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Nikolai Bukharin
Theory and Practice From The Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism

Written: 1931

Source: Science at the Crossroads: Papers Presented to the International Congress of the History of Science and technology

Held in London from June 29th to July 3rd, 1931 by the delegates of the U.S.S.R, Frank Cass and Co., 1931

Online Version: For marxists.org May, 2002

What is a crisis? A crisis is a time of danger or great difficulty. We hear of a a time of danger or great difficulty in present-day capitalist economy. And the present-day capitalist economy i.e., An economic
system based on private ownership of capital in the 1930s. and this crisis in present-day capitalist economy has caused a most profound crisis in the whole of capitalist culture. So present-day capitalist
economy creates a crisis in the whole of capitalist culture. capitalist economy drives or expresses capitalist culture. So present-day capitalist economy has primacy over the whole of capitalist culture.
And profound i.e., Coming from deep within present-day capitalist economy. And in profound we have going thoroughly and penetratingly into a the depths of a problem. So it is this article that wishes to
penetrate into the problem of the profound crisis in the whole of capitalist culture. But what is culture? Culture is the intellectual and artistic achievements or expressions. Culture also is about the refined
appreciation of the arts etc. (person of culture). In this article, culture means customs, achievements, etc. of a particular civilization or group. But at this point we know that this crisis in present-day
capitalist economy is difficult to fathom or understand. But the it is difficult to fathom or understand in the profound crisis which exists within the whole of capitalist culture.
The crisis of present-day capitalist economy has produced a most profound crisis in the whole of capitalist culture; a crisis in individual branches of science, a crisis in epistemology, a crisis in world
outlook, a crisis in world feeling.
What is epistemology? Epistemology is the philosophical theory of knowledge. So epistemology is found in Philosophy. So an example in epistemology is Methodological analysis. So epistemology is a
philosophical theory of knowledge. What is a theory? A theory is a possibility. It is a Hypothesis. Otherwise a theory is understood as a tentative insight into the natural world; a concept that is not yet
verified but that if true would explain certain facts or phenomena. So Capitalism is facing a crisis. But what is this crisis in Capitalism? Bukharin is claiming that the present form of Capitalism has
produced this crisis. It has produced a crisis in the whole capitalist culture. So Capitalism of his time has produced this crisis in the whole of capitalist culture. Furthermore, we have a crises in the
philosophical theory of knowledge i.e., epistemology. Epistemology being everything that is known. But lets break this paragraph up by further analysis.

The crisis of present-day capitalist economy has produced a most profound crisis
So we have a crisis. We have a crucial stage or turning point in the course of something. It is that Bukharin believed that this was the turning towards Socialism. It was a belief in Capitalism at the
crossroads. And this Capitalism at the crossroads would lead to its next point i.e., socialism. This is because Marxism teaches that Socialism will follow Capitalism and this was a profound belief, at the
time. But Bukharin is saying that we have a crisis in the present day. So it is in the historical moment of an economic crisis. So Bukharin is saying that Capitalism is at a crossroads. And he is saying that
the Capitalist system has produced a profound crisis. So it is an occasion that marks a juncture or a change. For a crises marks a transition point i.e., at the crossroads.

in the whole of capitalist culture;


So we proceed on about this crisis in capitalist culture. What is culture? Culture is all the knowledge and values shared by a society. So by knowledge we mean: The psychological result of perception,
learning, and reasoning. So we are on about the way things are seen or perceived, learnt and rationalized. And we are on about the way elements fit into the whole system. We are talking of the The
psychological result of perception, learning, and reasoning, in Capitalism. For people are confined within the conditions of Capitalism. So they perceive, learn and reason, within that context. For the
Capitalism has its own products i.e., culture. And we said that culture is the knowledge and values shared by a society. So we have a crisis in the knowledge and values of Capitalism. Values are the
Beliefs of a person or social group in which they have an emotional investment (either for or against something).

a crisis in individual branches of science,


So we proceed on that this crisis is in the individual branches of science. What are the branches of science? It is the areas in which science is practiced. Science being the Ability to produce solutions in
some problem domain. So we are on about ability. So here we are touching on about potential. In other words we are talking about the adaptability of humans. For in the social context, human beings
must adapt and evolve. So we are going on about capability in being able to produce and use knowledge to improve the conditions of man. So we are talking of competence or competency based on the
conditions that enable such abilities that are most suitable for man. So we are penetrating the conditions that are most condusive for man to develop. This is because science has the Ability to produce
solutions in some problem domain. But what are the branches of science? The branches of science are Agrobiology. Agrobiology is the study of plant nutrition and growth, especially as a way to increase
crop yield. And agrology? Agrology is the Science of soils, in relation to crops. And Agronomy? Agronomy is the application of soil and plant sciences to land management and crop production.
Architectonics is the science of architecture. Architecture being the profession of designing buildings and environments with consideration for their esthetic effect. We will not go on and define all the
branches of science. But here are some of the branches of science. We have cognitive science, cryptanalysis, cryptanalytics, cryptography, cryptology, informatics, information processing, information
science, IP, linguistics, math, mathematics, maths, metallurgy, metrology, natural history, natural science, nutrition, psychological science, psychology, scientific agriculture, social sciences, strategics,
systematics, tectonics, thanatology. So Bukharin is saying that these branches of science lie at the heart of present-day capitalist economy. Why? Because the individual branches of science serve the
larger social structure i.e., the capitalist economy. These branches are developments from certain fundamental aspects. They are parts of the whole, the Capitalist system. And the main engine to the
Capitalist system is its economic system. So these individual branches of science serve and are elements stemming from the whole economic system. Hence, if we want to look at any profound crisis, we
have to look at the whole. And we hear of epistemology. This epistemology is the study of the method and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity. So we have the study of
the way of doing something (method) and grounds i.e., extent of a subject dealt with e.g the book covers a lot of ground of knowledge. Basically epistemology is the theory of knowledge. Epistemology
asks how do we know something? And knowledge is the fact or condition of knowing. How do we know that what we know is correct? knowledge is the fact or condition of knowing something with a
considerable degree of familiarity, gained through experience, of or contact or association with the individual or thing so known. and within this theory of knowledge we are looking at the process of
producing knowledge. For even in this we have a way i.e., method. How do we generate knowledge? For often knowledge is just mere repetition and reformulation i.e., parroting what was said before. But
Bukharin is saying that we have a crisis in epistemology (the method and grounds of knowledge). knowledge is the acquaintance with or theoretical or practical understanding of some branch of science,
art, learning, or other area involving study, research, or practice and the acquisition of skills. Epistemology comprises Methodological analysis and methodology. So it is all about looking at knowledge per
se and the underlying methods that brought knowledge about. For knowledge cannot be produced of its own accord, in isolation.
a crisis in epistemology,

So Bukharin is going on about the crisis in branches of science. He proceeds that we have a crisis in epistemology. But what is epistemology?
a crisis in world outlook, a crisis in world feeling. In such historical circumstances the question of the interrelations between theory and practice has also become one of the most acute problems, and,
moreover, as a question both of theory and of practice simultaneously. Therefore we have to examine problems from various aspects:
We have this crisis in world outlook too. But what is this crisis in world outlook? This is mental attitude. This is the opinions or ways of thinking about the world; it is the behaviour reflecting this. And it is
necessary to make a detailed inspection of these problems from various aspects. The various aspects are listed below. So to examine the problems we need to look at the various aspects. The various
aspects are epistemology, sociology, history, modern culture. verifying the corresponding theoretical conceptions of the revolution, and making a forecast. So to understand this crises we must look at
epistemology, sociology, history, modern culture. verifying the corresponding theoretical conceptions of the revolution, and make a forecast. The question of the interrelations between theory and practice
is an acute problem. The question both of theory and of practice simultaneously is more importantly looked at. The simultaneity of theory and practice comes into the spotlight.
Theory is a system of ideas explaining something, esp. one based on general principles independent of the particular things to be explained. A system of ideas that explains something. Like the system of
ideas that explain evolution, the Capitalist system, the crisis in world outlook etc. This system being the complex whole; the set of connected ideas making up the organized body of knowledge on each of
those listed. We did list a few examples of theories i.e., system of ideas being evolution, the Capitalist system, the crisis in world outlook and so on. For a theory of the crisis in world outlook would be the
set of connected ideas explaining the crisis in world outlook. In other words the organized body of knowledge that explains the crisis in world outlook, that corresponds to reality. So any explanation is a
set of connected ideas or system of ideas. and a system of ideas is a pattern or construction of mental impressions or concepts. These mental impressions or concepts may be to some degree based in
reality or not. But we have the simultaneity of theory and practice. That is that theory and practice are occurring or operating at the same time. So they are concurrent.

(a) as a problem of epistemology,


(b) as a problem of sociology,
(c) as a problem of history,
(d) as a problem of modern culture. Lastly, it is interesting
(e) to verify the corresponding theoretical conceptions from the gigantic experience of the revolution, and
(f) to give a certain forecast.

In what succeeds we have the fundamental questions of philosophy. We need to answer important questions. This critical question is the question of the objective reality of the external world, independent
of the subject perceiving it, and the question of its cognisability (or, alternatively, non-cognisability). So we hear of objective reality. The question of the objective reality of the external world. Objective
means emphasizing or expressing things as perceived without distortion of personal feelings, insertion of fictional matter, or interpretation. So we have an undistorted perception of the world. Distortion is
alteration or misrepresentation of the world. So hence an altered or misrepresented reality is being presented in distorted reality. For this external world is independent of the subject perceiving it. We
remember that we have this external world and the internal world. And the external world is independent. It exists independently of the observer. The observers world is his unique pattern or system of
ideas. we previously called this system of ideas a set of connected ideas. but this is subjective in that it is still the observers world i.e., his unique pattern or system of ideas. The observers world is a
reflection of the external world i.e., objective reality. The external world is independent of the subject perceiving it i.e., it is objective. And in cognisability we wonder whether, or to what degree, the
objective reality is known. How can the subject know the object. In other words how can the observer know the external world i.e., cognisability of the external world.
We remind ourselves that epistemology is: the philosophical theory of knowledge. And knowledge is the psychological results of perception and learning and reasoning. knowledge is a
psychological result. In this we have that knowledge issues from mental functioning. So epistemology is all about the observers world; the system of ideas that is uniquely his or her own. In this sense it
is clearly and obviously subjective. The observers world is particular whereas the world of reality is general, in that it encompasses the whole. The observers world is a particular psychological result.
Thought this psychological result can be characteristic of a class.
1.-The epistemological importance of the problem. The crisis in modern physics-and equally in the whole of natural science, plus the so-called mental sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) -has raised as an
urgent problem, and with renewed violence, the fundamental questions of philosophy: the question of the objective reality of the external world, independent of the subject perceiving it, and the question
of its cognisability (or, alternatively, non-cognisability).

In the succeeding piece we hear of the schools of philosophy. All these schools of philosophy start from the thesis, considered irrefutable, that I have been given only my own sensations. That being I
have been given only my own sensations. Why this: I have been given my own sensations. And these schools of philosophy claim it Impossible to deny or disprove. This being the unique, distinctive
sensations. And any thesis is an unproved statement put forward as a premise in an argument. The schools of philosophy mentioned are pure description and renovated pragmatism. And we have pure
in the Marxian sense of the term. Pure as in the abstract i.e., like pure Mathematics (see the Poverty of Philosophy.) In pure we mean Concerned with theory and data, rather than, practice; opposed to
applied. Applied science would mean practical and useful in the world of reality. And this I have been given my own sensations covers theologising metaphysics to the Avenarian-Machist philosophy.
pragmatism being the doctrine that practical consequences are the criteria of knowledge and meaning and value. Dialectical materialism is the exception to this. dialectical materialism is the exception to
what? dialectical materialism is the exception to this I have been given my own sensations. And this I have been given my own sensations is an irrefutable thesis; a treatise advancing subjectivism as a
new point of view.
Nearly all the schools of philosophy, from theologising metaphysics to the Avenarian-Machist philosophy of pure description and renovated pragmatism, with the exception of dialectical materialism
(Marxism), start from the thesis, considered irrefutable, that I have been given only my own sensations.[1]

[1] Compare Ernest Mach: Analyse der Empfindungen, and his Erkenntnis und Irrtum; K. Pearson: The Grammar of Science, Lond. 1900.
H. Bergson: 'L'evolution creatrice, Paris, F. Alcan, 1907.
W. James: Pragmatism, N. York, 1908, and his The Varieties of Religious Experience, Lond. 1909.
H. Vaihinger: The Philosophy of As If, Berlin, 1911.
H. Poincare: La Science et l'Hypothese, Paris, E. Flammarion, 1908.

In the same circle of ideas there moves the logistics of B. Russell. The latest literature on this subject includes the work of Ph. Frank, M. Schlick, R. Carnap, et al. Even the almost materialist Study takes
his stand on the principle quoted: Compare his The realistic view of the world and the doctrine of space, I. Teil: The problem of the external world.

2. ungearbeitete Aufl, Vieweg & Sohn, 1923. This statement, the most brilliant exponent of which was Bishop Berkeley, [2]

[2] George Berkeley: Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Volume 1. of Works, Editor Frazer, Oxford., 1871.

In the following, below we hear of all those mentioned above i.e., the schools of philosophy, and their exaltation into a new gospel of epistemology. We need to learn that epistemology is the philosophical
theory of knowledge. So these schools of philosophy are given high moral or intellectual value; they are elevated in nature or style. They are exalted into a new written body of teachings of a religious
group of the philosophical theory of knowledge a.k.a subjective forms -the theologising metaphysics to the Avenarian-Machist philosophy.
is quite unnecessarily exalted into a new gospel of epistemology. When, for example, M. Schlick [3] [3] 3 Morifz Srhlick: The turn of the philosophy to knowledge, volume 1., No. 1.

'' Because I'm convinced that we are objectively authorized to toe DETL fruitless dispute of the system as ended (NB). (p. 5). on this basis builds up a completely final (quite endgultige) turning point in
philosophy, it sounds quite naive. Even R Avenarius [4]

[4] R. Avenarius: Critique of Pure Experience, volume 1. Leipzig, 1888, pp. 7. and 8.
Below we hear of the instability of this initial axiom. What is this instability of this initial axiom? it is something to do with pure description and renovated pragmatism taking on this I have been given
my own sensations. In this I have been given my own sensations; in that we are talking of subjectivism. This is the initial axiom. An axiom being a proposition that is not susceptible to proof or disproof;
its truth is assumed to be self-evident. So an axiom is a self-evident truth. It is an assumption, taken for granted. And the self-evident truth or axiom is mentioned above in I have been given my own
sensations. This is the initial axiom, of the mentioned schools of philosophy, with the exception of dialectical materialism (Marxism). Thus we have the exceptionalism of dialectical materialism (Marxism).
But this exceptionalism of dialectical materialism (Marxism) is purely on its system of ideas i.e., as an organized body of knowledge. Yet we have Bukharins communist doctorum opinio, mentioned later.
This communist doctorum opinio is mentioned and in it we allude to Berkeley's thesis rooting itself within. But Bukharin mentions the instability of this initial axiom of the cited schools of philosophy. He
then contends that Berkeley's thesis is strolling up and down all the highways of modern philosophy. Berkeley is an Irish philosopher and Anglican bishop who opposed the materialism of Thomas Hobbes
(1685-1753). Hobbes was a English materialist and political philosopher who advocated absolute sovereignty as the only kind of government that could resolve problems caused by the selfishness of
human beings (1588-1679). Bukharin goes on about Berkeley's thesis. Bukharin goes on that Berkeley's thesis is even rooted in the communist doctorum opinio with the tenacity of a popular prejudice.
And doctorum opinio is scientific consensus. Communis opinio doctorum was inititially the common opinion of the doctors. Interesting: Marx was called the doctor. And Berkeley's thesis is within the
communist doctorum opinio; with the tenacity of a popular prejudice. Prejudice being partiality that prevents objective consideration of an issue or situation. So prejudice prevents objective consideration.
So prejudice stops people from being in a certain state, objective state. So prejudice is linked to subjectivity. For prejudice is partiality, biase and one-sidedness. And we have it mentioned that this thesis
of Berkeley will not stand up to the test of serious criticism. In serious criticism we imply a serious study, analysis. And criticism is evaluating or analyzing with knowledge and propriety works i.e.,
Berkeley's thesis &c. serious criticism involves considering the nature of the above mentioned schools of philosophy. The above mentioned schools of philosophy are the schools of pure description and
renovated pragmatism. The pure description and renovated pragmatism cover the theologising metaphysics to the Avenarian-Machist philosophy. So these subjectivist schools will not stand the test of
serious criticism. In that serious criticism would involve considering the nature of what constitutes their outlook. And serious criticism would look at the history, intent and nature of these as an organized
body of knowledge. Thus in the following piece Bukharin highlights these schools of philosophy as being vulnerable. So a Critique of these schools of philosophy would expose this vulnerability. An Attack
on these subjective schools would open up and expose it as conquerable. The problem is that this doctrine is rooted in the communist doctorum opinio with the tenacity of a popular prejudice. Was this,
Berkeley's thesis, exposed through criticism? Was it conquered?
thought it necessary to emphasise all the instability of this initial axiom. Yet at the present time Berkeley's thesis is strolling up and down all the highways of modern philosophy, and has become rooted
in the communist doctorum opinio with the tenacity of a popular prejudice. Nevertheless, it is not only vulnerable, but will not stand the test of serious criticism.

It is defective in various respects; to the extent that it contains I and my; to the extent that it contains the conception of given; and lastly to the extent that it speaks only of sensations.
Why does the text say that Berkeley's thesis is defective in various respects? This is in that it has within it I and my. I being used by a speaker or writer to pass reference to himself or herself. So it is
said to be self-referential. The use of my infers me or myself. We have this containment of I and my. It is thereby characterised as self-referential. This self-referentiality goes to the extent that it holds
the conception of given; and lastly to the extent that it speaks only of sensations. In this we have the conception of being handed over. Thus the whole idea of knowledge being given. Being given the
chance to help. To give is to confer ownership. So we have I and my and given in this Berkelian thesis. And furthermore it speaks only of sensations. Lets just sum it up as I, my, given and
sensations. In given we have to put into the possession of another, for his use. And in this given we have cause to act or serve for a purpose; bring into service. So we have it that it obliges one to be
grateful and thereby indebted i.e., under a legal obligation. We think of the administering of sacraments. This idea of given in that something committed to the trust or keeping of another for a definite
purpose. It does not consider how it came through a historical process. Behind that would lie the idea that if poor it is ultimately to have some holy revelation, all mystical pronouncement i.e., through that
situation. Hence the Karmic idea in that it all lies in the past lives, being given another chance. This containment of I and my are highly subjective. And we still go on about sensations. For every
sensation is thereupon conveyed as a religious epiphany in this language of thought. Hence the idea that god speaks through you. So we are on about a kind of self-absorbed system of ideas. Thus lets
call it the ideology of self-immersion. But why immerse oneself in this way? This devotion to (oneself) fully detracts from the whole system of things. It kind of holds the idea you take care of yourself and
let others be. This ideology of self-immersion is completely attention; intense mental effort attending to self. Hidden meanings are sought in sensations. So in sensations we have faculties through which
the external world is apprehended. It is absorbed with the inherent cognitive or perceptual powers, more so, than the greater system of things. But in given we have to impart a tendency or propensity
too. This imparting a tendency or propensity alludes to a pattern or archetypical disposition. This cannot be scientific because it looks only at the atom but not the structure of which the atom is a part.
Reductionism involves the analysis of complex things into simpler constituents. In this, the simple constituent, is the individual entity. It is the individual entity, seperated from the complex whole. The
atom, simple constituent, is seperated from the complexity, is made up of related parts a.k.a the whole. So in reductionism, we have abstraction implied. For in a simple constituent we have it somehow
becoming an absolute. This simple constituent is absorbed with its own identity, ignoring the relationships and broader context. Ignorance of the relationships and broader context defines the ideology of
self-immersion. You, the individual, encompasses and expresses the universe. But lets move on. In the above, we understand that the world of reality is transformed in the inner world- transformed and
mystified. Thence this mystified, inner world, foists itself onto the existent reality.

In point of fact, it is only in the case of the first-created Adam, just manufactured out of clay and for the first time seeing, again with eyes opened for the first time, the landscape of paradise with all its
attributes, that such a statement could be made.

In the following we have it that any empirical subject always goes beyond the bounds of pure sensual raw material. What is an empirical subject? And empirical means: derived from experiment and
observation rather than theory. So it is not subjective, but, involving experimentation and observations. Anything empirical chooses to use experimentation and observation, over simple theory. Theory
involves just narrating a scenario to some degree describing the existent reality. This empirical subject always goes beyond the bounds of pure sensual raw material. So we are going beyond the
bounds of pure sensual raw material, in empiricism. And in this we allude to the empirical. It is going beyond the bounds of what you just merely see and hear and the other sensations. Is this not having
much to do with sensational, in that it commands attention in this sphere? But empiricism trancends pure sensationalism. Subjectivism embraces pure sensationalism. Sensationalism is all about inducing
sensations. Such sensationalism is about arousing or suited or designed to arouse a quick, intense, and usually superficial emotional response. And what is this sensual raw material? a raw material is a
material suitable for manufacture or use or finishing. So here we have the raw material that creates sensations. sensationalism is a doctrine in philosophy that postulates the origin of all our knowledge,
in sensation, or sense perceptions. From this we go on into his experience, representing the result of the influence of the external world on the knowing subject in the process of his practice, stands on
the shoulders of the experience of other people. So experience is representing the result of the influence of the external world on the knowing subject. The knowing subject is the observer. And
experience is in empiricism- expressed or is representative of the result of the influence of the external world. So the influence of the external world brings experience about. This is empiricism. So
empiricism holds that in the process of practice, one stands on the shoulders of the experience of other people. This on the shoulders of the experience of other people is important in that it alludes to a
history; this is implied or suggested a.k.a a connotation. And the process of his practice is accumulated experience i.e., a division of labour, in practice, that is historical. It is critical to understand that in
the empiricist's I there is always contained we. Why is in the empiricist's I there is always contained we so important? It is because in the empirical or scientific, the result is the influence of the
external world on the knowing subject, in the process of his practice, stands on the shoulders of the experience of other people. The important phrase being on the shoulders of the experience of other
people. Within experience we understand a trial or test. We have it that the trials or tests are built upon. By test we mean critical examination or trial of a person's or thing's or qualities. So a critical
examination overrides pure ideology or subjectivism. But we must not forget that pure action always has an element of bias. And we need to make a critical examination of Capitalism by actions agains
the pure ideology or subjectivism that defines the bourgeois world. For the bourgeois shows that something works or produces results, but is defined and shaped according the pure ideology or
subjectivism a.k.a the interests of the bourgeois. So the trials or tests of history are the actual real interaction between the social forces. And because contradiction, is inherent, we have this expressing
the obviousness of it being: an unresolved contradiction. But do all contradictions need to be resolved? If the evolution of the bourgeoisie implies the destroying of the proletariat; hence we would have a
conflict in which one or the other would be annihilated. Can the bourgeoisie annihilate the proletariat? But in this we hear of the pure ideology or subjectivism, which is expressed in Ignorance of the
relationships and the broader context. How can anything that is Ignorant of the relationships and the broader context be called scientific? And it inevitably is seperated from the complex whole. But
empiricism is somewhat different. empiricism unites the complex whole; empiricism takes into consideration the relationships making up the complex whole. The following reading mentions that in the
empiricist's I there is always contained we. This in the I there is always contained we, is underlined by on the shoulders of the experience of other people. For on the shoulders of the experience of
other people we have we being implied. And we hear that in the pores of his sensations there already sit the products of transmitted knowledge. What are these pores of his sensations? A pore is a
admitting passage. For the sensations are admitted through the senses. So we hear of the pores of his sensations. We also hear of the products of transmitted knowledge. Knowledge is transmitted and
therefore underlines the point of empiricism i.e., that in the I there is always contained we. For on the shoulders of the experience of other people we imply transmitted knowledge. For knowledge is the
(technical) knowledge and skill required to do something. We rely on the knowledge and skill, of others, to learn for ourselves. So this basically destroys the subjectivity of the I. for to know anything of
the I we use the transmitted knowledge, of others. We have the external expression of this all around us. transmitted knowledge is found all and everywhere. These are basically expressed in speech,
language and conceptions. How can we even consider thinking about the I without speech, language and conceptions? These are the products of transmitted knowledge. One person learns speech,
language and conceptions and passes on that knowledge to another, hence transmission. We continue: for in his individual experience there are included beforehand society, external nature and history.
So society, external nature and history proceed the individual experience. Maybe this is why we have the worship and looking up to the ancestors, in certain cultures. They retain an element of in the I
there is always contained we. For through history, we find transmitted knowledge. So the individual experience is never purely an individual experience. For society, external nature and history underlies
this individual experience. By this society, external nature and history we imply social history . We remind ourselves what social history is. social history is living together or enjoying life in communities or
organized groups. We derived transmitted knowledge by established life in communities or organized groups. We hear that the epistemological Robinson Crusoes are just as much out of place. What are
these epistemological Robinson Crusoes? Robinson Crusoe being a representation of this atomistic social science of the eighteenth century. But what is epistemological Robinson Crusoes? We
remember that the philosophical theory of knowledge is called epistemology. We hear of Robinson Crusoe being out of place. Why out of place? Experience is also direct observation of or participation in
events. But what of empirical experience? For these are the methods and knowledge of accumulated experience i.e., the growth of knowledge or skill. In method we have a way of doing something,
especially a systematic way; implying an orderly logical arrangement. This orderly logical arrangement is the constructed system. In this orderly logical arrangement we have structured or a coherent
whole that is logically arranged, deliberately arranged, often in advance. In structured we mean orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent relation of parts. By direct observation of or participation the
orderly logical arrangement we are able to develop a system. And the more consistent, ordered and logically arranged the better the operation of that system. And this orderly, logical, and aesthetically
consistent relation of parts of Capitalism took ages to develop. And describing the development of the orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent relation of parts is largely involved in the writings on the
genesis of Capitalism. But our Robinson Crusoe is a product of the we in the isolation of his island. In the same way the modern Robinson Crusoes are completely atomistic almost in the same sense
as atomistic social science of the eighteenth century. The word atomism is used in psychology. Atomism is a theory that reduces all mental phenomena to simple elements (sensations and feelings) that
form complex ideas by association. So we have input a.k.a sensations and feelings which together forms complex ideas. In atomism complex ideas are just a combination of sensations and feelings. But
any empirical subject always goes beyond the bounds of pure sensual raw material. So atomism is not empirical. For it is caught up in the boundaries of pure sensual raw material. It retains and is
restricted within the boundaries of pure sensual raw material. So it needs to break out of the boundaries of pure sensual raw material. There is more to the world of pure sensual raw material.
In the above we talked of the philosophical theory of knowledge i.e., epistemology. But my thoughts are on that the knowledge is derived by the orderly relationship of parts. For in the orderly
relationship of parts we imply a logical structure. For the individual experience is derived within the orderly relation of parts, that is the system. So we have extended this in the I there is always contained
we. For now the we is the whole of objective reality. We thereby cannot separate knowledge from the whole, the objective reality. So it is reading into whole. So the external world is represented in the
thoughts of the observer. And this representation is an orderly relation of parts. Hence the thoughts of the observer also derive some sort of inner representative logic. We have it that the orderly relation
of parts, in the existent reality is represented as an orderly relation of parts of the inner reality. We live within an orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent relation of parts. We ourselves being a
compononent, unit of this orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent relation of parts. And we are directly observing or participating in the workings of this orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent
relation of parts. To observe can mean to conform one's action or practice to (as a law, rite, or condition). So the actor in this wants to conform within the orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent
relation of parts. This orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent relationship of parts being the holders of laws. So the inner representative logic is based on perception (observation) within the confines
of this orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent relationship of parts. We have the development of a system according to the development of people. But this brings in the transcendance of reality and
the further expression within a world of illusion. For now we can be directly observing or participating in a virtual reality. And this virtual reality is nevertheless has an orderly, logical, and aesthetically
consistent relation of parts, though not in actual reality.
Any empirical subject always goes beyond the bounds of pure sensual raw material; his experience, representing the result of the influence of the external world on the knowing subject in the process of
his practice, stands on the shoulders of the experience of other people. In his I there is always contained we. In the pores of his sensations there already sit the products of transmitted knowledge (the
external expression of this are speech, language and conceptions adequate to words). In his individual experience there are included beforehand society, external nature and history -that is, social
history. Consequently, epistemological Robinson Crusoes are just as much out of place as Robinson Crusoes were in the atomistic social science of the eighteenth century.

But the thesis criticised is defective not only from the standpoint of I, my, only sensations. It is defective also from the standpoint of given.
In the succeeding piece we hear the defective thesis is criticised, not only from the standpoint of I, my, only sensations. The thesis is defective also from the standpoint of given. But what is the
defective thesis? This being the thesis that this piece critiques. It is defective from the standpoint of I. This is this pure ideology or subjectivism that Ignores the relationships and the broader context.
Hence it is atomistic, in other words seperated from the complex whole. So this standpoint of I ignores somewhat the idea of on the shoulders of the experience of other people. It takes the individual
subjective reality to be absolute. It is highly reductionist. Reductionism involves the analysis of complex things into simpler constituents. So the simpler constituent becomes the dominant form of thought.
To some degree, or another, everyone is reductionistic to some extent. But the position of the standpoint of I is reductionist. It relegates all of reality to the individual sensations of a particular. So the
whole is only reduced in the ideology of self-immersion. It is completely self-absorbed. In this system every particular or particle or atom speaks as a prophet.

Below we hear of the work of A. Wagner. It is written that the doctrinaire professor represents the relations of man and nature from the very outset not as practical relations. So man's relations with nature
are from the very outset not practical relations. Why does the work of A. Wagner do this i.e., say that man's relationship with nature are, from the very outset, not practical relations? What is practical?
Practical means relating to, or manifested in practice or action. And practice or action? practice is the habitual action or performance. Practice is commonly understood as repeated activity undertaken in
order to improve a skill. But in this case, I think, practice means action as opposed to theory. Practice also here can mean actually applied or in reality. So A Wagner does not see representations of the
relations of man and nature as actually applied. And what are the representations of the relations of man and nature? So a representation means to stand for or corresponds to the representations of the
relations of man and nature. So in the relations of man and nature we find something corresponding. A representation is a creation that is a visual or tangible rendering. So we have a visual or tangible
rendering of the relations of man and nature. So we have in this that the relations of man and nature are visible i.e., given physical form. These representations of the relations of man and nature do not
have practical purpose or use, says A Wagner, the doctrinaire professor. What are the practical relations? These relations are practical meaning those founded on action, something done. So these
representations of the relations of man and nature are founded on action. To A Wagner they are theoretical i.e., concerned primarily with theories or hypotheses rather than practical considerations. I
think that in theoretical we mean subjective. But people never begin by standing in theoretical relationship with objects outside the world. What are these objects outside the world? And standing in
theoretical relationships? For that is not the beginning, we hear, that man does not initially have a standing in theoretical relationships with objects outside the world.
Examining the work of A. Wagner, Marx wrote: The doctrinaire professor represents the relations of man and nature from the very outset not as practical relations- that is, those founded on action, but as
theoretical... but people never begin under any circumstances with 'standing in theoretical relationship with objects outside the world.

Below we hear about human beings begin by eating, drinking, etc. So this is their beginning i.e., deriving the most fundamental of needs (eating, drinking, etc) like other animals. So like other animals,
humans function actively. And in this human functioning we have that with the help of their actions take possession of certain objects of the outside world, and in this way satisfy their requirements. They,
humans, take possession of certain objects of the outside world. And in possession we have act of having and controlling property (tangible property). Action is thereby linked to taking possession. So it is
through action being linked to taking possession that we have satisfaction of human requirements. How do human beings realize their requirements (needs)? They satisfy their basic needs by taking
possession of certain objects in the outside world. In this ownership is linked to taking possession. Human beings expropriate from nature to fulfil their fundamental needs. So to fulfil their fundamental
needs they take possession of the world around them. And to take possession of the world we imply belonging to oneself or itself. So what belongs, or is owned, is functional i.e., serving the realizing the
fundamental requirements. So to have power or mastery over the objects of the outside world we must possess them. So power is linked to taking possession (owning). When holding objects of the
outside world we derive the power thereby. So in the satisfaction of basic requirements we derive the genesis of the power and all that goes with it.
Like other animals, they begin by eating, drinking, etc. -that is, they do not 'stand' in any relationship, but function actively, with the help of their actions take possession of certain objects of the outside
world, and in this way satisfy their requirements. (Consequently they begin with production.) [5]

This is from an extraneous text. And Berkeleian is synonomous with petit-bourgeois vision (perceptual experience of seeing). So the Berkeleian vision is reductionist. So what I see is how you are. It i.e.,
the Berkeleian vision is here indicated to be purely sensational. It purely reduces The analysis of complex things into simpler constituents. So it is atomism in that it purely simplifies, stereotypes and
makes this abstractionism. And this Berkeleian vision reduces social being to perceived being. You are what I see you to be, says the Berkeleian vision. So it is fundamentally sensory. So the reduction
social being to perceived being, seeming being. But the seeming is an appearance as such, but it is not necessarily so. In seeming we have impressions of being true, probable, or apparent. So the
apparent is passed off as an absolute. We hear about giving theatrical performances (representations) in order to be the object of mental representations. What is this giving theatrical performances? And
this is a deliberate display of emotion for effect. So they display, embellish and colour the social being to this. They distort and direct the way we should perceive the social being. So their perception is
foisted onto the social being. We could extend this onto the whole, the world of reality. And this is what is implied by theatrical performances. For a theatrical performance is the representation of that
object. A representation is a presentation to the mind in the form of an idea or image. In this we have an idea or image presentated to the mind in a particular form. And the way the theatrical performance
is produced, indicates the underlying interest or features. Thus we know that any representation or theatrical performances is a form of social production. We also hear that this reduces the social world
to the sum of the (mental) representations which the various groups have of the theatrical performances put on by the other groups. We therefore have this reduction of the social world. In this reduction
of the social world we have an act of reducing complexity. We hear of the sum of the (mental) representations which the various groups have of the theatrical performances put on by the other groups. But
what are the sum of the (mental) representations which the various groups have? This is the combination or parts that make the whole i.e., the sum of the (mental) representations which the various
groups have. So even in this sum of the (mental) representations which the various groups have, we have a reductionism. For the whole sum of representations is each a reduced theatrical performance.
We hear of the virtue of insisting on the relative autonomy of the logic of symbolic representations. So the Berkeleian or petit-bourgeois vision is insists on the relative autonomy of the logic of symbolic
representations. What is this relative autonomy of the logic of symbolic representations? autonomy is capacity of a system, here the logic of symbolic representations, to make its own decisions about its
actions. The Personal independence of the logic of symbolic representations. And as theatrical performances the logic of symbolic representations is still given autonomy. In autonomy we can even see it
as an output of reductionism. And more reductionist in that it is alienated or estranged from the material determinants of socio-economic conditions. The material determinants or socio-economic
conditions are relationships that link in to the logic of symbolic representations. Hence the logic of symbolic representations cannot be seperated from the material determinants or socio-economic
conditions.
The Berkeleian i.e., petit-bourgeois vision which reduces social being to perceived being, to seeming, and which, forgetting that there is no need to give theatrical performances (representations) in
order to be the object of mental representations, reduces the social world to the sum of the (mental) representations which the various groups have of the theatrical performances put on by the other
groups, has the virtue of insisting on the relative autonomy of the logic of symbolic representations with respect to the material determinants of socio-economic condition.

Now we will hear about the individual or collective classification struggles . Classification is the act of distributing things into classes or categories of the same type. So we have this distribution of things
into classes or categories. For collectively or individually we distribute things into classes or categories. The individual or collective classification struggles have an aim. What is the aim of the individual or
collective classification struggles? It is aimed at transforming the categories of perception and appreciation of the social world. We also hear of the forgotten dimension of the class struggle. What is the
forgotten dimension of the class struggle? This forgotten dimension of the class struggle is the transformation of the categories of perception and appreciation of the social world. So we have categories
of perception as the forgotten dimension of the class struggle. We also have appreciation of the social world as a forgotten dimension of the class struggle. We consider, on hearing about the
classificatory schemes which underlie agents. A scheme is an internal representation of the world; an organization of concepts and actions that can be revised by new information about the world. So
these are internal representations of the world that classify. So we have this organization of concepts and actions in a given classification.
The individual or collective classification struggles aimed at transforming the categories of perception and appreciation of the social world and, through this, the social world itself, are indeed a forgotten
dimension of the class struggle. But one only has to realize that the classificatory schemes which underlie agents practical relationship to their condition and the representation they have of it are
themselves the product of that condition, in order to see the limits of this autonomy. Position in the classification struggle depends on position in the class structure; and social subjects including
intellectuals, who are not those best placed to grasp that which defines the limits of their thought of the social world , that is, the illusion of the absence of limits are perhaps never less likely to transcend
the limits of their minds than in the representation they have and give of their position, which defines those limits.

[5] Karl Marx: On the book of Adolph Wagner. First published in Marx and Engels Archives, Volume. 5., pp. 387-388, Moscow, 1930. Marx's italics.

The criticised thesis is the work of A Wagner. It is said to be wrong on the basis that the thesis expresses a calmly passive, contemplative point of view, and not an active, functioning point of view, that of
human practice, which also corresponds to objective reality. What is meant by it has a calmly passive, contemplative point of view? Passive we will take to mean: Peacefully resistant in response to
injustice. And in contemplative we have deeply or seriously thoughtful viewpoint. A deeply or seriously thoughtful viewpoint is not a threat, it is benign and merely subjectivism and purely idealism. For the
opposing position would be active, disposed to take action or effectuate change.

Thus the thesis criticised is incorrect also because it expresses a calmly passive, contemplative point of view, and not an active, functioning point of view, that of human practice, which also corresponds
to objective reality. Thus, the far-famed irrefutable epistemological axiom must fall to the ground. For it is in categorical contradiction to objective reality. And it is in just as categorical contradiction to the
whole of human practice; (1) it is individualistic and leads directly to solipsism; (2) it is anti-historical; (3) it is quietist.

Therefore it must be rejected with all decisiveness. Lest there should be any misunderstanding: we entirely adopt the standpoint that sensuality, sensual experience, etc., having as their source the
material world existing outside our consciousness, constitute the point of departure and beginning of cognition.
We hear that the work of A. Wagner must be rejected with all decisiveness. There is an adopted standpoint. This is that is that sensuality, sensual experience, etc., having as their source the material
world exists outside our consciousness. So we hold that sensations have their source in the material world. And this sensations have their source in the material world is the adopted standpoint. It is
important to emphasize that it exists outside our consciousness. What exists outside our consciousness? This existence outside our consciousness emphasizes that it is independent of our minds. This is
a point of departure and beginning of cognition. Why is it a point of departure and beginning of cognition? The material world is the source of sensuality, sensual experience, etc.

It was just from this that began the philosophical rebellion of Feuerbach against the yoke of the idealistic abstractions and pan-logism of Hegel. Of course, individual sensations are a fact. But historically
there is no absolutely unmixed individual sensation, beyond the influence of external nature, beyond the influence of other people, beyond the elements of mediated knowledge, beyond historical
development, beyond the individual as the product of society-and society in active struggle against nature.
In the next we hear of the philosophical rebellion of Feuerbach against the yoke of the idealistic abstractions and pan-logism of Hegel. So the philosophical rebellion of Feuerbach is significant. Significant
in rebelling against the idealistic abstractions and the pan-logism of Hegel. Pan logism is basically universal logic. Idealism being of or relating to the philosophical doctrine of the reality of ideas. So
Feuerbach rebelled agains the philosophical doctrine of the reality of ideas. Abstractions? The process of formulating general concepts by abstracting common properties of instances. Or otherwise it
means a concept or idea not associated with any specific instance. It also could be the act of withdrawing or removing something. We have it that historically there is no absolutely unmixed individual
sensation. What is this unmixed individual sensation? So no sensation is beyond the influence of external nature. So one cannot sense anything that is beyond the effect of external nature. An effect is a
result or consequence of an action etc. An effect can also be the impression produced on a spectator, hearer, etc. Considering that we are the result of nature, as human beings. So we cannot have an
unmixed individual sensation, that is super natural, beyond the influence of external nature. And can we have an unmixed individual sensation beyond the influence of other people? For we are always
under the influence of other people i.e., even when just sensing. So the power or affect of others remains, is within the the sensation. We will not delve into the full spectrum of ideas around this but retain
the knowledge that no sensation is beyond the influence of other people. Take the example of Racism, Zionism, Fascism &c., which involve transferring the ideas onto others in how we see others. We
have no sensation, unmixed, beyond the elements of mediated knowledge. mediated knowledge is knowledge brought about through an intervening agency. So this intervening agency makes for
mediated knowledge. We learn so much at school- through an intervening agency. This intervening agency is the body of knowledge that has become tradition. The mediated knowledge of the vulgar
economists, representing the Bourgeoisie is an example of this. The outlook of the worker, in the production process is mediated through or by the system. And do we have unmixed individual sensations,
beyond historical development? Development is a process in which nature and socially we pass by degrees to a different stage. So you cannot escape the movement and the changes taking place. We
are carried forth by this movement of history i.e., changes in time and space. And can we have unmixed individual sensation beyond the individual as the product of society-and society in active struggle
against nature. We are a product of society. We cannot say that being a product of society does not become part of our individual sensation. And we are an artifact, created by society or some the
process of societys development. To disclaim this would place one into the realm of epistemological Robinson Crusoe. Earlier we talked of atomism and being caught up in the boundaries of pure
sensual raw material. Saying that historically there is no absolutely unmixed individual sensation underlines the point. Not beyond the influence of external nature, nor beyond the influence of other
people, nor the influence of external nature, beyond the influence of other people. Any sensation cannot be beyond the elements of mediated knowledge, beyond historical development. And finally no
sensation can be beyond the individual as the product of society-and society in active struggle against nature.
We think of the axiom under consideration. What is this axiom under consideration? Is it Wagners thoughts. And the importance is the axiom under considerations logical purity. And in pure we mean
undiluted or unmixed with extraneous material. And in pure we mean concerned with theory and data rather than practice; opposed to applied. So it has no basis in the world of reality. It is purely an
axiom under consideration, on the basis of pure thought. We harp back to pure mathematics compared to applied, once again. We have it that the whole axiom disappears when it is denied its logical
purity. The logical purity gives it some basis. In this sense the arguments we put forward are actual arguments. They are actual arguments, not, imaginary arguments. For speculative and imaginary
would not have any basis in the world of reality. Speculative would be logical pure i.e., purely speculative. So the propagating of the logical pure. Though we have two types that were cited earlier.
These were the theologising metaphysics to the Avenarian-Machist philosophies. And we did mention pure description and renovated pragmatism. But the whole axiom disappears with the loss of its
logical purity. When you bring it down to earth, you dispense with its logical purity. So such subjectivism is fundamentally based on logical purity. But I am interested in the arguments we put forward
are actual arguments. An argument is an assertion offered as evidence that something is true. Why would the arguments put forward be actual. It is because the arguments put forward are based on
reality i.e., observable, realizable etc. on the other hand the axiom under consideration is based on logical purity. Actual arguments are existing in fact i.e., in reality. These actual arguments are
effectively realizable. All actual arguments are taking place in reality; not pretentious or imitated. The logical pure create an appearance with is not based on reality. They are theatrical productions.
Anything actual is existing in fact or existent reality. Idealism is based on possible, potential and an imagined possible reality. Unrealizable it i.e., the whole axiom disappears. These actual arguments are
undeniable, unfabled, veridical i.e., coinciding with reality. The opposition to the actual arguments would be abstract, transcendental; academical, speculative, theoretical; fabulous, fictitious and mythical.
And in the axiom under consideration, what is important is its logical purity. If the latter disappears, the whole axiom disappears. For this reason the arguments which we put forward are actual
arguments.

We hear of the problem that theory and practice plays, from the standpoint of epistemology. So the philosophical theory of knowledges standpoint has a problem to solve. What is the problem ? This
problem is the problem of the application of practice and theory. For theory that has disconnected from practice is pure. And hence speculative. Pure speculation has thereby lost the nexus of its
standing i.e., its basis in the world. Hence it falls into the category of logical purity. This logical pure is mediated knowledge on the basis of pure speculation. And it becomes a philosophical doctrine of
the reality of ideas. The reality of ideas are thereby purely based on the conversing or production of more ideas. so we have a system of ideas that produces more in its expanding body of ideas. So we
have colossal growth of this speculative knowledge i.e., becoming an organized body of knowledge.

What is epistemology? For in the next we have it said, it can already be seen what a vast role, the problem of theory and practice plays from the standpoint of epistemology. So we are looking at it from
the epistemological standpoint. Epistemology is the study or a theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity . epistemology is a study or a
theory. A study being considering in detail and subject to an analysis in order to discover essential features or meaning. A study involves discovering essential features or meaning. How do we discover
essential features or meaning, in a study? We discover the essential features or meaning by considering the subject in detail and subjecting it to an analysis. So epistemology is about limitations and
validation. And what are the grounds of knowledge? For we have nature of knowledge and grounds of knowledge. The grounds of knowledge is the basis for belief or disbelief i.e., the basis for
acceptance of something to be true. We accept something to be true, on some basis. On what basis is something accepted to be valid, true, confirmed? Is it purely on the basis because we are told it is
true. Does being told that something is true, confirm and warrant our acceptance? So the grounds of our knowledge are based on who tells us it is true i.e., who is some sort of messenger. Often this
would be the scholar. But the nature or class structure impacts on this message. But epistemology is an active aspect for it is a study. It involves considering in detail and subjecting it to an analysis. And
from this considering in detail and subjecting it to an analysis we discover essential features or meaning. So this discover essential features or meaning is the result of a detailed study and analysis. A
detailed study and analysis is the action that provides the essential features or meaning. We would not need to have a detailed study and analysis if we know the essential features or meaning. Because
we are without the essential features or meaning we engage in a detailed study and analysis. But we know that this is all important with regard to understanding epistemology, studying or theorizing
about the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity. And we mention that we are considering the standpoint of epistemology. Considering the standpoint of
epistemology and the problem of theory and practice. The next piece mentions the considering the theme. What is the theme? A theme is a thing or area being discussed. What is being discussed? It is
the problem of theory and practice from a standpoint, of epistemology. The author mentions first of all that we should note that both theory and practice are the activity of social man. We have activity of
social man and theory and practice. So social man engages in an activity i.e., theory and practice. And activity can be any specific behaviour of social man. We are indicating social man compared to the
isolated individual. Why, because the isolated individual is not true. And this was covered in our previous studies, above. We spoke of the epistemological Robinson Crusoes and atomism. So we must
look at the activity of social man not the activity of isolated individuals. For social man is a reality. We are urged or think about examine theory not as petrified systems, and practice not as finished
products- that is, not as dead labour petrified in things, but in action. But what are petrified systems? In the case of examining theory not as petrified systems. Anything pertrified is rigid and set into a
conventional pattern. So we are urged to examine unpetrified theory i.e., not rigid (inflexible) and set in a conventional pattern. And practice as finished products. So we have theory as petrified systems
and practice as finished (the last stage) product. This being the be all and end all (fully completed) product. For a fully completed product does bring theory in a petrified system. Why examine something
anew when we have a fully completed product. So we need to examine theory not as petrified (conventional) systems. And also not to see practice as finished (the all and absolute great thing) products.
For when we see it as a fully completed product we see it as an absolute. We shall also hear of dead labour petrified in things. Practice as not as dead labour petrified in things, but in action. We hear of
the bifurcation of labour into intellectual and physical labour. But what is meant by the bifurcation of labour into intellectual and physical labour? These are the two forms of labour activity. This is the
branching into intellectual and physical labour. The bifurcation into mental and material. Lets just go back a bit and understand what we are on about in discussing bifurcation of labour. We looked at
examining theory which is not petrified. So we unpetrified (unconventional) theory. And in this we have two forms of labour activity, consisting of, intellectual and physical labour. With the bifurcation of
labour we have mental and material. And also with the bifurcation of labour comes theoretical cognition and practical action. Cognition is knowing, perceiving, or conceiving as an act or faculty distinct
from emotion and volition. So theoretical cognition is the knowledge, perception of theory. Anything theoretical is concerned with knowledge but not with its practical application. In theory we have the
imaginative contemplation of reality. And theoretical cognition is cognition that is depending on or confined to theory. So it is a specified form of cognition. It is the psychological result of perception and
learning and reasoning about theory. practical means suited to use; functional e.g., practical shoes. Practical can imply organizing, or mending things. Practical comes from Greek praktikos. Praktikos
comes from prasso which means: do. So theoretical cognition and practical action comes with this bifurcation of labour. We could also add the mental and material as well as intellectual and physical
labour. COGNITION (THEORETICAL): Cognition is knowing, perceiving, or conceiving as an act or faculty that is distinct from emotion and volition (conscious choice, decision and intention). So
theoretical cognition is the knowledge, perception or conceiving of theory. Anything theoretical is concerned with knowledge but not with its practical application. In theory we have the imaginative
contemplation of reality. But what is reality? What is real is existent or that which underlies appearances. Reality is all about what is actually existing or occurring. In Latin realis comes from res. Res
means thing. And theoretical cognition is cognition that is depending on or confined to theory. So it is a specified form of cognition. This is that cognition is the psychological result of perception and
learning and reasoning about theory. But why are we talking about cognition? We cannot answer this question and therefore know that we have lost our way. And the imperative to return to the
fundamental point, this being the quote from the Phenomenology of the Spirit. This quote comes again: symptoms must not only bear an essential relationship to cognition, but must also be essential
definitions of things. So we have an essential relationship to cognition. And we have the essential definitions of things. We recall that symptoms are a sign of the existence of something. These signs of
the existence of something bear an essential relationship to cognition. Thus Anything that accompanies X and is regarded as an indication of X's existence. And hence it becomes a subject of cognition.
Cognition being the psychological result of perception, learning, and reasoning. Whatever accompanies something is regarded as an indication of something else being present. The evidence lies in
perceived object and hence the content of cognition. The observer engages in cognition on the basis of the symptoms in objects. Hence the attributes of an object have an essential relationship to
cognition. He then proceeds by stating that the artificial system must be in conformity with the system of nature itself. So the artificial system must correspond in form or appearance with the system of
nature. so we have a compatibility, similarity or consistency; coincide in their characteristics. The character of the artificial system and system of nature must have a compatibility i.e., a capability of
existing or performing in harmonious or congenial combination. And we could go on about the organs of sensation. For in the organs of sensation we know of the attributes that make up the world.
From the above it can already be seen what a vast role, the problem of theory and practice plays from the standpoint of epistemology. We pass now to the consideration of this theme. First of all, it should
be noted that both theory and practice are the activity of social man. If we examine theory not as petrified systems, and practice not as finished products- that is, not as dead labour petrified in things,
but in action, we shall have before us two forms of labour activity, the bifurcation of labour into intellectual and physical labour, mental and material, theoretical cognition and practical action.

In the following we hear that theory is accumulated and condensed practice. Theory is amassed or accumulated and condensed practice. What is this condensed practice? So theory is derived from
practice. For through practice we derive theory, a speculative: an explanation (mental conception) of how it works. So theory generalises the practice of material labour. Draw from specific cases of
practice of material labour for more general cases. So as I understand this we specific cases of the practice of material labour. And from these specific cases of the practice of material labour we derive
generalizations. That is a generalisation of the practice of material labours derivative lies in the specific cases of the practice of material labour. We continue on and hear that it is qualitatively a particular
and specific continuation of material labour. What is this particular and specific continuation of material labour. What is this particular and specific continuation? So, material labour continues or persists; it
is the continuation of the activity of material labour. So basically material labour continues on into theory; theory being generalisation of the practice of material labour. And the first sentence has it that
theory is accumulated and condensed practice. This theory is qualitatively a special, theoretical practice, to the extent that it is active (Compare for example., the experiment) -practice fashioned by
thought. And we have a special example i.e., experimentation, which is practice fashioned by thought. So through thought we have practice in experimentation. So in this we have the forward or onward
movement towards a destination in that theory is the generalised practice of material labour. And it is particular and specific as the experiment, as an example. For the experiment is an example of
accumulated and condensed practice. Is an experiment an example of the generalised practice of material labour? That is bringing general statements of the practice of material labour. And in this we
have it being an example of qualitative and particular and specific continuations of material labour. We think of following in another person's footsteps i.e., doing as another did before in the practice of
material labour. And this practice fashioned by thought is do as another did before.
Theory is accumulated and condensed practice. To the extent that it generalises the practice of material labour, and is qualitatively a particular and specific continuation of material labour, it is itself
qualitatively a special, theoretical practice, to the extent that it is active (Compare for example., the experiment) -practice fashioned by thought.

Now we hear that practical activity utilises theory, and to this extent practice itself is theoretical. But why would practice itself be theoretical? Practice is theoretical in that practical activity utilises theory.
So extent to which practice is theoretical is pointed by: practical activity utilising theory. For practical activity cannot do without its theoretical bases. And the theoretical bases derive from practical activity.
So next we talk of in every class society. So we have the general i.e., class societies. And we have divided labour and, consequently, a contradiction between intellectual and physical labour. And what is
this contradiction between intellectual and physical labour? For in every class society we have divided labour. But how does divided labour, in every class society, create a contradiction between
intellectual and physical labour. Is it that the theoreticians do not have enough knowledge of practice? They wander off into the heavens, away from the practical base. So the essence is lost in this
contradiction between intellectual and physical labour. We also hear of the contradiction between theory and practice. This contradiction between theory and practice is the equivalent between the
contradiction between intellectual and physical labour. For if we have a contradiction between intellectual and physical labour then likewise the contradiction between theory and practice. In the division of
labour we have the living unity of opposites. For within the unitary whole, we have the contradiction of opposites. These opposites, encapsulated in the division of labour, are within the whole. So we call
this the living unity of opposites i.e., contending classes. And we have it that: Action passes into cognition. Cognition passes into action. Practice drives forward cognition. Cognition fertilises practice.
From the act we derive the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning viz., cognition. That is that through action we come upon cognition. That is that cognition fall to one's share;
through the action. And Cognition passes into action as well. For what you know, Ability, content, lexicon, mental attitude, nous, operation, perception, place, psyche, public knowledge, structure, &c., will
pass into action i.e., practice. And so Practice drives forward cognition. So through practice we find our way i.e., cognition. So Practice gives an impetus forwarding psychological result of perception and
learning and reasoning a.k.a cognition. And we have it that cognition fertilises practice. So the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning, cognition, is fertilized ( made more
productive) by practice. So cognition generates or enhances or establishes practice. But the whole process is important i.e., Action passes into cognition. Cognition passes into action. Practice drives
forward cognition. Cognition fertilises practice. Action and practice derive cognition. And cognition pushes forward or enhances action and practice. We recall that practical activity utilises theory. practice
itself is theoretical and this is underlined by our reading on the interrelated aspects of action, practice and cognition. But in the mid point we talked of the contradiction between intellectual and physical
labour. It lies in the structure in every class society and its divided labour. For in every class society we have theoreticians alienated from practice. We have the practicians (practical workers) alienated
somewhat from theoretical. So in this sense Practice drives forward cognition, of the elite. And the elites cognition fertilises practice, for the elite again. For at the basis of it all we have the living unity of
opposites.
On the other hand, practical activity utilises theory, and to this extent practice itself is theoretical. In actual fact we have in every class society divided labour and, consequently, a contradiction between
intellectual and physical labour - that is. . a contradiction between theory and practice. But, like every division of labour, here too it is a living unity of opposites. Action passes into cognition. Cognition
passes into action. Practice drives forward cognition. Cognition fertilises practice.[6]

Now we read a footnote, from Hegel.


[6] Theoretical capacity begins with the presently existing, given, external and transforms it into its conception. Practical capacity, on the contrary, begins with internal definition. The latter is called
decision, intention, task. It then transforms the internal into the real and external- that is, gives it present existence. This transition from internal definition to externality is called activity. Activity generally
is the union of the internal and the external. The internal definition with which it begins, as a purely internal phenomenon, must be removed in its form and become purely external.... On the contrary,
activity is also the removal of the external, as it is given directly...The form of the external is changed .. (Georg. Hegel: Introduction to Philosophy, sections 8 and 9.) Both theory
Hegel writes that the theoretical capacity begins with the presently existing, given, external and transforms it into its conception. So we start off about the genesis of the theoretical capacity. Where does
the theoretical capacity come from? He goes on that it begins with the presently existing, given, external. So he is saying it starts off with the presently existing, given, external. So the theoretical capacity
originates or arises or is located outside or beyond the world of ideas. it lies in the existent reality, objective reality i.e., presently existing, given, external. And transforms the presently existing, given,
external into its conception. In the writing we heard this too i.e., theory is accumulated and condensed practice. And Hegel writes Practical capacity begins with internal definition. So something needs to
be internally defined for there to be practical capability. And the latter, which is conception, is decision, intention, task. A decision is: A position, opinion or judgment reached after consideration. And
intention? Intention is: An act of intending; a volition that you intend to carry out. Then we hear of the transformation the internal into the real and external- that is, gives the internal present existence. So
we have a changing in form from the internally defined to the external, the real. So the idea transforms or realizes itself in something, manifested in the external reality. But decision, intention, task are all
part of conception. So Practical capacity begins with being internally defined. On the other hand theoretical capacity begins presently existing, given, external. Then we hear that activity is the transition
from internal definition to an externality. So activity is a transition, an act of passing from one state or place to the next. So it is the state of the internal tranforming into the real and external. So how does
Hegel see the manifestation of the real and external? It is through action. For action (activity) is the transition from an internal definition to an externality. So it is given present existence through activity,
claims Hegel. Then Hegel goes on saying: Activity generally is the union of the internal and the external. So it is union of the internal and the external. The internal and the external are united in activity.
Furthermore the internal definition with which it begins, as a purely internal phenomenon, must be removed in its form and become purely external. What is a purely internal phenomenon? It is pure
theory. On the contrary activity is also the removal of the external, as it is given directly. And what is this removal of the external? For it is the intermediate point between the external and internal. And
later, in the reading, the form of the external is changed. Any form is an arrangement of the elements in a composition. So the elements are composed synthesized differently. So through activity we have
this synthesis of the particulars a.k.a we have a new form. By this synthesis we unite the particulars through activity. But this theoretical capacity must begin with a presently existing, given, external.
Though this presently existing, given, external is transformed into a different presently existing, given, external, through a synthesis called activity.

In the following we hear that both theory and practice are steps in the joint process of the reproduction of social life. Reproduction is The act of making copies. What is it that theory and practice are
steps? So the reproduction of social life comes about in the steps of theory and practice. For we have the continuous reproduction of the steps of theory and practice. And these steps are a progression
toward a goal i.e., proceeding onwards. This is a series or continuity that is evolving and reproducing social life. And social is living together or enjoying life in communities or organized groups i.e.,
organised in a way to produce social life or existence. An old question asks How is cognition the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning, possible? Why do we therefore not ask
how is action possible? We have epistemology i.e., the philosophical theory of knowledge. But despite this, we hear that no learned men have yet thought of inventing some special praxeology.
Praxeology is the study of human actions. Praxis is translating an idea into action. And from the action i.e., activity, we have the synthesis or manifestation of a product. For we have it that theory passes
into practice. From cognition to action or activity. The study of human actions, Praxeology, would be the transformation and synthesis or combination of various forms, manifest in the external world.
These elements are taking up existent form, through activity. It is Bacon who spoke of the coincidence of knowledge and power, and of the interdependence of the laws of nature and norms of practice.
Coincidence is the temporal property of two things happening at the same time. So knowledge and power are happening at the same time. Knowledge is the basis of action, as we have heard in this
reading. And action makes for power. For in the action we can make objects or things of value. We have a transformation of the world. We have Bacon's coincidence of knowledge and power. For power
is here represented by the transformation of things. In power we mean the potentiality of man. We have this coincidence of knowledge and power, and of the interdependence of the laws of nature and
norms of practice. Interdependence is a reciprocal relation between interdependent entities. Anything interdependent is mutually dependent. We have the laws of nature and the norms of practice. For the
norms of practice depend on the laws of nature. Hence the laws of nature dictate the norms of practice. What are the laws of nature? A generalizations that describe recurring facts or events in nature are
laws of nature. And the standard i.e., regarded as typical way of operation or behaviour will be determined by the laws of nature. Practice is knowledge of how something is usually done. The way of doing
something is dependent on the laws of nature. The norms of practice cannot break free of this dependence. The laws of nature control how things behave i.e., the norms of practice. The norms of
practice is in the state of being contingent on the laws of nature. So the laws of nature open up possibilities for various norms of practice. So the norms of practice (technics) will determine the degree of
possibilities or potentiality that are open. Technic is a practical method or art applied to some particular task. And this practical method or art applied to some particular task (the norms of practice) must
consider the laws of nature (external conditions).
Both theory and practice are steps in the joint process of the reproduction of social life. It is extremely characteristic that from of old the question has been asked: How is cognition possible? But the
question is not asked: How is action possible? There is epistemology. But no learned men have yet thought of inventing some special praxeology. Yet one passes into the other, and Bacon himself
quite justifiably spoke of the coincidence of knowledge and power, and of the interdependence of the laws of nature and norms of practice. [7]

[7] Francis Bacon: Philosophical Works, Editor J. M. Robertson, London, 1905. Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for when the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature
to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule (p. 259.
We hear a quotation from Francis Bacon's Philosophical Works. He says that Human knowledge and human power meet in one. So we have human power and Human knowledge. And these two,
Human knowledge and human power meet in one. They come together in one i.e., they are united. They are present in one. And he asserts that when the cause is not known the effect cannot be
produced. A cause is a thing that produces an effect. A cause can be a person or thing that occasions or produces something. To cause means to produce or make happen. But what exactly is this
Human knowledge and human power meet in one? Is this Human knowledge equivalent to theory? And Is power the ability to change or tranform the world of reality? knowledge is the factual information
that a person knows. And information is the items of knowledge. So all of these items of knowledge enable man to have power of nature i.e., through knowledge he has the power to change the world
around him. And the knowledge and power meet in man. If man is ignorant i.e., not known. for the effect is derived from the cause. So power or tranformation, the effect, comes about through knowledge,
the cause. So knowledge is the cause producing a change in the world, the effect. Thus action is derived from the psychological result of perception, learning and reasoning a.k.a knowledge. So this
psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning gives man transformative power. We have knowledge and power meeting in one. Things happen because of some cause. Nothing can
happen with some cause. knowledge is the cause of tranformation i.e., power. Man has a controlling influence over the world due to his knowledge of that existent reality, with the laws of nature. We have
a production of an effect. In production we have the creation of value or wealth by producing goods and services. Nothing of value or wealth comes about without some spontaneous cause. We have the
spontaneous productions of nature i.e., virgin forests, fruits inter alia. But then these have natural causes i.e., the spontaneous productions of nature. And then we we hear that when the cause is not
known the effect cannot be produced. Nothing comes about magically, but through a process, a particular course of action. It is this particular course of action that brings this effect about. And in
particular course of action we mean action. We remind ourselves that praxis is translating an idea into action. In the idea we have intention, which produces action. And in praxis we have translation of the
idea into action. So action is a translated idea, knowledge. We act in accordance with what we know. There is a conformity between knowledge and action. And the outcome of the action is the effect. We
need to know what brings something about. Then correct action would derive the something to come about. So for something to come about we require the requisite action. Thence we come upon it that
nature to be commanded must be obeyed. To have authoritative control or power over nature we need to obey the natural laws. For the natural laws demand or prescribe how we exercize authoritative
control or power over nature. We are confined within the control or power over nature. Likewise we are confined to the control or power of the capitalist system. But with knowledge we are able to act and
have authoritative control or power over nature. Lastly Francis Bacon talks of that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule. So the contemplation, long and thoughtful observation,
can be the cause. It can be the cause of some operation. An operation being a process or series of acts especially of a practical or mechanical nature involved in a particular form of work. So there is a
relationship between the contemplation and the action i.e., the process or series of acts. And the rule is a condition that customarily governs behaviour. So the behaviour is governed by the
contemplation.

Francis Baconis de Verulomio: Novum Organum Scientiarum. Apud Adrianum Wijngaerum et Franciscum Moiardum, 1645, p. 31. Scientia et Potentia Humana in idem coincidunt, quia ignoratio causae
destituit effectum. Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur; et quod in Contemplatione instar causae est, id in Operatione instar Regulae est.

The power of Human Science and meet in one, because it left you is ignorance of the causes of the effect. For nature is overcome only by obeying, and that which in contemplation is the equivalent of the
cause, assume that the operation of the Rule is the equivalent of. In this way practice breaks into the theory of cognition, theory includes practice, and real epistemology, that is, epistemology which
bases itself upon the unity (not the identity!) of theory and practice, includes the practical criterion, which becomes the criterion of the truthfulness of cognition. The relative social disruption of theory and
practice is a basis for a break between the theory of cognition and practical action, or for the construction of a super-experimental theory as a skilled free supplement to the usual and earthly forms of
human knowledge. [8]

[8] Compare Marx and Engels: Feuerbach (Idealistic and Materialist Standpoint). Marx and Engels Archives, volume. 1., p. 221: Division of labour becomes a real division of labour, only when a division
of material and spiritual labour begins. From that moment consciousness may in reality imagine that it is something other than the consciousness of existing practice. From the moment that
consciousness begins really to imagine something, without imagining something real, from that time onwards it finds itself in a position to emancipate itself from the world and proceed to the formation of
'pure theory,' theology, philosophy, morality, etc. Hegel has the unity of theory and practice in a particularly idealistic form (unity of the theoretical and practical idea as cognition), [9]
Now we hear of ignorance of the causes of the effect. What is this ignorance of the causes of the effect? This is to have a lack of knowledge of what causes the effect. An effect being something that is
produced by an agent or cause. So some agency produces the effect. And this agency is the cause of the effect. The agency, exerting the power, brings about the effect. And the cause is the events that
provide the generative force that is the origin of something. So the cause generates the forces that brings something about i.e., the source of somethings existence or from which it derives or is derived.
So we are talking of the Origins of the effect. The origin is the first part or stage of subsequent events that result in the effect coming about. He proceeds by saying that nature is overcome only by
obeying. We master nature only by obeying. It is natural laws that will determine our actions that allow us to have mastery of nature. We are coming upon thoughts on ecology and enviromentalism, which
are indications that we are somewhat ignorant i.e., ignorance of the causes of the effect. We do not see how our action leads to a particular set of effects coming about e.g., global warming, acidification
of the seas and so forth. We would not have overcome nature if we are obliterated through our complete addiction to capitalism. We hear that contemplation is the equivalent of the cause. For when we
think deeply about a subject or question over a period of time we are able to act accordingly. So how we think derives in the result of that i.e., the whole man made world of reality. For the results i.e., the
capitalist system, must have come about through the activity of man. So the effects are found in the action of man i.e., interacting in the material world. So contemplation is equivalent to the cause. We
recall that we think and then act in accordance to our thoughts. It goes on that the operation of the Rule is the equivalent of. So unmentioned but it is assumed that the operation of the Rule is the
equivalent of the effect. In operation of the Rule we have the pattern of thought and the operation. For in the operation, in accordance to the rule i.e., thought pattern, we derive effect. In operation we are
talking of activity involving many people performing various actions. For in the activity involving many people we have an end result (effect). For the activity involving many people brings about a given
condition. And in this we get that practice breaks into the theory of cognition. In practice we mean action as opposed to theory. For to know of action we need to break into the theory of cognition. For
practice derives from cognition. Cognition is the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning. So through cognition we derive practice. And from practice we derive cognition i.e., the
psychological result of act or faculty of perceiving and acquired skill or knowledge and reasoning. Reasoning being thinking that is coherent and logical. So practice breaks into the theory of cognition.
We are reminded that an effect is something that follows immediately from an antecedent : a resultant condition. The antecedent is what comes before i.e., the descendent. So an antecedent is a
preceding occurrence, cause or event. So through practice we derive a cognitive response i.e., thinking. We act once more in accordance with the cognitive response. Further cognitive responses are
derived through the further action and cognitive responses. We go on hearing that therefore theory includes practice. By practice we mean the translating of an idea (cognition) into action (practice). We
also hear that real epistemology bases itself upon the unity of theory and practice. This real epistemology includes the practical criterion, which becomes the criterion of the truthfulness of cognition. We
recall that epistemology is the philosophical theory of knowledge. So to understand knowledge i.e., and real epistemology we must see the unity of theory and practice as the basis. For practice forms the
basis of theory while the theory forms the basis of practice. For as we act on the world at the same time the world acts on us. So the unity of theory and practice is basis of real epistemology, claims
Bukharin. We hear of the practical criterion and criterion of the truthfulness of cognition. A criterion is: A basis for comparison; a reference point against which other things can be evaluated. We have the
practical criterion i.e., practice as a point of reference. A point of reference is an indicator that orients you generally. An indicator is a device for showing the operating condition of some system. And a
criterion? A criterion is a principle or standard of judgement. So the principle or standard to judge cognition lies in the practical criterion. And the principle or standard of judgement of the practical criterion
lies in the cognition. And this underlines the unity of theory and practice. In the unity of theory and practice we maintain that theory cannot be without practice. And practice cannot be without theory. They
are a unified whole. So the criterion of the truthfulness of cognition lies in practice. And on the other hand the criterion of the veracity of practice lies in cognition. And then we have relative social
disruption of theory and practice is a basis for a break between the theory of cognition and practical action. What is this relative social disruption of theory and practice. Anything relative means not
absolute or complete. So we have a social disruption of theory and practice. So we have a displacement or discontinuity of theory and practice. theory and practice are no longer unified but seperated.
This being the social disruption of both. Any disruption is an act of delaying or interrupting the continuity. So the unity of theory and practice is discontinued i.e., as theory becomes alienated from
practice. This is a basis for a break between the theory of cognition and practical action. We have the theory of cognition and practical action. For this is knowing what cognition and practical action is all
about. For there is a break between theory of cognition and practical action. For there is an interruption between the theory of cognition and practical action. We hear of the construction of a super-
experimental theory as a skilled free supplement to the usual and earthly forms of human knowledge. What is this super-experimental theory? In super we have more than a specified category. So we
have this construction of a super-experimental theory. And this super-experimental theory is a skilled free supplement. A supplement is a supplementary component that improves capability. So we are
talking of improved capability. And we are on about the production of a super-experimental theory, a skilled free supplement to the usual and earthly forms of human knowledge. But what is the usual and
earthly forms of human knowledge? A skill is the ability to produce solutions in some problem domain. The usual is occurring or encountered or experienced or observed frequently or in accordance with
regular practice or procedure. So we are talking of a super-experimental theory i.e., beyond regular practice or procedure. And hence we are referred on to Marx and Engels: Feuerbach (Idealistic and
Materialist Standpoint). They write that Division of labour becomes a real division of labour, only when a division of material and spiritual labour begins. So we have the division of material and spiritual
labour. This division of material and spiritual labour indicates the real division of labour. We would have this to be material labour and spiritual labour. But why the real division of labour? Returning to our
earlier reading: the material labour creates spiritual labour in as much at practice creates or derives theory. And theory is a tentative insight into the natural world; a concept that is not yet verified but that
if true would explain certain facts or phenomena. So spiritual labour can be equivalent to insight into the natural world. For when we have this division we have it that consciousness may in reality
imagine that it is something other than the consciousness of existing practice. This imagining is the formation of mental images that is not present. So it is on about illusory (erroneous mental
representations). What is this consciousness of existing practice? This is having knowledge of existing practice. We talk of this formation of a mental image that it is something other than the
consciousness of existing practice. For in other than the consciousness of existing practice we have imagining that it is more than it actually is, in truth. And this is a moment when consciousness begins
really to imagine something. The awareness of yourself and your situation goes overboard i.e., really to imagine something. This is consciousness without imagining something real. It is consciousness
that has lost its basis in the world of reality i.e., practice. So from this time onwards it finds itself in a position to emancipate itself from the world and proceed to the formation of 'pure theory,' theology,
philosophy, morality, etc. So this is an emancipation of itself from the world. It goes searching for something else, other than the world of reality. So we come to the relative position or standing of things in
this emancipation of itself from the world. And hence it is proceeding on to the formation of 'pure theory,' theology, philosophy, morality, etc. and this is the point at which we find the origins in the division
of material and spiritual labour. And this is called the real division of labour. Hegel has the unity of theory and practice in a particularly idealistic form. So we have the unity of theory and practice in an
idealistic form. And Idealistic is of or relating to the philosophical doctrine of the reality of ideas. But this unity of theory and practice is particular and idealistic. Hegel has it as the unity of the theoretical
and practical idea as cognition. So Hegel has it as the unity of the theoretical and practical idea as cognition i.e., the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning. So this unity is just the
psychological result of perception, learning and reasoning. This unity of theory and practice is not derived from theory and practice but from cognition.

[9] The idea as recognition, which appears in the doubled form of the theoretical and practical idea. (Hegel's Science of Logic, 391 (6., section. 215). unity which overcomes the one sidedness
(Einseitigkeit) of theory and practice, taken separately, unity precisely in the theory of cognition.[10]

In the next we hear of the idea as recognition, which appears in the doubled form of the theoretical and practical idea. We also hear of the doubled form of the theoretical and practical idea. We also hear
of the unity which overcomes the one sidedness (Einseitigkeit) of theory and practice, taken separately, unity precisely in the theory of cognition. In an abstract of the Science of Logic we read: In Marx
we find the materialistic (and simultaneously dialectical) teaching of the unity of theory and practice, of the primacy of practice and of the practical criterion of truth in the theory of cognition. So it is
materialistic (and simultaneously dialectical) teaching of the unity of theory and practice. So Marxs unity of theory and practice is dialectical and materialistic. Hence dialectical materialism. But this
teaching of the unity of theory and practice holds the primacy of practice. Also this teaching of the unity of theory and practice maintains the practical criterion of truth in the theory of cognition. Note the
practical criterion of truth. Dialectics is a contradiction of ideas that serves as the determining factor in their interaction. Is it that the theory of cognition highlights the practical criterion of truth, with the
primacy of practice. And primacy is state of being first in importance. Of first in importance is practice. And the practical criterion of truth in the theory of cognition lies in the primacy of practice. So in
primacy we have preceding all cognition; practice is earliest in time. And by all of this Marx saves a striking philosophical synthesis. We also hear of the laboured efforts of modern pragmatism.
Pragmatism is (philosophy) the doctrine that practical consequences are the criteria of knowledge, meaning and value. So what is the criteria? A criteria is a basis for comparison; a reference point
against which other things can be evaluated. Laboured means lacking natural ease. This is the laboured efforts of modern pragmatism with its theological and idealistic contortions, its super-artificial and
laborious constructions of fictionalism. In artificial we mean artificially formal i.e., not according to nature; not by natural means. So it has lost its natural base. And it is characterized by effort to the point
of exhaustion; especially physical effort. Idealistic is relating to the philosophical doctrine of the reality of ideas. In idealistic contortion we have act of twisting or deforming the shape from its real base, the
world of reality. This is the distorted reality. We go on about the interaction between theory and practice, their unity, develops on the basis of the primacy of practice. They i.e., theory and practice interact.
theory and practice act upon one another. theory acts upon practice, while, practice acts upon and develops theory. But this is a development based on the primacy of practice. We hear that historically
the sciences grow out of practice, the production of ideas differentiates out of the production of things. We could put it differently. from its origin the Study of the physical and natural world grows out of
practice. The production of ideas becomes distinct stemming from the production of things. Hence from the primacy of practice. For in the primacy of practice we come to the production of things. So
this is the first. So right from the origins, beginning sciences grow out of practice. So the differentiation of ideas comes from this production of things. We differentiate ideas coming from the production
of things i.e., the primacy of practice. We then have it said that sociologically: social being determines social consciousness, the practice of material labour is the constant force motrice of the whole of
social development. What is it to say that social being determines social consciousness? A being is a living thing that has (or can develop) the ability to act or function independently i.e., is a social being.
So the social being gives direction to; be an influence on the social consciousness. A motrice is A square hole made to receive a tenon and so to form a joint. And the practice of material labour? And
social is living together or enjoying life in communities or organized groups. And consciousness is an awareness of yourself and your situation. What is the constant force motrice of the whole of social
development? It is the practice of material labour that is the constant force motrice of the whole of social development. Development is the act of improving by expanding, enlarging or refining.
Development is a process in which something passes by degrees to a different stage (especially a more advanced or mature stage).
[10] Lenin: Abstract of 'The Science of Logic, Lenin Review, Volume. 9., 6. 270. In Marx we find the materialistic (and simultaneously dialectical) teaching of the unity of theory and practice, of the primacy
of practice and of the practical criterion of truth in the theory of cognition. In this way Marx saves a striking philosophical synthesis, in face of which the laboured efforts of modern pragmatism, with its
theological and idealistic contortions, its super-artificial and laborious constructions of fictionalism, etc., seem but childish babble. The interaction between theory and practice, their unity, develops on the
basis of the primacy of practice. (1) Historically: the sciences grow out of practice, the production of ideas differentiates out of the production of things; (2) sociologically: social being determines social
consciousness, the practice of material labour is the constant force motrice of the whole of social development; (3) epistemologically: the practice of influence on the outside world is the primary given
quality.

From this follow extremely important consequences. In the exceptionally gifted theses of Marx on Feuerbach, we read: The question of whether the human thinking metallic zukomme gegenstandliche
truth - is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must be the truth, that is Prove the reality and power-sidedness of his thinking.
So we have consequences. A consequence is a result or effect of what has gone before. In the previous we hear of cause and effect. Here we have the effect a.k.a consequence. Then he provides us
with a quote from the exceptionally gifted theses of Marx on Feuerbach. A thesis is a proposition (statement or assertion) to be maintained or proved. This is question of whether thinking is not a
question of theory but is a practical question i.e., guided by practical experience and observation rather than theory. Thinking being the use or exercise of the mind or one's power of reason in order to
make inferences, decisions, or arrive at a solution or judgments. So we have the practical question of human thinking. The whole idea that it is not a question of theory but is a practical question. We hear
that In practice man must be the truth, that is Prove the reality and power- sidedness of his thinking. But why and what is meant by that man must be the truth, in practice? For in progenitor or ancestor in
the direct line towards thinking. For in the practical applications cometh his thoughts. But why does this mean that in practice man must be the truth? For in action as opposed to theory man is
conforming to reality or actuality. We are on about behaving in accordance or in agreement with reality or actuality. But this man must be the truth confuses me somewhat. Why must, in practice, man be
the truth. But truth is just the reality or actuality. For man is an actuality. The theistic holds that the concept is the reality or actuality. So this is an important question. In this we know man to be a material
object in the existent reality. So the basis of reality or actuality is existent man. Should this not be the proof of reality rather than Prove the reality. And this power-sidedness of his thinking? In power we
alluded to the power to transform and change the world around him. In power we have the controlling influence sidedness of thinking. And in power we have capability of acting or of producing an effect.
So we are talking of talent and effectiveness i.e., the quality of being able to bring about an effect. We earlier went on about cause and effect. The thought comes about through action i.e., drinking,
eating, sheltering. And through the thought the practice of interacting with the material world of reality. But when we have this division of labour i.e., between spiritual labour and material labour we have
an escapism into speculative and an imaginative reality. This is the power-sidedness of mans thinking. So mans a mental or physical ability or aptitude comes about through the power-sidedness of
thinking. And this is the strong unity between theory and practice. For ability is actually mans power to change the material reality. We consider how: the contemporary world is furthermore immersed in
virtual reality. In this we are talking of the immersion into the theological and idealistic contortions. But this power-sidedness of mans thinking is an important aspect to retain. We are talking of the ability
to control and direct lying in this power-sidedness of thinking. The further you take him in, with theological and idealistic contortions, the more he crippled i.e., unable to control and direct objective reality.
The only thing left is then the world of ideas. but how do we prove the reality and power- sidedness of man's thinking? It is in the creative manifestations in his transformation of existent reality. It is the
influential or authoritative side of his using his mind. And the power to affect persons or events i.e., the real world lies in his link to the material world. When we talk of power we allude to physical might or
resources. What is the physical might or resourced side of thinking. We think of Marxs title of the Poverty of Philosphy. And the might or resourced side of thinking lies with the actual. might expresses
possibility. The verb, might, is based on a condition not fulfilled e.g., if you'd looked you might have found it. For finding it, whatever is lost, is the effect. And this effect i.e., finding what is lost, depends on
looking for it. So finding it, whatever is lost, cannot come about, without looking for it. This is an example. Man must be the actual, the real i.e., the effect, derived through the construction of man. In other
words man is the end result of the construction or production of man. For the inherent property or effectiveness of man lies in this power-sidedness of thinking. For in power we have indication of the
possession of the ability to wield coercive force, permissive authority, or substantial influence. And this power-sidedness of the process of using the mind to consider something carefully, has a lot to do
with or the ability make effective use of one's capacities. Otherwise ineffective and incapacitated by theological and idealistic contortions. But we are labouring the point and need to move on.

The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic-prints question. (2nd Thesis.) The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways;
come to it, to alter it. (11th Thesis.)
Now we hear of the dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice. So we have a question of reality or non-reality. Is thinking isolated from practice real or imaginary. This
being thinking set or kept apart from practice. Thus we are on about pure theory. But doesnt pure theory have some aspects to offer practice? Look at Einsteins theory and atomic power. This theory
than is not pure but bears on the world of reality. Is thinking that is isolated from practice, real or imaginary? But in the 2nd Thesis he goes on that this is a purely scholastic question. And what is
scholasticism? Scholasticism relates to the philosophical doctrine of scholasticism. A scholastic is a person who pays more attention to formal rules and book learning than they merit. We then come to
the famous quote in the 11th Thesis. The 11th Thesis says The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; come to it, to alter it. They have understood the world, in a certain way;
made sense of the world in different ways. But Marx maintains come to the world. In other words approach the world. So it in not alienation from the world or being seperated from the world, but in
approaching it. And in coming to the world, altering it. And to come to implies to recover consciousness i.e., awareness of yourself and your situation or vitality in the world. For the theological and
idealistic contortions are other-worldly i.e., they are not of the world of reality (existent reality). And altering the world implies making a different; causing a transformation in the world. And this is the power
in the 11th Thesis. Wonderfully said, 11th Thesis: The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; come to it, to alter it.

The problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation: the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral part of the problem of transformation: the problem of
theory as a practical problem.
We hear of the problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation. Why would the problem of the external world be put as the problem of its transformation? There is a
resistance i.e., a reaction to change. By transformation we have a question of change, raised for consideration or solution. And we heard of the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral
part of the problem of transformation. And this cognition of the external world? We cognition is the psychological result of perception, learning and reasoning. A psychological result is the mental or
emotional consequence, issue, or outcome. And perception is Knowledge gained by perceiving i.e., being conscious of things. So we are talking about the problem of the results of perception of the
external world. How is the external world perceived? And this cognition of the external world is an integral part of the problem of transformation. So the cognisability of the external world is linked to the
and an integral part of the problem of transformation. Just in the same way, theory and practice are a unity. Earlier on we heard of the unity of the theoretical and practical idea. But transformation is linked
to cognition of the external world. This being the attention given to the external world. And cognition is a Psychological feature. And part of cognition we have the following list. We have ability, attitude,
brain, cognitive content, cognitive factor, cognitive operation, cognitive process, content, episteme, equivalent, general knowledge, head, history, inability, information, lexicon, lexis, mental attitude,
mental lexicon, mental object, mental process, mind, nous, operation, perception, place, power, practice, process, psyche, public knowledge, structure, unconscious process and vocabulary. So these
aspects need to be given guidance towards the problem of transformation. All of these link up with cognition of the external world. And we then have problem of theory as a practical problem. For in actual
use or practice we derive some theoretical basis. We read in the dictionary that theoretical is concerned with knowledge but not with its practical application. But here we assert that theory is a practical
problem. Why? It is because theory and practice are integral to each other i.e., a unity.

Practically-and, consequently, epistemologically-the external world is given as the object of active influence on the part of social, historically developing man. The external world has its history. The
relations growing up between subject and object are historical. The forms of these relations are historical. Practice itself and theory, the forms of active influence and the forms of cognition, the modes of
production and the modes of conception, are historical.
We hear that practically-and, consequently, epistemologically that the external world is given as the object of active influence on the part of social, historically developing man. And the external world is
given primarily as the object of active influence. So the object of active influence is the external world. Active means that it is exerting influence or producing a change or effect. And in this the
implication is that the external world is the object is exerting influence or producing a change or effect. And the object is a tangible and visible entity. And we heard of social, historically developing man. In
social we are talking of living together or enjoying life in communities or organized groups. So the external world is exerting influence or producing a change or effect on social, historically developing
man. So social, historically developing man is actively influenced by the external world. And because it is the practical external world, we have as a consequence- epistemologically. We hear of the
relations growing up between subject and object are historical. And what is the object, in the above? An object is a tangible and visible entity; an entity that can cast a shadow. Otherwise an object is a
goal intended to be attained (and which is believed to be attainable). So we have relations between subject and object. The relations between subject and object are historical relations i.e., between the
subject and object. But what is this subject and object?

The question of the existence of the external world is categorically superfluous, since the reply is already evident, since the external world is given, just as practice itself is given. Just for this reason in
practical life there are no seekers after solipsism, there are no agnostics, no subjective idealists. Consequently epistemology, including praxiology, epistemology which is praxiology, must have its point of
departure in the reality of the external world: not as a fiction, not as an illusion, not as a hypothesis, but as a basic fact. And just for this reason Boltzmann [11]
We are on about the question of the existence of the external world is categorically superfluous i.e., serving no useful purpose. The question of the existence of the external world is unnecessary. But why
categorically i.e., not modified or restricted by reservations? For the existence of the external world is a given. The existence of the external world is already self-evident. For practice itself is given. So
just as much as the existence of the external world is given, so too is practice a given i.e., an assumption that is taken for granted. We assume that practice is self-evident. For practice is a way of
operation or behaviour. And this way of operation or behaviour is taken for granted. And practice represents the relationship between subject and object. Why are we saying that practice represents the
relationship between subject and object? It is the existent reality that is the object, when we think. For the existent reality brings about thought. And therefore to some degree- influences human beings.
But human beings transform reality and thereby are also the subject. So human beings are both subject and object. We are acted upon by existent reality. Likewise we act on existent reality. By acting we
are subject. But in being acted upon, are the object. So subject and object are one in as much as theory and practice are unified. And the above maintains that it is for this reason in practical life there are
no seekers after solipsism, there are no agnostics, no subjective idealists. What reason? A reason is a rational motive for a belief or action. This reason is existence of the external world is superfluous.
What is meant in saying that in practical life there are no seekers after solipsism? Solipsism being the philosophical theory that the self is all that you know to exist. Solipsism being any of various
extreme versions of subjective idealism. For in practice there is a definite interaction with the existent reality. Hence it cannot maintain that the self is all that we know to exist. Once again alluding to
atomism. And in holding that self is all that we know to exist, we are holding to an extreme version of subjective idealism. And this extreme versions of subjective idealism holds that an epistemological
theory that the self can know nothing but its own modifications and states. There is nothing but my own modifications and states, says this extreme version of subjective idealism. Solipsism is a
metaphysical theory that the self is the only existent thing. And so in solipsism nothing is outside; the existent reality is a projection as I am the only existent thing. The tree, the mountain, the universe do
not exist, but in my mind, the only existent thing. But practical life undermines and is the relationship between things i.e., the self must relate to more than self. So we have it that practice represents the
relationship between subject and object. And this works in various ways, as I have stated. So this points that there can be no seekers after solipsism in practical life. For in performance or operation of
something we engage in an obvious relationship. In doing something successfully we can change the existent reality. But we too, are, tranformed through our position in time and space. We are acted
upon by existent reality a.k.a the world. So we are revolutionary and reactionary at the same time. Here we have the conflict between subject and object in reality. In this we have an inner contradictory
conflict. But it is in practical life that we realize this. Hence practical life determines that we are no seekers after solipsism. In practical life there are no agnostics. An agnostic is someone who is doubtful
or noncommittal. Can we doubt the existence of the external world? Can we not commit to the point that the external world is existent? We interact with the external world in practical life, hence cannot
be agnostic, in this sense. Are we uncertain of the existence of the external world? It certainly exists in that it acts upon us and also is acted upon. Hence the external world is both subject and object. So
in practical life we have no subjective idealists. Why do we have no subjective idealists in practical life? Subjectivism involves taking place within the mind and modified by individual bias. For this only
taking place within the mind is solipsism. But subjective idealists was what we were looking at. For subjective idealists. For subjective is the mental act performed entirely within the mind. In grammar
subjective means pertaining to subjects as opposed to objects. Thus in this sense it is being said that I am the transformer of reality. I, alone, can change the world to be as I wish it, says subjective
idealists. It does not in this sense- consider that the self is an object as well. I act but am not acted upon, says the subjective idealists. And this is so terribly important when one considers the thoughts
on the gap between theory and practice i.e., the alienation in modern culture. In that a given is becoming more consumed with its subject and the other its objective function. But that may not be so. An
idealist is someone guided more by ideals than by practical considerations. An ideal is idea of something that is perfect; something that one hopes to attain. So this idea of a perfect something in your
thoughts cannot be sought in the practical life. We heard that epistemology which is praxiology, must have its point of departure in the reality of the external world. So what is this point of departure in the
reality of the external world. So epistemology begins with the knowledge of the reality of the external world. And epistemology is praxiology. Praxeology is the study of human actions i.e., practice. For
Praxis is translating an idea into action. But we also have translation of the world into an idea. So we have idea into action and action into an idea. We stress the point of departure, which is the reality of
the external world. We maintain that the reality of the external world is not a fiction, not as an illusion, not as a hypothesis. The reality of the external world is a basic fact. The external world is not just an
figment of imagination i.e., creation of the mind. We do not through the use of our mind- create the external world. Hence we reemphasize the point of departure, which is the reality of the external world
as a basic fact. The external world is not an erroneous mental representation i.e., an imagining. And a hypothesis is a tentative insight into the natural world; a concept that is not yet verified but that if true
would explain certain facts or phenomena. This means we cannot verify the reality of the external world. So we say when we hypothesize- that the existence of the external world is a tentative insight.
This cannot be in practical life. For we maintained earlier that the reality of the external world is not a fiction, not as an illusion, not as a hypothesis. The reality of the external world is a basic fact. This is
our point of departure i.e., the reality of the external world.

[11] Boltzmann: popular writings, 905. declared with every justification that the premise about the unreality of the external world is the greatest folly that has ever ausgebrutet a human brain: it is in
contradiction to all the practice of humanity. Whereas E. Mach, in his Analysis of Sensations, considers that from the scientific (and not the practical) standpoint the question of the reality of the world
(whether it exists in reality, or whether it is an illusion, a dream) to be impermissible, since even the most incongruous dream is a fact no worse than any other.[12]
and now a quote from Boltzmann. He talked of the premise about the unreality of the external world. Boltzmann said, the unreality of the external world is the greatest folly that has ever affected a
human brain. This being the negation of the external world. We negate that negation i.e., the negate the negation of the external world. Boltzmann goes on that the premise about the unreality of the
external world is in contradiction to all the practice of humanity. For in practice we have actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge. And so
practice is application of knowledge. And so we have that it is in contradiction to all the application of knowledge of humanity. And in this we have application of knowledge as doing i.e., acting on the
external world. And we have it that E. Mach, in his Analysis of Sensations, considers that from the scientific standpoint the question of the reality of the world to be impermissible, since even the most
incongruous dream is a fact no worse than any other. So Mach has the question of the reality of the world to be impermissible, not permitted. So we have the impermissibility of the real world, according
to Mach. And his scientific standpoint is not the practical standpoint. We maintain that the practical standpoint is the scientific standpoint. He maintains that the most incongruous dream is a fact no worse
than any other. So he even equates an incongruous dream to another fact. So the incongruous dream equates to the full complexity, of forms making up the existent reality.

[12] E. Mach: Analysis of Sensations. This theory of cognition acquired from Vaihinger [13]

Now we will hear of theoretical, practical and religious fictions of mankind on the basis of an idealistic positivism. Idealism is the philosophical doctrine of the reality of ideas. For in Mach the most
incongruous dream (an idea) is a reality. For in this he is hold to the philosophical doctrine of the reality of ideas, and hence is idealistic. For positivism is the form of empiricism that bases all knowledge
on perceptual experience (not on intuition or revelation). So all knowledge is a perceptual experience, according to positivism, a form of empiricism. And that this idealistic positivism is a general
conviction of the thinking head. We hear of a demonstrative character. Demonstrative being marked by the open expression of emotion. So idealistic positivism is just characterized as emotional i.e.,
feeling. And it is further put that Mach erected fiction into a principle and system of cognition. A system is a group of independent but interrelated elements comprising a unified whole. We remember
cognition, to be, the psychological result of: perception, learning and reasoning. A principle is a rule or law concerning a natural phenomenon or the function of a complex system. So this principle and
system of cognition is fictionalized i.e., given a demonstrative character. Demonstrative being given to or characterized by a display of sentiment or feeling. So he i.e., Mach erected work based on the
imagination and not necessarily on fact into a principle and system of cognition. And Bukharin calls this work of Mach a peculiar somnambulistic epistemology. A somnambulism is walking by a person
who is asleep. It is a peculiar sleepwalking philosophical system of ideas explaining the theory of knowledge.
[13] R. Vaihingen: The philosophy of the system as Oh theoretical, practical and religious fictions of mankind on the basis of an idealistic positivism. Berlin, 1911, p. 91st. The matter is such a fiction is
nowadays a general conviction of the thinking head. a demonstrative character, as he erected fiction into a principle and system of cognition. This peculiar somnambulistic epistemology was foreseen in
his day by Calderon: [14]

What is life?
A frenzy: What is life?
An illusion, A shadow, a fiction,
And the greatest good is small.
That all life is a dream,
And dream the dreams are.
Practice is an active break-through into reality,
egress beyond the limits of the subject,
penetration into the object,
the humanising of nature,
its alteration.
What is life? What is the meaning of existence? Is it a frenzy? A frenzy being violent mental agitation i.e., a disturbance or excitement. Hence is life an outburst of emotion i.e., a disturbance or
excitement? Then Calderon asks: is life an illusion? It asks is life an figment of the imagination or a belief. For a figment of the imagination is an illusion. So is life initially an outburst of emotion i.e., a
frenzy. Or Calderon asks if it is an illusion, a figment of the imagination. So we have this question with disturbance or excitement and figment of the imagination. Is it a shadow i.e., dark shape projected
by a body intercepting rays of light. Is life a fiction i.e., a creation of something in the mind. And the greatest good is small. The highest qualities are Limited in size or scope. Can the best and most
suitable or right for a particular purpose be the small, most insignificant. And Calderon goes on That all life is a dream. This being that everything is a day-dream, mental image, Imaginative thought or
fantasy. Then Calderon goes on And dream the dreams are. So we have a mental image within a mental image i.e., a dream within a dream. He is asking what dreams are. Are they just a fantastic idea
of a person with a fantastic idea. Now we get to the crux of the poem. Calderon goes on: Practice is an active break-through into reality. A breakthrough is major advance or discovery. We move
forward with the idea that in practice we have an active moving forward into reality. So it is active i.e., taking action or effectuating change. We know and remind ourselves that practice is translation an
idea into action. So in In translating an idea into action is an active discovery (break-through) into reality. In breakthrough we have a removal of an obstacle, obstruction. And Calderon goes on with
egress beyond the limits of the subject. What is an egress? Egress means becoming apparent so we have becoming apparent beyond the limits of the subject. But what is the limits of the subject? A
subject is something that forms a basis (as for action, study, discussion, or use). And the limits: Restricted in quantity or scope. And we have then Calderons penetration into the object. The object is
person or thing to which action or feeling is directed (object of attention). So it is the goal. In Latin the word ob has meaning. Ob means to, toward, against. And jicere or icere (from jacere. Jacere means
to throw). And we end up with see into, find out, or discern i.e., penetration. So to return to penetration into the object. We have discerning of finding out about the thing to which action or feeling is
directed. And this is the altering of nature to make it accommodate the human requirement. As we change nature to suite ourselves- we have the humanising of nature. We thereby humanising of
nature are changing or transforming nature i.e., make or become different.

Practice is the refutation of agnosticism, the process of transforming things in themselves into things for us, the best proof of the adequacy of thought, and of its truth understood historically, as a
process. For, if the objective world is changed through practice and according to practice, which includes theory, this means, that practice verifies the truth of theory; and this means that we know to a
certain extent (and come to know more and more) objective reality, its qualities, its attributes, its regularities. Therefore the fact of technology, as Engels already remarked in Anti- Dhring,[15]
We hear in the following of Practice is the refutation of agnosticism. And refutation is the act of determining that something is false. So agnosticism is refuted. And by practice we achieve this refutation.
And agnosticism is a denial of ultimate knowledge. But we have it that we are talking of a specific agnosticism i.e., the solipsists and the agnostics who are unsure. Solipsism being the philosophical
theory that the self is all that you know to exist. And it is through practice that we refute agnosticism. We reestablish it that practice is the translating an idea into action . And an action relates to an
achievement. The achievement is the effect. The action is the cause. The achievement comes about through the cause. An achievement is an accomplishing of something. Hence it is to complete
successfully. Aggression is an action. And it gets reaction in various forms. We recall that practice is translating an idea into action. Aggression is translating a specific idea (Racism, Fascism) into action.
Why do people act aggressively? They feel they are under threat. We hear of the process of transforming things in themselves into things for us. And what are things in themselves and things for us.
A thing is any attribute or quality considered as having its own existence. So we have things in themselves as an unspecified item in itself i.e., a natural object. On the other hand we have things for us
i.e., artificial. And in practice we a process of transformation. PRACTICE is the process of transformation in that we make (action) things for us from things in themselves. We engage in production in
transforming things in themselves into things for us. Hence we can say that practice is a process of transformation, the act of changing in form, shape or appearance. New formations, shapes or
appearance that indicates that they are things for us. In their old formations, shapes or appearances they were just things in themselves. But it is the practice of interacting with the old formations,
shapes or appearances. We interact in a specific way transforming these old formations, shapes or appearances. Hence they take on New formations, shapes or appearances. They have become things
for us. We must engage with the world of reality to transform things in themselves to things for us. We turn what we find in nature into useful objects, satisfying human needs. We turn things in
themselves into things for us. They become something quite different to what they were initially. The things in themselves undergo a transformation or a change of position. And all of this i.e., the
process of transformation refutes agnosticism. For we the materialist concept, agnosticism and solipsism. And this process of transformation is the best proof. It is the best proof of the adequacy of
thought, and of its truth understood historically, as a process. The process of transformation is the best proof of the adequacy of thought. The process of transformation is the best proof of the quality of
being sufficient for the end in view coming from thought. So the effect is indicative of the proof of the effectiveness and sufficiency of thought. With sufficient thought we derive proof of thought's
effectiveness. Ineffective thought is ineffective i.e., no results, inadequate. Ineffective thought is not sufficient to meet a need. We also hear of truth understood historically, as a process. So we are not
talking of truth as an abstraction. But truth as a process, understood historically i.e., with respect to history (the aggregate of past events). For it is the aggregate of past events that derives the immediate
moment. For an aggregate of past events have established the current. The aggregate of past events with the various interacting forces- have derived the current existent form. So practice in the past
has derived the conditions of the immediate moment. These are the aggregate of past events. A process is a particular course of action intended to achieve a result. So we have the particular course of
actions that achieve results; the results manifest as events. And we have this aggregate of past events. For the results are built upon to derive further results. Nothing is an end in itself. For in the
immediate moment we proceed onwards into the future and create further immediate moments. This is the movement or flow of history. And the proof of thought's effectiveness lies in the particular
moment in time and space. For each particular moment in time and space makes the whole of history. And each particular moment in time and space is a manifestation formations, shapes or
appearances. And these i.e., each particular moment in time and space produces a given formation, shape or appearance. Each particular moment in time and space has natural and man-made
transformation. And each particular moment in time and space has its things in themselves becoming things for us, through the practice. Each immediate moment is representative of a change or
transformation in a given formation, shape or appearance. We measure time in the transformation in formations, shapes or appearances. And this is the best proof of the adequacy of thought. The most
adequate thought has given formation, shape or appearance to things in themselves. This underlines our earlier position that one stands on the shoulders of the experience of other people. But we
think of the experience of other people who have adequate (requisite qualities or resources to meet a task) thought. For this effectiveness is the proof thereof. Hence we say talk about truth understood
historically, as a process. We remember, again and again, that a process is a particular course of action intended to achieve a result. So from one given moment to the next we have actions and results
on the basis of various contending, conflicting and allied forces. We continue with the objective world is changed through practice and according to practice, which includes theory, this means, that
practice verifies the truth of theory. So it is a transformation of the objective world, through practice and according to practice. So the objective world is the world outside. And it is changed. And the world
that is expressing and perceived without distortion of personal feelings is the objective world. And we have change through practice, translating an idea into action. Our practice defines the particular
formations, shapes or appearances things take. For practice defines arrangement of people or things acting as a unit, concrete representation or outward or visible aspect of a person or thing. But we
have change through practice and according to practice. The objective world is changed according to practice. The objective world is transformed in agreement with or accordant with practice. So we
have a consensus on the way things are transformed. So there is this social agreement that defines how the objective world changes. And this change of the world also includes theory. And theory is a
well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world; an organized system of accepted knowledge that applies in a variety of circumstances to explain a specific set of phenomena. So we
also have it that practice verifies the truth of theory.

confutes Kantian agnosticism-that paltry doctrine, in the words of Hegel. [16]


What is it to confute? To confute means to prove to be false. That is to make clear the validity of the falsity of Kantian agnosticism, as by an example, explanation or experiment. And agnosticism is the
disbelief in any claims of ultimate knowledge. So Kants disbelief in any claims of ultimate knowledge is termed Kantian agnosticism. So he holds that that there is no ultimate knowledge. So ultimate is
furthest or highest in degree or order; utmost or extreme. And Hegel calls this Kantian agnosticism a paltry doctrine. Paltry in that Kantian agnosticism is not worth considering. And doctrine? Doctrine
being the system of beliefs accepted as authoritative by some group or school. And in this case it is the school of Kantian agnosticism i.e., the disbelief in any claims of ultimate knowledge.

[16] That we do not know realities, and that it has been granted us to know only accidental and passing -that is, paltry phenomena that is the paltry doctrine, which has made and is making the loudest
noise, and which now predominates in philosophy. Hegel: Encyclopaedia of Philosophic Sciences, Part 1., Speech of October. 22, 1818.)
It is maintainted in the Hegel's Encyclopaedia of Philosophic Sciences that we do not know realities, and that it has been granted us to know only accidental and passing-that is, paltry phenomena. What
is this we do not know realities? To not know reality i.e., the state or fact of being ignorant of the state of being actual or real. And real? Real means existing in act and not merely potentially. So it is not a
possiblility. Basically holding the position that we do not know realities. We know only accidental and passing paltry phenomena. Phenomena is any state or process known through the senses rather
than by intuition or reasoning. So we come to accidently engage with this passing paltry phenomena. And any phenomena stresses through the senses. And in this through the senses rather than by
intuition or reasoning. And Hegel goes on about predominance of Kantian agnosticism in philosophy. In the same way that we have the predominance of Kantian agnosticism in philosophy; we have also
in this work the mention of Berkeley's thesis strolling up and down all the highways of modern philosophy.

If K. Pearson in a Grammar of Science modernises the well known cave of Plato, replacing it by a telephone exchange, and the pale shades of the Platonic ideas by telephone signals, he thereby
demonstrates his own conception of the passively contemplative character of cognition. The real subject -that is, social and historical man-is not in the least like either Karl Pearson's telephonist or the
observer of the Platonic shades. He likewise does not in the least resemble that stenographer, inventing convenient signs in shorthand, into whom the philosophising mathematicians and physicists
desire to transform him (B. Russell, Wittgenstein, Frank, Schlick, and others). For he is actively transforming the world. He has changed the face of the whole of the earth. Living and working in the
biosphere,[17]
In the above we hear of the modernizing the well known cave of Plato. How do we modernize the well known cave of Plato? To modernize the well known cave of Plato we replace it by a telephone
exchange, and the pale shades of the Platonic ideas by telephone signals. So we do not have the cave but the telephone exchange. The pale shades of the Platonic ideas are signals from the telephone.
These shades are not full or rich, but shadows. So kant held to this well known cave of Plato. This well known cave of Plato lies within Kantian agnosticism in its paltry phenomena. A phenomena we
repeat- is any state or process known through the senses rather than by intuition or reasoning. So this paltry phenomena is unintuitive or unreasonable.We hear of the conception of the passively
contemplative character of cognition. Character is characteristic property that defines the apparent individual nature of something. So we have a conception, an abstract or general idea inferred or derived
from specific instances. These abstract or general ideas are dealing with the character of cognition. And the character of cognition is passive and contemplative. Passive in being the opposite to active
i.e., Not exerting influence or change. In contemplative it being Deeply or seriously thoughtful. We hear of the real subject as social and historical man. And social and historical man is not at all like Karl
Pearson's telephonist or the observer of the Platonic shades. And the observer of the Platonic shades is actually the telephonist. And then we hear of resemblance to the stenographer, inventing
convenient signs in shorthand, into whom the philosophising mathematicians and physicists desire to transform him. These philosophising mathematicians and physicists desire to transform social and
historical man into convenient signs in shorthand. Now Bukharin mentions that social and historical man is actively transforming the world. For social and historical man has changed the face of the whole
of the earth. And this change is an active transformation of the world. And this living and working takes place in the biosphere, an artificial enclosed ecosystem. Otherwise the biosphere is the regions of
the surface and atmosphere of the Earth (or other planet) where living organisms exist. But these convenient signs in shorthand are indications of subjectivism. These philosophising mathematicians and
physicists desire to transform social and historical man into just this, convenient signs in shorthand. So they would reduce social and historical man into plainly an observer of the Platonic shades. In this
we have the scientists mentioned before, Russell, Wittgenstein, Frank, Schlick, and others. And social and historical man is actively transforming the world, disposed to take action or effectuate change.
And in activity we understand characterized by action rather than by contemplation or speculation. So action is not contemplative or speculative. Though contemplative or speculative with regard to
practice. So its contemplative or speculative character fascilitates and enhances practice. It is not escapist. It is all about living and working in the biosphere, the artificial enclosed ecosystem i.e., the
existent reality. Lets term the world of ideas as the speculosphere or the ideosphere, metaphysical i.e., beyond the sphere of the tangible.

[17] See Y. Vernadsky, Member of Academy: The Biosphere. Leningrad, 1926. (Russian.)

social man has radically remoulded the surface of the planet. The physical landscape is ever more becoming the seat of some branch of industry or agriculture, an artificial material medium has filled
space, gigantic successes of technique and natural science confront us, the radius of cognition, with the progress of exact apparatus of measurement and new methods of research, has grown extremely
wide: we already weigh planets, study their chemical composition, photograph invisible rays, etc. We foretell objective changes in the world, and we change the world. But this is unthinkable without real
knowledge.
We hear of social man. Social relates to human society and its members. So in talking of human society and its members we allude to sociology. We have human society in civilization, culture, open
society and tribal society. We have the individuals as part of human society, in its various forms. And in remoulding we have make something, usually for a specific function. So man is remoulding the
surface of the planet and in that himself. Bukharin goes on about how the physical landscape is ever more becoming the seat of some branch of industry or agriculture. And in seat we have the location
(metaphorically speaking) where something is based. So we locate the branches of industry or agriculture in the physical landscape. So we return to our discussion of things in themselves to things for
us. And the physical landscape is a thing in itself which has become a thing for us. It is a seat i.e., a place where something specified is prevalent. We find the prevalence of the physical landscape
transforming into a branch of industry or agriculture. A seat can be understood as a part at or forming the base of something. A seat being a part (as a socket) or surface on or in which another part or
surface rests. So a component. Initially it was not a component of the broader branches of industry or agriculture. And in this we have an artificial material medium has filled space. This artificial being
contrived by art rather than nature. And material being the tangible substance that goes into the makeup of a physical object. So we are on about the tangible substance that goes into the makeup of the
orderly relationship of parts. This particular orderly relationship of parts being the expansion of the particular branches of industry or agriculture. And in this we have the gigantic successes of technique
and natural science confront us. Its the the degree or measure of achievement in attaining a desired end i.e., in the use of technique and natural science. We are confronted with these achievements. And
technique and natural science links or relates to the branches of industry or agriculture. In technique we refer to the characterization or showing of skill in or a specialized knowledge of applied arts and
sciences. So the application of the sciences is the technique. And the branches of industry or agriculture apply technique with gigantic success. And with this expansion of the branches of industry or
agriculture we have the cognitive expansion. We have the radius of cognition, with the progress of exact apparatus of measurement and new methods of research growning extremely wide. So we have
the range or theoretical base. And we recall that cognition is the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning. So this psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning has a
larger radius. We have this due to improved and exact apparatus of measurement. Likewise the new methods of research have widened the radius of cognition. In apparatus we have equipment designed
to serve a specific function. Apparatus has a lot to do with instrumentation. An apparatus is also used in Anatomy. An apparatus is a group of body parts that work together to perform a given function. An
example would be the Auditory and visual apparatus. And in measurement we are on about the act or process of assigning numbers to phenomena according to a rule. And we also have new methods of
research. Any method is a way of doing something, especially a systematic way; implies an orderly logical arrangement (usually in steps). Here we are on about the way or system of doing research, the
systematic investigation to establish facts i.e., a search for knowledge. He continues with examples of the new methods of research involving weighing planets, studying their chemical composition,
photographin invisible rays and much more. And he proceeds that we foretell objective changes in the world, and we change the world. And so we make a prediction about the objective changes in the
world. And we change or transform the world according to how we predicted it could be changed. We see what can be done and do according to our knowledge. We change the world on the basis of our
prediction of what the world is like. So the basis of any world transformation is on the basis of our knowledge thereof. And this is objective change it is undistorted by emotion or personal bias; based on
observable phenomena. It is on the basis of the actual world i.e., not on the basis of subjectivism. The world is as it is despite the observer. The world will not change on the basis of the subjective
position of the observer. And this transformation cannot be (it is unthinkable) without real knowledge. So real knowledge is the basis of actual transformation. We are Incapable of transformation being
conceived or considered without real knowledge. And this real knowledge is the knowledge of objective reality. But we have the allowance of many to transform the virtual reality. Hence it is not real
transformation but the illusory transformation of a reality i.e., it is subjective. But what of the changes that go against the reality of survival of the planet i.e., global warming, pollution etc. but there even
real knowledge is defined by the beneficial aspects of transforming the world of reality. And the new methods of research will define the balance or health of the planet in relation to transformation of the
world. Again the exact apparatus of measurement will be augmented to facilitate this aspect. The important aspect is that real knowledge is necessary to have transformation of the world. Otherwise it
remains unthinkable, it Incapable of being conceived or considered i.e., inconceivable. So real knowledge is the basis, the fundamental assumption from which transformation begins. So action is
therefore based on this fundamental assumption i.e., real knowledge enables or fascilitates transformation. And deriving real knowledge comes with exact apparatus of measurement and new methods of
research. We can foretell, make a prediction about objective changes. For all objective changes, that are predicted, are based on real knowledge.

In the following we hear of pure symbolism, stenography, a system of signs and of fictions. In symbolism we have a system of symbols and symbolic representations. In symbols we have something
visible that by association or convention represents something else that is invisible. So in symbolism the invisible takes on visibility. But the invisible takes on visibility as a representative form, standing
for something imperceptible. So the imperceptible becomes perceptible through symbolism. So we have color is imperceptible to the touch, and hence we show yellow, red and so forth by warmth i.e.,
being warm colours. In this warmth represents something of the essence of the colours. But the blind perceiver of warm colours has some understanding of something of the colours, in warmth. But he
cannot conceive it directly. His indirect position is forced upon him through is his imperceptibility, obliging him to perceive through the indirect route. And the indirect route is that involving symbols. The
direct observer of colour sees it directly and is not bound or forced along the indirect route. And stenography is the act or art of writing in shorthand, writing in abbreviated or symbolic form. So these
cannot serve as an instrument of objective changes. For they are means to conceptualize the world. They are not direct interfaces to the existent reality. It is only by direct action with the existent reality
that transformation can be existent. These, pure symbolism, stenography, a system of signs and of fictions, are not directly dealing with objective reality. On the other hand new methods of research deal
with actual direct action with the world of reality. For a method is way of doing something, especially a systematic way; implies an orderly logical arrangement i.e., usually in steps. We engage with the
world of reality in specified and predetermined ways. We remind ourselves that we are talking of pure symbolism, stenography, a system of signs and of fictions. Pure being completely theoretical. Pure is
concerned with theory and data rather than practice; opposed to applied.
Pure symbolism, stenography, a system of signs, of fictions, cannot serve as an instrument of objective changes, carried out by the subject.[18]

[18] Characteristic of the modern physicists and mathematicians is the following opinion of Ph. Frank: We see that in any kind of such problems, it is a question of an 'agreement between thought and
object,' as the school philosophy says, bring forth, but only to the invention of a method that is Suitable with the help of a clever gewahlten sign system to bring order to our experiences and thereby
facilitate their mastery of us. (Ph. Frank: pp. 2-4. What the gegenwartigen physical theories for the general theory of knowledge mean? To knowledge, volume 1,, pp. 134-135...).
We hear of the characteristic of the modern physicists and mathematicians in the following opinion. It is stated that we see that in any kind of such problems. In such it is a question of the agreement
between thought and object. In agreement between thought and object we need compatibility between thought and object. So the object, the tangible and visible entity; an entity that can cast a shadow
must be be in harmony with thought. So thought and reality must have a definite relationship. So thought and reality must conform they are part of a unity. We return to our earlier position that theory and
practice are a unity. We hear of the philosophical school stating bring forth, but only to the invention of a method that is Suitable with the help of a clever gewahlten sign system to bring order to our
experiences and thereby facilitate their mastery of us. And in bringing forth we are on about transformation of the world. And this bringing forth, transformation of the world can only be realized in invention
of a method that is suitable. The invention of a method that is suitable allows for the transformation of the world, the bringing forthwith. We need to have an invention of a way of doing something i.e., a
method that is suitable to the goal intended to be attained (object). No object can be achieved without a method that is Suitable. The method must correspond to the object. If the goal or object is
transformation of the world then what is the method? For the method is the means of bringing forth. Any method is an adaption towards a use or purpose. And on the other hand the alternative is a
maladaptation towards a use or purpose. Likewise we hear of the help of a clever sign system to bring order to our experiences. So the object in this instance is order to our experiences. But how do we
get order to our experiences? Order to our experiences can be derived through the help of a clever sign system. A system is a independent but interrelated elements comprising a unified whole. So we
have signs, perceptible indications of something not immediately apparent, as interrelated elements comprising a unified whole. So this clever sign system involves interrelated elements i.e., each sign in
the system. And this clever sign system brings order to our experiences. And then we bring order to our experiences, by using the clever sign systems. But this facilitates the clever sign systems mastery
of us. So we end up being subservient of a clever sign system (ideology). We thence become subservient or subordinate to some absolute.

What is meant that cognition, considered historically, is the more and more adequate reflection of objective reality? so the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning ought to have
historical consideration. So cognition ought to be given thought on how it is relating to the study of history. cognition is knowing, perceiving, or conceiving as an act or faculty distinct from emotion and
volition. Cognition can also mean the result of knowing, perceiving, or conceiving. And this result of knowing, perceiving, or conceiving must be considered historically. And in historical we mean relating
to, or having the character of history especially as distinguished from myth or legend. So the study of cognition that is not mythical or legendary. Because we can or do have the mythical or legendary
explanation of cognition. And this is a more adequate reflection of objective reality. So cognition is an adequate reflection of objective reality. We also hear of the fundamental criterion of the correctness
of cognition. A criterion is a A basis for comparison; a reference point against which other things can be evaluated. So the basis for comparing cognitions adequateness lies with its degree of
correspondence to objective reality. In other words to what point does it relate or maintain compatibility with objective reality. The compatibility with objective reality is fundamental criterion of the
correctness of cognition. And in adequateness we have the quality of being able to meet a need satisfactorily. Is cognition able to meet a need satisfactorily? In being able to meet a need satisfactorily
determines its adequacy or inadequacy. And to meet a need the cognition must be harmonious with objective reality. Then we hear of the instrumental criterion of truth. But what is this instrumental
criterion of truth? Any instrument is serving or acting as a means or aid, a resource. And we also hear of contradiction to this criterion. A criterion is a principle or standard of judgement. So we have the
instrumental principle or standard of judgement of truth. And that which serves or acts as a means or aid as a criterion of truth. And this is not in contradiction to this criterion i.e., the historical
consideration of cognition. In instrumental we have being an instrument that functions in the promotion of some end or purpose. The instrument that functions in the promotion of some end or purpose as
the principle or standard of judging the truth. And this instrumental must express a degree of correspondence to objective reality i.e., to some extent. For any instrument coincides with the historical
consideration of cognition. In each immediate moment we have a particular character of cognition i.e., depending on the paticular point in time. From one point in time to another the instruments will
change i.e., transformation. Likewise the change in the instruments will indicate a change in cognition i.e., from one point in time to another. So it coincides with the historical consideration of cognition.
For the historical consideration of cognition is corresponding to the instruments. We are saying that cognition is an instrument for the practice of social man, transforming the objective world. For the
intellectual process by which knowledge is gained about perceptions or ideas (theory) is the basis for the instrumental. For technology and technique derives through cognition. And the cognition ust have
compatibility with objective reality to be meaningful, make adequate changes. So we have got to Marx's revolutionary Praxis. But what is this i.e., Marx's revolutionary Praxis? We recall that Praxis is
translating an idea into action, method i.e., practice. And praxis means exercise or practicing of an art, science, or skill. So this is an instrument for the practice of social man, transforming the objective
world. On the other side of the spectrum we have the individual practice of any philistine in a beershop. A philistine being a person who is uninterested in intellectual pursuits. And this individual practice
of any philistine in a beershop links well with our thoughts on atomism and the epistemological Robinson Crusoes.
Cognition, considered historically, is the more and more adequate reflection of objective reality. The fundamental criterion of the correctness of cognition is therefore the criterion of its adequateness, its
degree of correspondence to objective reality. The instrumental criterion of truth is not in contradiction to this criterion, but coincides with it, if it is only a question of an instrument for the practice of social
man, transforming the objective world (Marx's revolutionare Praxis, Engels' umwalzende practice), and not of the individual practice of any philistine in a beershop.

Therefore the instrumental criterion of pragmatism (Bergson, close to pragmaticism; W. James and others) must be rejected with all decisiveness. James includes as practice, prayer, the experience of
religious ecstasy, etc.; doubting the existence of the material world, he does not doubt at all the existence of God, like, by the way, many other adherents of so-called scientific thought (A. S. Eddington,
R. A. Millikan, etc.).[19]
We hear of the instrumental criterion of pragmatism. It must be rejected with all decisiveness. And Bukharin likens this instrumental criterion of pragmatism to the individual practice of a philistine in a
beershop. We hear of how William James includes as practice, prayer, the experience of religious ecstasy, etc. pragmatism is the attribute of accepting the facts of life and favouring practicality and literal
truth. James is doubting the existence of the material world, he does not doubt at all the existence of God, like, by the way, many other adherents of so-called scientific thought. So he, James, doubts the
existence of the material world. But he does not doubt at all the existence of God. He is unsure of the material world but believes in existence of God. So what is self-evident is doubted and what is
unseen is believed. And we have it that many adherents of so-called scientific thought have this position. Many adherents of so-called scientific thought doubt the existence of the material world. And
many adherents of so-called scientific thought does not doubt at all the existence of God. And they can be likened to the individual practice of any philistine in a beershop.

[19] God is real, since he produces real effects (517). I believe the pragmatic way of taking religion to be the deeper way.... What the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual inflow
of energy in the faith-state and the prayerstate, I know not ... But the overbelief on which I am ready to make my personal venture is that they exist (519).
We have below the quote that God is real, since he produces real effects. Any effect is a phenomenon that follows and is caused by some previous phenomenon. So we have a previous phenomenon as
the basis for the presentphenomenon. And Reality is capable of being treated as fact. Reality is having substance or capable of being treated as fact; not imaginary. He proceed on with I believe the
pragmatic way of taking religion to be the deeper way. What is the deeper way? And this pragmatic way of taking religion, which is asserted to be the deeper way? Pragmatism can be concerned with
practical matters. Pragmatism comes from philosophy. The doctrine, pragmatism, that practical consequences are the criteria of knowledge and meaning and value. Practical is guided by practical
experience and observation rather than theory. What are practical consequences i.e., results or effects of what has gone before? And depth is marked by depth of thinking i.e., the intellectual ability to
penetrate deeply into ideas. furthermore goes on with this vein, what the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayerstate, I know not.
And these divine facts are the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayerstate. So we have faith-state and the prayerstate. And faith is a strong belief in a supernatural power or powers that
control human destiny. And supernatural is not existing in nature or subject to explanation according to natural laws; not physical or material. So the supernatural is not physical or material i.e., not matter
or material nor matter from which a thing is made. A state is an existing condition or position of a person or thing. So we have an existing condition or position, of faith, of a person. So it is an state of
being or fitness of a person or thing, the existing condition. And we have the existing condition or position of a person in prayer as the prayerstate.

William James: The Varieties of Religious Experience, London, 1909.

Compare also Pragmatism, p. 76. Study (loc. cit. 65, footnote) rightly observes: He (Vaihingen, NB), the pragmatism sentenced meretrix theologorum. I had the pragmatism 'the body - called stomach
and philosophy of banal natural humanity.' The criterion of economy of thought can in no way serve as a criterion, since the economy itself can only be established post factum: while taken in isolation, as
a bare principle of cognition in itself, it means the a priori liquidation of the complexity of thoughtthat is, its deliberate incorrectness. In this way economy is transformed into its very opposite. Man's
thinking is only 'economic' when it correctly reflects objective reality, and the criterion of this correctness is practice, experiment, industry.[20]
What is meretrix theologorum? I think a meretrix in Ancient Rome- was a registered prostitute. theologorum is theology. And what is it in saying I had the pragmatism 'the body - called stomach and
philosophy of banal natural humanity. Pragmatism is dealing with matters from a practical point of view. And what is banal natural humanity? Banal means commonplace, lacking originality, trite or
ordinary. We then hear of criterion of economy of thought can in no way serve as a criterion, since the economy itself can only be established post factum. What is a criterion? A criterion is a principle or
standard of judgement. principle is a fundamental truth or law as the basis of reasoning or action. A personal code of conduct. A standard is an object, quality, or measure serving as a basis, example, or
principle to which others conform or should conform or by which others are judged.
[20] Lenin: Materialism and Empiriocriticism, Works, Eng. ed, vol, xiii. We see, consequently, that modern capitalist theories of cognition either do not deal with the question of practice altogether
(Kantianism: Compare H. Cohen: Logic of pure knowledge, 1902, p. 12.

So the origins or beginnings lie with thinking. But what is thinking? To think means to judge or consider for e.g., he is thought to be a fraud). Thinking is to exercise the
mind (let me think for a moment). It is also to consider; be or become aware of. To think entails to form a conception of. Thinking is to produce (an idea etc.) by
thinking. Or to think over or reflect upon in order to reach a decision. And in what sense are we talking of here? We have that thinking is the beginning. And we go on
that thinking may have no origin outside of himself. But what is being said in thinking may have no origin outside of himself. And who is being alluded to? Origin is the
starting-point; the source. Origin is from Latin. In Latin origo. Origo or origin- comes from orior which means: rise. So the piece is alluding that thinking has no origin
outside of man. We return to unoriginal. It does not derive from the existent reality. That is what is being said that thinking does not have its origins in the world. What
is this outside of man? This outside of man alludes to the external reality. And here we are going on about the world of ideas and the world of reality. We also get to
hear of the treatment of practice in the Pickwickian sense. For what is it to treat practice in the Pickwickian sense? For Pickwickian is marked by simplicity and
generosity of character or by an appearance and manner suggesting these qualities. So we have the simple and generous i.e., Pickwickian. It is character that is
simple and generous. This can be in appearance and manner. So we have the appearance and manner of simplicity and generosity. For this simplicity and
generosity is Pickwickian. For in Pickwickian we have specially or whimsically limited or distorted in intended meaning. So we have a sense that is whimsically limited
or distorted in intended meaning. Whimsical means capricious or fantastic. In being limited we mean not great in scope or talents. So it is a sense that is a sense that
is not great in scope or talents. And sense is consciousness or awareness. So it is a consciousness or awareness that is not great in scope or talents i.e., limited. We
repeat that this sense is whimsically limited or distorted in intended meaning. So what is being attempted to be communicate i.e., meaning is distorted. So here we are
talking of the treatment of practice. But a treatment of practice in the Pickwickian sense. We are alluding to the discourse on practice. But it is Pickwickian in that it is
not great in scope or talents. It somehow is of limited consciousness or awareness of the essence of practice. And Pickwickian in that we hear that the treatment of
practice as: tearing practice away from the material world or from the highest forms of cognition (pragmatism, conventionalism, fictionalism, etc. this involves tearing
practice away from the material world. It is to be alienated from the material world. Torn from the material world in that thinking has no origin outside of himself. And in
this it i.e., practice is torn from the material world. So practice in being torn from the material world lies completely in thought. And these highest forms of cognition?
What are the highest forms of cognition? In highest we are going on about standing above others in quality or position. So we have a high standing in pragmatism,
conventionalism, fictionalism. But what are these three about? In pragmatism we have the doctrine that practical consequences are the criteria of knowledge and
meaning and value. So in pragmatism the practical consequences underlie the criteria of knowledge. So the principle or standard of judging, criterion in the value of
knowledge is based on the practical consequences. And this criteria of knowledge in practical consequences is one of the highest forms of cognition. Cognition being
the psychological result of perception, learning, and reasoning. So pragmatism is one of the highest forms a result of perception, learning, and reasoning. But
perception, learning, and reasoning as the basis of knowledge aimed at the practical consequences or outcomes. And conventionalism? CONVENTIONALISM is
Orthodoxy as a consequence of being conventional i.e., conforming with accepted standards. And in conventionalism we mean based on, settled by, or formed by
agreement or compact. A compact being formal agreement between two or more parties to perform or not perform some action. And in orthodoxy we mean a belief or
orientation agreeing with conventional standards. So this belief or orientation agreeing with conventional standards is conventionalism. And fictionalism? And in
fictionalism we are on about Make into fiction. Our author maintains that the only true position is held by dialectical materialism. Why does dialectical materialism hold
the only true position. We hear of a rejection of all species of idealism and agnosticism, and overcomes the narrowness of mechanical materialism. The narrow
mechanical materialism is ahistorical. Thereby narrow mechanical materialism is unconcerned with or unrelated to history or to historical development or to tradition.
And its antidialectical character? The antidialectical character of narrow mechanical materialism. The dialectic is marked by a dynamic inner tension, conflict, and
interconnectedness of its parts or elements. What is this dynamic inner tension? So narrow mechanical materialism does not; it rejects this dynamic inner tension.
And in tension we are on about balance between and interplay of opposing elements or tendencies. This is the opposing elements or tendencies. So we have
counteracting forces i.e., opposing elements or tendencies. These inclinations are different, opposing elements. So we have arrived at the opposition of elements. Or
elemental opposition. This being the elementary opposition caused by a dynamic inner tension. In dynamic we mean expressing action rather than a state of being
i.e., give expression to this dynamic inner tension. And furthermore narrow mechanical materialism fails to understand problems of quality. This quality being the
degree or grade of excellence or worth. We also hear of its contemplative objectivism. So it is objective, in the head i.e., contemplative objectivism. This
contemplative objectivism is deeply or seriously thoughtful about objectivity.
We begin with thinking. The thinking may have no origin outside of himself .), or treat of practice in the Pickwickian sense, tearing it away from the material world or
from the highest forms of cognition (pragmatism, conventionalism, fictionalism, etc.). The only true position is held by dialectical materialism, which rejects all species
of idealism and agnosticism, and overcomes the narrowness of mechanical materialism (its ahistorism, its antidialectical character, its failure to understand problems
of quality, its contemplative objectivism, etc.).

2. Theory and Practice from the Sociological Standpoint. Historical Forms of Society and the Connection of Theory and Practice.
We have theory and practice, from the Sociological Standpoint. Sociology is the study and classification of human societies. So we are on about theory and practice from the standpoint of the study and
classification of human societies. We hear of dialectical materialism as being a method of cognition. A method is way of doing something, especially a systematic way; implies an orderly logical
arrangement (usually in steps). In systematic thought, cognition, we allude to thought Characterized by order and planning. We thereby imply ordered thought; planned thought. So dialectical materialism
is ordered thought; planned thought. And this method of cognition is applied to social development. So dialectical materialism is applied to social development i.e., improving expanding, enlarging or
refining human society. Hence we have the creation of the theory of historical materialism. We have dialectical materialistic creating the theory of historical materialism. So historical materialism derives
from dialectical materialism. Hence the theory of historical materialism is dialectical materialistic, in origin. Our author goes on about the usual conception of Marxism. So this is Marxism of the
mechanical, natural-scientific materialism typical of the teachings of the French encyclopaedists of the 18th century. These French encyclopaedists of the 18th century held a profoundly scholarly
knowledge. We have it that Marxism is built up entirely on the idea of historical development. So this idea of historical development is the basis of Marxism i.e., it builds it. And in this Marxism is compared
to the hypertrophied rationalism of the encyclopaedists. Anything hypertrophied is excessively enlarged as a result of increased size in the constituent cells. So encyclopaedism is excessively enlarged as
a result of increased emphasis on rationalism. Rationalism is the theological doctrine that human reason rather than divine revelation establishes religious truth. Our author then goes on about the
numerous refutations of Marxism systematically beginning with the premise of the mechanical character of dialectical materialism and its sociological side. The sociological side of Marxism being
historical materialism.
Dialectical materialism, as a method of cognition applied to social development, has created the theory of historical materialism. The usual conception of Marxism is
that of a variety of the mechanical, natural-scientific materialism typical of the teachings of the French encyclopaedists of the 18th century or Buchner-Moleschott. This
is fundamentally wrong. For Marxism is built up entirely on the idea of historical development, foreign to the hypertrophied rationalism of the encyclopaedists.[21]

[21] It is characteristic that, in spite of this, the numerous refutations of Marxism systematically begin with the premise of the mechanical character of dialectical
materialism and its sociological side (the theory of historical materialism). Compare N. N. Alexeyev: The Social and Natural Sciences in the Historical Interrelation of
their Methods. Part 1. The Mechanical Theory of Society. Historical Materialism. Moscow, 1912.

Other attempts at a deeper criticism are founded on a poor acquaintance with the subject, though their name is legion. The question of theory in general must be put
as follows from what is said above -from the standpoint of social theory- that is, the standpoint of sociology and history. At the present time all scientists more or less
acquainted with the facts, and all research workers, recognise that genetically theory grew up out of practice, and that any branch of science has, in the long run, its
practical roots.[22]

[22] Compare on mathematics among the Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Indians, etc. M. Kantor: Lectures on the History of Mathematics.
Leipzig. Trubner, 1903, Volume 1. , 3rd Edition. Compare also F. J. Moore: History of Chemistry. Otto Wiener: Physics and the Development of Culture. R. Eisler:
History of science. A. Bordeaux: History of physical sciences, chemical, geological and nineteenth year. century. , Paris et Liege, 1920.

In what follows we hear of the necessity of studying the successive development of individual branches of natural science. What are these individual branches of natural science? In successive
development we are on about the history of the individual branches of natural science. How did these individual branches of natural science come about? We hear below about an example, astronomy.
And astronomy is absolutely necessary for pastoral and agricultural peoples. Why would astronomy be absolutely necessary for pastoral and agricultural peoples? Astronomy is the scientific study of
celestial bodies. But going into why pastoral and agricultural peoples needed to study astronomy can be looked at. We then hear that Astronomy could only develop only with the help of mathematics. So
we have mathematics as extending of astronomy. So astronomy and mathematics are mutually linked in origins. But obviously this link is not exclusive. For mathematics must have developed in other
spheres. But we do know that major civilizations develop alongside the fertile banks of great rivers. But lets return to our point: Astronomy can develop further only with the help of mathematics. So
astronomy can only evolve through the application of mathematics. So the application of mathematics, makes astronomy bigger, fuller, more elaborate. A more clear, full, and explicit presentation of what
astronomy is about comes through the application of mathematics. So for astronomy to make itself more visible or manifest, reaching the apex, it requires mathematics. So to cause astronomy to become
more completely unfolded so as to reveal hidden or unexpected qualities or potentialities it requires the application of mathematics. So consequently, it became necessary to study the latter, mathematics.
Therefore mathematics issues forth from astronomy. Without mathematics astronomy remains undeveloped i.e., hampered. Astronomy is haltered and strangled without the application of mathematics. It
remains confined and unable to develop, without breaking its own inner limitations. So it is self limited. So to cause to increase or improve or even promote the growth of astronomy, we require the
application of mathematics. The application of mathematics revolutionizes astronomy.
In the same vein we remember that dialectical materialism has created the theory of historical materialism. But it this really so? Was dialectical materialism restricted? Was it limited like
astronomy? Does dialectical materialism need historical materialism as astronomy needed mathematics? But in the following we hear about a certain stage of development. So we are talking about a
particular moment, in history. We have a particular point or period, in a process, or development being discussed. For a certain stage of development is required for a breakthrough to take place. It is a
particular point or stage of maturity that promotes the growth. The availability of given possibilities are consequence to a certain stage of development. And our author then gives examples like raising of
the water level for irrigation purposes in Egypt. This raising of the water level, for irrigation purposes in Egypt with other factors contributed to mechanics. So mechanics is an offshoot of other factors like
the raising of the water level, for irrigation purposes in Egypt and other factors. But what are the other factors? These are the origin of towns, large buildings, and the development of handicrafts. The
origin of towns, large buildings, and the development of handicrafts allows mechanics to advance, progress and broaden. And Mechanics? Mechanics is the technical aspects of doing something. In other
words the study of technique. We mention this definition as it alludes to practice. So the one goes in hand with the other. But in the development of handicrafts, we have the developing of mechanics.
Handicraft being work requiring manual and artistic skill. Hence mechanics develops or springs from work requiring manual and artistic skill, handicrafts i.e. work produced by hand labor. But in
handicrafts we mean hand labour with the most rudimentary tools. In handicrafts we are talking of a potentiality, that would be mechanics. The of mechanics out of certain potentialities that lay in
handicrafts.
The inherent capacity for coming into being is only potentiality. So we have an inherent capacity lying in handicrafts. And this realized capacity overcomes its latency and blossoms into
mechanics. Latency being the state of being not yet evident or active. But mechanics was not yet evident when it was in its state of latency. In that state it is only a possibility i.e., it is only something that
may exist or come to happen. So mechanics is part of a world of possibilities at a given point in time. In each and every point in time we have latencies. Latencies being the state of being, not yet evident,
or active. Therefore inactive and indeterminable. This means it is not capable of being definitely decided or ascertained. We also hear of the necessity for shipping and the art of war. So
shipping and the art of war comes through all of the factors mentioned. These factors that led to shipping and the art of war are: the origin of towns, large buildings, the development of handicrafts. In
shipping we mean the commercial enterprise of moving goods and materials. And in war we have the active struggle between competing entities. And in this the origin and development of Sciences are
conditioned by production. And in condition we mean specified as a condition or requirement, a demand, or a provision in the origin and development of Sciences. origin and development of Sciences.
And this conditioned by production, is so crucial, to our understanding. And conditioned by production at a certain stage of development.
It is necessary to study the successive development of individual branches of natural science. First astronomy- already from year to year absolutely necessary for
pastoral and agricultural peoples. Astronomy can develop only with the help of mathematics. Consequently, it became necessary to study the latter, too. Further, at a
certain stage of development and in certain countries (the raising of the water level for irrigation purposes in Egypt) and particularly together with the origin of towns,
large buildings, and the development of handicrafts, there developed mechanics also. Soon it also became necessary for shipping and the art of war.... Thus from the
very beginning the origin and development of Sciences are conditioned by production. (F. Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Dialectics and Natural Science. Marx and
Engels Archives, 2., p. 69.

From the standpoint of social development, science or theory is the continuation of practice, but-to adapt the well-known remark of Clausewitz- by other means. The
function of science, in the sum total of the process of reproduction of social life, is the function of orientation in the external world and in society, the function of
extending and deepening practice, increasing its effectiveness, the function of a peculiar struggle with nature, with the elemental progress of social development, with
the classes hostile to the given socio-historical order.
We look at things from the standpoint of social development. And we hear that science or theory is the continuation of practice. This is from the standpoint of social
development. A standpoint is a mental position from which things are viewed. What is a mental position? A position is the act of positing; an assumption taken as a
postulate or axiom. So it is the basis or the assumption that provides a particular outlook. A postulate is to assume as a necessary condition, esp. as a basis for
reasoning; take for granted. So here we have the basis of reasoning of social development. And development is all about the process in which something passes by
degrees to a different stage (especially a more advanced or mature stage). So we are talking of the advancement of society. And this science or theory is the
continuation of practice. What is meant when we say that science or theory is the continuation of practice. We remind ourselves that practice is translating an idea
into action. So science or theory is continuing of practice. We continue hearing of the well-known remark of Clausewitz. For science or theory is the continuation of
practice or theory by other means. We come to the The function of science in the sum total of the process of reproduction of social life. What is this reproduction of
social life? We know that social is relating to human society and its members. So we are talking of the production of further members of the same species. This
production of further members of the same species i.e., human society and its members. So in the process of reproducing social life we have the functionality of
science. So what is the functionality of science in the process of reproducing social life? The function is what something is used for. So we are thinking about what
science is used for. Firstly science is for orientation in the external world and in society. Firstly an orientation is a person's awareness of self with regard to position and
time and place and personal relationships. So in this sense science deals with or functions to a person's awareness of self with regard to position and time and place
and personal relationships. It allows you to determine your position, time, place and personal relationships. In position we mean the relative position or standing of
things or especially persons in a society. Hence we get to allude to the class or ranking. And in time we have the continuum of experience in which events pass from
the future through the present to the past. But how does science serve this function? An orientation can also be seen as an integrated set of attitudes and beliefs. We
have the function of extending and deepening practice. And practice is the customary way of operation or behaviour. Otherwise we are on about translating an idea
into action. So practice is made more effective. Just as the application of mathematics assisted astronomy. So too does science serve the function of extending and
deepening practice. And science has the function of a peculiar struggle with nature. We have had a struggle with nature in our arrival at this particular moment in time.
For science has assisted us as the mainstay in our struggle with nature. In the struggle with nature we have succeeded with the application of science. In nature we
have the totality of physical reality exclusive of things mental. We must engage with physical reality. Otherwise we can see nature as total system of spatiotemporal
phenomena and events that can be explained by other occurrences in the same system. What is spatiotemporal phenomena? spatiotemporal is of or relating to space
and time together (having both spatial extension and temporal duration). So we are talking of space and time. And a phenomenon is a fact or occurrence that appears
or is perceived. So things are given a spatiotemporality. Things, occupy time and space. These facts or occurrances appear in time and space, historical context i.e.,
a spatiotemporal context. These phenomena are existing in both space and time; having both spatial extension and temporal duration. Often this ir representive of the
spatiotemporal position in our struggle with nature. We also hear of the elemental progress of social development. In elemental we mean of or being the essential or
basic part. So we are on about the essential or basic part. The essential or basic part in the progress of social development. We return to what development is i.e.,
improving by expanding, enlarging or refining. We hear of the classes hostile to the given socio-historical order. The socio-historical order needs to preserve its
position within the given moment in time. In regard to this socio-historical order we think of the tipping over the apple cart.

The idea of the self-sufficient character of science (science for science's sake) is naive: it confuses the subjective passions of the professional scientist, working in a
system of profound division of labour, in conditions of a disjointed society, in which individual social functions are crystallised in a diversity of types, psychologies,
passions (as Schiller says: Science is a goddess, not a milch cow), with the objective social role of this kind of activity, as an activity of vast practical importance.
We get to the self-sufficient character of science. Earlier we hear of atomism and the epistemological Robinson Crusoes. Now we have the self-sufficient character of
science. This is science living on its own little island. And this self-sufficient character of science is just science for science's sake. Such science is nave i.e., marked
by or showing unaffected simplicity and lack of guile or worldly experience. It is village science. This science for science's sake confuses the subjective passions of
the professional scientist. Anything subjective is taking place within the mind and modified by individual bias. So we have him doing it for himself with no consideration
for the whole. It is science modified and developed by individual bias. This science works within a system of profound division of labour. So as according to division of
labour we require the work to suite the particular function as a component part within that system. It has to take congiscance of its function within the division of labour.
We have conditions of a disjointed society, in which individual social functions are crystallised in a diversity of types, psychologies, passions. In disjointed we mean
Lacking orderly continuity. What is a disjointed society? We hear tof individual social functions are crystallised in a diversity of types. What are the individual social
functions? A function is what something is used for. So we have social event that are quite out of sink with the whole structure. These individual social functions have
become fixed and definite in form, though in a diversity of types. Within these diverse individual social functions are particular psychologies, mental characteristics of
people.

The fetishising of science, as of other phenomena of social life, and the deification of the corresponding categories is a perverted ideological reflex of a society in
which the division of labour has destroyed the visible connection between social function, separating them out in the consciousness of their agents as absolute and
sovereign values. Yet any-even the most abstract-branch of science has a suite definite vital importance in the course of historical development. Naturally, it is not a
question of the direct practical importance of any individual principle -for example., in the sphere of the theory of numbers, or the doctrine of quantities, or the theory of
conditioned reflexes. It is a question of systems as a whole, of appropriate activity, of chains of scientific truths, representing in the long run the theoretical expression
of the struggle with nature and the social struggle.
What is a fetish? For here we hear of the fetishising of science. A fetish is an object worshipped by primitive peoples. It can also be an obsessional cause (makes a fetish of
punctuality). We hear of a perverted ideological reflex of a society. We have the fetishising of other phenomena of social life. So with the fetishising of science we have the fetishising
of other phenomena of social life. These and the deification of the corresponding categories is a perverted ideological reflex of a society. To deify means to make a god or idol of
something. A phenomena is any state or process known through the senses rather than by intuition or reasoning. The social is to do with tending to move or live together in groups or
colonies. But what are the corresponding categories? For the deification of these corresponding categories is a form of perversion i.e., a perverted ideological reflex of a society. Any
reflex is an automatic instinctive unlearned reaction to a stimulus. So the deification of the corresponding categories is a perverted ideological i.e., an automatic instinctive unlearned
reaction to a stimulus of a society. This is so interesting. Society has automatic instinctive unlearned reactions, to a given stimulus. And the automatic instinctive unlearned reaction to
a stimulus is the deification of the corresponding categories. deification means the condition of being treated like a god. An ideology is Of or pertaining to or characteristic of an
orientation that characterizes the thinking of a group or nation. So this is the characteristic thinking of a group or nation, that is perverted, a reflex. In perverted we have an intended
meaning altered or misrepresented. We have an alteration or misrepresentation. To alter is to make or become different i.e., to change. So are we saying that the ideological reflex of a
society is altered or misrepresented? So this ideological reflex of a society is distorted i.e., to twist out of the true meaning. So this automatic instinctive unlearned reaction, to a
stimulus, is ideological or in other words concerned with or suggestive of ideas. The work goes on that the division of labour has destroyed the visible connection between social
function. But what is this connection between social function? Social being relating to human society and its members, whereas, function means the proper or necessary role, activity,
or purpose. And this destruction of a visible connection? But how has the division of labour destroyed the visible connection? For there is a relationship that is capable of being seen.
But this relationship has become invisible and we are incapacitated and unable to see the social function. We hear of separating them out in the consciousness of their agents as
absolute and sovereign values. But seperating who is seperated or kept apart? For there is a necessary role, activity, or purpose that at is at hand. The necessary role, activity, or
purpose between social functions. We have this separating the social functions out in the consciousness of their agents as absolute and sovereign values. But what is the consciousness
of their agents? An agent being a representative, who acts on the behalf of other persons or organizations. And these absolute and sovereign values. What are these absolute and
sovereign values? These absolute and sovereign values are the consciousness of their agents. For consciousness is the alert cognitive state in which you are aware of yourself and your
situation. But in this we have the Bourgeois consciousness a.k.a the consciousness of their agents. For the bourgeoisie are the agents of the proletarians. They are the hegemonic class.
So in the consciousness of their agents we are on about the hegemonic state of consciousness. And in the consciousness of their agents we have the destruction of the visible
connections between social functions. The destruction of the visible connections between social functions has come about by the division of labour. The visible connections between
social functions has become less obvious. And this consciousness of their agents is seen as absolute and sovereign values. Values are the Beliefs of a person or social group in which
they have an emotional investment (either for or against something). Here we have division into components or constituents i.e., objectification. So the social function is unobvious.
But all of what is being said is unclear. But why this perverted ideological reflex? It is a perverted ideological reflex of a particular society. A particular society in which the visible
connections between social functions has been destroyed. And this destruction has come about through the division of labour. A function can be those engaged in an occupation. So we
have those engaged in an occupation for society i.e., in the social function. So those engaged in an occupation are seperated, and, we cannot see their connection. They have because
disconnected from their social function. They no longer can see their social function as they have become detailed workers in the division of labour. But this absolute and sovereign
values remains a question. We hear that the most abstract-branch of science has a suite definite vital importance in the course of historical development. A suite is a collection of
similar or related things, e.g. that can be used together or have some property or purpose in common. Even abstract branches of science have a collection of similar or related things in
the course of historical development. This abstract branches of science must have precise; explicit and clearly defined aspects in the course of historical development. The suite is a
series or group of things forming a unit or constituting a complement or collection. So a series or group of things forming a unit or constituting a complement or collection must go
with the course of historical development of even the most abstract-branch of science. A course is the onward movement or progression i.e., the course of historical development (stage
of growth or advancement). He goes on about not a question of the direct practical importance of any individual principle. What is this practical importance of any individual
principle? We need to define an individual principle. A principle is a general law in physics. Or othewise a law of nature forming the basis for the construction or working of a machine
etc. So this is critical i.e., a law of nature forming the basis for the construction or working of a whole system. So we would ask how the individual principle fits into the whole
system. He pushes the point that it is a question of systems as a whole. A system is an Instrumentality that combines interrelated, interacting artifacts designed to work as a coherent
entity. A system is a combination of interrelated interacting artifacts. And these combination of interrelated interacting artifacts are designed to work as a coherent entity. So in this it
is a question of systems as a whole. And in systems as a whole we allude to coherent entities. And it is also appropriate activity that is mentioned. For appropriate activity must fit the
system as a whole. A whole is a totality lacking no part, member, or element. We have chains of scientific truths. We have the theoretical expression of the struggle with nature and
the social struggle. These chains of scientific truths represent these theoretical expressions. Theoretical is -we once more underline the point- is concerned with knowledge but not with
its practical application. So it is a theoretical representation in symbols, communicating what one thinks, feels, or means. For in the long run these chains of scientific truths represent
in symbols the struggle with nature and the social struggle. So the social struggle and the struggle with nature are represented in the chains of scientific truths. And these scientific
truths are the theoretical expression of the struggle with nature and the social struggle. So scientific truths are presenting especially by description the struggle with nature and the
social struggle. We have the natural and social struggle. But the natural and social struggle are to exhibited by delineation, depiction, or portrayal.

Active relationship with the external world, which at the purely animal stage of human development presupposes the natural organs of man, as a variety of hominis
sapientis, is replaced by relationship through the medium and with the help of the continuation of those organs, that is, with the help of the productive organs of
social man (Marx), the implements of labour, and systems of social technique. At first this system is really the continuation of the organs of the human body.[23]

[23] Compare Marx: Capital, Eng. Editor , Volume 1. , p. 158: Thus Nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his own bodily organs,
adding stature to himself in spite of the Bible. Compare also Ernst Kapp: Outline of a Philosophy of Technology. Braunschweig, 1877, pp. 42 et seq.
We hear of the active relationship with the external world. It goes on with this: at the purely animal stage of human development presupposes the natural organs of
man, as a variety of hominis sapientis. But what is this purely animal stage of human development? What is the active relationship that is associated with the external
world. And these natural organs of man are presupposed. In presupposed we mean to require as an antecedent in logic or fact. So we have this active relationship
with the external world. And in this active relationship with the external world we have a presupposition. A presupposition is an act of presupposing or an assumption
made in advance : a preliminary supposition. So it is to assume beforehand. So before anything we have certain assumptions. The presupposition is all about the
presence of the natural organs of man. The natural organs of man are a variety or type of hominis sapientis. But what is this purely animal stage of human
development? And what is this assumption? An assumption about the natural organs of man. To assume means to take to be true. Basically it assumes the presence
of the natural organs of man as the basis to mans development. Hence a stage of growth or advancement that enables the further progression. A variety of hominis
sapientis, is replaced by a relationship through the medium and with the help of the continuation of his natural organs. But what is through the medium? For we have
this variety of hominis sapientis that is replaced. A medium is the substance, e.g. air, through which sense-impressions are conveyed. A medium can also be the
physical environment etc. of a living organism. So we have this relationship through the medium building a variety of hominis sapientis. For we are on about a
relationship with the existent reality, the conditions i.e., the relationship through the medium. A relationship is an abstraction belonging to or characteristic of two
entities or parts together. We have the individual and all else as two entities together. We are talking of the productive organs of social man. In productive we mean
having the ability to produce or originate. So this ability to change the world lies according to his relationship through the medium. And through this relationship he
creates a different medium, which changes himself. So the basis of changing the existent reality, is due to ability provided by the continuation of those organs. Any
continuation is a continuation and extention of these organs. So a continuation and extention develops, helped by the productive organs of social man. These organs
come to have or undergo a change of (physical features and attributes). So in the internet we have the continuation of the organs of communicating and working with
information. So these productive organs of social man have extended and appended from early origins. Lets return to the beginning in active we mean characterized
by action rather than by contemplation or speculation. We are on about action connected or associated with the external world. So the external world is linked with
man in an active relationship. And we heard about the purely animal stage of human development. But to break out of this purely animal stage of human development,
we must presuppose the natural organs of man. We assume beforehand the natural organs of man. For the natural organs of man are the basis of breaking out of the
purely animal stage. The purely animal stage must be transcended; this transcendance or going beyond the purely animal stage is through the natural organs of man.
So the human type changes through the relationship through the medium. And to transcend beyond the purely animal stage, man must actively engage with the
external world. And this variety of man i.e., hominis sapientis is replaced. But this change takes place through his relationship through the medium. He transforms the
external world. And the external world transforms him. All his developments are an extention or continuation of those organs. Or we could say that the productive
organs of social man are continued. The extention of the arm lies the tool. The extention of our communication limitations with the new communication technology. An
in a continuation we mean continuance in a state, existence, or activity : uninterrupted extension or succession. We are continuing to use these organs, in existence or
operation, in all that we have in terms of technological innovation. Hence we return to a continuation of those organs. Any continuation is something that continues,
extends, increases, or supplements. So the email supplements the old postage system, as that supplants something before i.e., takes the place or move into the
position of the more primitive form. And an organ is a fully differentiated structured and functional unit in an animal that is specialized for some particular function.
What is this fully differentiated structured and functional unit? It has definite and highly organized structure. And because they are productive organs of social man
we touch on organs having the ability to produce or originate. So the productive organs imply a creative element i.e., a transformative ability. And these exist in social
man. For we cannot operate alone but are effective in concert with other people. The combination or organization are an extension or continuation of those organs.
Recall that productive means to have the quality or power of producing. The ability to bring forth or able to bring forth especially in abundance is the productive
capacity. So we are on about potential. This is the inherent capacity for coming into being. An essential constituent to create. So this is all about being
effective i.e., being capable of producing an intended result or having a striking effect. Thereupon we get that it is yielding or furnishing results, benefits, or profits.
But lets return to our thoughts on the active relationship with the external world. For this active relationship with the external world is the relationship through the
medium. A medium is a means of communication. We communicate via the external world to know and affectuate changes in tranforming the external world. So the
external world is a forever changing feature thus a variable. And in this active relationship with the external world we actively relate via the productive organs of
social man. And in this active relationship we have the continuation of those organs. These break into new branches of learning through these initial organs. But it is
through these productive organs of social man that we integrate the world of ideas and the world of reality (the external world). But these productive organs are the
basis of this engaging in a meaningful relationship with the external world. These productive organs provide purpose. For we are dependent on the external world for
survival. So we derive meaning in our existence. And in this existence we have to utilize the productive organs of social man. Without the productive organs of social
man we would not exist effectively suriving amidst the natural hazards of nature. Our development is contingent upon the use of these productive organs of social
man. These productive organs must engage to provide the means of subsistence. And thereupon we must emphasize the need for a general conscious awareness.
For this is a requirement to control and order the productive organs of social man. Thereupon we mean to give order, swagger and poise to the productive organs of
social man. So these productive organs of social man are tending to suggest or imply that man must have a relationship through the medium, the external world. But
what are the productive organs of social man? these are the implements of labour, and systems of social technique. Instrumentation or implementation is a piece of
equipment or tool that is used to effect an end. And labour is any piece of work that is undertaken or attempted. We have an implement as an artifact (or system of
artifacts) that is instrumental in accomplishing some end. This implement is a natural object resembling a machine in structure or function. These implements of labour
enable man to have this relationship through the medium. These implements are a continuation of those organs. They are expressed in time and space as the
productive organs of social man. Any implement is a mechanical or electrical device that transmits or modifies energy to perform or assist in the performance of
human tasks. So these implements of labour, and systems of social technique with the productive organs are alluding to the relationship through the medium. A
medium being an intervening substance through which something is achieved. And action is producing or involving action or movement. And these systems of social
technique? What exacly is the systems of social technique? A technique is a practical method or art applied to some particular task. Hence we have a practical
method or applied art. And in applied we mean practical, not merely theoretical. And we remind ourselves that social means relating to human society and its
members. This practical method is that of human society and its members. For human society and its members have a broader way of doing something, especially a
systematic way i.e., social. And this is the chain and division of labour and so forth. For the whole of society is based on the productive forces that enable it. We have
the implements of labour in the vaste factories and manufactories that carry out the practical methods that enable man in his interaction with nature. But initially or at
the start it is continuation of the organs of the human body. At first it is a continuation of the basic organs of engaging. The most rudimentary implements of labour are
more close in form to the organs of the human body. For that is the basis of the evolution. But we hear that at first, this system, is really the continuation of the
organs of the human body. We know that a system is an Instrumentality that combines interrelated interacting artifacts designed to work as a coherent entity. So we
have the implements of labour interacting with the systems of social technique. But they no longer have lost that clarity to perceive that they begin with the
continuation of the organs of the human body. We remember that a system is interrelated interacting artifacts designed to work as a coherent entity. An entity is a
thing with a distinct existence. Thus an entity is a thing's existence in itself. In Latin ens or ent- means being. that is having existence in accordance with itself. We
recall our discussion on transformation in that we have the process of transforming things in themselves into things for us. But we have this continuity initiated,
brought into being, by the organs of the human body.

Later it becomes complicated, and acquires its own principles of movement (for example., the circular motions of modern machinery). But at the same time there
develops historically also orientation in the external world, again with the help of artificial instruments of cognition, instruments of spiritual labour, extending a gigantic
number of times the sphere of action of the natural organs of the body and the instruments of orientation. Micro-balances, the water-level, seismographs, the
telephone, the telescope, the microscope, the ultra-microscope, the chronoscope, the Michelson grating, electrical thermometers, bolometers, the photo-electrical
element of Elster and Geitel, galvanoscopes and galvanometers, electrometers, the apparatus of Ehrenhaft and Millikan, etc., etc.-all these immeasurably widen our
natural sensual capacities, open new worlds, render possible the victorious advance of technique. It is a piece of historic irony, fail to understand the value of
transmitted knowledge, [24]
And the later complication is mentioned. There is a development that complicates the situation. A series of actions advance a principle or tending toward a particular end. We hear about the acquisition of
its own principles of movement. But what are the acquisition of its own principles of movement? An example of the acquisition of its own principles of movement are the circular motions of modern
machinery. Through continuity and extentions we have principles that are quite different, contrasting significantly to their earlier forms.
Next we hear of orientation. What is orientation in this context? Orientation is a person's awareness of self with regard to position in time and place and personal relationships. Thus we are
alluding to the position within the social order i.e., the productive organs of social man.
ORIENTATION (EDUCATION): Orientation is a person's awareness of himself , his position held in time, place and personal relationships. The school's orientation precedes the entry into the
process of production. Thus schooling alludes or aims at production. It already confirms some belief, within the learner of his or her position within the existent social order i.e., the productive organs of
social man. As according to the position within the organisation of production on a large scale of society. I recall the discussion I had with Lutawan. In our discussion I spoke of George Bernard Shaw
and his view of school among other things. For schools and education teaches learners how and where they will fit into the existing social order. They work producing school work and are defined within
the school's social structure. Thus the school's social structure mimics societies order (with its productive organs of social man) And what is done in the social situation. We hear about orientation in the
external world. Orientation is a relative position. Orientation is all about a person's attitude or adjustment in relation to circumstances. The orientation we are talking about is considered in relation to other
people. So this is implying comparison or contextual relation; so it is having reference or relating to the position within society. And what determines this? It is the position taken up by a man within the
given social order, with its mode of production. And it is thereby hinted at as an orientation in the external world. Orientation can allude to an awareness of the existing situation with reference to time,
place, and identity of persons. For man must find himself within the mode of production and the implements of labour, and systems of social technique. For the division of labour forms a part of the mode
of production. And the way that this evolves i.e., continues from the organs of the human body into these complicated forms. And in the acquisition of its own principles of movement we have the
historical orientation, the position in time and space. We also hear of the help of artificial instruments of cognition, instruments of spiritual labour, extending a gigantic number of times the sphere of action
of the natural organs of the body and the instruments of orientation.
What are artificial instruments of cognition? Lets start off with these artificial instruments of cognition. These are cognitive instruments. What are the artificial instruments of cognition? Artificial is
contrived by art rather than nature. So it is: man made. An instrument is a device that requires skill for proper use. The psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning is called cognition. So
we perceive, learn and think coherently and logically. We can become aware, through the senses, extended by an apparatus, an instrument. In this we are alluding to computers and the other
instruments of cognition. These do link up or have a relationship with the productive organs of social man. Though with cognition we seem to point towards theory. And we go on about the instruments of
spiritual labour. But what would the instruments of spiritual labour be? Here we indicate that spiritual labour is lacking material body, form or substance. An instrument is a means whereby something is
achieved, performed, or furthered. So the instruments of spiritual labour might be the media organs, the churches etc. An example would be the modern university, which is the instrument for preserving,
enlarging, and disseminating an ever-increasing body of knowledge. Instruments of spiritual labour would a legal document (as a deed, will, bond, lease, agreement, mortgage, note, power of attorney,
ticket on carrier, bill of lading, insurance policy, warrant, writ) evidencing legal rights or duties, especially of one party to another. It is a means of understanding a legal agreement between parties. Hence
it accomplishes a sense of right and wrong. So it is produced to facilitate some form of understanding. The manifesto could be seen in this light a document as a instruments of spiritual labour. And these
instruments of spiritual labour helps to orientate the individual in the external world.
This extends a gigantic number of times the sphere of action of the natural organs of the body and the instruments of orientation. What is this extension and the sphere of action of the natural
organs of the body? A sphere is a particular aspect of life or activity. It is the area of activity in which the natural organs of the body operate. It is the field of operation, in which the natural organs of the
body are active. In extention we mean push to a further point. We push to a further point the sight of the eye. push to a further point the sound of the ear. We push to a further point our limits of abilities.
So we are alluding to the frontiers of knowledge, which are gigantic extensions of the sphere of action. But gigantic extensions of the sphere of action of the natural organs and the instruments of
orientation. For these instruments, though they have been gigantically extended, eternally determine the position of man in space. By extension we mean to bring to a further degree of development. So
thus bringing to these furthest degrees of development, indicative of gigantic extensions of the sphere of action of the natural organs. We have tremendous growth from these primitive spheres of activity.
For such spheres of activity where originally the purely and only the natural organs of the body. And we ought to remember the instruments of orientation too. A chronoscope is an instrument for accurate
measurements of small intervals of time. A bolometer is a measuring instrument that measures heat radiation; extremely sensitive. A galvanometer is a Meter for detecting, comparing or measuring small
electric currents. The instruments, immeasurably widen, our natural sensual capacities. These instruments extend in scope or range or area the natural sensual capacities; this is the power to learn, or
retain, knowledge; in law, the ability to understand the facts and significance of your behaviour. These are capabilities that are beyond the natural senses. Hence we proceed with opening new worlds.
These widen of our natural sensual capacities, with such instruments, renders possible the victorious advance of technique. And technique is practical method, or art, applied to some particular task. And
this is a victorious advance. We have this victorious advance in practical methodology, the system of methods followed in particular disciplines. These methods have been victorious through the use of the
aforementioned instruments. And these aforementioned instruments are the continuation of the organs of the human body. They are a continuation of the organs of the human body, immeasurably
widened, increased in scope, range or area. These aforementioned instruments have been extensions through the relationship with the medium. They are forms i.e., the instruments that are extended by
gigantic number of times from: the sphere of action of the natural organs of the body.
And we hear about a piece of historic irony. What is irony? Irony is incongruity between what might be expected and what actually occurs. So the expectation and the actual occurance are
incongruous. That is expectation and the actual occurance are lacking in harmony, compatibility or appropriateness. We have the failure to understand the value of transmitted knowledge. Transmitted
means sent from one person or place to another. This is knowledge that is inherited. This historic irony is to not Know and comprehend the nature or meaning of transmitted knowledge. This is knowledge
transmitted, initially, from the sphere of action of the natural organs of the body. And this underlies the developing of the inherent cognitive or perceptual powers of the mind. For as the natural organs of
the body are extended so too do we develop these mental powers. And at each point of extension we bring these powers to a further degree of development. And on top of it all we have this historic irony.
A failure to understand the value of transmitted knowledge. Our mind, an instrument for measuring, cannot see or measure the value thereof. This is the obvious irony of it all. The appreciation of
knowledge transmitted is the historic irony. And knowledge is The knowledge and skill required to do something.

[24] ....Rather, we believe that only the observation of knowledge imparted by the facts that form the world, while all thinking is nothing but tautological forming. (Hans
Hahn: The importance of the scientific conception of the world, especially in mathematics and physics in knowledge , 1, Numbers. 2-4, p. 97, 1930.

We hear of a quote from Hans Hahn: we believe that only the observation of knowledge imparted by the facts that form the world, while all thinking is nothing, but
tautological forming. Thus we are on about the facts learned by observing. A fact being a concept whose truth can be proved. We also hear about the facts that form
the world. These facts, that form the world, impart knowledge. And we observe the imparted knowledge. And it proceeds with this: thinking is nothing but tautological
forming. What is a tautology? A tautology is a statement that is necessarily true. So it is to state the obvious i.e., a useless repetition. It repeats what lies in the
existent reality, the material world. It repeats it in the thought-scape. This is the way the world is shaped. And the world Transmits knowledge or skills i.e., the facts that
form the world. Any fact is the quality of being actual or existing in reality. A fact is a piece of information presented as having objective reality. For thinking is just a
restating of the obvious, in various ways.
We have or hear of group of empirio-critics failing to understand that the product of perceptive activity is qualitatively different from sensual raw material. So
we have sensual raw material and the product of perceptive activity. And we have a qualitative difference between the product of perceptive activity and sensual raw
material. A product is a thing or substance produced, esp. by manufacture. In other words a product is a result. The product of perceptive activity i.e., is the result of
sensitive activity. But what is sensual raw material? And raw material is material suitable for manufacture or use or finishing. So it is the stuff used to make or use i.e.,
to sense. Anything qualitative is relating to or involving comparisons, based on qualities. So its a comparison between sensual raw material and the product of
perceptive activity. We are provided with a similarity i.e., not an example, for just as a completed locomotive is qualitatively different from its metallic parts. The
locomotive is made out of the metallic parts. The locomotive is determined by its relationship to the metallic parts. A quality is a distinguishing attribute. So we are
talking about what distinguishes the product of perceptive activity, from the sensual raw material, is determined. A quality means an intelligible feature by which a thing
may be identified. Is the product of perceptive activity intelligeable, understood or comprehended? Furthermore do we understand the sensual raw material. Can we
thereby determine the difference, between, the product of perceptive activity and the sensual raw material?
Next we discuss the reduction of the whole process of cognition to the production of tautology. We are talking not of reducing the whole process of cognition to
some narrow aspect. But here we have reduction of the whole process of cognition to the production of tautology. The whole process of cognition is reduced. But
reduced to what? The whole process of cognition is reduced to the production of a tautology. A tautology is statement that is necessarily true. An example: 'he is brave
or he is not brave' is a tautology. And this being that the electrical nature of matter is the last word of science. This electrical nature of matter comes up. But why? It
being the last word of science. In the same sense we have the genetic understanding being the last word of science. The film Zeitgeist put this into perspective. Then
we hear that it is just the electrical feeling, which we lack. So the tautology is the electrical nature of matter. And this is since it is just the electrical feeling which we
lack.
We go on to hear that the whole world of electricity was discovered to us none the less by means of the application of artificial organs of sensation. These
artificial organs of sensation are the instruments cited previously. And the whole world of electricity comes about at a particular point in time and space. And at this
immediate moment we have the technological instruments and hence the discovery of the whole world of electricity. And this is due to application of the artificial
organs of sensation. We use these artificial organs of sensation to sense beyond the limitations of our immediate organs. And in this sensing, using artificial organs of
sensation, we discover or make breakthroughs. And in application we make use of or employment of the artificial organs of sensation. We have an act of putting to
use, in application, of the artificial organs of sensation. We even see the use of or operation of these things in technological innovation. And in the case of television,
virtual reality and the rest, we have the artificial organs of sensation leading to a distortion of reality. But in the sense below we focus on the artificial organs of
sensation giving us the essence of reality. And we have some who are blackballed by these artificial organs of sensation.
The group of empirio-critics fail to understand that the product of perceptive activity is qualitatively different from sensual raw material, just as the completed
locomotive is qualitatively different from its metallic parts, even though 'made' out of them. and reduce the whole process of cognition to the production of tautology,
that precisely the electrical nature of matter is the last word of science: since it is just the electrical feeling which we lack. Yet the whole world of electricity was
discovered to us none the less by means of the application of artificial organs of sensation. [25]

[25] O. Wiener, Op. cit., p. 41.

Thus there have proved to be historically variable both the organs of sensation and the so-called picture of the world, verified by the gigantic practice of modern
humanity as a whole, a picture of the world much more adequate to reality than all its predecessors, and therefore so fruitful for practice. And so man is historically
given as social man in contradistinction to the enlightened Robinsons of Rousseau, founding society and history like a chess club, and with the help of a contract.
This social man, that is, human society, in order to live, must produce.
In the next we hear of the picture of the world. We also hear about the organs of sensation. We also consider the gigantic practice, of modern humanity, as a whole. So we have this gigantic translating an
ideas or theory into the actions of modern humanity as a whole. And what is this to say that they proved to be historically variable. Variable can mean liable to or capable of change, variety, making or
becoming different. These organs of sensation give us we said- the facts that form the world. We earlier on talked about the product of perceptive activity. That is the theory that is the product of
perceptive activity. Earlier on, we talked about the gigantic extensions of the sphere of action of the natural organs. Now we have the gigantic practice of modern humanity, as a whole. And the gigantic
practice of modern humanity as a whole have developed by the gigantic extensions of the sphere of action of the natural organs. And variable is marked by diversity or difference. They differ i.e., the
organs of sensation, and, the picture of the world. And as the organs of sensation change, so too, does our picture of the world. For we derive our picture of the world from use of the organs of sensation.
We must state that we have extended our natural organs, with the artificial organs of sensation. At a given historical moment the organs of sensation are such and such. At a further extention they have
changed. And in this change ,we have an extension of such and such. And as these organs of sensation develop that is Gradually change into something different. So with
different organs of sensation we must have different pictures of the world. And in this conversion from the organs of sensation to pictures of the world we have reductionism. Hence abstraction has arisen
in our discussion. A transmutation is an act that changes the form, character or substance of something. So the substance of our picture of the world is changed i.e., transmuted by the interaction with or
via the organs of sensation. And in this we have the gigantic practice of modern humanity, as a whole. For the gigantic practice of modern humanity, as a whole is based on the transformation of the
world of theory. Our world of theory is developed according to our use or interaction with the world. A picture can be seen as an illustration used to decorate or explain a text. For the more we interact with
the world of Marxism the more we derive the essence of what it really is about. For Marxism itself is part of the gigantic practice of modern humanity, as a whole. But it is based on the experience of
Marxism. The proof is determined in the gigantic practice, of modern humanity, as a whole. A picture is a description so vivid or graphic as to suggest a mental image or give an accurate idea of
something. So the accuracy of our ideas relates to our use of these organs of sensation. For it is through the organs of sensation that we know of the world. We remind ourselves that a picture is
something that by its likeness vividly suggests some other thing. Thus we are talking of a copy. A picture is a concrete embodiment of an abstraction. And in practice is action as opposed to theory. So this
historical variability is underlined by the gigantic practice of modern humanity, as a whole. We confirm the truth of this historical variability by this gigantic practice, of modern humanity, as a whole. We
hear of the picture of the world, much more adequate to reality than all its predecessors, and therefore so fruitful for practice. So the more the picture of the world is adequate to reality, the more fruitful
our practice. We hear much about this picture of the world. It is much more adequate to reality than all its predecessors. In adequate we mean having the requisite qualities. That is the required qualities.
So does our picture of the world hold the required qualities to function? And we also consider the fruitfulness for practice. In this we allude to the intellectual productivity of a creative imagination. So what
are the requirements for the modern world, modern living etc? we talk of the adequacy or the quality of being able to meet needs satisfactorily, in terms of reality. We must not forget that the organs of
sensation are owned by the bourgeoisie. And hence we have a bourgeois picture of the world. For these organs of sensation are bourgeois and translated by the bourgeois interpretation and hence
picture of the world. For we engage with the world of reality via the organs of sensation, and derive a particular picture of the world. The concrete embodiment of the abstraction is the bourgeois picture of
the world. Why? Because the scene or a set of facts or circumstances immediately present to the attention via the organs of sensation. We talk of this scene or a set of facts, or circumstances
immediately present to the attention via the bourgeois organs of sensation. We have the key word: humanity as a whole. This is key for we are not talking of the bourgeois organs of sensation but the
organs of sensation that support humanity, as a whole. This is the difference. For at this particular point in time we have a particular interest in the use of these organs of sensation. Can this particular
picture of the world satisfy humanity, as a whole? Should not the wholes picture of the world meet the satisfactory application, or practice, for humanity as a whole? For we have in the particular picture of
the world a separation and distinction from others of the same group or category. So we ask who owns the practice? It is the forces that have the organs of sensation. For practice is linked or related to
the particular picture of the world. Or who wields the organs of sensation.
We further hear of man as historically given as social man in contradistinction to the enlightened Robinsons of Rousseau. What is this social man in contradistinction to the enlightened
Robinsons of Rousseau? A contradistinction is a distinction made, by contrasting. So we can contrast the enlightened Robinsons of Rousseau and the social man. And we can see a link between the
enlightened Robinsons of Rousseau and the bourgeoisie. For they hold a particular picture of the world. And hence this particular picture of the world is that of the enlightened Robinsons of Rousseau.
We recall how we started this work talking of the epistemological Robinson Crusoes i.e., on their island of reality. This island of reality is their particular bubble. And we recall how these enlightened
Robinsons of Rousseau have not considered fully social man. And what underlines social man is on the shoulders of the experience of other people. We further hear of these enlightened Robinsons of
Rousseau words i.e., 'founding society and history like a chess club, and with the help of a 'contract.
On the other hand we have social man underlined in that human society, in order to live, must produce. So production underlies human society. For production is the basis of living. For
production allows human society to rise from the grave. And therefore social man proceeds or continues on the basis of production. And
this is key. Because production has neglected to apply the forces of science employed in the interest of humanity, as a
whole. These forces have been employed in a particular i.e., producing wealth for the bourgeois. The organs of sensation
do not consider this, but consider themselves the best, the holiest of holies, the eternal all consuming mystery of the
worlds. For we underline the point that for in order that some can bask in wealth, others are lost in destitution i.e.,
alienated from the organs of sensation. They are ill considered i.e., dehumanised.

Am Anfang war die Tat (in contrast to the Christian Logos: In the beginning was the Word). Production is the real starting point of social development. [26]
What is a logos? The divine word of God; the second person in the Trinity (incarnate in Jesus). We go on that in actual fact production is the real starting point of
social development. Development is the act of improving by expanding, enlarging or refining. Improvement implies higher or more vigorous. An improvement implies
change for the better; progress in development. So in development we mean advancing or bettering. And we imply within this the conditions i.e., the things upon the
fulfilment of which something else depends. And social development? So social development requires production. production is the real starting point of advancing the
social sphere, underlining the organs of sensation, by which we know the world and advance, socially. And within production we have the organs of sensation, the
instruments of production. And with this picture of the world man interacts as social man or anti-social man. In starting point we are on about where social
development originated or was nurtured in its early existence. So production is this starting point. This is where social development originated or was nurtured in its
early existence. And this production is the real starting point. This is reflecting the essential or genuine starting point. In terms of a starting point we can consider
production as the bottom of something considered as its support i.e., the foundation. So the foundations of social development are production. The fundamental part,
basic principle underlying social development is production. In other words it is production that brings social development into existence, a state or fact. We underline
our point in human society in order to live, must produce. And in order to survive man must know the world; thus underlying the organs of sensation. And to know we
allude to a picture of the world. But this is not enough for man must practice or interact with the world of reality. We need these artificial organs of sensation to know
the world. To to apprehend the world of reality by reason or imagination, we must, have some basis in the underlying reality. In this we have that Bukharin needs to be
vindicated for his ideas that were not allowed to fully be given to the world. We have it to find or base securely (as a theory) in the basic essence of production
establishes mans survival. So in production we have the act of giving form or shape to social development; or else to put it: the taking form of social development.
Social development implies a group of associations. These associations are bound together, by, close similarity in life forms or habits and by dependence upon
closely similar climates. This dependence is important. Dependence is the state of relying on or being controlled by someone or something else. So social
development implies levels of dependence. So production is serving as an original or generating source. Production is the source that generates via the extension of
the organs of sensation- all social development. We restate our earlier point that Production is the real starting point of social development.

[26] This is not a secret for some modern physicists either. The physical conditions of existence are more fundamental than the aesthetic, moral, or intellectual. A child
must be fed before it can be taught. A certain standard of living above that of animals is a preliminary condition for the development of any of the special qualities of
human beings. (Frederic Soddy: Science and Life, London, J. Murray, 1920, p. 3.) In the process of production there takes place a metabolism (Marx) between
society and nature. In this process, active on the part of historical and social man, a material process, people are in definite relationship one with another and with the
means of labour. These relations are historical, their totality constitutes the economic structure of society. It is also a historic variable (in contradistinction to the
theories of society generally, eternal society, ideal society, etc.). The economic structure of society (the mode of production) includes, above all, the relationship
between classes. On this basis there grows up the superstructure: political organisations and State power, moral norms, scientific theories, art, religion, philosophy,
etc. The mode of production determines also the mode of conception : theoretical activity is a step in the reproduction of social life; its material is furnished by
experience, the breadth of which depends on the degree of power over the forces of nature, which is determined, in the long run, by the development of
productive forces, the productivity of social-labour; the level of technical development.
And these are more fundamental physical conditions of existence. These physical conditions of existence are more fundamental than the aesthetic, moral, or the intellectual. These physical conditions of
existence are more basic i.e., contributing to the growth of the essential structure, or composition, of existence. What underlines this more fundamental aspect i.e., that the physical conditions of existence
are more fundamental than the aesthetic, moral, or intellectual. It is more fundamental that A child must be fed before it can be taught i.e., Imparting skills or knowledge. So food provision preceeds the
aesthetic, moral, or intellectual i.e., higher functioning. In our previous bits we read that production is the real starting point. The world of theory derives as a development from production. And we recall
that society, in order to live, must produce. So we have certain facts that form the world. And these facts, that form the world, are developmental. Is this what we meant when we said this is transmitted
knowledge? We bring production to a further degree i.e., certain point of development and thereby deriving the means to have aesthetic, moral, or intellectual development. So in this case production
must be pushed to a further point and hence theory that becomes pure theory. And it is only when production has reached this point that we can develop the artificial instruments of cognition esp., pure
cognition, even to the point of theology. And this child must be fed before it can be taught, are the whole of humanity. And in this story we have an ever changing picture of the world. We hear furthermore
that a certain standard of living above that of animals is a preliminary condition for the development of any of the special qualities of human beings. What is a certain standard of living above that of
animals? This is a level of material comfort in terms of goods and services available to someone or some group. So the level of material comfort in terms of goods and services, must be above animals,
for the special qualities of human beings to begin its progress. And in this level of material comfort, in terms of goods and services, we allude to the means of production that enable or allow for the
special qualities of human beings. Without these factors the special qualities of human beings cannot come about. Hence we must emphasize the preliminary conditions required. A preliminary is
denoting an action or event preceding or in preparation for something more important. A preliminary is designed to orient or acquaint with a situation before proceeding. So the preliminary conditions, for
mans development are: the that a certain standard of living be met. Without a certain standard of living the conditions that allow further development will not be met. A condition is something established
or agreed upon i.e., as a requisite to the doing or taking effect of something else. It is required that the physical conditions of existence are suitable for any further development. So A child must be fed
before it can be taught. The special qualities of human beings have certain necessary conditions to develop. A condition is something that limits or modifies the existence or character of something else.
So the conditions can be a limitating factor, of further development. This would be the conditions that a restrict or disqualify i.e., hamper, cripple or hinder further progress. Thus we are on about the
attendant circumstances i.e., the set of facts or circumstances that surround a situation or event. For these set of facts or circumstances that surround either progress or hamper. We recall what we wrote
initially on latency. Let us recall all that was put forward for thought as it links up with this, very much.
The inherent capacity for something to come into being is known as latency. Latency is therefore is a potentiality. It is something potentially existing but not presently evident or realized. We
must understand that we are talking about latency, in this particular context i.e., commonly applied to pathology, where it means not presently active e.g., diabetes. So we do not allude to the full
definition of the word, in such a context. But here it initially it just lies as an underlying possibility. So we have an inherent capacity, as the science of mechanics, lying in handicrafts. And this inherent
capabilitity is realized as capacity overcomes its latency and in this example, is a preliminary condition for the development of mechanics. Latency being the state of being that is not yet evident nor
active. But mechanics is not yet evident when it was in its latent state, the handicrafts. In that state it is only a possibility i.e., it is only something that may exist, happen or come about. So it is a hidden
part of the world of possibilities. Refer to the world of possibilities.
Now we hear that In the process of production there takes place a 'metabolism' (Marx) between society and nature. What is this 'metabolism' that Marx speaks of? 'metabolism' is the organic processes
(in a cell or organism) that are necessary for life. And this 'metabolism' is the precondition for more special qualities, to come about. All of this emphasizes the relationship and the term social man. For
some special quality, to come about, a relationship of man to man must exist. The aesthetic, moral, or intellectual are all derived as man progresses through social man. And social man is one of the
preliminary conditions that needs to be in place for man to develop. And it is In the process of production there takes place a 'metabolism' (Marx) between society and nature. Some are taxed that others
may seize upon higher functioning i.e., the special qualities of human beings. This is so powerful because Bukharin alluded to the reproduction of social life. For the reproduction of social life we require
that certain preliminary conditions are in place. For the reproduction of social life requires conditions to reproduce. And we had talk of extentions, a gigantic number of times. Extentions of the sphere of
action of the natural organs of the body and the instruments of orientation. And in this condition we mean a mode or state of being, thereby indicating a requisite action or circumstance. And this process
of production? In production we have, in economics, manufacturing, mining or growing something (usually in large quantities) for sale. It is the harnessing of the powers lying latent in nature. And it is
man who discovers the latency, as he engages with nature. And production is a course of action intended to achieve a result. So this 'metabolism' is in the process. So production is a particular course of
action intended to achieve a result; 'metabolism' is part of this. metabolism is the chemical processes in a living organism, producing energy and growth. The word comes from Greek metabole. Metabole
means change. This word, metabole, is related to meta-, and the Greek ballo, which means to throw. Meta, when in a combined form, denotes change of position or condition. So in this 'metabolism'
between society and nature enables this transformation of society. Metabolism is understood to be the chemical changes taking place in living cells by which energy is provided, for the vital processes,
activities and new material, which is assimilated to repair the waste. So we have in the process of production an assimilating of material between society and nature. We hear of how in this process of
production, we have the activity on the part of historical and social man. In activity we have a specific behaviour. It is confined within the discipline and restriction determined by the process of production.
But what is historical man? For we have historical man and social man. historical man has lived, existed or taken place in the real world as distinct from being legendary. So in historical man we allude to
authentic, actual man. So historical man is different in nature or quality to mythical and legendary man. Historical is often used in the study of language. Historical is used of the study of a phenomenon
(especially language) as it changes, through time. We are looking how man changes over time, as well. So historical man belongs to anthropology that puts man into the time continuum. Anthropology is
the social science that studies the origins and social relationships of human beings. We also hear that people are in a definite relationship, one with another, and with the means of labour. And the means
of labour? The means of labour are the instruments that all the result to be obtained, or achieve an end. A means is something (as a step, stage, connection) intervening, intermediate, or intermediary. So
an enabling aspect in between nature and society. A means is something by the use or help of which a desired end is attained or made more likely. So the desired end is achieved and man can transform
nature, through the means of labour. A means is an agent, tool, device, measure, plan, or policy, for accomplishing or furthering labour. And the means of labour provides favorable conditions to
'metabolise material existence. So we are on about the acquisition of resources (as of force or wealth) available for disposal. For the means of labour, provides and allows, for this acquisition. And this
material process? Thus material is a tangible substance that goes into the makeup of a physical object. The activity of historical and social man is tangible; it makes up or composes physical reality. This
relationship implies a state involving mutual dealings between people, parties or countries. Being definite implies that the relationships are obscure, doubtful, or tentative. So its a connection with one
another and the means of labour. And the relations are historical. There are origins of mans relationship with another and the means of labour lies in the development of social man i.e., history. For
certain conditions would have needed to be met for such relations to come into existence. The totality of these relationships constitute the economic structure of society. Which relationships? The
relationships of man with man and the means of labour. These relationships in totality- constitute the economic structure of society. For the economic structure of society is composed of a relationship
between men and a relationship with the means of labour i.e., the instrumentality for accomplishing the results of labour. And the economic structure of society is a formation or position taken in mans
relationship with nature. And why a historic variable? It is because it varies according to given times, in mans history. We see how it contrasts i.e., is in contradistinction with the general theories of
society, eternal society and ideal society. It is plainly developmental i.e., seeing how the process goes through various stages of development. We go on about the economic structure of society (the
mode of production) which includes, above all, the relationship between classes. Why is this relationship between classes so important? It is because the relationship between classes underlies the
distinctive contrasting conditions of those class forces. And it is On this basis the superstructure grows. On what basis? Any basis is the fundamental assumptions from which something is begun,
developed, calculated or explained. So it is on the assumption that the mode of production and the relationship between classes develops the superstructure. So this superstructure grows out of the
relationship between classes and the mode of production. Hence we have political organisations and State power, moral norms, scientific theories, art, religion, philosophy, etc. so these political
organisations and State power, moral norms, scientific theories, art, religion, philosophy, etc., relate to the superstructure. Hence these are developed in the process of production. They are
developmental features in this process which stems from the economic structure of society. We remind ourselves that this economic structure of society comprises the mode of production and the
relationship between classes. We hear that the the mode of production also determines the mode of conception. There is a definite relationship between production and abstract or general ideas inferred
or derived from specific instances. But how does the mode of production determine the mode of conception? We recall what we had written about metabolism, earlier in our reading. And we go on that
theoretical activity is a step in the reproduction of social life. And what is this reproduction of social life? So here we mean the replicating of social life. So a given human society and its members are
replicated i.e., produced. So we are on about the production of social life. Thus the social life is generated, expanded. But how? It goes into the mode of production. We have an expanding body of ideas
derived from the extension of the means of labour. For the social organisation is derived and enabled in the progression made by the means of labour. And this expanding body of ideas are developing
and as man, with and reflecting, his gigantic success, of technique, natural science confront us. With this comes new methods of research and exact apparatus of measurement. And thence the help of
artificial instruments of cognition, instruments of spiritual labour; these are extended a gigantic number of times. So we see the expansion of the sphere of action, of the natural organs of the body and
the instruments of orientation developing to the full. And the social life is derived through these gigantic extensions of the sphere of action of the natural organs. We repeat that we alluded to bringing to a
further degree of development by referring to extension. Thus the organs of sensation and our picture of the world come about. And within this comes the growth of the superstructure. So the growth of
the superstructure is a development within the historical process. The historical process, with social life, develops into the superstructure. And hence the political organisations and State power, moral
norms, scientific theories, art, religion, philosophy, etc., etc. They are generated through this historical process. And this mode of production determines also the mode of conception i.e., concept and
constructs. And we hear of material furnished by experience. What exactly is material furnished by experience? We said that theoretical activity is a step in the reproduction of social life. So theoretical
activity is part of the reproduction of social life. But what exactly is theoretical activity? Anything theoretical is concerned primarily with theories or hypotheses rather than practical considerations. A theory
is a supposition or system of ideas explaining something, especially one based on general principles, independent of the particular things to be explained. An example: atomic theory; theory of evolution).
It is also speculative, especially a fanciful view. Theory is abstract knowledge or speculative thought. So it is speculative thoughts that are: aimed at the reproduction of social life. What is being alluded to
is that in the reproduction of social life we have ideology. So it is furnished by experience. But furnished by experience that is material. The breadth of the experience depends on the degree of power over
the forces of nature. So we have a degree of power over the forces of nature. To what extent do we have power over the forces of nature? With more power, a greater depth of experience. Experience is
the accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from direct participation in events or activities. And in this case the accumulation of knowledge or skill in engaging with the forces of nature. And this
accumulation of knowledge or skill determines our degree of power over the forces of nature. That being the possession of controlling influence. To what degree do we have control over the forces of
nature; for this is the power. This is how or to what degree are we effective in transforming and working upon the natural world. And this effectiveness is derived through the accumulation of knowledge or
skill i.e., experience. This being the direct observation of or participation in transforming nature. And in this we allude, once more, to metabolism. Earlier we read that In the process of production there
takes place a metabolism (Marx) between society and nature. And this is an active process on the part of historical and social man. And we spoke of a people in a definite relationship one with another
and with the means of labour. We must remember that the reproduction of social life can only occur through production. For man must engage with nature to provide for himself. Hence survival relates to
the reproduction of social life. For social life cannot reproduce, expand or exist without production. So production is the basis on which social life reproduces and expands. Therefore this underlines our
earlier point: people are in a definite relationships, one with another and with the means of labour. And the reproduction of social life depends on their relationship with each other and the means of labour.
In the below we said that theoretical activity is a step in the reproduction of social life. By step we mean any manoeuvre made as part of the progression toward a goal. So in reproducing social life we
have theory. For in theory we prepare and engage with experience- with the material world. And the more we have power over the forces of nature the more the experience. And we hear of the
development of productive forces, through that experience. For the degree of power over the forces of nature is determined by the development of productive forces. These are having the power of
effective action i.e., production. And the development of productive forces involve the productivity of social-labour. Productivity is the ratio of the quantity and quality of units produced to the labour per unit
of time. So Productivity is this i.e., the ratio of the quantity and quality of units, produced by social-labour. In social-labour we imply communities or organized groups. For these communities or organized
groups, social-labour, produces a ratio of quantifiable and qualitative units. And this quantity and quality ratio is based or implying a degree of power over the forces of nature. The greater the degree, the
more the power, over the forces of nature.

Stimuli proceed from the tasks set by practice; the forming principles, the mode of conception
in the literal sense, reflect the mode of production, the socio-class structure of society and its
complex requirements (the idea of rank, authority, the hierarchy and the personal God in
feudal society; the idea of the impersonal force of fate, of the elemental process, of the
impersonal God in capitalist commodity-society, etc.). The prevailing conceptions are those of
the ruling class, which is the bearer of the given mode of production. [27]
In the next we hear that stimuli proceed from the tasks set by practice. What is a stimulus? A
stimulus is any stimulating information or event; acts to arouse action. So we have the tasks
set by practice and the stimuli that follows up. A task is any piece of work that is undertaken or
attempted. And stimuli proceed from these tasks. Practice is Knowledge of how something is
usually done. To set means make ready or suitable or equip in advance for a particular
purpose or for some use, event, etc.,. So when we ready ourselves, with particular tasks, we
receive the follow up in terms of stimuli. That is bodily or mental activity. A stimulus is a thing
that rouses to activity. So in stimulus we have any stimulating information or event; acts to
arouse action. The forming principles come about. The composition in the principle. A principle
being the the rule or law concerning a natural phenomenon or the function of a complex
system. And in this case we are alluding to the functioning of a complex system that is the
mode of production and the mode of conception. We have the mode of conception. As the
mode of conception reflects the mode of production. A conception is the creation of something
in the mind. So the creating of ideas i.e., the picture of the world, is reflected from the mode of
production. The mode of conception is based on and is evidence of the mode of production.
We recall what we read earlier about the degree of power over the forces of nature. And this
provides us with the breadth of our experience. And this is more inclined to what degree we
control the forces of nature, in the mode of production. We also mentioned that there is an
expanding body of ideas, in this relationship, with the forces of nature. The expanding body of
ideas is derived, through the extension of the means of labour. And we had talked of extentions, a gigantic number of times.
We spoke earlier of the gigantic extensions of the sphere of action of the natural organs. This
extension of the means of labour is just as the extention we spoke of in deriving from the
organs of nature. We need to point out that the mode of production includes the organization of
human beings to enhance the process. Though conditions need to be in place to enhance and
extend the process further. For these conditions are the preliminary prevailing context that
influences the performance or the outcome of a process. The preliminary prevailing context will
eventually develop and expand the subsequent context. The preliminary prevailing context and
the subsequent context are, reflections of the mode of conception, that developed. For the
subsequent context came about through the preliminary prevailing context. And the preliminary
prevailing context was the basis for thought that developed into the subsequent context. We
have given this a lot of thought, so lets just rewind and reflect, from our dictionary. CONTEXTS
(PRELIMINARY AND SUBSEQUENT): A set of conditions need to be in place, to enhance and
extend the process further. These conditions are the preliminary prevailing context that affects
the performance or results (an outcome) of a process. The preliminary prevailing context will
-through thought- develop, expand and manifest into the subsequent context. This is an
ongoing cycle. The preliminary prevailing context and the subsequent context are reflections of
each other. For it is the mode of conception that developed them. The preliminary prevailing
context being a result of some earlier process, as a subsequent context. But in this circuit of
our cycle it is the basis or foundation for a subsequent context. For the subsequent context
came about through the preliminary prevailing context. And the preliminary prevailing context
was the basis for thought that developed the subsequent context. So because of this the mode
of conception reflects the mode of production. We have in the mode of conception the socio-
class structure of society and its complex requirements (the idea of rank, authority, hierarchy
and the personal God in feudal society; the idea of the impersonal force of fate, of the
elemental process, of the impersonal God in capitalist commodity-society. For all of these are
developed from the mode of conception. They are preliminary and subsequent contexts. The
CONTEXTS : A set of modes of conception are listed, above i.e., the socio-class structure of
society, the idea of rank and authority, hierarchy, God in Feudalism, fate, God in capitalist
commodity society. Certain requisites need to be in place, to enhance these modes of
conception to develop. Those conditions are preliminary prevailing contexts. These conditions
affect or are the basis for the resulting conception. The preliminary prevailing context will
-through thought- develop, expand and develop into a subsequent context, listed above. So
God in capitalist commodity society is a subsequent context, derived through given conditions,
a set of preliminary prevailing contexts. Studying the preliminary prevailing contexts will clarify
subsequent context, as the one is a reflection of the other. The preliminary prevailing context
being a result of some earlier process, as a subsequent and continual context i.e., as
Feudalism developed into Capitalism &c. But in this cycle of history: our Feudal conditions are
the basis or foundation for a subsequent context, capitalist commodity society. For the
subsequent context (capitalist commodity society) came about through the preliminary
prevailing context (Feudalism). And the preliminary prevailing context (Feudalism) was the
basis for thought that developed the subsequent context (capitalism and its commodity
society). And these are the prevailing conceptions of the ruling class. why are they the prevailing conceptions of
the ruling class? The ruling class is the bearer of the given mode of production. A bearer is The person who is in possession of a check or note or bond or document
of title that is endorsed to him or to whoever holds it. So he is entitled to the mode of production. he is the Holder of the mode of production. The prevailing
conceptions of the ruling class stem from this position of control. For the ruling class have the power to direct or determine and hence the evolution of preliminary
prevailing context and the subsequent context.

[27] The fashionable German philosopher and author of Christian- prophetic Socialism, Max
Scheler, while carrying on a desperate struggle against Marxism, borrows from the latter a
number of basic principles, producing as a consequence a perfectly intolerable cacophony of
motifs. To illustrate the influence of Marxism on this Catholic philosopher, we quote the
following passage from his large work, The forms of knowledge and society (Leipzig,
mcmxxvi), p. 204- 205: It is not correct that even very formal ways of thinking and
Wertnehmung are massive class-natured different - though only in the laws of the large
number of Fille, since everyone can overcome the bond of his class position in principle to
such. klassenmissig certain formal ways of thinking I expect beispielweige following: -

1. Prospektivismus value of time consciousness subclass; Wertretrospektivismus-upper class.

2. Subclass are viewing: viewing being upper class.


3. Mechanical world view subclass; teleological view of the worldtop class.
4. Realism (the world largely as a 'resistance') subclass: idealism upper class (world primarily as 'Imaginative').

5. Materialism subclass; spiritualism upper class.

6. Induction, empiricism subclass; priori knowledge, rationalism upper class.

7. Pragmatism subclass, superclass-intellectualism.

8. Optimistic and pessimistic view of the future retrospection subclass. Pessimistic and optimistic views retrospection, 'the good old time' upper class.

9. Contradiction seeking mentality or 'dialectical' thinking subclass; identitatssuchende thinking-upper class.

10th Milieu theoretical thinking subclass; nativistisches thinking upper class.

This original table is extremely schematic and unhistorical, but it contains individual elements of truth.

We now hear about natural historical development, which changes the forms of biological species. In forms of biological species we have a group of
organisms within a species that differ in trivial ways from similar groups. What makes the forms of biological species? It is the developments in natural
history. When certain conditions are present we have a change in the forms of biological species. So what is the preliminary prevailing context? It is the
conditions that allow a certain characteristic to manifest and develop. And this new form is found within a new condition (subsequent context). How
does the new form operate in the subsequent context? The subsequent context now becomes the preliminary prevailing context, which would create
further biological formations. But we also have the historical development of society too. And the historical development of society has the movement of
the productive forces at its foundation. This movement are the series of actions advancing a principle or tending toward a particular end. That is tending
to optimize or generating wealth i.e., in production. We have with the changes i.e., the historical development of society, the changes in socio-historic
forms of labour. For socio-historic forms of labour develop according to given conditions. Socio relates to Involves society or sociology. Sociology is
the study and classification of human societies. So the forms of labour have developed according to the historical context i.e., the alternating preliminary
prevailing and the subsequent contexts. Labour being the social class comprising those who do manual labour or work for wages. So we have diverse
forms of the class comprising those who do manual labour or work for wages. And the changes are the socio-historic forms of labour. We have social
structures that change or come about with the socio-historic forms of labour. Any social structure are the people in a society considered as a system
organized by a characteristic pattern of relationships. This social structure is a characteristic pattern of relationships. And this characteristic pattern of
relationships composes the social structure. These are relationships making up the complex whole. For the historical development of society is the
changes in this complex whole. And in each period we have the socio-historic forms of labour each characteristically coming about through given
conditions. And this characteristic pattern of relationships is according to the conditions. We remind ourselves that practical life undermines and is the
relationship between things. Thence we have social structures and modes of production. And with mode of production and the social structures we find
together with which there changes the whole ideological superstructure. But what is this whole ideological superstructure? Ideological is Imaginary or
visionary theorization. Ideology is of or pertaining to or characteristic of an orientation that characterizes the thinking of a group or nation. So we have
the thinking of a group. It is the characteristic, orientation or thinking of a group. So how can we say that we do not have Ideology? For it is the Ideology
that tranforms and makes the socio-historic forms of labour. The socio-historic forms of labour cannot develop blindly without the thoughts of man. For
mode of production are complex systems, which by such stand as equal to any invention. And often these magnificent inventions are manifest within the
preliminary prevailing and subsequent contexts of socio-historic forms of labour. And in this we have the changes the whole ideological superstructure.
For the changes the whole ideological superstructure come about according to the movement of the productive forces. So the changes the whole
ideological superstructure are undergoing historic changes, based or founded on movement of the productive forces. Even the highest forms of
theoretical cognition and reflective illusions come about through the movement of the productive forces. Theory we remind ourselves- is concerned
primarily with theories or hypotheses rather than practical considerations. For in theory we have the imaginative contemplation of reality. So it is
imaginative thought upon the state of being, the actual or real. Otherwise a theory is a belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the basis of
action. A theory is a principle or plan of action. And with these plans and actions we have the ideological superstructure. We know that on the upper
deck we have the ideological classes. We recall the pictures that show the layers of society with the bottom layer holding up the superstructure. Theory is
the coherent set of hypothetical, conceptual, and pragmatic principles forming the general frame of reference for a field of inquiry (as for deducing
principles, formulating hypotheses for testing, undertaking actions). After this we return to the movement of the productive forces. In the next bit we
hear about the contradiction between the movement of the productive forces and the historic forms of social labour. The historic forms of social labour
are in opposition to the movement of the productive forces. Why? It is because the bourgeois own the means of labour. The cause of the change in these
forms, is realised through class struggle. So we have arrived at this point i.e., that the contradiction between them and the historic forms of social labour
need to be resolved. The historic forms of social labour can be transformed by class struggle. In speaking of class societies which blow up at certain
points i.e., at the out-of-date social structure. For an out-of-date social structure has oulived itself and needs to be transformed. So it becomes a form of
development to fetters on development. But what is meant by a form of development? What is being said in the fetters on development?
HOWEVER, this truth does not prevent Default Scheler from standing pat on the side of the upper class and launching into the wilds of Appropriate religious metaphysics. But, just as development in
natural history changes the forms of biological species, the historical development of society, with the movement of productive forces at its foundation, changes the socio-historic forms of labour, social
structures, modes of production, together with which there changes the whole ideological superstructure, up to and including the highest forms of theoretical cognition and reflective illusions.

The movement of productive forces, the contradiction between them and the historic forms of social labour are, consequently, the cause of the change in these forms, realised through class struggle (to
way the
the extent that we are speaking of class societies) and the blowing up of the out-of-date social structure, transformed from a form of development to fetters on development. In this

practice of material labour is the basic motive force of the entire process as a whole, the
practice of the class struggle is the critical- revolutionary practice of social transformation
(criticism weapons which takes the place of the weapon of criticism), the practice of scientific
cognition is the practice of material labour continued in particular forms (natural science), of
administration and the class struggle (the social sciences). The class subjectivism of the
forms of cognition in no way excludes the objective significance of cognition: in a certain
measure cognition of the external world and social laws is possessed by every class, but the
specific methods of conception, in their historical progress, variously condition the process of
the development of the adequateness of cognition, and the advance of history may lead to
such a method of conception as will become a fetter upon cognition itself. This occurs on the
eve of the destruction of the given mode of production and its class promoters. It is from this
historico-materialist angle that we should also approach the exceptionally complicated
question of the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences. Here there
is a considerable number of various solutions: (a) to take as a criterion the difference between
causal theoretical series (Natrgesetz, law) and teleological, normative series (rule, system of
rules, prescriptions); [28]
In the above we hear of the advance of history may lead to such a method of conception,
as will become a fetter, upon cognition itself. So a restraint upon cognition, is being alluded to.
And we remind ourselves what cognition is: it is knowing, perceiving, or conceiving, as an act or faculty, distinct from emotion and volition. So
theoretical cognition is the knowledge, perception of theory. We hear of the cognitive mental processes. cognition is the intellectual process by which knowledge is gained about perceptions or ideas. So
cognition is an intellectual process. And through this intellectual process, knowledge, is gained. But lets first get to what an intellectual process is, then, to how knowledge is gained. Intellectual is of or
appealing to the intellect. The intellect being a faculty of reasoning, knowing, and thinking. A faculty is an aptitude for a particular activity. It can mean inherent mental or physical power. So compare
faculty, the aptitude for a particular activity, with latency. The intellect has a lot to do with understanding. And a process? A process is a course of action or proceeding, esp. a series of stages in
manufacturing etc. It is the progress or course (in the process of construction). So the intellectual process is all about the course of action that gives or constructs knowledge. Through the course of action
and through the faculty of reasoning, knowing, and thinking we derive knowledge. A process is, a progressive forward movement, from one point to another on the way to completion. So progressive
forward movement gets us to the point of knowing. When hearing of this process, progressive forward movement, we consider the way Bukharin has alluded to the gigantic successes of technique and
natural science that are confronting us. These gigantic successes point to the point of knowing i.e., when knowledge is put into application. We must not forget the allusion to the radius of cognition,
progressing with the exact apparatus of measurement and new methods of research. So cognition is linked up with technology. This underlines our earlier reading i.e., that the progressive forward
movement to the point of knowing is linked to mans activity i.e., practice. We recall that the basis for comparing cognitions adequateness lies with its degree of correspondence to objective reality. In
other words to what point does it relate or maintain compatibility with objective reality. But initially in our reading we have it that the advance of history may lead to such a method of conception as will
become a fetter upon cognition itself. So we cannot take the advance of history as a definite, continual progressive movement, towards some ideal. For we can have a method of conception that fetters
cognition. This is because the advances are particular and not in the general interest. So history can advance and eventually have a stifling, limiting or confining method of conception. Bukharin alludes
to the epistemological Robinson Crusoes and the atomism, previously mentioned. Thus an abstraction that does not take the full complexity of the system, into its theoretical database. And we hear of the
eve of the destruction of the given mode of production and its class promoters. So, at the time, just before an event, we have a particular or non-particular, mode of conception. And why this mode of
conception, stifling cognition? It is an occurance on the eve of reaching the crossroad. Hence the title of this work i.e., science at the crossroads. So, a given mode of production, is about to give way, or
fall down. But why would there need to be a fetter upon cognition before the destruction of the given mode of production? For cognition is linked up to consciousness, of the state, or conditions. The
class promoters hamper perception, learning and reasoning in an effort to extend the given mode of production. For they are the beneficiaries of the given mode of production. Hence they are the: class
promoters, of the given mode of production. Why would they be class promoters if they were not the beneficiaries of the given mode of production? We then discuss the historico-materialist angle. We
hear of the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and the applied sciences. For the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences is an exceptionally complicated question. That
is how does theory relate to the applied sciences? And how does the applied sciences relate to theory? For there is a definite agreement between the two. For the mode of production defines the social
structures and hence the position, time, place and personal relationships. Hence it defines ones standing in the social order of things and therefore ones position in terms of class struggle. There are a
considerable number of various solutions regarding the question of the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences. But what are the various solutions? He cites to take as a
criterion the difference between causal theoretical series (Natrgesetz, law) and teleological, normative series (rule, system of rules, prescriptions). So we have a criterion. A criterion is a principle or
standard of judgement. And we want to judge the difference between causal theoretical series and teleological, normative series (rule, system of rules, prescriptions). So we have to define, or get to
understand, what are causal theoretical series. Anything causal refers to cause i.e., a word (such as because) that expresses a reason or a cause, a rational motive or explanation. Anything causal is a
justification for something existing or happening. So we are on about differentiating. So from the historico-materialist angle, we look at the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied
sciences. And we consider the considerable number of various solutions. This is differentiating between causal theoretical series and teleological, normative series. And in the causal theoretical series we
have the rationale or explanation behind the theoretical series. A series is similar things placed in order or happening one after another. So in the theoretical series we have the theories placed in order,
hence alluding to history (the historico-materialist angle). So we have the ordering or sequential arrangement of these theories i.e., the causal theoretical series. And furthermore we have the teleological,
normative series. Teleology is a doctrine explaining phenomena by their ends or purposes. Teleology is the philosophical study of evidence of design in nature. So its looking for evidential design, in
nature. That is the specific role, purpose or effect, of some form, in nature. It is seeing how something in nature, the fact or the character of being is directed toward an end. It is shaped by a purpose.
Hence holding some explanatory basis for its form. Though we must take into account that Teleology has aspects that have become entangled with metaphysical and theological aspects. And at this
point in time we are unsure if Bukharin is looking at this. But is he connecting the more metaphysical aspects with the causal theoretical series? We will disentangle ourselves from the confusion. For I
can see that there is a correlation or relationship between the world of reality, the theoretical framework and the world of ideas (in its furthest extent). But lets separate the tangles by means of further
analysis. We realize that we are on about Teleological series too. So we have teleology in the historical context. For lets remind ourselves about what Teleology is all about. TELEOLOGY: Teleology is a
doctrine explaining phenomena by their ends or purposes or causes. We ask what makes something the way it is? Teleology is the philosophical study of evidence of design (some system) in nature. So
its looking for evidence or some type of purpose in the design, in nature. That is the specific role, purpose or effect of some existent form in nature. It is seeing how something in nature, takes a given
form or character, according to a given purpose. Teleology involves seeing the fact or the character of a being, its composition or direction taken towards a given end. It is shaped or modified by a
purpose. Hence holding some explanatory teleological basis for its form (composition). Now lets consider the normative series. But what are the normative series. For the normative series goes with the
teleological series. These two are compared with the causal theoretical series. Normative is relating to or dealing with norms. Otherwise anything normative is pertaining to giving directives or rules.
Normative is of, relating to, or dealing with norms, their nature, or mode of discovery and existence. From my understanding, I take it to be somewhat like a paradigm or established form. So we have in
the normative series, the paradigm shifts i.e., (the rules, systems of rules, the prescriptions) changing in the course of history.
In the following we hear of the practice of material labour is the basic motive force of the entire process as a whole. But what is a basic motive? A motive is what induces a person to act in a particular
way. And the basic motive force is material labour. For it drives and is the fundamental underlying aspect. material labour is the basic motive force of the entire process, as a whole. Class struggle is the
critical-revolutionary practice of social transformation. And critical-revolutionary practice? practice being Knowledge of how something is usually done. Critical in that it is a tendency to find and call
attention to errors and flaws. We understand the basic motive force, which is the practice of material labour; this being the basic motive force of the entire process as a whole. but we are on about social
transformation i.e., changing the life in communities or organized groups. So we are on about the reorganization of society. PRACTICE being actual performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge. For non-applied knowledge is irrelevant. For the application of knowledge is the act of bringing something to bear; using it for a particular purpose.
Otherwise it is knowledge for knowledges sake. We hear about the practice of scientific cognition is the practice of material labour continued in particular forms. Cognition is the psychological result of
perception and learning and reasoning. So the psychological result of Scientific perception, learning and reasoning is material labour, continued. Though continued in particular forms i.e., a perceptual
structure. So the practice of scientific cognition is said to be a particular form of administration and the class struggle. In administration we have natural sciences but in class struggle we have the social
sciences. So the natural sciences and social sciences go together. One is the science of the fundamentals of man with nature. The other the fundamentals of man as social man. But man interacts with
nature, in production, and derives social man. And it is within this subsequent context that we have the social sciences. Who would want social sciences to be truly scientific. Not the bourgeoisie for the
obviousness of social sciences looking at objective reality, would expose the underlying basis of the whole social structure. Then it comes down it is a question of systems as a whole. we previously
mentioned that this represents, in the long run, the theoretical expression of the struggle with nature and the social struggle. And the struggle with nature is primary, whereas the social struggle comes as
an extension of it. And in this primary engagement with nature, extending into class struggle (social sciences) we have in this the gigantic practice of modern humanity as a whole. The struggle with
nature is primary, for human society, in order to live, must produce. So production is the basic underlying foundation i.e., the fundamental essence of it all. And the organs of sensation are aiming to
expose, bring into the scope of reality, the real essence underlying the natural and social worlds. And because production is the real starting point, underlining the essence of where change eminates
from. We proceed in that class subjectivism of the forms of cognition in no way excludes the objective significance of cognition. What is this objective significance of cognition? Objective is existing
independent of mind. Anything objective is relating to an object as it is in itself or as distinguished from consciousness or the subject. Objective can be belonging to nature or the sensible world. Anything
publicly or intersubjectively observable or verifiable especially by scientific methods. Objective is independent of what is personal or private in our apprehension and feelings. The objective significance of
cognition is the reality in that man must think as he acts in the material world. So cognition is objectively significant i.e., despite class subjectivism. Significant has it that cognition is rich in significance or
implication. There is a certain measure that cognition of the external world and social laws is possessed by every class. To some extent everyone has a cognition of the external world. Furthermore
everyone, to some extent, has cognition of the social laws. But in subjectivity it is expressing or involving the use of facts without distortion by personal feelings or prejudices. To some extent we have a
distortion of cognition, by personal feelings or prejudices. But the specific methods of conception, in their historical progress, variously condition the process of the development of the adequateness of
cognition. These mode of conception progress, in history. Any method is a way of doing something, especially a systematic way; implies an orderly logical arrangement. So system of conception has a
history. For we have conception according to the changes in the historical and social modes of production.

[28] E. Husserl: Logical Researches. Compare M. Lomonosov: On the Value of Chemistry,


Works (St. Petersburg, 1&10), 3., p. 1.

(b) to take as a criterion distinction according to objects -the pure sciences study the natural
surroundings given to man: the applied sciences the artificial surroundings (machines,
transport technique, apparatus, raw materials, etc.); [29]
now we hear of Husserl. But who was Edmund Husserl? Husserl was a German philosopher
he developed phenomenology. He lived from 1859 to 1938. Phenomenology is a philosophical
doctrine proposed by Edmund Husserl based on the study of human experience in which
considerations of objective reality are not taken into account. So phenomenology does not
consider objective reality. Phenomenology is involved in studying human experience.
Experiences are the accumulation of knowledge or skill, that results from direct participation in
events or activities. So we have a collection of knowledge or skills i.e., an increase by natural
growth or additions. But this increase by natural growth or addition can be through direct or
indirect participation. And direct means without deviation. For direct means having no
intervening persons, agents, conditions. Intervention means to come between. So in direct
participation we imply that we have no intervention, nothing coming between, the observer and
the experience. And participation involves taking part or a sharing in. Participation is the basis
or foundation to have the experience. Without participation we cannot have an experience.
Only intellectual processes in direct participation involves creating a distance between the
observer (experiencer) and his experience i.e., the developed knowledge or skill, derived
through participation.
Knowledge is an awareness or familiarity. Thus awareness is being aware or conscious;
having knowledge. And awareness involves being awake and aware of one's surroundings and
identity. This puts us at once in a relationship to a reality. But I suppose Edmund Husserl would
have it as a subjective reality.
It can also be a person's range of information. Knowledge is an understanding of a subject
etc., example: he had a good knowledge of Greek. So experience is: the accumulation of
knowledge. So is phenomenology then the study of human accumulation of knowledge and
skills? And accumulated knowledge and skills is to do with phenomenology and Edmund
Husserl. And how do we get experience? It is through the direct or indirect participation in
events or activities, that experience is derived. Anything direct is with nothing, or no-one, in
between. So it is not someone telling you about the experience. But you directly experiencing.
The other would be an indirect experience. An experience is observation of or practical
acquaintance with facts or events. But this can be a direct observation or an indirect
observation. And observation implies or attends to the power of perception. For to observe
means the act of making and recording and measuring. So this meaning of experience is
quantifying or all about quantification. Observation can be the Facts, learned by determining
the existence, presence, or facts of the existent reality. So a determination of the facts, through
direct action, is unmediated. Unmediated means no intervening persons, agents, or conditions
i.e., direct. We are talking of nothing in the middle. But lets orientate ourselves by looking back
at what we have written about. We return to our discussion of the historico-materialist angle.
We it was mentioned that we need to approach from the historico-materialist angle in looking at
the exceptionally complicated question of the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and
applied sciences. So the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences
comes under our spotlight. Lets move this idea of the interrelations between the theoretical
(pure) and applied sciences, into the foreground; this makes the interrelationships more visible
or prominent. We have heard that there are a considerable number of various solutions. The
first solution is to: take as a criterion the difference between causal theoretical series (law) and
teleological, normative series (rule, system of rules, prescriptions). This was the first, helping
us simplify the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences. But what is
the second? And a taken criterion distinguishing according to objects -the pure sciences.
Studying man's natural surroundings: the applied sciences the artificial surroundings
(machines, transport technique, apparatus, raw materials, etc.) The second is acquiring knowledge;
acquisition is observing i.e., the things that are or deserve to be investigated. So it is to investigate, observe and acquire information about the natural
surroundings given to man. Hence we investigate, observe and acquire information about the applied sciences. And applied means concerned with
concrete problems or data rather than with fundamental principles. So its a study of the applied sciences, artificial surroundings i.e., the machinery,
transportation technique, apparatus and raw materials. Thus we could put it to be machinery (mechanical or electrical devices), transport techniques
(practical method), apparatus (equipment designed to serve a specific function), raw materials (Material suitable for manufacture) &c. all of this is the
natural surroundings given to man. For the natural surroundings given to man are the applied sciences and the artificial surroundings. We hear talk of a
criterion distinction. A criterion is a basis for comparison; a reference point against which other things can be evaluated. A basis is a relation that
provides the foundation for something. Here we are talking of the relation that provides the foundation for pure sciences and the applied sciences. Hence
we have got to the point of a breakthrough in our understanding. This is in that we see now, after some work, that we are distinguishing between the
natural surroundings given to man and the artificial surroundings. For in the natural surroundings given to man we allude to the pure sciences. On the
other hand the artificial surroundings allude to the applied sciences. So we have a criterion which is the basis to drawing a distinction. We can
distinguish between pure sciences and applied sciences. But a criterion distinction according to objects. What do we mean by according to objects? For
we distinguish according to objects. That is the objects in the pure sciences and applied sciences. An object is something that is put or may be regarded
as put in the way of some of the senses. In this sense the meaning or sense in pure sciences and applied sciences. So its indicating the distinction
between the pure and applied sciences. What differentiates the pure and applied sciences? For there must be some criterion distinction. Or else the pure
and applied sciences would be indistinct and hence undefineable. And the criterion, the principle or standard of judgement, lies in that the pure sciences
studies the natural surroundings given to man. On the other hand the applied sciences look at artificial surroundings, which applied the natural
surroundings given to man, to be formed. So the applied sciences involves so the natural surroundings given to man provides a relation that provides the
foundation for the applied sciences. In the same way we described how the natural organs of man serve and are extended. So this relationship is the basis
of the pure and applied sciences. The applied sciences cannot be seperated from the pure sciences. For the applied sciences is an extention of the pure
sciences. Or possibly we might have to see it the other way round i.e., the pure sciences is an extention of the applied sciences. But what are we talking
about here? In our focus we have lost the essence of what we are on about. And we had two aspects brought up. Why did we have these two i.e., The
first solution is to: take as a criterion the difference between causal theoretical series (law) and the teleological, normative series (rule, system of rules,
prescriptions). The second a taken criterion distinguishing according to objects -the pure sciences. Studying man's natural surroundings: the applied
sciences the artificial surroundings (machines, transport technique, apparatus, raw materials, etc.). So lets return to our earlier point, which will colour
our later reading. We initially discussed the historico-materialist angle and how we should approach the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and
applied sciences. And then we mentioned that there are a number of solutions i.e., means or ways of solving a problem. What is the problem we want to
solve? It is looking at the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences. And thence finding these interrelationships leads to the two
points covered so far. These being taking as a criterion the difference between causal theoretical series (law) and the teleological, normative series (rule,
system of rules, prescriptions). And secondly: a taken criterion distinguishing according to objects -the pure sciences. Studying man's natural
surroundings: the applied sciences the artificial surroundings (machines, transport technique, apparatus, raw materials, etc.) and these surroundings are
environmental condition. So we have natural surroundings and artificial surroundings. Hence natural objects or conditions around or affecting a person
or thing. And on the other hand: the artificial objects or conditions around or affecting a person or thing. This is basically highlighting the social man and
the natural conditions that nature imposes upon him. For nature imposes itself and man adapts. This adaptation is reflected in his social being, in all its
various manifestations. Through our efforts all of this has become more distinct i.e., perceptible. We can more clearly see the interrelations between the
theoretical (pure) and applied sciences. An object is something (as an end, aim, or motive) by which the mind or any of its activities is directed :
something on which the purposes are fixed as the end of action or effort. At the end of action or effort of study will lead to the natural surroundings
given to man. And the end of action or effort would the artificial surroundings. The one being the end of action or effort of pure sciences would natural
surroundings. On the other hand the the end of action or effort would be the pure sciences.
[29] Paul Niggli: Reins and applied science. The natural sciences. 19th Jahrffang, Book 1.

(c) to take as criterion time (the pure sciences work with a long period in view, forestalling
developments, the applied serve the needs of the moment); [30]
Now we come to the third. In our investigation or experience of looking at the interrelations
between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences we come to a third solution. In this we
have take as criterion time. Or to put it take time as a criterion. So lets recall what a criterion is.
A criterion is a basis for comparison; a reference point against which other things can be
evaluated. And we are evaluating the interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied
sciences, from the historico-materialist angle. And we had two other solutions. Now we have
criterion of time. We hear that the pure sciences work with a long period in view. Thus the pure
sciences keep developments from happening or arising i.e., forestalling them. On the other
hand the applied sciences serve the needs of the moment. The needs of the moment are
rather powerful aspects. And a need is a condition requiring relief. So we are on about a
condition requiring relief, at this moment in time. Hence we are talking of fulfilling the purpose,
role, or function of the moment. Forestalling can mean to act in advance of; deal with ahead of
time. And I think it is in this sense that we deal with forestalling developments . So we are
dealing with developments ahead of time i.e., before the improving by expanding, enlarging or
refining of something. So the pure sciences anticipate or proceed the expansion that derives
from the discoveries. So we have to define or get to understand what the pure sciences are.
They are concerned with theory and data rather than practice; opposed to applied. We need
this pure sciences i.e., theory and data to apply it. We cannot apply knowledge if we do not
understand it. Understanding forms the initial basis of applied knowledge. So time is the
criterion i.e., basis for comparison; a reference point against which other things can be
evaluated. A criterion can be a characterizing mark or trait. So we would have the continuum of
experience in which events pass from the future through the present to the past i.e., time, as a
characterizing mark or trait. But what are we on about? We have to return to topic that is being
discussed, to reorient ourselves. Our topic involved the historico-materialist angle and the
interrelations between the theoretical (pure) and applied sciences. Of this i.e., the interrelations
we have the first solution. This was to take as a criterion the difference between causal
theoretical series (law) and the teleological, normative series (rule, system of rules,
prescriptions). The second in our looking at the interrelations between the applied sciences
and pure sciences. What was the second? It was a taken criterion distinguishing according to
objects -the pure sciences. Studying man's natural surroundings: the applied sciences the
artificial surroundings (machines, transport technique, apparatus, raw materials, etc.) and
thirdly? The third was to take as criterion time. And within the third we have the pure sciences
work with a long period in view, forestalling developments, the applied serve the needs of the
moment. And we are looking at what forestalling is. What is forestalling developments? This
means that lie in wait, as they are latent. BREAKTHROUGH: This means we have got to a
breakthrough point; the process involved in applied and pure science has been understood.
The pure must initiate some fundamental aspect that will expand into the various branches,
involving practice and the application of technique (applied Science). And this emphasizes or
underlines it to be the historico-materialist angle. Somehow I sense and suspect that we have
simplified the point in our discussion. But there is some essence of truth in all of this that needs
to be studied. But the applied sciences serve the needs of the moment. And the pure sciences
preclude the developments. For developments are bigger, fuller, more elaborate aspects
brought or that come to an active, visible, or mature state. And an active, visible, or mature
state is indicative of a process. A process being a particular course of action intended to
achieve a result. And the moment is the particular point in time.

[30] Compare Ostwald: The energetic Imperative, 1st series, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 46, 53. (d) to
take as criterion, lastly, the degree of generality (abstractness) of the particular science.

On this subject it is necessary to remark (a) on the first criterion: sciences teleologically set
forth at bottom are not sciences, but arts (Knste). However, any system of norms (we have
not here in mind ethics and the like) depends upon a system of objective laws, which are either
covertly understood or directly set forth as such. On the other hand, the sciences in the
particular sense of the word (pure sciences) are not pure, since the selection of an object is
determined by aims which are practical in the long run - and this, in its turn, can and must be
considered from the standpoint of the causal regularity of social development. [31]
and in the next we get to energetic Imperative. We hear of the degree of generality. And we
take as criterion lastly, the degree of generality. It all comes down to put these keys word
together; it all comes down to to take as criterion, lastly, the degree of generality (abstractness)
of the particular science . Anything abstract is of or existing in thought or theory rather than
matter or practice; not concrete. It this the right understanding of abstractness. Abstractness as
a particular object or specific instance, is, separated from embodiment. Thus it is disconnected
or can only be seen as conceptual. And an abstractness is expressing a property, quality,
attribute, or relation viewed apart from the other characteristics inhering in or constituting an
object. So it is not the whole but a property, quality, attribute, or relation of the whole. And what
is a degree of generality of a particular science? But what is a generality? And a generality is a
a quality of being general or widespread or having general applicability. So in this sense it is
applicable in all cases. It is not specific. But here we have the degree of generality. So it is to
what extent is it general or widespread i.e., having general applicability. So one thing is more
general than another. And to what extent of generality or we touching on. Does this have
anything to do with the expansion from something particular. And this degree of generality
(which is called abstractness) is taken as a criterion. A criterion being the basis for
comparison; a reference point against which other things can be evaluated. So we have a
reference point, which is the degree of generality. And generality is an idea or conclusion
having general application, as a basis for comparison. So this abstractness or degree of
generality is taken as criterion, of a particular science. We go on the subject of degree of
generality: we have the first. So on the first basis of determining the standard we have
sciences teleologically set forth. at bottom are not sciences, but arts. Teleologically sciences
set forth are not sciences, but arts. Our dictionary defines teleology as doctrine explaining
phenomena by their ends or purposes. So here we even have a relationship of arts and
science put across. So we wonder to what degree is this teleos Hegelian. For any Marxist,
worth his salt, would wonder at something that featured so prominently in the development of
Marxism. And dialectical materialism emphasizes so many aspects of something and is too a
large degree of abstractness. In this it being that it encompasses so much of what makes up
the world. So any particular science must have this degree of generality. And this degree of
generality is the abstractness. But we must not take this literally because we have a possible
quote that may not reflect the position of our author. But it does bring to thought the teleology,
a doctrine explaining phenomena by their ends or purposes. For the sciences teleologically set
forth are arts. Now let us return to our work our earlier divergent point and the work of de and
re-constructing. Let us work from specified identifiable position in this investigative continuum.
But what is this specified identifiable position? It is the thoughts about sciences teleologically
set forth. And teleology is a philosophical theory. A philosophical theory that explains
phenomena by their ends or purposes. But this sciences teleologically set forth remains
somewhat puzzling to me. We then go on to reading about a system of norms. This system of
norms depends on a system of objective laws. We remind ourselves what a system is. A
system is instrumentality that combines interrelated interacting artifacts designed to work as a
coherent entity. So any system is a coherent entity. But a coherent entity as a combination of
interrelated interacting artifacts. A combination of interrelated interacting artifacts makes an
entity that is coherent. Coherence means orderly, logical, and aesthetically consistent relation
of parts. Any consistent relation of parts are a coherent entity. So in consistency, relationship
and something less than the whole (a part) we have coherence. Something incoherent does
not have a consistent relation of parts. But something incoherent would be an inconsistent
relation of parts. Thing do not fit together in an inconsistent system. But the system of norms is
spoken of. What are the system of norms? Any norm is the standard, model or pattern
regarded as typical. And this does not mean ethics, but a system of objective laws i.e.,
expressing things as perceived without distortion of personal feelings, insertion of fictional
matter, or interpretation. So we are articulating perception, without distortion. So it is
undistorted perception. So a system of objective laws is an articulation that derives undistorted
(misrepresented) perception. A law is a generalization that describes recurring facts or events
in nature. So the expression of these laws are an undistorted perception that expresses the
actual world of reality. But we have the distorted laws of the bourgeois. For it a bourgeois
world. And most social systems are a system of unobjective laws. For the laws, in this sense,
express the hegemony of the ruling class and its prevailing conceptions. For these prevailing
conceptions are what defines or emphasizes the system of unobjective laws. But system of
objective laws conforms to the world of reality. And studying the system of objective laws
should speak for itself. It allows the observer to see the world for what it is in reality. Hence it is
the direct opposite of idealism, subjectivism &c. Now lets put the sciences teleologically set
forth back into the focus of our study. Teleology is a Philosophy doctrine explaining phenomena
by their ends or purposes. So the ends or purposes justify the means. For wealth justifies the
inhumanity of man to man. So phenomena serving a particular purpose would fall within the
Teleological category. Hence the Capitalist system serves the purpose of a particular ruling
group, hence is a Teleological category. But this system is a cohesive system, according to this
paricular dominant class. So the Teleological category serves and is means to optimize the
power and extend this dominant class. And in so being i.e., sciences teleologically set forth are
in inverted commas. Such sciences are arts. For the arts are characteristically subjective. An
end is an outcome worked toward especially with forethought, deliberate planning, and
organized effort. We indicate that despite the subjectivity, any system of norms depends upon
a system of objective laws. This is what makes the Capitalist system work so well, despite
unobjectivity i.e., it relies on the system of norms, system of objective laws. The system of
objective laws are covertly understood or directly set forth as such. Covertly indicates not
openly practised or engaged in or shown. The system of objective laws is not openly practised
or engaged in or shown but understood or directly set forth as such. In other words it is
understood or set forth as an absolute i.e., objective law. In understanding, we mean fully
apprehended as to purport, meaning or explanation. Now we hear of particular sciences. What
these particular sciences? PATICULAR SCIENCES are Sciences in the particular sense of the
word ('pure sciences') are not 'pure'. But why are these particular sciences not pure? An object
is selected and determined by aims. These aims, the object are practically selected, in the long
run. The determination of aims, in its turn, can and must be considered from the standpoint of
the giving rise to a regularity of social development. And any regularity is a fixed principle or
rate. A principle is a basic generalization that is accepted as true and that can be used as a
basis for reasoning or conduct. So the basis for reasoning or conduct is profit, returns etc., in
the Capitalist system. This is basis for reasoning or conduct of a ruling class, dominant entity.
Hence it is a particular basis on which to reason and practice. But the regularity of social
development of a particular group. Its underlying rationale is to make someone or something
act in a particular way or do a particular thing is the regularity of social development.

[31] The attempts, recently still fashionable, of the school of H. Rickert to dig an impassable
abyss between the social and natural sciences logically rely upon the naive conception that in
the natural sciences, as opposed to the social, there is no relation to values. This relation to
values exists in the natural sciences as well, so far as selection of an object is concerned.
In what follows we hear of H Ricket attempting to dig an impassable abyss between the social and natural sciences. And to logically rely upon the naive conception that in the natural sciences, as
opposed to the social, there is no 'relation to values'. But what are these relation to values? What are values? values are the quality (positive or negative) that renders something desirable or valuable.
And Rickert holds that naive conception that in the natural sciences, as opposed to the social, there is no relation to values. So the natural sciences have no relation to values. This is opposes the social
sciences which have a value relationship. And Bukharin says that Rickerts conception is naive i.e., that the social sciences has no relation to values. We continue that a relation to values exists in the
natural sciences as well, so far as selection of an object is concerned. For why selection of an object and not the selection of a different object. A selection of a goal, intended to attain something (and
which is believed to be attainable). The intention expresses the action that results in a particular result. People dont do things for nothing i.e., there is a motivation or basis underlying all action. A
motivation is a psychological feature that arouses an organism to action or towards a desired goal; the desired goal or reason causing the action; that which gives purpose and direction to behaviour.
Purpose indicates what something is used for. So the underlying action is based on its usefulness.

However, teleology must be driven out of science, as a system of theoretical principles


discovering objective regularities, and this applies equally, to the social and the natural
sciences. The raison-d'etre of the Rickertian view for the bourgeoisie, however, is that its social
science is rapidly declining to scientific non-existence, changing more and more into the simple
apology of the capitalist system, which for the Rickerts undoubtedly has a most outstanding
value. As for the other distinction of principle made by Rickert (the historical character of the
social sciences and the non-historical character of the natural), it relies upon an extreme
narrowness of outlook, which takes note of the historical evolution of some social phenomena,
but does not see the history of nature. At the present time a new school is arising in place of
Rickert- Dilthey- M, Weber, O. Spann, W. Sombart -which proclaims the impossibility of the
perception of external nature (the essence of things) and the full possibility of the perception
of the sense of social phenomena, Sombart moreover maintaining that the natural sciences
have practical value, while the social sciences cannot have any practical application.

Truly modern bourgeois science is beginning to walk on its head! Compare Sombart: The three
political economies v. history and system of the doctrine of the economy. Duncker and
Humblot, 1930. (b) On the second criterion: engineering, for example, may be set forth as a
pure study -that is. . theoretically, without norms, without constructive rules; however, usually
in its enunciation we also have a teleological and normative element.
Now lets put teleology back into the scope of our study, back into our focus. Teleology involves the fact or the character of being directed toward an end. Everything is shaped by a purpose; this use of
natural processes or of nature as a whole conceived as determined by final causes or by the design of a divine Providence. Teleology is opposed, to, purely mechanical determinism or causation
exclusively by what is temporally antecedent. Anything temporal is the arrangement of events in time. We hear that teleology must be driven out of science. Why must teleology be driven out of science?
For teleology is not a system of theoretical principles discovering objective regularities. Hence it must be a system of theoretical principles discovering subjective regularities. And principles are a rule or
law, concerning a natural phenomenon or the functioning of a complex system. The raison-d'etre for Rickertian view is that its social science is rapidly declining to scientific non-existence, changing more
and more into the simple apology of the capitalist system. Hence it becomes unobjective and he and his kind are apologists of the capitalist system. And this being the raison-d'etre and thence social
science is rapidly declining to scientific non-existence, changing, more and more, into the simple: apology of the capitalist system. So social sciences is apologizing for the capitalist system. And they are
apologists of the capitalist system. And this is its outstanding value i.e., it apologetic nature. We then hear of the historical character of the social sciences and the non-historical character of the natural, in
Rickertian thought. Rickert relies on an extreme narrowness of outlook, noting the historical evolution of some social phenomena, but not seeing the history of nature. And we hear of the new school that
proclaims the impossibility of the perception of external nature. That is that we are incapable of perceiving external nature. that we are blind to perceiving the external nature is the view of the new school.
So it holds that the essence of things is beyond our ken, the range of what we can know or understand. So in this sense external nature is imperceptible. External nature is incapable of being perceived
by the senses or intellect, according to this point of view. Hence the essence of things is beyond us. We are closed to the essence of things. We cannot perceive the full possibility of the perception of the
'sense' of social phenomena. But what is the 'sense' of social phenomena? And sense: is the general conscious awareness. So they proclaim the impossibility of the perception of external nature. and
they claim it is impossible to see the full possibility of the perception of the general conscious awareness of social phenomena. Sense as prevalent or usual conscious awareness. Can we possibly fully
perceive the sense of social phenomena? Or is the sense of social phenomena imperceptible. Sombart moreover maintains that the natural sciences have practical value and that the social sciences
cannot have any practical application. Now we get to hear that modern bourgeois science is beginning to walk on its head. We have the three political economies of Sombart being mentioned. But what
was the three political economies all about? And this stand against the history and system of the doctrine of the economy. We hear about on the second criterion. But what is this on the second criterion?
What is a criterion? A criterion is a basis for comparison; a reference point against which things can be evaluated. To evaluate means to estimate or determine the nature, value, quality, ability, extent, or
significance of something. A comparison is a relation based on similarities and differences. So we are on about, a foundation or support, to see the difference between one thing and another. I know one
thing to be different to another on the basis of such and such. A comparative study needs some basis from which to look at the differences. This is a basis for comparison. A basis is a relation that
provides the foundation for: seeing the difference. A basis is also the fundamental assumptions, from which something is begun, developed, calculated or explained. So the underlying reasons, the facts,
that lie at the basis of one thing and another, is being alluded to. A reference point is an indicator that orients you generally. And we did allude earlier to how the structure or position within the production
process is a reference point, from which to see ones social status. Let us return to our earlier work, when we looked at real epistemology. Our earlier point went on that practice breaks into the theory of
cognition. So in this the theory of cognition is derived, through practice. We mentioned that theory includes practice. And then that real epistemology, that is, epistemology which bases itself upon the unity
(not the identity!) of theory and practice, includes the practical criterion, which becomes the criterion of the truthfulness of cognition. And this criterion of the truthfulness of cognition is so important. So this
is from where we have come. But now we reestablish ourselves in our current reading position, on the second criterion. We hear that engineering, for example, may be set forth as a 'pure' study -that is
theoretically, without norms, without constructive rules; however, usually in its enunciation we also have a teleological and normative element. What is a 'pure' study? A 'pure' study is a study concerned
with theory and data. This concern with theory and data is rather than practice; so a 'pure' study is opposed to applied. So we are hearing setting forth engineering as a 'pure' study. As I understand it,
engineering is the discipline dealing with the art or science of applying scientific knowledge to practical problems. So in this sense engineering is the application of scientific knowledge for practical
purposes. And it enunciates itself and, in that enunciation, we have a teleological and normative element. What is teleology? Teleology is found in Philosophy. It is a doctrine explaining phenomena by
their ends or purposes. When engineering is set forth as theoretical. And in this an element comes forth which is Teleological. Teleology is the fact or the character of being directed toward an end or
shaped by a purpose, an anticipated outcome. So in other words Teleology holds that something is directed toward an end. In studying realism we have behaviour which faces facts, accepting things as
they are and not trying to change them or fight against them. So we have a conservative belief in the absolute, in this sense. For in accepting things as they are and not trying to change them speaks for
itself. So this has some degree of Fascism in that this is a subordination, of all contradictions, to an absolute. Resignation and surrender to an absolute. What is it to say that engineering in this sense-
can be set forth, without norms. What are norms? A norm is a standard, pattern, or type or customary behaviour. And without constructive rules i.e., Intending to improve or promote development; having
a use. So without constructive rules implies not intended to improve or promote development. A rule is a law concerning a natural phenomenon or the function of a complex system. So rules explain the
functioning of complex systems. So the explanation i.e., theory, of the functioning of a complex system in this sense, engineering- is not to improve, or, to promote development. Hence we are on that is
without constructive rules. And this Teleological aspect is also understood to mean the use of design, purpose, or utility as an explanation of any natural phenomenon. So natural phenomenon has an
explanation i.e., a comprehensible description of the relevant structure, operation or circumstances. This is Teleology in this sense. And the normative element? What is the normative element? Anything
normative is relating to or dealing with norms, standard, model or pattern regarded as typical.

The same has to be said, for example., of the resistance of materials, the science of staple
commodities, and so forth. This is not an accident, for here the object itself (the artificial
surroundings) is material practice.
In the next we hear of the resistance of materials, as an example. For the same has to be said
for these. We have the science of staple commodities and the resistance of materials as the
same. The same as what? Our second criterion was a taken criterion distinguishing according
to objects -the pure sciences. Studying man's natural surroundings: the applied sciences the
artificial surroundings (machines, transport technique, apparatus, raw materials, etc.) this was
in our earlier reading. Does this have anything to do with that second criterion. As that was all
of that about. We were talking about Approaching the exceptionally complicated question of the
interrelations between the theoretical ('pure') and applied sciences. But does this approaching
the exceptionally complicated question of the interrelations between the theoretical ('pure') and
applied sciences have anything to do with our current reading? We said that modern bourgeois
science is beginning to walk on its head. And we hear of how social science is rapidly declining
to scientific non-existence, changing more and more into the simple apology of the capitalist
system. We hear that it is not an accident, for in this, the object itself ('the artificial
surroundings) is material practice i.e., knowledge of how something is usually done (activity).
The object did not just happen suddenly, or by chance, without an apparent cause. For the
artificial surroundings are material practice.
(c) On the third criterion: a vividly practical task may also be protracted (for example., the
problem of aeronautics, as it stood for a number of centuries, or -at the present time- the
transmission of energy from a distance), a task which always has its purely theoretical
equivalent as well. (d) On the fourth criterion: a very concrete science may also be purely
theoretical, since knowledge has broken up into a number of rivulets, and has become
extremely specialised It would hardly come into anyone's head, for example, to classify the
Japhetic theory of language among the applied sciences, although it also, of course, is bound
up with a number of the most important practical tasks. (Here we should also note the relativity
of the conceptions of concrete and abstracti) And so, apparently, all the definitions are
defective. The most accurate definition is the division according to the characteristic of causal
and teleological series. However, here too we see obvious defects from the standpoint of
actual relationship. But all these defects of logical definition reveal the objective dialectics of
reality: contradictions arise here because there is an objective contradiction between theory
and practice, and at the same time their unity; there is their difference, as opposite poles of
human activity, and at the same time their interpretation; there is their separate existence as
functions, as branches of divided social labour, and at the same time their unitary existence, as
steps in the joint production of social life.
With regard to the next. We hear on the third criterion: a vividly practical task may also be 'protracted' (for example., the problem of aeronautics, as it stood for a number of centuries, or -at the present
time- the transmission of energy from a distance. What is it to say that a vividly practical task may also be 'protracted'. That is that it may be Drawn-out, lengthened or prolonged. We have the
prolongation of (for example: the problem of aeronautics). And we also have the transmission of energy, from a distance, as a protracted practical task. We have 'purely theoretical' equivalent to vividly
practical task. So this 'purely theoretical' equivalent is the problem of aeronautics purely in the world of ideas i.e., cognition or the theoretical. On the other hand we have the vividly practical task of the
problem of aeronautics. Or we have the transmission of energy from a distance as a vividly practical task. Though we also have the transmission of energy from a distance as a 'purely theoretical'
equivalent. So this emphasizes that we have a 'purely theoretical' equivalent and a vividly practical task, that are, somewhat, related. And we hear of the fourth criterion. A very concrete science may also
be 'purely theoretical,' since knowledge has broken up into a number of streams, and has become extremely specialised (particularized). Concrete means capable of being perceived by the senses; it is
not abstract or imaginary. So a concrete science is clearly perceptible. Despite is distinctiveness, this concrete science may be also 'purely theoretical'. We hear that a very concrete science may be
'purely theoretical' i.e., since knowledge has broken up into a number of rivulets. Knowledge is the (technical) knowledge and skill required to do something. The requirements to do something have
broken up into a number of rivulets. We have the coming together, or the breaking up, into extremely specialised areas.
Teleology is used of natural processes or of nature as a whole conceived as determined by final causes or by the design of a divine Providence and opposed to purely mechanical determinism or
causation exclusively by what is temporally antecedent. But what is determinism? Determinism is the doctrine that human actions, events, etc. are determined by causes, external to the will. But I would
like to return to our point of focus. So lets return to the third criterion and the vividly practical task. This being the vividly practical task that can be protracted i.e., extended or prolonged. And this vividly
practical task has its 'purely theoretical' equivalent. Then we come to a fourth criterion. What is the fourth criterion? We hear that a very concrete science may also be purely theoretical, since knowledge
has broken up into a number of rivulets. What is a concrete science? Anything concrete is: capable of being perceived by the senses. Something concrete is not abstract or imaginary, it is perceptible. So
we have, the abstract or imaginary, the concrete. They are opposite aspects. So a concrete science i.e., that which is perceivable, via the senses, can be abstract or imaginary. Should we say having its
'purely theoretical' equivalent. And this is on the basis that knowledge has broken up into a number of rivulets. knowledge is the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity. This condition of
knowing something, with familiarity, is gained through experience or association. And knowing is involved in showing knowledge. Showing means a display or performance that expresses a certain quality.
To break up means to separate (substances) into constituent elements, or, parts. To break up involves forcing, or taking apart, pulling apart, or marking as different. So we are on about differentiating.
Thus we are in break up looking at distinctive features, attributes, or traits that distinguish one thing from something else. This separation is equivalent to breaking up. Identifying or distinguishing
distinctive features, attributes, or traits. So in this break up we develop seperation, focussing or going into identifying a particular part or parts of a whole i.e., the parts distinctive features, attributes, or
traits. Now lets put this knowledge and rivulets into the target of our spotlight. Rivulets are branches or small streams. So knowledge branches out. And a branch is a division of some larger or more
complex organization. A complex organization is divided into these parts of the larger whole. and knowledge has been divided or branched out. These are its given tendencies. A tendency is a general
direction in which something tends to move. So we find these rivulets, branches or tendencies. And sometimes they end up working at cross purposes. And this is extremely specialised knowledge. So as
it branches out we have this extremely specialised knowledge, in the rivulets. SPECIALISED is developed or designed knowledge for a special activity or function. So it is unique or specific, in that sense,
it is special. So back we go, toward a past time, returning our thoughts to the thoughts we had, in the writing before. And our thoughts of how knowledge has broken up, into a number of rivulets. And this
is that a concrete science may also be purely theoretical. And this 'purely theoretical' derives from the break up into rivulets, tendencies, inclinations. So we have each of the rivulets, a distinct component
part. As a component part it is determined in relation to the main branch, from which it originated, or grew. It still holds some relation to the main branch of knowledge. And the rivulet have become
extremely specialised. It is a particular branch of the source i.e., the main knowledge. I think we are getting back to the idea of the genesis and expansion that takes place in time. For from practice and
the natural organs of man we derive so much more. And these ever expansive branches, are, the derivatives, the rivulets. And knowledge has broken up into a number of rivulets, that will return and
critique the original form. One could liken this to the process that develops man in extraordinary ways i.e., both socially and biologically. So extremely specialised knowledge i.e., knowledge that has
developed or designed for a special activity or function comes about. Is it a derivative or a rivulet? We move on and consider the Japhetic theory of language. This Japhetic theory of language is not of the
applied sciences. But it does stem from ancient practice that has derived something quite specialized i.e., language theory. So the applied sciences can expand, or branch out, into something quite
different i.e., extremely specialised knowledge. For this Japhetic theory of language is bound up with a number of the most important practical tasks. This Japhetic theory of language is closely or
inseparably connected or associated with important practical tasks. A task is a piece of work that is undertaken or attempted. And in this instance we say the task is: guided by practical experience and
observation, rather than theory. So the Japhetic theory of language must be guided by practical experience and observation rather than theory. A task, in this instance, is a piece of work that is
undertaken or attempted linking to the active use of language. And language is a result and useful aspect of social reproduction. It is a concrete science, it involves something that is capable of being
perceived, by the senses; it is not abstract or imaginary. So language has the requisite qualities to impact on an audience, the recipients of a message. We hereby note the relativity of the conceptions of
concrete and abstract. So we are on about the relative conceptions in concrete and abstract. And relativity holds or is a theory that space and time are relative concepts rather than absolute concepts. So
now we have relative concepts and absolute concepts. And in this relativity we imply that space and time are both relative concepts. But in the reading we have it meaning the quality of being relative and
having significance only in relation to something else. So we are talking of having significance, though, only in relation to something else. And something else is another, which is under consideration, or
implied. And anything relative in this reading we are talking of conceptions of concrete and abstract is a thing having a relation to or connection with, or necessary dependence, upon another thing. It is a
being or object posited by virtue of its relations. So concrete conceptions have a relationship or connection with or necessary dependence upon abstract conceptions. A conception is a creation of
something, in the mind. So abstract conceptions create concrete conceptions. So in this sense we have abstract conceptions and concrete conceptions being strongly interlinked i.e., mutually effective.
For abstract conceptions affect concrete conceptions and vice-versa. And this relativity of the conceptions of concrete and abstract. The concrete and abstract are relatively conceptualized i.e., thought
about in terms of their mutual relationship to or connection of one to the other. They are inextricably linked according to the concrete and the relationship with the abstract. And in this sense relativity
implies the existent relationship. So the quality of the conceptions in the abstract relates to the concrete. And the qualitive element in the concrete relates (relativity) to the abstract. So we have defective
definitions. Why, defective definitions? It is because they withdraw from looking at the relativity of the conceptions. In such these definitions are particular and do not consider the relationships. So there is
some corresponding aspect in that a relationship is concrete. I.e., the relationship is perceptible; not abstract or imaginary. We are not considering the relativity of the conceptions as unscientific. We go
on that the most accurate definition is the division according to the characteristic of causal and teleological series. Causal being an expression of a reason or a cause. A reason is an explanation of the
cause of some phenomenon. We go on that the most accurate definition is the division according to the characteristic of reasons or something that occasions or produces something else (causal) and
explaining phenomena by their ends or purposes i.e., teleological, series. What is a series? A series are similar things placed in order or happening one after another. But the most accurate definition of
what? I think we are on about conceptions of concrete and abstract. And it is under the question of accuracy that we consider the most accurate definition. The most accurate definition is the division
according to the characteristic of causal and teleological series. teleology is used in philosophy. Teleology is a doctrine explaining phenomena by their ends or purposes. A teleological question asks: To
what ends, was the work? The end being the state of affairs that a plan is intended to achieve and that (when achieved) terminates behaviour intended to achieve it. So a given state of affairs is intended.
We could see the state of affairs as the combination of circumstances, at a given time. So a combination of circumstances are the ends. And teleology explains phenomena by their required combination
of circumstances or otherwise put: state of affairs. And causal? Let us return to this. Causal is Involving or constituting a cause. Causal asks what gave rise to something? What caused such and such an
event to happen? What lay behind the occurance are all causal in nature. Causal is what made someone or something act in a particular way or do a particular thing? So we are thereby exploring the
underlying reason? So it involves justifying something existing or happening. And the most accurate definition is the division i.e., brings us back to our branches. And here we have the causal and
teleological series. This cause being a person, thing, fact, or condition that brings about an effect or that produces or calls forth a resultant action or state. So these factors bring about an effect. An effect
is a phenomenon that follows and is caused by some previous phenomenon. A phenomenon is a state or process, known through the senses, rather than by intuition or reasoning. An the plural of
phenomenon is phenomena. And the teleological series? We remind ourselves what teleology is. TELEOLOGY (DEFINED): Teleology is a doctrine explaining any state or process known through the
senses i.e., according to the state or processes ends, or purposes. A teleological question is to ask: To what ends? What is the aim or purpose behind something? Thus we are on about: state of affairs,
that a plan is intended to achieve. The end being: the state of affairs that the will and intention aim to achieve; that (when achieved) ends the behaviour intended to achieve it. So it has a lot to do with the
setting of goals. For a goal is an end result -intended to be achieved. So this goal is a mental object. It is an objective, target or purpose. Any goal has a given state of affairs that are intended. But why
are we talking about this? We cannot answer this question and therefore know that we have lost our way. And the imperative to return to the fundamental point, comes about. But what is our fundamental
point? Our fundamental point led from talking about the branches. We covered how we have a 'purely theoretical' equivalent, the concrete science may also be purely theoretical. So the concrete science
has lost its concrete basis. This concrete base is its point of departure. And from this point of departure it has become something purely theoretical. We could see the state of affairs, as a combination of
circumstances, at, a given point in time. So a combination of circumstances (a set of facts) are the ends. And teleology explains phenomena by these required combination of circumstances i.e., the
destiny or fortune, that lies at the basis of human action. It is ones portion, in the distribution of human output. The required combination of circumstances could otherwise be put as a state of affairs. And
we said that knowledge has broken up into a number of rivulets. This knowledge that has branched out becomes extremely specialised. Then we spoke of the relativity of the conceptions. Hence the
concepts have relationships i.e., the state of connectedness. Connectedness implies a relation between things or events (as in the case of one causing the other or sharing features with it). So we have
the case of concrete causing the other abstract or both of them sharing features with one another. Hence we note the relativity of the conceptions of concrete and abstract. And thereupon, we realize, that
definitions are defective i.e., not working properly. These definitions are defective in that definitions are not based, nor considering the relativity of the conceptions.
The relationships define the concepts. This reminds me of our earlier thoughts on context. Nothing can be conceived in isolation. A conception is an abstract or general idea; it is inferred or
derived from specific instances, within specified contexts. Hence the specific instances lead to, or derive a general idea. Therefore these specific instances derive a general content of cognition, the main
thing you are thinking about. The development or evolution of a general idea is a natural extention or progression. This natural extention derives from the study of the relationship between the specific
instances. Without considerng the specific instances, we will not derive a general idea. So without active study: the general idea lies in a state of latency. from a latent or potential state, subsequent
studies focussed on the relativity of specific instances deriving or progressing into a general idea. In addition, general means not specialized or limited to one class of things. Thence a general idea is not
limited, or narrowly defined, nor restricted in its scope.
So back we go, toward a past time, returning our thoughts back to latency. What exactly was latency and how does it touch on what we have written about above? LATENCY (WITH A WORLD OF
POSSIBILITIES): The inherent capacity for something to come into being, is known as latency. And in our previous paragraph the general idea is, before coming about, in a latent state. Latency is
therefore is a potentiality of the general idea coming about. It is something potentially existing but not presently evident, or realized. The specific instances need to be related and thence produce the
general idea. So we do not allude to the full definition of the word, in such a context. But here it initially it just lies as an underlying possibility. So we have an inherent capacity, as the science of
mechanics, branched forth or grew from handicrafts. And this inherent capabilitity is realized as capacity overcomes its latency and in this example, is a preliminary condition for the development of
mechanics. Latency being the state of being that is not yet evident nor active. But mechanics, nor the general instance, was not yet evident; it was in its latent state, the handicrafts or the specific
instances. In that state the general idea is only a possibility i.e., it is only something that may exist, happen or come about. So the general idea is a hidden part of the world of possibilities.
Now lets REORIENTATE OURSELVES. We have a need to revisit and build on our earlier thoughts on topics in the paragraph that is being discussed, in our reading. What comes into our discussion
after the most accurate definition is the division according to the characteristic of causal and teleological series. We know that we are discussing the relativity of the conceptions of concrete and abstract.
And we also spoke of defective definitions. That brought us to the most accurate definition is the division according to the characteristic of causal and teleological series. However, even in the causal and
teleological series; we find in the causal and teleological series obvious defects from the standpoint of actual relationship. The defects are from mental position from which causal and teleological series
are viewing the relativity of the conceptions of concrete and abstract. What is the actual relationship i.e., a connection or association, between the concrete and abstract? The actual relationship is
presently existing, it is a fact and not merely a potential or possiblity. So it is an existent relationship. These defects of logical definition reveal the objective dialectics of reality. We have defects of logical
definition and objective dialectics of reality. The objective dialectics of reality are shown, made visible or apparent through the defects of logical definition. So the goal intended to be attained, by, the
dialectics of reality is being expressed. This is based on change, through the conflict of opposing forces. In this reality we mean the state of being actual or real. So the actual or real come about through
the objective dialectics of reality. And dialectics implying change, through the conflict of opposing forces. We then go on and hear that contradictions arise here because there is an objective contradiction
between theory and practice. Where do contradictions arise? Contradictions arise in logically defining the concrete and abstract. But what is a contradiction? A contradiction is an opposition between two
conflicting forces or ideas. A contradiction is an assertion of the contrary to what has been said or affirmed. It is an idea or assertion that goes against what it claims to be. I am a cat. Yet I am not a feline,
is an example. It is a statement or proposition containing contradictory parts. So the defects of logical definition reveal the objective dialectics of reality. So contradictions arise in logically defining. And it
therefore need dialectics to extend it out of its confined, limited position. So in this we resort back to how mathematics extended astronomy, in our earlier reading.
ASTRONOMY (PROGRESSES THROUGH MATHEMATICS): We went on about studying the successive development of individual branches of natural science. In the reading we have defects
of logical definition, with contradiction holding back i.e., hampering a break through. In successive development we are on about the historical extension, growing from defects of logical definition, in the
objective dialectics of reality. We asked in our earlier reading: How did these individual branches of natural science come about? Agricultural people needed to study astronomy, which could only develop
with the assistance of mathematics. So we consider, how mathematics had it in itself, the ability to extend astronomy. So astronomy and mathematics are mutually linked in origins. And through these
defects of logical definition, dialectics is revealed. In the astronomical example: Mathematics must have developed in other spheres, i.e., having its own particular history. In consequence the impetus
given to astronomy came about through the application of mathematics, in astronomy. Mathematics revolutionizes astronomy, allows it to go beyond its limitations. Likewise we have a revolution from the
defects of logical definition, allowing it to go beyond its own limitations, via the application of the objective dialectics of reality. We recall of how contradictions arise here, because, there is an objective
contradiction between theory and practice. But there is a unity between theory and practice too. so we need to reconcile contradictory as well as unifying factors in theory and practice. Theory and
practice are different, as opposite poles of human activity. Theory and practice are characteristically opposite extremes i.e., opposite poles of human activity. But opposite poles of human activity, yet at
the same time, a unification of human activity. In human activity, theory and practice, are the unification of carrying out an action (practice). But also at the same time, their interpretation. An interpretation
is a mental representation of the meaning or significance of something. For theory represents a continuation of practice. And practice represents or signifies theory. For in practice we have theory
embodied. And in theory we have the embodiment of practice. In the practice we have the actual or discernible, in the theory. In practice we have an explanation of what is not immediately, plain or
explicit, in theory. And theory is an explanation of what is not immediately plain or explicit in practice. We hear of their separate existence as functions, what they are used for. A function is a relation such
that one thing is dependent on another. It is a relation in that: theory is interdependent, with practice. They are a unity, yet at the same time distinctly different. THEORY and practice are branches of
divided social labour. But at the same time we know of their unitary existence. For theory and practice have a unitary existence though have a separate existence as distinct functions. Theory and
practice are separate existence as functions, though branches of divided social labour. While being this theory and practice remain with a unitary existence. Theory and practice are steps in the joint
production of social life, at the same time, a unitary existent reality. They are part of the combined element that makes for the production of social life. In that they are steps in the joint production of social
life. In other words theory and practice as a movement, or proceeding forward, into a new situation, in the joint production of social life. In other words they have a unitary existence. In the above we go
on about the contradiction and unity in things i.e., their separate existence as functions. Yet at the same time having a unitary existence, being steps in the joint production of social life. A step is any
manoeuvre made as part of progress toward a goal. And this progress toward a goal which is the joint production of social life. We remind ourselves as to what production is. PRODUCTION is the act or
process of producing something. In this instance we allude to the act or process of producing social life. So we are on about a quantity or qualitative aspect in social life. We mean an identifiable and
distinct form of social life. In the extension of the manufacturing, mining or growing something we have a distinct social life that goes with it. For the social life is related to the production. And in this we
would have the branches of divided social labour.
PRODUCTION (LIES AT THE BASIS OF SOCIAL LIFE): On the other hand we have social man underlined in that human society, in order to live, must produce. So production lies at the basis
of human society. For production is the foundational basis to living i.e., social life. And therefore social man proceeds or extends, into other spheres, on the foundations of production. And this is a key
point, in this reading. The productive forces have been employed in a particular sphere, branching out, as they develop. And this development is a process in which something passes by degrees to a
different stage (especially a more advanced or mature stage). And development involves the branches of divided social labour.

Under the cover of the difficulty of the exact demarcation of the applied and theoretical
sciences beats the dialectics of the relationship between theory and practice, the passing of
one into the other: which does not fit -and cannot fit -into the framework of school-logic and
academical-pedantic definitions. In reality we have a whole chain of various theoretical
sciences, linked up by internal connections (the classification of sciences, of which each
analyses a separate form of motion or a number of interconnected forms of motion which pass
into one another, is also a classification or hierarchy of these very forms of motion according to
the order inherent in them: and just in this lies its significance.) [32]

[32] F. Engels: Dialectics of Nature, pp. 31-33.


In the next we hear about under the cover of the difficulty of the exact demarcation of the
applied and theoretical sciences. In other words Hidden from view or knowledge. So under the
cover of a difficulty. This is the difficulty of finding an exact demarcation of the applied and
theoretical sciences. Where does applied and theoretical sciences draw its lines? Where do
we draw the boundaries of applied and theoretical sciences? So behind this difficulty beats the
dialectics of the relationship between theory and practice. Beats means to be superior. So the
difficulty is unresolvable, but dialectics provides a way out. We hear of the passing of one into
the other. For theory passes on into practice. And practice passes into theory i.e., we have the
transmission of one into the other. But what is this dialectics of the relationship between theory
and practice? dialectics is based on change through the conflict of opposing forces. So we
hear about the conflict of opposing forces, which causes change. So transformation comes
through the conflict of opposing forces. So we have a conflict of opposing forces in
demarcating theory and practice. This demarcation of the applied and theoretical sciences
does not fit and cannot fit into the framework of school-logic and academical-pedantic
definitions. What is a framework? A framework is a hypothetical description of a complex entity
or process. And the complex entity here is the demarcation of the applied and theoretical
sciences. A hypothetical description within the framework of school-logic and academical-
pedantic definitions- will not satisfy us. Nor will the academical-pedantic definitions be able to
demarcate the applied and the theoretical sciences. Anything pedantic is marked by a narrow
focus on or display of learning especially its trivial aspects. A framework can also be seen as a
structure supporting or containing something. So the support of school-logic is being alluded
to. So academical-pedantic definitions and school-logic are inefficient in demarcating the limits
of applied and theoretical sciences. We hear of a whole chain of various theoretical sciences,
linked up by internal connections. Now lets put the branches, those rivulets back into our
thoughts. We have whole chains of various theoretical sciences. This is series of things
depending on each other as if linked together. These are determined by conditions or
circumstances that follow on from each other. We therefore have various theoretical sciences
linked up by internal connections. The internal connection is the Innermost or essential
connection i.e., the relation between things or events (as in the case of one causing the other
or sharing features with it). So we have a whole chain of various theoretical sciences,
connected or joined somehow. They are an an assemblage of various components, each
derived from some common aspect. This essential connection is basic and fundamental aspect
i.e., like the basis or origins lying in production. We hence look at the classification of sciences.
In the classification of sciences we mean act of distributing the sciences into classes or
categories of the same type. The writing indicates that the sciences i.e., each branch analyses
a separate form of motion or a number of interconnected forms of motion which pass into one
another. And motion is a state of change. What is this state of change? By analysis we mean
to examine in detail; ascertain the constituents of (a substance, sentence, etc. so we have
these sciences, each with a detailed examination, of a separate form of motion. change
implying to make or become different. Any change implies an alteration or modification. It can
also allude to a new experience; variety (e.g., I need a change). It indicates to undergo, show,
or subject to change; make or become different. It can also be about changing over change
from one system or situation to another. And in analyzing a separate form of motion. We have
these various theoretical sciences each with separate analysis. But the various theoretical
sciences are interconnected i.e., they are operating as a unit within the whole. they take up
positions as elementary pieces with a large complex organization. We earlier spoke of areas of
extremely specialised knowledge. And the speciality or specificity of the various theoretical
sciences comes upon us, once more. So in each of these various theoretical sciences we have
a particularization. We earlier mentioned the relativity of conceptions when discussing the
concrete and abstract. We recall how definitions are particular and do not consider the relationships. We thereupon talked of corresponding aspects in that a
relationships are concrete. Concrete though despite this, not acknowledged, and often imperceptible. Through the process of reasoning these diverse and various
theoretical sciences have come into being, branching forth. Thus we know that they are linked up by internal connections. Each of
these various theoretical sciences are separate analyses. And these various theoretical sciences pass into one another. What do
we mean by saying that they pass into one another? They Pass into a specified state or condition according to each other. The
piece goes on about the classification or hierarchy of these very forms of motion according to the order inherent in them. What
is the classification or hierarchy of the various theoretical sciences? The classification involves the basic cognitive process
of arranging into classes or categories. Categories or classes are A collection of things sharing a common attribute. And they
have a hierarchy. And in hierarchy we have hierarchy implies a system of grades of status or authority ranked one above the
other. And we recall how HANDICRAFTS (LEADS TO MECHANICS): In our previous reading we considered how dialectical materialism
created the theory of historical materialism. We thereupon wondered whether dialectical materialism needed historical materialism
as astronomy needed mathematics? Then we thought about certain stages of development i.e., a particular moment in history. We
have a particular point in time, in a process, accomodating further development, being discussed. For a certain stage of
development is required for a breakthrough to take place. It is a particular point or stage of maturity that promotes the growth.
The availability of given possibilities are consequence to a certain stage of development. We considered how handicrafts with
(hand labour with rudimentary tools) developed mechanics. So in handicrafts we now have the means to see a latent potentiality,
that in this case mechanics- came to the fore. But there is a hierarchy in each of the various theoretical sciences. This
hierarchy considers their particular analyses of a separate form of motion, though interconnected. And they can be classified or
grouped according to their inherent qualities. Any inherent quality is the nature of something though not readily apparent. So we
can derive classes and hierarchy in accordance with a study into the nature of the various theoretical sciences. For there is an
order inherent in them. So they have an inherent order, within and according to their nature. Thus they can be placed in a
certain order. ORIENTATION (EDUCATION) : Orientation is a person's awareness of himself , his position held in time, place and
personal relationships. Likewise the various theoretical sciences already confirm a position within the existent social order
i.e., a relation according to the productive organs of social man. As according to the position within the organisation of
production on a large scale of society. For schools and education teaches learners how and where they will fit into the existing
social order. We hear about orientation in the external world. Orientation is a relative position. Orientation is all about a
person's attitude or adjustment in relation to circumstances. In orientation this is implying comparison or contextual relation;
so it is having reference or relating to the position within society. And what determines this? It is the position taken up by
various theoretical sciences within the given social order, within its expanded mode of production. And it is thereby hinted at
as an orientation in the external world. Orientation can allude to an awareness of the existing situation with reference to time,
place, and identity of persons. And in the acquisition of its own principles of movement we have the historical orientation, the
position in time and space. And this ordering is inherent. In being inherent we mean that it existing as an essential constituent
or characteristic of the whole. For being an essential constituent it is an artifact that is one of the individual parts; it is
an element of which a composite entity is made up. This being especially a part that can be separated from or attached to a
system. A system being a group of independent but interrelated elements comprising a unified whole. Anything inherent is
structural or involved in the constitution or essential character of something.

[32] F. Engels: Dialectics of Nature, pp. 31-33.

See also Hegel: Phenomenology of the Spirit (Saint Petersburg; 1913, p. 112): Symptoms
must not only bear an essential relationship to cognition, but must also be essential definitions
of things, so that the artificial system must be in conformity with the system of nature itself, and
express only that system. These sciences are born out of practice, which first sets itself
technical tasks: the latter require, in their turn, the solution of theoretical problems, problems
of the first, second, etc., order, a special (relative) logic of motion being thereby created.
Practice in this way grows into theory: the sought-for rule of action is transformed into the
search for the law of objective relationship: there arise innumerable knots and interlacings of
problems with their solutions: these, in their turn, sometimes fertilise a number of hierarchically
lower branches of science, and through technology penetrate into technique-consequently, into
the direct practice of material labour, transforming the world.
In the above piece we hear from the Phenomenology of the Spirit. In it Hegel writes symptoms must not only bear an essential relationship to
cognition, but must also be essential definitions of things. But what are symptoms? SYMPTOMS are subjective evidence of disease or physical
disturbance observed by the patient. An example is that of a headache; it is a symptom of many diseases. Likewise visual disturbances may be a
symptom of retinal arteriosclerosis. A symptom is something that indicates the existence of something else. An example in this context would be
volcanoes are symptomatic of some kind of internal disorder, in the earth. Another that sedition is often the symptom and not the cause of serious unrest.
So we have an essential relationship to cognition. And we hear of the essential definitions of things. But lets recall what cognition is. Cognition is the
cognitive mental processes. What are the cognitive mental processes? Cognition is to do with knowing, perceiving, or conceiving as an act or faculty,
distinct from emotion and volition. But what are the cognitive mental processes? A process is a course of action or proceeding, esp., a series of stages in
manufacture etc. A process is understood to be a progress or course (in the process of construction). Any process is a natural or involuntary course
involving change (process of growing old). But cognition is a cognitive mental progression, or, course i.e., the process. So it is the series of stages
involved in thinking i.e., the mental. Cognition is the intellectual process by which knowledge is gained about perceptions or ideas. Hence we are
talking of an intellectual process. A process is a course of action or proceeding, esp. a series of stages in manufacture etc. Any process involves progress
or course (in process of construction). A process can also be a natural or involuntary course or change, example the process of growing old. A process is
a progressive forward movement from one point, to another, on the way to completion. The intellect is the faculty of reasoning, knowing, and thinking.
Intellect has a lot to do with understanding. So in this we have an intellectual progressive forward movement. A process involves growth and
development. In other words the action of passing through continuing development from a beginning to a contemplated end. Another way of putting it
would be the action of continuously going along through each of a succession of intellectual acts, events, or developmental stages. An intellectual is a
clever or knowledgeable person. Intellectual is of or appealing to the intellect. We are talking of how knowledge is gained about perceptions or ideas.
Perception being the act or faculty of perceiving. Perception is all about apprehending, which means to get the meaning, of something; this is esp.
through sight; observation; they could involve using the artificial instruments of cognition. So we have returned to the concept of the observer. We can
also apprehend with the mind; understand; to see or regard. We are talking of the essential relationship of symptoms to cognition. But what are the
essential relationship to cognition? It is that symptoms must bear an essential relationship to cognition. Any symptom is something that accompanies X
and is regarded as an indication of X's existence. It is something that is present or associated with an event or entity, in this case, X. So what
accompanies X and is regarded as an indication of X's existence, essentially relates to cognition. So what is associated with X and is looked upon as an
indication of X's existence, by its very nature relates to cognition i.e., the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning. So the
psychological result of perception (cognition) and the attributes of something are in an essential relationship. One depends on the other i.e., cognition,
the psychological processs resulting from perception, depends somewhat on the symptoms, the properties of some thing. And the symptoms must also
be the essential definitions of things. The definition of something is a statement expressing exactly what something means or is used to mean, in its
specified context. So cognition (the psychological result of perception) has a context (set of facts or circumstances that surround it). For the set of facts,
or circumstances, that surround the existent reality have some bearing on the cognition of existent reality. The facts being the piece of information about
circumstances that exist or events that have occurred. Cognition relates to information about circumstances that exist. A message is received and
understood emanating from some element of existent reality. And thus we derive the cognition therefore as a derivative of this. Hence the artificial
system is built on cognition, so the artificial system must be in conformity with the system of nature itself. Any system is a combination of interrelated
interacting artifacts designed to work as a coherent entity. And cognition derives within a combination of interrelated interacting artifacts designed to
work as a coherent entity. In coherence we have a logical, orderly, and consistent relation of parts. And the relationship of the parts are perceived,
thereby forming a cognitive model. A model is a hypothetical description of a complex entity or process. So we have the inner model of reality in a
relationship with the external consistent relation of parts, the existent reality. And the crux is that this inner model is to some degree or another,
inconsistently related to existent reality. We are thereby emphasizing the inadequacy of our natural sense organs. Thus we have distortion. Thus we have
returned to a distortion of reality. And cognition is always alteration or misrepresenting existent reality. We spoke previously, in our reading of the
external world is independent of the subject perceiving it. So we have the actual order of things, with its consequential cognitive side. And the cognition
is the basis to the artificial system, which is derived through theory. We use what we know of the world around us to change the world. The basis of
changing the world lies in the cognition of the world of reality. We remind ourselves that a system is a group of independent but interrelated elements,
comprising a unified whole. and here we have two interrelated elements comprising a unified whole i.e., the theory and practice. Theory and practice are
interrelated elements, comprising a unified whole. for theory (linking to cognition) is related to the world. These are reciprocally connected. Thus theory
is connected to the world. And in return, cognition relates back, to the world esp., its artificial system. We hear that these sciences are born out of
practice. So back we go, toward a past time, returning our thoughts to the whole chain of various theoretical sciences. And our thoughts of the whole
chain of various theoretical sciences, linked up by internal connections. This was what we were on about the whole chain of various theoretical sciences
are born out of practice. But what is practice? PRACTICE is the translating of an idea into action. PRACTICE is to Change from one form (cognition)
or medium into another (practice). Hence we act in accordance to our understanding of the world. We hear also of the solution of theoretical problems.
We hear how it first sets itself technical tasks. For these whole chain of various theoretical sciences first set themselves technical tasks. What are
technical tasks? Technology is characterizing or showing skill in a specialized knowledge of applied arts and sciences. So technology is the application
of specialized knowledge, of applied science. So the factual information that a person knows, is the basis, towards using it i.e., applied science. So the
applied sciences are derived through the factual information of the world. What do we mean in saying it first sets itself technical tasks? To set
something is to have it converted to solid form (as becoming concrete). Technical means of or relating to a practical subject that is organized according
to scientific principles. So the setting of technical tasks is in accordance to scientific principles. We have these firstly and secondary ordered problems.
And these firstly and secondary ordered problems derive,after first setting itself "technical" tasks. We hear of the latter requiring a solution of
"theoretical" problems. What is being alluded to in the latter? For it seems that the technical tasks require a solution of "theoretical" problems i.e., a
method for solving a problem. And solving a problem brings about theory (cognition). So we are indicating that theory comes into being through solving
a problem, in there being a state of difficulty; a condition or state of affairs requires or obliges one to find a resolution. And consequentially the
technical tasks require a method for solving a problem. Obstacles need to be overcome in the development. We come to hear of a special (relative)
logic of motion. But what exactly is this special (relative) logic of motion? Special implying Unique or specific i.e., distinguishing something particular.
It is particular, though still relative. Thereby relating to the technical tasks. Hence the close connection between theory and practice, at this point. But
acquiring its own distinguishing features i.e., its own special (relative) logic of motion. What is this logic of motion? Logic is the system of reasoning,
hence the intellectual faculty by which conclusions are drawn from premisses. A premiss is a statement that is assumed to be true and from which a
conclusion can be drawn. So we are on about the intellectual faculty of reasoning about motion i.e., the state of change. We have theory being alluded to
in the special (relative) logic of motion, created through the necessity of finding a solution to the "theoretical" problems that have come about. So we
hear that Practice in this way grows into theory: the sought-for rule of action is transformed into the search for the law of objective relationship. The key
being the sought-for rule of action. A rule being the principle or condition that customarily governs behaviour. This sought-for rule of action develops
into the search for the law of objective relationship. Man realizes that natural laws determine a particular rule of action. Thus man tries to locate or
discover, or try to establish the existence of a sought-for rule of action. And thereupon we have a basic generalization in the sought-for rule of action;
this basic generalization comes to be accepted as true and that can be used as a basis for reasoning or conduct. Thereupon we find that there arise
innumerable knots and interlacings of problems with their solutions. So there comes about a linki ng or locking closely
together or interlacings of problems with their solutions. How did these interlacings of problems with their solutions come about? They come about
through a sought-for rule of action. We thereupon have further developments in the fertilisation of a number of hierarchically lower branches of science.
This is to stimulate, supply, or enrich the development of these hierarchically lower branches of science. For it is successive levels or layers. In that we
have a branching out of these hierarchically lower branches of science. This word fertilize interests me hugely. For in fertilize, in this metaphor we
allude to development. We have a stimulation of the hierarchically lower branches of science. A Stimulus being the effect of stimuli i.e., acts to arouse
action. The hierarchically lower branches of science are given give something useful or necessary to be able to develop further i.e., to extend themselves.
These hierarchically lower branches of science are given what is useful or necessary to extend themselves. We have it that there is stimulation,
supplying, or enrichment and the development there from. In enrichment we have making fuller or more meaningful (rich in significance or implication)
or rewards. And we furthermore hear of technology penetrating into technique. But what is it to say that technology is penetrating into technique?
Likewise we also go on hearing about the direct practice of material labour, transforming the world. But lets first think of what is meant by technology
penetrating into technique. technology is the discipline dealing with the art or science of applying scientific knowledge to practical problems. So
technology is about application of scientific knowledge to practical problems. We have already defined knowledge. knowledge is the psychological
result of perception and learning and reasoning. So through the application of scientific knowledge to practical problems, we derive or penetrate into
technique. So the penetration into technique comes through technology. And all of this underlines the point of direct practice of material labour,
transforming the world.

Here law becomes transformed into a rule of action, the percipient decision is verified by that
action, orientation in the surroundings becomes the alteration of those surroundings, the
intellect is immersed in the will, theory once again reverts to the form of practice. But this
metamorphosis has as its final result by no means a simple repetition of the previous cycle of
practice, since practice becomes practice on a more powerful and qualitatively altered basis.
We hear the transformation of law into a rule of action. transformation is the act of changing in
form. So by law i.e., we mean the rule or body of rules of conduct inherent in human nature
and essential to or binding upon human society. So this rule or body of rules changes to
become a rule of action. A rule being a principle or condition that customarily governs
behaviour. Action being something done (usually as opposed to something said). So it is the
transformation from the rule or body of rules to doing i.e., human action, human activity. In this
sense law may mean a generalization that describes recurring facts or events, in nature.
Hence noticing general and recurring facts or events, in nature. That is in law just describing
natures facts (things that are known to exist or to be true). These natural facts or events are
general and recurring. An example would be the changing seasons, the constellations in
astronomy and others. And the transformation is in that it gets to be about the rule of action.
Hence because the law of nature is such and such, hence our action i.e., the rule of action
should be something. In this the relationship between the natural law is complimented by
mans rule of action. But the initial course of this process is first law, then rule of action. We
highlight, once again, our point: Hegel wrote, Symptoms must not only bear an essential
relationship to cognition, but must also be essential definitions of things, so that the artificial
system must be in conformity with the system of nature itself, and express only that system.
We read that sciences are born out of practice. But practice that first sets itself technical
tasks. We then heard that Practice, in this way, grows into theory: the sought-for rule of action
is transformed into the search for the law of objective relationship. But in the later, to which we
return, we find that law becomes transformed into a rule of action. So what was one thing, the
law, becomes another thing, the rule of action. And we move on to hear that the percipient
decision is verified by that action, orientation in the surroundings becomes the alteration of
those surroundings. What is the percipient decision? Percipient means characterized by ease
and quickness in perceiving. The ease and quickness of a decision is by action, orientation in
the surroundings becoming the alteration of those surroundings. So action and orientation in
the surroundings becomes the alteration of those surroundings. To verify means to establish
the truth, correctness, or validity of something, by examination. So to establish the truth,
correctness, or validity of a percipient decision is based on the action, orientation in the
surroundings. It becomes the alteration of those surroundings. And this action and orientation
in the surroundings becomes the basis of modification of the surroundings. To alter means to
make or become different i.e., to change. The positioning of one i.e., orientation in the
surroundings, becomes, the alteration of those surroundings. So fitting in, the position defines
the basis for transformation. We transform the world around us, on the basis of fitting in or
positioning ourselves, or orientating. Percipience is capable of or characterized by perception.
So a perceived (percipient) decision is verified. A percipient decision is affirmed by the
truthfulness by the rule of action. And to verify is to serve as conclusive evidence, argument,
proof, or demonstration of something. So the decision is based or served on the conclusive
evidence, argument, proof, or demonstration of the action. So the law becomes the rule of
action. And the rule of action serves as conclusive evidence, argument, proof, or
demonstration of the decision. The decision is based on the rule of action. A decision is the act
or process of deciding. A decision is a resolution made after consideration. So the resolution is
based on practice i.e., the rule of action (that which has proven to work). To transform means
to make a thorough or dramatic change in the form, appearance or character. Orientation can
mean the relative positions of atoms or groups in a chemical compound especially about a
nucleus. In orientation we mean the relative position within the surroundings. And position is
the relative position or standing of things or especially persons in a society i.e., the appropriate
or customary location. For we are located within the order of things. So we are saying that the
relative position or standing of things becomes the alteration of those surroundings. So we
have a transformational aspect derived by the relative position or standing of things. One and
another are related in the alteration of those surroundings. For it is in Production that we
transform the world. We produce our needs. We alter our surroundings as we fulfil our
material needs. And in the fulfilment of our material needs, we need to orientate ourselves. We
continue that intellect is immersed in the will, theory once again reverts to the form of practice.
Intellect is Knowledge and intellectual ability. The intellect is enclosed or enveloped completely
in the will. Will is the capability of conscious choice, decision and intention. We have the
conscious choice, decision and intention (will) swallowing the intellect. So Knowledge and
intellectual ability is devoted completely in the will i.e., the conscious choice, decision and
intention. The will being the wish or desire, expressing probability or expectation. So intellect is
subsumed by the urge to get or have what is wanted. So the Knowledge and intellectual ability
(the intellect) becomes devoted or subservient, to conscious choice, decision and intention (the
will). And in this theory, once again, reverts to the form of practice. Reverts means going back
to a previous state. Theory is a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural
world; an organized system of accepted knowledge that applies in a variety of circumstances
to explain a specific set of phenomena. Thence the aim is not to explain the world, but, to
change it. We said that law becomes transformed into a rule of action. And orientation in the
surroundings becomes the changing of the surroundings. Thence intellect is immersed in the
will, theory once again reverts to the form of practice. The reversion to a form of practice,
meaning that the theory serves practice i.e., translating an idea into action. In form of practice
we mean perceptable aspect of practice. You just see the theory in serving practice. Reversion
can mean return toward some ancestral type. For in such an apect i.e., when theory once
again reverts to the form of practice, we do in this find a return to the starting point. For it is
springing from practice, that we derive theory. And it is that we return to it that theory reverts
back to practice. Now we hear but the metamorphosis has as its final result by no means a
simple repetition of the previous cycle of practice, since practice becomes practice on a more
powerful and qualitatively altered basis. So this change is not to return to the previous cycle of
practice. For we cannot return to the past cycle of practice. We cannot, because, currently
practice is on a more powerful and qualitatively altered basis. What exactly is practice?
Practice can be a customary way of operation or behavior. But in our case we understand
practice to be the translating an idea into action. But here we have translating an idea into
action on a more powerful and qualitatively altered basis. The alteration of action brings forth a
different result. The same action brings the same result. Powerful in that practice has greater
power, force, potency or effect. And qualitative practice is relating to or involving comparisons
based on qualities.

The problem of the "pure" and "applied" sciences, reflecting and expressing the problem of
theory and practice, is not however a purely logical problem. It is itself a problem of history, and
a problem of transforming historical practice. The acuteness of the problem in the innermost
recesses of the capitalist order, and even the seeing of the problem itself, is the theoretical
expression of the real separation, fixed in terms of profession and class, and rupture between
theory and practice -a rupture, naturally, relative and not absolute. This rupture, consequently,
is a historical phenomenon: it is bound up with a definite historico-economic formation, with a
definite historically transitory "mode of production," with the bifurcation of labour into
intellectual and physical labour, with the polarisation of classes.
In the above we hear of the problem of the 'pure' and 'applied' sciences, reflecting and
expressing the problem of theory and practice, is not however a purely logical problem. So the
problem of the 'pure' and 'applied' sciences and the problem of theory and practice are
reflections of each other. What is a pure science? Pure is Concerned with theory and data
rather than practice; opposed to applied. Applied is concerned with concrete problems or data
rather than with fundamental principles. Concrete means existing in a material form i.e., real.
Anything concrete is denoting a material object, as opposed to a quality or state, etc.
Otherwise put: Capable of being perceived by the senses; not abstract or imaginary. So
anything concrete is perceptible, in this sense. So in this sense, concrete is objective, real,
tangible. We have a purely logical problem. For this problem of the pure and applied sciences
being reflected and expressing the problem of theory and practice is not a purely logical
problem. Logical means capable of thinking and expressing yourself in a clear and consistent
manner. So it is about clear and consistent expression. Is the reflection and expression just
about clarity and consistancy in terms of expression i.e., a purely logical problem? We hear
about the problem of history, and a problem of transforming historical practice. So the problem
of the "pure" and "applied" sciences, reflecting and expressing the problem of theory and
practice is a problem of history, and a problem of transforming historical practice too. Why
would the problem of the "pure" and "applied" sciences, reflecting and expressing the problem
of theory and practice, be a problem, of history? And why would it be a problem of transforming
historical practice? For we are talking here of change, or altering in form, appearance, or
nature. we talk of change or altering the appearance, or nature of practice i.e., historical
practice. In this we are talking of what is belonging to the past; of what is important or famous
in the past. We hear thence of the acuteness of the problem in the innermost recesses of the
capitalist order. Acute being highly developed. In the innermost recesses of the capitalist order,
we find this acute (highly developed) problem. We continue on about seeing the problem itself,
is the theoretical expression of the real separation, fixed in terms of profession and class, and
rupture between theory and practice. We allude in the latter part of this sentence the
separation of theory and practice. We have the fixety in terms of profession and class.
Profession being an occupation requiring special education. So a profession involves special
education. And class? Class alludes to people having the same social, economic, or
educational status. Fixed in terms of profession and class i.e., that class and profession are
incapable of being changed. We have this rupture between theory and practice, which is
relative and not absolute. Absolute can mean expressing finality with no implication of possible
change. It can also be understood to mean not capable of being violated or infringed. The
writing contends that the rupture between theory and practice is a historical phenomenon. Any
phenomena is a state or process known through the senses rather than by intuition or
reasoning. Intuition is immediate insight or understanding, without conscious reasoning. And
so much speculation, esp., in the Pickwickian sense falls into the immediate insight or
understanding (intuitive). Lets return to our thoughts on the relativity and not absoluteness of
the rupture between theory and practice. Hence the rupture between theory and practice is
estimated by comparison; not absolute or complete. It is estimated by looking at the
relationships between theory and practice; this relationship is based on similarities and
differences between theory and practice. This rupture is a historical phenomenon bound up
(inseparably connected or associated) with a definite historico-economic formation. In this
sense bound can also mean starting or having started (e.g., bound for stardom). So in this
sense we mean a fundamental point (a historico-economic formation) that is definite (clearly
defined) but not absolute. We are using formation indicating that it is process that is caused by
something to form. It is part of an underlying developing process i.e., a sustained phenomenon
or one marked by gradual changes through a series of states. And we hear that this historico-
economic formation is a definite historically transitory mode of production. We go on more
about the bifurcation of labour into intellectual and physical labour, with the polarisation of
classes. What is bifurcation? Bifurcation is the act of splitting into two branches. And this
bifurcation alludes to the splitting into intellectual and physical labour. And this bifurcation of
intellectual and physical labour comes about with the polarisation of the classes. So we have
bifurcation, polarisation of the classes and intellectual and physical labour. And this degree of
bifurcation goes with a definite historico-economic formation. And the rupture between theory
and practice is relative and not absolute. It goes according to its historical phenomenon i.e.,
being bound up. Polerization is to cause to concentrate about two conflicting or contrasting
positions. Hence the conflicting or contrasting positions go with the given or definite historico-
economic formations. Each definite historico-economic formation has a level of class conflict
and concentration of those polar positions. At particular points in time this reaches a critical
point. We mean by concentration the strengthening of these class positions i.e., the
polarisation of classes. Now lets put some thought into expanding our ideas on this paragraph.
By synthesizing the various key ideas; seeing how each of the seperate ideas completes and
gives a comprehensive overview of the fundamental thought. Critical reading involves knowing
what is being said i.e., seeing how the key concepts contribute to understanding the whole.
The paragraph starts with the problem of the 'pure' and 'applied' sciences. What was pure
science? Pure means concerned with theory and data rather than practice; opposed to
applied. Pure is taken in its essential character and apart from relations and applications. So it
does not concern itself with the application of science i.e., applied sciences. Pure sciences are
concerned basically with theory rather than practice or application. Theory is the supposition or
system of ideas explaining something, esp. one based on general principles independent of
the particular things to be explained. So in this sense the particular science is a system of
ideas explaining some area of nature. Bukharin seems to draw attention to the relationship
between pure science and thoughts on the system of nature. Whereas the applied sciences is
studying the artificial system. This is particularly in that he is offering up a historico-materialist
angle. For he then goes on to explain that the pure and applied sciences reflects and
expresses the problem of theory and practice. So the problem of the 'pure' and 'applied'
sciences give evidence of the quality of the problem of theory and practice. And the problem of
theory and practice lies in the innermost recesses of the capitalist order. Likewise the problem
of the 'pure' and 'applied' sciences also lies within the innermost recesses of the capitalist
order. For the capitalist order is relative and not absolute. The capitalist order is a definite
historico-economic formation. So a definite historico-economic formation has its relative
degree of the problem of pure and applied sciences i.e., the rupture between the two. We
could have used the term alienation. For in this sense the pure and applied sciences have
because alienated from each other accordingly as to a definite historico-economic formation. In
the Feudal period there was a different problem of the 'pure' and 'applied' sciences. And even
therein we had a definite historico-economic formation. And different points in the Capitalist
continuum can be identified as definite historico-economic formations. And the Feudal period
was a a definite historically transitory mode of production which progressed and preceded the
capitalist order. And the acuteness of the problem in the innermost recesses of the capitalist
order. This acuteness of the problem lying deeply within the self, the recesses of the capitalist
arrangement of separate elements. For the capitalist order is an arrangement of separate
elements, working as a networked i.e., interconnected whole. We hear about seeing of the
problem itself, is the theoretical expression of the real separation, fixed in terms of profession
and class, and rupture between theory and practice. But what is this theoretical expression of
the real separation? We give theoretical expression to a real separation. So we have a real
separation and a theoretical expression. The theoretical expression being the well-
substantiated explanation of the problem of the 'pure' and 'applied' sciences. Likewise our
theoretical expression goes into the problem of theory and practice. Both are theoretical
expressions. But these theoretical expression underlie a real separation. For there is a real
separation between theory and practice as there is a separation between pure and applied
sciences. And we put this down as a problem of history. And thereby we can see this problem
of history which brings us to the problem of transforming historical practice. But why cant we
transform historical practice? It is because the acuteness of the problem lies in the innermost
recesses of the capitalist order. It is fundamental to the essence of the structure or design of
the capitalist order. Its underlying fundamental structure, basis is its innermost recess. Now we
hear of seeing the problem i.e., perception of a state of difficulty (the innermost recess) needs
to be resolved. But this is just a theoretical expression that considers a real separation. As a
theoretical expression it is theory underlying the signs or symptoms; a way of showing
something that is existent. And what underlies this theoretical expression of the real
separation? It is underlaid by a fixety of profession and class. And with this a rupture
(alienation) between theory and practice. What we are getting and underlining here is that this
rupture is a historical phenomenon. The rupture, the problem is a consequence of historical.
And this put the rupture, problem as relative and not absolute. Its non-relative and non-
absoluteness is in that the rupture and problem is an expression of a definite historically
transitory mode of production. And it comes about with the bifurcation of labour into intellectual
and physical labour, with the polarisation of classes.
It may therefore be said with every justification that socio-economic formations ("modes of
production," "economic structures") differ from one another also in the particular character of
the relationship between theory and practice. And in fact, in the theocratic state of Ancient
Egypt there were elements of a natural centralised planned economy; knowledge (theory) was
most closely connected with practice, since it was expediently directed towards practice. But
this connection was of a special type. Knowledge was inaccessible to the mass of workers:
their practice for them was blind, and knowledge was surrounded with an aureole of dread
mystery.
In the following we come upon a key point. This is that the socio-economic formations ('modes of production,' 'economic structures') differ from one
another also in the particular character of the relationship between theory and practice. We can say with justification that socio-economic formations.
What are the socio-economic formations? The socio-economic formations are the modes of production and economic structures. These socio-economic
formations are different as also in the relationship between theory and practice. For this relationship between theory and practice is of a particular
character. We recall our earlier point and draw an analogy between the relationship between theory and practice and a definite historically tranitory mode
of production. Being a historical phenomenon was emphasized. So it would have a particular character in its relationship between theory and practice!
We then hear of the theocratic state of Ancient Egypt there were elements of a natural centralised planned economy. And in Ancient Egypt knowledge
(theory) was most closely connected with practice, since it was expediently directed towards practice. So there we have a close connection between
theory and practice in this theocratic state. We have a drawn toward a centre or brought under the control of a central authority. This theory was
appropriate to a purpose; practical aspects. Though in this theocratic state it was of a special type. The closeness of theory and practice, was a special
type. It this theocratic state knowledge was unobtainable to the mass of workers. For the mass of workers practice was blind, and knowledge was
surrounded with an aureole of dread mystery. An aureole is a an indication of radiant light drawn around the head of a saint. So it was a mystery. And
this mystery i.e., knowledge was something mystical and to be afraid or scared of. And this blind practice of ancient Egypt, this theocratic state, was in
that they, mass of workers, were unable to perceive or understand practice. They just did their work according to a given technique.

In this sense there was a vast rupture between theory and practice. If we take for comparison
the epoch of industrial capitalism, the epoch of the flourishing of "economic man," of boundless
individualism, of "laissez faire," we see a different picture. On a social scale no one puts
forward in an organised fashion either problems of cognition or problems of application of
acquired knowledge. The division of labour creates a group of scientists and ideologues,
bound up with the ruling class, which in its turn is broken to pieces by competition.
We go on and take for comparison the epoch of industrial capitalism, the epoch of the
flourishing of 'economic man,' of boundless individualism, of 'laissez faire'. This being the
epoch of industrial capitalism. This being the epoch of the flourishing of 'economic man'.
Economic being relating to an economy, the system of production and management of material
wealth. An epoch of boundless individualism i.e., unlimited belief in the importance of the
individual and the virtue of self-reliance and personal independence. And individualism can
mean the doctrine that government should not interfere in commercial affairs. And this laissez
faire means the doctrine that government should not interfere in commercial affairs. With this
comparison we have a different picture. In this epoch of industrial capitalism we have a group
of scientists and ideologues, bound up with the ruling class. These are closely or inseparably
connected or associated, and hence devoted, to the ruling class. And this ruling class is broken
to pieces by competition. Competition is a business relation in which two parties compete to
gain customers. An ideologue is an advocate of some ideology, which is Imaginary or visionary
theorization. Hence we draw to the fact that this links up with theory. The scientist being a
person with advanced knowledge of one or more sciences. This is all dealing with the ability to
produce solutions in some problem domain. On a social scale no one puts forward in an
organised fashion either problems of cognition or problems of application of acquired
knowledge. And this is to do with the epoch of industrial capitalism. For in the epoch of
industrial capitalism on a social scale no one puts forward in an organised fashion either
problems of cognition, or, problems of application of acquired knowledge. So the problems of
the application of acquired knowledge and problems of cognition are not put forward, on a
social scale. The division of labour creates a group. This is a particular group, bound up with
the ruling class. So the scientists and ideologues are class bound. They are embedded with
the ruling class. They i.e., the scientists and ideologues are integral part of a surrounding
whole, i.e., the ruling class. So scientists and ideologues speak with the particular interests of
their class. But in turn the ruling class is broken to pieces by competition.

The connection between theory and practice is to a considerable extent built up "privately." But
the bifurcation of intellectual and physical labour does not disappear: it receives a different
expression -a certain degree of "democratisation of knowledge," necessary from the standpoint
of technique: the formation of a large stratum of technical and other intelligentsia: the
specialisation of science: the creation of high theoretical generalisations, completely remote
from the consciousness of the mass of practical workers (wage-workers). This is another type
of connection.[33]
We hear of the connection between theory and practice is to a considerable extent built up
'privately'. So the private interest determines connection between theory and practice. For the
economic factor and competition determines the connection between theory and practice. For
to determine the strength in capitalist order determines this private connection. In competition
the area of theory and practice becomes a determinant in who will survive in the epoch of
industrial capitalism. But is this so today? We ask whether the bifurcation of intellectual and
physical labour remains? It is maintained that this bifurcation of intellectual and physical labour
does not disappear. This bifurcation of labour receives a different expression i.e., this
bifurcation of labour is communicated differently. This bifurcation of labour is a certain degree
of 'democratisation of knowledge,' necessary from the standpoint of technique. Democracy
being the advocacy or based upon the principles of democracy or social equality. So it that all
can use the knowledge. Though the conditions, in objective reality, determine a definite
problem. For from the standpoint of technique, we have the democratisation of knowledge.
This democratisation of knowledge is a necessity from the standpoint of technique. A technique
means a practical method or art applied to some particular task. Technique can also mean
skillfulness in the command of fundamentals deriving from practice and familiarity. Our reading
takes us to the formation of a large stratum of technical and other intelligentsia. We have a
formation of a large stratum of technical and other intelligentsia. This stratum is a people
having the same social, economic, or educational status. So this stratum is the technical
intelligentsia and others. Does this formation of a large stratum of technical and other
intelligentsia indicate a certain degree of 'democratisation of knowledge,' necessary from the
standpoint of technique? And technique is technique being the mechanical skill in art.
Technique can mean the skilful manipulation of a situation, people, etc. and this formation is
the act of forming or establishing something. We have the establishment of the technical
intelligentsia. Though this establishment of the technical intelligentsia is on the basis of the
necessity from the standpoint of technique. And a standpoint is a mental position from which
things are viewed. So it is pragmatic in that it is a necessity from the standpoint of technique.
The determinent needs dictate the formation of this technical intelligentsia i.e., who are the
educated and intellectual elite. We hear of the specialisation of science. In the formation of a
large stratum of technical and other intelligentsia we have the specialisation of science. This
specialisation of science is special line of work you have adopted as your career i.e., with a
particular function. Any specialization of science would be confined to a particular field of study,
activity, or interest. Such a specialisation of science would have a restricted concern to one
branch or aspect of a wider field (as of knowledge). We hear of the creation of high theoretical
generalisations, completely remote from the consciousness of the mass of practical workers
(wage-workers). What are high theoretical generalisations? High theoretical generalisations
are highly theoretical. Generalisations is reasoning from detailed facts to general principles.
Otherwise put: the process of formulating general concepts by abstracting common properties
of instances. So through the abstracting common properties of instances we derive a
generalisation. And here we are on about an intelligentsia that is abstracting common
properties of instances to form generalisations. So a little of this, a little of that and so we have
a generalisation. But these are high theoretical generalisations alienated from the
consciousness of the mass of practical workers (wage-workers). What is consciousness?
CONSCIOUSNESS is conscious is about being awake and aware of one's surroundings and
identity. Consciousness is the awareness of; concerned with. the word is from Latin scio. Scio
means to know. So these high theoretical generalisations are beyond the awareness of mass
of practical workers (wage-workers). These high theoretical generalisations are distant,
remote and irrelevant to the consciousness of the mass of these practical workers (wage-
workers). CONSCIOUSNESS is the totality in psychology of sensations, perceptions, ideas,
attitudes, and feelings of which an individual or a group is aware at any given time or within a
particular time span. So these high theoretical generalisations are sensory distant,
impreceptible because of the position. These high theoretical generalisations are disconnected
from their lives.

[33] A number of other examples might be quoted. Moore, in his "History of Chemistry," already
quoted, writes of the Greek philosophers: "They lacked direct acquaintance with chemical
transmutations. Owing to their social position they were deprived of direct contact with those
who might have communicated practical information to them, while the general spirit of the age
forced them to despise experiment, equally with physical work. Only pure thought was
considered worthy of a philosopher" (p. 2).
We hear now of the Greek philosophers. And this talk of the Greek philosophers who lacked direct acquaintance with chemical transmutations. So they
lacked direct Personal knowledge or information about chemical transmutations (changes of one chemical element into another). And we hear that
owing to their social position they were deprived of direct contact with those who might have communicated practical information to them. They were
alienated from those who might have communicated practical information to them. So what did being deprived of direct contact do for them? In addition
the general spirit of the age forced them to despise experiment, equally with physical work. So the general spirit of the age dictated despising experiment
and physical work. So this despising experiment and physical work was the general spirit of the age. Hence through this general spirit of the age they
lacked direct acquaintance with chemical transmutations. They felt that only pure thought was considered worthy of a philosopher. So among the Greek
philosophers Only pure thought was considered worthy of a philosopher. We remind ourselves what pure thought is. Pure is concerned with theory and
data rather than practice; opposed to applied. So pure is solely theoretical, data focussed and opposed to applied.

"The slow progress of science in antiquity is explained by the dissociation of theory from
practice. There existed no contact between those who worked and those who thought" (pp. 9,
10).

Compare also Hermann Diels: "Science and technology among the Hellenes" in "Ancient
Technology." (Trubner, Leipzig & Berlin, 1920) pp. 21 and those that follow. Compare with this
observation Marx on Aristotle in "Capital," volume. 1.
Now we hear of the slow progress of science in antiquity is explained by the dissociation of
theory from practice. There was an act of removing from association practice from theory. In
the Egyptian case we have a removal of theory from practice. There is a gradual improvement,
growth or development in antiquity. But why this slow progress of science in antiquity? It being
the isolation, abstraction, or extraction from the total perceptual field of some element which is
to be separately observed or analyzed. So the perceptual field of theory is beyond the practical
worker. He or she is deprived of direct contact. And in the Greek i.e., the ancient we have the
general spirit of the age and despising experiment and physical work. In the Greek
philosophers they lacked direct acquaintance with chemical transmutations. And with them
Only pure thought was considered worthy of a philosopher. To isolate is to place apart or
alone. To isolate means to disconnect. In Latin insulatus means made into an island. Hence we
return to our thoughts on our epistemological Robinson Crusoes, atomism etc. The above
points of thought are alluding to this. And an abstraction? And reductionism? An abstraction is
a general concept formed by extracting common features from specific examples. So from
specific example we extract common features (prominent attributes) . A dissociation is a state
in which theory becomes separated from practice and functions independently. We have
thereby the independent functioning of one or the other i.e., theory and practice. And the
theocratic state of Egypt, with blind practice, underlies this point of discussion. For there must
exist a contact between those who work and those who think. And work is a product produced
or accomplished, through the effort or activity, or agency of a person or thing. So the agent of
theory and the agent of practice can be independent of each other. And this would be if there
existed no contact between those who worked (practice) and those who think (theory).

Its inevitable consequence is the abstract and impersonal fetishism of science (science for
science's sake), the disappearance of the social self-consciousness of science, etc. Modern
capitalism reproduces this anarchy on the new and more powerful basis of trustified industrial
complexes and the corresponding scientific organizations. But it cannot either discover a
scientific synthesis, or attain the self-knowledge of science, or achieve its organization, or its
fusion with practice. These problems, which are poignantly felt, lead already beyond the
boundaries of capitalism.
And we hear of an inevitable consequence. This inevitable consequence is the abstract and
impersonal fetishism of science (science for science's sake), the disappearance of the social
self- consciousness of science. But what is this abstract and impersonal fetishism of science
(science for science's sake)? A fetish is a belief in the magical power of fetishes. We ask what
is the disappearance of the social self-consciousness of science? Having social knowledge of
science. The social self-consciousness of science has disappeared. It has become an abstract
and impersonal fetishism. So from the social self-consciousness of science has because an
abstract and impersonal fetishism. Hence anything imperonal is relating to or responsive to
individual and avoiding its social aspect. So it is individual rather than social. And this
individuality rather than social underlies the abstract and impersonal fetishism of science. We
go on that modern capitalism reproduces this anarchy on the new and more powerful basis of
trustified industrial complexes and the corresponding scientific organizations. So we have
reproduction of this anarchy on the new and more powerful basis. We copy this anarchy on a
new and more powerful basis i.e., a relation that provides the foundation for something. So the
underlying aspect of capitalism is emphasized. It ability to generate, expand is based on its
foundations i.e., the underlying aspect of the underlying mechanism that allow its development.
Any basis is the foundation or support. Any basis is the main principle or ingredient. It is the
starting-point for a discussion etc. In Greek it relates to base. We hear about trustified
industrial complexes. A trust is a consortium of independent organizations formed to limit
competition by controlling the production and distribution of a product or service. We have a
complex as a conceptual whole, made up of complicated and related parts. And with these
trustified industrial complexes we find the corresponding scientific organizations. So the
trustified industrial complexes conforms in every respect scientific organizations go. We hear
that it cannot either discover a scientific synthesis, or attain the self-knowledge of science, or
achieve its organization, or its fusion with practice. What is this discovery of a scientific
synthesis? A synthesis is a combination of ideas, constructing a complex whole. And to attain
the self-knowledge of science. An understanding of science and its goals and its abilities is
self-knowledge. And these problems are or leads beyond the boundaries of capitalism.

3.Theory and Practice of the U.S.S.R. and the Empirical Test of Historical Materialism.
It follows from all the foregoing that the question of theory and practice is simultaneously both
a theoretical and a practical question: that both theory and practice, and likewise the forms of
combination of theory and practice, are bound up with a definite historical order of society, its
development, its "motion." Therefore it is beyond all doubt that a particularly stormy course of
social life (a revolution) and a new social order (Socialism im Werden) are of exceptional
interest from the standpoint of the problem we are considering.
We come to the empirical test of Historical Materialism. Empiricism is derived from experiment and observation rather than theory. So lets observe and
see how historical materialism performs. Thus from all the foregoing that the question of theory and practice is simultaneously both a theoretical and a
practical question. The foregoing being the writing or speech; going before. The question of theory and practice is at the same time a theoretical and a
practical question. The forms of combinations of theory and practice are bound up with a definite historical order of society, its development, its motion.
The definite historical order of society needs to be considered; it is bound up with the combination of theory and practice. So theory and practice is
assembled of separate forms of theory and practice; each part or quality linking to the definite historical order of society. Definite in that this historical
order of society is precise, explicit and clearly defined. The historical order of society is clearly characterized or delimited according to its history.
Bound up I might say- with the definite historical order of society. More so, the definite historical order of society in its development and its motion.
Now lets reconsider how we used motion in our our study, backing it back into focus. This mention of motion was all dealing with the demarcation of
the applied and theoretical sciences. Within that beats the dialectics of the relationship between theory and practice. We therein discussed the
classification of sciences. And we spoke of how each analyses a separate form of motion or a number of interconnected forms of motion which pass into
one another. The reading goes on about a particularly stormy course of social life (a revolution) and a new social order.

All knowledge is tested in practice, by experience. The same has to be said of the
systematised knowledge, of theory, theoretical tendency, "doctrine." It is relevant here to
record, first of all, that Marxism, weighed in the balance of history, has been verified therein in
the most varied directions.
We hear that all knowledge is tested in practice, by experience. By practice we mean practical
applications. It is guided by practical experience and observation rather than theory. The
knowledge is proven by its use in its practical application. Hence we have the practical
application of knowledge. KNOWLEDGE being the The psychological result of perception,
learning, and reasoning. And this is knowledge that is tested in practice, by experience. But
what is experience? Experience is the accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from
direct participation in events or activities. So the knowledge is tested in its practical application,
by its accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from direct participation. This
accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from direct participation takes place over bound
up with the definite historical order of society. And this definite historical order of society is
bound up with the development, unfolding of the process. Through this development we have
the accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from direct participation. Hence the
accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from direct participation leads to and is a
historical phenomenon . the same would apply to the systematised knowledge, of theory,
theoretical tendency and doctrine. To sytematise means to arrange according to a system or
reduce to a system. So it is an arrange according to a system or reduce to a system. This
arranging or reducing is put into a proper or systematic order. So even systematised
knowledge, of theory, theoretical tendency and doctrine is tested in practice, by experience.
We move on to state that Marxism, weighed in the balance of history, has been verified therein
in the most varied directions. It has been verified therein i.e., within history. It is proved to be
true within this context. We earlier spoke of how It is required that the physical conditions of
existence are suitable for any further development. And further development is bound up and
latent within the definite historico-economic formation; this is seen as a definite historically
transitory mode of production.

Marxism foretold the war; Marxism foretold the period of revolutions and the whole character of
the epoch we are going through; Marxism foretold the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
rise of a Socialist order; even earlier had been brilliantly justified the theory of the
concentration and centralisation of capital, etc. The Revolution has proved the great destroyer
of fetishes, laying bare the fundamental links and interdependences of society in their real
significance.
We go on with how Marxism is weighed in the balance of history. We hear that Marxism
foretold the period of revolutions and the whole character of the epoch we are going through.
This character is characteristic property that defines the apparent individual nature of
something. Marxism brilliantly justified the theory of the concentration and centralisation of
capital. The Strengthening the concentration and the consolidating power under a central
control of capital, was justified, by Marxism.

The State appeared to bourgeois science now as a distinct organism (even up to the point of
determining its sex), now as a fantasy, now as an expression of the "Absolute Spirit," now as
the universal organisation of the popular will, etc.

The Revolution has destroyed one State and built up another: it has practically invaded this
sphere of reality, and has ascertained the component parts of the State, and its functions, and
its personnel, and its "material appendages," and its class significance, and its significance
from the standpoint of economics. The Revolution has completely confirmed the theoretical
teaching of Marx on the State. The same has happened to the norms of law, with "law" itself:
juridical fetishism has burst into atoms. Morality, which found its "theoretical justification" in the
categorical imperative of Kant, and which reached its highest stage of deification, disclosed
itself to be a system of relative historical norms, with a quite earthly, quite social, and suite
historical origin.
We now have it that we have a destruction of one state, the building of another. And
furthermore that it has practically invaded this sphere of reality . Marxism has ascertained the
component parts of the State, and its functions, and its personnel, and its "material
appendages," and its class significance, and its significance from the standpoint of economics.
What is the function? A function are the actions and activities assigned to or required or
expected of a person or group. So a function is about the actions and activities. These
functions are the actions and activities assigned to or required, or expected, of a person or
group. A requirement is required by rule. A rule is a principle or condition that customarily
governs behavior. We are on about the governing of behavior. So in the governing of behavior
we assume authority. So the state has actions and activities i.e., functions. These actions and
activities are assigned to or required or expected of a the State. Its i.e., the States personnel is
the group of people willing to obey orders i.e., serve the interests of the ruling class. We hear
of the States material appendages. But what are the states material appendages? The
material appendage is the part that is joined to something larger. It is the extentions that make
up the State. That what has branched out in the extension of the state can be the material
appendages. We have looked at its class significance too. The significance being the message
that is intended or expressed or signified. The State tells us about the nature of the ruling
class. This is as it is a material appendage of this group. So the State has a class significance.
It is not class insignificant. The State plays an important role for the ruling class. The reading
proceeds with the Revolution has completely confirmed the theoretical teaching of Marx on the
State. So we have a confirmation, in the revolution. And it is valid in terms of the standpoint of
economics. That is the mental position of Marxism, from which economics is viewed. And lastly
it goes on that juridical fetishism has burst into atoms. So we have it that Morality, which found
its 'theoretical justification' in the categorical imperative of Kant. What is the categorical
imperative of Kant? The categorical imperative is the moral principle that behaviour should be
determined, by duty. This reached its highest stage of deification, disclosed itself to be a
system of relative historical norms, with a quite earthly, quite social, and suite historical origin.
It disclosed i.e., the categorical imperative of Kant that itsefl to a system of relative historical
norms. The categorical imperative of Kant is a historical norm i.e., bound up with a definite
historical order of society. The categorical imperative of Kant has a quite earthly, quite social,
and suite historical origin.

Religion, which is revered as the highest product of human thought, proved to be a cast taken
from a society of lords and slaves, a construction on the model of a dualist society, on the
model of a hierarchical ladder of domination and exploitation. For this very reason it began
rapidly to die out. But the revolution in reflective categories, which was the inevitable result of
the material revolution, has not yet concluded.
We hear of Religion. Religion wa revered as the highest product of human thought. But it turns
out to be nothing more than cast taken from a society of lords and slaves, a construction on
the model of a dualist society, on the model of a hierarchical ladder of domination and
exploitation. It is formulated in the particular style or language of a society of lords and slaves.
Religion is a construction on the model of a dualist society. Dualistic means the doctrine that
reality consists of two basic opposing elements. These two basic opposing elements are often
taken to be mind and matter (or mind and body), or good and evil. But in the sense we are on
about it being a construction on the model of a dualist society i.e., two basic opposing
elements. We also hear of the revolution in reflective categories. This revolution in reflective
categories is an inevitable result of the material revolution. And this revolution in reflective
categories links up to the problem of theory and practice, applied sciences and pure science
&c. and this revolution in reflective categories has not yet concluded.

We are patently viewing its first phase. Here it is necessary to dwell on some problems in this
connection, related to the question of theory and practice. The capitalist economic order is a
system of unorganised elementally developing, and as a whole irrational economic life
("anarchy of production," competition, crises, etc.).
We hear that We are patently viewing its first phase. This being the first phase of the
revolution in reflective categories, an inevitable result of the material revolution. We go on that
it is necessary to dwell on some problems in this connection, related to the question of theory
and practice. So the capitalist order is an interrelated interacting artifacts designed to work as
a coherent entity. But this capitalist order is unorganised and elementally developing.
Therefore it is as a whole irrational economic life. It is Not consistent with or using reason. But
this irrational economic life can be resolved as our abilities improve to organise on an
expanded scale.

The Socialist economic order is a system of organised, planned, and anti-exploiter economy, in
which little by little there disappears the division between town and country, intellectual and
physical labour. Hence follow vast consequences. First of all, it is necessary to note the
changes in the character of social regularity. The regularity of capitalism is an elemental
regularity, coming into existence irrespective of (and sometimes against) the will of man
(typical examples are the regularity of the industrial cycle, of crisis, etc.).
We that vast consequences follows: the Socialist economic order is a system of organised,
planned, and anti-exploiter economy, in which little by little there disappears the division
between town and country, intellectual and physical labour. So it is maintained that the division
between town and country recedes. This division means organised on industrial scale i.e., the
countryside (that is how I see it). We also have the division into intellectual and physical labour
receeding. And with the Socialist economic order we have vast consequences transpiring. A
consequence is a phenomenon that follows and is caused by some previous phenomenon.
And firstly we note the changes in the character of social regularity. A transformation in the
distinguishable features of social order. The piece goes on about the regularity of capitalism is
an elemental regularity, coming into existence irrespective of (and sometimes against) the will
of man (typical examples are the regularity of the industrial cycle, of crisis, etc.). the will of man
cannot control the regularity of capitalism. Hence it often is out of control and thereupon points
to its Anarchic side, mentioned previously. And it is an elemental regularity. This elemental
means it is essential or basic part. The elemental regularity is an essential or basic part of
capitalism. So the capitalist orders elemental regularity comes into existence despite the will of
man. What are the elemental regularities? The typical examples are the regularity of the
industrial cycle, of crisis, etc.
This regularity shows itself in the shape of a compulsory law, "like the law of gravity when a
house falls on your head." [34]
Regularity means the quality of being characterized by a fixed principle or rate. We recall that a
principle is a basic generalization that is accepted as true and that can be used as a basis for
reasoning or conduct. So this regularity show itself in the shape of a compulsory law. A
principle is a rule or law concerning a natural phenomenon or the function of a complex
system. It is about the functioning of a complex system. Through understanding the functioning
of a complex system we get to the rules and law concerning social phenomenon. The rule is
the compulsory principle governing action. What governs the action of the elemental regularity,
within the capitalist order. We have the regularity of the industrial cycle i.e., the governing
action. And in action we allude to motion, practice etc. For these too are rules and laws as we
have natural laws. Gravity is cited in the quotation from Capital, volume 1.

[34] "Karl Marx: "Capital," Volume. 1. Compare also Engels: "Ludwig Feuerbach,".

In relation to the actions of individual persons this regularity is irrational, even though every
one of them should act according to all the rules of rational calculation. This irrational current of
life is the consequence of the anarchic character of the capitalist structure.

The regularity in organised Socialist society is of a different type. It loses (if we are speaking of
a process, it begins to lose) its elemental character: the future lies ahead as a plan, an aim:
causal connection is realised through social teleology: regularity shows itself not post factum,
not unforeseen, incomprehensible, blind: it shows itself as "recognised necessity" ("freedom is
recognised necessity"), realised through action organised on a social scale.

Consequently, here is present a different type of regularity, a different relationship between the
individual and society, a different relationship between causal and teleological series. In
capitalist society the theoretical foreknowledge of the general course of events does not
provide the instrument for taking direct control of that course (and there is no subject to set
himself such a task: society itself is subjectless, blind, un-organised).
In the above we hear of the relations to the actions of individual persons and that this regularity
is irrational. We are on about the regularity. We spoke previously, in our reading, above, of the
regularity of capitalism, which has a elemental regularity, it is independent of the subject
perceiving it. We also touched upon it, coming into existence, irrespective of (and sometimes
against) the will of man. Elemental means relating to or being an element. An element is a
component part; a contributing factor. So a contributing factor in the capitalist order- are the
cogs that develop and expand. For we have a development of these contributing factors. And
this elemental regularity is the systemic, component parts, the laws that goven i.e., that
develop and expand. Anything that contributes causally to a result is a contributing factor. The
results or outcome is the world of reality i.e., the capitalist world of reality. And it is an outcome
or result of specified laws having a fundamental, underlying elemental regularity. This does not
mean that the various twists and turns of its history change the elemental regularities. But this
regularity is irrational i.e., it is not consistent with or using reason. So it is inconsistent, lacking
in the powers of understanding. We hear of the actions of individual persons. An action being
the process of doing or acting (demanded action). Thus the deeds, acts (not aware of his
actions). It can also allude to the style of movement of an animal or human. So the process of
doing or acting goes against its rational aspect. So irrational despite every one of them is
acting according to all the rules of rational calculation. So the absolute implementation of rules
of rational calculation are irrational. They go against the natural human tendency. So the rules
of rational calculation do not imply that it is rational. We thereupon come across the irrational
current of life. What is this irrational current of life? Life being animation and energy, in action,
or expression. For man in his general activity and motion- is animated. He expresses himself
in his particular mode of activity. This could be his particular mode of practice. This particular
mode of practice is bound up with a definite historico-economic formation; this is seen as a
definite historically transitory mode of production. And the underlying growth of this
transformation would lie in the irrational current of life (it irrational). For this historically
transitory stage is a historical phenomenon expressing the immediate moment. And the
consequence of this irrational current of life lies in the anarchic character of the capitalist
structure. Anarchic indicates that it is Without law or control. So it has a lawless side, an
uncontrollable aspect. A consequence is something that is produced by a cause or follows from
a form of necessary connection or from a set of conditions. S the anarchic character of the
capitalist structure produced, caused by the irrational current of life. So the production process
produces the product. And the anarchic character of the capitalist structure, a product,
produced by the irrational current of life. And the irrationality underlying its elemental
regularities. We move on, to the point of discussing the regularity in organised Socialist
society. In other words the fixed principles that underly the organised Socialist society. And the
regularity in organised Socialist society is of a different type. This organised Socialist society
loses its elemental character, it essential attributes (structural or functional). So it loses some
of its structural and functional aspects (like the withering away of the state &c). We are talking
of a process i.e., a course of action or proceeding, esp. a series of stages. This being the
progress or course of development. As it expands or matures it loses many of it elemental
characteristics. It uses the state to build itself, though in turn, dispenses with the state as it
develops. We hear that in the regularity in organised Socialist society the future lies ahead as a
plan, an aim etc. so it is all about a series of steps to be carried out or goals to be
accomplished. We hear that organised Socialist society has a causal connection that is
realised through social teleology. We remind ourselves that teleology is a doctrine explaining
phenomena by their ends or purposes. A phenomena is any state or process, known through
the senses, rather than by intuition or reasoning. So the ends or purposes underly its state or
process. So the goal, end or outcome underlies the process. And we recall that once a goal is
achieved we can dispense with aspects, Teleology is the doctrine explaining any state or process known through the senses according to their ends, or
purposes. A teleological question is to ask: To what ends? Thus we are on about state of affairs that a plan is intends to achieve or bring about. A goal is an end result -intended to be achieved. It is an
objective, target or purpose, a given state of affairs, that are intended. We could see the state of affairs as a combination of circumstances, at, a given point in time. So a combination of circumstances (a
set of facts) are the end results of a process. And teleology explains phenomena by these required combination of circumstances i.e., the destiny or fortune; the undelying basis of human action.
Socialist society loses its elemental character, its essential attributes as it follows its plan. So in the process of growth- it loses some of its structural and functional aspects. How would we
approach withering away of the state &c). the state becomes an unnecessary element. We are talking of a directed process i.e., a course of action, a series of stages which are goal oriented. This goal
being the progress or course of development of society as a whole. As the whole of society expands or matures it loses many of it elemental characteristics. It used the state to build itself, though in turn,
dispenses with the state as it develops. Hence the state becomes a relic of the past. We hear that in the regularity in the organised Socialist society lies a future being built, according to a plan. The
progressive development involves a series of steps, to be carried out, with numerous goals to be accomplished. We hear that organised Socialist society has a causal connection that is realised through
social teleology. We remind ourselves what teleology is: it being a doctrine explaining phenomena by their ends or purposes. So the elements of an organised Socialist society are made of goal focussed
component parts. A phenomena is any state or process, known through the senses, rather than by intuition or reasoning. Hence these elements should be sensed in the actual state of reality. So the
ends or purposes underlie the state or processes. Goals, ends or outcomes underlies the process of developing and organising Socialist society Once a particular goal is achieved, we can dispense with
aspects. We hear after talk of realised social teleology i.e., planned, aimed and causal that regularity shows itself not post factum, not unforeseen, incomprehensible, blind: it shows itself as 'recognised
necessity' ('freedom is recognised necessity'), realised through action organised on a social scale. What is this regularity shows itself not post factum. That means the regularity is not shown after the fact.
The particular organisation and processes are not unforeseen, incomprehensible and blind. The organisation and processes of organised Socialist society are anticipated, understandable, seen. The
organised Socialist society takes upon itself order and structure; progresson or course in process of construction are anticipated, understandable, perceptible actively directed towards the overall plan.
Hence human method or practice in an organised Socialist society- serves a recognised necessity. We even get to hear that freedom is recognised necessity. So there is an acknowledged necessity. So
the essential requirement, requisites underlie the organisation. The Demands and needs underlie the organisation and social plan. This organised Socialist society is a natural or necessary result of the
inability of the capitalist order to see to the whole of our social needs. And this inability is because it has an underlying irrationality i.e., its elemental characteristics. And action organised on a social scale,
directs the organised Socialist society towards, recognised necessity. And this is directed by action organised on a social scale.
We hear of a different type of regularity. It is regularity in this sense is aimed at freedom
i.e., freedom is recognised necessity. So it is a realization through action organised on a social
scale. In organised Socialist society we have a different relationship between the individual
and society. In the capitalist order the worker works for the capitalist. But in an organised
Socialist society he works for the whole. We go on that there is a different relationship
between causal and teleological series. A cause is a thing that produces an effect. A cause can
be a person or thing that occasions or produces something. Otherwise a reason or motive is
often seen as a cause. A cause is a principle, belief, or purpose. So what is the end result or
the reason underlying organised Socialist society compared to the capitalist order. In one the
cause or reason behind existent forms lies in its objectification for capitalist enrichment i.e., in
the the capitalist order. The other is the whole of the society as the result of human practice. In
organised Socialist society practice is socially directed; on the other hand, in the capitalist
order, it is directed towards capitalist enrichment. For in capitalist society the theoretical
foreknowledge of the general course of events does not provide the instrument for taking direct
control of that course. And this theoretical foreknowledge? Foreknowledge is knowledge of an
event before it occurs. And the general course of events and the instrument for taking direct
control of that course. What is the instrument for taking direct control of that course? An
instrument is the means whereby some act is accomplished. The means is action, agent,
device, or method to take direct control of that course. This implies steering society towards
an organised Socialist society. For what would be needed to take direct control of that course
i.e., the socialist course. So theoretical foreknowledge of the general course of events does not
give something that enables the taking direct control of the course. We have it that there is no
subject to set himself such a task. A subject can be seen to be a branch of knowledge. So the
branch of knowledge, that would put us on this course is absent. For society itself is
subjectless, blind, un-organised. A subject is a person who owes allegiance to a particular
course. And this blind? A slow progress of science in antiquity is explained by the dissociation
of theory from practice. There existed no contact between those who worked and those who
thought. But the idea is that is organised Socialist society theory and practice are in sync. All
practice in that they are establishing Socialism. Our earlier reading on theocratic state of
Ancient Egypt indicated how were elements were subject to a natural centralised planned
economy. In this, knowledge (theory) was most closely connected with practice, since it was
expediently directed towards practice. But this connection was of a special type. Knowledge
was inaccessible to the mass of workers. For the mass of the workers practice was blind, and
knowledge was surrounded with an aureole of dread mystery. Within those thoughts we come
upon blind practice. The mass of the workers were unable to see the basis of their practice.
They had given all power to a ruling theocratic elite. It was this ruling class that formed,
structured, with power over the coherent whole i.e., its on the basis of its theoretical form of
understanding.

In Socialist society the theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity can at once become a norm
of action on the scale of the whole of society -that is, on the scale of "the whole." Thereby is
afforded the possibility of the fusion of theory and practice, their gigantic social synthesis,
historically more and more realised in the measure of the elimination of the rupture between
intellectual and physical labour. In the economic life of capitalism the elementary social
necessity of definite proportions between the branches of production is achieved by means of
an elemental fluctuation of prices, in which the law of value expresses itself as the elemental
regulator of socio-productive life. In the economic life of Socialism the distribution of resources
(means of production and labour power) takes place as a constructive task of a plan.
We continue with Socialist society. The theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity can at once become a norm of action on the scale of the whole of
society. This theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity is underlying element, the norm, in a Socialist society. This theoretical foreknowledge of the
necessity is critical. The theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity is the condition of being essential or indispensable for the whole of society. So
theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity serves not the particular, but is in the general interest, i.e., for the whole of society. So it comes in on the scale
of the whole. thus we are on about theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity on the scale of the whole. Hence because it looks at things on the scale of
the whole it is afforded the possibility of the fusion of theory and practice. Because thereby it serves the whole of society, without the particular. Thus
we have the combination of theory and practice, in this. He goes on to call this a gigantic social synthesis i.e., the combination of the particular to fit and
serve into a complex whole. we hear of a norm of action. For the norm of action is the theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity. But theoretical
foreknowledge of the necessity is the norm of action on the scale of the whole. this makes an interesting bit i.e., the element of scale. With this we have
a difference in degree being alluded to. This book does not consider the responsible for crimes against humanity on a vast scale, for which his
bosses memory is almost universally vilified. But this was unknown or something he was blinded to. And probably this aspect falls beyond the
aspect of this work. But in scale we have the massing on an ever more vaster level. The piece mentions a gigantic social synthesis between theory and
practice. So it is not the theory of the Socialist society but the actual bringing the building to practice. Hence it is in this vein that we are on about a
gigantic social synthesis. A synthesis is being a combination of elements merging into a whole. To combine means to join together; uniting for a
common purpose. An element is a component part; a contributing factor within the whole. So it is gigantic combination of social elements, coming
together, in unity. The common purpose being the organised Socialist society. The unification on the basis of this i.e., on the scale of the whole. We are
on about the measure of the elimination of the rupture between intellectual and physical labour. The measure being the degree, the extent, or amount of
distance between theory and practice. The measure is the suitable action to achieve some end. So it is tw what degree we eliminate the rupture between
intellectual and physical labour. We have intellectual and physical labour. And the seperation between intellectual and physical labour is being discussed,
here. separation and disconnected. This rupture implies that intellectual work becomes incoherent and illogical to either of the opposite poles. We move
on to the economic life of capitalism. Furthermore the same sentence goes on about the elementary social necessity of definite proportions, the branches
of production, the elemental fluctuation of prices, the law of value and the elemental regulator of socio-productive life. We discuss the economic life of
capitalism and how it achieved. It achieved by means of an elemental fluctuation of prices. So prices go up and down, accordingly, in the economic life
of capitalism. And the elementary social necessity is the needs of human society and its members. What does society need i.e., on the scale of the whole
of society? This is the elementary social necessities. And we have definite proportions between the branches of production and the elementary social
necessity. For the branches of production provides the needs. So we have the elementary social necessities, on the scale of the whole. and the whole of
society needs a definite proportions of these requirements. Hence we get to the branches of production. The elemental fluctuation of prices, expresses the
law of value, is the elemental regulator of socio-productive life. So it is a controlling or regulating socio-productive life. So the elemental fluctuation of
prices controls or regulates socio-productive life. A regulator is a control that maintains a steady speed in a machine. So the elemental fluctuation of
prices controls the production or speed of the branches of production. We can call this supply and demand. When there is a demand the prices rise;
when the demand is low the prices drop. Hence this demonstrates the elemental regulator of socio-productive life. The law of value expresses itself in
the elemental fluctuation of prices. So this is the elementary social necessity. This elementary is the essential or basic part. We have the essential social
needs. And necessity is the spontaneous reflex to survive. And the perverted ideological reflex needs to be thought of. There is something underlying the
perverted ideological reflex and the current line of thought. So it is not ideological that the economic life of capitalism expresses the elementary social
necessity in the elemental fluctuation of prices. This is a law as it expresses a consistent, relationship of parts working coherently in a process. A system
of norms is spoken of in the elemental fluctuation of prices. What are the system of norms? It is the norm of rise in price, relating to demands. And
dropping according to a lack of demand. Any norm is the standard, model or pattern regarded as typical i.e., the elemental fluctuation of prices are built
on the branches of production. These norms qualities or characteristics that identify a group or kind or category are determined by the elemental
fluctuation of prices. So in this system of norms economists articulate perception, without distortion as they observe the process at work. So it is
undistorted perception i.e., without an ideological aspect. It is a system of objective laws, within the the economic life of capitalism; laws articulating
and derived to an undistorted (misrepresented) perception. A law is a generalization that describes recurring facts or events in nature, though here we are
describing a general law of the economic life of capitalism. For the laws, in this sense, express the hegemony of the ruling class and its prevailing
conceptions of the dominant class, who own the means of production, and the surplus labour therein. But a system of objective laws conforms to the
Capitalist world of reality, in this instance. And studying the system of objective laws; demystifying its Capitalist context should speak for itself. It
allows the observer to see the world for what it is, where it derives (its historicity) in reality. Hence it is the direct opposite of idealism, subjectivism &c.
So the elementary social necessity of definite proportions is expressed in the elemental fluctuation of prices. And the branches of production work
according to elemental fluctuation of prices (the law of value). And the elemental fluctuation of prices is the elemental regulator of socio-productive
life. socio-productive life cannot flourish without an elemental regulator i.e., the elemental fluctuation of prices. Now we get to discuss the economic life
of Socialism. We hear also of the distribution of resources (means of production and labour power) and the constructive task of a plan. So here in the
economic life of Socialism we again have the branches of production. And these branches of production are implicated in the distribution of resources
(means of production and labour power). In the economic life of capitalism the branches of production are bound by the elemental fluctuation of prices.
But in the economic life of Socialism the branches of production are achieved by the constructive task of a plan. In the economic life of Socialism the
distribution of resources (means of production and labour power) is based on the constructive task of a plan. On the other hand in the economic life of
capitalism it is on the basis of the elemental fluctuation of prices. In elemental we imply according to atmospheric conditions. The economic life of
Socialism is firmly conscious in that it is a task Intending to improve or promote development. And Intending to improve or promote development,
according to a plan (an organized system). So the distribution of resources (means of production and labour power) complements this organized system,
in the economic life of Socialism. The law of value expresses itself in the elemental fluctuation of prices, in the economic life of capitalism. And the
law of value is determined according to the elementary social necessity of definite proportions, in the economic life of Socialism. So we have a different
relationship between the individual and society in the economic life of Socialism and the economic life of capitalism. The individual and society serves
the constructive task of a plan, in the economic life of Socialism. In the economic life of capitalism, the individual and society is in accordance to the
elemental fluctuation of prices. So the general course of events is aimed at this constructive task of a plan, in the economic life of Socialism. In this
sense society itself is not subjectless, blind, or un-organised. For the individual and society is building society, whereas the economic life of capitalism
does not impute any social role.

But the plan does not fall from the sky: it is itself the expression of "recognised necessity."
Consequently, here (a) the tasks of cognition expand to a colossal degree; (b) this cognition
must embrace a huge quantity of problems, and express itself in the work of all branches of
science; (c) this cognition must become synthetic, for a plan is a synthesis, and a scientifically
elaborated plan can rely only on a synthesis; (d) this cognition is directly bound up with
practice: it relies on practice, it serves it, it passes into it, for the plan is active: it is at one and
the same time a product of scientific thought, laying bare causal regularities, and a system of
purposes, an instrument of action, the direct regulator of practice and its component part.
The economic life of Socialism is planned to express a RECOGNISED NECESSITY. It is an
expression of recognised necessity. It is Acknowledging the current need and planning to fulfil
and practice to achieve the need. So recognised necessity determines the practice. For the
practice is based on fulfilling recognised necessity. This plan causes the tasks of cognition
expand to a colossal degree. Why, it is because we have a return to the original process that
sets of the expansion, and development of early society. Once the recognised necessity have
been fulfilled we have the development of tools and the expansion into other branches of
science. And in this we have the tasks of cognition expanding. But why to a colossal degree?
It is because everyone has to fit into this large social plan and hence the task involved
incorporates cognition and the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning.
For the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning itself is in accordance
with the plan of a gigantic social synthesis i.e., socialist construction. Society building itself for
itself. And the plan aims at expressing recognised necessity. And this cognition must embrace
a huge quantity of problems, and express itself in the work of all branches of science. So the
overcoming of given problems will produce. And as theoretical cognition expands to a colossal degree we find so too does the
two forms of labour activity i.e., mental and material. As the tasks of cognition expand to a colossal degree so to do theoretical cognition and practical
action. For we have social man, and his activity, both theory and practice. In the above we allude to a unity of the theoretical and practical idea as
cognition. And the tasks of cognition expand to a colossal degree. In other words the unity of the theoretical and practical idea (cognition) must embrace
a huge quantity of problems, and show itself in the work of all branches of science. These huge quantity of problems will be the basis of the
development to a colossal degree i.e., of cognition. These sciences are born out of practice, which first sets itself technical tasks: the latter require, in
their turn, the solution of theoretical problems, problems of the first, second, etc., order, a special (relative) logic of motion being thereby created. We
recall what we wrote before Practice in this way grows into theory: the sought-for rule of action is transformed into the search for the law of objective
relationship: there arise innumerable knots and interlacings of problems with their solutions: these, in their turn, sometimes fertilise a number of
hierarchically lower branches of science, and through technology penetrate into technique-consequently, into the direct practice of material labour,
transforming the world. But we have to return to this piece, just quoted to understand the basis; but the basic idea is clearly illustrated and relevant. We
go on that cognition must become synthetic, for a plan is a synthesis, and a scientifically elaborated plan can rely only on a synthesis. But what is
synthetic? Synthetic is Involving or of the nature of synthesis (combining separate elements to form a coherent whole) as opposed to analysis. So
synthetic is relating to the nature of synthesis. Synthesis is all about combining separate elements to form a coherent whole. the writing goes on that a
plan is a synthesis. A synthesis is reasoning from the general to the particular (or from cause to effect). Otherwise a synthesis is the combination of ideas
into a complex whole. A complex whole consists of related parts; it is a composite whole. And composite means to be made up of parts. Composite
relates to the Latin word meaning compose. The point is underlined: cognition must become synthetic. In other words Knowledge must be synthetic.
Cognition is the psychological result of perception, learning, and reasoning. Why do we say: cognition must become synthetic? It is because knowing,
perceiving, or conceiving as an act or faculty distinct from emotion and volition must complement the plan. And the plan is a gigantic social synthesis,
with the elementary social necessity as the basis. So the human element or individual must subordinate himself or herself to the plan (the gigantic social
synthesis). For the plan is on the on the scale of the whole. A synthesis is a union in accordance with this action organised on a social scale. Synthesis
emphasizes that it is an comprehensive, incorporative plan involving the various elements. We go on: this cognition is directly bound up with practice: it
relies on practice, it serves it, it passes into it, for the plan is active. Hence knowing, perceiving, or conceiving are bound up with practice i.e., relying on
practice. For cognition serves practice and practice cognition. Active involves taking part in an activity. Cognition is the intellectual process by which
knowledge is gained about perceptions or ideas. so the perceptions or ideas are known through an intellectual process. We have knowledge of
perceptions or ideas, through an intellectual process. This is called cognition. Otherwise cognition means a conscious intellectual act. cognition must
serve practice, rely on practice, pass into practice. For a plan is active. In the next we hear of the product of scientific thought, laying bare causal
regularities, a system of purposes, an instrument of action and a direct regulator of practice. It is also a component part of practice. You cannot thereby
separate practice from cognition. For cognition comes about as a product of scientific thought. Scientific thought produces cognition. And cognition is
lays bare causal regularities i.e., what gives rise to something; what causes something to happen or occur etc. cognition links to the system of purposes.
A system is a complex whole; a set of connected things or parts; organized body of things. It is an organized body of things with an anticipated outcome,
that is intended or that guides your planned actions. So it is a complex unity formed of many often diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a
common purpose. And an instrument of action implies that a society is used in performing an action of developing it. Any purpose is the object to be
attained; the thing intended. It is the resolution, determination. In direct regulator of practice we have it being a control element in practice. In this sense
regulator is to control by rule; hence we are on about a compulsory principle governing action. We spoke of the elemental fluctuation of prices in the
economic life of capitalism, which is the elemental regulator of socio-productive life. And the elemental regulator of socio-productive life in a economic
life of Socialism is the constructive task of a plan. This constructive task of a plan being based on the theoretical foreknowledge of the necessity.

But the plan of Socialist construction is not only a plan of economy: the process of the
rationalisation of life, beginning with the suppression of irrationality in the economic sphere,
wins away from it one position after another: the principle of planning invades the sphere of
"mental production," the sphere of science, the sphere of theory. Thus there arises here a new
and much more complex problem: the problem of the rationalisation not only of the material-
economic basis of society, but also of the relations between the sphere of material labour and
"spiritual labour," and of relations within the latter-the most striking expression of this is the
question of the planning of science.[35]
We hear that the plan of Socialist construction is not only a plan of economy. So it is not
confined solely to this i.e., a method or procedure of economy. It is about the process of the
rationalisation of life. What is rationalisation? Rationalisation means a systematic organization;
the act of organizing something according to a system or a rationale. So it is giving an orderly
structure to, systematizing life. We hear that the plan of Socialist construction is about
suppression of irrationality in the economic sphere. About getting rid of the illogical;
unreasonable in the economic sphere i.e., particular aspect of life or activity. And it wins away
from it one position after another. So one position after another is won away from the
economic sphere. So from the economic sphere we move towards a planned economy i.e., a
rationalised economy and life. Hence we have the principle of planning invading the sphere of
mental production. Thus we have acts of formulating programs for a definite course of action,
towards the plan. This principle of planning becomes important. planning involving the
preparing of methods or procedures for doing something; otherwise the designing, schemes,
or stated intentions. A principle is the fundamental truth or law forming the basis of reasoning
or action. So the basis of reasoning or action is the recognised necessity, and the plan of
Socialist construction. So the sphere of science involves the principle of planning. So planning
enters or Occupies the sphere of mental production. And this principle of planning is the
overarching plan with the recognised necessity. We have also the sphere of theory too. In the
sphere of theory we have the principle of planning therein. For the sphere of mental
production includes the sphere of science and the sphere of theory. We proceed on about the
arising of a new and much more complex problem. This being the problem of the
rationalisation not only of the material-economic basis of society, but also of the relations
between the sphere of material labour and 'spiritual labour'. And this relations between the
sphere of material labour and 'spiritual labour' is rather important. Within the sphere of spiritual
labour we have a most striking expression. And this most striking expression of the relations
between the sphere of material labour and spiritual labour is the planning of science. A plan is
an act of formulating a program for a definite course of action. So the definite course of action
of science is aimed at the recognised necessity of the social plan. So science served this
through planning. And we recall that science is part of the sphere of mental production. We
maintained that the sphere of science and the sphere of theory would be invaded in the
process of the rationalisation of life. And that this would begin with the suppression of
irrationality in the economic sphere. And thus wins away from it one position after another. Are
we alluding to the evolution of the economic sphere, by the process of the rationalisation of life.
And this links in with Bukharins position on the NEP and the Kulaks. Going to fast into
Socialism he felt, would be catastrophic. Thus the problem of the rationalisation not only of
the material-economic basis of society, but also of the relations between the sphere of material
labour and 'spiritual labour'.
[35] For this see: "Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Planning of Scientific Research
Work," Moscow, 1931.

In the ideological life of capitalism a certain social necessity of definite proportions (much less
definite than in economic life!) between the various branches of ideological labour is regulated
to an extremely small extent by the State (the only sphere which is completely regulated is the
production and diffusion of religious ideas through the organisation of the State Church.) The
regularities of development are here also elemental.
Now we hear of the ideological life of capitalism. We hear of a certain social necessity of
definite proportions. This ideological life of capitalism is less definite than in economic life.
Definite being precise, explicit and clearly defined. For Capitalism must have an ideological life
too. And this ideological life must have a social necessity of definite proportions. And we have
the branches of ideological labour too. Obviously these branches of ideological labour are
linked to the social necessity of definite proportions. And the regulation is in accordance with
the whole capitalist system, as a whole. These branches of ideological labour are regulated to
an extremely small extent. These branches of ideological labour are controlled or governed
according to rule or principle or laws to a extremely small extent. Which sphere is regulated? It
is maintained that the only sphere which is completely regulated is the production and diffusion
of religious ideas. and this being the production and diffusion of religious ideas through the
organisation of the State Church. These regularities of development in this instance are
elemental i.e., an essential or basic part. Or is elemental indicating relating to severe
atmospheric conditions. To regulate means to shape or influence; give direction to. It can also
mean bring into conformity with rules or principles or usage; impose regulations. So to
progress it has regulations, rules and principles.

Those basic principles which the theory of historical materialism puts forward cannot serve as
a standard of action for the ruling class, on the social scale of that action, for the same reason
that a capitalist "plan" is unrealisable: a plan is in contradiction to the very structure of
capitalism, the prime dominants of its structure and its development.
Now we hear of the basic principles which the theory of historical materialism puts forward. We
ask if these principles can serve as a standard of action for the ruling class. We hear of the
social scale of that action. It continues that the capitalist 'plan' is unrealisable. A plan is in
contradiction to the very structure of capitalism. We also hear of the prime dominants of its
structure and its development. For the prime dominants are what exercises influence or control
in Capitalism. The prime dominants of its structure and its development go agains the plan.
Capitalism is claimed to be an unplanned economy. What about Fascism, which is the barrack
system of Capitalism. For the plan in Socialism is recognised necessity on the basis of the
whole.

Here, too, the building of Socialism puts the whole problem in a new way. The elemental
regularity of interdependences between economy and ideology, between collective economic
practice and the multifarious branches of theoretical labour, yield place to a considerable
degree to the principle of planning. At the same time, all the basic proportions of the theory of
historical materialism are confirmed: one can feel with one's hands, as it were, how the
requirements of the rapid and intensive growth of the U.S.S.R. imperiously dictate the solution
of a number of technical problems, how the solution of these problems, in its turn, dictates the
posing of the greatest theoretical problems, including the general problems of physics and
chemistry.
We hear of the building of Socialism puts the whole problem in a new way. So it is a line
leading to a place or point, a course of conduct. So we are implying a new pattern or approach.
So any explanation of reality is based on a set of connected ideas or system of ideas. And these system of ideas are based within the socialist system of ideas is a pattern or construction of mental
. And these system of ideas are built within a given context with this plan and
impressions or concepts

oriented towards recognised necessity. We thereupon go on about the elemental regularity of


interdependences between economy and ideology. So economy and ideology are linked
together i.e., bound up. We used this bound up in explaining the Japhetic theory of language. It
being bound up with a number of important practical tasks. The above goes on with collective
economic practice, multifarious branches of theoretical labour. Multifarious means having
many aspects, many and various. So there are many and various branches of theoretical
labour. This conversation is about putting the problem in a new way. These multifarious
branches of theoretical labour will yield place to a considerable degree to the principle of
planning. So the principle of planning is the basis or impetus. A principle is a basic
generalization that is accepted as true and that can be used as a basis for reasoning or
conduct. So the basic generalization is that the principle of planning should be the dominant
orientation. Central planning with planning within the whole system to develop it. We repeat our
definition of what a plan is i.e., formulating a program for a definite course of action.
Formulating is to come up with (an idea, plan, explanation, theory, or principle) after a mental
effort. We continue that the basic proportions of the theory of historical materialism are
confirmed. Should this be propositions? For proportions implies magnitude or extent.
Proportions also implies balance among the parts of something. The text goes on about the
requirements of the rapid and intensive growth of the U.S.S.R. imperiously dictate the solution
of a number of technical problems. Why the rapid and intensive growth? It is because of the
recognised necessity i.e., the requirements. requirements, the needs; what is depend on for
success or fulfilment (the work requires patience). A requirement is to lay down an imperative
(required by law). So what are the imperatives of the immediate moment. What are the
imperatives of history. So rapid and intensive growth has certain requirements. What are the
requisites to grow rapidly. And the requirement of the rapid and intensive growth involves
solving a number of technical problems. In this we are alluding to skills in or specialized
knowledge. This is in being able to overcome its deficiencies. So we are alluding to technique
or proficiency in a practical skill that needs to be applied i.e., as a requirement for rapid and
intensive growth. And we get to the solution of these problems i.e., the method for solving a
problem. A problem being doubtful or difficult matter requiring a solution. A problem is
something hard to understand or accomplish. The solution of these problems dictates the
posing of the greatest theoretical problems. But here we have theory that serves the
requirements i.e., the rapid and intensive growth of the country. So theory dictates planning to
fulfil the requirements i.e., the recognised necessity. And within these great theoretical
problems we have physics and chemistry. Physics being the science of matter and energy and
their interactions. On the other hand, chemistry being the science of matter; the branch of the
natural sciences dealing with the composition of substances and their properties and reactions.
So the idea is that it has a social component, though yet goes into the areas of specific
sciences like physics and chemistry.

One can feel with one's hands how the development of Socialist agriculture pushes forward the
development of genetics, biology generally, and so on. It can be observed how the
exceptionally insistent need for the study of the natural wealth of the Union broadens the field
of geological research, pushes forward geology, geochemistry, etc. And all the poverty of the
idea that the "utility" of science means its degradation, the narrowing of its scope, etc.,
becomes crystal clear and apparent.
So here we have the imagery of feeling with ones own hands, therefore being hands on. The
piece goes on about the development of Socialist agriculture. And the development of Socialist
agriculture is bound up with the expansion of other branches. The development of Socialist
agriculture broadens other fields. So geological research, geology, geochemistry, etc., are
broadened by the development of Socialist agriculture. They are based on fields that are being
used in the plan for the recognised necessity. For the plan necessitates that these areas be
pushed forward as they are requirements in the development of Socialist agriculture. We hear
of the poverty of the idea that the 'utility' of science means its degradation. So the idea of being
of practical use, degrades (debases) the science; this is combatted. For such an idea is only
the narrowing of its scope i.e., the area in which something acts or operates or has power or
control. So it is the fields serving a definite social function. This relates to our thoughts on the
general idea as a development from the specific instances. The relationships define the
concepts. This reminds me of our earlier thoughts on context. Nothing can be conceived in
isolation, but within the broader understanding of the specifics i.e., the interrelationship of
various fields with the overall plan. A conception can be inferred or derived from specific
instances, within specified given contexts. Hence the specific instances lead the origins of
general ideas. Therefore the specific instances provide the content of cognition, the main thing
you are thinking about. The development or evolution of a general idea is a natural extention or
progression. This natural extention derives from the study of the relationship between the
specific instances. Without considering the specific instances, and their interconnection, we will
not derive a general idea. We will not see the specific instances within the system of things. So
without active study: the general idea lies in a state of latency. And from a latent or potential
state, subsequent studies focus on the relativity of specific instances deriving or progressing
into a general idea. In addition, general means not specialized or limited to one class of
things. Thence a general idea is not limited, or narrowly defined, nor restricted in its scope. A
narrow focus within a field is a narrowing of its scope. We are talking of expanding the scope
of the particular field. Hence this is an important development in our thought. It is similar to our
earlier thoughts on Astronomy and mathematics. ASTRONOMY (PROGRESSES THROUGH
MATHEMATICS): In what follows we hear of the necessity of studying the successive
development of specific branches of natural science. What are these individual branches of
natural science? In successive development we are on about the history of the individual
branches of natural science. How did these individual branches of natural science originate?
We hear below about an example, astronomy. And astronomy was absolutely necessary for
pastoral and agricultural peoples. Astronomy is the scientific study of celestial bodies. But
going into why pastoral and agricultural peoples needed to study astronomy can be looked at.
We then hear that Astronomy could only develop only with the assistance of mathematics. So
we have mathematics as extending of astronomy. So astronomy and mathematics fertilize
each other. But obviously this link is not exclusive. For mathematics must have developed in
other spheres; it might even have been fertilized by astronomy. But we do know that major
civilizations develop alongside the fertile banks of great rivers. But lets return to our point:
Astronomy can develop further only with the help of mathematics. So astronomy can only
expand through the application of mathematics. So the application of mathematics, makes
astronomy bigger, fuller, more elaborate. A more clear, full, and explicit presentation of what
astronomy is about comes through the application of mathematics. So for astronomy to make
itself more visible or manifest, reaching the apex, it requires mathematical input. So to cause
astronomy to become more completely unfolded so as to reveal hidden or unexpected qualities
or potentialities it has requirements. So consequently, it became necessary to study the latter,
mathematics. Therefore mathematics issues forth from astronomy. Without mathematics
astronomy remains undeveloped i.e., hampered. Astronomy is haltered and strangled without
the application of mathematics. It remains confined and unable to develop, without breaking its
own inner limitations. So it is self limited. So to cause to increase or improve or even promote,
expand the scope and growth of astronomy, we require the application of mathematics. The
application of mathematics revolutionizes astronomy. Likewise our reading alludes to the
development of Socialist agriculture developing other fields like genetics, biology generally,
and so on. We are on about the broadening of the fields through one area assisting or
fertilizing another.

Great practice requires great theory. The building of science in the U.S.S.R. is proceeding as
the conscious construction of the scientific "superstructures": the plan of scientific works is
determined in the first instance by the technical and economic plan, the perspectives of
technical and economic development. But this means that thereby we are arriving not only at a
synthesis of science, but at a social synthesis of science and practice. The relative
disconnection between theory and practice characteristic of capitalism is being eliminated. The
fetishism of science is being abolished. Science is reaching the summit of its social self-
cognition. But the Socialist unification of theory and practice is their most radical unification.
For, gradually destroying the division between intellectual and physical labour, extending the
so-called "higher education" to the whole mass of workers, Socialism fuses theory and practice
in the heads of millions.
Now we come to Great practice requires great theory. We hear of the relative disconnection
between theory and practice characteristic of capitalism. So we have a feature of capitalism in
that we have this disconnection between theory and practice. And it is being eliminated.
Furthermore the fetishism of science is being abolished. That is the science for sciences sake.
The piece goes on that Science is reaching the summit of its social self-cognition. So it is
seeing its position in the context of human society and its members i.e., realizing its social
significance. And this is maintained to be the highest stage of development in that science
realizes its social self-cognition. It perceives itself as an element serving a social context. We
have the Socialist unification of theory and practice. This unification of theory and practice
(socialist) is the most radical unification. And so gradually i.e., evolves the division between
intellectual and physical labour. So intellectual and physical labour become unified. Thus we
are extending the so-called 'higher education' to the whole mass of workers, Socialism fuses
theory and practice in the heads of millions. Education provided by a college or university is
higher education. In this context the whole of society is the instrument of higher education to
the whole mass of workers. And in this we have a fusion of theory and practice, in the heads
of millions.
Therefore the synthesis of theory and practice signifies here a suite exceptional increase in the
effectiveness of scientific work and of the effectiveness of Socialist economy as a whole. The
unification of theory and practice, of science and labour, is the entry of the masses into the
arena of cultural creative work, and the transformation of the proletariat from an object of
culture into its subject, organiser and creator.
We hear of the synthesis of theory and practice. A synthesis is the combination of ideas into a
complex whole. So here we are indicating the merging of them i.e., theory and practice. This
synthesis of theory and practice brings about an exceptional increase in the effectiveness of
scientific work. Effective means the power to be effective; the quality of being able to bring
about an effect. In effect is the result or consequence of an action etc. It can mean the
impression produced on a spectator, hearer, etc. An effect is bringing about (a change, cure,
etc.). To bring (or carry) into effect is to accomplish something. So scientific work will bring
about results i.e., the required consequences. And the effectiveness of Socialist economy as a
whole implies the required results in terms of wealth i.e., production and distribution and
consumption of the recognised necessities. We hear that the entry of the masses into the
arena of cultural creative work is derived through the unification of theory and practice. In
science and labour we provide entry to cultural creative work for the masses. And this implies
a transformation of the proletariat. They functional transformation from an object of culture into
its subject, organiser and creator. As subject, organiser and creator rather than object of
culture. Hence from being the goal intended to be attained i.e., a particular type to a subject of
directing the development of his own species being.

This revolution in the very foundations of cultural existence is accompanied necessarily by a


revolution in the methods of science: synthesis presupposes the unity of scientific method: and
this method is dialectical materialism, objectively representing the highest achievement of
human thought
We have it that the revolution in the very foundations of cultural existence is accompanied necessarily by a revolution in the methods of science. So the
revolution in the methods of science complements or reflects the revolution in the very foundations of cultural existence. And likewise the revolution in
the very foundations of cultural existence will bear on the revolution in the methods of science. The piece goes on that synthesis presupposes the unity
of scientific method. The scientific method unified a presupposition of synthesis. So in synthesis we require as a necessary antecedent or precondition
the unity of the scientific method. This method is dialectical materialism. This dialectical materialism is then objectively representing the highest
achievement of human thought. dialectical materialism is the materialistic philosophy of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Thought being the content of
cognition; the main thing you are thinking about. And dialectical materialism is action of accomplishing something. So it was latent and given
expression by the writing of these thinkers.

Correspondingly is being also built up the organisation of scientific work: together with
concentrated planned economy there is growing the organisation of scientific institutions,
which is being transformed into a vast association of workers. [36]
With the organisation of scientific work we have the developing of the organisation of scientific
institutions. So one goes in the hand of the other. So with the organisation of scientific work we
have a concentrated planned economy. Concentrated means gathered together or made less
diffuse, spread out. We have this organisation of scientific institutions growing in the course,
develop within a concentrated planned economy. What is meant by an organisation of scientific
institutions being transformed into a vast association of workers. This is unclear. Does this
allude to a vast association of workers i.e., doing the work in the organisation of scientific
institutions. But not everyone can be a scientist so this is defined according to the recognised
necessity of the plan.

[36] Otto Neurath: "Way of scientific opinion "(" knowledge " Volume. 1., No. 2-4, p. 124):

"In grosstem style plan massive community mental work than Allemeinerscheinung probably
only possible in a massive plan by organized society, with the help of ground begrundeter
means, firm and aware of the order of life in terms designed to earthly happiness, social
changes are Prague mental changes. " The same author pays a tribute to the materialist
conception of history (p. 121), recognising the fact of the true prognoses drawn up by the
Marxists. Quite otherwise has been the philosophic evolution of W. Sombart, who in his last
book writes that Marxism owes its "monstrous" power "ausschusslich the expiring mysticism in
philosophy of history constructions of this doctrine of salvation "(Werner Sombart:" The three
National okonomien, " p. 32).
And this massive community mental work? And this massive community mental work is only
possible in a massive plan by organized society. A plan is a method of achieving something. to
achieve means to reach or attain, esp. by effort. In other words to accomplish (a feat or task).
So this is a massive means being put in place i.e., to reach or attain, esp. by effort. In other
words to accomplish (a feat or task). by organized society. The aim to attain the recognised
necessities of society (as a whole). A plan is a detailed and systematic formulation of a large-
scale campaign or program of action. So we have a social large-scale campaign or program of
action. And to carry out a large-scale campaign or program of action we need an organized
society (organized system). A plan is a proposed undertaking or goal (object of ambition or
effort i.e., a destination). Within this frame of thought: a plan is an orderly arrangement of parts
in terms of an overall design or objective. This orderly arrangement of parts is to compliment
the basis or fundamentals of the plan. So the overall design or objective is in direct relations to
the plan. We understand that this is in order with the original development behind social man.
For social man organizes himself according to production. And this organization is in
relationship to the plan to fulfil his recognised necessities. But on reflection one can at once-
see how elites have taken this under their own control i.e., the wealth of this unfolding has
gone their way. This was not any different in the days of theory and practice, the book. socio-
productive life is developed on the basis of fulfilling societies required needs. This development
is firm and aware of the order of life in terms designed to earthly happiness. So the plan is
purposefully aiming at happiness on this earth i.e., is the general well-being of society. So the
order of life is based on achieving the greatest happiness and well-being for the whole of
society. And with the social changes are producing mental changes. Man is changing as he
joins with others in his social role. We hear of the author on the materialist conception of
history. And we have this author recognising the fact of the true prognoses drawn up by the
Marxists. A prognosis is a prediction about how something will develop. So in the true
prognoses drawn up by the Marxists we have how it will develop. But it is likely to develop in
that the plan is drawn with a particular recognised necessity, in mind. And hear of W Sombart,
who in his last book writes that Marxism owes its monstrous power in dispelling the validity of
mysticism in philosophy and making history constructions of this doctrine of salvation. So his
argument is that it is another mystical of the philosophy of history.

This charge of mysticism levelled against Marxism is just as stupid as the previously
mentioned "essence" and "sense" of the latest "sociology of sense." And bourgeois science is
patently beginning to wander in its accusations against the theory of the revolutionary
proletariat? In this way is arising a new society, growing rapidly, rapidly overtaking its capitalist
antagonists, more and more unfolding the hidden possibilities of its internal structure. From the
standpoint of world history the whole of humanity, the whole orbis terrarum, has fallen apart
into two worlds, two economic and cultural-historic systems. A great world-historic antithesis
has arisen: there is taking place before our very eyes the polarisation of economic systems,
the polarisation of classes, the polarisation of the methods of combining theory and practice,
the polarisation of the "modes of conception," the polarisation of cultures.
We have a rebuttal of Sombart. He rebuts the charge of mysticism levelled against Marxism.
So this position is just as stupid as the previously mentioned. What was previously mentioned?
It is the 'essence' and 'sense' of the latest 'sociology of sense'. And this is coming about i.e.,
2x arising a new society, growing rapidly, rapidly overtaking its capitalist antagonists, more and
more unfolding the hidden possibilities of its internal structure. The power here is the unfolding
the hidden possibilities of its internal structure. Hence this implies that it is a future prospect or
potential. So we have future prospects or potential coming to the fore. Coming about in that the
organization, brings future prospects or potential about i.e., unfolding the hidden possibilities of
its internal structure. And in hidden possibilies we are alluding to latency, again. LATENCY
(WITH A WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES): The inherent capacities (potentials) to come into being
is based on the organization or structure, based on the plan, material and intellectual labour.
Latency is therefore this untapped potentiality. It is something potentially existing but not
presently evident or realized. Only evident or realized as the develops, expands and matures
-unfolding. So we have the bringing about an inherent capacity, as the science of mechanics,
entombed in primitive handicrafts. And this inherent capabilitity will be realized as capacity
overcomes its latency. The state of being that is not yet evident nor active, must be realized in
the unfolding development and the expansion according to the organized plan. In that state
the unfolding of hidden possibilities comes, through its internal structure; without organization
is only a possibility i.e., it is only something that may exist, happen or come about. So it is a
hidden part of the world of possibilities, realizable in the material recognised necessities. Later
we hear about the polarisation of economic systems, the polarisation of classes, We have also
the polarisation of the methods of combining theory and practice. For the methods of
combining theory and practice differ in the Socialist and Capitalist spheres of action.
Furthermore we hear of the polarisation of the modes of conception. A conception is the
conceiving or being conceived i.e., an idea or a plan. Hence we are talking of the creation of
something in the mind. So mental work will according to a socialist mode. Lastly there is the
polarisation of cultures i.e., all the knowledge and values shared by a society. But I think,
culture, here means a particular society at a particular time and place.

The crisis of bourgeois consciousness goes deep, and traces out marked furrows: on the
whole front of science and philosophy we have gigantic dislocations which have been
excellently formulated (from the standpoint of their basic orientation) by O. Spann: the main
thing is a war of destruction against materialism. This is the great task of culture. [37]
What is a dislocation? A dislocation is a displacement of a part. So these gigantic dislocations
are within and evident i.e., a crisis of bourgeois consciousness. On the front of science and
philosophy we have these gigantic dislocations which have been excellently formulated.
Formulations from the standpoint of their basic orientation they are exposed to be gigantic
dislocations. The quote above and below indicate their fight or stance from the standpoint of
their basic orientation.
[37] Othmar Spann: "The Crisis in Economics," p. 10 - we find .... that one ... on destruction
hinzielender fight ... let materialism every last beat, wasted Rare elucidating there is no more
vital matter of culture. "

in the opinion of the warlike professor, who protests against knowledge without God and
knowledge without virtue (Knowledge without God and without virtue knowledge). In economic
ideology, under the influence of the crisis of the capitalist system, there has begun the direct
preaching of a return "to the pick and the hoe," to pre-machine methods of production. In the
sphere of "spiritual culture" the return to religion, the substitution of intuition, "inward feeling,"
"contemplation of the whole," for rational cognition. The turn from individualist forms of
consciousness is patent.
Our author talks of the warlike professor. He protests against knowledge without God and
knowledge without virtue. Then we hear of the economic ideology, a trend, preaches a return
to the pick and the hoe, to pre-machine methods of production. These are anti-technology
trends i.e., Luddites. And they talk of pre-machine methods of production. And also in the
sphere of spiritual culture the return to religion. So the pre-machine methods of production are
likened to religion in the sphere of spiritual culture. They also talk of substitution of intuition,
inward feeling contemplation of the whole, for rational cognition.

It is universal- the idea of "the whole," "wholeness" ("das Ganze," "Ganzheit") in philosophy; in
biology (Driesch and the Vitalists), in physics, in psychology (Gestalt psychology), in economic
geography (territorial complexes), in zoology and botany (the doctrine of heterogeneous
"societies" of plants and animals), in political economy (the collapse of the school of "marginal
utility," "social" theories, the "universalism" of Spann), and so on, and so forth.
But this turn to the "whole" takes place on the basis of the absolute breaking-away of the whole
from its parts, on the basis of idealistic understanding of the "whole," on the basis of a sharp
turn to religion, on the basis of the methods of super-sensual "cognition." It is not surprising,
therefore, that from any scientific hypothesis quasi-philosophic (essentially religious)
conclusions are being drawn, and on the extreme and most consistent wing there is openly
being advanced the watchword of a new medievalism.[38]
As above mentions we have a turn to the whole. We have this turn to the whole on the basis
of the absolute breaking-away of the whole from its parts. So it looks at the whole without
considering its parts. For the whole and its collection of parts are equivalents. This brings us
back to our thoughts on the GENERALITY (DEGREE OF the general): A generality is a quality
of being general or widely distributed or having general relevance. So in this sense something
is applicable across a number of instance. It is not specific (a part) but relates to the
contemplation of specifics (parts). This contemplation of specifics (parts) matures into
understanding the whole. So the knowledge of the given specifics (the component part)
provides the basis to the system (the whole) i.e., the general applicability, the relationship of
the whole to its given parts. We discussed the extent of generality. Does this have anything to
do with the expansion from something particular (a component)? So we have a reference
point, which is the degree of generality (based on the understanding of the parts). And any
generality is an idea or conclusion having general application, on the basis of a study of its
composite parts. We hear of the basis of idealistic understanding of the whole. this is the turn
to the whole, the absolute breaking-away of the whole from its parts. This is on the basis of a
sharp turn to religion. So we have a sharp turn to religion i.e., a turn to the whole. We also hear
of the methods of super-sensual cognition. And because of this we have from any scientific
hypothesis quasi-philosophic (essentially religious) conclusions are being drawn. For what has
been stated are quasi-philosophic (essentially religious) conclusions. And this reminds me of a
return to the pick and the hoe, to pre-machine methods of production. And here is the sphere
of spiritual culture the return to religion. And the watchword of a new medievalism can be found
in the most extreme and most consistent wing of its science. We know that a watchword is a
slogan used to rally support for a cause.
[38] Compare E. Morselli: [greek characters] in "Journal of Philosophy, "Volume. 21., No. 2," en
return to a new Middle Ages in various forms today shake the thought of the 'elite' European '
(p. 134). Compare also Berdiaeff: "A new Middle Ages." Paris, 1927.

In complete opposition to this comprehensible development, young Socialism is arising -its


economic principle the maximum of technical economic power, planfulness, development of all
human capacities and requirements its cultural-historical approach determined by the Marxist
outlook: against religious metaphysics advancing dialectical materialism: against enfeebled
intuitive contemplation, cognitive and practical activism: against flight into non-existent meta-
empirical heavens, the sociological self-cognition of all ideologies: against the ideology of
pessimism, despair, "fate," fatum, the revolutionary optimism which overturns the whole world:
against the complete disruption of theory and practice, their greatest synthesis: against the
crystallisation of an "elite," the uniting of the millions. It is not only a new economic system
which has been born. A new culture has been born.
We cite the elemental character of young Socialism that is arising. The first being the maximum of technical economic power. Technical is of or relating
to technique or proficiency in a practical skill. This is getting the most out of technical economic power. Of or relating to an economy, the system of
production and management of material wealth. Planfulness is the second economic principle. And the development of human capacities. It goes on but
eventually goes on against religious metaphysics. For religious metaphysics is combatted by advancing dialectical materialism. Enfeebled (weak)
intuitive contemplation is combatted by cognitive and practical activism. The non-existent meta-empirical heavens are combatted by the sociological
self-cognition of all ideologies. The ideology of pessimism, despair, fate, fatum is combatted with revolutionary optimism (inclination to hopefulness
and confidence) which overturns the whole world. It goes against the complete disruption of theory and practice with their synthesis. The crystallisation
of an elite is combatted by the uniting of the millions. It is not only a new economic system which has been born. A new culture has been born. Culture
being the customs, achievements, etc. of a particular civilization or group.

A new science has been born. A new style of life has been born. This is the greatest antithesis
in human history, which both theoretically and practically will be overcome by the forces of the
proletariat -the last class aspirins to power, in order in the long run to put an end to all power
whatsoever.
On the other hand, practical activity utilises theory, and to this extent practice itself is theoretical. In actual fact we have in every class society divided labour and, consequently, a contradiction between
intellectual and physical labour - that is. . a contradiction between theory and practice. But, like every division of labour, here too it is a living unity of opposites. Action passes into cognition. Cognition
passes into action. Practice drives forward cognition. Cognition fertilises practice.[6]

[6] Theoretical capacity begins with the presently existing, given, external and transforms it into its conception. Practical capacity, on the contrary, begins with internal definition. The latter is called
decision, intention, task. It then transforms the internal into the real and external- that is, gives it present existence.

This transition from internal definition to externality is called activity. Activity generally is the union of the internal and the external. The internal definition with which it begins, as a purely internal
phenomenon, must be removed in its form and become purely external.... On the contrary, activity is also the removal of the external, as it is given directly...The form of the external is changed .. (Georg.
Hegel: Introduction to Philosophy, sections 8 and 9.)

Emancipation. According to standard liberal views, freedom is the absence of interference or (even more narrowly) coercion. I am free to do what others do not prevent me from doing. Marxism is heir to a wider and richer view,
stemming from such philosophers as Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, of freedom as self determination.
What are these standard liberal views? Liberalism is having political or social views favoring reform and progress. So when standard liberal views? And in standard we mean established or well-known or widely recognized as a
model of authority or excellence. So in standard liberal views we could mean the estalished liberal views. What have the standard liberal views to say about freedom? It is that freedom is the absence of interference. Or more the
absence of interference or (even more narrowly) coercion. So there is no interference. Neither is there any coercion in standard liberal views.n interference is a policy of intervening in the affairs of other countries or other. This
being to not get involved, so as to alter or hinder an action, or through force or threat of force. And coercion? In coercion we mean the act of compelling by force of authority. What is freedom as self determination? self
determination is Deciding or controlling something's outcome or nature.

What are the absence of restrictions? For in the following we hear about the absence of restrictions. Any restriction being a restriction is a regulation that restricts or restrains. So in terms of common language we hear of
deregulation i.e., the act of freeing from regulation (especially from governmental regulations). This would mean less restriction, laws or rules. A restriction is a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment of real or other property.
Within limits would imply that there is some degree of freedom. In other words freedom is not an absolute. But in the standard liberal views the degree is pushed to the limits. We have the encumbrance on land restricting the uses
to which it may be put. In the Irish potato famine this is particularly relevant. A limitation that is imposed upon a class or ethnic group and that excludes its members from a fairly competitive use and enjoyment of the facilities of
a community (as housing, employment, or education). So it is a confinement within bounds. An absolute is complete and without restriction or qualification; sometimes used informally as intensifiers. A state at a particular time
implies conditions. Why would a state at a particular time be implying restrictions? It is because the state at a particular time is bound within the its own historical and social limitations. Society itself is bound within time and
space, and its heights just lie. See latency in our dictionary work.
If, in general, freedom is absence of restrictions upon options open to agents, one can say that the liberal tradition tended to offer a very narrow construal of what these restrictions can be (often confining them deliberate
interferences), of what the relevant options are (often confining them to whatever agents in fact conceive or choose), and of agent (seen as separate individuals, pursuing their independently conceived ends, above all i n the market-
place).

Marxism invokes wider notions of the relevant restrictions and options, and of human agency.

More specifically Marx and later Marxists tend to see freedom in terms of the removal of obstacles to human emancipation, that is to the manifold development of human powers and the bringing into being of a form of
association worthy of human nature. Notable among such obstacles are the conditions of wage labour. As Marx wrote, 'the conditions of their life and labour and therewith all the conditions of existence of modern society have
become . . . something over which individual proletarians have no control and over which no social organisation can give them control' (German Ideology, vol. I, IV, 6).

Overcoming such obstacles is a collective enterprise and freedom as selfdetermination is collective in the sense that it consists in the socially cooperative and organized imposition of human control over both nature and the social
conditions of production: 'the full development of human mastery over the forces of nature as well as of humanity's own nature' (Grundrisse, Notebook V, Penguin cdn., p. 488).

It will only be fully realized with the supersession of the capitalist mode of production by a form of association in which 'it is the association of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive forces of course)
which puts the conditions of the (development and movement of individuals under their control'. Only then 'within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions' {German Ideology, vol. 1,
IV, 6). What this form of association - embodying collective control, association or community the development of manifold individuality i n personal freedom - would look like, Marx and Engels never say possible
conflicts among these values, or between them and others.

Marxism tends to treat consideration of such matters as utopian'. But such a vision of emancipation is plainly integral to the whole Marxist project: a point clearly grasped by so- called 'Critical Theory', which postulates such a vision as
a vantage-point from which to criticize actual (and perhaps unemancipateable) societies (see FRANKFURT SCHOOL).

Marxism's wider and richer view of freedom has often led Marxists to understate, even denigrate both the economic and the civic freedoms of liberal capitalist societies. Though Marx plainly valued personal freedom, he did, in
On the Jewish Question, see the right to liberty as linked to egoism and private property, and elsewhere wrote of free competition as limited freedom because based on the rule of capital and therefore [sic] at the same time the
most complete suspension of all individual freedom'. (Grundrisse, Notebook VI, Penguin edn, p. 652).

More generally, he tended to see exchange relations as incompatible with genuine freedom. Later Marxists have followed him in this, and, especially since Lenin, they have often shown a pronounced tendency to deny the 'formal'
freedoms of bourgeois democracy the status of genuine freedoms.
Such formulations are theoretically in error and have been practically disastrous. There is no essential link between liberal freedom and either private property or egoism; neither economic competition nor exchange relationships
are inherently incompatible with the freedom of the parties concerned (nor indeed is the pursuit of self-interest implicit in both necessarily incompatible with emancipation, unless this is defined as based on universal altruism);
and the limited character of bourgeois political and legal freedoms does not make them any the less genuine, it is a mistake to think that unmasking bourgeois ideology entails exposing bourgeois freedoms as illusory, rather than
showing them to be in some cases (such as the freedom to accumulate property) precluding other more valuable freedoms and in others (such as the freedom to dissent) as applied in far too limited a fashion.

In practice the failure to call liberal freedoms freedom has legitimized their whole suppression and denial, all too often in the name of freedom itself
i