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In a duly probated last will and testament of one Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the naked
ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct to the
children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The fishpond is situated
at a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan.
The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo turned out to be fourteen,
namely: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria, Teodora, and Juan, all surnamed Perez,
Apolonio Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and
Servillano Perez. On the other hand, Teodorica de la Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her will
all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P. Policarpio who used to give them
proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them. During the term of the lease, however, three of
the usufructuaries died, namely, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez, and so,
upon their death, both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares
corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries in the amount of P10,714.26. Because of these
conflicting claims, the lessee withheld said amount.
Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego
de Dios who, after executing the contract of lease, came to know of the existing conflicting claims,
and not knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of the deceased usufructuaries should be
paid, said lessee was also constrained to withhold the corresponding part of the usufruct of the
property. So on November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action for interpleader
against both the naked owner and surviving usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims.
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory that since the usufructuaries
were instituted simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries
did not extinguish the usufruct, hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares
corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries, the usufruct to continue until the death of the last
usufructuary.
When the case was called for hearing, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision upon the
submission of their respective memoranda considering that the issue involved was purely legal in
nature, and on March 29, 1963, the trial court rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to the
sum of P10,714.25 representing the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries in the lease
rental due from plaintiff Gil Policarpio, ordering the latter to deliver to said defendant the
aforesaid amount; and likewise declaring said defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to share
with the eleven usufructuaries in the proceeds of the lease contract executed by them with
plaintiff Batas Riego de Dios, ordering the latter to deliver to him such amount as would be
equivalent to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries, with the parties bearing their
own costs and expenses of litigation.
The important issue to be determined is whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond
in question are the ones entitled to the fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased
usufructuaries or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.
Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares of the
deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil Code which provides "A usufruct constituted in favor of
several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the
last survivor." On the other hand, appellee contends that the most a usufruct can endure if
constituted in favor of a natural person is the lifetime of the usufructuary, because a usufruct is
extinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary intention clearly appears (Article
603, Civil Code). Hence, appellee argues, when the three usufructuaries died, their usufructuary
rights were extinguished and whatever rights they had to the fruits reverted to the naked owner.
If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three usufructuaries has the effect of
consolidating their rights with that of the naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code
would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary
extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears. Furthermore, said theory would cause a
partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides
that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The theory of appellee
cannot, therefore, be entertained.
The well-known Spanish commentators on the counterpart of Article 611 we have copied above
which implicitly provides that the share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the
benefit of the surviving usufructuaries, also uphold the view we here express. Thus, the following is
their comment on the matter:
Al comentar el articulo 469 (now Art. 564) hablamos, entre formas de constitucion del
usufructo, del disfrute simultaneo y sucesivo. Ninguna duda cabe, puesto que el derecho de
acrecer es aplicable a los usufructuarios, segun el Art. 987 (now Art. 1023), sobre la no
extincion del usufructo simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que sobreviva. . . .
Si a varios usufructuarios se les lega la totalidad de una herencia; o una misma parte de
ella, se da el derecho de acrecer cuando una de ellos muere despues del testador,
sobreviviendo otro y otros?Como dice la obra anotado, el Digesto admitio, segun un texto
de Paulo, la solucion afirmativa, y Pothier reprodujo dicha doctrina.
It, therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is
accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before
the end of the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament
and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none. On the contrary, the testatrix
constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction that
they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that,
should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of
the will are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby
declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary,
appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money
withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.