OUTLINE NO.

3
EDGARDO BOJOS LUARDO JR.MONDAY, JULY 31, 2017
SEPARATION OF POWERS
I. Separation of powers
A. Allocation of governmental powers in the Constitution
1. The major departments: Legislative, Executive & Judicial (Art. VI, VII, and VIII)
2. The Constitutional Commissions: COMELEC, CSC & COA (Art. IX)
3. The independent constitutional bodies: the SET & HRET (Art. VI, Sec. 17); the Commission on
Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 18); the PET (Art. VII, Sec. 4); the JBC (Art. VIII, Sec. 8); the
Ombudsman (Art. XI, Sec. 5)
ART. 6, SEC. 17:
- The Senate and the House of the Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be choses on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registerd under the party-lest system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

ART. 6, SEC. 18:

- There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.

ART. 7, SEC. 4.
7.The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualification of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

ART. 8, SEC. 8:
1.) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

2.)The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term
of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Members first
 appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of
law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private
sector for one year.

3.) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the council
and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

4.) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.

5.) The Council shall have the principal function for recommending appointeed to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign
to it.

- ART. 9, C. SEC. 5:
- No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of the election
laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.

B. Manner/form of conferment of power

1. Express powers
a. Legislative power to Congress
b. Executive power to the President
c. Judicial power & power of judicial review to the Supreme Court and lower courts
d. Other express powers (to the other independent constitutional bodies)

2. Implied powers: the doctrine of necessary implication

CASES:
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936 power to promulgate rules,
including fixing of relevant timetables/reglementary periods, implied from the express power
vested in the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly
- The Electoral Commission, as we shall gave occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election.
Returns, and qualifications of the members of the national Assembly.

-The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority
in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is , to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, and independent organ. It is, to be
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other.
 - The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly.

- The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only
would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the
legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable
clash of powers from time to time.

Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950 power to make investigations and exact
testimony from resource persons, and power to cite in contempt, implied from legislative power
under the 1935 Constitution; power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an auxiliary of
legislative function
- If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

- If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exist while the legislative
body exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce continue
until the final adjournment and the election of its successor.

- The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the
legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.

- There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

- That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in
performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for
contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the
right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it as an essential and
appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish
for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the
investigation at eh next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the
witness until the investigation is completed and absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure,
which should be avoided.

3. Inherent powers
CASES:
In re Dick, G.R. No. L-13862, April 16, 1918 inherent power of states to deport undesirable
aliens.
- Having held that he Governor- General was lawfully authorized to institute and maintain
deportation proceedings against the petitioner under the provisions of section 69 of the
Administrative code; and having declared that we have no jurisdiction in these habeas corpus
proceedings to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he based his
ruling in the course of these proceedings; and the Governor-General having declared, as a result of
an investigation lawfully held under his direction, that the petitioner is an undesirable alien, whose
presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace tot he peace and safety of the community; it would
seem to be a flagrant abuse of our discretion to turn him loose upon the community at such the
time as this, in the face of the insistent objection of the Chief Executive who is primarily charge
with the maintenance of the safety, peace, and good order of these Islands.

In Re Sotto, January 21, 1949 (Read also the concurrence of J. Perfecto) inherent power of
courts to cite a person in contempt
- The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or
principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is
applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as
expounded in American Jurisprudence.

--- The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be
regarded as an essential element of judicial authority.
--------- In many instances the right of certain tribunals to punish for contempt is expressly
bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is unnecessary, so far as the courts of general
jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as
concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower them to act.

------ Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness

of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision.

In re Integration of the Philippine Bar inherent power of the Supreme Court to integrate and
regulate the Philippine Bar
- The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power------to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Courts
constitutional authority over the Bar.
----- In providing that the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar, R. A 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Courts inherent
power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public
interest or, more specifically, will raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.

Santiago v. Vazquez, G.R. Nos. 99289, January 27, 1993 inherent power of courts to issue
interlocutory orders to protect, preserve and maintain its jurisdiction
- The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an
invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the
effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before
them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in
relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter
when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no
writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no
impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction
and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued,
the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.

- Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are
such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction or essential to
the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of jsutice; or
are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and
include the power to maintain the courts jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.

- Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies
the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws
and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that
are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.

- furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to
protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to
propert coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or
the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual.
What ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999 inherent, power of courts
to control and supervise the execution of their decisions
- The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case.
By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter
the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it.
 - The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial
power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

C. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction corollary to separation of powers

II. Checks and balances

Blending of powers
CASE: Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) (Read the
oft-quoted dissent of J. Holmes regarding blending of powers)
---------------------- HUHUHUHUHU--------
B. Checks and balances
1. Between the Executive and Congress
a. Law-making [Article VI, 27(1)]
- Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by tow-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered
in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if
he had signed it.

b. Grant of amnesty (Article VII, 19)

- Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.

c. Ratification of treaty (Art. VII, 21)

- No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and efective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

2. Between the Executive and the Constitutional Commissions

a. Presidents pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence in cases involving violations of
election laws, rules, and regulations requires a favorable recommendation from the COMELEC
[5, Article IX(C)]
 - No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of teh
Commission

3. Between the Executive and Congress, and the Judiciary

a. After a conviction by final judgment in a criminal case, the President may grant to reprieve,
commutation of sentence, pardon, or remits of the fine and forfeiture imposed by the court (Article
VII, 19)
- Par. 1: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, adn pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

b. Congress has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
(Article VI, 2), subject to the limitation that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Article VI, 5 (Ibid.), and that no law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without
the latters advice and concurrence (Article VI, 30)
- No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

c. Congress may also pass a law reorganizing the judiciary, but it should not undermine the
security of tenure of the members of the judiciary (Article VI, 2)
i. Examples
CASES:
Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-7910, January 18, 1955 Under the 1935 malaquias 2017-08-15 22:09
Constitution, Congress can abolish courts lower than the Supreme Court; thus, it can do the lesser Comment[m1]: dili mao imo case na search
thing of reducing the number or changing the category of judges presiding over such courts;
distinction between removal and abolition of office

De La Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982 Removal different from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office; no tenure to a non-existent office (decided under the 1973
Constitution)
- Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.
- It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of
the incumbent... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As
well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

4. The Role of the Judiciary

a. Judicial power and the power of judicial review
i. Expanded power to determine grave abuse of discretion (Sec. 1, Article VIII)
- ART. 8, SEC. 1, Par. 2:
 - Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ii. Review of the factual basis of Martial Law (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
- ART. 7, SEC. 18:
- The President shall be the Commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a repost in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may,
in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

- The congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

- The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial alw or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

- A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

- the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

- During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
CASE: Lagman v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 mandate of the SC to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of ML and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of HC a sui generis power; President has discretion to determine territorial
scope of ML
 - We revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial
law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is not constitutional edict that martial law
should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired.
This is not only practical but also logical.

- Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose
martial law only within the Courts compound because it is where the armed public uprising
actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded
from expanding the coverage of marital law beyond the courts compound. After all, rebellion is
not confined within predetermined bounds.

b. The judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, is the constitutional organ mandated to allocate
constitution boundaries
CASE: Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra
- In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.

c. Presumption of constitutionality a consequence of separation of powers

d. Supreme Court ruling on constitutional issues cannot be undone, or in effect reversed, by
Congress
CASES:
Endencia v. David, G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953 The Legislature cannot lawfully
declare, through a statute, the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers not a
decrease of their salary after the Supreme Court has decided previously otherwise
- The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly sec. 9, Art. VII,
has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because
the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
---- Now comes the Legislature and in sec. 13, R.A No. 590, says that no salary wherever
received by any public officer of the Republic shall be considered as exempt from the income
tax. (nag interpret sila pinaagi ang balaod) and proceeds to declare that payment of said income
tax is not a diminution of his compensation.

- CAN THE LEGISLATURE VALIDLY DO THIS?

- NO. (obviously)
- We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned
the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them.
--- If the legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific protion of
the constitution meaans, specially after the courts have in actual ascertain its meaning by
 interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely case confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions.

- We further hold that the interpretation and application of the constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and taht
in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such
a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the
courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought
and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case
by the highest court of the land.

Sameer Overseas Placement v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014 unconstitutionality of
a law cannot be cured by reenactment
- When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial
positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.

- However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact
clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the
circumstances.

- Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar
law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as
such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

e. Political vs. justiciable questions

i. Political questions
CASE:
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 the six characteristics of a political question
- The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political
question are:
1. Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department?
2. Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the
issue?
3. The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion.
4. The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.
5. Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made?
6. Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Alejandrino v. Quezon, G.R. No. 22041, September 11, 1924 SC does not possess the power of malaquias 2017-08-20 17:23
coercion (thru a writ of mandamus) to compel Philippine take any particular action (NOTE: ruling Comment[m2]: obsolete
no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)

Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946 SC cannot order a branch of the Legislature malaquias 2017-08-20 17:23
to reinstate a member thereof; doing so would establish judicial predominance (NOTE: ruling no Comment[m3]: obsolete
longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947 proposal to amend the Constitution a malaquias 2017-08-20 17:46
political question (NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution) IMPT: Read Comment[m4]: Obsolete, pero nice ang dissenting
also the scathing dissent of J. Perfecto, especially on the political question doctrine opinion ni Justice Perfecto.
J. PERFECTO
- The Majority enunciates the proposition that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary except by constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary. Then
argues that a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the enrolled bll rule
out of respect to the political departments.

- We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on

the unsettled meaning of political question. The general proposition that political questions
are not within the province of the judiciary is just one of the many numerous general
pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals
to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.

- Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions
relating to it, therefore, betaken away from the courts? Then, what about the constitutional
provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide all cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty or a law?

Arnault v. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955 SC cannot review the findings of the malaquias 2017-08-20 18:06
Houses of Congress in the exercise of the latters legislative prerogatives Comment[m5]: Lahi ang nakuha, G.R. No. L-3820
- G.R No. L-3820 July 18, 1950--- (kari ra ang na print) ang na print.
- The power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has
jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded,
this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling
of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to
review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this
proposition.

Osmea v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960 political question: whether a
legislators action constitutes disorderly behavior or disorderly conduct
- On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmena may e discipline, many arguments pro and con have been
advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not
be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if
this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmena conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.

- Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

- The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in
what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated senate is given the power to
example a member, the court will not review it action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair
decision.

De Castro v. Committee on Justice, G.R. No. L-71688, September 3, 1985 political issue: malaquias 2017-08-20 18:31
whether the action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan in dismissing, for insufficiency in Comment[m6]: Wala kay case
form and substance, the impeachment complaint against President Marcos was valid

Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December 20, 1985 political issue:
whether the snap presidential elections of 1986 should be enjoined
- The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not issue any restraining
order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents
office) which can be truly decide only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled
election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The court cannot stand in the way
of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a neq
mandate or to elect a new president.

Romulo v. Yiguez, G.R. No. 71908, February 4, 1986 political issue: whether the Supreme
Court should order the Committee on Justice to recall the impeachment resolution and complaint
against President Marcos, and the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges
- A closer look at the substance than the form of the petition would reveal that resolution of
the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of the Rules is not even necessary, What
petitioners are really seeking is for this Court to compel the Batasan to proceed with the hearing
on the impeachment of the President.

- An interference by the judicial department of the government with the workings and
operations of the committee of the legislative department would be tantamount to an interference
with the workings and operations of the legislative department itself.

- The batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules of its proceedings may adopt, as it did
adopt, necessary rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings.
 - That the Rules on Impeachment of the Interim Batasan in the judgment of petitioners is
better is no argument against the validity or constitutionality of the Rules on Impeachment
approved by the batasan. More importaatly, said Rules are always within the power of the
Batasan to modify, change or replace any time. They do not have the force of law but are
merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of
proceedings before the Batasan. They are merely procedural and not substantive. They may
be waived or disregarded by the Batasan and with their observance the Courts have no
concern.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 Political: Whether a law is void
because the House failed to comply with its own internal rules (read also the concurring and
dissenting opinion of J. Puno)
- Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report
on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and
void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16 (3) that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution
itself.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed
to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
---- it was held. At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.
- It has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently , mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

--- CJ FERNANDO.
- Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded t=by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons oter than member
of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

- in this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more
power to look into the internal proceedings of the House than members of that House have to look
over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

- the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely
of non-compliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limtis
of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of our power.

- Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only
that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 legislative policy underlying the enactment of
a statute not reviewable by the Court; Court rejected argument that because R.A. 9262 is intended
to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abusewhich could very well be committed by
either the husband or the wifegender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under the law
- It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of
a stature. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution.

Metrobank v. Tobias, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012 principle of non-interference: courts
do not interfere with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the
public prosecutor in the latters determination of the existence of probable cause in a criminal case
- Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in
this case by the DOJ. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.

Spouses Balangauan v. CA, G. R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008 exception to the principle of
non-interference: when Secretary of Justice commits grave abuse of discretion
 - It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi judicial- proceeding,
and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the finding of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.

- The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of crimes,
its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component
of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators, the responsibility for
which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to
warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or
that the evidence are hand points to a different conclusion.

- But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor has erroneously exercised the
discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

And while it is this Courts general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause,
we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as when the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority, resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. Although
there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause, since the same
must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination,
such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge (public prosecutor) or run counter to
the clear dictates of reason.

ii. Justiciable questions

CASES:
Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949 (decision: SC has no jurisdiction over the
issue on the legitimacy of the Senate presidency); March 14, 1949 (resolution: SC has jurisdiction
over the issue) (Read also concurrence of J. Perfecto to the March 14, 1949 resolution,
especially his critique of the judicial hands-off policy)
- MARCH 4, 1949:
- In view of the separation of powers political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should
not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the
Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected
without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain n this case because the selection
of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall--- not in the Supreme Court.

- MARCH 14, 1949

- This second question depends upon these sub-questions:
Was the session of the so-called rum Senate a continuation of the session validly
assembled with 22 Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?
Was there a quorum in that session?

- other justices deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is
held, as they do, that the Court has not jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion
of the other four on those four on those sub-questions.

- Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the
session was a continuation of the morning session and the a minority of 10 senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that
met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the
resolution been approved only by ten or less.

- if the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate? The 4 justices say there was, firstly because
the minute say so, secondly, because tat the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view
of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a
majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
--- When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum, the House, does not mean all the members. Even a majority of
all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majoirty (12)
of all the member of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
J. PERFECTO.
- The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case,
notwithstanding their political nature and implication, are justiciable and
within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the Supreme Court, which
cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution.
---- Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of 12 Senators in
which respondent was elected acting President of the Senate, is a question that
call for teh interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and
specific provision of the Constitution.

- The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable

condition for effective collective action.
 - When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a
quorum we did it for mighty reasons, such as that democracy is based on the
rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less than the majority of the
members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to
allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where
the Constitution provided for only one.

J. PERFECTO CONCURRING. ---- JUDICIAL HANDS-OFF---

- Judicial Hands-off policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority
complex. Consequently like its parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on
notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an upshot of distorted part experience,
warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy appraisal of reality in
its true form.

- For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction on the cases is to

violate the Constitution. Refusal to exercise the judicial power vested in it is to
transgress the fundamental law. This case raises vital constitutional questions
which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. It
would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of
our Constitutional Convention to have drafter a document leaving such a glaring
hiatus in the organization of Philippine democracy if it failed to entrusted to the
Supreme Court the authority to decide such constitutional questions.

- Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is an unjustifiable as the

refusal of senators on strike to attend the sessions of the Senate and to perform their
duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the legislative power vested by the constitution
in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful than a laborers strike or a
legislative impasee. Society may go on normally while laborers temporarily stop to
work. Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But
society is menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of
justice. Anarchy and chaos are its alternatives.

- Here is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest

organs and officers of government. If they should fail to perform their functions
and duties, what i the use for minor official and employees to perform theirs? The
constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.

Taada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957 justiciable issue: whether the election
by the Senate of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as additional members of the SET, upon
nomination by the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate, contravened the
constitutional mandate that said additional members shall be chosen upon nomination . . . of the
party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate
- Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, has the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed
the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening sutdy on
judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:

- The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers hall be exercised,
and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In
performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the
government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same thing as teh
performance of the act.
- In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the aprticular
service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been
violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative.

- It is well settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory provisions.

- It is not easy, however, to define the phrase political question nor to determine what matters, fall
within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the
judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.

- Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether the election of senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate on behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravened the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen upon nomination of the party having the second largest number
of votes in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. -------- THIS IS NOT A POLITICAL
QUESTION.------ the Senate is not clothed with full discretionary authority in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.

--- whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given
situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with
such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress
on the constitutional or statutory rights.

- What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with,
the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers
intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties
therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the
resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of
members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role thereby are called upon to play. It
constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory,
and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973 justiciable: Whether
President Marcos proclamation that the people have already ratified the proposed new
Constitution was valid
- Does the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of he nature of a policial,
and, hence, non-justiciable question?

- The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are
justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the
non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of
powers-------- characteristic of the Presidential system of government--- the functions of
which are classified or divide, by reason of their nature, into 3 categories, namely:
1. Those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department;
2. Those concerned mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial
decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department;
and
3. Those prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are
apportioned to courts of justice.
Within its own sphere-- but only within such sphere-- each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers
or field of action assigned to any of the other departments but also, to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments--- provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto
by the Constitution.

- what is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it
is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has
been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act.------------- His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily
because they are of a politics nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the
particular matter under his control.

- The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing Constitution is
a judicial question. There can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect
that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been
amended in the manner required by the Constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to
determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be
permitted to illegally amend the organic law.

- In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution
prescribes the method or procedure for its amendment, it is clear to my mind that the question
whether or not the revised Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable one and non-political in nature, and that it
is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Courts bounden duty to decide such
question.

----- On the first issue inovlving the political question doctrine of Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, fernando, Teehankee and myself, or 6 members of the court, hold that the
issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote,
stating that inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may
inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval and, in
the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the peoples will, but, in
negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution been complies with. Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or 3
members of the Court hold that the issue is political and beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.

Sanidad v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976 justiciable issue: whether President
Marcos had the power to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution in the absence of the
interim National Assembly, which had the power to propose constitutional amendments during the
period of transition.

Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989 justiciable issue: whether petitioners
removal from the Commission on Appointments and replacement by respondent was valid

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003 issues arising
from impeachment proceedings not outside the ambit of the power of judicial review

DELEGATION OF POWERS
I. GR: What has been delegated, cannot be further delegated (principle of non-delegability) EXC:
cases of permissible delegation
II. Instances of permissible delegation
A. Legislative power
1. GR: Legislative power is vested in Congress (except to the extent retained by the people
through the system of initiative and referendum)
2. EXC: Delegation of legislative power
a. Rationale the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of
Congress to cope directly with the problems demanding its attention
b. Instances of delegation of legislative power
i. legislative power to local governments (Sec. 16 and 18, R.A. 7160) NOTE: power of taxation
not delegated by Congress through R.A. 7160, but expressly conferred to the LGUs under 5,
Article X of the Constitution
ii. power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, etc. to the President (Sec. 28(2), Article VI)
iii. ordinance power to the President under the Administrative Code (E.O. No. 292, The
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Chapter 2)
iv. Delegation to administrative bodies: the power of subordinate legislation
CASES:
Cruz v. Youngberg, G.R. No. L-34674, October 26, 1931 valid delegation: Presidents power to
issue continent regulation pursuant to his delegated authority to determine a state of facts upon
which the enforcement of the law depends
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988 standard: fair and
equitable employment practices
v. emergency powers to the President (Sec. 23(2), Article VI)
CASES:
Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949 C.A. 671, or the Emergency Powers
Actwhich declared a state of total emergency as a result of the 2nd World War, authorized the
President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency, and provided that it shall
be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise providebecame
inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946 (decision) (NOTE: Modified
by the 1987 Constitution)
Rodriguez v. Gella, G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953 Emergency powers lasted only during
the emergency resulting from WWII, which factually involved the Philippines when C.A. 671 was
passed on December 16, 1941, and ended when the emergency terminated upon the end of WWII
(NOTE: Modified by the 1987 Constitution); Emergency power given in a time of war cannot be
used during a national calamity following the end of the war
III. Tests of valid delegation
A. Completeness test the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions and must set forth
the policy to be executed by the delegate so that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it
CASES:
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922 incomplete law: Act No. 2868 did not
define and penalize the crime, but left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what
was any cause for enforcing the act and what was an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,
rice or corn, and under undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold; In the
absence of the proclamation no crime was committed
Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 159149, June 26, 2006
compare with U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho; DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 a valid administrative
regulation implementing B.P. Blg. 33
B. Sufficient standard test there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot
CASES:
People v. Rosenthal, G.R. Nos. L-46076 and L-46077, June 12, 1939 sufficient standard:
public interest
Cervantes v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1952 sufficient standard: simplicity,
economy and efficiency
Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940 sufficient standard: public
convenience and interest
People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937 inexistent standard: Act 4221, the (old)
Probation Law, provided that the law shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer, but did not fix any rules or
standards to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine
whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 inexistent standard: E.O.
626-Awhich prohibited the inter-provincial movement and slaughtering of carabaos and
carabeef, and provided that the confiscated animal or meat shall be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaosan invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers mentioned because they were granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties taken
Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997 sufficient standard: Section
15, R.A. 8180, the first Oil Deregulation Law, provides sufficient standard to guide the President
in judging whether to advance full deregulation: he was to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable; early deregulation under E.O. 392
misapplied R.A. 8180 as it considered an extraneous factorthe depletion of the OPSF fundas
a factor in advancing full deregulation
Abakada Guro v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008 sufficient standard: R.A. 9335,
or the Attrition Act of 2005which provides in Sec. 7(b) and (c) that officials of the BIR and the
BOC may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at
least 7.5%reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target
by at least 7.5%) analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties
Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965 existence of apparent
standard, either in the text of the law itself or outside thereof, does not automatically render the
delegation valid; When what is delegated is inherently a legislative function, the existence of an
apparent standard will not save the law
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 Even if completeness test
is complied with, if sufficient standards test is violated, law still unconstitutional
Tatad v. Executive Secretary, supra Standard set in the law cannot be validly modified or
misapplied by the delegate
IV. Delegation of ascertainment of facts or a contingency strictly not the same as delegation of
legislative power
CASES:
Cruz v. Youngberg, supra
Abakada Guro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 R.A. No. 9337, Sec. 4, 5 and 6,
amending Sec. 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC, and giving the President stand-by
authority to raise VAT rate from 10% to 12% effective January 1, 2006, after either (1) the VAT
collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2
4/5%); or (2) the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 %): not a delegation of legislative power, but simply delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the
law is contingent