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Right to remain silent and when is their valid waiver

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness at himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain anent and to court
and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other m which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The accused may waive his right when the confession was voluntarily made.

People vs Dela Cruz


124 SCRA 229
Facts:
Dela Cruz together with the two other accused were charge of the crime of murder. During
the preliminary investigation of the three accused in 1951, Dela Cruz and one co accused jumped
bail and disappeared. The third co-accused (Cenon) was tried almost nine years later. He
implicated his two missing co-accused, was found guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
He has since been released on parole.
After (18) years after he jumped bail, the Dela Cruz was arrested. He was charged in an
amended information, tried, and sentenced to DEATH.

Issue:
Whether or not accused has the right to be informed of the crime charge

Held:
After a thorough review of the evidence on we are convinced that the accused-appellant
was at the scene of the crime during its commission and that, contrary to his protestations, he had
something to do with the killing. However, because of unavoidable difficulties or unfortunate
lapses on the part of the prosecution, the only evidence directly the incriminating the appellant
confession of the convicted earlier happens to be inadmissible against him. We are, therefore,
constrained to acquit the accused-appellant and the write finis to the 39-year old killing not because
the evidence had adduced subsequent to his recapture 25 years after the crime, fails to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys-

USED AS A PRINCIPAL EVIDENCE, IN ADMISSIBLE, WHERE RIGHT TO


CONFRONTATION NOT DULY OBSERVED. The confession of Cenon, however, is not
simply corroborative not is the principal evidence against Dela Cruz. It was not utilized by the
lower court merely as circumstantial evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court applies the rule
that extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating an accused cannot be used against the latter
unless repeated in open court. As far as the Dela Cruz is concerned, the confession which helped
send Cenon to jail for life is hear say
Purpose of Arraignment; Right to be heard by himself and counsel
Arraignment
A criminal proceeding at which the defendant is officially called before a court of compet
ent jurisdiction, informed of theoffense charged in the complaint, information, indictment, or oth
er charging document, and asked to enter a plea of guilty,not guilty, or as otherwise permitted by
law. Depending on the jurisdiction, arraignment may also be the proceeding at whichthe court de
termines whether to set bail for the defendant or release the defendant on his or her own recogniz
ance.

Purpose of Arraignment:
1. Double joepardy to attach
2. Court can proceed trial in absentia in case accused absconds

People vs Judge Bocar


GR L- 27935, 16 Aug 1985

Facts:
A complaint against the 3 accused for the crime of theft was filed. Upon arraignment the 3
accused pleaded not guilty. Judge Bocar conducted a summary investigation directing
questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. The judge issued the order dismissing the
case, holding that the case is more than civil than criminal.

Issue:
Whether the Judge dismissal constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.

Held:
The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the judge. No
evidence in law as had yet been entered into the records of the case before the court. The Courts
issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable
abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court cannot permit.
The constitutional guarantee is that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" (Sec. 22, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court (substantially reproduced as Section 7, Rule 117 in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
made effective on January 1, 1985) clarifies the guarantee as follows:
Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy.-When a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it
was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.