Case No. 50- Von Whether Manila Electric is liable for the death of Magno.

PLAINTIFFS OWN NEGLIGENCE IS A DEFENSE IN NEGLIGENCE CASES.

Manila Electric Company v. Rebioquillo (as Guardian of the Heirs of E. Magno) Held:

G.R. No.: L-8328; May 18, 1956 No. The Court found that the ultimate and proximate cause of Magnos untimely
death was his own negligence, and that the presence of the electric wires was
Facts: nothing more than a remote cause for the tragedy. Not only did the Court find that
Manila Electric is correct in its argument that the distance of 3 meters was to be
In August 1950, Efren Magno went to the house of his stepbrother, Antonio
measured from the walls rather than the protrusion of the media agua, it also noted
Penaloza to repair the latters leaking media agua located just below a window of
the fact that the wires had already been there for a period of two years prior to the
the third story of the structure. Magno, who was standing on the media agua,
construction of Penalozas residence, and it was unreasonable to expect the
received 3x6 sheet of galvanized iron from his son thru a window. Upon turning
Petitioner to take note of every illegal building construction close to its wires. Also
his body, however, the iron sheet came into contact with an uninsulated electric
unreasonable was the expectation that Manila Electric would spend a fortune to
wire of Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and children
insulate wires which had already been positioned far from the curious touch of the
filed an action for damages before the RTC which ruled in their favor. The RTC
ordinary pedestrian. The Court finally held that it was the Plaintiffs Own Negligence
decision reasoned that the presence of the wires violated a city ordinance
which was the proximate cause of his own demise, considering that he, as a
mandating that all wires must be at least 3 meters away from all buildings, and
tinsman and carpenter should have been more aware of the danger of the said
highlighted the fact that the said wires, given their high voltage, were uninsulated.
wires considering his age and experience. On the foregoing justifications, the Court
Manila Electric insisted that the media agua was constructed in violation of the
granted the petition and dismissed the Plaintiffs cause.
building permit issued to the owner, and that contrary to the findings of the RTC,
the 3 meter distance ought to be measured from the building instead of protrusions
like the media agua. It also argued that the demand for insulation was prohibitive
given that no insulation had yet to be developed for such wires of high voltage, and Torts Case 51 DAMAGES
that the same would be far too costly. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
a slight modification as to the amount, holding that Manila Electric ought to have PLDT v CA and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN
been more careful given that diligence cannot be measured in meters or inches,
and regardless of the fact that the wires had been existing in the same location at G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989
least two years before the construction of Penalozas house, it still should have
taken necessary precautions to prevent such an incident. Given the adverse rulings Doctrine: A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden
of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts
of the courts a quo, this petition was filed.
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in
the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his
action must fail.
Issue:

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 1

Facts: Spouses Antonio and Gloria Esteban filed a case for a damages in the CFI of
Negros Occidental against PLDT for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July
30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. They alleged that respondent Antonio failed to notice the open
trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of
any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on
her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the
windshield of the jeep was shattered.
PLDT denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent
spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an
independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the
conduit system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte
alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be
answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence or carelessness
of Barte or any of its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it
notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with
the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate
standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the
excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the
traveling public of the presence of excavations.
The CFI found PLDT liable, ordering Barte to reimburse. From this decision both
PLDT and private respondents appealed, the latter appealing only as to the amount
of damages. Third-party defendant Barte did not appeal. The CA dismissed the case.
It held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved
petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages. Spouses filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Spouses filed a motion for leave of court to file
a second motion for reconsideration, which was granted. PLDT filed an opposition
to and/or motion to dismiss said second motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions on the resolution of the second motion
for reconsideration, designated two additional justices to form a division of five. On
September 3, 1980, said division of five promulgated its resolution, penned by
Justice Zosa, setting aside the decision dated September 25, 1979, and affirming in
toto the decision of the lower court.
Issue:Whether or not the Antonio Esteban was negligent
Note: Please look at the case for the issue on whether or not the motion for
reconsideration was filled out on time. It was not. No appeal having been taken
seasonably, the respondent court's decision, dated September 25, 1979, became
final and executory on March 9, 1980. The subsequent resolutions of respondent
court, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing private respondents
to file a second motion for reconsideration and reversing the original decision are
null and void and cannot disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction
to respondent court. This is but in line with the accepted rule that once a decision
has become final and executory it is removed from the power and jurisdiction of
the court which rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke it. The
decision rendered anew is null and void.
Held: Yes, the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of
diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent
omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The findings of the CA clearly show that the
negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries
and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident,
as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed
by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent
Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of
petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident;
the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of
excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of
said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which
caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained
sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As
opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of
warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only
when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is basic
that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own
failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a
societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of
caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 2
last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed
on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of
the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to
danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

There was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We
have for consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio
Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the
accident. The absence of a police report of the incident and the non-submission of a
medical report from the hospital where private respondents were allegedly treated
have not even been satisfactorily explained.

As aptly observed by respondent (a) There was no third party eyewitness of the
accident. As to how the accident occurred, the Court can only rely on the
testimonial evidence of plaintiffs themselves, and such evidence should be very
carefully evaluated, with defendant, as the party being charged, being given the
benefit of any doubt. Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to plaintiffs,
another person could have deliberately engineered a similar accident in the hope
and expectation that the Court can grant him substantial moral and exemplary
damages from the big corporation that defendant is. The statement is made only to
stress the disadvantageous position of defendant which would have extreme
difficulty in contesting such person's claim. If there were no witness or record
available from the police department of Bacolod, defendant would not be able to
determine for itself which of the conflicting testimonies of plaintiffs is correct as to
the report or non-report of the accident to the police department.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 11,

1980 and September 3,1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its original decision,
promulgated on September 25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 3

Torts Case 52 Defense Held: No, the CA did not err in not holding Ray Castillons negligence as the
proximate cause of his death. No cogent reason exists for disturbing the following
NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, vs. findings of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed: To the mind of the
HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON court, this is exactly what happened. When Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the
side road, he slightly veered to the right for his allowance. Ray Castillon, who was
G.R. No. 160709 February 23, 2005 following closely behind, instinctively veered to the left but it was also the moment
when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left towards the side road. At this
juncture both were moving obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the
Doctrine: Negligence as the proximate cause
side of the jeepney throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle
bar on the left front door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away.
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to
The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile show that he did
the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left
not stop even for a second, or less before making the left turn. On the contrary, he
turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
slightly veered to the right immediately followed by the abrupt and sudden turn to
happened.
the left in order to enter the side road. It is apparent that Reynaldo Gamot did not
keep a lookout for vehicles or persons following him before proceeding to turn left.
Facts: In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his
He failed to take into account the possibility that others may be following him. He
brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then
did not employ the necessary precaution to see to it that the road was clear.
invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the
motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his
supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the
right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray
highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they
and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the
and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the
made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray
collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly
and injuries to Sergio.
held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all
probability would not have happened.
The heirs of Ray Castillon, filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert in the RTC of Iligan City. The
Petitioner misunderstood the ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a
complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the
motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared
damages caused to the motorcycle. On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the
therein that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are
court a quo rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents but reduced
presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence".
petitioners liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES (Included the discussion kasi baka tanong ni Atty.)
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not holding Ray Castillons negligence as the
proximate cause of his death. While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of contributory
negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we find it equitable to
increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victims
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 4
negligence. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff P200.00 per month. The amount of P9,672.00, however, appears unrealistic, and
who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover constitutes only 30.34% of the gross earnings. It even includes expenses for
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The cigarettes which by no means can be classified as a necessary expense. Using the
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his cited formula with the net earnings computed at 50% of the gross earnings, a
negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies detailed computation is as follows:
depending on the circumstances of each case.
NET EARNING = LIFE EXPECTANCY [2/3 x GROSS ANNUAL - LIVING
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was CAPACITY (X) (80-age at the time of INCOME (GAI) EXPENSES (50%
driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) death)] of GAI)
has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective X = [2/3 (80-35)] x [P31,876.00 -50% x
helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his P31,876.00]
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of X = [2/3 (45)] x [P31,876.00 - P15,938.00]
these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of X = 30 x 15,938.00
the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall X = P478,140.00
recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage
shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the We sustain the awards of P33,215.00 as funeral and burial expenses being
petitioner. supported with receipts; P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. However, the award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees must be deleted for
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the lack of basis. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at
following factors are considered in determining the compensable amount of lost P3,000.00, based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code. However, the amount has been
earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; gradually increased through the years. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the
and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence amount at P50,000.00. Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the basis
provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the for the award of moral damages in quasi-delict. While it is true that there can be no
formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of
Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second damages cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation, we hold that
factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the the trial courts award of moral damages of P50,000.00 for the death of Ray
deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such Castillon is in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.
earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is
ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision
used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the net earnings
[2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and is computed at 50% of the gross annual income to conform with the prevailing
necessary living expenses)]. jurisprudence, and the FURTHER MODIFICATION that petitioner NELEN LAMBERT is
ordered to pay the heirs of Ray Castillon only 50% of the damages herein awarded,
It was established that Ray was 35 at the time of his death and was earning a gross except attorneys fees which is DELETED for lack of basis.
annual income of P31,876.00 as a driver at the Mindanao State University. In
arriving at the net earnings, the trial court deducted from the gross annual income
the annual living expenses in the amount of P9,672.00, broken down as follows:
P20.00 a day for travel or P520.00 per month; P60.00 a month for cigarettes; P26.00
for drinks; and other personal expenses like clothing, toiletries, etc. estimated at
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 5
Case 53 Rina
Defenses: Plaintiff's Negligence
Doctrine: Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Proximate cause is
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. It was the negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the
negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller,
which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and
not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the
petitioners.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA
PASCUAL, et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO
LIPANA, its President & General Manager, respondents.
G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Rommel's Marketing Corporation ,RMC, maintained two (2) separate current
accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling
appliances.
[In the ordinary and usual course of banking operations, current account deposits
are accepted by the bank on the basis of deposit slips prepared and signed by the
depositor, or the latter's agent or representative, who indicates therein the current
account number to which the deposit is to be credited, the name of the depositor or
current account holder, the date of the deposit, and the amount of the deposit
either in cash or checks. The deposit slip has an upper portion or stub, which is
detached and given to the depositor or his agent; the lower portion is retained by
the bank. In some instances, however, the deposit slips are prepared in duplicate by
the depositor. The original of the deposit slip is retained by the bank, while the
duplicate copy is returned or given to the depositor.]
Petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash
totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing
said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that
these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were
instead deposited to Account of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise
maintains an account with the same bank. During this period, petitioner bank had,
however, been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements
showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never been the
practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing
complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
[ Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish two
(2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the
name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate
copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account
holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and
stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the
original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy
was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would
then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and
change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and
make it appear to be RMC's account number. With the daily remittance records also
prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private respondent RMC together with the
validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number, she made her
company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited
to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited by her and
credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. This went on in a span of
more than one (1) year without private respondent's knowledge.]
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the
return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160. The trial court found petitioner
bank negligent.
Issue:
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the
private respondent RMC petitioner bank's negligence or that of private
respondent's?
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 6
Held::
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. The
seventy-eight (78)-year-old, yet still relevant, case of Picart v. Smith,8 provides the
test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate
copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of
the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate
as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The fact that
the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits
should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone
that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information that of the name of the
account holder should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than
readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more
cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the
account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was
filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the
too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy
was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later
on. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence
to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as
a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad
proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the
bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was
exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig
Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while
he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank
deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures.
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the
petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the
proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's
act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Proximate cause is "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. .
. ." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the
incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the
facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. Apropos,
once again, is the pronouncement made by the respondent appellate court, to wit:
Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the
culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are
negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the
other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof. 19Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if
the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by
the exercise of due diligence. 20Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was
negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with
the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it
cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing
their self-imposed validation procedure.
In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good
father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with
the highest degree of care.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 7
Case 54 Rina
demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to

Defenses: Fortuitous Event respondents demand.

Doctrine: Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous event as Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be .[]Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep
independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the selection and
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; supervision of her employees; that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls.
his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any Petitioner denied liability on the grounds that the fire was a fortuitous
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her
employees.
VIRGINIA REAL, Petitioner,,- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
G.R. NO. 146224 After trial, the MeTC rendered its Decision[6] in favor of the
January 26, 2007
respondent. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court, insisting that
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: the fire was a fortuitous event. RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC.
Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the
Food Center of the Philippine Womens University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Issues:
Manila.Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters Whether the fire was a fortuitous event.
fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU.
Held:
No .
Around 7:00 oclock in the morning, a fire broke out at petitioners Wasabe
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous event as follows: (a)
Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area, including
the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of
respondents stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1
human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes
Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes
the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the
coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed at
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
petitioners stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 8

obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent.[36]

It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes

from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioners fastfood stall and her
employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other
fastfood stalls, including respondents fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not
support petitioners theory of fortuitous event.

Petitioners bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule
in her favor. It is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated
by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.[32] In short, mere allegations are not
evidence.[33]

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another,

there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof
that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition
and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 9
CASE # 55- MEL
Fortuitous Event
DOCTRINE: When a person's negligence concurs with an act of God in producing
damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing
that the immediate or proximate cause of the damages or injury was a fortuitous
event.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE
DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION DIMAANO
and MILAGROS DIMAANO
G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998; Purisima, J.
FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while
petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. On
October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon "Saling" hit
Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner's building was
partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing
of private respondents' house.
An ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by the city building
official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna:
1.
5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the
formation of the building in the area and the general direction of the wind.
Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey
building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general
formation of the building becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated
along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence,
there are portions of the roofing, those located on both ends of the building,
which remained intact after the storm.
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the
roofing structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the
roof beams.
It then recommended that "to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs
and property of persons living in the vicinity," the fourth floor of subject school
building be declared as a "structural hazard."
In their Complaint 6 before the RTC Pasay City, for damages based on culpa
aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the
same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others' houses. Petitioner
averred that typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond human
control" such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought
thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
RTC: in favour of private respondents.
CA: Affirmed RTC
ISSUES:
1. Is the typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event?
2. If so, is the petitioner negligent, such that if it were not, the damage
caused to private respondents' house could have been avoided?
HELD:
Yes, the typhoon "Saling" was a fortuitous event.
SEE 1174 NCC.
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary
that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the
loss may have been occasioned. 12 An act of God cannot be invoked for the
protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to
forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a person's negligence concurs
with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not
exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damages or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 10
 result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention, or
neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 13
Here, there is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
foresight, diligence or care. 15 In order to be exempt from liability arising from any
adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human
participation amounting to a negligent act. 16 In other words; the person seeking
exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as
commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk
or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, 17 or the omission to do
something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
2. No, petitioner was not negligent.
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on
the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection
of petitioner's school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts,
an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. 20 What is visual to
the eye through, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one
who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely
conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or
caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be
clearly shown. (I like this analogy )
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was
conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner's
school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans,
specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective.
Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and
specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such
building was basically flawed. 21
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private
respondents, city building official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of
petitioner's school building were approved prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna
admitted that it was a legal requirement before the construction of any building to
obtain a permit from the city building official (city engineer, prior to the passage of
the Building Act of 1977). In like manner, after construction of the building, a
certification must be secured from the same official attesting to the readiness for
occupancy of the edifice. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of
occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and
proper construction of subject school building. 22
Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by
typhoon "Saling", the same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs
without any deviation from the original design and subsequently, authorized the
use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. These only prove that subject
building suffers from no structural defect, contrary to the report that its "U-shaped"
form was "structurally defective." Having given his unqualified imprimatur, the city
building official is presumed to have properly performed his duties 23 in connection
therewith. In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and
administration who testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of
subject school building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to
present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular
inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and
simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice president's narration.
Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government service
since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the
same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the
case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common
occurrences in this country. If subject school building's roofing was not firmly
anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and
several typhoons even stronger than "Saling."
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the
judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown
negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school
building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the
damage suffered by private respondents' house.
Thus, the petition is GRANTED
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 11

CASE # 56- MEL
Fortuitous Event
DOCTRINE: Human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or
contributory cause of the injury or loss.
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL, ,
vs.
SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA, .
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005; CORONA, J
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erected a
semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the provincial
road of Santiago, Isabela. The building was known as "Super A Building" and was
subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey
residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building.
On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita
Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita).
Petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner-corporation), through its
branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of
lease of the first door of the "Super A Building," abutting the office of Matsushita.
Petitioner-corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The left
side was converted into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for
a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina.
Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three
days later, he returned to Santiago and, after checking his appointments the next
day, decided to "warm up" the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched
on the ignition key, the engine made an "odd" sound and did not start. Thinking it
was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the
accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard
an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he
turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage
when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole
garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and
arms.Respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud
explosions.
The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and concluded that the fire was
"accidental." A criminal complaint for "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage
in Property"1 was filed against petitioner Pascual.
Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against
petitioners for a "sum of money and damages," alleging that Pascual acted with
gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 12
ISSUES:
1. Was there a fortuitous event and thus the petitioner is not liable?
2. If petitioner is liable, is res ipsa loquitor applicable?
HELD:
(This is how the SC explained the non-existence of fortuitous event vis--vis res ipsa
loquitor so ganyan ayos nyan kahit na categorical ung pag-construct ko ng issues.)
1. No, there was no fortuitous event thus petioner is liable.
2. Yes, petitioner is liable based on res ipsa loquitor
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the following requisites must concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge
and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.17
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur
unless there is negligence. "Ordinary" refers to the usual course of events. 18 Flames
spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event.
Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this
case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the
evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same
situation would have employed?19 If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Here, the
fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had
it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his
negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car, constantly
used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For
failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the
necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
Pascual attempted to exculpate himself from liability by insisting that the incident
was a caso fortuito. We disagree.
The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the
human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso
fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal
manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have
participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident. 20
In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or
contributory cause of the injury or loss.21 In a vehicular accident, for example, a
mechanical defect will not release the defendant from liability if it is shown that the
accident could have been prevented had he properly maintained and taken good
care of the vehicle.22
The circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual. Clearly, there
was no caso fortuito because of his want of care and prudence in maintaining the
car. Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the
occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the person in
charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control
of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and
ensure its proper functioning. No other person, not even the respondents, was
charged with that obligation except him. Where the circumstances which caused
the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain
person and, in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened
had that person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack
of such care.23 The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that
he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening. In this
aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents
contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car and had no responsibility
regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 13
CASE #57 CRUZ, YRAH MICARLA M. In another place, on that fateful date, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer
of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain
Defenses: Assumption of Risk fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded
or short-circuited lines. He set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection.
It has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging
voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he
decided to go to the INELCO Office. As he turned right at the intersection of
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he
Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across the
seeks to rescue his endangered property.
street "and the other end was seeming to play with the current of the water."
Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
returned to the NPC Compound.
(First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA
JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI. In
G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
its Answer, Petitioner INELCO advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the
PARAS, J.:
deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. CFI ruled in favor of
FACTS: In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a
Petitioner. CA reversed such decision finding petitioner liable for damages.
strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had
abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death
Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law,
Antonio Yabes, in Laoag City, and proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of which
HELD: YES. Petitioner may be held liable for the deceaseds death. The
she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that
respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be
might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased
exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is
was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may
the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which
be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's
was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance
death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took
of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the deceased screamed
place.
"Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear
dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of
saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the
June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a
water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from
incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that
her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded
defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men
Ernesto to seek help from Antonio. When Antonio was informed that his mother-in
(linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office.
law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. They passed by the City Hall of
Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it
Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Thereafter, they recovered Nana
that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an
Belens body.
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 14

be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this
high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right
to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous
event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).

Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no
application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and
brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, the deceased,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to
see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her
the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the
rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was
faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence,
private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a
result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 15

CASE #58 CRUZ, YRAH MICARLA M.
Defenses: Emergency Rule
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC.,
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: At around 2:00 am of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
was driving a blue Mitsubishi Lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her
home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with
a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before
reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires. Having been
told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach
her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet
away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to
open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to
the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by
a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name
of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed,
and then fell to the ground. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her
thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was
brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)".
Valenzuela filed an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict for serious
physical injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Defendant Richard Li denied
that he was negligent and alleged that Valenzuelas car was improperly parked.
The lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard
Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Art. 2176, CC and
Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
under Art. 2180, CC. CA agreed that Li was liable for damages but absolved
Alexander Commercial Inc. CA found that there was "ample basis from the evidence
of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at
the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car. Richard Li,
contended that he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate
cause of the accident was Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argued
that if he is found negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
ISSUES: Whether or not Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence.
HELD: NO, Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as
a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct
normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does
not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.15
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and
could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not
of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable
precautions.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 16
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of
Li on the night of the accident. The circumstances established by the evidence
adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in
driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed
at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the
street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was
under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively
dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. Li's
obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of
the accident was clearly of his own making.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 17

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
DOCTRINE: In Bahia vs. Litonjua, It is held that from this article two things
are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily
that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
Facts: On May 10, 1958, a collision between the car driven by Augusto Ramos
owned by his father Placido, transpired with a tractor track owned by Pepsi Co.
driven by Andres Bonifacio. As a consequence, the plaintiff filed a complaint against
Pepsi Co. After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961,
finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently
proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. Not satisfied, an appeal was file by the defendant.
The CA affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio
negligent, but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding
that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due
diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio. In rendering the decision, the CA
primarily relied on the testimony of the employee of Pepsi Co. Named Juan T.
Anasco, stating that in employing Bonifacio, they had size him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical
examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second, the practical
driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, The CA sense that
defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
choice or selection of defendant driver'. Further, the CA stated that in order that
the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service."
Defendant Company has taken all these steps.
ISSUE : WON PEPSI CO. EXERCISED DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY?
Yes. Under Art 2180 of the NCC, the owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua, It is held that from this article two things are
apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant
or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
From the testimony of Anasco, it is clearly shown the steps taken by PEPSI,
before employing Bonifacio showing that the former exercise due diligence
of a good father.
N.B. After the case was decided, A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner urging the SC abandon the Bahia ruling.In its stead, We are urged to
apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We cannot however,
abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit mandate of the law. A
motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages caused by its
driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility
shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 18
family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence
consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-
employee.

Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his
employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently
select and supervise his erring employees. We do not and have never followed
the respondent superior rule.8 So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based
as they are on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 19

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER,
petitioners, vs. HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON
TRANPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.
RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.
DOCTRINE: The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to
the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if
the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling
force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity
even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Facts: Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a
vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a
northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of
its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five
(5) of the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted. However, as there
was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability
was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a separate
civil action.[3] They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Petitioners insisted, that the right to file a separate action in this case
prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the
criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the
complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the
prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause
of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on
quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four (4)
years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that
petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to
be dismissed on the ground of prescription.[5]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the
criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment. [6]
Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint
arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed
grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by
petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed.
Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause
of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since
Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits
contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case
was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case
was made.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that
petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delictand had prescribed under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more than four (4)
years after the vehicular accident. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURTS ARE CORRECT IN DISMISSING
THE CIVIL CASE FILED BY THE PETITIONER?
HELD: No. Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a
separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of
this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan,
did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron
Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of
action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in
cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 20
 At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue
the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause
of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto
does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar
to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if
the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling
force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity
even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on
the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in their
complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss[17] and motion for reconsideration[18]
of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising
from crime.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 21

CASE 61_LALA

PROXIMATE CAUSE SPOUSES FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA vs. ERLINDATORRE
CAMPO SONKIN

G.R. NO. 193659 JUNE 15, 2015

PERLAS -BERNABE, J.

CASE DOCTRINE: While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendants
wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous
to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only given to ease the
defendants grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the
extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. (SEE ART. 2179)

FACTS: The petitioners-spouses Vergara (Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Sonkin (Sps.
Sonkin) are adjoining landowners. The property owned by the Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin
Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara
Property).

The Sps. Sonkin constructed a house on their property using a portion of the
partition wall as part of the wall of the masters bedroom and bathroom.

Thereafter, the Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of their property
making it even higher than that of the Sonkin Property. Eventually, Sps.
Sonkin began to complain that water coming from the Vergara Property was
leaking into their bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well
as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 22
repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall on their
property in order to contain the landfill that they had dumped thereon, but the
same went unheeded.
Hence, Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and issuance of a temporary
restraining order against Sps. Vergara, as well as Sps. Rowena Santiago
and Harold Santiago, Dolores Vergara-Orbistondo, and Rosario Vergara-
Payumo, the other possessors of the Vergara Property.
In a Decision dated January 4, 2007, the RTC found Sps. Vergara civilly
liable to Sps. Sonkin for damages.
The CA on appeal ruled that while the act of the Sps Vergara in elevating
their property was the proximate cause of the water seepage, the Sps.
Sonkin were guilty of contributory negligence in building their house directly
abutting the perimeter wall. Thus, it deleted the actual damages ordered by
the RTC. It nevertheless awarded the Sonkins moral damages and attorneys
fees.
Hence this appeal by the Sps Vergara.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sps Sonkin are entitled to moral damages.
HELD: NO. Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in
dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall
back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is
nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe
the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for
disregarding the legal easement (to receive water from higher estates)
constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and
equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkins contributory negligence, the Court deems it
appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendants wrongful act or
omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only
given to ease the defendants grief and suffering and should, therefore,
reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the
wrong done.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 23
CASE 62_LALA indemnity for loss of income.

PROXIMATE CAUSE In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its
billboard structure was due to extraordinarily strong winds that occurred
instantly and unexpectedly, and maintained that the damage caused to
RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION VS ADWORLD SIGN AND Adworld's billboard structure was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise filed
ADVERTISING CORPORATION AND TRANSWORLD MEDIA ADS, INC. a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the collapsed
billboard structure in the former's favor. It was alleged therein that the
G.R. NO. 204866 JANUARY 21, 2015 structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and poor foundation not suited for
billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as such, Ruks should ultimately be
PERLAS -BERNABE, J. held liable for the damages caused to Adworld's billboard structure.

For its part, Comark denied liability for the damages caused to Adworld's
billboard structure, maintaining that it does not have any interest on
CASE DOCTRINE: Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
Transworld's collapsed billboard structure as it only contracted the use of the
omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in
same. In this relation, Comark prayed for exemplary damages from
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
Transworld for unreasonably including it as a party-defendant in the
person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
complaint.
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.

Lastly, Ruks admitted that it entered into a contract with Transworld for the
construction of the latter's billboard structure, but denied liability for the
FACTS: The instant case arose from a complaint for damages filed by damages caused by its collapse. It contended that when Transworld hired its
Adworld against Transworld and Comark International Corporation (Comark) services, there was already an existing foundation for the billboard and that it
before the RTC. In the complaint, Adworld alleged that it is the owner of a 75 merely finished the structure according to the terms and conditions of its
ft. x 60 ft. billboard structure located at EDSA Tulay, Guadalupe, Barangka contract with the latter.
Mandaluyong, which was misaligned and its foundation impaired when, on
August 11, 2003, the adjacent billboard structure owned by Transworld and
used by Comark collapsed and crashed against it. Resultantly, on August 19,
The RTC found both Transworld and Ruks negligent in the construction of
2003, Adworld sent Transworld and Comark a letter demanding payment for
the collapsed billboard as they knew that the foundation supporting the same
the repairs of its billboard as well as loss of rental income. On August 29,
was weak and would pose danger to the safety of the motorists and the other
2003, Transworld sent its reply, admitting the damage caused by its billboard
adjacent properties, such as Adworld's billboard, and yet, they did not do
structure on Adworld's billboard, but nevertheless, refused and failed to pay
anything to remedy the situation. In particular, the RTC explained that
the amounts demanded by Adworld. As Adworld's final demand letter also
Transworld was made aware by Ruks that the initial construction of the lower
went unheeded, it was constrained to file the instant complaint, praying for
structure of its billboard did not have the proper foundation and would require
damages in the aggregate amount of P474,204.00, comprised of
additional columns and pedestals to support the structure. Notwithstanding,
P281,204.00 for materials, P72,000.00 for labor, and P121,000.00 for
however, Ruks proceeded with the construction of the billboard's upper
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 24
structure and merely assumed that Transworld would reinforce its lower
structure. The RTC then concluded that these negligent acts were the direct
and proximate cause of the damages suffered by Adworld's billboard.
In a Decision dated November 16, 2011, the CA denied Ruks's appeal and
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC
declaring Ruks jointly and severally liable with Transworld for damages
sustained by Adworld.
HELD: No. Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure
to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand,whereby such other person suffers injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's finding that Transworld's
initial construction of its billboard's lower structure without the proper
foundation, and that of Ruks's finishing its upper structure and just merely
assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two
(2) successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the
damages sustained by Adworld. Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully
aware that the foundation for the former's billboard was weak; yet, neither of
them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on
each other's word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none
was done at all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both
Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the construction of the
former's billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its collapse and the
resulting damage to Adworld's billboard structure. As joint tortfeasors,
therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, "[j]oint tortfeasors are
those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act
together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other,
unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint
tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves." The Court's
pronouncement in People v. Velasco is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not
same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer
is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors] whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In conclusion, the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring Ruks
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 25
jointly and severally liable with Transworld for damages sustained by
Adworld.
Case no. 63 A person injured cannot claim damages if it is shown that the
proximate cause of the injury was his/her own negligent act.
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., represented by its General
Manager and Chief Executive Officer, GABRIEL A. TORDESILLAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE TANGONAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with three passengers
figured in a mishap along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey,
Cagayan. It was driven by its owner Camilo Tangonan who died from the
accident, while his companions respondent Rapanan and one Erwin Coloma
suffered injuries.
On March 29, 2000, Rapanan and Camilos common law wife, respondent
Mary Gine Tangonan, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan a complaint2 for damages against petitioner. They alleged that
while the victims were traversing the national highway, they were struck
and electrocuted by a live tension wire from one of the electric posts owned
by petitioner. They contended that the mishap was due to petitioners
negligence when it failed to fix and change said live tension wire despite
being immediately informed by residents in the area that it might pose an
immediate danger to persons, animals and vehicles passing along the
national highway.
In its Answer,3 petitioner alleged that the typhoons that struck its areas of
responsibility caused some of its electric poles to fall and high tension wires
to snap or cut-off which caused brownouts in said areas. It claimed that they
cannot be faulted for negligence if there were electric wires dangling along
the national road since they were caused by typhoons which are fortuitous
events. It likewise contended that the proximate cause of the mishap was
the victims negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the
motorcycle they were riding on.
Rapanan testified5 that he, Camilo and one Erwin Coloma were riding a
motorcycle along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan on
October 31, 1998, around 9:00 in the evening. He claimed that they saw a
wire dangling from an electric post and because of a strong wind that blew,
they got wound by said dangling wire.
According to Dr. Hasim, the abrasions of Rapanan were caused by pressure
when the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but she is uncertain as
towhether a live electric wire could have caused them. She further said that
she did not find any electrical burns on Rapanan. As with Camilo, she found
abrasions and hematoma on his body and that the cause of death was due
to "cardio respiratory arrest secondary to strangulation." She also opined
that the strangulation could have been caused by an electric wire entangled
around Camilos neck.
Petitioner, for its part, presented four witnesses among whom were SPO2
Pedro Tactac, Tranquilino Rasosand Rodolfo Adviento.
SPO2 Tactac, who investigated the incident, testified7 that there was a skid
mark on the cemented portion of the road caused by the motorycles foot
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 26
rest which was about 30 meters long. According to him, it appears that the
motorcycle was overspeeding because of said skid mark.
Rasos and Adviento, employees of petitioner, both testified8 that as a result
of the onslaught of typhoons Iliang and Loleng in Buguey and Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, the power lines were cut off because the electric wires snapped
and the electric poles were destroyed. After the said typhoons, petitioners
employees inspected the affected areas. The dangling wires were then
removed from the electric poles and were placed at the foot of the poles
which were located four to five meters from the road.
On December 9, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision9 in favor of petitioner
and dismissed the complaint for damages of respondents. It held that the
proximate cause of the incident is the negligence and imprudence of Camilo
in driving the motorcycleOn appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and held
petitioner liable for quasi-delict. the CA found that despite the different
versions of how the incident occurred, one fact was consistent the
protruding or dangling CAGELCO wire to which the victims were strangled or
trapped. The appellate court nevertheless ruled that the victims were partly
responsible for the injuries they sustained. At the time of the mishap, they
were over-speeding and were not wearing protective helmets. Moreover,
the single motorcycle being driven carried three persons. While said
circumstances were not the proximate cause of Camilos death and
Rapanans injuries, they contributed to the occurrence of the unfortunate
event.
Issue: (1) Was petitioners negligence in maintenance of its facilities the
proximate cause of the death of Camilo and the injuries of Rapanan?
Held: No.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.
From the testimonies of petitioners employees and the excerpt from the
police blotter, this Court can reasonably conclude that, at the time of that
fatal mishap, said wires were quietly sitting on the shoulder of the road, far
enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to passing
motor vehicles and even pedestrians. Hence, if the victims of the mishap
were strangled by said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle
careened towards the shoulder or even more likely, since the police found
the motorcycle not on the shoulder butstill on the road, that the three
passengers were thrown off from the motorcycle to the shoulder of the
road and caught up with the wires. As to how that happened cannot be
blamed on petitioner but should be attributed to Camilos over speeding as
concluded by the police after it investigated the mishap.
Based on the cross examination, the foregoing shows that the motorcycle
was probably running too fast that it lost control and started tilting and
sliding eventually which made its foot rest cause the skid mark on the road
(skid mark that lasted up to 30 meters from the start to the place where the
motorcycle fell).
Therefore, the mishap already occurred even while they were on the road
and away from petitioner's electric wires and was not caused by the latter
as alleged by respondents. It just so happened that after the motorcycle
tilted and slid, the passengers were thrown off to the shoulder where the
electric wires were. This Court hence agrees with the trial court that the
proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of Camilo. Had Camilo
driven the motorcycle at an average speed, the three passengers would not
have been thrown off from the vehicle towards the shoulder and eventually
strangulated by the electric wires sitting thereon. Moreover, it was also
negligent of Camilo to have allowed two persons to ride with him and for
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 27
Rapanan to ride with them when the maximum number of passengers of a
motorcycle is two including the driver. This most likely even aggravated the
situation because the motorcycle was overloaded which made it harder to
drive and control. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.16

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 28


Case no. 64 - Foreseeable Intervening Causes: If the intervening cause is
one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or
one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO,
respondents.
FELICIANO, J:
At about 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way
home he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio
had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car
and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding
down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation)
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he
saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The
dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna
Street. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in
such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The
dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner
Armando U. Carbonel, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on
the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries
was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a
curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare
in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix
and Carbonel
The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence
in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was
merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent
Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause
determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. Petitioner
alleged that court did not take into consideration the fact the private
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 29
respondent had no curfew pass, that he was speeding, that he turned off
the headlight and that he was intoxicated.
Issue: who is liable for the proximate cause of the injuiry? (Phoenix! But
Dionisio is guilty of contributory negliegence)
Held:
(Curfew pass)
Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during
the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have
misplaced his curfew pass. This certification was to the effect that private
respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not,
however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of
the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was
unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the
accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not
have such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-
possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the
other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he
had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to
avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station
for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.
(speeding home)
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident almost
immediately after it occurred, testified that people who had gathered at the
scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did
not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he
was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour 3
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly
smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently
startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions
from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and
should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight
should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it
could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump
truck.
(purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally
malfunctioned, just moments before the accident)
The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of
Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal
as to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio
purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so
as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a
resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We
believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that
offered by private respondent Dionisio i.e., that he had his headlights on
but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient
way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his
lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.
(intoxication)
The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the
effect that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was
taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an
unconscious condition. There simply is not enough evidence to show how
much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 30
faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that
"one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He
was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that
was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner
Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's
injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner,
the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character
of the intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a
"passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient
cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's
car would in a probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone
driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible.. What the Petitioners describe as an
"intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the
petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from
Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the
defendant may be negligent among other reasons, because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual
and customary wind arising later wig spread it beyond the defendant's own
property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The
person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public
place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. ... In all of
these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's
conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence
consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. (I placed this
just incase feel ni maam itanong J)
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the
risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant
has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening
forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 31
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the
usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as
usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who
leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a
vehicle or a train will run into it; ...

We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only

contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts

To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the

fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission.

The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the
dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the
following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the
part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked
when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in
vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

The court ordered Phoenix to shoulder 80% of the damages

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 32


CASE # 65 - NOMBRE
G.R. No. 160110 June 18, 2014
MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, Petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ,
Respondents
DOCTRINES:
(1) Employer-employee relationship: An employer may be held liable under
the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine,
a person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage
or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either
directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances (Art. 2180).
(2) Rebuttal of presumption of negligence: The general rule is that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision of his employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved of
liability. (Note: However, in this case, it does not apply).
FACTS: On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) owned by
respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora) and driven by Antenojenes Perez
(Perez), was hit by a Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) registered
under the name of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim) and driven by petitioner
Mariano C. Mendoza (Mendoza).
An Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries was filed against Mendoza. Mendoza, however,
eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate complaint for damages
against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for lost
income, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of
the suit.
According to PO1 Melchor F. Rosales (PO1 Rosales), investigating officer of
the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu truck, coming from Katipunan Road
and heading towards E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along the
downward portion of Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the corner
of Riviera Street, fronting St. Ignatius Village, its left front portion was hit by
the Mayamy bus. According to PO1 Rosales, the Mayamy bus, while
traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the lane occupied by the Isuzu
truck.
PO1 Rosales also reported that Mendoza tried to escape by speeding away,
but he was apprehended in Katipunan Road corner C. P. Garcia Avenue by
one Traffic Enforcer Galante and a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.
As a result of the incident, Perez, as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu
truck sustained injuries necessitating medical treatment amounting to
P11,267.35, which amount was shouldered by respondents. Moreover, the
Isuzu truck sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights and
steering wheel, amounting to P142,757.40.
Respondents also averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily income
of P1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying plastic scraps and
delivering them to recycling plants, respondents claimed that the Isuzu truck
was vital in the furtherance of their business.
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in
question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim,
the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had
the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport)
under the so-called "kabit system." Respondents then impleaded both Lim
and Enriquez.
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented Teresita Gutierrez (Gutierrez),
whose
testimony was offered to prove that Mayamy Bus or Mayamy Transport is a
business name registered under her name, and that such business is a sole
proprietorship. Such was presented by petitioners to rebut the allegation of
respondents that Mayamy Transport is a corporation; and to show, moreover,
that although Gutierrez is the sole proprietor of Mayamy Transport, she was
not impleaded by
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 33
respondents in the case at bar.
RTC: found Mendoza liable for direct personal negligence under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, and it also found Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of
the same Code. As regards Lim, the RTC relied on the Certificate of
Registration issued by the Land Transportation Office on 9 December 1996
in concluding that she is the registered owner of the bus in question.
Although actually owned by Enriquez, following the established principle in
transportation law, Lim, as the registered owner, is the one who can be held
liable.
CA: affirmed RTC with the exception of the award of unrealized income
which the CA ordered deleted Unsatisfied with CA ruling, petitioners filed
this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Mendoza was negligent.
2. Whether or not Lim can be held vicariously liable.
3. Whether or not the presumption of negligence in this case may rebutted.
HELD: 1)YES. As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was
negligent in driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact
that, at the time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the
Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly
in violation of traffic laws. Article 2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation. Mendozas violation of traffic laws was the proximate cause
of
the harm. Before the collision, the Isuzu truck was in its rightful lane, and was
even at a stop, having been flagged down by a security guard of St. Ignatius
Village. The mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast
speed as
shown by the impact of the collision, and going in the opposite direction as
that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said
Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to spin, injuring Perezand the helpers,
and considerably damaging the Isuzu truck.
2. YES. Mendozas employer may also be held liable under the doctrine of
vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who
has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to
another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or
subsidiarily under certain circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability
or imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the
basis for damages in the action under said article is the direct and primary
negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his
employee.
As to why Lim and not Enriquez:
As accorded in te case of Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas: registered
owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously
liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. Also
Citing Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom in Filcar, the Court ruled that
in so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor
vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is
considered merely as an agent of such owner. Thus, whether there is an
employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver
is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death
caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.
3. NO. Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after
the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris tantum5 and
not juris et de jure6; consequently, it may be rebutted.
Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in the selection and supervision of his employee he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption
is overcome and he is relieved of liability. However, with the enactment of the
motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned
task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage are no longer
available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the
motor
vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180. This does
not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against Enriquez
and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the
actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code,
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 34
whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the
claim.
CASE # 66 NOMBRE
G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON,
Petitioners,
vs. FULGENCIO DACARA*, Respondent.
DOCTRINE: (1) Art. 2189 NCC capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it
exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the petitioner
to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is
tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable.
(2) Art. 2219(2) NCC specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for
quasi delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries.
There can be no recovery or moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted
in physical injury.
(3) Art. 2231 NCC mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, it is subject to
the discretion of the courts but cannot be awarded unless claimants show
their entitlement to moral, temperate or actual damages.
FACTS: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of herein respondent was driving the
Toyota Corolla of his father along Matahimik St. in Quezon City. While
driving, the vehicle rammed into a pile of earth (street diggings) as the street
was being repaired by the Quezon City government. As result, Dacara
allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damages when it turned turtled as it hit the pile of earth. Indemnification was
sought from the City Government but it yielded negative results. Dacara Sr.
on behalf of his minor son filed a complaint for damages against herein
petitioner (QCG). In its answer, QCG alleged that the diggings were provided
with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks
placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. QCG claimed
that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all
necessary measures to avoid accident. Such claim was disproved by the
investigation report which stated that the deep excavation was without any
warning device.
RTC: On the basis of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment in favor
of Fulgencio Dacara and ordered QCG to pay the former actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
CA: Affirmed trial courts decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not negligence of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was the proximate
cause of the accident.
2. Whether or not award for moral damages is proper.
3. Whether or not award for exemplary damages is proper.
HELD: (1) NO. Art. 2189 NCC capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it
exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the petitioner
to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is
tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable.
Petitioner pointed out that Fulgencio was driving at the speed of 60kph which
was above the maximum limit of 30kph when he met the accident, so he can
be presumed negligent based on Art. 2185. Such a matter was not raised at
any time during the trial and was only raised for the first time in their Motion
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 35
for Reconsideration. The Supreme Court held it was too late to raise such
issue.

(2) NO. Art. 2219(2) NCC specifically allows moral damages to be recovered
for quasi delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries.
There can be no recovery or moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted
in physical injury. In the case at bar, Fulgencio testified that he suffered a
deep cut on his left arm. However, no other evidence such as a medical
certificate, was presented to prove such bare assertion of physical injury.
Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral
damages. Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury inflicted on a person. Moral
damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof that the person
experienced emotional and mental suffering. Mere allegations do not suffice,
clear and convincing proof is necessary.

(3) YES. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, it is

subject to the discretion of the courts but cannot be awarded unless
claimants show their entitlement to moral, temperate or actual damages. In
the case at bar, petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of the
incident, thereby establishing his right to actual damages. Art. 2231 NCC
mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Such a circumstance
obtains in the instant case. The City Government failed to show the modicum
of responsibility, much less, care expected from them by the constituents of
the city. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street-digging in a
side street which caused the accident in the so-called 'premier city'.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 36


Case #67 (Velasco, Divina G.)
Causation : Remote Cause
Doctrine: The negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS
and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II,
JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 143363 ; February 6, 2002
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way
to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. James Daniel
II, then 15 years old and a student of the same school, allegedly drove
the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained.
Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case for
damages against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr.
and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 37
Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City for the
death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos.
RTC ordered:
Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City to pay the
plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos:
a) P50,000.00 indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;
b) P40,000.00 actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for
burial and related expenses;
c) P10,000.00 for attorneys fees;
d) P500,000.00 for moral damages; and to pay costs.
Defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel, being
subsidiarily liable, were ordered to pay the amount of damages
above-stated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St.
Marys Academy of Dipolog City.
Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the
commission of the tort and who was under special parental
authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED.
Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any
liability.
Petitioner St. Marys academy appealed. CA reduced the actual
damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirmed. Motion for
reconsideration denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
RULING:
NO. CA held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive
and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the
jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers;
or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field
trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 38

In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between
the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence
of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
Respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was
the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and
Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the
cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep
of Vivencio Villanueva. No one disputed the report and testimony of
the traffic investigator as to the cause of the accident. Respondents
did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II.
There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It
was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva,
who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the
vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at
the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy
had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident. Not liable for moral damages also. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. In
this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to
petitioner. Death indemnity and attorneys fees also deleted for
petitioner.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 39
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the
vehicle was respondent Villanueva. We have held that the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways
or streets. The accident occurred because of the detachment of Case #68 (Velasco, Divina G.)
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Causation : Concurrent Causes

PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, petitioners, vs.

CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-21512 ; August 31, 1966

CONCEPCION, C.J.

FACTS:

In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two

trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna-
Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and
owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each
other in a road curve. Agripino Custodio a passenger of LTB bus, who
was hanging on the left side as truck was full of passengers was
sideswiped by the truck driven by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino
Custodio was injured and died.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 40

The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took
place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955
when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a
sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the
six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on
board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda. Under
the above-stated condition, there exists strong persuasion to accept
what Belen Makabuhay and Sofia Mesina, LTB passengers, had
testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast
rate of speed. Lagunda admitted that the presence of three hanging
passengers located at the left side of the bus was noted when his
vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus, and yet
despite the existence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road
which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not care to exercise
prudence to avert the accident simply because to use his own
language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.
Belen Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, testified that the 6 x 6
truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda
had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been
sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided
with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6
x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Agripino Custodio. It is incredible
that the LTB was running on the middle of the road when passing a
curve. He knows it is dangerous to do so. We are rather of the belief
that both trucks did not keep close to the right side of the road so they
sideswiped each other and thus Agripino Custodio was injured and
died. In other words, both drivers must have driven in their trucks not
in the proper lane and are, therefore, both reckless and negligent.
It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was
hanging on the left side of the LTB bus. Otherwise, were he sitting
inside the truck, he could not have been struck by the six by six truck
driven by Aser Lagunda. This fact alone, of allowing Agripino Custodio
to hang on the side of the truck, makes the defendant Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages. For certainly its
employees, who are the driver and conductor were negligent. They
should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that
manner.
CFI Laguna and CA held that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.
hereinafter referred to as the carrier and its driver Nicasio Mudales,
had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas
petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by
reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable in the manner
above indicated.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively
to the negligence of the carrier and its driver.
2) Whether petitioners were guilty of negligence.
3) Whether petitioners can be held solidarily liable with the carrier
and its driver.
RULING:
1 & 2) NO, both are liable and YES, petitioners were negligent.
(Answers are interrelated.)
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 41
The carrier and its driver were guilty of negligence for
having allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the running board
of the bus, in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that
this negligence was the proximate cause of Agripino's death.
3) YES. Petitioners contend that they should not be held
solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver, because the
latter's liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that
of the former springs from a quasi delict. The rule is, however,
is that:

However, the petitioners were also guilty of contributory
negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of the
accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners' truck was
running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was
negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its
right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle
portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the
opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its
running board.
Petitioner Lagunda testified that he saw the passengers riding
on the running board of the bus while the same was still 5 or 7
meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the
distance between the two (2) vehicles was such that he could
have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were
not running at a great speed.
According to the great weight of authority, where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission
of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination,
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, and it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have caused the entire
injury, or the same damage might have resulted from
the acts of the other tort-feasor.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is

independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck
driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate
cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the
negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced
this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein.
What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of
time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's
bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite
direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last
clear chance.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 42


CASE #69- PROXIMATE CAUSE (Andal, John Caleb C.)
"The general principle is that the violation of a statute or
ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident,
in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the
statute or ordinance was intended to prevent."
G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
FACTS: The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by
defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for
hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi
Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of
Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The said second
floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters,
and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it
had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape
ladders and the presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on
the wall.
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke
out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute.
Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four
instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute were
present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be
afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is
made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the street.
They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway
two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of the
instructresses, took to the microphone so as to convey to the students
the above admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped three
students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino Meliton, the registrar,
whose desk was near the stairway, stood up and tried with
outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing and pushing their
way to the stairs. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the
students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes
kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby
causing stampede therein.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 43
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the
panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister
of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on
account of the stampede.The injuries sustained by Lourdes
Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes and on the upper lip,
contused abrasions in different parts of the body, internal hemorrhage
and fractures in the second and third right ribs. The cause of death,
according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic
fractures of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the
conjunctiva of both eyes. The deceased's five brothers and sisters
filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner
and operator of Realistic Institute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to comply with the requirement of
the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez.
HELD: NO. The case of Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs.
Medina, G. R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957, is cited in support of
the contention that such failure was not the proximate cause. It is
there stated by this Court:
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by settling
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Having in view the decision just quoted, the petitioner relates the
chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as
follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3)
shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6)
injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only
a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes which produced the
injury complained of. A statement of the doctrine relied upon is found
in Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo, L-8328, May 18, 1956, wherein
this Court, citing Corpus Juris said:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede
were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs
from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and
resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance
with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other
events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its
occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one,
since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a
specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 44
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this
particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single
stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused
the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go
down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the
authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one
stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. Thus,
as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 841: "The general
principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency
if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened,
was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate
cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true
perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at
the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what
the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two
stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by
the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such
violation.
CASE #70- PROXIMATE CAUSE (Andal, John Caleb C.)
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action
if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980,
petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the
tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he
stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of
the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and
Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the
opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the
one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his
soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed
his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide)
and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was
used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran
away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him
again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo,
causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict
further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 45
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe
brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the
incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the
Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to
report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was
brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural
health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but
instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla
had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions
returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate. Upon the
intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle
their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Urbano advanced P400.00 to
Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of
barangay captain Soliven. At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980,
Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was
having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended
to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by
tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's
palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15,
1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. Filomeno
Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from
the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death
HELD: YES. In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used
in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus,
like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable
that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of
tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction
of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than
six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound
was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he
died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of
the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v.
Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 46
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al.
(99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of

an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause."

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of

criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal
liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay
mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier.

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and

remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual
case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of
civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.

Torts Defenses until Proximate Cause | 47