You are on page 1of 41

^ D 11

13
1 Rogelio V. Morales
5906 Magnolia Avenue
2
Riverside CA 92506 SEP 2 0 2017
3 P:(951)742-8052
F:(951)905-1283
4 E: rogeIiolaw0311@gmaiLcom
5
In Pro Per
0 COPY
6
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
7

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE
8

9 HALL OF JUSTICE

10 Case No. RIF1701355


PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
11
CALIFORNIA, DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V
12 MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIO^
Plaintiff, TO DISQUALIFY ENTIRE RIVERSIDE
13 COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE PURSUANT CAL.PENAL CODE
14 1424
15 vs.

Hearing Date: October 6,2017


16
Time: 8:30a.m.
17
Department: 63
18 ROGELIO V. MORALES

19

20 Defendant

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
-1-
28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
]
1 I, ROGELIO V. MORALES,declare:

2
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, except as to those stated on
3
information and belief and, as to those,I am informed and believe them to be true. If
4
I am called as a witness, I could and would testify under oath to the matters stated
5

6 herein.

7 2. On August 30, 2016, in Case Number RICl609607, Judge Tranbarger granted my


8
special motion to strike pursuant California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16,
9
necessarily finding all the lawsuits I had filed in Riverside County were
10

11
^^constitutionally protected"* conduct and "w/ subject to a restraining order."

12 However, the special motion to strike was also partially denied. I have appealed the
13 partial denial of the special motion to strike and the matter is currently on appeal.
14
Based on my legal research and consultation with constitutional law experts,I expect
15
my appeal with be sustained in its entirety.
16

17 3. On or about November 3, 2017, the following individuals (who are also so-called

18 "victims")pled the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when they were
19
asked ifthey had stalked my wife in violation of California Penal Code Section 646.9,
20
a felony, during a trial related to my wife's petition for civil harassment restraining
21
orders:
22

23 i. Bryan S. Owens

24 ii. Rosa Elena Sahagun


25
iii. Nelida Jimenez de Garibay
26

27
-2::
28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
1 iv. Jose Paniagua
2
V. Luis Zamora

Because an adverse inference can be taken by a federal court when a party invokes the

Fiith Amendment right to remain silent in a federal civil court,I shortly thereafter sent

6 demand letters to these individuals that I would file a federal civil lawsuit for violation

7 ofthe federal stalking statute, which would fall under the definition of^^racketeering'
Q

as defined at 18 U.S.C. 1961^ 1512 unless we settled outside ofcourt.


9
4. On March 24,2017,1 also filed a claim against the City of Riverside, California and

12 alleged that Detective David Smith obtained an illegal search warrant in violation of
12 my constitutional First Amendment right to free speech in violation of Judge

Tranbarger's August 30, 2016 order that granted my anti-SLAPP motion. A true and
14
correct copy of this claim form is attached as Exhibit "A". Upon hearing this
15
information and in a pathetic attempt to save himself. Detective David Smith
16

17 submitted a police report and laughably suggested he was being extorted for violating

18 my constitutional rights simply because I filed a claim against him, and the City and
19
County of Riverside. A true and correct copy of Detective Smith's police report
20
discussing my initial claim against him is attached as Exhibit
21

22 5. On April 20, 2017, in apparent retaliation for filing a claim against Detective
23 Smith and/or the Citv and Countv of Riverside, my wife and I were arrested after

24 the Riverside County District Attorney's Office filed numerous criminal charges
25

26

27 ,,
:3i
28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
1 principally related to approximately eleven (11) lawsuits and other litigation I have
2
pursued on behalfof my wife and I from approximately May 2016 to the present.

6. On or about June 26,2017,1 filed a citizen complaint against Detective David Smith

and Detective Melissa Brazil others for being engaged in ^''racketeering''as defined by

6 18 U.S.C. 1961, 1512 since they filed some charges to prevent me from filing a

7 federal lawsuit against individuals who plead the Fifth Amendment right against self-
8
incrimination when they were asked, under oath, if they had stalked my wife in
9
violation of California Penal Code Section 646.9, a felony. On or about July 6,2017,
10
jj my complaint was accepted and is now currently being investigated by the Riverside
12 Police Department, Office of Internal Affairs. Attached to Exhibit **" is a copy of

^^ that complaint and correspondence received by Internal Affairs that advised me that I
14
was under "no obligation to cooperate with any other investigation conducted by a
15
representative^^ ofeither detective,
16

17 7. Based on my legal research, both the Riverside District Attomey's Office and the

18 Riverside Police Department are, at least, civilly liable to me and my wife to violation

the federal civil "RICO" statute. Attached as Exhibit"D" is a copy ofthe 18 U.S.C.
20
1961, 1512, which makes it unlawful to, among other things, to use force or the
21

22 threat of force to prevent or hinder reporting a possible federal offense to a federal


23 judge via a federal civil lawsuit.

24 8. On or about May 31, 2017, Deputy District Attorney Heather Ferris drove to Palm
25
Springs in a blatant attempt to intimidate me and my wife from proceeding with our
26 '
27

28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY


ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
1 constitutional right to petition and free speech and sat in the courtroom with an angry

scowl on her face. I am quite certain that Deputy District Attorney Heather Ferris

cannot take days off like that for ail of her cases. What is more likely is that Deputy

District Attorney Heather Ferris has an emotional, personal and financid stake in the

5 outcome ofmy case and made special arrangements to appear like a mentally unstable

7 creep at my civil case jury trial. I guess she had free time that morning for all the
8
criminal cases she is handling. Or perhapsjust mine.
9
9. On or about July 2,2017,1 filed a claim against Riverside County District Attorney
10
Mike Hestrin and Deputy District Attorney Heather Ferris for engaging in

12 ^Racketeering" for trying to prevent me from filing a federal lawsuit against

individuals who I believe stalked my wife. Attached as Exhibit"E" is a copy of my


14
filed claim. If my claim is denied, I will file a federal Racketeering, Influenced and
15
Corrupt Organizations Act("RICO")civil lawsuits against the County of Riverside,
16

Iq California and any other individuals whom I may conclude took in any part in trying
18 to prevent or hinder me and my wife from reporting a possible federal offense to a
19
federaljudge in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1961,1512.
20
10. In short,the criminal case against me and my wife is a violation ofour right to petition,
21
right to free speech and right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Moreover,I
22

23 relied on the California Supreme Court's decision in Angelluci v. Century Supper

24 Club,(2007)41 Cal. 4th 160 in determining that my conduct and wife's lawsuits are
25
proper and ethical, since my wife and I engaged in the exact same conduct which was
26"
27

28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY


ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
1 sanctioned as legal by the Califomia Supreme Court.See Id. at \1^. CDefendant also
^ contends that meritless, abusive litigation ofthis type is proliferating in California
3
and generally results in the extortion ofa settlement on the basis ofthe plaintiffs
4
^ unsupported factual allegations. Although we share to some degree the concerns
6 voiced by the trial court and the appellate court below and by defendant and its amid
7 curiae regarding thepotentialfor abusive litigation being brought under the Act, these
8
concerns do not supply ajustificationfor our inserting additional elements ofproof
9
into the cause ofaction defined by the statute. It isfor the Legislature (or the People
10

11
through the initiative process) to determine whether to alter the statutory elements of
12 proof to afford business establishments protection against abusive private legal
13 actions and settlement tactics. It is for the Legislature, too, to consider whether
14
limitations on the current statutory private cause of action might unduly weaken
15
enforcement ofthe Act or place unwarranted barriers in the way ofthose persons who
16

17
suffer discrimination and whose interests were intended to be served by the Act.").
18 Since the Legislature has not changed the private cause of action in the Gender Tax
1^ Repeal Act of 1995 since 2007,then my wife and I are legally and ethically justified
20
in carrying out the Legislature's intention to eradicate gender discrimination which is,
21
ofcourse,at least according to Judge Tranbarger,'''constitutionallyprotected"A copy
22

23 of Califomia Supreme Court's decision in Angelluci v. Century Supper Club,(2007)


24 41 Cal. 4th 160 is attached as Exhibit"F'.

25

26

27

28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY


ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
11. My intention in lawfully filing these lawsuits was to eradicate gender discrimination

pursuant the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, which several ofthese businesses have

admitted, under oath in deposition testimony, they violated as alleged by my wife.


Furthermore, pursuant California Code of Civil Procedure 52(a),'Vhoever denies,

6 aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to [the


7 Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995]is liable for each offense [...]" and thus,the City and
8
County of Riverside, and members of the Riverside District Attorney's Office face
9
additional civil liability for their actions, in conjunction with the liability for their
10

Ij ^^racketeering activity'^ and possibly criminal exposure.


12 12. Moreover, due to the media attention this case has received, I have heard rumors that
13
the reason criminal charges were filed against me is because Riverside County District
14 '
Attomey Mike Hestrin and one of the so-called 'Victims" Rosa Elena Sahagun are
15
,
. involved or were involved in an extramarital affair. Attached as Exhibit "G" is a
io

17 photo that appears to suggest an inaPDroDriate sexual intimacy nr familiriY


between a married man(Hestrin)and an apparently unattached, never-married
19
woman(Sahagun)due to the closeness and body language displayed in the photo.
20
I request an opportunity to put Hestrin on the stand, placed under oath, and put these
21
rumors to rest.
22

23 13. Lastly, on September 7, 2017, Deputy District Attomey Heather Ferris enlisted the
help of a bailiff to prevent me firom entering a courtroom so I could appear on my
25
client's motion to withdraw his guilty plea (in an unrelated case)for no reason other
26 "

27

28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY


ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
to seek to harass and embarrass me in front of several attorneys and courtroom staff.
Simply put. Riverside County District Attorney Mike Hestrin and Deputy District
Attorney Heather Ferris have conducted themselves in a manner,over the rather short

course of this case, leading to the appearance of a personal, financial and

emotional stake in the conviction of mvself and mv wife; not the fair

administration of justice.
8
I declare under penalty ofpequry under the laws ofthe State of California that the foregoing is
9
true and correct.
10

11
Executed in Riverside, Califrnniaon September20,2017
12

13

14 ^
ib V. Morales,
15 YCIhProPer

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
:8^
-io DECLARATION OF ROGBLIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
1
PROOF OF SERVICE
2

3 I am employed in the aforesaid county, State of California; I am over the age ofeighteen
(18) years, and not a party to the within action; I am not a registered California process server;
4 my business address is: 5906 Magnolia Avenue,Riverside CA 92506.
5 On September 20,2017,1 served the foregoing documents described as:
6 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
7 PURSUANT CAL.PENAL CODE 1424
8
on the interested parties in said action, on each ofthe following:
9
Heather Ferris
10 Riverside District Attomey*s Office
3960 Orange Street #500
11 Riverside CA 92501

12
State of California Department ofJustice
13 Office ofthe Attorney General
300 S. Spring Street,#1700
14
Los Angeles, CA 90013
15
[X](BY MAIL) I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and procesiiing
16 correspondence for mailing.It is deposited with the U.S.Postal Service on the same day in the ordii lary
course of business. I am aware that on motion of party service, service is presumed invalid if pc stal
17
cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailinj; an
18 affidavit.

19
I declare under penalty of peijury under the laws ofthe State of California that the foregoing is
20
true and correct.
21
Executed in Riverside, California on September 20,2017.
22

23

24 Senaida Morales

25

26

27

28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY


ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
1

10

11

12 EXHIBIT A
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
10-
28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
CITYOFRiVERSa^

FlEWfTM:

dtyClnft^Of^ CLAIM FOR DAMAGES RESERVE FORJFIUNQ STAMP

rManoaSCI
mtrn^tOiiasB toipeRSCm OR PROPERTY

"U Cbimfertfcilu'B^icrpsonortptioniipnpefiyinustbe9ediwiierfliansix
<iciDunnee>(Qoy.Ccda Se. t.2^)
2. Cl^foirdiifni^tBivatimvii^aidi^sm MAR 24 2017
<^foh n^diarKi MfibM bk.fM notiaberthan ooa(1)
^aere6ciwcnc*^<6M.Ca^ 01l^CI|iler1.(.P(9eidel^^ City of Riverside
3.
4.
CttyderlCsOfRce
fi. ThadaimflRtm^a^besiaMdanpia^
g A^achaww^afiw^tfMCtaMhf.fediiaftadrt^ StSMEACH SHEET
ofBMi of Ciainiant
TO: CmrOFRIVBIHOe >kwe20,i6Ty|
NaiiNir<3aimaRt OcoupaaonQrcWmant
RogiaSDV.Moiates jAatomey
HeiMRMxie Number
|%1-Q61^186"
BusMieAekfne5sa^ BusbMBbPlisntNumber
1951-742-6052
|
6iaa4wldwiaaHtf NiyiiOHi niawbBfbytwblob jfcy dBsita twUBCs aftiBrorauticwboni to iS"
.com
i^gMgiSS.:>widBOAaia^ '
lEEpsBBBmrasiK: TEwlS'fltfjuMf/Ci^'em^loyMS itiuoliwtS'it)DMWSE,aifUWY,ofLOSg
UOfcllPjgij lOetecinmDatfidSmiQri/RPDBpgcel^^
tf dArtirv IpKT
tfibbbmiiMMi'

.kiiuRY.wlOSS bodta^ OMttlK bdiy,^lMabon(bograra on iMiwsde oTMs sheia. VMecc apsrabtiaife.amc sb^^
nPMwg<IMOSgsailDlnfflBtgtflltlRlSWW MIMUaflBC

WhecK^oe Magriola Avenue^ CA92S06.

T^^^^SBS^^^E^^^E^^^^^iZZIZZZZIZIZZZZZIZZZIZZIZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZiZZZZZZZZZZZZZZiZ
BasddonttiCDiniatton^^a^ beSef.on oralitt0ecentt^2,2016k Oetectfwo OMSmmiobtaMao
ViiAtficn of A CotitOiiter.Oft Augiisl 30,2016,Judge tranbsiger issued an a om
atodnd dioi^ HoiMwr. TranlMigeratso ruietfttiat afl ortny eodai medbiac^ notto st^iectto
iwbaning Older5inc8#vviere oqrffitSutionaKy protected.FolCHnng Ju^Tia^^ omer.I oonteiued toind on
M!toiBS0dM fiiedto stes-f=urtheffnQre^JtidffB T>aitefgBr6)mifadBv dented any'stay
me.
TtieiBalter,Oetectira E)mfto S urdawiui search wananttor )9a^ in the social moSa aoilvtlyJudge
Tiartoaiifer iiiiBd 1 was aSowBd toei^^
1^doyoodaimeCyjsi*sp^^ ~ ^

daMdBmtthQfteemldBiAgoy. thto datoito dentedJ Meito to filed a


Section 19^agatostlMsC^.Counhf.and Dstecfive dntth.

Deielte

to tie ftee^fiom "teweasdnahiesearthes*.

ssnteeaipyet} TkffiS CLAM MUST BE SfGNED OH REUSISEsee

Pa^l
CLAM NO.
EipnsMfeiiiBdfaiiaKliia^pMaMe^ l|

IE. MBBn^Sff
^sooyDni
^jsntjDoo
Kmffsm 3
iasiaf^flfpii lijrjto^iite^daii^f iljQQOIXD

mm imMK.miimtiaamwi^

>i|ii.iiit. 11111111 iirii.iML

mrnmammma

IMDSHlliiB-

llddBt.

RBIBaMBWLY
ar.al' fjpBMi WMBB of raftflaaxif J
if IT i*dlBBa*efl#feleeiE<flrfomr
Mfel Mlfe|MMftapMtbr'3r.
HEftB: tiffipHi liilwJa
mSSi!Sm

mmm
msmm

Pagt2

mm
EXfflBIT B

-11-
DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Riverside Police Department
Continuation Sheet
Page 2 File#P16182866
03-16-17 Dgt Dsvid Smith #0444

Narrative

While investigating this case I interviewed S-Morales on the telephone on 12-06-16. During that
conversation we discussed my opinion that he may be violating the civil restraining order that
was granted to V-Sahagun and that what he was doing to the small businesses he was filing
lawsuits against may be extortion. S-Morales disagreed with me on the phone.
The next day I saw that S-Morales had sent me emails regarding our conversation in which he
tries to explain to me and cite some case law on why he believes that he had not committed any
crimes. In the emails he also states that if I were to arrest him for any of these alleged crimes he
could sue me for violating his civil rights and stated, Tou might want to make sure."
I responded, "Mr. Morales. You are coming close to threatening me to not perform my duties. I
would cease these emails and save it for court, if It ends up there." He responded, "Your last
response proves you are not reading my emails". He has not emailed me since then. I have
attached copies of those emails to this report.

I continued to investigate this case and filed the case with the District Attorney's Office on 03-
15-17. While waiting for the DA's Office to go through the case I was notified by the Internal
Affairs Lt., Lt. Schubert, that S-Morales had filed a "Claim for Damages" with the City of
Riverside on 03-24-17 demanding $1,000,000 for "Constitutional Violations" against him
because of the search warrants I authored and served on his professional Facebook page and a
fake page he created to violate the restraining order against him by V-Sahagun. In the daim he
also says that if he is not paid, "then I intend to file a federal dvil lawsuit for violations of 42 USC
Section 1983 against this City, County and Detective Smith"(see attached copy).
I believe that S-Morales' is using the same threats and actions here as he is using to extort the
many small businesses and individuals he is victimizing in the community.
Disposition

This report will be forwarded to the District Attomey's Office.

RIF1701355
nno42S
2

10

11

12

13
EXHIBIT C
14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
__ -Uz
28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
r" -> I
^ vt \^-rZT

Police
Departmi^ . ii'-''--"^T""'':'l:'''^'-'i p-^/''!;-''-" ::-
Office o//^emdi A^li^

Mf, Rogelio V. Morales


5906 Magnolia Ave,
..y-.y-' ^
Riverside, CA 92506

1^; CTHzaey cqmpiatnt- pn 704007

Dear Mr. Morales:

year the Riverside Police Departoient^s Communicatioiis Division recdves over four kmdr^
fifiy thousand phoUe c^s firotn citizeits. Unfortunately,mpst oftije time diese contactsinvolvefhe
citizen being a victim^ witness^ injured, or upset During asmall percent^e ofthese cireumstances
ranfusioc, &i^t or anger can result in the citizen believing pur employee's demeaimr was
inappropriate; police powers did procedures are abusive; or the law does not the puhlic;
However,the overV^hning majority ofcitizens supppdlawenforcernent,:espedallytiiecommum1y
oriented policing philosophy.

That d(^ notmeatite we are alwaysright in what we say or do. Your complaint cotrid mean that
something we are doing or have done is inconsistent wltiithe values ofthe Department As Chief,I
am constantly looking to improve ourservice to the community and I can assure you tfaat I take the
condud ofeach employee Seriously.
The;complaint you filed with the Riverside Police De^rtment has been accepted and is|ffesently
being investigated by a supervisor or a member ofInternal Affairs. A copy of your Gompiaint is
^closed Please read the statementofcoi^laintfor accuracy. Ifyou have additionalinfonuation or
wish to coifect the complakt,plea^ attach a separate sheet ofpaperto the copy and return it to the
OfSce ofInternal AJ^^. A retiitn envelope is enclosed for your Cpiivdiidice.

i must also advise you that you are iinder no obligation to cooperate with any o&er inys^igation
t^nducted by a repjtesentative ofthe involved employee.

10540 fttegnolio Avb.,Sfe B Riverside, CA 92505951.353.7260 w*^^riyeftideco.gw


Jti^6,.2U7

sms^^Az

guiie^Ailbas

i J3I$ClQSill!l@'>''' '

-J.

^ .'I 1-,' _ - _. S fi

w.v^';i:H:;,i!'5 ;<%:

. r.;:

. ' : ' -

.vi-:;:,.I'M.
; -i^ - u;fV ;: ^ c'::; -^
% ^-J-K ;!',..V.i ;,! ' . '" ':':i ':'
-:::r
' A.:i -T:. ..:.: ". dcH-'V""- *''"
"<

W;;:::d
- 1
rr: f ' \ ..
di-'
, !/r-: . . .. ; . ..,- ., -v.-

;:V\.;;^:;:i.,-;..,:- :::,:.V'^- r:i;::,-.-.i;:=^;:i;K;:.;;::\ , Y,.! -: '


. - ' v "v: ,: ' ; ' r: i-' ; ' ; t. -'; ?'"v S-f^ ;>-f '!' , ! , ' .; ,:: x^x.a'.a-
ar^.j - sL<6. . . .
Locatkm^ofBKadeait:: 5387 At^j^igrON avenU. CA Da^- Al^20.a?1? TiTPg-
RecdvedSv: CPRC Pat^ime: 6^^17 Roitifid tOi ^ntftro3l,ACfa[Fs
r MEUSSASRAZU. mgio^s

Con^lain^ R06EUQ V. MQHUES Dale ofBirtfa: 06/20(1977 Se3c:MALE . Race:HiSf'ANIC


AAfregs' feoeDOOUTOE AV^UE,Af^TM xj^itv: RiVgRSlDE Slate: Cfflje.-92^
Home Phone: 051-742-8052 . ^ Cell / Business Phoi;
Business Address: S906MAGROUAAVfeNtJE>RlVERSiD CA92a .
Email AcMress: ROGaK3UWl3llQOIiiWLC^ '"
ARIAS Date ofBirth: s,y.female hisPanic
eae dooutue AVeaJE.apt tos city: a2^2L___^ siate:.2i SpCode:^
951-742-8052^:^^ PpII / ntttttnffsg Phnw' 951-^1283 ;
Business-'-AddRKs: ^ - ;
Wttn^gg- 2^te ofBirds: Raee:.
AAAivl^ State;.
Home PtonK Cell / Business Phone:
Busmen Addr^i:

fl35aijaBuaaLM38^^

Sigiuitiire of CompUiinaiit(Option^):

YOursay also sub^a copi^lniik hy (951)351-6050(Watch 24 hours).


RIVERSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT
COMPLAINT CONTROL FORM PolPoficeRqMrt/OteNa^^ ftPD16182866
.Sitmim
Location of incident: B^VERSfDE, CALIFORNIA Datev AgRtt ai,;20i7 7^^^. feisPW
Date/Timg! 6/24/17 Routed to: tntemai Affairs

Complataaat: ROGEUOV. MORALES Date of Birth; 06a0ffi977 gex- MALE


Addl^: ^506OOCMJTTLE AVENUE, APT705 CitV! WVERSiDg"" . qa Race: Hispanic
Home Phone; ^1-:961-2166 ^ Cell / Business Phone: same as home Zm Code:
Business Address: 5906MAGI)UA AVENUE, RIVERSIDE CA ^506
Eniaii Address: ROGI^QUVji^;i1@awAiLCoi^ ^

Business A^hlressv
el}Bstea Phono;
Cotie:^
Witness:
Date of Birth: Sex:_ Race:_
Address:
State:. Sp Code:.
Cell / Business Phone:

AS DERNfcD BY I6 U.S.C-

Signatiire of CompUinant (Optional):

by telephohfeg the Department at (951) 351-6050 (Watch Commanded


i-24hous)^
1

10

11
EXHIBIT D
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
-13-
28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
9/19/2017 -10 U.S. Code 1961 - Definitions
| US Law
| Lll / Legal Information Institute
Cornell Law School

Legal Information Institute Ft ttI


OPEN ACCESS TO LAW SINCE 1992 I I.^Xx
|

U.S. Code > Title 18 > Part I > Chapter 96 > 1961

18 U.S. Code 1961 - Definitions


As used in this chapter

(1)'racketeering acBvfty' means(A)any act or threat Involving murder, kidnapping, gambling,arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
n a controlled substance or listed chemical(as defined in section 102 ofthe Controlled Substances Act), which Is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonmentfor more than one year;(B)any act which is Indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18. United States Code:Section 201 (relating to
bribery), section 224(relating to sports bribery), sections 471.472.and 473(relating to counterfeiting), section 659(relating to theftfrom interstate shipment)if the
act indictable under section 659 Is felonious, section 664(relating to embezzlement finom pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894(relating to extortionate credit
transactions),section 1028(relating to finaud and related activity In connection with identification documents),section 1029(relating to fraud and related activity in
connection with access devices),section 1084(relating to the transmission of gambling Information),section 1341 (relating to mafl fraud),section 1343(relating to
wre fraud), section 1344(relating to financial institution fraud),section 1351 (relating to fraud in foreign labor contracting),section 1425(relating to the procurement
of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426(relating to the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers),section 1427(relating to the sale of
naturalization or citizenship papers),sections 1461-1465(relating to obscene matter),section 1503(relating to obstruction ofjustice), section 1510(relating to
obstruction of criminal Investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction ofState or local law enforcement),section 1512(relating to tamperina with a witness
vi^m.oranmformant).section 1513(relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1542'(S'ng to false statement in application and uU
of passport), section 1543(relating to forgery or false use of passport), section 1544(relating to misuse of passport),section 1546(relating to fraud and misuse of
vis^permits. and other documents),sections 1581-1592(relating to peonage,slavery,and trafficking in persons)..ift sections 1831 and 1832(relating to economic
es^age and theft oftrade secrets),section 1961 (relating to Interference with commerce,robbery, or extortion), section 1952(relating to racketeering),section
1953(relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),section 1955(relating to the
prohibition of Illegal gambling businesses), section 1956(relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957(relating to engaging in monetary
transactions in property derived from specified unlawiy activity),section 1958(relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-fbr-hire)
section 1960(relating to illegal money transmitters), sections 2251.2251A.2252,and 2260(relating to sexual expioitatton of children), sections 2312 and 2313
(relating to mterstete transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315(relating to Interstate transportation of stolen property),section 2318(relating
to trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords. computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other
audiovisual works), section 2319(relating to criminal infringement ofa copyright),section 2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation ofand trafficking In sound
recordings and music videos of iive musical performances), section 2320(relating to trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks),section 2321 (relating
to trafficking In certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346(relating to trafficking In contraband cigarettes),sections 2421-24(relating to white
stove traffic), sections 175-178(relating to biological weapons),sections 229-229F(relating to chemical weapons),section 831 (relating to nuclear materfals),(C)
any act which is indictable under title 29. United States Code,section 186(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations)or section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlemontfrom union funds).(D)any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title), fraud
In the sale ofsecurities, or the felonious manufacture. Importation, receiving, concealment, buying,selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed
chemical(as defined In section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United States.(E)any act which is Indictable under the
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.(F)any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. section 274(relating to bringing in and
harboring certain aliens), section 277(relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278(relating to importation of alien for
Immoral purpose)if the act Indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain, or(G)any act that is Indictable under anv
provision listed in section 2332b(gX5KB);
(2)'State' means any State of the United States,the District of Columbia,the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States any
political subdivision,or any department,agency,or Instrementallty thereoft
(3)'person"indudes any Individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial Interest In property;
(4)'enterprise"indudes any Individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity; ^

racketeering activity- requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date ofthis chapter and the last of
vwiich occurred within ten years(exduding any period of Imprisonment)after the commission ofa prior act of racketeering activity;
W^mlavvful debt" means a debt(A)incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was In violation ofthe law ofthe United States,a State or political subdivision
teereof. or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to prindpai or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and(B)which was
Incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending
money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law. where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate;
investigator- means any attorney or Investigator so designated by the Attorney General and charged with the duty of enfordng or carrying into effect

(8)'racketing investigation- means any inquiry conducted by any racketeering investigatorfor the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has been involved
to any violation of this chapter or ofany final order.judgmenL or decree of any court ofthe United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under this
CnSptGr^

(9) documentary material' includes any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material; and

n General- includes the Attorney


Attorney GeneralGeneral of theStates,
of the United United States, the DeputyofAttorney
or any employee GeneralofofJustice
the Department the United States,
or any the Associate
employee Attorney General
of any department of the
or agency of
the United States so designated by the Attorney General to carry out the powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter. Any department or agency so

https://www.law.comell.edU/uscode/text/18/1961
9/19/2017 *18 U.S. Code 1961 - Definitions | US Law| Lll / Legal Information Institute
designated may use in investigations authorized by this chapter either the investigative provisions of this chapter or the investigative power of such department or
agency otherwise conferred by law.
(Added Pub.L 91-452,tifle IX.901(a). OcL 15,1970,84 Stat 941;amended Pub. L. 95-575,3(c), Nov.2,1978,92 Stat. 2465;Pub. L. 95-598 title III 314{g)
Nov.6.1978,92Stat 2677;Pub. L.98^73,title II, 901(g), 1020, OcL 12.1984,98 StaL 2136,2143; Pub.L 98-547,tWe II, 205,OcL 25.1984 98 SteL 2770* Pub
L. 99-570,title I,1365(b), OcL 27.1986,100 StaL 3207-35; Pub. L. 99-646,50(a), Nov. 10,1986,100 StaL 3605; Pub. L 100-690,title VII,7013 7020(c) ^32*
7054,7514, Nov.18,1988,102 StaL 4395,4396,4398,4402,4489; Pub. L. 101-73, titfe IX,968,Aug.9.1989,103 Stat. 506;Pub. L. 101-647 title XXXV 3^0 '
Nov. 29.1990,104 StaL 4927; Pub. L. 103^22,tWe IX,90104,title XVI,160001(f), tide XXXIII. 330021(1), Sept. 13.1994,108 StaL 1987 2037 215o 'pub L'
103-394,title III,312(b), OcL 22. 1994,108 StaL 4140;Pub. L. 104-132,title IV.433.Apr. 24,1996,110 StaL 1274; Pub. L. 104-153,3,July 2,1996,110 StaL
1386; Pub.L 104-208, div. C,titlo II, 202,SepL 30.1996,110 StaL 3009-565;Pub. L 104-294,tide VI,601(b)(3),(1X3), 604(b)(6), Oct. 11,1996,110 StaL 3499
3501,3506;Pub.L 107-56,dde VIII, 813,OcL 26,2001,115 StaL 382;Pub. L 107-273,div. B.tide IV,4005(f)(1), Nov. 2,2002,116 StaL 1813;Pub L 108-193'
S(b), Dea 19,2003,117 StaL 2879;Pub.L 108-458, tide VI.6802(e), Dea 17.2004,118 StaL 3767;Pub.L 109-164.tide I,103(c), Jan.10 2006 119 StaL 35-
Pub.L 109-177,tide IV,403(a), Mar.9,2006,120 StaL 243;Pub. L.113-4,tide XII.1211(a), Mar. 7,2013,127 StaL 142; Pub. L114-153,3(b) M^11 2016 130
StaL 382.)

So in original.

Lll has no control overand does not endorse any external Internet site that contains links to or references ill.

About Lll

Contact us

Advertise here

Help

Terms of use

Privacy

[ml

https://www.law.comeII.edij/uscode/text/18/1961 2/2
9/19/2017 18 U.S. Code 1512 - Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant
| US Law
| Lll / Legai information Institute

Comet! Law School

Legal Information Institute [t ttI


OPEN ACCESSTOUW SINCE mz I 1-XXJ

U.S. Code > Tifle 18 > Part I > Chapter 73 > 1512

18 U.S. Code 1512 - Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant


(a)
(1)Whoever kills or attempts to Kill another person, with intent to
(A)prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(B)prevent the production of a record, document,or other object, in an official proceeding; or

(0)prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of infbnnab'on relating to the commission or
possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;

shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).

(2)Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to
(A)influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person In an official proceeding;
(B)cause or induce any person to
(I) withhold testimony, or withhold a record,document, or other object,from an official proceeding;
(ii) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding;
(ill) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document,or other objecL in an official proceeding;or
(Iv) be al}sent from an official proceeding to which that person has been summoned by legal process; or

(C)hinder, delay,or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer orjudge of the United States of infonnation relating to the commission or
possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation,supervised release, parole,or release pending judicial proceedings;

shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).

(3)The punishment for an offense under this subsection is


(A)in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112;

(B)in the case of


(i)an attempt to murder,or

(II) the use or attempted use of physical force against any person;

imprisonment for not more than 30 years; and

(C)in the case of the threat of use of physical force against any person, imprisonment for not more than 20 years.

(b)Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to

(1)influence, delay, or prevent tire testimony of any person in an official proceeding;

(2)cause or induce any person to

(A)withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object,from an offidal proceeding;

(B)alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to Impair the object's integrity or availabiiity for use in an official proceeding;

(C)evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or

(D)be absentfrom an offidal proceeding to which such person has been summoned by legal process; or

(3)hinder, delay,or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of infbmtation relating to the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation l^l supervised release,,!^' parole,or release pending judidal proceedings;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(c)Whoever corruptly
(1)alters, destroys, mutfiates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability
for use in an official proceeding; or
https://www.law.comell.edU/uscode/text/18/1512 1/2
9/19/2017 18 U.S. Code 1512- Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant
| US Law
| Lll / Legal Information Institute
(2)othenwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any offidai proceeding, or attempts to do so.

sliall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or t)oth.

(d)Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders,delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from
(1)attending or testifying in an offidai proceeding;
(2)reporting to a law enforcement officer or Judge of the United States the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of
probation^ supenrised release,,'' parole, or release pending judiciaJ proceedings;
(3)anesting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Federal offense; or
(4)causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceeding,to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding;
or attempts to do so,shall t)e fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.

(e)In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative defense,as to which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence,that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendanrs sole Intention was to encourage,induce,or cause the other person to testify
trutftfully.

(f) For the purposes of this section


(1)an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense; and
(2)the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege.

<g)In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance
(1)that the official proceeding before a Judge,court, magistrate Judge, grand Jury, or government agency is before a judge or court of the United States,a United
States magistrate Judge,a bankruptcy Judge, a Federal grand Jury, or a Fedei^ Govemment agency;or
(2)that the Judge is ajudge of the United States or that the law enforcement officer Is an officer or employee of the Federal Govemment or a person authorized
to act for or on behalf of the Federal Govemment or serving the Federal Govemment as an adviser or consultant

(h)There is extraterritorial Federal Jurisdiction over an offense under this section.

(I) A prosecution under this section or section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to be instituted)
vras Intended to be affected or in the district In which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.

0)if the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, the maximum term of Imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense
shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been Imposed for any offense charged in such case.
(k)Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which
was the object of the conspiracy.
(Added Pub. L.97-291,4(a), Oct 12,1982,96 StaL 1249;amended Pub.L 99-646,61, Nov. 10,1986,100 StaL 3614; Pub. L 100-690,title Vil,7029(a),(c), Nov.
18,1988,102 StaL 4397,4398;Pub. L. 101-650,title III, 321,Dec. 1,1990,104 StaL 5117;Pub. L 103-322,title VI,60018,titleXXXIII,330016(1X0).(U),SepL
13,1994,108 StaL 1975,2148; Pub. L. 104-214,1(2), OcL 1,1996,110 StaL 3017;Pub. L 104-294,title VI,604(b}(31), OcL 11,1996,110 StaL 3508;Pub L 107-
204,tIBe XI,1102, July 30,2002,116 StaL 807;Pub. L 107-273,div. B, title III, 3001(a),(c)(1), Nov.2.2002,116 StaL 1803,1804; Pub.L 110-177 title II 205
Jan. 7,2008,121 StaL 2537.) ' '

ril So In original.

Lll has no control over and does not endorse any external Internet site that contains links to or references Ul.

About Lll

Contact us

Advertise here

Help

Terms of use

Privacy

httpsy/www.law.comeIl.edu/uscode/text/18/1512 2/2
EXHIBIT E

14-
DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
COUNTY OF mVERSIDE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES TO PERSON OR PROPERTY
.A

I
/

aS-5'rtr.*7_S'4ri

iftiLkAfciEoTcUttWrf , ,, ,, ,
Rogelio V. Mofales these unlawful
aMARJNGAOORESS (STR^IPOBOX) acts within the scojpe oftheir employment with the
5906 Magnolia Avenue
citY StAfE apcooe
Riverside CA 92506
ft NAIlCS OF ANV(^DUNrvSlitPLOYEES(AM}TIR OEPARTMENTS)MVCcvraiN
INJlAtY OR #APFUCABLE).
|i 1 M 1, 1 1 1
a VWI^0(0 OAMAK OR INJURV OCCUR.^lEASE BE EXACT) NAME;

April 20,2017in Riverade, CA Mike Hestrin


4. y^ERE DID DAMAGE OR INJURY bCCUR? NAME DSWrniCNr:

Heather Ferris Riverside CouiUy District Attonu


STREET CTTY STATE ZHaX ia wmestoss TO nUilAGE OR INJURY: UCT All PBtStWS/WD MMRBSES OF
PERSOre KNCMM TO HAVE INF0fa4AT>0N:
Near 6506 Doolitde Avenue,Riverside CA 92503

MireyaArias
rtrfr-raa
Based on infomiation and belief, Riverside District Attorney
5906 MaimoUa Avenue.Riverade CA 92506
both county employees,engaged in "racketeering" actfvity as

prevent me from filing a federal dvil lawsuit gainst a"female


lea tne tmn Amendment ngot
t sdf-incrimination vdten Hestrin's friend was a^ted.

aWBtEPOUCEORRIkRAMKXCSCAaED? YES

TQTAiI TOT*LBTTMATSDPHOSPPfTn\<En>^yfF<i
Ea.S30 million

Est$30miBion g H
^ vo-<
TWaCIAimPiaraESIQWEDTOBEVAUD. NOTE: PftES&aAT10M0FAFALSEaJUUtSAFELi^tPBIALC00ES&ni^rT2r~
WARN/NQ:
> CL>dMS FOR DEATH, INJURY TO reRSON OR TO PERSONAL PROPERTY MUST BE FILED NOT LATER THAN SIX IIONTMB ;rrn the
OCCURRENCE. (GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 8i1.2) " o. s ri.eu nui latek fMAN SIX (B) MONTHS AFTER THE
> JJI^HER claims for damages MUST BE FILED NOT LATER THAN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE OCCURRENCE. (GOVERNMENT CODE ACTION

ia PRINT OR TYJ NAME CMTE


^ Rogelio V. Morales June 30,2017
SIGNATURE REIATIONSHIP TO ClAJMANT

ISVSaX 8000006
#IM8TRUCT!QliS;
COUMTY OF RIVERSIDE

M
lUftreiM^nn

t. Read dahn ttowuSftiy.


CLAIM F0|
M 1 7!.^" ^
2. FUloutdatmaaiwtiCTtedii^adiaddttiwiaJWwinafionwjlMprt^
IBlia-iCliaJ

.3. ThtenfflnftnecdgtheoriafM/ comptetsd ct^fofm BfriMft


0faItochmente(tfany)ffc>f1ginal8arBnQtavrfabte. H!I OS
4. TO dalrn16rmmosibe^ned. RiverStd
DEUVBi OR U.S. MAIL 70: CLERK OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS nktrirtA
ATTN: CLAIMS DIVISION ^ , UlbUIL.1^
PC BOX 1628, 4080 LEMON ST. 1 FL. ReCSI
RIVERSIDE. OA. 92802-1628 (951) 958-1060
WHY H> YOU CLAIM THE COUMTY IS RESPONSIBLE?
1RIU.NAME0FCLWMANT ..
Mireya Anas Both Hestrin and Ferris committed these unlawfial
2MAIUiid AOOHESS (STREET/POBOX) acts within the scope oftheir employment with the
5906 Magnolia Aveniw

mmsmm
^9514961-2186 I {9^^14905-1283
3. VVNabOAMAQE OR INJURY OCCUR(P15ASE BE BCT) NAlK^
DEPARTMBUr

Mike Hestrin
Riverside County District Attorm
April 20,2017 in Riverside,CA DeARTMeKr.
NAME:

Heather Ferris Riverside (Ilounty District Attorn


n-ALl PBUONS AND AOUKfcSbbb OF

Rogeiio V. Morales
SS
Based on Infonnation and b^ef,Riversi^ JDistnct Attorney 5906 Masnolia Avenue.Riverside CA 92506
WliT I irmin wini ...i. 1 1 j - ^
berth couirty cn^loyes,engaged in "racketeeriiig activity as
AEO^ess

prevent me from filing a federal dvillawsuit agairat a female

11. USTD4AG6SINCUfW6DTOOATE{achooptwmf>lpttwi**J*rtn*li^

Estimate: $30 million for violation of my constimtionalri^ts


&VlEPOUCEOftPARM4EOIG8GMLLEO? 168 esear

TH CLAIM MUSTBESIGMeDTOBeVALID. NOTE: PRESeHTATtOHOFAFALSECLAmiSAFELCaiY


WARNING:
CLAIMS FOR DEATH. INJURY TO PERSON OR TO PERSONAL PROPERTY MUST BE FILED NOT LATER THAN SIX (6) MONTHCATE^TOE
OCCURRENCE. (GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 9114a

ALL OTHER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES MUST BE FILED NOT LATER THAN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE OCCURRENCE. (GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION
911.2)

> SUBJECTTO CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS. YOU HAVE ONLY SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE WWTTEN NOTICE OF REJECTION OF YOUR CLAIM
TO FILE A COURT ACTICW. (GOVERNMENT COX SECTION 945.6)
y IF VWWTTHN NOTICE OF REJECTION OF YOUR CLAIM IS NOT GIVEN. YOU HAVE TWO (2) YEARS FROM ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION TO RLE
ACOORTACnON. (GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 945.6)

cmraSAiERB&iMi- 1 a RNT OR TYPE NAME DATE

^ Mins)^ Ari^ June 30,:KH7


1

10

11

12
EXHIBIT F
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
45:
28 DECLARATION OF ROGELIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
9/19/2017 Angelucd v. Century Supper Club, 158 P. 3d 718 - Cal: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar

59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142(2007)
158P.3d718
41 Cal.4th 160

Marc ANGELUCCI et al.. Plaintiffs and Appeiiants,


V.

CENTURY SUPPER CLUB,Defendant and Respondent

No.5136154.

Supreme Court of Caiifomia.

May 31,2007.
Modification Denied June 27,2007.

'143 *143 Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Joseph R. Kalln^.

The Rava Law Rrm,Alfred G. Rava, San Diego; Law Offices of Morse Mehrban and Morse Mehrban for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant and Monlque Olivier, San Francisco,for Consumer Attorneys of California as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Jennifer C. Plzen Christine P. Sun, Hector P. Vlllagra; David Blair-Loy; and Tamara Lange for Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, American Civil Litierties Union Foundation
of San Diego & Imperial Counties and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California as Amid Curiae on behalf
of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Harry Crouch for National Coalition of Free Men, Los Angeles Chapter, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Steven L. Martin and Steven L Martin, Santa Monica,for Defendant and RespondenL

Payne & Fears, Daniel L. Rasmussen, Irvine, and Julie J. Bisceglia for Corinthian Colleges as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Respondent.

Deborah J. La Fetra and Timothy Sandefur, Sacramento,for Padfic Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant
and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

We granted review in the present case to determine whether, in order to state a claim under Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a),
the relevant remedial provision of the Unruh Civil Rights Act(Civ. Code,51 et seq.; also hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
Act), plaintiff must demonstrate that they affirmatively requested nondlscriminatory treatment and were refused.^

As we shall explain, we conclude that the text of the Act does not support defendant's and the Court of Appeal's assertion that, In
order to recover under the Act, plaintiffs who are discriminated against when they present themselves at a business establishment
144 and pay the price of admission also must demand equal treatment and be refused. Nor do we believe it "^144 would be consistent
with the policy of the Act, or with our case law, to read such a requirement Into the language of the Act. Accordingly, the judgment
rendered by the Court of Appeal Is reversed.

Plaintiffs Marc Angelucd, Edgar Pacas, Elton Campbell, and Jeff Kent filed a complaint against Century Supper Club (the dub)for
violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995( 51.6).^21 The complaint alleged tfiat plaintiffe
patronized the dub on several occasions in June and July 2002,and were charged an admission fee higher than that charged to
women. Specifically, the complaint alleged that two of the plaintiffs were charged $20 for admission on June 14,2002, although the
admission fee for women was $15, that they again were charged $20 for admission two days later, although women were admitted

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr 1/10
9/19/2017 Angelucci v. Century Supper Ciub, 158 P. 3d 718 - Gal: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar
free, and that the other plaintiffs patronized the club on several occasions and experienced similar treatment. Plaintiffs alleged they
were charged higher prices because they are men.^ They sought statutory damages under section 52,subdivision (a)(section
52(a)), the relevant portion of the remedy provision of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the related Gender Tax Repeal Act.

The club moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs could not recover under section 52(a)for violations of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Gender Tax Repeal Act, because they had not alleged they had asked the club to be charged at the
same rate as female patrons.^ Defendant claimed that without having made such requests, plaintiffs could not prevail. The trial
court agreed with defendant and entered Judgment in its favor.

Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 52(a) provides a remedy only to those plaintiffs who
request nondiscriminatory treatment and are refused. The appellate court relied principally upon language in this court's decision in
Koim V. Metro Car Wash M985140 Cal.3d 24.219 Cal.Rotr. 133. 707 P.2d 195(Koire)and characterized that case as "holding that
there must be an affirmative assertion of the right to equal treatment... based on the fact that there cannot be a discrimination or a
denial of services unless services are requested. The principle is consistent with long-standing California law... which holds that a
plaintiff cannot sue for discrimination in the abstract, but must actually suffer the discriminatory conduct." The Court of Appeal
added that the requirement that the plaintiff demand equal treatment"ensures that the statutes will be used to redress genuine
grievances and to punish genuine misconduct, not by those who seek to exploit the law for financial gain," citing Reese v. Wal-Mart
Stores. Inc. f1999)73 Cal.ADD.4th 1225.1236.87 Cal.RDtr.2d 346(Reese). The Court of Appeal concluded that Its analysis would
145 apply equally to plaintiflte' claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Gender *146 Tax Repeal Act, observing that the parties
had not separately addressed the Gender Tax Repeal Act.^
We granted plaintiffs' petition for review.

II

In an appeal from a motion granting judgment on the pleadings, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and review the
legal issues de novo."A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general demurrer, tests the allegations of the complaint or
cross-complaint, supplemented by any matter of which the trial court takes judicial notice, to determine whether plaintiff or cross-
complainant has stated a cause of action.[Citation.] Because the trial court's determination is made as a matter of law, we review
the ruling de novo, assuming the truth of all material facts properly pled." ILeko v. Cornerstone Blda. hsoection Service f2001)86
Cal.ADD.4th 1109.1114.103 Cal.RDtr.2d 858.)

In pertinent part, the Act provides that "[a][l persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages,facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever."( 51,subd.(b).)

The Act includes an enforcement provision that authorizes individual actions. Section 52(a) provides that "[w]hoever denies, aids or
incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51,51.5, or 51.6[the Gender Tax Repeal Act], is
liable for each and every offense for the actual damages,and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting
without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars
($4,000), and any attorney's fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights
provided in Section 51,51.5, or 51.6."^

146 *146 As we have declared in past cases, the Act must be construed liberally in order to carry out its purpose. IKoire. suora. 40
Cal.3d at p. 28. 219 Cal.Rotr. 133. 707 P.2d 165.^ The Act expresses a state and national policy against discrimination on arbitrary
grounds.(Buiks v. Poddv Construction. Co./1962157 Cal.2d 463.471. 20 Cal.Rotr. 609. 370 P.2d 313.1 Its provisions were
intended as an active measure that would create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in Califomia business
establishments by "banishing" or "eradicating" arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments.(Isbister v. Bovs'Club of

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2684119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&ol=scholarr 2/10
9/19/2017 AngeluccI v. Century Supper Club, 168 R 3d 718- Cai: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar
Cruz, Inc.(198^)40 Ca|,3d 72,75-76.^19 Cal-Rptr. 150.707 P.2d 212(Ishistfnr)[referring to a legislative desire to "'banish
such [discriminatory] practices from California's community life"!; Koire. suora. 40 Cal.ari at n. 36.219 CalRptr. 133 707 P9ri
[observing that the purpose expressed by the Act and other enactments is the "eradication" of discrimination based upon sex]; In re
Pox(1970)3 Calt3d 90 Ca|.Rptr, ^4,474 P.2d 992[speaking of a patent legislative purpose to "interdict" the arbitrary
discrimination targeted by the Act].)

The Act stands as a bulwark protecting each person's inherent right to "full and equal" access to "all business establishments."(
51.subd.(b); /gbfsfer. sppra.40 Cal.3d at p. 75.219 Cai.Rptr. 150.707 P.2d 2121 The Act, like the common law principles upon
which it was partially based,imposes a compulsory duty upon business establishments to serve ali persons without arbitrary
discrimination.(Mflrf/ia Point Ltd v. Wolfson (1982^ 30 Cal.3d 721. 73R lan CaLRotr. 49fi fi40 P.2d llfi- see a\so Warfield v
Pofl/psp/a pQ/ffl CQuntrv c/ub(1985)10 Cal.4th 594.607-608.42 Cal.RDtr.2d sn qr poh ttr)jhe Act serves as a preventive
measure, without which it is recognized that businesses might fail Into discriminatory practices. Usbister. suora. 40 Cal.3d at n 7S
219 Cal.Rptr. 150. 707 P.2d 212.1

In interpreting a statute, we first consider its words, giving them their ordinary meaning and construing them in a manner consistent
with their context and the apparent purpose of the legislation.(Fitch v. Select Produnta Co. r2QQ5136 Cal.4th 812.8ia ai
Cal.RDtr.3d 591.115 P.ari 1233 1

As can be seen from the statutory language quoted above,the Act does not contain express language requiring that before a legal
action may be filed, the victim of the asserted discrimination must have demanded equal treatment and have been refused. Unlike
some other remedy statutes, the Act. and specifically section 52(a). does not establish as a condition of Instituting a lawsuit that the
defendant have been given notice and an opportunity to correct the asserted violation.(Compare51.6. subd.(f)(6)[under the
Gender Tax Repeal Act. a 30-day notice is required prior to filing suit premised upon the feiiure of a business establishment of a
specified type to post notice of its prices and of its nondiscriminatory pricing policy]; see also 1782,subd.(a)[specifically requiring
that one seeking damages for unfair or deceptive practices under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act( 1750 et seq.)notify the
person responsible for the violation and demand rectification 30 days prior to filing suit]; Health & Saf.Code, 25249.7,subd.(d)(1)
[requiring that private persons seeking damages for violation of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act(Health &
SaLCode.25249.5 et seq.) provide notice to certain public entities and the alleged violator 60 days prior to filing suit].)
147 *147 According to the Court of Appeal, however, plaintiffs were not"denied" their rights within the meaning of the Act. because they
did not suffer refusal of an express demand that defendant accord them equal treatment The Court of Appeal pointed to statutory
language It believed supported its conclusion. Section 52(a) provides for a civil action against "[w]hoever denies, aids or incites a
denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to" the Unruh Civil Rights Act(or the Gender Tax Repeal Act). According
to the appellate court,"there cannot be a discrimination or denial of services unless services are requested." In essence,the Court
of Appeal posited that the word "denies" as used in section 52(a)connotes only a responsive measure a business
establishment's response to a demand for equal accommodation.

This linguistic argument is unpersuasive. Dictionaries define the term "deny" as commonly meaning to "withhold"(Ballentine's Law
Diet(3d ed.1969)p. 334)or to "deprive."(Gamer's Diet, of Modem Legal Usage(2d ed.1995) p. 265[complaining that, although
ttils usage is common, it is inaccurate].) We note that the federal Constitution uses the term "deny" in the equal protection clause
and other provisions, but we are unaware of any authority supporting the startling proposition that a right acknowledged by these
provisions is not "denied" if the victim is a passive sufferer of discrimination rather than a person who expressly demands his or her
rights and is refused.(See U.S. Const, 14th Amend,["nor shall any state... deny to any person within its Jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws"];see also Id., 15th Amend.fThe right of citizens... to vote shall not be denied or abridged... on account of
race, color, or previous condition ofservitude"]; Id., 19th Amend.fThe right of citizens... to vote shall not be denied or abridged...
on account of sex"]; id., 26th Amend.[The right of citizens... who are eighteen years of age or older... to vote shall not be denied
or abridged... on account of age"].)And the language of section 52(a) permitting a private action against any business
establishment that"makes any discrimination or distinction" In violation of the Act. contains no Implication whatsoever that a
business establishment violates the Act only if it refuses an express demand for equal treatment.
The interpretation offered by the Court of Appeal and endorsed by defendant also would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act
to "eradicate" or "eliminate" arbitrary. Invidious discrimination in places of public accommodation. As we have explained, the Act
Imposes a duty upon business establishments to refrain from arbitrary discrimination. If businesses are held not to violate the Act or
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2684119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vls=1&oi=scholarr 3/10
9/19/2017 /Vngelucd v. Century Supper Club, 158 P. 3d 718 - Cal: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar
Infilct Injury unless they are challenged by a patron, their ordinary practice may revert to discrimination, with special exceptions
being made for Individuals who happen to challenge the practice. Contrary to the purpose of the Act to eradicate discrimination, the
Court of Appeal's Interpretation leaves business establishments free to advertise and provide gender-based discounts and,
presumably,to engage In other forms of discrimination that violate the Act,so long as these establishments agree to provide equal
treatment to those customers knowledgeable and assertive enough to demand It.

It Is Instructive to consider early examples of unequal treatment on the basis of race that we found to constitute violations of the
Act's predecessor civil rights statutes. In tiiese cases. Instances of racial segregation In the provision of accommodations were held
148 to violate Callfomla's antidiscrimination laws. Violations occurred when African-American ticket *148 holders were admitted to a
movie theater or racetrack clubhouse or gained access to a soda fountain, but, because of their race, were restricted to a
segregated or otherwise substandard area.(See Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club /1941145 CaLADD.2d 283. 287.114 P.2d 27-
HuteOfi y. 7i>,e 9w/Pnw gg,(1926> 79 Cal.Add. 390. 392.249 P. 524:Jones v. Kehrtein f1920)49 Cal. Add.646.651. P. SS-> It
would be absurd to conclude that such civil rights act violations occurred only when the African-American patrons expressly
demanded that their treatment be equivalent to that accorded the White patrons In those situations. Actionable discrimination
obviously occurred in these early cases and such conduct would constitute discrimination under the current Act.

The Court of Appeal's interpretation also would leave without redress those persons who discover only after the ^cf that they have
suffered discrimination In violation of the Act For example, an African-American family seeking to purchase a home may not realize
that the real estate agency they employed has discriminated against them on the basis of race by failing to disclose to them eligible
homes In a White-majority neighborhood until after the agency has concluded Its services. At that point a demand for equal
treatment and a refusal on the part of the agency would be pointless. Also denied redress under the foregoing Interpretation would
be persons discriminated against on an occasion when there was no one present to receive and answer a demand for equal
treatment(for example, persons encountering, as they did In past decades, racially segregated drinking fountains or restroom
facilities at an unattended structure).

In support of Its argument that relief under section 52(a)Is limited to persons who demand equal treatment and are refused,
defendant relies upon certain early decisions that also formed the basis for the Court of Appeal's holding. These decisions are of no
assistance to defendant. They arose In the context of a business establishment's asserted discriminatory exclusion of patrons and
stand at most for the proposition that persons who were not patrons of a business establishment or who did not present themselves
for service or access as a patron and tender the price of admission did not adequately allege injury under the predecessor to the
Act

In Weaver V. Pasadena Tournament ofRoses f1948132 Cal.2d 833.198 P.2d 514. the plaintiff alleged that he waited In line to
purchase a ticket to the Rose Bowl football game but was unable to obtain one, because fewer tickets were available for sale than
had been promised. The plaintiff sought to bring an action on behalf of all persons who stood In line for tickets but were unable to
purchase them because of the shortfall. This court concluded the case was not actionable as a representative suit because the
question, as to each Individual plaintiff, was whether he or she presented himself or herself, demanded admittance to the game,
and tendered the price of a ticket. {Id. at p. 838,198 P.2d 514.)Thus the Issue In Weaver was whether the plaintiff, who properly
had presented himself, sought admittance, and tendered the price of the ticket, could represent a dass of persons who may not
have done so. By contrast. In the present case, each plaintiff presented himself for admittance, paid the price of admission, and
entered the establishment.(See also Bartiett v. Hawaiian Villaae. Inc. /1978187 CaLApp.Sd 435.438-439 & fn. 6.151 Cal.Rptr. 392
[denying dass certification in litigation under the Act because Individual Issues would predominate Issues such as whether each
149 *149 Individual presented himself or herselffor admission at the defendant nightclub].)

Qdoffv. HoHvwood Turf Club f19521110 Cal.ADD.2d 340. 242 R2d 660. the plaintiff was ejected from a racetrack and was told he
would not be admitted In the future. He sued under a predecessor to the Act, seeking damages for his nonadmlsslon on each day
the track was open, daiming he was entitled to damages for the days he did not seek admission. The court rejected his dalm for
damages for days on which he had not presented himself for admission and tendered the price of a ticket, commenting that the
defendant had no duty to the plaintiff under the Act until the plaintiff tendered either an admission ticket or the price of admission.
(Id. at pp. 342-343,242 P.2d 660.)By contrast, again, in the present case plaintiffs did present themselves for admission and paid
the price charged by defendant. It cannot be said that defendant had no duty to refrain from discriminating under these
circumstances.

https7/scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholaiT 4/1Q
9/19/2017 Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 158 P.3d 718- Gal: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar
Defendant also claims its interpretation of the Act Is consistent with Crowe// v. Isaacs /19fiS^ 235 CaLADD.2d 755.45 Cal. Rotr. 566
IPromff} and Hales v. Oiai Vallev Inn & Country Club(1977)73 Cal. App.Sd 25.140 Cal.Rotr. 555(Hales). In Crowell, plaintiffs.
White persons,filed suit against their real estate agent, under the predecessor to the Act, for filing to seek out qualified African-
American purchasers for their home.The court held that the agent's mere failure to seek out African-American purchasers did not
constitute discrimination against the plaintiff sellers. The court also observed that circumstances might exist in which "mere
quiescent Inaction" could constitute discrimination, providing the example of an agenfs failure to show a home to Afncan-American
potential purchasers who contact the agent seeking a purchase in the style and price range of the home.{Crowell, at p. 757,
Cal.Rptr. 566.1

From this example of a situation not actually presented by the Crowell case, defendant derives the rule that the plaintiffs must"seek
the very rights or access he or she claims was denied." But plaintiffs did seek access to defendant's club. They do not accuse
defendant in the present case of mere Inaction, and the Crowell decision does not support defendant's view that a plaintiff must
demand expressly that his or her rights be honored. The courts example in Crowell of potentially actionable conduct posited
African-American purchasers who desired a certain type of home, but did not suggest such purchasers would be required to
demand that they be shown homes on the same basis as l/Wr/fe potential purchasers. In addition, the court announced in Crowell
that the more significant ground for Its decision was that the reason the plaintiffs were not entitled to a remedy was that it was not
f/rey who had been denied the rights guaranteed by the civil rights act, and that they did not purport to sue as representatives of
other aggrieved persons.(Crowell. suora. 235 Cal.App.2d at p. 757.45 Cal.Rptr. 566.1 The White sellers in Crowell were not the
victims of any discrimination against African-American persons, whereas In the present case plaintiffs were the persons who were
disadvantaged by defendant's discriminatory pricing.

Defendant's citation to Hales, suora. 73 Cal.App.3d 25.140 Cal.Rptr. 555. is equally unhelpful. There the court determined that the
plaintiff could state a claim under the Act by alleging that when he entered a restaurant seeking food and drink, he was told he
could not be served unless he wore a tie, but that at the same time the restaurant permitted female patrons to be served In less
150 formal attire. Nothing in the decision indicates that the plaintiff demanded "150 that he receive the same treatment as female
patrons, nor does the decision in any way establish such a requirement.(73 Cal.App.3d at pp. 28.30.140 Cal.Rotr. 555.1^3

According to the Court of Appeal, the requirement that a plaintiff request equal treatment and suffer denial "ensures that the
statutes will be used to redress genuine grievances and to punish genuine misconduct, not[to assist]those who seek to exploit the
law for financial gain." In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeal cited Reese, suora. 73 Cal.App.4th 1225.87 Cal.Rptr.2d
346.

In Reese, suora. 73 Cal.ADD.4th 1225.87 Cal.Rptr.2d 346. the plaintiff filed a motion for class certification in an action alleging
violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Gender Tax Repeal Act, based upon Wal-Marfs practice of offering a "Ladies' Day"
discount at facilities that offered automotive oil changes. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment In the underlying action on the
ground that the plaintiff deliberately had refrained from requesting to receive the discount, but the trial court denied Vne motion for
summary judgment{Reese at p. 1232,87 Cal.RDtr.2d 346). and the issue was not reached on appeal. Rather, the issue on appeal
was the propriety of the trial court's order denying the plalntifPs motion to certify the class. The Court of Appeal held that the trial
court appropriately determined the plaintiff had not demonstrated that substantial benefits would accrue to the litigants or the courts
from class treatment The trial court appropriately could doubt that dass certification was necessary to avoid multiple lawsuits. A
multiplicity of claims was unlikely, because no other aggrieved party had brought suit over the years the discount had been offered
and the plaintiff himself had generated his own injury by patronizing Wal-Mart for the purpose of being denied the "Ladies' Day"
discount. Stating it would not express an opinion on the propriety of the plaintiffs substantive daim,the Court of Appeal concluded
"the trial court could reasonably condude that It would likely not have to adjudicate a multiplicity of actions if the dass was not
certified." {Id. at p. 1236,87 Cal.Rptr.2d 346.1

As our description of the case makes plain, the decision In Reese did not suggest that a plaintiff must demand equal treatment and
be refused in order to be able to state a daim under the Act. Moreover, the court's discussion in Reese demonstrates that the
safeguard proposed by the Court of Appeal in the present case might not meet its salutary goal. As the court in Reese pointed out,
the plaintiff in that case consulted his lawyer for the purpose of finding a lawsuit, and only subsequently presented himself to Wal-
151 Martfor service "151 on "Ladies' Day."(Reese, suora. 73 Cal. ApD.4th at p. 1236.87 Cal.Rptr.2d 346["Whereas most litigants
consult with a lawyer after an injury to seek judidal redress, this dient went to his lawyer to seek an injury for which he could claim
judidal redress"].) It is precisely such a well-instructed professional plaintiff, in contrast to the untutored victim of discrimination, who
would possess the information necessary to enable him or her to comply with the Court of Appeal's suggestion that plaintiffs be
required to demand equal treatinent and secure a refusal.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr 5/10
9/19/2017 Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 158 P. 3d 718- Cal: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar

According to the Court of Appeal, under the circumstances alleged In the complaint, plaintiffs did not suffer an Injury. But our
decision In Koire. suom.40 Cal.Sd 24. 219 Cal.Rptr. 133. 707 P.2d 195. held that a business establishment's policy of affording
price discounts to female patrons purely on the basis of gender ordinarily constitutes unlawful discrimination against male patrons
within the meaning of the Act, and we concluded the plaintiffs In that case were Injured within the meaning of the Act when they
presented themselves for admission and were charged the nondlscounted price.^
In Ko/re. supra. 40 Cal.Sd 24. 219 Cal. Rotr. 133. 707 P.2d 195. the plaintiff, a male, alleged that he had visited several car wash
establishments on "Ladies' Day" and requested services at the discounted rate offered to female customers. The businesses
refused. The plaintiff also alleged that he visited bars that offered discounted admission prices to female patrons and that on one
occasion, he visited a bar and asked for the free admission that was being accorded to female patrons, but was refused. The trial
court granted judgment in favor of the defendant business owners alter trial on the plaintiffs Unruh Civil Rights Act claims,
concluding that the discounts did not violate the Act

This court reversed the judgment rendered In favor of the defendants. We concluded that the language of the statute encompasses
not solely access to business establishments, but also treatment of patrons. We also set forth the examples noted above of cases
In which courts identified racial segregation within theaters and eating establishments as violatlve of the predecessor to the Act
Our opinion concluded:"The Act's proscription Is broad enough to Include within Its scope discrimination In the form of sex-based
price discounts."(Koire. suom.40 Cal.Sd at o. 30. 219 Cal.Rotr. 133.707 P.2d 195.1

We rejected the defendants' daim that gender-based price discounts do not constitute arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of
the Act Acknowledging the existence of circumstances in which either the patron's conduct or the nature of the business
establishment might warrant an exception to the Act(Koire. suora. 40 Cal.Sd at dp. 31-32.219 Cal.Rptr. 133. 707 P.2d 1951. we
declined to extend such exceptions to gender-based price discounts of the type challenged In the case. {Id. at pp. 32-33,219
Cal.Rptr. 133,707 R2d 195.)

In response to the Koire defendants' daim that ttieir gender-based price discounts did not injure either men or women and,
specifically, did not Injure the plaintiff, we commented that the Act renders "arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses... perse
152 Injurious."(Koire. suora. 40 Cal.3d at p. 33.219 Cal.Rotr. 133. 707 R2d 195.1 As we stated,"Section 51 provides *152 that all
patrons are entitled to aqua/treatment Section 52 provides for minimum statutory damages... for every violation of section 51,
regardless of the plaintiffs actual damages." {Ibid.)

Moreover, we explained, the plaintiff suffered actual damage. Referring to drcumstances that also occurred in the present case, we
observed:"The plaintiff was adversely affected by the price discount. His female peers were admitted to the bar free, while he had
to pay. On the days he visited the car washes, he had to pay more than any woman customer, based solely on his sex."(Koire.
suora. 40 Cal.3d at o. 34. 219 Cal.Rotr. 133. 707 R2d 195.fn. omitted.)

Finally, we predicted that our holding would not put an end to proper, non discriminatory promotional price discounts, and we
described policies permitting, for example, discounts based upon age for children or older persons.(Koire. suora. 40 Cal.Sd at dp.
36-38.219 Cal.Rotr. 133.707 R2d 195["the fact that sex-based discounts are not permissible does not have an Impact on the
validity of age-based discounts"]; see also Pizarro v. Lamb's Plavers Theatre /2Q06) 135 Cal.ADD.4th 1171.1175. 37 Cal.RDtr.3d
89.) We also acknowledged there might be public policies warranting differential treatment of male and female patrons under
some circumstances, but "[t]he plain language of the Unruh Act mandates equal provision of advantages, privileges and services in
business establishments of this state. Absent a compelling social policy supporting sex-based price differentials, such discounts
violate the Act."(Koire. suora. 40 Cal.3d at o. 38. 219 Cal.Rptr. 133. 707 R2d 195.^

In sum, Koire Interpreted the Act as broadly condemning any business establishments po//cy of gender-based price discounts.
Further, Koire determined that Injury occurs when the discriminatory policy Is applied to the plaintiffthat is, at the time the plaintiff
patronizes the business establishment, tendering the nondlscounted price of admission.

Even in light of the Koire decision's broad definition of Injury, of course, a plaintiff must have standing to bring an action under the
Act We do not dispute the Court of Appeal's admonition that "a plaintiff cannot sue for discrimination In the abstract, but must
actually suffer the discriminatory conduct"

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case7cases2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr 6/10
9/19/2017 Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 158 R 3d 718 - Cai: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar
In general terms, in order to have standing, the plaintiff must be able to allege Injury that Is, some "Invasion of the plaintiffs
legally protected interests."(5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997)Pleading.862, p. 320; see Code Civ. Proc.,367 fEvery
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party In Interest, except as otherwise provided by statute"].)

Standing mies for actions based upon statute may vary according to the Intent of the Legislature and the purpose of the enactment.
(Midoeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors f199Q1221 Cal.ADD.3d 1377.1385. 271 Cal. Rotr. 99:see also
Librers v. Black /20051129 Cal.ADD.4th 114.124.28 Cal.RDtr.3d 188.1 In essence, an individual plaintiff has standing under the Act
If he or she has been the victim of the defendant's discriminatory act.(Midaeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood
Investors, supra. 221 Cal.ADD.3d at do. 1383.1386.271 Cal.Rotr. 99[standing under the Act extends to persons "actually denied
full and equal treatment by a business establlshmenr that Is, to "victims of the discriminatory practices"].)

Plaintiffs adequately alleged they had suffered an "Invasion of legally protected Interests"(5 WItkIn, Cal. Procedure,supra,
153 Pleading,862, p. 320)sufficient to "153 afford them an Interest In pursuing their action vigorously. According to their allegations,
each of the plaintiffs was subjected to, and paid, defendanfs gender-based price differential. Accepting plaintiffs'factual allegations
as true, as we are required to do In reviewing a Judgment entered on the pleadings, plaintiffs must be considered "person[s] denied
the rights provided In Section 51."( 52(a).)

The Court of Appeal and defendant assert that In Kolre. suora. 40 Cal.3d 24.219 Cal.Rptr. 133.707 P.2d 195. we actually adopted
their view of the nature of an injury under the Act. In support, they rely upon a single sentence contained In a footnote appearing In
the Koire decision's statement of facts. This reliance Is unwarranted.^ Not only Is it unreasonable to suppose that such a reference
in a footnote In our statement of facts was Intended to establish a new and essential element of a cause of action under the Act, the
conclusion advanced by defendant that a violation or Injury occurs only after a demand for equal treatment has been refused
Is contrary to our legal analysis In Kolre and to the purpose of the Act

Our statement offsets In Koire recounted that the plaintiff visited several car wash establishments on "Ladles' Day" and was
refused when he asked to be charged the same price as women customers. The plaintiff In that case also asked to be charged the
same night club admission fee as women patrons and was refused. We footnoted the circumstance that in the Instance of one of
the car wash establishments. It was clear the plaintiff asked for equal treatment, but there was a factual dispute as to whether the
defendant explicitly refused. The dispute was Inconsequential, we explained, because whether or not defendant refused a request.
It was undisputed that the car wash advertised a "Ladles' Day" policy that forced male customers who sought the discount to ask for
It affirmatively. We employed the following language:"There was conflicting testimony at trial about whether defendant State
College Car Wash refused to wash plaintiffs car for the reduced 'Ladles' Day' price. The trial court did not resolve the factual
dispute, since It held as a matter of law that'Ladles' Da/ discounts do not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act State College Car
Wash does not deny that It advertises special 'Ladles' Day' prices. At a minimum, men who wish to be charged the same price as
women on 'Ladles' Day* must affirmatively assert their right to equal treatment."(Koire. suora. 40 Cal.Sd at o. 27.fn. 3. 219
CaLRptr. 133. 707 P.2d 195.1

The Court of Appeal declared:"The Supreme Court made the statement In a footnote, and the footnote appended to the sentence
that tells us that most of the car washes refused plaintiffs request for the discounted price. The Supreme Court reversed the
Judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded the case to the trial court'for further proceedings consistent with the views
expressed herein.'The Court thus directed the trial court to resolve the factual dispute In light of the holding that sex-based price
discounts violate the Unruh [Civil Rights]Act By so doing, it implidtiy held that a denial of services... is necessary to state a daim
for sex-based price discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act Further, the 'at a minimum'language,following as It does the
154 statement that'[defendant] does *154 not deny that It advertises special "Ladles' Day" prices,' establishes that merePy]advertising
a sex-based price discount does not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act."

The Court of Appeal misread our footnote in several ways. The quoted footnote cannot be construed as a holding. Implicit or
otherwise, on any point of law. The footnote appears In a statement of facts, not in the context of any legal analysis. Moreover, cur
point was not that a violation or Injury would not occur under the Act unless the defendant refused the plaintiffs request to grant a
discount We found that the factual dispute concerning whether a particular defendant refused to grant the plaintiff a discount was
of no consequence, because It was undisputed that the defendant had a discriminatory policy that would force men to ask for the
discount if they wanted to receive It. The words "[a]t a minimum" noted that a man would be required to request to be treated
equally if he was to have any chance of avoiding discriminatory treatment, the Implication being that even such a request might not

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case7cases2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vls=1&oi=scholan- 7/10
9/19/2017 Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 158 R 3d 718 - Cal: Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar
secure equal treatment.(Koire. suora. 40 Cal.3d at p. 27.fn. 3.219 Cal. Rptr. 133.707 P.2d 195.1 Our remand order responded to
the circumstance that the trial court(apparently sitting as the trier offact) had granted judgment for the defendants primarily upon a
legal ground that is, its belief that gender-based price discounts do not violate the Act The trial court's legal error in concluding
that the Act did not apply to gender-based price discounts undermined the entire judgment it rendered. Our reversal signified that
the entire matter could be retried. We did not direct the trier of fact to resolve any particular factual dispute.

Most significantly, in the present case the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the Act is fundamentally inconsistent with the legal
analysis contained in our Koire decision. As noted, our actual discussion and analysis of the applicable legal principles concluded
that gender-based price discounts,such as were alleged in that case, violated the Act, that arbitrary gender discrimination is per se
injurious, and that the particular plaintiff suffered actual Injury because he paid more for admission or services than female patrons.
(Koire. suora. 40 Cal.3d at dp. 33-34. 219 Cal.Rptr. 133. 707 P.2d 195.1 Nothing in our discussion of the legal issues suggested the
Act is not violated and an injury does not occur unless the victim of discrimination not only tenders the price of admission but also
demands equal treatment and is refused.

Ill

The trial court's and the Court of Appeal's interpretation of section 52(a)reflects in part defendant's assertion that Angelucci and the
other men involved In the present case are professional plaintiffs who "shake down" business entities on the basis of assertedly
technical violations of civil rights laws and similar enactments, and that they and their attorneys engage in this practice simply to
make a living unmotivated by any desire to eliminate discrimination or to redress any actual injury. Defendant claims that
plaintiffs made repeated unannounced visits to defendant's business establishment in order to increase the statutory damages they
could seek for multiple violations of the Act, and defendant accuses plaintiffs and their attorneys of being "bounty hunters" who
have been involved in numerous similar lawsuits. Defendant also contends that meritless, abusive litigation of this type is
155 proliferating in California and generally results in the extortion of a settlement on the basis of the plaintiffs unsupported factual *155
allegations.^
Although we share to some degree the concems voiced by the trial court and the appellate court below and by defendant and its
amid curiae regarding the potential for abusive litigation being brought under the Act, these concems do not supply a justification
for our inserting additional elements of proof into the cause of action defined by the statute. It is for the Legislature(or the People
through the initiative process)to determine whether to alter the statutory elements of proof to afford business establishments
protection against abusive private legal actions and settlement tactics. It is for the Legislature, too, to consider whether limitations
156 on the current statutory private cause of action might unduly weaken enforcement of the *156 Act or place unwarranted barriers in
the way of those persons who suffer discrimination and whose interests were intended to be served by the Act.
A question was raised at oral argument regarding the extent of the damages that could accrue for repeated unannounced visits by
a male person to an establishment offering discounts to women. A hypothetical case involving daily visits for a period of a year was
invoked. Without purporting to answer this question conceming the speculative damages suffered in such a context, there may be
equitable considerations. Although equitable principles may not be applied in opposition to statutory enactments or to defeat public
policy established by the Legislature(13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005)Equity, 3, p. 285; see McKennon v.
banner PubiishlnQ Co.(19951513 U.S. 352.360-362.115 S.ct. 879.130 L.Ed.2ri RROY such principles have been
applied to reduce ordinary tort damages imposed for violation of antidiscrimination laws.(McKennon.suom. 513 U.S. at dp. 360-
3^2,115 g,Ct. 879 Tunclean hands" doctrine may reduce damages awarded a wrongfully discharged employee]; State Deot. of
tLapith SarviQOa v. Superior court(200Z)31 Cal.4th 1026.1042-1046.6 Cal Rptr.Sd 441.79 P3d ["avoidable consequences"
doctrine may reduce damages awarded an employee subjected to sexual harassment]; see also Lusardi Construction Co. v. Auttn/
(1992)1 Qa|,4th 976. 996-997.4 Cal.Rptr.2d 837.824 P.2d 643[equitable considerations barred assessment of certain statutory
penalties for the employer's failure to pay prevailing wages].)

In addition, there are constitutional constraints on the accrual of statutory penalties.(People ex mi. Lockver v. R.J. Revnoidft
loffodpo Qo, fi^O05)3709k4th 707.728-731. 36 Gal.RDtr.3d 814.124 P.3d 408[triable issues remained whether due process
principles or the constitutional prohibition against excessive fines should reduce an accrued fine of$14,826,200 for ongoing
violation of a statute goveming distribution of cigarettes]; Hale v. Morgan M978122 Cal.3d 388.149 Cal.Rptr. 375.584 P.2d .612
[same constitutional provisions limited accrual of a $100 per day statutory penalty that was payable to a tenant whose landlord shut
off his utilities].)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr 8/10
9/19/2017 Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 158 P. 3d 718- Cai:Supreme Court 2007- Google Scholar
The advisability and propriety of the foregoing legislative and judicial responses to perceived instances of litigatfcn abuse are not
presently before us, nor is our task now to review defendant's potential equitable defenses or to examine any constitutional
limitations on damage awards that are based upon violation of a statute. The issue raised in defendant's motion for Judgment on the
pleadings and reached by the trial court was a limited one. The question, in the words of the trial court, was whether, in order to
state a cause of action for violation of the Act, plaintiffs were required to express their "^vish to be charged the same price as
women on Ladies' Day." Although defendant supported its interpretation of the statute with an equitable argument that plaintiff
intentionally sought unequal treatment in order to create a cause of action and collect damages and attomey fees for each visit
(and in passing mentioned this point again in its brief in the Court of Appeal),the claim was not developed as an independent basis
for Judgment, nor did the trial court or the Court of Appeal consider the applicability of specific equitable defenses. Our undertaking
has been to determine whether piaintiffis adequately alleged a cause of action under the Act On that point we have concluded that
existing law does not support the restriction that the Court of Appeal placed upon the statutory private right of action established by
157 section 52(a). We make plain, however, that nothing we "157 have said in this opinion should be interpreted as a restriction on
potential equitable or constitutional defenses with respect to any damages that may be sought pursuant to section 52(a).

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter Is remanded to the Court of Appeal for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR: KENNARD,BAXTER,CHIN, MORENO,and CORRIGAN,JJ.

Concurring Opinion by WERDEGAR,J.

I fully agree with the majority's analysis and conclusion. I write separately because I cannot Join the majority's conjectural
discussion {ante, 59 Cai. Rptr.Sd at p. 156,158 P.3d at p. 729-730)of equitable defenses to hypothetical claims under the Unruh
Civil Rights Act(Civ.Code,52,subd.(a)). As the majority explains (ante, at p. 156,158 RSd at p. 730), no such issue is before us.
That nothing the majority says on the subject has any precedential force necessarily follows.(People v. Mendoza ^2000123 Cal.4th
896. 915. 98 Cal.RDtr.2d 431.4 P.3d 265: Hart v. Burnett(1860115 Cel. 530. 598-599.1

O Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to artlde VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Ill Statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.

121 This statement of facts is based upon the recital contained in the Court of Appeal's opinion.
121 According to the Court of Appeal, shortly after filing the above complaint, plaintiff Campbell sued the club and other establishments in another
case. In that case Campbell alleged that he went to the club on July 20, paid $20 admission though women were admitted free, and was subjected
to a search of his person although women were not searched. The two cases were consolidated.

la For the purposes of the motion,the parties agreed that plaintiffs had not asked to be admitted at the rate charged to female patrons.
El The parties do not dispute the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that private actions for violations of section 51.6,the Gender Tax Repeal Act,
are governed by the same provision, section 52(a), that applies to Unruh Civil Rights Act violations, and that plaintiffs' daim under the Gender Tax
Repeal Act is subject to the same analysis and outcome with respect to the issues of notice and injury. Thus we do not separately consider the latter
act Defendant asserts, however, that the Gender Tax Repeal Act does not apply in the first Instance to plaintiffs' claim, because defendant's
conduct did not involve the provision of"services." The record does not reflect that defendants raised this issue in the Court of Appeal, and that
court did not reach the issue. Accordingly, we decline to reach it.

ISl Section 51.6 states In pertinent part that "[n]o business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged
for services of similar or like kind, against a person because of the person's gender."( 51.6,subd.(b).)In a provision Inapplicable to the present
case,the statute imposes upon certain businesses a duty to disclose prices and post a notice confirming that prices must not be discriminatory.(
51.6,subd.(f).) Failure to comply with the disclosure duty subjects the enumerated business to a $1,000 civil penalty if the business "fafls to correct
a violation of this subdivision within 30 days of receiving written notice of the violation...."( 51.6, subd.(fK5).)In all other respects,"the remedies
for a violation of[section 51.6]are the remedies provided in subdivision(a)of Section 52."( 51.6, subd.(d).)
m Defendant daims "other states that have judidally abolished discounts for women have similariy decreed that it is the failure to give an
advertised discount to men that is Improper, not merely the offer of a 'Ladies' Day'discount or preference." The authorities dted in support do not
assist defendant In fcffdd Y. lQW9 West Racing Association flowa 19891438 N.w.2d 600.602 the court actually dedared that the promotional
campaign itself"was dearly violatlve ofthe statute" because of the advantage given to women.Peoo/n v. IVoods/de Dniinatessen f1986167
M^,App- 508 Atgri 263similarly does not support defendanfs position. On the contrary, that case involved a challenge to the practice of a
business establishment. The court affirmed an administrative agency's determination that the defendanfs promotional campaign offering discounts
for persons wearing skirts constituted a discriminatory practice, because the "overwhelming majority of discount redplents" were female and the
https://scholar.gocgle.com/scholar_case?case=2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr 9/10
9/19/2017 Angelucd v. Century Supper Club, 158 P. 3d 718 - Cal: Supreme Court 2007- Google Sctiolar
evidence demonstrated that the defendant's practice of requiring patrons to wear a skirt in order to receive the discount was intended to and did
have the same effect as a "Ladies' Night"{Id. at p. 266.)

ISl Amicus curiae for defendant Pacific Legal Foundation, has asked us to reconsider our conclusion in Kolm. However,that Issue Is not within the
scope of review and, accordingly. Is not property before us.

^Accordingly, we reject the view of the Court of Appeal that the Legislature has acquiesced in that Interpretation of Koim.

IM We are aware that legislators, courts, and commentators at the state and national level have been troubled that the enactment of a private right
of action intended to enforce certain types of civil rights legislation may have led to an explosion of assertedly unwarranted or unduly burdensome
Individual lawsuits brought by professional plaintiffs and bounty-hunting attorneys against business establishments. Much ofthe debate arises In the
context of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990{42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.)(ADA)and specifically In the context of claims against private
property owners for alleged denial of access. Some writers have argued that compliance with the ADA remains elusive,justnying the continued use
of the private right of action In spite of occasional abuse.(See Bagenstos, The Perversity ofLimited CMifyghts Remedies: The Case of'Abusive'
ADA Udgation (2006)54 UCLA L.Rev. 1,15.21 fwhether a class of litigation unduly burdens the courts necessarily depends on a normative
assessment of the importance of that class"].)

Other commentators chronicle Instances In which a single plaintiff or law firm filed hundreds of ADA claims,some alleging assertedly technical or de
mlnlmls variations from applicable accessibility standards,and the authors consider whether such asserted litigation abuse warrants restriction of
remedies under the ADA.(See Becker, Private Enforcement ofthe Americans widi Disabiiities Act via Seriai Udgation: Abusive or Commendabie?
(2006)17 Hastings Women's L.J. 93,97-99,113[describing assertedly abusive ADA litigation in Pennsylvania, Florida, and Califbmia and
suggesting adoption of"safe hartxir" provision In the ADA to protect businesses that undertake good faith efforts to make premises accessible];
McCabe, Caiifbmia DisabiiityAnti-Discriminadon Law;Ughthouse in die Storm, or Huntfor Buried Treasure?(2005)36 McGeorge LRev.661,679-
681,686-689[noting the problem and describing the debate]; see also Milani, Go Ahead, Make My90 Days:Should Piaindffs Be Required to
Provide NodcetoDefendantsSefbre Fiiing Suit Under We Hi of die Americans with Disabiiides Act?(2001)200^ Wise. LRev. 107,185[arguing
that title III of the ADA already incorporates a notice provision from another statute].)

Courts In this state have expressed similar concerns in the context of litigation under the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act(Health &
Saf.Code, 25249.5;see Consumer Defense Group v. Rental Housing industry Members f20061137 Cal.ADD.4th 1185.1215-1219.40 Cai.Rotr.Sd
S22[referring to attorneys engaged In a "shakedown" through bringing and settling frivolous lawsuits under that act]) and the unfair competition law
(Bus.& Prof.Code, 17200).(See People exrel. Lockverv. Brar 12004)115 Cal.ADD.4th 1315.1316-1317.9 Cal.RDtr.3d 844[discussing the
Attorney General's effort to prevent the defendantfrom engaging in a "shakedown"through the filing offrivolous lawsuits over "ridiculously minor
violations" of the unfeir competition law].)

We note as well that In 2004 the California electorate enacted legislation restricting previously broad standing requirements for a private right of
action under the state unfair competition and false advertising laws(Bus & Prof.Code, 17200 et seq., 17500 et seq.), stating In the preamble to
the measure that the broader standard had encouraged frivolous litigation, had been abused by attomeys who were motivated only by private
financial gain, and negatively had affected many businesses.(See Prop.64, 1. subds.(b),(c)&(e)as enacted at Gen. Elec.(Nov.2,2004)[see
Bus & Prof.Code, 17204,amended by Prop.64 to limit standing to "any person who has suffered injury In fact and has lost money or property as a
result of... unfair competition"].)

Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2664119839595007381&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr 10/10
2

10

11
EXHIBIT G
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 DECLARATION OF ROGBLIO V. MORALES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY


ENTIRE RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
.m
f
^C-,
v"-. ,>
f
V'X'
r v't