. However, this was disputable and Trinidad successfully overcame it. Consolacion is therefore the natural child of Father Lumain and she is entitled to claim the disputed property, she having been instituted in the will as universal heir.

ISSUE: WON Consolacion is the natural child of Lumain and if so, WON she is entitled to the possession of Portion G

HELD: SC finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee Consolacion. As Father Lumain, who died w/o any compulsory heir, Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all of his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. Portion G and its improvement declared to be owned by Consolacion. No award of moral damages to be given to Hipolito for Consolacion was acting in her belief that she was legal heir of the land. Judgment affirmed.

B. Proof of Filiation
1. How to prove filiation
FC, Art 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (PRIMARY EVIDENCE FOR VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION) 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned In the absence of which: (SECONDARY EVIDENCE FOR INVOLUNTARY RECOG) 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws

* Defense against Art 166 (grounds for impugning) It is the husband or his heirs who must present proofs to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. * Necessary for Art 169 ( statusless ) The Family Code gives children their status from the moment of their birth. But such status may be questioned or in the case of a child born after 300 days following the termination of the marriage of the mother, the law does not give him any status so that the child or someone in his behalf will have to prove his status for him. * Secondary evidence not admissible if primary exists! My question: In this case, can a man voluntarily recognize the child to be his illegitimate child at the opposition of the biological mother? RECORD OF BIRTH The books making up the civil register and all the documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts therein If the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the

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mother or doctor or registrar is void. The father s signature is necessary. *Ma am Beth says that the rule requiring father s signature on the birth certificate to prove participation is ridiculous since there is no blank or provided space for the father to sign. The only chance a father can sign on the birth certificate is if he is the informant. ADMISSION IN A DOCUMENT A public document is one which is 1) issued by a public office and 2) private document that is notarized A typewritten document containing an admission of the legitimate filiation is not admissible, as the signature therein may be super-imposed and may not be the true signature of the parent Also, for handwritten documents, the intent to recognize the child must be sufficiently apparent. OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD E.g. bearing the father s surname, treatment by the parents and of the family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child s support and education and giving the child the reputation of being the child of his parents BASIS: the admission of the parents themselves and the concurrence therein of the family and of the society Continuous = uninterrupted and consistent o Tolentino: idea of possesory status of some duration o Sempio-Diy: no required particular length of time o Pangalangan: distinguished from continually which allows for interruption as long as it is in a regular basis, continuously may be translated to walang humpay Maybe enjoyed by a child conceived but not yet born OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS A. Baptismal certificate: is a presumptive evidence only, especially when people often have different names in their birth certificate and baptismal B. Judicial admission C. Family bible where child s name is entered: As explained by Ma am Beth, this is given importance because a Bible is presumed to have been there for generations and is handed down to children. As the family grows, the names of the children are added in the list. This is biased to Catholics though. D. Common reputation respecting pedigree. E. Admission by silence F. Testimonies of witnesses G. Other kinds of proofs admissible under Rule 130 of RRC

RRC, Rule 130 Declaration against interest Act or declaration about pedigree Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree Common reputation Entries in official records Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding Opinion of expert witness Opinion of ordinary witnesses

CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

****For cases under Proof of Filiation, focus on the pieces of evidence established in each case CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ (1992) 209 SCRA 18 Amelia Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support of her child Michael, and damages against Ivan Mendez, a married man. Mendez denied having sexual intercourse with Constantino. HELD: Filiation was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof to establish the allegation is on Constantino. Constantino s testimony as to when she had intercourse with Mendez is contradicted by evidence. The date was crucial to determine whether Michael was conceived during the time Amelia and Ivan were having sexual relations. There was also no clear and convincing proof that Amelia did not have any sexual encounter with other men. MENDOZA v MELIA (1966) 17 SCRA 788 Father versus son s common law wife and her son Paciano Pareja owned lot No. 3390-B in Sorsogon. He donated it to his son Gavino in 1939. Gavino during that time had been living with his common-law spouse Catalina Mendoza, and their only son Rodolfo who was born in 1935. Gavino disappeared in 1943 and had not been heard of since. Paciano Pareja sold the disputed property to Temistocles Mella in 1948 who then told herein petitioners to vacate the said land in 1952. With the notice remaining unheeded, Mella filed and action in 1955. Petitioners claim ownership of said land, claiming Rodolfo as the rightful successor being the son of Gavino, and for having adverse possession of the land for 10 years. Trial and appellate courts ruled for Mella, hence this challenge by Catalina and Rodolfo. As to the issue of possession, petitioners invoke Art. 390 of Civil Code but the respondent argued that this was never raised in the trial court nor the appellate court thus could not be considered at the SC. With the issue of Rodolfo as successor, he showed a coy of his birth certificate.

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ISSUE: WON Rodolfo can be considered acknowledged natural child by virtue of his birth certificate as evidence. HELD: No. The appellate court deemed the birth certificate insufficient because it did not have the signatures of the parents, it being only a certified copy of the registry. The court ruled that in the absence of such signatures, there was no clear proof that the parent recognizes the child. LIM v CA (1975) 65 SCRA 160 - In 1962, Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy Chen Hong for the declaration of nullity of the affidavit Uy executed in which he adjudicated to himself (120 square meters located in Tayabas), as the only son and heir of Susana Lim. - Uy and Lim fights over the inheritance of Susana Lim s property, to the exclusion of each other - Lim claims that she is the natural daughter of Susana. Her evidence are as follows: o baptismal certificate which stated the her mother was Susana o marriage contract wherein Susana gave consent to the marriage of Felisa - On the other hand, Uy claims that he is the only son and heir of Susana. His evidence: o application form for alien registration which stated that his mother was Susana o order of the BOI cancelling his alien registration, by derivation from his Filipina mother o his identification certificate which describes him as the son of Susana. - RTC: In 1967, Felisa Lim was held as the daughter and only heir of Susana Lim to which Uy filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial but the court denied it. - CA: Upon Uy s appeal, CA ruled that neither Felisa Lim nor Uy is entitled to the inheritance because: o neither of them been recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any means provided for by law o neither of them been declared in a judicial proceeding to be the child of Susana Lim - They both assailed the decision of the CA - Lim says that Susana s consent to her marriage constitutes recognition as natural daughter and was even executed in a public document in the form of her marriage contract (Sec 131 of CC of 1889 says that be made in the record of birth, in a will or some other public document - Guadalupe Uy contended that her husband purchased the property in question with his own money prior to his mother s death and took conveyance and title. There was an existence of implied trust. His mother gave him a little money to complete the purchase price. ISSUES & HELD: 1. WON Felisa Lim is entitled to the inheritance. NO - Felisa Lim alleges that she was recognized by Susana Lim during 1943 which means that it was during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889. Sec. 131 of CC of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child be made in

the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document. - Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with formalities required by law. The two classes of public documents are: o Executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries (MARRIAGE CONTRACTS WOULD FALL UNDER THIS CATEGORY) o Those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office - Marriage contract presented by Felisa does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the CC of 1889. There was no intervention of a notary. - The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. 2. WON Uy is entitled to the inheritance. NO - The title is in the name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony cannot overcome the fact that the sale was made to Susana Lim and title issued in her favor - Implied trust arises where a person purchases land with his own money and takes conveyance thereof in the name of another. The property is held on a resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer unless a different intention or understanding appears. - Uy raised the theory of implied trust in favor of her husband for the first time in her motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court and evidence regarding the purchase by her husband is altogether unconvincing. HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BAÑAS v HEIRS OF BIBIANO BAÑAS (1985) 134 SCRA 260 Raymundo was the child of Dolores Castillo and an unknown father. Upon Raymundo s death, his heirs filed for partition of recovery of hereditary share against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that Raymundo was a recognized natural son of Bibiano.





Trinidad, niece of Faustina


Handwritten note alledgedly written by Bibiano to the 18 yo Raymundo with a complimentary ending










CC 278 provides for authentic handwriting which is a private document thus acknowledgement of the child in such instrument should not be incidental but explicit. The

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 su padre complimentary ending might be due to the close relations Raymundo enjoyed with his uncle/guardian Bibiano; there is no clear expression of acknowledgement of filiation. Paternal solicitude paternity Bibiano signed these documents as guardian of Raymundo while he is growing up since the latter spent for his education because Pedro (the real father) is unable to support him; thus it is natural that Bibiano signs as the guardian even more so that Raymundo spent most his lifetime in Bibiano and Fautina s care This typewritten evidence taken into account the contradicting testimony of Raymundo s wife Trinidad casts doubt to the authenticity of these personal accounts of Raymundo

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WON prescription barred private respondents right to demand partition of Lupo s estate. 2. WON the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights of over the estate. What is the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents. HELD: The children from the third marriage continuously possessed the status of legitimate children. Filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar, a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. 1) WON prescription barred private respondents right to demand partition of Lupo s estate. Since they are legit kids and heirs of Lupo, the time limitation prescribed in Art 258 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable. Prescription doesn t run against private respondents w/ respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, haven t expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. Prescription of an action for partition doesn t lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. A co-owner can t acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owner absent a clear repudiation of coownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. Also, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible & can t be barred by laches. It is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership & for segregation & conveyance of a certain property. No valid repudiation was made by the petitioners. Assuming the petitioner s registration of the subject lot was an act of repudiation of co-ownership, prescription hasn t set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition. The registration didn t operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. SC stated that prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation w/c subject to certain conditions: 1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership 2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners 3) the evidence thereon is clear & conclusive 4) he has been in possession thru open, continuous, exclusive & notorious possession of the prop for a period required by law Inasmuch as petitioners registered the prop in their names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioner s act of defraudation. And this action was commenced 2 months after learning petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved to the prejudice of private respondents. 2) WON the private respondents, were successional rights over the estate. YES FC has to apply since it is effective Art 172, filiation of legit kids may be record of birth appearing in the civil able to prove their already. And under established by the register or a final


School records, report cards, school receipts for matriculation all signed and paid by Bibiano

Typewritten letters to Atty. Faustino alleging his personal circumstance; as well as typewritten autobiography asserting that his father is a surgeon Bibiano Bañas

A sworn affidavit duly notarized and executed by Bibiano Banas declaring that Raymundo Banas is his brother, Pedro s son A sworn JOINT affidavit duly notarized and executed by Raymundo and Pedro Banas correcting an error made on the marriage certificate of the former changing the father of Raymundo from Bibiano to Pedro



A public instrument explicitly stating Pedro is the father of Raymundo is strong evidence that he does not acknowledge or have the intention thereof that the latter is his son If Raymundo really believed that he is indeed the son of Bibiano he could not have consented to executing such declaration; Trinidad s contention of the document was contradictory and therefore set aside.

*Ma am Beth does not buy the interpretation of Your Father as a reference term for an uncle. UYGUANGCO v CA See Illegitimate Filiation

MARIATEGUI v CA (1992) 205 SCRA 675 Lupo Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three marriages with three different women and sired three sets of children. First: with Eusebia Montellano, 4 kids Baldomera: died, survived by kids surnamed Espina Maria del Rosario Urbana Ireneo: died, left a son, Ruperto Second: with Flaviana Montellano, one daughter, Cresciana Third: with Felipa Velasco, 3 kids: Jacinto, Julian, Paulina He died intestate and the children from his 1st and 2nd marriages excluded the children from the 3rd marriage in the extra-judicial partition of Lupo s properties. ISSUES:

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judgment or by the open & continuous possession of the status of a legit kid. Evidence proves the private respondents legit filiation. Jacinto s birth cert was presented. Though Julian and Paulina didn t present evidence required by Art 172, they continuously enjoyed the status as kids of Lupo in the same manner as Jacinto. And for a considerable length of time & despite the death of their mom, they lived with Lupo until his death. ACEBEDO v ARQUERO (2003) 399 SCRA 10 Edwin Acebedo charged Eddie Arquero for immorality in an administrative complaint. He alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo and respondent unlawfully cohabited as husband and wife as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two. Attached was the birth certificate of the girl indicating her parents to be Arquero and Dedjoe. He also presented a copy of their marriage contract. Arquero vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is just a mere harassment and a product of complainant s hatred and extreme jealousy to his wife. He presented a sworn statement wherein Edwin Acebedo (complainant) acknowledged paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him. He also said that the complainant was cohabiting with another woman. MTC recommended that the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the charge Memorandum by the Office of the Court Administrator disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without pay. ISSUE: WON Arquero can be suspended due to immorality. RATIO: Yes. The entry of respondent s name as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A baptismal certificate merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized. Arquero admitted that he had an illicit relationship with the wife of the complainant Arquero justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant s wife with the spouses having previously entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was embodied in a Kasunduan . This justification fails because Arquero, being an employee of the judiciary, knows that the Kasunduan





has no force and effect because Article 1 of the FC provides: marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties. RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the State s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Arguero s act of having illicit relations with the complainant s wife is a disgraceful and immoral conduct. Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense. Since it is his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.

HERRERA v ALBA (2005) 460 SCRA 197 Armi Alba instituted an action for support, damages and compulsory recognition against Rosendo Herrera on behalf of her 13 year old son Rosendo Alba. Respondent requested for DNA testing to determine her son s paternal relation to Herrera, which RTC granted. Herrera appealed assailing that compulsory DNA testing violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination CA: right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion and affirmed the order to DNA ISSUE: WON DNA testing is a valid test for paternity in this jurisdiction HELD: Yes. DNA testing has probative value in this jurisdiction owing to its growing accuracy in establishing matches between a parent and an offspring. However, it should take not of the following things: 1. how the samples were collected and handled 2. the possibility of contamination of samples 3. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples 4. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests 5. qualification of the analysts who conducted the test The policy of the FC to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially legitimate children is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.

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FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY 1. prima facie case that the woman had sexual relation with the putative father 2. affirmative defense show physical incapability or sexual relations OR sexual relation with other men at the time of conception 3. presumption of legitimacy 4. physical resemblance between father and child



2. Action to claim legitimacy
FC, Art 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during the minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute action. The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.



The right of a child to claim legitimacy may only be transferred to the heirs under two cases and within 5 years: 1. if the child dies during minority 2. if the child dies in a state of insanity *The effect of legitimacy claim extends the successional rights

and from then on was never seen or heard from. Neither was any support for his family ever received from him. 29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza petitioned for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership which was granted. On 11 July 1977 Fe petitioned to drop the surname of her estranged husband, it was approved. On 26 April 1986, Pablo was judicially declared as an absentee. Fe married Ernesto Yu on 15 April 1986, with then Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos Sr. solemnizing the ceremony. Cynthia grew up treating Yu as her father and Yu treated her as his own daughter. Confusion and embarrassment was caused by her use of the surname Vicencio when his stepfather is surnamed Yu. She was made to use the surname Yu when she joined two beauty pageants, where the use was with the consent of her stepfather. When Cynthia petitioned for a change in surname, the stepfather openly declared his consent. The Trial Court decided in her favor and Appellate Court upheld, both saying that granting her request would be for the best interest of Cynthia SG opposed saying that even if it would improve her personality, there was no valid, proper, and reasonable cause to grant her request. It would generate complicated problems especially with regards to problems of inheritance since her status will be affected. They say, Ernesto could have adopted her instead of Cynthia coming to court with this petition.

3. Rights of legitimate children
FC, Art 174 Legitimate children shall have the right: 1. to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the CC on surname 2. to receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support 3. to be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the CC *Ma am Beth s mnemonics: 3s - support, surname, succession *The child s use of his/her father surname indicates the family to which he/she belongs. Hence, it is mandatory for the child to do so. REPUBLIC v CA & VICENCIO (1998) 300 SCRA 138 Cynthia Vicencio was born on 19 January 1971 at the Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City to spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. They lived in Meycauayan, Bulacan and Pablo left the said abode on 10 January 1972 after a quarrel with Fe

ISSUE: WON appellate court erred in affirming trial court s decision allowing the change of private respondent s surname with that of her stepfather. HELD: Yes. A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Confusion might arise with regard to private respondent s parentage because of her surname. But even more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. A legitimate child must use the surname of his/her father.

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DE ASIS v CA (1999) 303 SCRA 176 Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her son Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for support and maintenance against the alleged father Manuel de Asis. Manueld denied filiation. Vircel agreed to compromise that she would not pursue the case if Manuel will withdraw his counterclaim. After six years, Vircel filed an action for support and maintenance of her son. HELD: The right to support cannot be the subject of compromise. The action for support cannot be barred by res judicata. The ratio behind the prohibition against waving the right to future support is the need to maintain one s existence. Paternity and filiation (or lack of it) must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. The agreement entered into by the petitioner and respondent s mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support, which is in the nature of a compromise, cannot be countenanced. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person as per Art 301 CC. Also, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise as in Art 2035. ** Legitime of a legitimate child: half of the parents estate divided by the number of legitimate children.



those conceived of parents who have no legal impediment to marry at the time of the conception may be legitimated all other illegitimate children

1. Proof of filiation
FC, Art 175 Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. (Art 172) The action must be brought within the same period specified in Art 173 (lifetime of the child, will not be extinguished by death of either parties), except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Art 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Why must the action be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent in Par 2? Since there might still be a question as to whether the child is really the illegitimate child of the alleged parent or not, the latter must be given an opportunity to contest the action, and this he or she can only do if the action is filed during his or her lifetime. Ma am Beth asks: How would illegitimate children know they are illegitimate if they have always been living with the family? The only time they d learn they do are not entitled to their parent s estate is when they die. Only Sempio-Diy knows that rule, mortals don t! COMPARED WITH THE CC PROVISION ON PROVING ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for exceptions in the prescription for recognition of natural children, FC removed this provision in Par 2, Art 175. (Uyguangco v CA) 1. If the father or the mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority. 2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from the finding of the document. HOW TO BRING ACTION TO CLAIM FILIATION 1. File a separate action 2. Intervene in the settlement of estate of his/her alleged parent LEUTERIO v CA (1991) 197 SCRA 369 Ma. Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural daughter of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglangque, who was the servant of the former. Alicia claims that she was conceived at the time when her parents were not disqualified to marry each other

C. Illegitimate Children
Generally, illegitimate children are those born of parents who are not united by a valid marriage. Under the CC, there were three main groups of illegitimate children: 1. Natural children 2. Natural children by legal fiction 3. Spurious children o adulterous o incestuous o sacrilegious born of persons who are disqualified to marry by reason of religious profession o manceres those born of prostitutes Under our law, there is no disqualification to marry on the ground of religious profession. And we also have no law which automatically classifies children of prostitutes as illegitimate. FC abolished all distinctions between illegitimate children such that there are only two categories of children today: legitimate and illegitimate. However, an informal distinction between two groups of illegitimate children was established:

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and that she was legitimated by the marriage of her parents nine years after her birth. Around four months after Pablo s marriage to Ana, Pablo died so she took possession of Pablo s estate and its administration, Pablo s siblings objected and prayed for the administration and succession rights be transferred to them alleging that Pablo died a widower and that the allegation that Alicia was a legitimated daughter is without foundation in fact and law. The lower court affirmed this conclusion and said that Alicia s evidences are insufficient, being forged and incompetent There was no document to show that petitioner had been supported by the deceased in his lifetime. There were neither receipts of payment of school fees in the name of Pablo nor signatures in school cards and letters to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as daughter. The baptismal certificate and birth certificate do not bear express acknowledgment of petitioner as a child of the deceased. As proof of filiation, petitioner claimed that she was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the decedent and her mother. CA affirmed the lower court s findings ratiocinating that it is not unusual if Pablo looked upon Maria as if she were his own daughter because he had no child in his previous marriage.

parent. His action is barred because of the death of his father. Art 283 CC which gives weight to continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family has been superseded by Art 175 FC. RODRIGUEZ v CA (1995) 245 SCRA 150 On Oct. 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos filed a case against Bienvenido Rodriguez. He presented his mother as witness to reveal the identity of his father. Counsel for Rodriguez objected and the Trial Court sustained. Clarito filed a petition in the SC and the SC referred the case to the CA. That decision is assailed in this case. Petitioner: Felicitas shouldn t be allowed to reveal the name of the father as stated in Art. 280 of the Civil Code: When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified. Respondent: Fecilitas should be allowed by : 1. Art 283(4) CC: The father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father 2. Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules

ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of Pablo and Ana HELD: No. CA decision was affirmed. The relief of petitioner is that of involuntary recognition which may be given if there is incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity. The recognition must be precise, express and solemn. The photographs she presented likewise did not bear the decedent s signature. She was also not a legitimated daughter. UYGUANGCO v CA (1989) 178 SCRA 684 Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco who died intestate. Graciano admits having no documents to prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. He moved to Misamis Oriental where Apolinario supported his education and even hired him as a storekeeper in their store without objection of the family. He was allowed to use the surname and shared in the profits of the copra business. ISSUE: WON he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the CC. HELD: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred. Since Graciano seeks to prove filiation based on Par 2 of Art 172 FC, it should take place during the lifetime of the

ISSUE: WON the testimony of the mother is admissible for compulsory recognition. HELD: Yes. Prohibition in A280, against the identification of the father or mother of a child apply only in voluntary & not in compulsory recognition. The said laws were repealed by the FC. Art 172 FC states that filiation may be proved by any evidence and proof that the defendant is his father. ARUEGO v CA (1996) 254 SCRA 711 Jose Aruego while married had an extra-marital relationship with Luz Fabian in 1959 until his death in March 1982. Allegedly born to this amorous relationship were Antonia and Evelyn, both surnamed Aruego. In 1983, Luz Fabian filed a complaint for the compelled recognition of her children as compulsory heirs of the deceased on the grounds of open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children. RTC declared only Antonia as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and entitled to her share in the estate ISSUE: 1. WON Family Code provisions apply in instant case

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WON application of Family Code in this case prejudice or impair vested right of respondent should FC be given retroactive effect WON trial court lost jurisdiction when FC took effect.

HELD: 1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of FC, thus CC provisions still apply. Art 285 CC governs the case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC. 2. YES. If FC prevails over CC in the choice of which should govern, it would prejudice Antonia s right which was vested upon her by virtue of Art. 285, through the above-mentioned suit for recognition. 3. NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court never lost its original jurisdiction. What is your understanding of a vested right? It is not defined in Art 256 FC because it should be on a case to case basis, taking into account all the circumstances and facts. Subsequent change of law should not affect the available cause of action. JISON v CA (1998) 286 SCRA 495 Monina Jison alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison. Francisco denied paternity. While married to Lilia Jison, Francisco impregnated the nanny of his eldest daughter, Esperanza Amolar. The child was born and enjoyed the continuous and implied recognition as an illegitimate child. Francisco spent for her education until she became a CPA and eventually worked as Central Bank examiner. It was her father who paid for the burial expenses for her mother s death. And it was through filiation with her father that she previously was able to seek employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. She was able to name the members of the Jison household as well as the staff in her father s office. She also claimed knowing the 3 children of Francisco and Lilia. The last time she saw her father was when she sought his blessings to get married. In sum, Monina s evidence and testimonies showed that a. she was close with Francisco s relatives b. she received P15 as monthly allowance from her father coursed through accountants of his office c. her filiation was known in the Jison office & household d. her allowance was not recorded in the books but in a separate cash book because it had to be hidden from Mrs Jison and children e. that she even asked for a Christmas gift from her godfather, Don Vicente, father of Mrs Jison When Monina wanted to go to Spain, her father negotiated that in exchange for the expenses, she would sign a document that denies her being a daughter. HELD: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Her witnesses (she had 11) established her claims. However, Monina cannot rely on her birth certificate in the Local Registrar where Francisco is named as her father.

Neither can she rely on her baptismal certificate naming Francisco as her father. There was no showing that Francisco had anything to do with the filing of said certificates. Moreover, Art 172 provides the various forms of evidence w/c may be presented. Monina was able to present a high standard of proof which was coherent, logical and natural as compared to Francisco s evidence which was barren and mostly denials. As regards the issue that there was opportunity for Monina s mother to have slept with other men during the time she conceived Monina, Francisco had the burden of proof which he failed to deliver. The issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim s or mother s word, as against the protestation of the accused or putative s father. Although Pansay unfortunately passed away and therefore cannot testify, this does not mean that Monina could no longer prove her filiation. Since it was established that Pansay was still employed under Francisco at the time Monina was conceived, sexual contact between Pansay and him was not at all impossible, especially in the light of the overwhelming evidence. Francisco is Monina s father and she was conceived at the time Pansay worked for him. He recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct as was found by CA and such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner. Moreover, if Monina were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for Francisco to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition denied. Challenged CA decision affirmed. ALBERTO v CA (1994) 232 SCRA 745 Ma. Theresa Alberto claims that she has been in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of the late Juan Alberto and is entitled to a share in his estate. The following are the proofs used: 1. Juan & Aurora were sweethearts prior to Juan s marriage to Yolanda 2. Juan gave money to Aurora thru Fr. Arcilla, Juan s first cousin 3. Juan gave Theresa money for her schooling 4. Juan made known to his friends & relatives that she was his daughter 5. He made known to personnel of International School where Theresa was enrolled that she was his daughter 6. Juan s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, asked Theresa to be sent to her house to meet her dad for the first time when Theresa was 9. 7. Fr. Arcilla brought Theresa to Juan s bedside in the hospital when he was shot & asked guards to give way to her as she was a member of the family. 8. Juan s step mom, Saturnina Alberto, introduced Theresa to one of Juan s daughter (her half-sister). She was introduced as an elder sister.

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Aurora testified that her giving birth to Theresa was due to an indiscretion and that Mrs. Solidum did arrange mtg bet Theresa & Juan 10. Theresa testified that: a. her dad gave her P500.00 on their first meeting along with two phone numbers where he could be reached. b. She met him several times after the first meeting and he gave him money during those times too c. Dad visited her in IS twice. IS is very strict when it comes to visitors & by allowing Juan to see Theresa, this shows that he was identified by the school personnel as Theresa s dad. d. Dad promised to see her in school during her 14th birthday which didn t happen because he was gunned down. e. Her uncles and aunts (bros and sis) of her dad regarded her as their niece & she was introduced as Juan s eldest daughter. The children of Juan s bros and sis likewise recognized her as their cousin. 11. Jose Tablizo testified that there was a strong physical resemblance bet Juan & Theresa & they wrote similarly too. He further stated that it was known among Juan s friends (the Breeze Gang) that Theresa was Juan s daughter and that Juan proudly showed him Theresa s report card w/high grades. 12. Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Juan s lawyer, Immigrations Commissioner Edmundo Reyes discussed w/him Juan s letter saying that he was not denying that he was Theresa s dad and due to his marital status & since he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public scandal thus support will be given quietly thru Fr. Arcilla. CA reversed decision. It was not satisfied that Theresa was in continuous possession of status of natural child of deceased. Bases: 1. Case wherein 2 nurses took care of kids at the expense of alleged dad, that he kissed kids, called them sons, gave money for their necessities, they called him dad & was publicly regarded as dad of the children but Court held that they were insufficient basis for a declaration of paternity. CA finds Theresa s evidence weaker than this. Dad may have been convinced of his paternity but they don t show his intent to place kids in possession of status of natural children. 2. Theresa s letter to Jose Tablizo wherein she wrote of how proud she is of her dad & how she only knew him as a big man & that his friends like Tablizo who knew him well & she envied them for having that privilege. (see p. 751). CA claims that the letter gave the impression that Juan distanced himself from Theresa. Yolanda denied that Juan ever recognized Theresa as his daughter. She presented letters sent by Aurora to Juan & Fr. Arcilla as proof that Juan refused to recognize Theresa. In one letter Aurora complained that Juan didn t give a damn to Theresa & she mentioned


that the child was graduating from Prep School. Letter likewise stated that she waited for the money for support & that she was grateful for the P300 he sent. HELD: Theresa was able to prove her open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. 1. Letters from Aurora: did not prove that Juan refused to recognize Theresa, it only proved that Aurora was having a hard time raising child on her own and she asked for Juan s assistance. 2. Juan never stopped Theresa from using his last name. 3. Report card story: being discredited for hearsay but according to SC this is w/in the exception of the hearsay rule (Sec. 38, Rule 130, ROC). 4. Relatives of Juan recognized Theresa too. Yolanda could have presented any of these relatives to negate Theresa s claims but she failed to do so. 5. Re Theresa s letter to Tablizo: What a poignant novel she can now author as she seeks to establish her parental links with her dad. There must be questions as to why his dad didn t marry her mom when there were no legal impediments at the time of her conception. Note that under the different categories of illegitimate children under the CC, the natural child occupies the highest position since her parents were not disqualified to marry during her conception. Child is often the fruit of first love & is entrenched firmly in her parents hearts. Juan could ve not resisted manifesting signs of concern & care in so far as his first born is concerned especially since child has much talent & great promise. It s expected that dad would proudly step forward to claim his paternity. Discreetness is understandable considering the straight-laced mores of the times & the social & political stature of Juan. But despite that, he openly visited his daughter in school and met with her in several occasions. Though letter may imply lack of association, it s understood because their relationship was far from normal. There s sufficient proof that Juan acted in such manner as to show his intent to recognize Theresa as his own & not that he distanced himself from her. 6. CC Art. 285: Action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of presumed parents except (1) if dad/mom died during child s minority, in w/c case, child may file action before the expiration of 4 yrs from attainment of his majority. Theresa falls w/in this exception since she was only 14 when her dad died. So can file an action before she reaches 25 (4 years after age of majority w/c was 21 then). So she had until Sept. 18, 1978 to file the action. And she filed the present action on Sept. 15, 1978, 3 days before the expiration of the 4-year period. GUY v CA (2006) 502 SCRA 151 Sima Wei died intestate in Makati City on October 1992, leaving 10M worth of real and personal properties His known heirs are his surviving spouse and Shirley Guy and children Private respondents (minors Karen and Kamille Wei), represented by their mother Remedios filed a petition and prayed for the appointment of a regular

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administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei s estate. Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the petition of Remedios on the following grounds: 1. That Sima Lei left no debts and there is therefore no need to secure letters of administration 2. That private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei 3. That private respondent s claim had been paid, waived and abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios RELEASE AND WAIVER CLAIM stating that in exchange for the financial educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabitilities

petitioner s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination HELD: 1.


The action does not amount to conversion. Rather, the DNA was necessity to establish the respondent s cause of action. Also, even if the order would effect the establishment of filiation, the integration of the two actions is still lawful because the resolution of one issue necessary in the determination of the other issue. No. Right to self-incrimination is considered only in written and verbal compulsion.

ISSUES: 1. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights 2. WON private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation HELD: 1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. The document does not state with clarity the purpose for its execution. Parents and guardians may not also repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. It must also be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Private respondents could not have possible waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. 2. A ruling in the same would be premature considering respondents have yet to present evidences to prove their filiation. It is the duty of the trial court. AGUSTIN v CA (2005) 460 SCRA 315 Arnel Agustin had an extramarital affair with Fe Prollamante which produced the child named Martin. Arnel suggested to have the pregnancy aborted which Fe refused. Arnel allegedly took care of all the medical bills in Martin s birth and even signed his birth certificate as the father. However, in the long run, Arnel failed to give sustenance despite his adequate financial capacity. Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for support. They also moved for DNA testing to prove their cause of action. ISSUES: 1. WON complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition 2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating

Lucio Campo


Ramon Osorio



Guillermina & Nanie Guillerma (illegitimate child with Amparo Sagarbarria)

Nazario Edilberta Jose Jacoba Gorgonio


This case involves the partition of the estate of decedent Guillermo and Josefa Delgado. The two groups contending the right of inheritance are the heirs of Josefa Delgado (her half and full-blood siblings and their descendants) and the heirs of Guillermo Delgado (his siblings and their descendants, his illegitimate child and de facto adopted child). Josefa died before Guillermo, both intestate. The existence of their marriage is also under question. 1. HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO. Felisa had seven children fathered by two men, all the births were out of wedlock. In effect the children belong to the illegitimate line. 2. HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA. He had an illegitimate child named Guillerma with Amparo Sagarbarria. However, in his petition for adoption of his ampun-ampunan Guillermina, he declared that he had no legitimate, legitimated or acknowledge natural child. ISSUES: 1. WON Guillermo and Josefa were validly married 2. Who the legal heirs of the decedents are 1. Their cohabitation of 50 years cannot be doubted. By presumption of law, there existed valid marriage between them. Marriage contract is not the only proof of marriage. The baptismal certificate wherein Josefa was referred to as señorita has no legal bearing. Because of the declaration of Luis as the natural child of Felisa , it was established that no marriage took place between Ramon Osorio and her. Given that, illegitimate siblings, whether half or full blood


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can reciprocally inherit from each other. Only the collateral relatives (and their heirs by their right of representation) of Josefa who are alive at the time of her death are entitled to a share in her estate. Guilllerma s right to compulsory recognition prescribed upon the death of her putative father because her open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child is only a ground for compelling acknowledgement. The obituary written by Guillermo for Josefa which includes her as his child does not pass as genuine writing. Same goes for the ampun-ampunan Guillermina. As a result, Guillermo s compulsory heirs are his collateral relatives.

2. Rights of illegitimate children
FC, Art 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. PROVIDED, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist one-half of the legitimate child. *As amended by RA 9255 in 2004

ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v DIAZ (2007) 540 SCRA 480 Jinky sued for the determination of her minor child Joanne s filiation via DNA testing for claim of support. Despite her marriage with Hasegawa Katsuo, she maintained illicit affair with Rogelio Ong. She got impregnated, and Rogelio Ong covered all the medical bills and baptismal expenses until he cut off the support and said that the child was not his. During the pendency of the case, Rogelio died. ISSUES: 1. WON the court erred in not declaring Joanne as the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky 2. WON DNA analysis is still feasible notwithstanding the death of Rogelio Ong HELD: 1. No. The presumption of legitimacy of the child is not conclusive and may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Further, the resolution of the second issue will render the issue moot. 2. Yes. Rogelio s death does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological samples means any organic material originating from a person s body, even if found in inanimate objects. *This was decided differently, deviated from the rule that only the husband can raise or impugn the child s legitimacy. Mam is in favor of this ruling.

IN CC: recognition of the father was required before illegitimate child can use his surname. IN FC: regardless of recognition, illegitimate child shall use mother s surname. RA 9255: reverts to the CC rule which allows illegitimate children to use father s surname subject to the father s recognition. * RA 9255 was authored by Sen. Ramon Revilla who is known for having at least 85 children of legal age. (Read: the number does not include minor children.) * The problem with this law is that it takes out of the picture the role of women. DAVID v CA (1995) 250 SCRA 82 Ramon villar, a married man, had three children with his secretary Daisie David. Ramon recognized the children as his. Ramon refused to return Christopher then 6 years old and his youngest child after a trip to Boracay. He also enrolled him in a school. Daisy filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher. HELD: Christopher, as an illegitimate child, is under the parental authority of his mother. That the husband can provide the needs of the son better is not an argument against the mother s custody. The fact that Ramon recognized the child may be a ground for him to give support but not for giving him custody of the child. PEOPLE v NAMAYAN (1995) 246 SCRA 646 The accused Tortillano Namayan raped Margie Pagaygay, 21 years old but is slightly retarded with a mental age of 3-7 years old. The bulging stomach indicating pregnancy became evident. Margie says that Namayan raped her on several occasions while she was fetching water from the artesian well. Namayan denied all allegations purporting that at the time specified, he was serving time in jail. However, the jail warden admitted that he cannot confirm WON

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Namayan was indeed in jail because it was not his responsibility to look after the prisoners. In fact, some of the detainees are allowed to go out at the discretion of the guard. ISSUES & RULING: 1. WON it was physically impossible for Namayan to be the father of the child. NO On July 30, 1991 Margie was found to be 4-5 months pregnant therefore sexual intercourse might have happened during the period between March 15, 1991 to April 15, 1991. It was proven that Namayan was seen outside the Municipal Jail during the town fiesta (March 19, 1991). Namayan was detained in a minimum security prison and it was also stated that some prisoners were able to go out depending on the discretion of the guard. These facts disprove the claim of Namayan that it could not have physically possible for him to commit the act. Also, even if he was released only on April 12, 1991 it would have still been possible for him to impregnate Margie. 2) WON compulsory acknowledgement and support for the child is a proper remedy in this case. YES No legal impediment The crime of rape committed by Namayan carries with it among others the obligation to acknowledge the offspring if the character of its origin doe not prevent it and to support the same. MOSSESGELD v CA (1998) 300 SCRA 464 Eleazar Calasan, a married man, signed the birth certificate of his illegitimate son, Jonathan Mossesgeld CAlsan. The local civil registrar refused to register the birth certificate of Jonathan using the surname Calasan. HELD: Illegitimate children must use the surname of their mother regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in the record of birth. The father may however choose to legally adopt the child. Once adopted, the child may use the father s surname. REPUBLIC v ABADILLA (1999) 302 SCRA 358 Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot two children during their common law relationship. The children s birth certificate indicated their surnames as Abadilla. They filed a petition for correction/cancellation of entries to rectify Herson to Gerson and delete the entry in the parents marriage date and place. RTC granted the petition. OSG interposed the RTC decision s reversible error in not ordering the change of minors surname from Abadilla to Celestino , as effect of the deletion of the entry on marriage. HELD: Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. The surname of the children in the birth certificates should be changed to Celestino.

** Under RA 9255 (2004) illegitimate children may use their father s surname if he consents to it. GONZALES v CA (1998) 298 SCRA 322 Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and brothers of Ricardo alleged that they are the only heirs of the deceased. Honoria Empaynado (partner for 27 years), Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion alleging that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo. There was also another illegitimate child with Dolores Sancho named Rosemarie Abad. The collateral relatives adduced the following proofs: o Mapua Institute of Technology enrollment forms which did not state Jose as dead. o Affidavits of Quiambao & Ramos claiming that they know Jose died in 1971 & that he was buried at the Loyola Memorial Park. o A doctor who said Ricardo had gonorrhea so he was sterile. HELD: The Best evidence is Jose s death certificate which was not presented. Loyola Memorial Park showed a certain JOSE BAUTISTA LIBUNAO married to a JOSEFA REYES and not JOSE SANTOS LIBUNAO married to HONORIA EMPAYNADO. Also, Dr. Arenas affidavit is inadmissible for tending to blacken Ricardo s reputation. The privilege of secrecy is not abolished because of death. Respondents presented his ITR where he declared Honoria as his legitimate wife & the 3 as his legitimate dependents. He also opened bank accounts for them and paid insurance premiums. The evidence presented proved that the three sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo. Hence, they are entitled to inherit Ricardo s estate. Art 988 CC provides that in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, illegitimate children succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. REPUBLIC v VICENCIO (1998) 300 SCRA 138 - SUPRA GAN v REYES (2002) 382 SCRA 357 Bernadette Pondevida wrote Augustus Caezar Gan demanding for support for the their love child, 3 year old Francheska Joy Pondevida, in order that she may send the child to school. Gan denied paternity of the chld, prompting Bernadette to institute in behalf of her daughter a complaint for support. HELD: In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality. Cases involving child support are final and immediately executory, even more so, cannot be stayed by an appeal.

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TONOG v CA (2002) 376 SCRA 523 Petitioner Dinah Tonog, a nursing student begot a child with a physician Edgar Daguimol. The child named Gardin Faith Tonog and the mother resided with the Daguimol s parents. Then, Dina left for the US to work and the child was left in the care of paternal grandparents and her father. Daguimol applied for legal guardianship of the child, which was subsequently granted. Dina instituted action for remand of custody ISSUE: WON Dina can claim custody of the child on TYP and Art 176 FC HELD: The custody case is not yet concluded, meaning the court can only rule on temporary custody. The CA did not err in allowing Edgar to retain in the meantime parental custody over Gardin. A child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith is already 12 years old, her choice should also be given weight. However, the decision should not be taken against the fitness of the mother or the preference or the father. DE GUZMAN v PEREZ (2006) 496 SCRA 474 Petitioner Roberto and private respondent Shirley became sweethearts while STUDYING LAW in UST. Their studies were interrupted when Shirley became pregnant and gave birth to Robby. The two, nonetheless, never got married. Roberto married another woman later on. He never provided any financial support for Robby except in two instances (1992 & 1993) when he sent money for the schooling and when he gave P7000.00 for the kid s hospitalization expenses. Shirley, at one instance, demanded support for Robby s education since she was suffering some financial problems. Roberto did not give anything despite his fabulous wealth. He managed the De Guzman corporations, has five luxurious cars, owns a house in Ayala Heights Quezon City and regularly travels abroad with his family. Shirley then filed criminal complaint for abandonment against Roberto. Respondent s evidence: Notarized copy of the Gen Info Sheet of RNCD Development Corporation showed that Roberto owned P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate shares. The city prosecutor of Lipa found probable cause to charge petitioner with neglect of child under Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Sec 10(a) of RA 7610 Roberto filed a petition for review with the Sec of Justice who then affirmed City Prosecutor s resolution Petitioner s claims: (1) He is financially incapable as all the alleged properties belong to his father. His share was also in reality his dad s; (2) Robby is not a neglected child since his education was provided by Shirley and her relatives

ISSUE: WON a parent who fails/refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his financial station in life and condition may permit, be charged criminally for neglect of child under Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 HELD: Petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He had not denied that he never contributed for his education except in two instances. He admitted that the boy s education was being financed by Shirley and her relatives. There is also a prima facie evidence that he is financially capable as shown by the notarized GIS. Roberto s argument that "neglect attaches only if BOTH parents are guilty of neglect does not hold. The law is clear. The crime may be committed by ANY parent. The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent s faithful compliance with his/her own parental duties. Petitioner, however, cannot be indicted for violation of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 as the latter covers only those cases of neglect under the former which are not covered by the RPC. Neglect of child under PD 603 is also a crime under Art 277 of the RPC. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of 7610 Presumption of innocence is his favor still stands. What has been ascertained is simply the existence of probable cause for petitioner s indictment for the charge against him. Petitioner s guilt should still be proven beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case. ZEPEDA v ZEPEDA (1963) 41 Ill App 2d 240 Plaintiff Joseph Dennis Zepeda sued his father for causing him to be an adulterine bastard. The father induced the mother to have sexual relations with him with the promise of marriage despite his full knowledge of its impossibility because he is already married. As a result, the plaintiff suffers the consequences of being an illegitimate child like social stigma, inability to inherit from paternal ancestors and deprived of the right to have a normal home. An illegitimate very birth placed him under a disability. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has cause of action HELD: Recognition of the plaintiff s claim means creation of a new tort: a cause of action for a wrongful life. Courts must take into consideration the consequences of opening the doors of litigation wider. Lawmaking, though inherent in the judicial process, should not be indulged in where the result could be as sweeping as here. The interest of the society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort could be so far-reaching, that the policy of the State should be declared by the representatives of the people. ALBA v CA (2005) 465 SCRA 495 (same parties as in 460 SCRA 197) Rosendo Herrera seeks to delete his name as a father and his surname from the birth certificate of Armi Alba s son Rosendo Alba, Jr. RTC granted the petition and duly notified Armi of the said decision. However, the decision notice was sent to the wrong address.

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Armi now avers that Rosendo deliberately provided the wrong address to prevent her from appealing in the case. That he is well aware of her present address because they used to live there as common law spouses. As a result, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction was committed by the court.

facilitate the reunion between him and his mother, once she successfully petitions him. Petitioner s Contention: Is should be tried as an adversarial proceeding and not a summary proceeding. *To this the respondent has already complied with such requirement by posting it in a newspaper of general circulation, no opposing petitions were put forward.

ISSUE: WON the RTC grant to correct the entries in Rosendo Alba s birth certificate should be annulled HELD: No. The petition for correction of birth certificate is in rem so it does not require the presence of Armi. Also, no extrinsic fraud occured because although Armi claims that the address in the birth certificate was erroneously entered by her sister, her signature signifies her approval in the entries provided. Rosendo Herrera s payment of the condominium unit only proves his previous ownership and fails to establish any intimate relations between them. The photocopied love notes also do not have any probative value and never proven to be the respondent s authentic writing. Finally, even if the court annuls the decision, Rosendo Herrera Jr is still not eligible to retain his surname because RA 9255 provides that an illegitimate child shall only use his father s surname if the latter acknowledges his filitiation, which is not the circumstance in this case. Therefore, Rosendo Herrera must use his mother s surname. REPUBLIC v CAPOTE (2007) 514 SCRA 76 Trinidad Capote filed a petition for the change of name of one Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores, a minor under her guardianship being that the mother is in abroad. The minor was the illegitimate child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso, born July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and as such used the name of his father despite the absence of marriage between them The father never gave any support and failed to take up his responsibilities towards the said minor from his birth. The minor is now fully aware of his position and likewise prays for the same, since his mother would like to petition him to join her in abroad, and having a different surname without a father would cause and inconvenience in the processing of document. RTC granted petition and CA affirm ISSUE: WON the guardian may rightfully change the minor s name HELD: Yes. Since private respondent has complied with the requirements of Rule 103. Art 366 CC states that he should take the surname of the recognizing parent, who in the present case is the mother. Art 176 FC mandates that illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother. Being that the name established filial relations it is of importance that he change his name to affirm his status. It will erase the impression that he was recognized by his father. The SOG has likewise misapplied Rule 108 RC, because such action is separate and distinct from the action at hand. This is for the best interest of the child since it will

D. Legitimated Children
FC, Art 177 Only when conceived and born outside of the wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. LEGITIMATION remedy by means of which illegitimate children are considered legitimate, it being supposed that they were born in lawful wedlock. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN illegitimate children who are considered legitimate because of the subsequent marriage of their parents In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists by nature, while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a relation that did not in fact exist by nature. REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION 1. child was conceived AND born out of wedlock 2. the parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other at the time of conception CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED 1. adulterous 2. incestuous 3. of marriages against public policy 4. of bigamous marriages but can be ADOPTED to elevate their status Why can t children of adulterous relationships cannot be legitimated? 1. rational of legitimation would be destroyed 2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of successional rights 3. problem of public scandal 4. will destroy the sanctity of marriage 5. very scandalous, especially if the parents marry years after the birth of the child 6. it is tantamount to tolerating what would have been a wrong act, it would seem to be more beneficial to the erring spouse FC, Art 178 Legitimation shall take place by subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.

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CC: legitimation takes place through subsequent marriage (Art 270) provided that the parents have acknowledge the child before or after the marriage FC: legitimation takes place through subsequent marriage as long as the requisites of Art 177 are met. The length of time between child s birth and the parents marriage does not matter. * The status of legitimated children in void ab initio marriages are likewise affected because no marriage exists at all.
FC, Art 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.

claims that she is entitled to inherit from the estate of Antonio by virtue of her being the legitimate daughter of Tomasa, who is a legitimated sister of Antonio ISSUE: WON Maria Luciano is entitled to inherit from Antonio HELD: YES. A child that enjoys continuous possession of the status of a natural child is considered legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents. Maria Luciano s mother Tomasa was legitimated by the Maria of her parents hence a legitimate sister of Antonio. A legitimate daughter of a legitimated sister is entitled to inherit from her mother s legitimate daughter - Maria may inherit from Antonio. RAMIREZ v GMUR (1919) 42 Phil 855 Doña Ana Ramirez Samuel Bischoff Wertmuller Felisa Castro

FC, Art 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child s birth.

* To protect not only the child but also the child s descendants because it can happen that at the time of the marriage of the child s parents, the child already had married and died is survived by children who should benefit from the legitimation of their deceased parent.
FC, Art 181 The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.

Leona Castro Frederick von Kauffman Elena Federico Ernesto Dr. Ernest Emil Mory
Leontina Elizabeth Carmen Maria Esther

FC, Art 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues.

DE LOS SANTOS v LUCIANO (1934) 60 Phil 328 Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra before they were married. After her parents got married, they begot two more children: Antonio and Fortunato Escobar. All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses and their two legitimate children. The children called the spouses Tatay and Nanay . The other children called Tomasa Manang, which is an appellation given to elder sisters. Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the spouses until she married. The spouses supported her, treated and presented her as their daughter, and was publicly known as such. Tomasa married and had a daughter, Maria Luciano. When she was widowed, she took her daughter with her and lived in the house that Leon Escobar built for them. Leon visited them almost everyday. He sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep them company at night. When Tomasa died, Leon took Maria into his home until she married and was taken by her husband to the province. Leon Escobar died, then Fortunato became ill. Antonio wrote to Maria to return to Manila to nurse Fortunato, even sending money for passage. When Fortunato died, Antonio took Maria into his home, where she lived until Antonio s death. Maria






Samuel, a Swiss, is married to Ana Ramirez without children. He died in 1913 and left a will which declares that he has no forced heir. He bequeaths all his properties to his wife, to the exclusion of properties in Switzerland which are adjudicated to his brothers and sisters. His declaration of absence of force heirs ignores the possibility of his descendants from Leona. Leona is born to Felisa Castro and an unknown father. However, on the margin of her original baptismal certificate was an annotation by Fr. Ferrero that Samuel recognized her as his natural daughter. Leona grew up in Samuel s family and brought up as a family member, which effected a tacit admission of paternity. 1895 Leona Frederick, a Brit born in HK with whom she had three children. 1899 Leona goes to Switzerland to recuperate in a sanatorium (did not specify illness). After sometime, she told Fred that she does not want to be his wife anymore. So in 1904 Fred went to France and obtained a decree of divorce which was granted in 1905. Leona fell for her doctor Emil. They begot a child in 1900 and married after Leona got divorced from Fred. Two more daughters issued in the married. 1910 Leona died The heirs of Leona seeks participation in the estate of their alleged grandfather Samuel. Otto Gmur (respondent) appeared as guardian of 3 Mory children while Fred appeared for his own children. Ana insists that Samuel did not recognized Leona.

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ISSUES: 1. WON Leona is a recognized natural child of Samuel 2. WON the divorce between Fred and Leona is valid 3. WON Leontina should be considered as a legitimate daughter of Fred and Leona (being born before the divorce decree, hence while their marriage is subsisting) 4. WON the Mory and the Kaufmann children are entitled to their share in the estate. 5. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of forced heirs who don t appear to contest the probate. HELD: 1. Yes. Prior to her first marriage, she was in an uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of natural child & treated as such by Samuel. Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible since he s the custodian of church records. Original document not needed since they have shown that diligent search was made to find it, to no avail. Thus, secondary evidence presented by the priest is sufficient. Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro which became Law 1, Title 5, Book 10 of the Novisima Recopilacion which provides that recognition could be established by proof of acts on part of the parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his child. This is different from CC Art 131 provision which provides that acknowledgment must be made in the record of birth, by will or in other public instrument. Regardless of what provision is applied, it s sufficiently shown that Leona was recognized. Ana s contention that only kids born of persons free to marry may possess status of recognized natural child. There being no evidence to show Felisa Castro s status at the time Leona was born, she will be presumed single or widow. Court cannot entertain contrary presumption that Felisa s guilty of adultery. As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her dad, she would have been his forced heir (CC Art 807 (3) & 939) and entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art 842).

law invoked in obtaining the divorce allowed divorce where wife has been guilty of adultery/husband guilty of concubinage. Evidently, this should not be upheld since it is repugnant to the moral sensibilities of our people & it s contrary to law.

Leontina s status: The first marriage was still subsisting when she was born thus she s an offspring of an adulterous intercourse w/c is not capable of legitimation (CC Art 119). WON the Mory and the Kaufman children are entitled to inherit. Frederick s children are legitimate & entitled to inherit, thus no need to discuss. The divorce being invalid, the claims of the Mory children should then be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated & acknowledged natural children, excluding kids of adulterous relations. Descendants under CC Art. 941 can t include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. No. Rights of forced heirs to their legitime are not divested by decree admitting a will to probate, regardless of fact that no provision has been made for them in the will. Decree of probate is conclusive only as regards due execution of will. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 753: forced heirs can t be prejudiced by failure of testator to provide for them in his will. And even if testator intended to leave everything to his wife, will is intrinsically invalid if it would cut off the rights of his forced heirs.



No. French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for dissolution of marriage contracted in the Phil by persons domiciled here especially since such marriage is indissoluble under Philippine laws. Although the spouses (first marriage) have traveled to different places, all those stays were limited & thus we can t say that they have established their domicile elsewhere. It has been established that court of a country in w/c neither spouse is domiciled & w/c one/both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status & a divorce granted by such court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Going to one place for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce w/o intention to remain in that place is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on courts of that state especially if cause of divorce is not recognized by the laws of the state of that person s own domicile. During the time they obtained divorce decree, the Phil law provided that a valid marriage can only be dissolved by death of one of the parties. The

IN RE JULIAN WANG (2005) 454 SCRA 155 The mother, Anna Lisa Wang, wants to change her minor child s name from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang, in effect dropping his middle name. The mother explains that the family will be migrating to Singapore where middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person s name. She fears that this will cause discrimination and embarrassment to her son as Carulasan sounds funny in Mandarin (they pronounce R as L). There will also be difference in Julian and her sister s (Wang Mei Jasmine) name. They might be confused because they have different surnames. RTC: denied, the reason they purported does not fall within the grounds provided by law OSG: No proof that change of name is in the best interest of the child; Mere convenience is not a valid reason for petition for change of name; Singaporean law does not prohibit the use of middle name; There will be no confusion to parentage because they both use their father s surname ISSUE: WON the change of the minor s name should be allowed HELD: No. SC adopts the same reason as OSG and added that such change of name would make his integration into the Singaporean society is not sufficiently establish. Also,

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petitioner is only a minor. The matter of change of name should be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.
Cute trivia: Did you know that Pepe is the nickname for Jose because Joseph is the padre putative (putative/foster father) of Jesus, shorted to P.P. which is pronounced pe-pe in Spanish?

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ADOPTION is a juridical act which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. PURPOSE OF ADOPTION Originally: mainly for the benefit of the adopter, who are usually people who had no children, so that they may experience the joys of parenthood Modern view: for the benefit of the children to be adopted o It has both social and moral purpose: to extend to the orphan or to the child of the indigent, the incapacitated or the sick, the protection of society in the person of the adopter o The adopted child remains an heir of his parents by nature CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION LAW: construed so as to encourage the adoption of unfortunate children by persons who can properly read and educate them CHILD WELFARE PARAMOUNT: In determining whether adoption shall be allowed, the welfare of the child is the primary consideration. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Petition for adoption is done through proceeding in rem. No court may entertain such a petition unless it has jurisdiction over: the subject matter of the case and over the parties the res, which is the personal status of the person to be adopted as well as that of the petitioners ADOPTION AND LEGITIMATION similar in the sense that in both of them the child is given the status of the child born in lawful wedlock of the parents adopting or legitimizing it LEGITIMATION Only natural children May take place by extrajudicial act of parents (marriage) Only by both parents of the child Child receives the same status and rights as a legitimate child, not only in relation to the legitimizing parents, but also in relation to other relatives of the latter ADOPTION Strangers (generally) Always by judicial decree May be made by one parent Creates a relationship only between the child and the adopting parent, but not with the relatives of the latter

WHAT DOES ONLY BY A JUDICIAL DECREE MEAN? Only an adoption made through the court is valid. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence Proof required: judicial decree of adoption o Absence of proof of order of adoption by court cannot by substituted by oral evidence o Secondary evidence admissible where the records of adoption were actually lost or destroyed o Pedigree testimony is not admissible Mere agreement of adoption between the adopters and the biological parents of the child is not valid Mere fact that the child has lived with the alleged adopter who had treated him like his own child is not sufficient to establish a valid adoption (Lazatin v Campos) Neither is the mere registration of the child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed adopters a valid adoption (simulated birth)

A. Pre-adoption and Adoption Procedure
There are no provisions on pre-adoption procedures in FC, it is only introduced in RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998).
FC, Art 184 The following persons may not adopt: 1. The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final account rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relations; 2. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; 3. An alien, except: a. a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter

Persons affected Procedure

Carried out by whom Benefits

GUARDIAN: To prevent a guardian who has misused or misappropriated the funds or properties of his ward to resort to adopting his ward to avoid an accounting of such funds or properties and possible criminal prosecution. Guardianship must be terminated first in accordance with the Rules of Court and the final accounts of the guardian approved, before said guardian can be allowed to adopt his or her ward. MORAL TURPITUDE: Adoption demands that the adopter be morally qualified to do so, and a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude shows lack of good moral character on the part of the person convicted. The disqualification is not removed by a pardon given to the offender, since the lack of necessary moral qualification remains even if criminal liability has been removed.

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*The fact that adopter has legitimate or illegitimate children is no longer a barrier to adopting. This was prohibited by CC and removed in PD 603, FC and RA 8552.
FC, Art 187 The following persons may not be adopted 1. A person of legal age, UNLESS, he or she is A child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse Prior to the adoption, said person had been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority 2. An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations 3. A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded

ii. after 3 months of no claiming, petition for Declaration of Abandonment (DA) now becomes a ward of the government 2. Declare the child legally available for adoption

11. Issuance of Travel Authority if foreign adoption

*Preparation of Home Study Report
1. Visit to adopter s home 2. Will include documents of adopter (locals) a. authenticated birth certificate b. Marriage contract c. Written consent of children d. Physical and mental evaluations e. NBI/Police clearances f. financial proofs g. character references h. pictures i. Certificate of attendance to pre-adoption fora 3. For foreigners (on top of item 2) a. certification of legal capacity to adopt b. certificate that country will allow entry of and permanent residence of adoptee into the country c. Certificate of Philippine residents from BID d. Two character references from non-relatives from home country e. Police clearances from all places where adopter lived

ADOPTION OF ADULTS 1. No need to adopt adults because they are old enough to take care of themselves. 2. If the only reason someone wishes to adopt and adult is to share his material advantages with another, he can do so by simply giving the latter financial assistance and leaving him something in his will. 3. Rational of adoption: to give poor, orphaned, abandoned little children the advantages of having parents who would love, support, protect, rear and educate them until they are old enough to take care of themselves. 4. EXCEPTIONS a. If the adult is the parent in nature because this would raise the status of the illegitimate child b. If in the custody since childhood/minority, there is the presumption that adopter really wants to adopt the child but only neglected to do so before the latter reached majority. PROCEDURE FOR ADOPTION ACCORDING TO RA 8552 (Ma am Beth tabulated the procedure during lecture) CHILD
1. Biological parent goes to DSWD for: a. counseling (Sec 4) - importance of providing relevant info on the child, medical history and family background - possibility of child to be placed for adoption b. signs a Deed of Voluntary Commitment or DVC** c. give the parent 6 months to reconsider **but if no DVC was signed (in cases where the child was abandoned or left to strangers) i. locate unknown parents through trimedia (TV, radio or newspaper) (Sec 5)

BIOLOGICAL PARENT: Does not provide exception for age. This means that a minor mother does not need the consent of her parents to give up her child for adoption. Even if the parents are against the adoption of their grandchild, they cannot prevent the biological parent from doing so. GRACE PERIOD: This is an innovation of RA 8552. The biological parent is given the right to reconsider his/her decision to relinquish his/her child within six months from signing the Deed of Voluntary Commitment - This grace period is what makes it impossible to adopt a newly born infant. However, if adoptive parents insist, they can be given risk placement wherein the adopters get custody of the child, subject to the biological parent s change of mind within 6 months. MATCHING: The adoptive parents are allowed for certain preference, for instance, they could specify sex. Females are generally more adoptible because they are easier to take care of. The notion is adopting a boy is like bringing in a male stranger. The peak season for adoption is during Christmas. Parents prefer younger children because they have no values yet. They are relatively more convenient to shape and rear in a way the adoptive parents want to. Not much mannerisms or habits yet. Regarding physical attributes, Ma am Beth noticed that the adoptive parents want the child to have a resemblance with the husband.

Inquiry Attend adoption forum Application DSWD makes a case study report home study report (Sec 14) 5. Matching 6. Placement issuance of preadoption placement authority (PAPA) 7. Supervised trial custody for 6 months or less adjustment period (Sec 12) 8. Recommendation and consent of DSWD 9. File a petition for adoption Lawyers only come in at this point (dahil pampagulo lang sila) 10. Decree of adoption (Sec 13) 1. 2. 3. 4.

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B. Who may adopt/be adopted
FC, Art 183 A person of age, and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate in keeping with means of the family. Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title. In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the adopted or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the person to be adopted.

Art 183 (who may adopt), Art 184 (who may not adopt), Art 185 (joint adoption of spouses) and Art 186 (parental authority) have been amended by Art III Sec 7, RA 8552
WHO MAY ADOPT I. For Filipino citizens 1. of legal age 2. full capacity and legal rights 3. good moral character, no conviction for crime involving moral turpitude 4. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children 5. at least 16 years older than the adoptee UNLESS biological parent of the adoptee or the spouses of the adoptee s parent II. For aliens 1. qualifications for Filipino citizens 2. the country has diplomatic relations with the Philippines 3. has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the filing of application 4. certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country 5. his/her government allows the adoptee to enter the country as his/her adopted son/daughter 6. requirements for residency and certification of qualification is waived for the following a. former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity OR affinity b. seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse c. married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity OR affinity of the Filipino spouse III. Guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities IV. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: a. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other b. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter PROVIDED that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto c. if the spouses are legally separated from each other If spouses jointly adopted or one spouse adopted the illegitimate child of the other, Joint parental authority shall be exercised by parents.

*The age gap ensures that the relationship between the adopter and the adoptee will be a parent child relationship (approximate natural filiation) and that the adopter has sufficient maturity to fulfill the role of a parent to the adopted child. (Think Daddy Long Legs) ADOPTION OF SEVERAL CHILDREN: A person may legally adopt two or more children.
FC, Art 185 Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: 1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child 2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other

* Under CC and PD 603, spouses can adopt solely. * But what if one spouse seeks to adopt the illegitimate child of the other?
FC, Art 186 In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

* Consent not required in case of legal separation because it terminates the common life between the spouses and the reason for requiring the consent of one spouse for the adoption made by the other no longer exists this was made explicit in RA 8552

* Qualifications for exemption in residency requirements of RA 8552 (Number 6 in box above) is the exemption to the general rules for adoption by aliens in Art 184 Par 3. One difference is that RA 8552 allowed for adoption of relatives by affinity

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Art III Sec 8, RA 8662
WHO MAY BE ADOPTED Any person: 1. below 18 years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption 2. legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse 3. illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy 4. a person of legal age IF prior to the adoption said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority 5. a child whose adoption has been previously rescinded 6. a child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died PROVIDED that no proceedings shall be initiated within 6 months from the time of death of said parent

relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Petition for adoption granted. REPUBLIC v CA and BOBILES (1992) 205 SCRA 356 Private respondent Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then 6 yo and who had been living with her family since he was 4 mos old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued and order setting the petition for hearing. The order was duly published and posted with copies seasonably served to interested parties. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition which was affirmed by the CA. During the pendency of her petition, the FC took effect which makes mandatory the joint adoption of spouses. Petitioner now contends that the petition for adoption should have been dismissed outright as it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband Dioscoro Bobiles, in violation of Art 185 FC. It argues that FC must be applied retroactively to the petition of Mrs. Bobiles. And that even if the FC is not applied, the court still erred by granting adoption to both the spouses instead of Zenaida alone. ISSUE: WON the FC provision regarding joint adoption of spouses should apply HELD: No. Art 256 FC provides for the retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof subject to the qualification that such retroactive application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. Zenaida had rightfully commenced the petition prior to the effectivity of the FC. Her right to that action is not subject to subsequent modification of the law. Art 185 FC is remedial in nature. Technical rules should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings because it involves the future condition and paramount welfare of the adoptee. Petition for adoption granted. REPUBLIC v TOLEDANO and SPS. CLOUSE (1994) 233 SCRA 9 Spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse filed a petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn s 12 yo brother. Alvin is a natural born American citizen while Evelyn was a former Filipno who became naturalized American citizen in Guam. Solomon Joseph Alcala and his mother, Nery Alcala consented to the adoption due to her inability to support the boy s education. HELD: The Clouse may not adopt Filipino children. Alvin is not qualified to adopt under FC because he is not a former Filipino citizen and Solomon is not his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Evelyn, as a former Filipino citizen, is qualified to adopt but the FC requires spouses to jointly adopt. Hence, the spouses may not adopt Solomon. ** Under RA 8552 qualified resident aliens may adopt Filipino citizens

IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA (1967) aka SANTOS Jr. v REPUBLIC 21 SCRA 299 Spouses Luis Santos Jr a lawyer and Edipola Villa a nurse, having no child of their own, filed a petition praying that the minor Edwin Villa, a younger brother of Edipola, be declared their son by adoption. Due to the child s sickness, he was entrusted to the petitioners since birth. The natural parents of the minor voluntarily gave their consent and written conformity to the adoption. The SG opposed the petition on the ground that relatives by blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting one another bec of the incongruous dual relationship that will result. TC dismissed the petition, hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON an elder sister may adopt her younger brother HELD: Yes. There is no provision in the law prohibiting relatives by blood from adopting one another. A. 335 NCC enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners aren t among those prohibited from adopting. A. 339 NCC names those who can t be adopted and the minor Edwin isn t one of those excluded by law. A. 338 NCC on the other hand allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate kids by their father or mother, and a stepchild by the stepdad or stepmom. To say that adoption shouldn t be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in those cases enumerated Art 338 CC is to preclude adoption among relatives no mater how removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, w/c isn t the policy of the law. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate kids, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such kids by persons who can properly rear and educate them. The fact that adoption in this case will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting sister, shouldn t prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by adoption is limited to the adopting parents and doesn t extend to their other

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REPUBLIC v MILLER (1999) 306 SCRA 183 Claude Miller, formerly a member of the US Air Force assigned at Clark Air Base, and his wife, Jumrus Miller, both US citizens but residing in Angeles City, filed before RTC a verified petition to adopt minor Michael Magno Madayag. Poverty and deep concern for his future prompted Michael s natural parents to give their irrevocable consent to the adoption. RTC granted petition for adoption finding petitioners to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for adoption. Michael was freed from all obligations of obedience and support with respect to natural parents. He was then declared child of the Millers by adoption. His surname was to be changed from Madayag to Miller . ISSUE: WON the Court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under FC, effective on Aug 3, 1988, when the petition for adoption was filed before FC, on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which allowed aliens to adopt. HELD: Yes. The enactment of FC will not impair the right of alien respondents to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Adoption statues, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill the compassionate and noble objectives of the law.






a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister o a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara (petitioner s son) During Margarita de Asis lifetime, she kept a safety deposit box at the People s Bank and Trust Company, which either she or Nora could open. Five days after Margarita s death, Nora opened the said box and removed its contents (shares of stock, adoption papers of hers and her sister s, jewelry belonging to her and to her mother) Her sole reason for opening the box was to get the stock certificates and other small items. A bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to open the box in view of her mother s death. So, she decided to remove everything from it On June 3, 1974, the private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of Margarita Days after learning that Nora opened the box, Ramon Sta. Clara filed a motion in the probate court, claiming: o that Margarita had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate o demanded its production o prayed for the opening of the box Of course, when the court ordered its opening, the box was already empty. o Seven months after Margarita s death, Renato Lazatin intervened for the first time as an admitted illegitimate child. Then he also filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, this time as an adopted child on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, stating that Renato was an illegitimate child of Mariano who has later adopted by him. The affidavit was later modified to state that Renato was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita Renato s motion to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita was denied by the lower court on the ground that the evidence presented tend to prove that he was a recognized natural child of Mariano, but not a legally adopted child of Margarita. He never presented a decree of adoption in his favor. Likewise, Renato s motion for reconsideration was denied by the court unless he presented some documentary evidence to prove his adoption Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in the probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child.



C. Nature of adoption proceedings
LAZATIN v CAMPOS (1979) 92 SCRA 250 Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate and was survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters Nora L. De Leon (married to Bernardo de Leon) and Irma Lazatin (married to Francisco Veloso) A month after Mariano Lazatin s death, Margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding before the CFI of Pasay. To the said proceeding, Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne intervened since they claimed to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Mariano with a woman named Helen Muñoz. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another illegitimate (not natural) child 2 months after the intestate proceeding, Margarita de Asis died but left a holographic will (a will written entirely in the testator s hand), which provided, among others, for: o a legacy of cash, jewelry and stocks to Arlene De Leon, a granddaughter -


ISSUE: WON Renato is an adopted child HELD: Renato has not established his status as an adopted child. Secondary evidence is not admissible unless the existence of the records are proven along with the contents of the records and its loss. Adoption is a juridical act and the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out otherwise it is a nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proven by the person claiming its existence.

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SANTOS v ARANZANSO (1966) 16 SCRA 344 Paulina, 17 and Aurora, 8 were adopted by spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes. The two minors were in the custody of the couple since infancy and the whereabouts of their biological parents are unknown since the outbreak of the war. Crisanto de Mesa, the guardian ad litem gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina who was over 14 years old then also put in writing her assent to the proceeding. An adoption decree was eventually granted 8 years later, Juliana died and Simplicio commenced the settlement of her estate declaring that he and the two adopted daughters, are the surviving heirs Gregoria Aranzanso, an alleged first cousin of Juliana opposed the settlement estate saying that the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio is void ab initio for being bigamous. Likewise, the adoption is also null for want of written consent of their parents. Demetria Ventura, who claims to be another cousin of Juliana and mother of Paulina filed her opposition in the same tenor as Gregoria s. ISSUE: WON the adoption decree is valid. HELD: Yes. Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their kids, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices. In adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent w/c evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties & relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural & legal obligations of care & support which parents owe to their kids. Although the adoption court did not use the term abandonment the reasons propounded bear the essential elements of abandonment. Granting arguendo that the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio is void, the adopted children are deemed to be adopted by Juliana as a single person. The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote welfare of the child, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. DSWD v BELEN (1997) 275 SCRA 645 Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo, naturalized US citizens, filed a petition to adopt their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Antonio Belen granted the petition based on the findings and recommendations of the DSWD that the adopting parents and the adoptee have developed emotional attachment. When travel clearance was being sought from DSWD so that the child may join her adopters in the States, it was discovered that DSWD was not informed about the commencement of the adoption proceedings nor was it given notice of the petition being granted. HELD: The DSWD has to be notified of the adoption proceedings. A Home and Child Study Report is mandatory before adoption is to be finalized. The DSWD is undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper

recommendation. Adoption is a legal advice by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child. Judge censured and social worker reprimanded.

D. Consent necessary for adoption
FC, Art 188 The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: 1. The person to be adopted, if 10 years or older 2. The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality 3. The legitimate and adopted children, 10 years or older, of the adopting parent/s 4. The illegitimate children, 10 years or older, of the adopting parent, IF living with said parent and the latter s spouse, if any 5. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted Art III Sec 9, RA 8662
WHOSE CONSENT IS NECESSARY 1. 2. The adoptee if 10 years of age or over the biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over the illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over of the adopter IF living with said adopter and the latter s spouse the spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted

3. 4.


* PD 603 and CC: The consent of the adoptee was required only if 14 years of age or over. DUNCAN v CFI (1976) 69 SCRA 298 A 3-day old baby named Colin Berry Christensen Duncan was given by his unwed mother to Atty. Corazon Velasquez. She also instructed him to look for a suitable couple to adopt the child. Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses (Robin Francis Radley and Maria Lucy Christensen) to adopt the child. Husband: British national residing in the country for the last 17 years and wife: American citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines No child of their own but previously adopted another child ISSUE: WON Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required by law to give consent the adoption HELD: Yes. She can rightfully give consent to the adoption. The father s consent is not necessary because the child is illegitimate. The mother s consent is not necessary either because she is deemed to have abandoned the child and has given the child to Atty. Velasquez for guardianship.

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CANG v CLAVANO (1998) 296 SCRA 128 Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano (employee at the Philippine Consulate in LA) were legally separated because the husband s extramarital affairs. Herbert became naturalized US citizen and secured a divorce decree there. Clavano s brother (Ronald Clavano, a wealthy businessman) and his wife Maria Clara (a flight stewardess) wanted to adopt the three children (Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony) of the spouses Cang and Clavano. The 14 yo son signed the petition of adoption along with Clavano. The mother justified the adoption with the following statements: o The brother had been her in taking care of the children o She will be going to the US and the children would hamper her job-seeking venture abroad o Husband had long forfeited his parental rights Herbert immediately returned home upon learning about the adoption proceeding, which he opposes. RTC and CA granted the decree of adoption ISSUE: WON the consent of the father to the adoption must be sought, given that he expresses desire to retain parental authority and that he did not abandon his children HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cang s consent as the father is necessary. Petitioner s conduct did not manifest relinquishment of parental duties. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his children, it was proven that he continued to send support for the family from the US. It was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. LANDINGIN v REPUBLIC (2006) 493 SCRA 415
Maria Taruc Ramos Diwata Landingin Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley Manuel Ramos Amelia Ramos



and works as a part-time waitress. Petitioner s children executed an affidavit of consent for the adoption proceeding in the US. Elaine, the eldest of the three adoptees likewise testified regarding their consent to be adopted by their aunt. The DSWD social worker was able to interview Amelia when she went home to the Philippines. According to the mother, she is willing to let go of her parental ties with the children since it s her in-laws who have been rearing them. RTC granted but CA reversed for absence of consent of the petitioner s children and the adoptee s biological mother.

ISSUES: 1. WON the adoption may proceed absent the mother s written consent 2. WON the affidavit of consent executed by the petitioner s children in Guam not in the presence of a Philippine consular office is admissible 3. WON the petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees HELD: 1.

2. 3.

No. The petitioner failed to present actual evidence regarding the mother s consent. It cannot be said that she intends to abandon them because she continually gives them financial support no matter how minimal. Also, the eldest daughter admitted that she consults her regarding serious issues. No. The authenticity of her children s affidavit was also not clearly established. No. Her advanced age and instable source of income puts doubt on her financial capacity to raise the three kids in the US. That her own children are willing the back her up is untenable because the ability to support must be personal to the adopter.

ADOPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS A Review of New York Law Unmarried fathers should be given legal rights to their involvement in the lives of their illegitimate children. The New York legislature has adopted specific statutory guidelines for identifying unwed fathers who have a constitutionally protected parental right which must be surrendered or terminated before their child can be adopted. 1. Fathers with full substantive rights Unwed fathers who maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child have the same rights as unmarried mothers with respect to their children, and must execute a voluntary surrender before the child can be adopted. The father has to have a substantial relationship with the child, the standards of which vary according to the age of the child. A. For children under six months old i. openly lived with the child or the child s mother for a continuous period of six months prior to the placement of the child for adoption

Elaine Elma Eugene



Diwata Landingin wants to adopt the legitimate children of her deceased brother Manuel. Since his death, the children have been in the care of their paternal grandmother Maria as their biological mother left for Italy to work. Since then, it has been the paternal relatives who give support to the children. The mother also rarely communicates with the children and already has a second family in Italy. Petitioner is a 57 year old widow, naturalized US citizen in Guam with four grown-up children of her own who have their own respective families and gainfully employed also in Guam. She lives alone in her house

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openly held himself out to be the father of the child for six months prior to the placement of the child for adoption iii. paid or offered to pay a fair and reasonable sum according to his means toward the medical expenses in connection with the mother s pregnancy or the birth of the child B. For children over six months old i. pays a reasonable sum according to his means toward the support of the child ii. visit the child monthly or maintain regular communication with the child or agency that has custody of the child 2. Fathers with due process rights For those who do not meet the statutory criteria which would require their consent to adoption, they can still be entitled to special notice which gives due process rights with respect to voluntary surrenders and termination of parental right. This do not include men convicted of first degree rape when the child who is the subject of the termination was conceived as the result of the rape. i. ii. any person adjudicated to be the father of the child by any NY court any person adjudicated to be the father of the child by another state court when a certified copy of the order has been filed with the NY putative father registry any person who has filed a timely and unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity any person who is recorded on the child s birth certificate as the child s father any person who is openly lived with the child or the child s mother for a continuous period of six months prior to the placement of the child for adoption any person who has been identified as the child s father by the mother in a written, sworn statement any person who was married to the child s mother within six months subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender or the initiation of a termination proceeding any person who has filed an instrument with the putative father registry acknowledging the paternity of the child


E. Effects of Adoption
FC, Art 189 Adoption shall have the following effects: 1. For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; 2. The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses 3. The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives

CC, Art 365 An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

* RA 8552 allows the adopters to give their adopted child a name of their choice. This was previously not available in PD603 and FC (Republic v Hernandez). The rationale for this rule is that the given name will be the only emotional tie the adoptive parents can have with their adoptee.
FC, Art 190 Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules: (1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession; (2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters; (3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by the adopters. (4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters; (5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and (6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

iii. iv. v.

vi. vii.


3. Fathers without rights Those who have not made efforts to establish a relationship with a non-marital child do not have a right to be included in a court decision to approve a mother s surrender, to terminate the mother s rights or to approve the adoption of the child 4. Fathers unable to meet the criteria prevented from visiting or contacting the child because of a court order or other actions taken to protect the mother from domestic violence incarceration drug addiction father unaware of the child relative s action

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Sec. 16) All legal ties bet. biological parents and adoptee are severed, and the same shall be vested on the adopter, except if the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter. LEGITIMACY (Sec. 17) The adoptee shall be considered legitimate son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and purposes, and entitled to all rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate children born to them without discrimination of any kind. Adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support. SUCCESSION (Sec.18) Adopter and adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation, in legal and intestate succession. If adoptee and his/her biological parents had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

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TAMARGO v CA (1992) 209 SCRA 518 Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the 10 yo minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the petition was granted, Adelberto shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo using an air rifle. The parents of Tamargo sued Adelberto s natural parents for damages. The child though was acquitted for acting without discernment. The Bundocs claim that the Rapisuras should be the proper parties in this suit since parental authority shifted to the adopting parent from the moment the petition for adoption was filed. ISSUE: Who between the adoptive parents and the biological parents should be held liable for the damages incurred by the child? HELD: Adelberto s natural parents are liable for the damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred prior to the adoption. Adelberto was in his natural parents actual custody at the time of the accident. The effects of adoption on parental authority cannot be given retroactive effect. SAYSON v CA (1992) 205 SCRA 321
Rafaela Mauricio Rosario Basilisa Remedios Eleno Isabel



children, alleging that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel, and that Doribel was a legitimate child as such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro s share in his parents estate by right of representation The lower court decided both cases in favor of herein respondents Both decisions were based on findings evidenced by the decree of adoption of Delia and Edmundo, and the birth certificate of Doribel In the first case, it was held that the respondents, being legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel, the herein petitioners were excluded from sharing in the estate of the spouses In the second case, it was held that Delia, Edmundo and Doribel were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation (of their father Teodoro) The CA, however, held that Delia and Edmundo are NOT entitled to inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela, but affirmed the lower court s decision in all other respects Petitioners contend that: Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born when the decree of adoption was issued. Doribel s birth disqualified her parents from adopting based on Art 335 CC, which names among those who cannot adopt those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction. Doribel is not a natural child of Teodoro and Isabel, but of Edita Abila who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was the mother of Doribel

Teodoro Teodoro

Delia (adopted) Edmundo (adopted) Doribel (legitimate)



The surviving brother, sisters and mother-in-law of Teodoro filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Teodoro and Isabel, but this was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, alleging successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent s lawful descendants Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed another complaint for the accounting and partition of the estate of their grandparents (Eleno and Rafaela) against the 4 surviving

1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel - YES It is too late to challenge the decree of adoption. It was issued way back in 1967, and therefore has become final and executory Assuming that the petitioners were the proper parties, they should have seasonably appealed or assailed the decree of adoption on the basis of Doribel s birth before or seasonably after the decree was issued, but they did not Mauricio also claims to have no personal knowledge of Doribel s birth A challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in petitioners action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue A presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven Santos v Aranzanso An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts, and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it 2. WON Doribel is a legitimate child - YES Doribel s birth certificate is one of the prescribed means of recognition under both Art 265 CC and Art 172 FC. Although it is only prima facie evidence of filiation, which may be refuted by evidence, such evidence is lacking in this case

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Mauricio s testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila is suspect as it comes from an interested party Abila s affidavit denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is hearsay. It was also never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without Abila s affidavit, the birth certificate must be upheld. It was held in Legaspi v CA that the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity Doribel s legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting. It should be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party It cannot be questioned by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose

HELD: Isabel s husband did not concur in the adoption. Hence, the child should use Isabel s maiden name or it may lead to confusion. REPUBLIC v WONG (1992) 209 SCRA 189 Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr and Segundina Alcala. When they were 2 and 9 yo respectively, he and his sister were legally adopted by Hoon Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong (naturalized Filipinos who are childless after 15 yrs of marriage. When he turned 22, Maximo wants to revert to his natural parents real name saying that the Chinese surname of his adoptive parents embarrassed and isolate him in his Muslim community. Likewise, it hampers the progress of his business (furniture store). The adoptive mom does not mind his action and even assured that he will still be entitled to inherit from them despite the name change. RTC granted the petition for change of name SG resists because change of name is an act of ingratitude to his adoptive parents who cared for him. ISSUE: WON the reasons submitted by Maximo are valid, sufficient & proper to warrant the granting of the petition. HELD: Yes. It was proven that the surname was detrimental to Maximo s business. Likewise, the change of Maximo s surname was not done to defraud anyone. Use of the adoptive parents surname is not the main objective of adoption but merely one of its effects. FC echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter. Thus, the use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right. SC said that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals & entities for the purpose of identification & a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced & the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege w/c may be granted upon showing of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason. While it is true under the law that an adopted child must bear the name of the adopter, the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. REPUBLIC v CA and CARANTO ( ) 255 SCRA 99 Midael had been living with Jaime since he was 7 years old. When Jaime married Zenaida on 19 January 1986, Midael stayed under their care and custody. Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed for the adoption of 15 yo minor Midael C. Mazon on 2 September 1988. Aside from the decree of adoption, they also prayed for the change in the given name birth certificate entry from Midael to Michael. OSG opposed the petition insofar as it also sought to change Midael to Michael in an adoption proceeding. RTC dismissed OSG and rendered judgment on 30 May 1989 granting Caranto spouses petition.

3. WON Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to inherit from Teodoro and Isabel - YES Doribel, as the legitimate daughter, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, in conformity with Art 979, which states that legitimate children, which includes adopted children, succeed their parents The underlying philosophy of the article is that a person s love descends first to his children, and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives It is also supposed that one of a person s purposes in acquiring property is to leave them eventually his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care after his death 4. WON Delia and Edmundo are entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela - NO The grandparents were total strangers to Delia and Edmundo, as adopted children An adopted child is deemed to be a legitimate child, and thus has the same rights as legitimate child. HOWEVER, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child, and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. * The adopted children are entitled to Teodoro s estate. Legally adopted children have the right to inherit from the adoptive parents. However, the adopted children may not represent their adoptive parent. Adoption creates a relationship only between the adoptive parents and the adopted. It does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. JOHNSTON v REPUBLIC (1963) 7 SCRA 1040 Isabel Johnston filed a petition to adopt a 2 yo minornamed Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana from Hospicio de San Jose as she is in a childless marriage with Raymond Arthur Johnston. The petition was granted and the child was given Isabel s maiden surname, Valdez. Isabel filed a motion to change the child s surname to ValdezJohnston, Isabel s married name.

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OSG appealed to CA, CA upheld RTC on 23 January 1992; hence, this petition.

other, and therefore, two special proceedings which cannot be joined as having one cause of action. They must be instituted separately. 2. No. The change of surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. The birth certificate, as it appears in the civil register, contains the official name. It does not matter if the mother, with all intention to abandon it later, named the child for the sake of naming it. If they really want to change the name, they institute another action under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction on petition for adoption WON RTC and CA erred in granting change of given name from Midael to Michael HELD: YES. Petitioner contends that since the name appearing in the requisite notice by publication did not state the true name of the child. Court ruled that the case at bar was an obvious clerical error in the given name of the child, and does not confuse any identities. NO. The change of given name is without force and effect. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not only refer to errors concerning civil status, but even to names as well as enumerated in item (o) of § 2 of Rule 108. The local civil registrar must have been made party to the proceeding. The notice by publication also failed to include the matter on the change of name, depriving the local civil registrar of notice and opportunity to be heard. REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ (1996) 253 SCRA 509 Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted an infant who bears the name Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran in his birth certificate. When they had him baptized, they gave him the name Aaron Joseph, the name by which the child is known to the family, relatives and friends. The spouses then instituted a joinder of the petition for adoption and the petition for a change of name. The petitioner opposed the said action saying that there is no legal basis for the change of the adoptee s given name. RTC ruled in favor changing the name of the child ratiocinating that as adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may feely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. Further, the respondents submit that change of name may be given liberal construction since the object of strict implementation is to prevent fraudulent acts, while an infant has not exercised any of its rights. ISSUES: 1. WON joinder of petition for adoption and petition for a change of name is allowed by the law 2. WON there is lawful ground for the adoptee s change of name HELD: 1. No. In order for two petitions may be joined in one proceeding, the causes of action must: (a) not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and (b) arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. There is no conceptual unity between petition for adoption and petition for change of name. The two actions are different and unrelated from each

F. Rescission
FC, Art 191 If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon petition of any person authorized by the court or proper government instrumentality acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the adopted is at least 18 years of age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the adoption on the same grounds prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant.

FC, Art 192 The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases: 1. If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for disinheriting a descendant 2. When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year, or by some other acts has definitely repudiated the adoption

** Under CC, PD 603 and FC, both the adopted child and the adopter can ask for the judicial rescission. However, RA 8552 only allows rescission by the adoptee. Art VI Sec 19, RA 8662
GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF ADOPTION 1. 2. 3. 4. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) attempt on the life of the adoptee sexual assault or violence abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations

The only remedy available to the adopter is Art 919 CC which is disinheritance.

*Art 919 CC causes for disinheritance 1. conviction of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouses, descendants or ascendants 2. having accused the testator of a crime punishable by imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless 3. conviction of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator

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5. 6. 7. 8.

having induced the testator to make a will or to change one already made, by fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence refusal without justifiable cause to support the testator maltreatment of the testator by word or deed living a dishonorable or disgraceful life conviction of a crime which carrier the penalty of civil interdiction

RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH (Art VII Sec 22, RA 8522) Three-in-one procedure 1. Correction of Entries in Birth certificate 2. Declaration of Abandonment 3. Adoption Decree Application for correction of the birth registration shall be filed within 5 years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter

FC, Art 193 If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both. Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption. The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries.

H. Adoption decree
REYES v SOTERO (2006) 482 SCRA 520 Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for issuance of letter and administration and settlement and estate as the niece of the decedent with the collateral relatives of the decedent. Chichioco alleged that the properties of the decedent is with the petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes, her grand niede and that she be appointed as the administrator of these properties instead. Reyes filed an opposition to the petition, claiming that she is in fact the adopted child of the decedent and her husband Serafin delos Santos and that the appointment of administration is unnecessary since she is the sole heir of Lising. As evidence, she provided the following: o Certification from the Municipal Registrar of Paniqui, Tralac that on the Record of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin delos Santos. o Certification of the Clerk of Court of the RTCTarlac City that judgment was rendered on Dec 21, 1968 decreeing her adoption by the spouses o Judicial form no. 43: the adoption decree which declares her adoption o Decree of final distribution issued by PVAO: benefits paid to her as daughter of Serafin delos Santos. Chichioco filed an annulment of the adoption decree stating that documents presented are false and fraudulent; and that petitioner and her mother collaborated to make it appear that petitioner is adopted by Elena and Serafin. ISSUE: WON the petitioner herein should prove the validity of her adoption due to irregularities raised by private respondent. HELD: No. The Court ruled that the documents presented by the petitioner sufficiently proved that she is legally adopted by Elena and Serafin. It is presumed that these documents are regularly issued as they are issued under the seal of the issuing offices and signed by the proper officers. The adoption decree is a public document that is required by law to be properly registered in the official repository i.e. local civreg as well as the court that rendered such judgment. Thus these documents are prima facie evidence of the facts therein unless proven contrary with proof of such alleged irregularity be brought in a separate proceeding for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree as in Santos v

Art VI Sec 20, RA 8662
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Restoration of parental authority to original Reciprocal rights and obligation between adoptee and adopter extinguished Cancellation of amended birth certificate Successional right back to before as of date of rescission Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected

G. Rectification of Simulated Birth
CRIME OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH (Art VII Sec 21, RA 8522) intended to curb or prevent such acts done by people who want to avoid trouble and expenses of judicial adoption o simply register adopted child in heir names any person who causes fictitious registration of birth of child under name/s of person/s not his/her biological parent/s punishable by prison mayor medium plus P50k fine includes physician/nurse/hospital personnel who cooperated in execution of crime, similar penalties apply plus permanent disqualification Ma am Beth says: The cost of adoption decree is just as much as normal delivery! Well, at least, that s my rate.

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Aranzanso. The private respondents cannot assail such decree to defeat the petitioners claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Therefore, the petitioner whose adoption is presumed to be valid is the sole heir of the decedent.

J. Adoption issues
THE PROS AND CONS OF INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT1 Nationalistic reasons against IA 1. International pride political pressure to upgrade internal system of social welfare 2. An unacceptable form of international charity 3. Belief that country and heritage is special and children would be deprived of something valuable if removed from it 4. Waste of human resources and exploitation by Western neighbors Best interest of the child 1. Remain in their biological families, or at least in their home countries a. Deprivation of cultural identity b. Racial discrimination c. Unnecessary separation from family 2. IA acts as an escape valve for LDC s and a conscience-saving mechanism for developed countries, it works to the disadvantage of all children in these nations a. limited response to the needs of children by benefiting only a few, leaving millions of homeless children in need of assistance b. IA reduces pressure on the nations to improve their child and family welfare programs 3. IA is dictated by the demands of would-be parents in developed countries, rather than the needs of the children involved a. incentives for child trafficking and trading likewise increase b. will result to increase in number of abandoned children, it will even encourage more mothers who want better life for their children c. western people are adopting for their own selfish needs, then it is not an altruistic activity 4. IA facilitates child trafficking *Too lazy to include the rebuttals which is the second part. It s nice though. You might want to check it out yourself.

I. Inter-country Adoption
* Governed by RA 8043 or the Inter-country Adoption Act WHO MAY BE ADOPTED Any child: 1. has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department as dependent, abandoned, or neglected pursuant to the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code may be the subject of Inter-Country Adoption; 2. Povided that in case of a child who is voluntarily committed, the physical transfer of said child shall be made not earlier than six (6) months from the date the Deed of Voluntary Commitment was executed by the child s biological parent/s. The prohibition against physical transfer shall not apply to adoption by a relative or children with special medical conditions. WHO MAY ADOPT Any foreign national or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad who has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the Act may file an application if he/she: (a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age; (b) is at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted at the time of the filing of the application, unless the applicant is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or is the spouse of such parent by nature; (c) has the capacity to act and assume all the rights and responsibilities incident to parental authority under his/her national law; (d) has undergone appropriate counseling form an accredited counselor in his/her country (e) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (f) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law (g) can provide the proper care and support and give the necessary moral values and example to the child and, in the proper case, to all his/her other children; (h) comes from a country: a. with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations; b. whose government maintains a foreign adoption agency; and c. whose laws allow adoption; and (i) files jointly with his/her spouse, if any, who shall have the same qualifications and none of the disqualifications to adopt as prescribed above.


Summary by Karichi Santos

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PARENTAL AUTHORITY (patria potestas) is defined by
Manresa as the mass of rights and obligations which parents have in relation to the person and property of their children until their emancipation and even after this under certain circumstances.

* The preferential right of fathers is for cases that require immediate decision and are essentially temporary until decided by the court. CHILDREN S DUTY 1. observe respect and reverence permanent, lifetime of parent and child 2. obey them temporary, only as long as they are under parental authority *But in the Philippines, the best way to show respect and reverence is to obey!
FC, Art 212 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, UNLESS the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.

A. Parental Authority General Provisions
FC, Art 209 Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

FC, Art 213 In case of separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under 7 yo shall be separated from the mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Tender Years Presumption)

FC, Art 210 Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law.

Parental authority is a purely personal right. It cannot be renounced except for the following waiver permitted by law: 1. adoption 2. guardianship 3. surrender to an orphanage or asylum (Art 223-224) Minority does not divest a parent of parental authority. In fact, there are two kinds of parental authority: 1. parental authority over the person of the child 2. parental authority over the property of the child PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE PERSON    When does a parent have parental authority over the person but not the property? 1. when the parent is a minor 2. when the parent is disinherited by an ascendant (Grandparent Parent Child)
FC, Art 211 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as they children are under parental authority.

FC, Art 214 In case of 1. death 2. absence 3. unsuitability of the parents Substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority.


PD 603, Art 58 Damages by child are answered by parents

CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

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1. Custody
A. Determining the best interest of the child
i. GENDER AND TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION EX PARTE DEVINE (1981) 398 So. 2d 686 Alice Beth, an employee at the US Army at Fort McMClellan Christoper, a school teacher Matthew Patrick and Timothy Clark Mr and Mrs Devine were divorced, the court awarded the children to Mrs Devine, according to the tender years presumption (if both parents are fit, and children are at their tender years, under 7 years, mother will take care of them, based on instinctive role of the mother). Mr Devine now challenges the constitutionality of the tender years presumption and claiming that it is violative of the14th amendment (equal protection) ISSUE: WON the trial court s reliance on tender years presumption deprived the father of his constitutional entitlement to the equal protection of the law HELD: Yes. The tender years presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex. It creates a presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent without consideration of the actual capabilities of both parties. It also imposes unnecessary legal burden on the father. (Note: The burden of proof that the mother is unfit. Thus, the male can only gain custody IF the female is unfit even if the father is fit. This violates the equal protection clause.) * Remember Moe v Dinkins, a case about the requirement of parental consent TEST PROXY MOE v DINKINS Maturity Age DEVINE Fitness Sex/Gender Is there a fit between the test and the proxy? No, because even if mothers are closer than fathers during infancy, it is not sufficient ground because as the child matures, the difference between the parental skills of the father and the mother decreases. CERVANTES v FAJARDO (1989) 169 SCRA 575 Angelie Anne Cervantes is the product of common-law relationship between Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon. They offered Angelie for adoption to her sister and brother in law, Zenaida Carreon Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, the petitioners in this case. Gina executed an affidavit of consent and an appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners. The petition was granted. Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid 150,000, or else, they would get back their child. The petitioners refused.


Gina took the child from their yaya at the petitioners residence. Petitioners asked for the child but respondent refused, saying that she had no desire to give up the child in the first place and the affidavit that she executed wasn t explained fully to her. The petitioners herein filed a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: WON Gina has rights to the child HELD: No. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 7 yo will not apply when the court finds compelling reasons to do otherwise. In this case, Gina s situation is not economic and moral conducing for the child. Conrado is married to another woman, and also, Gina has another child by another married man. Having a sibling with a different surname will cause confusion to the child. Angelie Anne was also legally adopted and it dissolves the authority of the natural parents to the child. Ma am Beth does not agree with the decision, she says that 3 yo kids will be happy for the playmate. It would not ask Sino tatay mo? Moral of the story: Don t use different surnames, even if the father acknowledges the child. UNLESS he gives support, otherwise, it s useless! Would it favor an adulterous mother if the child was younger or older? Younger, because the child does not have any opinions yet. All it wants is milk, diaper and burp. ESPIRITU v CA (1995) 246 SCRA 362 Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met at Iligan City in 1976. In 1984, they again met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and began to maintain a common law relationship as husband and wife. 2 years later, Rosalind was born. They then got married in 1987 and later had a son, Reginald. Their relationship deteriorated and they separated in 1990. Teresita then left the children and Reynaldo and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines and left them to her sister. Teresita then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the petitioners. The trial court denied the writ, but the CA granted the petition, applying Art 363 CC which states that a child below 7 yrs old shall not be separated from the mother. ISSUE: WON Teresita is fit to be granted custody of the children HELD: No. The prime consideration is the child s best interest. TYP provides that if the child is under seven years of age, the mother is the best custodian. However, the presumption is not absolute and may be overcome by compelling reasons. When a child is over seven, his or her choice of parent is paramount. The testimonies of the psychologist and social worker showed that the children disliked their mother, even loves her yaya more. Their testimonies were given weight by the

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court since the interview and the examination were done for foreign travel and school purposes respectively, not for the advancement of the litigation case. Also, she refuses to talk to her in the phone and when they saw each other in court, daughter ignored her mother and did not show any longing. The mother s illicit affair with Reynaldo s coworker seemed to have caused emotional disturbances to Rosalind. There is also nothing in the records which show that Reynaldo was unfit. His assignment in the states is just temporary, and he will be coming back home to the Philippines permanently. CELIS v CAFUIR (1950) 86 Phil 554 When Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy, Joel, she entrusted him to Soledad Cafuir because of her father s displeasure of the disgrace Ileana brought to the family for having illicit relations with a man whom she is not married with and because of her father s objection of having her son stay in the paternal home. Ileana made two documents: 1) entrusting Soledad her child and only Soledad can adopt the child. 2) appointment of Soledad as the child s guardian. Ileana only came to visit the boy every Saturday and provided some milk, food and a little money. She eventually married co petitioner Agustin Rivera and then decided to get the boy back, but Soledad refused. Ileana then filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Soledad, in her defense, claims that the two documents enacted by Ileana renounced her custody of and patria potestas over her child. ISSUE: WON Ileana had renounced her custody of the child in favor of Soledad. HELD: No. The first document merely entrusted her son to soledad. Entrusted cannot convey the idea of permanent renunciation. Also, the clause that says No one has the right to claim for adoption except Soledad merely provides an option for Soledad, which she didn t take. The second document, on the other hand, merely designated Soledad as the guardian of the child. The designation of one as the guardian does not mean that the guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position. GAMBOA-HIRSCH v CA (2007) 527 SCRA 380 Agnes Gamboa-Hirsh Franklin Harvey Hirsch and a daughter was born to them named Simon Noelle They were married in Bacolod but the couple cannot agree on where they would establish their conjugal home, whether in Boracay or in Makati. They settled in Boracay but Agnes insisted on going to Makati. She did, and took with her Noelle with no intention of coming back. Husband petitions for writ of habeas corpus which CA granted and they were given joint custody ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving custody to both the parents

HELD: Yes. Art 213 applies because the child is under 7 years old and the mother did not have the disqualification for possessing custody. SY v CA (2007) GR No. 124518 Mercedes filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for her two minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah. Her husband Wilson alleges that she is unfit for custody because she has 1) abandoned their family, 2) mentally unstable and 3) cannot provide for their children ISSUE: WON Mercedes can have custody of her children HELD: Yes. Because all of Wilson s arguments, aside from being unsubstantiated, had been refuted by Mercedes. She left the conjugal home to work in Taiwan and earn money to reclaim her children. Her act of praying in the rain is a mere expression of her faith, which is the same reason for the couple s separation (religious differences). ii. PARENTAL UNFITNESS FELDMAN v FELDMAN (1974) 358 NYS 2d 507 Mady Feldman filed for divorce against her husband, Philip, based upon cruel and inhuman treatment. Pursuant to their separation agreement, she was awarded the custody of their 2 children. After the divorce, the former wife began dating a married man. In one visit of the former husband at her former wife s house, he found a copy of Screw Magazine and some letters with explicit photographs on the dining room and kitchen tables. The letters were in response to the ads placed by the former wife and her male companion regarding fun and games with other couples or groups. The former husband then filed a petition for the custody of the two children. The trial court found that the wife was living sexually liberated lifestyle. Based on this, the trial court granted the custody of the two children to the former husband. ISSUE: WON the mother s unusual sexual activities makes her unsuitable for custody because of immorality HELD: No. Her peculiar sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. It was found that she had supported her children well and has given them a great atmosphere at home. The unusual practices by the mother did not, in any way, affect the children. There is no evidence also, that the publications or pictures were ever seen by the children. (Note: the right of a divorced woman to engage in private sexual activities, which no way affect her minor children, is within the penumbra of privacy mandated by the Bill of Rights) Also, the children were wellprovided for both emotionally and physically (doing good at school, even elected as class officers) and that the mother s home had a cheerful and happy atmosphere (which to Ma am Beth s mind was maaliwalas .

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SANTOS v CA (1995) 242 SCRA 407 Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of the latter s parents ever since the child was born. The grandparents were the ones who provided support for the child, since Leouel cannot afford to do so. Julia then left for the States to work. The grandparents claim that Julia has been sending financial support to her son. On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child from his grandparents. The grandparents then filed for custody of the boy, which the trial court granted. Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents have failed to show the he is unfit to be the father and that the substitute parental authority granted to the boy s grandparents was inappropriate. The respondents claim that they are financially well-off to take care of the son, while Leouel is not. They can provide the child with an air-conditioned room since he is asthmatic. Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouel s use of trickery to abduct the child also is a sign of his unfitness. They likewise claim that they are in the best position to take care of the child, and this should be the primary consideration of the court. ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper custody HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be an unfit parent. The fact that he kidnapped his son from the latter s maternal grandparents does not render him unfit. Also, disqualifying him as custodian because of the nature of his work would mean depriving all soldiers of their child s company. Only in cases of death, absence or unsuitability of parents may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparents.

The presumption of legitimacy continues even if the husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart. This presumption is one of the strongest known in law and cannot be overthrown except by stronger evidence to the contrary. Considering that the reunion with the wife is not impossible nor improbable. Mariano also asserted the unchastity of his wife after the birth of Lorenzo, contradicting his earlier statements and actions. He had found out about Maria s affair as early as March 1934 but gave her money in September and October 1934. Maria is entitled to prima facie presumption of innocence of the crime of adultery. A declaration of adultery in this case affects her standing, as well as her child. Since alleged adultery of Maria has not been sufficiently established, Lorenzo is presumed to be legitimate because he was born in lawful wedlock, there having been no divorce relative or absolute. Maria swore that she had left her husband and the conjugal abode because he had kept a mistress there, and had repeatedly done her bodily harm. These assertions were not contradicted. Consequently, the defense of unworthiness having failed, the innocent wife must be given separate maintenance. She would also be given the custody of her three children, because 1) the contract of separation stipulated that Gloria and Julita stay with her and 2) it was for the best interest of the children. GOLDSTEIN v GOLDSTEIN (1975) 115 R.I. 152 Edward Goldstein was awarded custody of a child, Ann Robin, after a decree by the court. As such, the child and her father lived in Israel, while the mother, Claire, stayed in the States. The wife then initiated a series of proceedings to reclaim rights over the child and she finally succeeded in part, when her husband and child returned to the States and appeared in court. The trial judge found it advisable to place the child under the mother s custody pending the hearing. At the hearing, both were found to be fit. Ann was found to be very intelligent and suffers no emotional damage. The wife requested for the judge to take notice of the threat of war in Israel, while the husband argued that the states had more violence and engaged in much more wars. The judge and Ann Robin then talked, and from their conversation, Ann said that she loved her father more than her mother and that she had no desire to visit with her mother but agreed if she was allowed to live with her father if she visited her mother for 4 weeks during the summer. The judge, taking into consideration the child s best interests, granted custody to the father. The wife argued that the judge failed to consider all circumstances and allowed the child s choice to control his decision.

B. Role of the child s preference
PIZARRO v CA & VASQUEZ (1937) 36 OG 449 Maria and Mariano were wed in 1928 and lived together until 1922. they have two children. Because of Mariano s infidelity and cruelty, spouses agreed to live separately. They executed a contract of separation stating that the custody of the children will be with Maria. One year late, Maria gave birth to Lorenzo. Mariano sues and wins a case for adultery. However, since both parties had committed adultery after such separation, the court gave custody to the paternal grandparents. ISSUE: WON a wife accused of adultery was entitled to separate maintenance. HELD: In absence of proof of guilt, yes she is entitled to support. The contention here is between the wife s affirmation against the husband s denial of the short-lived marital reunion. Maria said she had briefly reconciled with her husband during a fiesta in Cavite. He promised to behave so she was persuaded to live with him again.

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ISSUE: WON the judge s reliance on the child s preference was justifiable HELD: Yes. The factors in awarding custody to one or the other of the parents were equally balanced as to make it difficult for the judge to decide between them. That being so, it does not seem that he abused his discretion when he gave great weight to the child s preference. LAXAMANA v LAXAMANA (2002) 388 SCRA 296 Lourdes (a degree holder in banking and finance) Raymond (graduate of LLB, buy and sell, resto owner and fishpond) Michael and twins Joseph & Vincent The family was well off until the father became drug dependent and violent. This led the wife and her children to abandon the petitioner After going in and out of the rehab and finally being declared drug-free, Reymond then filed a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of the 3 children Lourdes opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of the petitioner and then filed for an annulment of their marriage Reymond filed in the habeas corpus case a motion seeking visitation rights over his children. After the parties reached an agreement, the court granted the visitation rights and ordered the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination. The results of the psychiatric evaluation were presented to the court. The exam states that the children were affected psychologically by the father s drug-related behavior, and also the psychiatrist found that Reymond is still not completely cured of the drug addiction. However, the psychiatrist did not detect any evidence that the paternal visits would be harmful to the children. Based on this, the court granted custody to Lourdes and visitation rights to Reymond. ISSUE: WON the court properly resolved the issue of custody HELD: No. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of the children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While Reymond may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. Although he is not completely cured of his drug dependence, there is no evidence showing that he is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education and moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they wanted to live. * Ma am Beth does not like this decision. Why would you risk the children staying with someone who has propensity for drug addiction? It s only saving grace is that the lower court would only receive evidence.

C. Presumption for primary caretaker
This rule is not followed in the Philippines. It s just included here so that we ll know that we have other alternatives to: 1. tender years presumption 2. best interest of the child 3. child s preference GARSKA v MCCOY (1981) 278 S.E. 2d 357 Michael Garska, the appellee and Gwendolyn McCoy, the appellant, met at North Carolina. Michael got Gwen pregnant and thus, Gwen moved back to her grandparents. During her pregnancy, she received no support from Michael, but after she gave birth, Michael sent a package of food and diapers. In the subsequent months, the baby had many complications, and to pay for the medical bills, Gwen s grandfather attempted to use his medical insurance provided by the united mine workers. But he has been informed that they would have to adopt the baby so they can avail of the said insurance. Gwen then signed a consent in which she agreed that her baby will be adopted by her grandparents. Michael, upon learning this, visited the baby for the 1st time and sent money weekly. Gwen s grandfather then filed a petition for adoption. Consequently, Michael filed a petition for write of habeas corpus to secure custody of his son. The court denied the petition for adoption, since the baby had not resided with them for the requisite 6 months. The court also awarded custody to Michael for reasons that he: is natural father, was better educated, more intelligent, able to provide better financial support, among others. ISSUE: WON Michael should be awarded custody HELD: No. the court set forth the rule regarding the presumption of primary caretaker. The court held that the primary caretaker is one who performs the following caring and nurturing duties of the parent: 1. preparing and planning of meals 2. Bathing and grooming and dressing, 3. purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes, 4. medical care, 5. arranging for social interaction among peers after school, 6. arranging alternative care, 7. putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning, 8. disciplining, 9. educating, and, 10. teaching elementary skills. Once the primary caretaker is identified, all that need to be determined is whether the parent is unfit or not. In this case, it is obvious that Gwen is the primary caretaker. There is no finding which points that Gwen is unfit. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that she mobilized all of the resources at her command, namely the solicitous regard of her grandparents, in the interest of this child and that she went to extraordinary lengths to provide for him adequate medical attention and financial support.

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D. Flip of the coin 2
(Mnookin article) CRITICISMS AGAINST ALTERNATIVES TYP results to protracted litigation. However, if we do way with no presumptions, there is the disadvantage of moving into the facts, and what should be the hierarchy of the facts? Each and every case will be litigated, and we end up spending money and destroying families when we could have done it by being civil. How much weight should be given to the child s choice? When and where should we ask the child? Any place where there are neither parents nor lawyers like the chambers of the judge. When do you ask? Not during the trial of course, when the child would be fearful of hurting the parents. What is the advantage of flipping the coin? It is perfectly random, like the way they pick people in the draft, who will fight the war. BUT we cannot flip the coin because application to the government s capacity to decide on the child s best interest. It symbolically ignores the difference between the parties. Also, people lose the opportunity or forum to vent, to flame which is good for the soul. Conclusion: accept the flaws of whatever presumption we have.

1. To keep them in their company 2. To demand from them respect and obedience

All others! So in effect, parents have more duties than rights

FC, Art 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

FC, Art 222 The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires

FC, Art 223 The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper.

2. Other rights and duties in exercise of parental authority
FC, Art 220 The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties: 1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; 2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; 3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, selfreliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship; 4. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; 5. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; 6. To demand from them respect and obedience; 7. To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and 8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.

FC, Art 224 The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than 30 days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper.


Summary by Krissy Conti

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 225 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.

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y Administration and usufruct are two distinct things. There may be administration without usufruct or vice versa.
FC, Art 227 If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime.

Who has authority over the child s property? 1. parents unless minor or disinherited by ascendant 2. parental authority SALIENTES v ABANILLA (2006) 500 SCRA 128 Marie Antonette Loran Lorenzo Emmanuel The family lives with the wife s parents. However, Loran cannot get along with his in-laws so he urges his wife to leave and transfer to their own place. Marie refuses so Loran leaves alone. Loran was prevented from seeing his childn. So he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for his 2 yo child. CA dismissed his case because WHC is resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. ISSUE: WON a father may be deprived to see his son HELD: No. Since they have de facto separation, the custody is yet to be settled so father retains his parental authority over the child. CABANAS v PILAPIL (1974) 58 SCRA 94 - Florentino Pilapil had a child (Millian Pilipil) with the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas, married to another man. - The deceased insured himself assigning the child as the beneficiary and his brother, respondent herein, Francisco Pilapil as the trustee during her minority. Upon his deaths, the proceeds were given to the brother. - Mother prays for appointment as the administrator in her capacity as the natural parent. Uncle resists invoking the terms of the insurance policy. ISSUE: Who between the mother and the uncle has the right to administer the child s property? HELD: The mother. Art 320 and 321 of CC says that the father, in his absence, the mother is the legal administrator of the property of the child. There is no ambiguity in the law, so apply it if the facts are not disputed. LIBI v IAC (1992) 214 SCRA 816 Julie Ann Gotiong (18 yo, 1st year Commerce student at University of San Carlos, Cebu) and Wendell Libi (1819) were sweethearts.

FC, Art 226 The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.

PROPERTY OF THE CHILD 1. child s earning through his labor, work or industry 2. property acquired by the child by gratuitous title donated or inherited 3. property acquired by the child through onerous title 4. fruits of all the properties of the child whether acquired by lucrative or onerous title 5. insurance proceeds accruing to the child PURPOSES WHICH THE PARENTS MAY USE THE FRUITS AND INCOME OF THE CHILD 1. child s support and education 2. collective daily needs of the family as a social unit EXTINGUISHMENT OF PARENT S USUFRUCT 1. emancipation of child 2. death of the child 3. loss of parental authority through judicial decree 4. consent of the parent to the child s living independently 5. disinheritance and incapacity to succeed by reason of unworthiness

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Julie broke up with Wendell because he was sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell attempts to reconcile with her but to no avail. So he resorts to threatening Julie who in turn, sought the help of her best friend Malou Alfonso in whose house she stayed to avoid her ex-bf. Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot inflicted by a revolver licensed in the name of Wendell s father, Cresencio Libi (the petitioner). No eyewitness account so the parents of the two parties presented their own theories. GOTIONG VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell killed their daughter, the committed suicide. LIBI VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell was an informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), so an unknown and antagonized third party killed him and included Julie to eliminate any witnesses. The Gotiongs filed a civil case against the Libis to recover damages for their daughter s death

mortgage, encumber or dispose. Also, the action for reconveyance of immovable prescribe only after 30 years. PEOPLE v SILVANO (1999) 309 SCRA 362 It is not for the humans to ravish what they produced. Sheryl Silvano, a beautiful and tall mestiza, 16 yo was raped by her father as a punishment for her coming home late. She has been raped since she was 13 yo old. And only told her mother and grandmother about it when she was being compelled to return to their home (she left their home and stayed at her lola s house). Father submits many arguments like: he couldn t have possibly raped the child because the room was cramped, that his wife just wants to severe marital ties with him, that if he did rape her it would have woke up her two brothers who are sleeping in the same room. He was merely teaching her sex education. ISSUE: WON raping is justified form of punishment HELD: No! Sex with one's own child is per se abhorrent and can never be justified as a form of parental punishment. It is detrimental to the child s moral development and wellbeing. His arguments are likewise untenable because any noise that they would have produced is disguised as a form of parental reproach. DEATH ROLL! SHIELDS v GROSS (1983) 58 NY 2d 338 - Brooke Shields wants to revoke a contract entered into by her mother when she was just 10 years old. The contract was for a modeling session wherein she was made to pose nude in a bath tub. ISSUE: WON a child upon reaching age of majority may disaffirm a contract entered into by her parent HELD: No. Neither was judicial approval of the contract was necessary because this was only required of child performers which by statutory definition excludes child models. The decision balanced two interests, that of: 1. the child: not pornographic (????) 2. stability of commercial transactions SILVA v CA & GONZALES (1997) 275 SCRA 60 Carlitos Silva (a married businessman) cohabited with Suzanne Gonzales (an actress) and begot two children, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia Because the wife resumed her acting career (though wife contends that she did not stop) they separated Mother refuses to allow father the children s company on weekends and says that he is into gambling and womanizing which she fears might affect the values of the children RTC gave visitation rights to the father Mother remarries a Dutch national and goes to Holland with kids.

ISSUE: WON the parents of the Wendell are liable for the damages HELD: Yes. Parents are primary liable for damages caused by minor children from quasi-delicts and criminal offenses except when they exercised due diligence. In this case, parents did not exercise due diligence since the son gained access to the key of the safety deposit box where gun was (mother just kept it in her bag, to the knowledge of the son) and their ignorance to the nature of his job as evidence by the picture of him with a gun given to Julie Ann. Also, the Libi s theory is untenable because they did not file a case against the alleged malefactor of their son, there were only two bullets used and no paraffin test was conducted because of the hasty interment. * Ma am Beth recognizes the impulse of teen-agers to have a life unknown from their parents. Mahirap talagang maging magulang, if you don t know what your child is doing, you re a bad parent and if something goes wrong you re liable for it. If you get involved too much, you re being too intrusive and stunts your child s growth. LINDAIN v CA (1992) 212 SCRA 725 Dolores Luluquisin, acting as a guardian of her minor children, sold a land registered in the name of her children to the private respondents Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila for P2000. They assert that the value can be validly sold without written court approval because the property was less than P2000. Even if the sale was invalid, the petitioners right to redeem has already prescribed because it is only allowed until four years after reaching age of majority ISSUE: WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of minor s property by the mother HELD: Yes. Sale of minor children's property executed by the mother is void. Judicial approval is necessary because the powers and duties as legal administrator are only powers of possession and management; no power to

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CA denies custodial rights to father and asks for selfsacrifice, saying that rotational custody is harmful to the children, especially if they see that the father has another family. If he really loves his children, he will give them what is best for them, even if it means he will not see them. Besides, illegitimate children should be under the parental authority of the mother.

ABANDONED CHILD is one who has no parental care of guardianship or whose parents or guardian have deserted him for at least six months
FC, Art 218 The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

ISSUE: WON the father may be deprived of visitation rights HELD: No. Provisions on inherent and natural right is regardless of legitimacy. Besides, Art 49 FC may be applied here (visitation rights of void ab initio marriages). The consequences are merely the product of the unfounded imagination of the judge. Besides, the RTC gave safeguards to the visitation rights: cannot take out children without the mother s consent .

FC, Art 219 Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts.

B. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
FC, Art 216 In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated.: 1. surviving grandparent, as provided in Art 214 2. oldest brother or sister, over 21 yo, unless unfit or disqualified 3. child s actual custodian, over 21 yo, unless unfit or disqualified whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.

CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY Grandparents, oldest sibling or court appoint guardian Exercised in case of death, absence or unsuitability of parents Subsidiarily liable for if damages caused by act or omission under the supervision of people with special parental authority Law is silent about prohibition of corporal punishment

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY School, administrators and teachers Exercised concurrently with the exercise of parental authority Principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by act or omission of minor under their custody, supervision or instruction Cannot inflict corporal punishment on the minor

PALISOC v BRILLANTES (1971) 41 SCRA 548 While inside the laboratory room of Manila Technological Institute, Dominador Palisoc and Virgilio Daffon engaged in a brawl which killed the former. Parents of Dominador claims damages from the school, the teacher and Daffon (who is already of legal age). ISSUE: WON the school, its administrators, the teacher and Daffon are liable for damages HELD: President and instructor are jointly and severally liable since incident could have been prevented if they gave proper supervision. It is not necessary that the student board in the school for Art 2180 to apply. As long as students are in their custody, they stand in loco parentis and must exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.

FC, Art 217 In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children s homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.

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AMADORA v CA (1988) 160 SCRA 315 Just before their highschool graduation, Pablito Daffon shot Alfredo Amadora which resulted to his death. It was proven that they were only at the school auditorium to finish their project in Physics. Amadora s parents claim for damages which RTC and CA dismissed. ISSUE: Who may be held liable for the damages? HELD: 1) Not the school nor the administrators: Art 2180 only holds school administrators of trade and art school liable, but not academic institutions. 2) Not the teacher in charge because it was not show that he was not required to be there at the time of the incident. 3) Not the school prefect because it was not proven that the gun used by Daffon was the same gun he had confiscated and did not report to authorities. However, it was established that Art 2180 applies to all schools, academic or non-academic. In academic schools, teacher in charge is liable for student's misconduct. In nonacademic schools, the head is liable. Custody is not coterminous with semester. As long as student is under the control and influence of school and within its premises in pursuance of legitimate right, obligation or privilege, he is considered under school custody. * Ma am Beth thinks Amadora was incorrectly decided DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PALISOC AND AMADORA PALISOC during school hours, school liable if impleaded AMADORA not during classhours, what mattered was the purpose

HELD: NO. Even if under the aforementioned articles, the school, its administrators and teachers, have special parental authority over minor children (Art 218) and that they will be solidarily liable for any damages (Art 219), it was erroneously established that their alleged negligence of not sending a teacher to serve as guardian was the proximate cause of the accident that caused the death of Sherwin. Rather, it was the reckless driving of James II and the mechanical failure of the jeep when its steering wheel guide got detached that caused the jeep to lose control and turn turtle, injuring its passengers and causing the death of herein petitioners minor child. The ones liable should be the parents of James Daniel II (JD II being in their care and custody) and Vivencio Villanueva for his negligence regarding the condition of his jeep and his grandson s allowing of James to drive the said vehicle. VANCIL v BELMES (2001) 358 SCRA 707 Reeder Vancil died as a US Navy Serviceman in 1986. He is survived by his common-law wife Helen Belmes (herein respondent) and two minor children Valerie and Vincent. The kids were 6 and 2 years old respectively in 1987. Bonifacia, Reeder s mother and a naturalized American citizen, is the petitioner in this case. She seeks guardianship over the persons and properties of the two minors. RTC appointed her as legal and judicial in 1987. Helen appealed to the in 1988 CA and won. CA said that parents are the ipso facto guardian of their minor children without the need of the court appointment. The grandmother did not present any reason to contest Helen s fitness to hold parental authority. Ten years later or in 1998, Bonifacia brought the case to SC saying that Helen is morally unfit as guardian because her live-in partner raped Valerie several times and that her status as an expatriate is not a statutory requirement for guardianship. ISSUE: WON the grandmother may be granted guardianship of the two children instead of the mother. HELD: OF COURSE NOT. As the Court held in Santos, Sr. v CA, parents have the preferential right to the custody of their children especially if there is continuous parental authority. Grandparents are only resorted to in case the parent is absent, dead or proved to be unsuitable. Bonifacia did not present convincing evidence showing that Helen is unfit to be Vincent s guardian (Valerie already turned 18 by 1998, ergo guardianship for her is moot). Also her expatriate status disqualifies as a substitute guardian because 1) she resides in the US (plus the fact that her libel case here in the Philippines would give her second thoughts on coming back) and 2) her old age, she will merely delegate guardianship duties to someone else who may not qualify as a guardian. Besides, Vincent only has 2 years before emancipation. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

ST. MARY S ACADEMY v CARPITANOS (2002) 376 SCRA 473 On 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Mary s Academy Dipolog conducted enrolment drive for the school year 1995-1996. This included visiting schools where prospective enrollees are. Among the volunteer students are Sherwin Carpitanos and James Daniel II. On one day of the campaign, James Daniel II who was then 15 took the wheel from the grandson of Vivencio Villanueva, the owner of the Mitsubishi jeep, and by reckless driving caused the overturning of the said vehicle which caused injuries to its passengers and led to the death of Sherwin. Sherwin s parents sued James Daniel II and his parents, Vivencio Villanueva, and the school. JD II and Villanueva were absolved while SMA was held to pay primary liability while James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel were to pay subsidiarily. SMA appealed and on 29 February 2000, got reduced damages to pay. They moved to reconsider on the same date, but got denied on 22 May 2000. Hence they filed this appeal. ISSUE: WON SMA is liable under Art 218 and 219 FC

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C. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
FC, Art 228 Parental authority terminates permanently: 1. Upon the death of the parents; 2. Upon the death of the child; or 3. Upon emancipation of the child



ipso facto if with civil interdiction (reclusion temporal, perpetua or death) terminated by: i. service of penalty ii. amnesty or pardon judicial decree

FC, Art parental 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

229 Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, authority also terminates: adoption guardianship abandonment final judgment divesting parental authority absence or incapacity

FC, Art 230 Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender.

CHUA v CABANGBANG (1969) 27 SCRA 791 CFI dismisses Pacita s claim for her daughter. She was a prostitute who had three children by three men whom she lived with successively (Chua Ben, Sy Sia Lay and Victor Tan Villareal). Betty Chua, 11 yo at the time of the trial, was one of her children and is in the custody of Flora Cabangbang. Cabangbang and Chua had different stories as to how Betty s custody was acquired. FLORA: she found the child wrapped in a bundle in their front door PACITA: Villareal gave Betty to Flora as a payment for his debts. She now claims custody of her child after five years allegedly because she did not know where to look for the child. ISSUE: WON Pacita may regain her child HELD: No. There was constructive abandonment and hence she may be deprived of parental authority. She only wants the child back so her biological father s support would resume (take not that this is still uncertain) and she was even willing to withdraw her suit if the Cabangbangs would pay her 150 K. She attests no genuine motherly longing. In the best interest of the child, Flora Cabangbang should retain custody. COMPARED WITH CELIS v CAFUIR, Celis did not lose communication with her child during the time that Cafuir had custody of her child. ABIERA v ORIN (1907) 8 Phil 193

FC, Art 231 The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: 1. 2. 3. 4. Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty; Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; Compels the child to beg; or Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.

The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated.

Miguel Vicenta Mario Petra Juan Sebastian Vicenta, Mario and Petra were brothers and sisters. Vicenta was married to Miguel; Petra to Juan. When Vicenta died, Miguel, Mario and Juan entered into an agreement covering the disposition of the properties left by Vicenta; Mario and Juan were representing their children, who are the heirs of Vicenta. Sebastian, son of Petra and Juan filed a complaint as special administrator of his deceased father, alleging that Miguel has not complied with the said contract/agreement.

FC, Art 232 If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority.

FC, Art 233 The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child.

TERMINATION permanent SUSPENSION temporary

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ISSUE: WON Sebastian, being the son of the deceased Juan Abiera has the right to ask for the compliance with the said obligation HELD: No. The true interested parties in the obligation contracted by Miguel Orin are the children of Juan Abiera, and not the latter, for the simple reason that the obligation was executed in their favor and not in favor of said Abiera. This being the fact, it is evident that the plaintiff in his office as administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera has no right to ask for the compliance with the said obligation. As such administrator, he has only the right to institute such actions as correspond and pertain to the estate which he is administering, and no other action dealing with contracts and obligations contracted in favor of 3rd persons or others from whom he does not derive such right, can be brought as such administrator. The right of Juan Abiera to represent his children as father or guardian of the same, and that he has not transferred nor could he transfer to the administrator of his estate such right from the mere fact that he was such administrator. The said right attached to parental authority or guardianship was extinguished when Juan Abiera died. CORTES v CASTILLO (1921) 41 Phil 466 Maria Cortes Alejandro Herrera Acardio and Bernardo Maria committed adultery and was convicted but Alejandro pardoned her and they reconciled. However, Maria again committed adultery so Alejandro filed annulment of their wedding and brought his children to his mother. During the pendency of the annulment proceeding, Alejandro died as a policeman. ISSUE: WON Maria Cortes may have custody of her children? HELD: No. she had insufficient means to support the children and the fact that she had been found guilty of adultery, she has corrupt moral values harmful to the welfare of the minors. Grandmother retains custody. *Cortes is a very old case and would not be the same if decided today. In the olden days, females are judged by her womb, all these laws reflect that she s just a wife and mother, not a person.

D. Rights and Duties of Children
Rights of the child Duties of the child Rights of the parents Duties of the parents

CC, Art 356 Every child: 1. is entitled to parental care 2. shall receive at least elementary education 3. shall be given moral and civil training by the guardians 4. has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to physical, moral and intellectual development

* Rights of the child * Compare with Art 3 of PD 603
CC, Art 357 Every child shall: 1. obey and honor parents or guardian 2. respect grandparents, old relatives and persons holding substitute parental authority 3. exert utmost for education and training 4. cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same

* Duties of the child * Compare with Art 4 of PD 603
CC, Art 358 Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with high-mindedness, love of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace. CC, Art 359 The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible: 1. schools in every barrio, municipality and city where the optional religious instruction shall be taught as a part of the curriculum at the option the parent or guardian 2. puericulture and similar centers 3. Council for the Protection of Children 4. juvenile courts

CC, Art 360 The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among other functions: 1. foster the education of every child in the municipality 2. encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents 3. protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children and orphans 4. take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency 5. adopt measures for the health of children 6. promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 CC, Art 361 Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.

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CC, Art 362 Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother or guardian may in a proper case be judicially admonished.

FC Art 226 The property of unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter s support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child s property shall be limited: 1. primarily, child s support 2. secondarily, collective daily needs of the family

CC, Art 363 In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter s welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.

CC, Art 375 In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either: 1. Add a middle name or the mother s surname 2. Add the Roman numerals II, III and so on

CC, Art 376 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. * Repealed by RA No. 9048 Correction of clerical or typographical error without need of judicial order




Not allowed if it will sow confusion on paternity and successional rights When father changes his name, there are no effects on children. However, children may elect to change their names on a separate petition upon emancipation. The father can also include their minor children in his petition. Change of name shall have no effect on: family relations, family rights and duties, legal capacity like civil status or citizenship. Change of name is done in a proceeding in rem.
FC, Art 129 (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition in accordance with Art 51. FC, Art 211 Par 2 Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (17a, PD 603)

FC, Art 213 In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

* Separation in this article applies both to de facto and legal separation

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PD 603 Art 3 Rights of the Child. - All children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. Every child has the right to: (1) is endowed with the dignity and worth of a human being from the moment of his conception, as generally accepted in medical parlance, and has, therefore, the right to be born well. (2) a wholesome family life that will provide him with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral and material security. Dependent or abandoned child: shall be provided with the nearest substitute for a home. (3) a well-rounded development of his personality to the end that he may become a happy, useful and active member of society. Gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement to develop his special talents. Emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted child shall be treated with sympathy and understanding, and shall be entitled to treatment and competent care. Physically or mentally handicapped child shall be given the treatment, education and care required by his particular condition. (4) a balanced diet, adequate clothing, sufficient shelter, proper medical attention, and all the basic physical requirements of a healthy and vigorous life. (5) be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character. (6) an education commensurate with his abilities and to the development of his skills for the improvement of his capacity for service to himself and to his fellowmen. (7) full opportunities for safe and wholesome recreation and activities, individual as well as social, for the wholesome use of his leisure hours. (8) protection against exploitation, improper influences, hazards, and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral development. (9) live in a community and a society that can offer him an environment free from pernicious influences and conducive to the promotion of his health and the cultivation of his desirable traits and attributes. (10) the care, assistance, and protection of the State, particularly when his parents or guardians fail or are unable to provide him with his fundamental needs for growth, development, and improvement. (11) an efficient and honest government that will deepen his faith in democracy and inspire him with the morality of the constituted authorities both in their public and private lives. (12) grow up as a free individual, in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and with the determination to contribute his share in the building of a better world.

PD 603 Art 4 Responsibilities of the Child. - Every child, regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status, political antecedents and other factors shall: (1) Strive to lead an upright and virtuous life in accordance with the tenets of his religion, the teachings of his elders and mentors, and the biddings of a clean conscience; (2) Love, respect and obey his parents, and cooperate with them in the strengthening of the family; (3) Extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness, and helpfulness, and endeavor with them to keep the family harmonious and united; (4) Exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service, particularly by undergoing a formal education suited to his abilities, in order that he may become an asset to himself and to society; (5) Respect not only his elders but also the customs and traditions of our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of our country, and the principles and institutions of democracy; (6) Participate actively in civic affairs and in the promotion of the general welfare, always bearing in mind that it is the youth who will eventually be called upon to discharge the responsibility of leadership in shaping the nation's future; and (7) Help in the observance of individual human rights, the strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of world peace. Conventions on the Rights of the Child Art 1 Definition of a child A child is recognized as a person under 18, unless national laws recognize age of majority earlier. Art 2 Non-discrimination All rights apply to all children without exception. It is the State s obligation to protect children from any form of discrimination and to take positive action to promote their rights. Art 3 Best interest of the child All actions concerning the child should take full account of his or her best interest. The State shall provide the child with adequate care when parents, or others charged with the responsibility, fail to do so. Art 4 Implementation of rights The State must do all it can to implement the rights contained in the Convention. Art 5 Parental guidance and the child s evolving capacities The State must respect the rights and responsibilities of parents and the extended family to provide guidance for the child which is appropriate to her or his evolving capacities. Art 6 Survival and development Every child has the inherent right to life and the State has an obligation to ensure the child s survival and development. Art 7 Name and nationality The child has the right to a name at birth. The child also has the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, to know his or her parents and be cared for by them. Art 8 Preservation of identity The State has an obligation to protect and if necessary, re-establish basic aspects of the child s identity. This includes name, nationality and family ties. Art 9 Separation from parents The child has a right to live with his or her parents unless this is deemed to be incompatible with the child s best interest. The child also hast the right to maintain contact with both parents if separated from one or both. Art 10 Family unification Children and their parents have the right to leave any country and to enter their own for

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 purposes of reunion or the maintenance of the childparent relationship. Illicit transfer and non-return The State has an obligation to prevent and remedy the kidnapping or retention of children abroad by a parent or third party. The child s opinion The child has the right to express his or her opinion freely and to have that opinion taken into account in any matter or procedure affecting the child. Freedom of expression The child has the right to express his or her views, obtain information, make ideas or information known, regardless of frontiers. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion The State shall respect the child s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, subject to appropriate parental guidance. Freedom of association Children have a right to meet with others, and to join or form association. Protection of privacy Children have the right to protection from interference with privacy, family, home and correspondence and from libel or slander. Access to appropriate information The State shall ensure the accessibility to children of information and material from a diversity of sources, and it shall encourage the mass media to disseminate information which is of social and cultural benefit to the child, and take steps to protect him or her from harmful materials. Parental responsibilities Parents have joint primary responsibility for raising the child, and the State shall support them in this. The State shall provide appropriate assistance to parents in child-raising. Protection from abuse and neglect The State shall protect the child from forms of maltreatment by parents others responsible for the care of child and establish appropriate social programs for the prevention of abuse and the treatment of victims. Protection of a child without family The State is obliged to provide special protection for a child deprived of family environment and to ensure that appropriate alternative family care or institutional placement is available in such causes. Efforts to meet this obligation shall pay due regard to the child s cultural background. Adoption In countries where adoption is recognized and/or allowed, it shall only carried out in the interests of child, and then only with the authorization of competent authorities and safeguards for the child. Refugee children Special protection shall be granted to a refugee child or to a child seeking refugee status. It is the State s obligation to co-operate with competent organizations which provide such protection and assistance. Disabled children A disabled child has the right to special care, education and training to help him or her enjoy a full and decent life in dignity and achieve the greatest degree of self-reliance and social integration possible. Health and health services The child has a right to the highest standard of health and medical care attainable. States shall place special emphasis on the provision of primary and preventive health care, public health education and the reduction of infant mortality. They shall encourage international co-operation in this regard and strive to see that no child is deprived access to effective health services. Periodic review of placement A child who is placed by the State by reasons of care, protection or treatment is entitled to have that placement evaluated regularly. Social security The child has the right to benefit from social security including social insurance. Standard of living Every child has the right to a standard living adequate for his or her physical, mental, moral,

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Art 11

Art 12

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Art 35

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spiritual, and social development. Parents have the primary responsibility to ensure that the child has an adequate standard of living. The State s duty is to ensure that this responsibility can be fulfilled and is. State responsibility can include material assistance to parents and their children. Education The child has a right to education and the State s duty is to ensure that primary education is free and compulsory to encourage different forms of secondary education accessible to every child and to make higher education available to all on the bases of capacity. School discipline shall be consisted with the child s rights and dignity. The State shall engage in international cooperation to implement this right. Aims of education Education shall aim at developing the child s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to the fullest extent. Education shall prepare the child for an active adult life in a free society and foster respect for the child s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, and for the cultural background and values of others. Children of minorities or indigenous populations Children of minority communities and indigenous populations have the right to enjoy their own culture and to practice their own religion and language. Leisure, recreation and cultural activities. The child has the right to leisure, play and participation in cultural and artistic activities. Child labor The child has the right to be protected from work that threatens his or her health, education or development. The State shall set minimum ages for employment and regulate working conditions. Drug abuse Children have the right to protection from the use of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and from being involved in the production or distribution. Sexual exploitation The State shall protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse, including prostitution and involvement in pornography. Sale, trafficking and abduction It is the State s obligation to make every effort to prevent the sale, trafficking and abduction of children. Other forms of exploitation the child has the right to protection from all forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child s welfare covered in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 35. Torture and deprivation of liberty No child shall be subjected to torture, cruel treatment or punishment, unlawful arrest or deprivation of liberty. Both capital punishment and life imprisonment without the possibility of release are prohibited for offenses committed by persons below 18 years. Any child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child s best interests not to do so. A child who is detained shall have legal and other assistance as well as contact with the family. Armed conflicts State parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that children under 15 years of age have no direct part in hostilities. No child below 15 shall be recruited into the armed forces. States shall also ensure the protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflict as described in relevant international law. Rehabilitative care The State has an obligation to ensure that child victims of armed conflicts, torture, neglect, maltreatment or exploitation receive appropriate treatment for their recovery and social reintegration. Administration of juvenile justice A child in conflict with the law has the right to treatment which promotes the child s sense of dignity and worth, takes the child s age into account and aims at his or her reintegration into

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 society. The child is entitled to basic guarantees as well as legal or other assistance for his or her defense. Judicial proceedings and institutional placements shall be avoided wherever possible. Respect for higher standards Wherever standards set in applicable national and international law relevant to the rights of the child that are higher than those in this Convention, the higher standard shall always apply. The State s obligation to make the rights contained in this Convention widely known to both adults and children.

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Art 41

Art 42

living sibling Jerry has. For Jerry only those who are able to communicate intimately with him can help in his mental treatment, and in most cases these are members of his family. Tom is important to him in that he can identify himself with him. Tom is his model, his tie with his family thus his life is vital to his improvement at the asylum. Considering that their parents are in their fifties, it would be in the best interest of Jerry s welfare if Tommy were to survive. CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N. aka Mildred G. v Valerie N. (1985) 707 P. 2d 760 | SC of California Valerie N (29), is inflicted with Down Syndrome and has an IQ of 30. She lives with her mother and her stepfather. The mother instituted a court proceeding for appointment as conservators and requested for additional powers to sterilize Valerie through tubal ligation (salpingectomy). According to the mother, sterilization was necessary because Valerie is sexually aggressive at the sight of men (kiss, hug, climb and sit on their laps). Though she is not sexually active for being under close watch, she masturbates excessively. Her mother fears the day when she will no longer be able to look after her daughter. She also went through unsuccessful behavior modification, tried to ingest contraceptive pills but rejected it eventually and would not cooperate in pelvic examination for intra-uterine device. Lower court granted conservatorship but not authority to sterilize the incompetent. ISSUE: WON conservators can give consent to sterilization on behalf of their incompetent wards HELD: No. Although the repeal of the statutes regarding asexualization of mentally challenged individuals have been declared unconstitutional for violating their due process and equal protection rights, conservators still may not be authorize to conduct the procedure unless all means have been exhausted. The mother also did not provide clear and convincing evidence as to the necessity of irreversible sterilization. That Valerie is capable of pregnancy, that other brands of pills were administered and that other means of administering contraceptive pill were attempted. JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993) 851 P. 2d 776 - SUPRA GILLICK v WEST NORFOLK & WISBECH AREA HEALTH AUTHORITY (1985) 3 All E. R. 402 Victoria Gillick wrote to area health authority asking for assurance that her daughters aged 13, 12, 10 and 5 will not be given contraceptive advice and treatment without her consent. The reply to the letter stated that they cannot give such assurance because the final decision must be for the doctor s clinical judgment. Gillick again asked for a declaration from the office that it will not provide minors under 16 years old with

The Child is Not a Person: Family Law and other Legal Cultures (Caroline Sawyer)3 Paradigms of the Child 1. Family Law 2. Property Law 3. Children s Obligation

Tort and Contract

Confusion between the capacity of a person to be the subject of rights and obligations (legal personality) and the capacity of that person to take action which produces legal effects (legal capacity)

E. Parents versus Children When rights clash
STRUNK v STRUNK (1969) 445 S. W. 2d 145 | CA of Kentucky Tommy (28) and Jerry (27) Strunk are brothers. Tom is suffering from chronic glomerulus nephritis, a fatal kidney disease, and requires a kidney transplant. Jerry, an incompetent with the mind of a 6 year old and a speech defect (severely retarded with IQ of 35), is the only viable donor for the operation. The mother as a committee secures court consent for the operation. Both the Department of Mental Health and psychiatrist find Jerry is emotionally dependent on Tom such that his death would be more detrimental and traumatic for him than the loss of one kidney. Guardian ad litem questions authority of the State to approve the procedure. ISSUE: WON a court of equity may approve the operation for the incompetent. HELD: YES! The doctrine of substituted judgment applies which means that where the legal disability of the individual is shown, the jurisdiction of the court is plenary and potent to afford whatever relief may be necessary to protect his interests and preserve his estates. Such rule has not only been extended to cover matters of property but also of personal affairs of the incompetent. It is also important to note here the questioned ruling of the circuit court. Therein the operation was approved because it was held to be for the best interest of the incompetent. The testimony of the psychiatrist held that Tommy was indispensable for the welfare of Jerry because he is the only

Summary by Krissy Conti

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contraceptive advice and treatment without informing the parents but the health authority was steadfast. They argued for the patient-doctor confidentiality and that if this principle is abandoned, minors might not seek professional advice at all. This will lead to consequences such as unwanted pregnancies, STD and high risk abortions. She contends that permitting minors to disregard their parent s consent undermines parental responsibility and family stability. ISSUE: WON doctors can lawfully give contraceptive advice and treatment to minors without parental consent (the extent of a parent s right and duties with respect to the medical treatment of a girl under 16 years old) HELD: NO. Girls under 16 can give no valid consent to anything in the areas under consideration which apart from consent would constitute an assault, whether civil or criminal, and can impose no valid prohibition on a doctor against seeking parental consent. CURTIS v SCHOOL COMMITTEE (1995) 652 N. E. 2d 580 | SC of Massachussetts Parents contend the condom availability program in a public school where senior and junior high school students may obtain condoms for free in the nurse s office and for 75 cents in the vending machine in their CR. Condoms are given away with counseling from nurse and pamphlet about HIV/AIDS and STD, with authorities stressing the importance of abstinence as the best method to avoid STD. The program did not provide for an opt out nor parental notification wherein parents would be notified of their children s request for condoms. ISSUE: 1. WON the program violates the parents constitutionally protected right to familial privacy and parental liability 2. WON the program infringes into the free exercise clause HELD: 1.

ROE v DOE (1971) 29 NY 2d 188 | CA of New York Daughter was cut off from support by her father by not obeying his instructions that she live in a college dormitory while studying in college and instead took up residence with a female classmate in an off-campus apartment. Her father requested she come home but instead, the daughter sold her car [a gift from her father] and finished the school year using the proceeds thereof. Upon returning to New York for the summer, she further disobeyed her father by choosing to stay with the parents of her female classmate in Long Island. Daughter in general fares poorly in school and has experimented with drugs. Furthermore she has had a spotty childhood, her mother died when she was three and her father has repeatedly married and remarried since then his most recent remarriage in 1970. With the help of a guardian ad litem, she initiated this action for support. ISSUE: WON daughter is entitled for support in light of her transgressions against her father. HELD: While delinquent behavior of a child even if unexplained or persistent does not merit the termination of the duty of the parent to support, voluntary abandonment by the child of the parent s home is tantamount to forfeiture of the claim to support. A father in return for maintenance and support may establish and impose reasonable regulations on his child. Courts as much as possible do not interfere with the parent s prerogative in caring, controlling and protecting the child except only when there is a clear and obvious display of abuse or neglect on the part of the parent. The parent was concerned about the temptations that abound outside of campus hence his insistence that she live in the campus dorm. While the daughter may be free disagree and choose to not comply, she puts herself at risk of incurring her father s wrath and consequently, by abandoning her home she forfeits her right to support. IN RE EDWARD C. (1981) 178 Cal. Rptr. 694 | CA of California The appeal instituted by spouses Edmond and Deborah to regain custody of their two sons Edward and Eric who were previously declared dependent children. Edward and Eric were removed from their parents home because they were maltreated and subjected to cruel and inhuman corporal punishment by their father. The father, supported by the mother, argues that he is vested with divine and Biblical authority to inflict discipline on his children. Their daughter, Marlee, was given to her maternal grandmother for adoption after suffering physical abuse in the hands of her father. ISSUE: WON the dependency of children is a violation of constitutional right of privacy of the family HELD: NO. The parental doctrine and child s best interest are usually compatible but when they clash, the latter is protected by the legal system. The finding on Marlee s case is admissible to Eric and Edward. The fact that the sons witnessed the vicious beatings as command of the Lord may inhibit their healthy emotional development. Until the



No. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate how condom availability constitutes unconstitutional interference by the state. There was no coercive burden upon the students: a. Students are free to decline b. Parents are free to instruct their children not to participate No. They were unable to demonstrate sufficient facts to support any substantial burden to religious exercise. They merely alleged that the program contravenes parental teaching on premarital sex: the not only is it permissible but can be made safe. Parents have no right to tailor public school policy to meet their individual religious and moral preferences.

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parents cooperate to counseling program, reunification of the family will be detrimental to the welfare of the minors. PRINCE v MASSACHUSSETTS (1944) 321 US 158 | SC of Massachusetts Sarah Prince, a member of the Jehovah s Witness is a mother to two sons and the guardian of minor Betty Simmons One night she went one to distribute Watchtower and Consolation, fulfilling one of her religious obligations She used to bring along her kids but upon reprimand by Peskins because it violates the statute law against child labor and employment, she ceased to take her children with her. However, Betty Simmons insisted to come that particular night. ISSUE: 1. WON the religious act of selling their magazines violate the statute 2. WON the presence of parent will exempt them from punishment HELD: 1.




The couple had a quarrel so he took the sons with him to Ligao, Albay and then to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Wife sought the help of the parents and the parents in law, and even the Lupong Tagapagpamayapa to make peace with the husband, but to no avail. She alleges that the travel disrupted the education of the children and deprived them of maternal care. They accused each other that their respective parents always meddle with their family affairs. Mother is unfit because she is always drunk and would come home late at night from the beerhouse. She neglected her duties as a mother. Father, a tricycle driver, drove mother out, and a gambler, drug addict and alcoholic himself.

ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction regarding writ of habeas corpus under Sec 5 (b) of RA 8369 HELD: Yes. Concurrent jurisdictions of Family Court, SC and CA so that the decision will be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Note that he had moved to two different provinces.



Yes. It does not infringe on the free exercise clause because the burden on the religious activity was merely incidental. The prohibition applies to all children. No. There was clear and present danger even though in the company of adults. The State s authority over children is broader than adults especially in public activities and employment which has crippling effects on the child. They reserve the Parents can make martyrs out of themselves but not of their children. Check out the dissent. Parents reserve the right to train their children religiously.

F. Summary Procedure
REYES-TABUJARA v CA (2006) 495 SCRA 844 Ivy Joan Ernesto Carlos Iñigo The separated and custody battle ensued. Dad initially won. Mother files a consolidated petition for writ of habeas corpus and Anti-VAWC. However, the presiding judge went on leave effect June 1. But the new presiding judge issued decision in favor of the mother on May 31. ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. HELD: Yes. RA 8369 did not divest RTC jurisdiction over such cases. MADRINAN v MADRINAN (2007) 527 SCRA 487 Felipe Francisca three sons and a daughter Romnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo and Krizia Ann