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Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art.


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Facts: On Christmas day, around 4pm, Luzviminda (14 y.o., daughter of the
Jaime Ballesteros, victim), saw Decena rushing towards her father with a
long bladed weapon prompting her to warn her father.

Decena, however, stabbed him on the right chest causing his death.

Narration of the defense:

At about 4pm, the victim was drunk and for no apparent reason, he held the
appellant by the neck and poked a fork against it. A barangay tanod
intervened and advised the appellant to go home. Appellant left but was
later followed by Jaime (victim).

Biala, uncle of the appellant, testified that he saw Jaime attacking the
appellant with a balisong. Appellant was able to parry the blow, and
overpowering Jaime, thruste the knife into his body.

Issue: W/N the appellant acted in complete self-defense that in killing

Jaime Ballesteros absolving him from criminal liability.

Held: No. In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecution which
may rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. However, upon invoking self-defense, the accused admits that he
killed the victim and the burden of proof is upon him in proving that he
really acted in self-defense.

Basic requirement for self-defense as a justifying circumstance is unlawful

aggression against the person defending himself.

It must be shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack
that placed the life of the accused in danger forcing him to inflict wounds
upon his assailant

According to the defense, the unlawful aggression started when the victim
started poking the appellant with a fork

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Elementary rule: when the aggressor leaves, the aggression ceases. It

follows that when appellant and Jaime heeded the advice of the barangay
tanod, the unlawful aggression had ended. Since the aggression no longer
existed, appellant had no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.

The defense failed to establish that the victim persisted in his design to
attack the appellant

Defense: continuing aggression

Whenever the victim was drunk, he would look for trouble (refuted by the
testimony of the wife)

Witnesses: Jaime was staggering or wobbling as he walked the victim

could not have persisted in attacking the appellant with his current state.

Testimony of the uncle: imaginative or coached witness


Facts: dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when
Macapagal (victim, San Antonios ex-live-in partner) went to their
apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door of the
bedroom ahere dela Cruz was demanding him to go out

Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that Macapagal was pointing
the gun at him, he immediately went back to the room and closed the door.

The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a gun (.35 caliber

The two immediately grappled each other and not long after, shots were
heard and Macapagal fell dead on the floor.

Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he
surrendered the gun he used and told the police that he shot Macapagal in
self defense.

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According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were

non-penetrating (upper jaw, below the left shoulder, right side of the waist).
The shot that took his life was on the left side of the chest penetrating the

Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-
defense in order to extenuate him from the crime.

Held: No. Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:

Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed

presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger

on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude but most importantly at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor.

In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the
appellant, upon seeing the victim pointing a gun at him was able to prevent
at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have
stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim.

Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that

unlawful aggression

The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this

component of self defense. The four gunshot wounds indicate a determined
effort to kill.

Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary

measures, appellant could no longer argue that there was no provocation
on his part

Claim of self defense rejected

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by

treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968,
Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez
from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap
when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his
shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the
deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was
involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of
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the shooting, defendant had leased his

property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to
avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was
barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his
person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both
murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs,
and to pay for moral damages.

1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the
fact that he acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the
house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the
victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights
to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art.
30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to
the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It
is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he

acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense

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is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC

enumerates these requisites:

Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression

towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months
and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of
chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code
also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or
intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to
be respected in his possession

Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the

case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here,

there was no provocation at all since he was asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.
These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by
the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill
since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of
planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable

to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil

indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only
and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its

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conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not

a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22
of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances

and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4
months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for
moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his
immediate release is ordered.

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Palaganas| G.R. No. 165483 September 12, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Aggravating circumstance
Laws Applicable: Art. 14

January 16, 1998 8pm: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer
were on a drinking spree in their house because Melton visited his brothers
in Pangasinan all the way from San Fernando, La Union.
January 16, 1998 9:45 pm: The brothers decided to go to Tidbits
Videoke bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. They were the
only customers
January 16, 1998 10:30 pm: Jaime Palaganas, Ferdinand Palaganas
and Virgilio Bautista arrived and they occupied a different table. When
Jaime sang My Way, Melton sang along. But, Jaime resented this,
approached the brother and said in Pangasinan dialect "As if you are tough
guys. You are already insulting me in that way." Jaime struck Servillanos
head with the microphone and a fight ensued. Virgilio Bautista did not
joined in and just left. During the rumble, Ferdinand went out of the

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bar. Michael was about to pursue him but was stopped by

Servillano. They went back to continue to fight with Jaime. Edith
Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the bar, arrived and pacified
them. Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was missing. Since the
brothers could not locate it inside the bar, they went outside. They saw
Ferdinand at them and said to Rujjeric Palaganas "Oraratan paltog mo
lara" meaning "They are the ones, shoot them." Rujjeric shot Servillano
first at the left side of the abdomen penetrating his large intestine and
urinary bladder causing him to fall on the ground then Melton with a fatal
shot on the head and on the right thigh. When Servillano noticed that
Melton was no longer moving, he told Michael "Bato, bato and they threw
stones at Rujjeric and Ferdinand. Michael was hit on the right shoulder.
The police came and took the Ferrer brothers to Manaoag Hospital and
later to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan.
Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm
Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm
Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm
Criminal Case No. U-9634: using a caliber .38 without first securing the
necessary permit/license in violation to Comelec Res. 2958
Rujjeric and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" Upon
motion of Ferdinand, the four cases were consolidated.
RTC: Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of
Frustrated Homicide but acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code while Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him.
CA Affirmed
Rujjeric argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present
in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that
when he fired his gun, he was then a victim of an unlawful aggression
perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his
left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer

ISSUE: W/N Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of

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Frustrated Homicide


Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm -
attempted homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the
use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence of
Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto
mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision correccional as
maximum period
Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm -
homicide is reclusion temporal - There being a special aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of
prision mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum period
Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm -
frustrated homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the
use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum period.

petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are

present in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is
proper; that when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a victim
of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in
fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the
stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
o no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified
the act of petitioner in shooting them. Ferrer brothers then were merely

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standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying any weapon
o When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in
a state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5
meters) of the latter from the location of the former. He was still capable of
avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have also
called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
o gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. x x x.
unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense. It is an
essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim
As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the
elements of self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in
attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the
crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other
hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is
a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.
when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of
a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on
whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the
victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is
only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

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If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s
sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious,
less serious or slight physical injury
Michals wound took six to eight days to heal - attempted homicide
use of an unlicensed firearm - special aggravating circumstance by
Republic Act. No. 8294 on June 6, 1997
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all
crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of
increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot
increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and
charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to
be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstance,
CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance

PEOPLE V RICOHERMOSO | L 30527 28 | March 29, 1974 | J.

Aquino| Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury

Facts: Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son

Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso.
Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin,
Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she
should be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso
said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.

Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by

Ricohermosos house and asked him about the palay, to which the latter
answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever happens.
Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement),
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal
got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place,
Ricohermosos brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito.
They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out.

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When he regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried

beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.

The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the


Issue: W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance
of avoidance of a greater evil or injury

Held: No. Juan Padernals reliance on the justifying circumstance is

erroneous because his act in preventing Marianito from shooting
Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was
designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the
assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of greater evil or injury. His
intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.

Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the
appellants with lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with
respect to Marianito de Leon.

Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.

(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the
prosecutions version of the case and trial courts finding of guilt.)

PEOPLE v. NORMA HERNANDEZ (1959) | SLANDER | Plaintiff-Appellee: People of

the Philippines| Defendant-Appellants: Maria Norma Hernandez, Mariano
Hernandez (father) & Ramona Martinez (mother)

FACTS: Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma

Hernandez and after months of courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On
the same date, she asked him to bring his parents over her home so that they
could talk about their marriage.

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When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens and
goats and they agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the
sponsors and to repair the uncles roof.

While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be

found. Vivencio and his parents waited but she never showed up thus causing
them great shame and humiliation.

Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that she
wasnt really in love with him. Her parents tried to persuade her to accept the
proposal and that she only accepted it out of obedience to her parents and the
uncles insistence.

Before Vivencios parents came to their home, she already counselled them not to
bring the chickens and that they should not regret whatever may happen later.

Appellant said she felt torture because she wasnt honestly in love with Vivencio
and so she decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage.

Appellants parents also corroborated her testimony.

RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and
deliberately fled to prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.


Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.


Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasnt been proven. There is no
malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising
her right not to give her consent the marriage after mature consideration.

Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the complainant

& appellant before the incident. There always existed good relations between
them for they were neighbours so it cannot be sustained that appellant was
motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating the marriage.

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Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry and
it would be utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply because
she desisted in continuing with the marriage. If she would be liable then that
would be tantamount to compelling her to go into a marriage without her free

Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless
marriage. (Art. 11 par.4, RPC

People vs Delima Case Digest

Facts: Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail. Some days afterwards,
policeman Felipe Delima found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed
with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his
surrender. Napilon answered with a stroke of his lance. Delima dodged, it,
and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit
him. Napilon ran away, without parting with his weapon. Delima went after
him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and
killing him. Delima was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to
reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties.


The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was
under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of
his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the
hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means,
which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the
circumstances. (People vs. Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, December 22, 1922)


Appellee: People of the Philippines |Defendant-Appellant: Ignacio

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FACTS: The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan,

Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano,
Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar.

Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long
afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so
Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look for him.

Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3
shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one. They were already assembled by
the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran
away because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his
companions were also probably scared and that is why they ran.

Another prisoner, Mariano Ibaez stated that Epifanio Labong did not
answer their call so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the
mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote plantation and found
footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When
Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass and that he was unable to look for
Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria
told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to
assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot
Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran
away because he also could have been shot.

Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata

though his testimony corroborated those of the other prisoners.

Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales,

Sanitary Division president, verified the gunshot wound and that the death
of Tipace resulted therein.

Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners
were running far from him when he already ordered them to stop. He said
that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his
custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like the

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others. He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was

not part of the prisoners work.

HELD: Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and
serious physical injuries.

Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of

incomplete justifying circumstance. (Art.11 par.5, RPC)

RATIO: It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at

Tipace. The record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any
act of aggression or that he attempted to escape.

According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around

him. How could anyone intending to escape run towards and around the
very guard one was supposed to escape from?

Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his

duties, the circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire
directly against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one
of them.

While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only
ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them.

MAMANGUN V PEOPLE | Fulfillment of Duty/Lawful Exercise of Right

Facts: Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-

holdup call, with his fellow police officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted
residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and
proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz
and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop and
saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who
was ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned out
to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) Contreras died of the gunshot
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According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the

policemen to the lighted rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he
(Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed
his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed Hindi ako, hindi ako! to which
Mamangun replied, Anong hindi ako? and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at
the dark rooftop when Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly
continued to run. Mamangun shouted Pulis, tigil! whereupon the person
stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamanguns head. This prompted
Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only
said Hindi ako, hindi ako only when they approached him. Mamangun
then asked Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are policemen
here. Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed
investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on
found a steel pipe on the roof.

Issue: W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the
petitioners fulfillment of his duty

Held: No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms
Sandiganbayans decision after finding the petitioners testimony to be
nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per
Sandiganbayans observations, the defense was self-serving for the
accused and biased with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses because:

After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by

Mamangun, it is contrary to human experience for a man (who is not the
suspect) to attack one of three policemen with drawn guns

Mamanguns admission that he did not ask the victim Why did you try to hit
me, if you are not the one? clearly belies their claim

The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that
the victim instinctively shielded himself instead

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Additionally, petitioners pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially
reported to the desk and was only conveniently remembered when the
investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.

Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify
the petitioners firing the fatal gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim was absent, which leads to the failure of the
petitioners plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a
privileged mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying
circumstance the injury was caused by necessary consequence of due
performance of duty.

PEOPLE V BERONILLA | Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior

Facts: Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto

Adriatico file an appeal from the judgement of the Abra CFI, which
convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected
mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be
aiding the enemy.

Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by

Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold,
regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as
guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla
received a memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo
men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or abetting
the enemy.

Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in
Bangued, he was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to death
by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla
reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying I can only compliment
you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury,
were indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas
Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to persons who

committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla
and others were convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on
purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.

Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants actions are covered by justifying

circumstances for obedience to lawful order of superior

Held: Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which
as military subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith
without the being aware of its illegality.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest,
prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of
superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla received
the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which
called attention to the illegality of Borjals conviction and sentence. Had
Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared to report it to
Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part
because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal,
suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death sentence review
sent to the superior officers.

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of to be innocent).

Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the
benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory
dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were contradictory,
the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are any
reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty)
proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused.

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

Tabuena v Sandiganbayan

Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to
pay directly to the presidents office and in cash what the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985
memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-
Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum
dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction.
In obedience to President Marcos verbal instruction and memorandum,
Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused
the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million,
following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting
the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds,
to issue a managers check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The
check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and
the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which,
Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on
the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue
any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the
second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made
on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31
January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuenas co-signatory to the
letter- request for a managers check for this amount. Peralta accompanied
Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the
counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the
trunk of Tabuenas car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the
money to Mrs. Gimenez office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million
that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from
Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta

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were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large.

One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the
volume of the questions asked were more the combined questions of the
counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing
the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of
20 December 1991.

Issue:Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Held:Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of

malversation. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and
bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land.
It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its
face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of
an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its
execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that
the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in
the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing
and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an
error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such
matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an
appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of
the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error
or not.

People v Taneo

FACTS: On January 16, 1932, in the house of Potenciano Taneos parents

in Dolores, Ormoc, Leyte, because of severe stomachache, Potenciano
slept early. While sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room with a bolo in
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hand and upon meeting his wife who tried stop him, he wounded her int eh
abdomen. Several others were also attacked, this includes his father, and
his guests, Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. It was claimed that he was
dreaming when the crime happened. The trial court found Potenciano guilty
of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:WON the defendant is criminally liable.

HELD:No. The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts with which he
was charged were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
The expert witness claimed that the defendant was under the influence of
hallucination and not in his right mind. The defendant is not criminally liable
however, he was ordered to be confined in an insane asylum.

PEOPLE V BONOAN | Imbecility

Facts:Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing

Carlos Guison with a knife, which caused his death three days afterwards.
An arraignment was then called, but the defense objected on the ground
that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined at
the Psychopatic Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors,
production of the defendants complete record of mental condition from the
hospital and defendants admission to the hospital for personal observation,
assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court that
Bonoan may be discharged for being a recovered case. After trial, the
lower court found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding
Bonoan suffered dementia only occasionally and intermittently, did not
show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not establish the
defendants insanity and finding accused guilty.

Issue:W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

Held:Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he

perpetrated the crime, which consequently exempts him from criminal

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liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other
hospital for the insane. This ruling was based on the following evidence:

Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane

department of San Lazaro Hospital and diagnosed with dementia praecox
long before the commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments were
not entirely lacking of scientific foundation

Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility

because they have no control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms
similar to manic depression psychosis

Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox,

four days prior to act according to Dr. Francisco

Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and
arrest, indicating the polices doubt of his mental normalcy

Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr.


People v Dungo

Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to
Mrs. Sigua's office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit,
Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope
he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he
departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied
bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14
wounds, 5 of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in

February 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his
wife was requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to him
the procedure at the DAR.

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The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the offense:

Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he
appears to be in deep thought always, maltreating their children when he
was not used to it before. There were also times that her husband would
inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not.

On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't

bother to buy medicine as the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he
went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to the store, he was
no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way home, she heard
people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her
parents-in-law's house with people milling around. She asked her husband
why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's the only cure for
my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a
number of days, I would die. That same day, the accused went to Manila.

Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health
testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order
of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff,
they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before, during
and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as
an organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to
stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive
disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series
of medical treatment in their clinic.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of
the crime charged.
Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that there

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.

Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity.

However, the definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the
Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that
insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person
has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his

Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of
doing the act. However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his
mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the time of the act
in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts.

It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may
have wronged him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs.
Sigua. From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware of his acts.
This also established that the accused has lucid intervals.

Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he
shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This
statement makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane when he
committed the act.

The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal
weapon, that he ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed
the victim several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that
he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the
victim. (This was taken from the TC's decision).

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65

FACTS: Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old when hired as
a househelper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio
Rafaran and his family lived with his mother in the same house. Policarpio
was married and has children. One evening, the mother of the accused
called complainant to help him close the door. When the complainant went
near him, he pulled her inside the store and raped her despite her
resistance. After that, he warned the complainant not to tell anyone about it
or he will kill her. The next day, the family of the accused knew what
happened. Appellant claimed that he is suffering from schizophrenia when
he inflicted violent intentions to Estelita. Trial court suspended the tria; and
ordered his confinement to National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong. After
2 years, he was reported to be behaved and in improved condition and in
mental condition to stand court in trial. Trial of case resumed.

ISSUE: W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to relieve him from criminal

HELD: No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.

Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason
or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the
crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

People of the Philippines vs. Anacito Opuran

FACTS: On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, Anacito

Opuran, herein accused, stabbed Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench.
At 7:45 pm of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was walking on the
national highway of Catbalogan, Samar. Thereafter, the accused emerged
from where he was hiding and stabbed Patrimonio.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused can use the exempting circumstance of

insanity as a defense.

RULING: No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at the prcised

moment of the commission of the act. The accused failed to prove that he
was insane at the precise moment of commission or immediately before
said act. Thus, insanity is not attendant in the case at bar.

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife
Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage,
Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and
the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became
violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her
husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On
the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the
victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause
of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.
Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and
imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an

URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1)
the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of
said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the
trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses
on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
Supreme Court as part of the records.

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman
syndrome as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that
she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly

subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-

called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at
least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising

from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle
of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm
from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order
to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to
the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that
in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in

itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner.
Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in
our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1)
Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It

presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent
danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her
fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time,
he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified

that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion
and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her
will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so

powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a
result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should
concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be

proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the
rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression
from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful
act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally

produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put
her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide.

However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and
without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has
been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE
her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262,
otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors
who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome
do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the
Revised Penal"

People vs. Doquena [68 Phil. 580 (1939)]

Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio
Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual,
Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and
threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased
Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the nape, and
punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to
resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw
at Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and

resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest,
thereby killing the latter. The court held that in committing the act, the
accused acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and
consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was
untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the
brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT program), and thus
convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to
the Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the
appeal by the accused, stating that to determine whether or not there was
discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into

a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the actcommitted.

b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed

c) The time he had at his disposal

d) The degree of reasoning of the minor

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment.

Accused mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of
intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between right and
wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by
therecords in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

Ortega vs. People

Facts:At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old
while the victim was 6. The case was pending when the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending among others
the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. At
the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the
age of majority.

Issue:Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
9344) should be applied, in the resolution of the case.

Held:The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be
applied. By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has
been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is evidently favorable to the
accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by
petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his
mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never assailed in any of the
proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time
of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No.
9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011 | People of the Philippines vs Allen
Udtojan Mantalaba

Facts:Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in

Butuan City received a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was
selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against
Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized
of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for
illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the
ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor

Kriz Abeja | Crim Digests Art. 11+++

and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the
present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there
was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during
the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of custody of the
seized shabu was not established.

Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.


The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the above
testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the
elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer
were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the
marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was
also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not

fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance
will not render an accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but
was of legal age during the promulgation of the decision. It must be noted
that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's decision
against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance
with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
the judgment. However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of
sentence can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the
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promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs

old, therefore his suspension of sentence is already moot and academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority as

privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the
rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than
reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty
should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor
aggravating circumstance.

US v Tanedo










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4 Phil. 350 (1905)


Robert Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were convicted as accessories to

the crime of assassination or murder of four American school-teachers,
having buried the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime. They were
allegedly coerced.

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WON the defense under Art12(5) is tenable


Yes. Not only is Baculis confession that he only assisted in the burial of the
corpses because he was compelled by the murderers, but this was
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Sabate. Sabate said that
he was present when the Americans were killed; that Baculi was not a
member of the group of murderers but he was in the banana plantation
gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run;
that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidro, the leaders of the band;
that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns
forced him to bury the corpses. As for Caballeros, there was no proof that
he took any part in the execution of the crime; there was conclusive proof
to the contrary. Sabate and Baculi declared that Caballeros did not take
any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place
of the occurrence when the burial took place. Their failure to report the
crime is not an offense punished by the Penal Code.

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People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936)

FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina

Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few
minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes stained
with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs
of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to
her house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to
help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining
the thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno
declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child
into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must

be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show
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that the appellant, in causing her childs death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She
had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair
with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took
place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirolshe
considers him her husband as he considers him his wifebegan a year
ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was
his and that theyve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The
appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not
occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which
cause may be considered lawful or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from
the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned
and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to
pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same
place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other
reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be
blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention
on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the
fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted
of the crime that she had been accused of.