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G.R. No.

118910 July 17, 1995 effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, staggering as the billions of pesos its is expected to raise. The
CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition
JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO and, in the exercise of its sound discretions, this Court hereby
SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents
FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, tried to take advantage of.
QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
vs. further showed substantive grounds or considerations of
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the importance which strengthened the legal standing of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE petitioner to bring and maintain the action, namely: (a) the public
GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents. character of the funds or other assets involved in the contract of
lease; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent agency;
(c) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
I register a dissenting vote. interest in raising the questions involved therein; and (d) the wide
range of impact of the contract of lease and of its implementation.
I
I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs. Garcia,3 this
Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al.1 (hereinafter referred to as the first Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason who had
lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the joined in the dissenting opinions in the first lotto case denying the
exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the petitioners' locus standi therein, invoked and applied the ruling on
PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the locus standi in the first lotto case. He stated:
issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of
lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such government or government-owned or controlled corporations
reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to disallow the same
confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay
the certainty and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176
opens the floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of SCRA 240 [1989]).
such pronouncements and weakens this Court's judicial and
moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not
and to impose sanctions for their opposite conduct. reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the
legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the
It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case was present action.
unconditionally accepted by the PCSO and the PGMC, as can be
gleaned from their separate manifestations that they would not Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also dissented in the
ask for its reconsideration but would, instead, negotiate a new first lotto case on the issue of locus standi; unqualifiedly
equipment lease agreement consistent with the decision and the concurred with the majority opinion in Tatad. Mr. Justice Vicente
PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the Court a copy of V. Mendoza, the writer of the ponencia in this case, also invoked
the new agreement. The decision has, thus, become final on 23 the locus standi ruling in the first lotto case to deny legal standing
May 1994.2 to Tatad, et al. He said:

As the writer of the said decision and as the author of the Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens.
exception to paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as In the cases in which citizens were authorized to sue, this
amended, I cannot accept the strained and tenuous arguments Court found standing because it thought the constitutional
adduced in the majority opinion to justify the reversal of our rulings claims pressed for decision to be of "transcendental
in the first lotto case. While there are exceptions to the importance," as in fact it subsequently granted relief to
aforementioned doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or
upsetting prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming governmental actions. Thus in the Lotto case [Kilosbayan,
considerations of justice and irresistible desire to rectify an error, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relied upon by the
none of such considerations and nothing of substance or weight majority for upholding petitioner's standing, this Court took
can bring this case within any of the exceptions. into account the "paramount public interest" involved which
"immeasurably affect[ed] the social, economic, and moral
In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the petitioners, well-being of the people. . . and the counter-productive and
and in no uncertain terms declared: retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system."
Accordingly, the Court invalidated the contract for the
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance operation of the lottery.
to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public
interest and of a category even higher than those involved in Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justices
many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Jose A. R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Jose C.
issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his concurring
well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took no part in the first
the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive lotto case and Justice Francisco who was not yet a member of
this Court at the time, the rest of the Justices who joined the and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in
concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza had dissented in the first collaboration, association, or joint venture with any person,
lotto case on the said issue. association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign,
for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing
Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that this Court has defined sources of funds for health programs, including the expansion
the issues in this case and limited them to the following: of existing ones, medical assistance and services and/or
1. Whether the challenged ELA constitutes an association, charitable grants. [Id., 1006-1007].
collaboration, or joint venture within the meaning of
Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. Before the motion of Assemblyman Zamora for the approval of
42; the amendment could be acted upon, Assemblyman Davide
2. Whether the ELA requires prior public bidding; and introduced an amendment to the amendment:
3. Whether the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the
Government. MR. DAVIDE:
Mr. Speaker.
In fact, during the oral arguments of this case on 3 March 1993 THE SPEAKER:
this Court aborted the attempt of the principal counsel for the The gentleman from Cebu is recognized.
PGMC, Atty. Renato Cayetano, to revive the issue of locus standi. MR. DAVIDE:
Since it seemed that he had prepared himself for and had been May I introduce an amendment to the committee
assigned to discuss that issue alone, he took his seat without amendment? The amendment would be to insert after
protest and without a suggestion that he would ask for an "foreign" in the amendment just read the following: EXCEPT
expansion of the scope of the issues. FOR THE ACTIVITY IN LETTER (A) ABOVE.
When it is a joint venture or in collaboration with an entity such
In the first lotto case, this Court also emphatically ruled that the collaboration or joint venture must not include activity Letter
language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. (a) which is the holding and conducting of sweepstakes races,
42, is indisputably clear that with respect to its [PCSO's] franchise lotteries and other similar acts.
or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, MR. ZAMORA:
lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise it We accept the amendment, Mr. Speaker.
"in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. MR. DAVIDE:
This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase "except Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," THE SPEAKER:
namely, "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar Is there any objection to the amendment? (Silence) The
activities. amendment, as amended, is approved. [Id., 1007, emphasis
supplied]
In support thereof, we explained how the amendment came about
and quoted portions of the Record of the Batasan4 on the Further amendments to paragraph B were introduced and
proceedings during the period of amendments to show the approved. When Assemblyman Zamora read the final text of
unequivocal intent of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to paragraph B as further amended, the earlier approved
proscribe the holding or conducting by the PCSO of sweepstakes amendment of Assemblyman Davide became "EXCEPT FOR
races, lotteries, and other similar activities, "in collaboration, THE ACTIVITIES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH (A)"; and by
association, or joint venture with any person, association, virtue of the amendment introduced by Assemblyman Emmanuel
company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign." For Pelaez, the word PRECEDING was inserted before
convenience, I quote what this Court stated in the said case: PARAGRAPH. Assemblyman Pelaez introduced other
amendments. Thereafter, the new Paragraph B was approved.
B.P. Blg. 42 originated from Parliamentary Bill No. 622, which [Id.] This is now paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
was covered by Committee Report No. 103 as reported out amended by B.P. Blg. 42.5
by the Committee on Socio-Economic Planning and
Development of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The This Court further explained the rationale for the prohibition as
original text of paragraph B, Section 1 of Parliamentary Bill follows:
No. 622 reads as follows:
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent
To engage in any and all investments and related profit- the prohibition can be allowed since the privilege to hold or
oriented projects or programs and activities by itself or in conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar
collaboration, association or joint venture with any activities is a franchise granted by the legislature to the
person, association, company or entity, whether domestic PCSO. It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government
or foreign, for the main purpose of raising funds for health to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and
and medical assistance and services and charitable franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against
grants. [Record of the Batasan, vol. Two, 993] the grantee . . . [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in
derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his
During the period of committee amendments, the Committee title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely
on Socio-Economic Planning and Development, through expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful
Assemblyman Ronaldo B. Zamora, introduced an provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not
amendment by substitution to the said paragraph B such that, unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere
as amended, it should read as follows: implication." [36 Am Jur 2d Franchises 26 (1968)].

Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, In short then, by the exception explicitly made in paragraph
to engage in health-oriented investments, programs, projects B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the
joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such related doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment on the ground that
franchise. It has been said that "the rights and privileges the question of standing is a legal question, as this case in
conferred under a franchise may, without doubt, be assigned involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal question of
or transferred when the grant is to the grantee and assigns, locus standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the
or is authorized by statute. On the other hand, the right of first lotto case is the same in this case and in every subsequent
transfer or assignment may be restricted by statute or the case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the
constitution, or be made subject to the approval of the grantor conduct or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration,
or a governmental agency, such as a public utilities association, or joint venture with any person, association,
commission, except that an existing right of assignment company, or entity. And, the contract in question is not different
cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation. [Id., 63]. from or unrelated to the first nullified contract, for it is nothing but
a substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato was even candid
It may also be pointed out that the franchise granted to the enough to admit that no new and separate public bidding was
PCSO to hold and conduct lotteries allows it to hold and conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO was of the
conduct a species of gambling. It is settled that "a statute belief that the public bidding for the nullified contract was
which authorizes the carrying on of a gambling activity or sufficient.
business should be strictly construed and every reasonable
doubt so resolved as to limit the powers and rights claimed Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States8 that
under its authority. (38 Am Jur 2d Gambling 18 [1968]).6 preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues
of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved,
The PCSO and the PGMC never challenged our application or is misplaced. For one thing, the question of the petitioners' legal
interpretation of the exception clause and our definitions of the standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and the same
terms collaboration, association, and joint venture. On the issue of law. For another, these cases involve the same and not
contrary, they unconditionally accepted the same by not asking substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract
for the reconsideration of our decision in the first lotto case. between the PCSO and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line
lottery system.
Under the principle of either the law of the case or res judicata,
the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the ruling in the first lotto The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very
case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the application or authority it cited regarding the exception to the rule of issue
interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 preclusion (Restatement of the Law, 2d Judgments 28), the
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The
interpretation has been laid to rest under the doctrine of stare doctrine of the stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to
decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply
Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides: "Judicial decisions means that stare decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of
applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part a prior judgment.
of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a
These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously. principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision
They are based on public policy and other considerations of great of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases
importance and should not be discarded or jettisoned in a cavalier involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for
fashion. Yet, they are now put to naught in this case. securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity or privity of parties.9 This is explicitly fleshed out in Article
The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter of 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or
policy to end litigation. There would be no end to a suit if every interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal
obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to system. Such decisions "assume the same authority as the
listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate on chances from statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
changes in its members.7 become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which
must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide
It is, however, contended that the law of the case is inapplicable thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
because that doctrine applies only when a case is before an thereto." 10 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong
appellate court a second time after its remand to a lower court. and compelling reasons which I do not find in this case
While indeed the statement may be correct, it disregards the fact otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected
that this case is nothing but a sequel to and is, therefore, for all from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's
intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case. By their confidence in the stability of its solemn pronouncements
conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the diminished.
PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto case a copy of
the ELA in question, and the petitioners commenced the instant The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue of
petition also in the said case. Our resolution that the validity of the locus standi and a re-examination of the application or
ELA could not be decided in the said case because the decision interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1
therein had become final does not detract from the fact that this of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the
case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter Rules of Court on effects of judgment expressly provides:
in the raging controversy between the petitioners, on the one
hand, and the PCSO and the PGMC, on the other, on the (b) In all other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to
operation of the on-line lottery system. the matter directly adjudged or as to other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceedings, ordinary civil actions, thereby effectively subordinating to that rule
litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the same the doctrine of locus standi. I am not prepared to be a party to that
capacity. proposition.

This doctrine has dual aspects: First. Friedenthal; et al., whose book is cited in the majority
(1) as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same opinion in its discussion of the rule on real party in interest and
claim, demand, or cause of action; and the doctrine of locus standi, admit that there is a difference
(2) as preclusion to the relitigation of particular facts or issues in between the two, and that the former is not strictly applicable in
another action between the same parties on a different claim public law cases, thus:
or cause of action.11
Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time, and The evolution of standing doctrine seems to point to greater
the interest of litigants as well as the peace and order of society, freedom of action for plaintiffs. However, the courts still have
all require that stability should be accorded judgments; that not articulated how the balance is to be struck between the
controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose; relevant and often competing interests: the plaintiff's right to
that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be made on the same relief and the legislature's right to carry out its policies without
set of facts; and that there be an end to litigation which, without judicial interference. Nor has the judiciary's competence to
the said doctrine, would be endless. It not only puts an end to rule on these interests have analyzed systematically or its
strife, but recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be limits defined. Courts essentially continue to be free to
maintained. It produces certainty as to individual rights and gives reconcile these competing values on an ad hoc basis.
dignity and respect to judicial proceedings.12
It is important to note, however, that standing, because of its
The justifications given in the majority opinion to underrate the constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
ruling on locus standi and to ultimately discard it are different from questions relating to whether a particular
unconvincing. It is not at all true, as the majority opinion contends, plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
that "[t]he previous ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may Although all three requirements are directed toward ensuring
in fact be considered a departure from settled rulings on 'real party that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
in interest' because no constitutional issues were actually restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as
involved. well as of broader policy concerns relating to the proper role
of the judiciary in certain areas. 13
It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on
real party in interest was never put in issue in the previous case. In an earlier book, 14 the same Friedenthal and Miller, with, John
It was the clear understanding of the Members of the Court that J. Cound as the lead author, expounded that in the realm of public
in the light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced law, the real party in interest rule is not applicable, thus:
therein, only locus standi deserved consideration. Accordingly,
the majority opinion and the separate dissenting opinions therein A third problem of proper parties occurs in the realm of public
dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in the process a vast law. When governmental action is attacked on the ground that
array of authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly stressed it violates private rights or some constitutional principle, the
in the concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano, both constitutional courts have tended to analyze the question whether the
and legal issues were involved therein. Finally, as shall hereafter challenger is a proper party plaintiff to assert the claim in
be discussed, in public law the rule of real party in interest is terms of the judge-made doctrine of standing to sue
subordinated to the doctrine of locus standi. requiring that plaintiff be adversely affected by defendant's
conduct rather than according to real-party-in-interest or
Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's contention that the capacity principles. See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and
ruling on locus standi in the first lotto case may not be preserved Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601 (1968); Jaffee, The Citizen as
because the majority vote sustaining the petitioners' standing was a Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
a "tenuous one" that may not be maintained in a subsequent Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033 (1968); and
litigation, and that there had been changes in the membership of Jaffee, Standing Again, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1971). To the
the Court due to the retirement of Justices Isagani A. Cruz and extent that standing is understood to mean that the litigant
Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment of Justices Vicente V. actually must be injured by the governmental action that is
Mendoza and Ricardo J. Francisco. It has forgotten that, as earlier being assailed, it closely resembles the notion of real party in
stated, the ruling was reiterated in Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, interest under Rule 17(a). However, several other elements
when in his concurring opinion in the Tatad case, Justice of the standing doctrine clearly are unrelated to the simple
Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because their case real-party-in-interest test. One significant context in which the
did not have the same importance as the first lotto case, he two concepts diverge is when for standing purposes plaintiff
thereby accepted the concession of standing to the petitioners in is required to show both that he has been adversely affected
the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that all the Justices who by the governmental conduct that is under attack and has
had dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi suffered an injury to a legally protected right. When standing
were either for the majority opinion or for the concurring opinion is defined in this fashion it may entail a preliminary
in the Tatad case. Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has given consideration of the merits of the case and therefore is quite
vigor and strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case. different from the real-party-in-interest notion. (emphasis
supplied).
The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is not
whether the petitioners have locus standi but whether they are the The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination to the
real parties-in-interest. This proposition is a bold move to set up restrictive rule on real party in interest cannot be justified by the
a bar to taxpayer's suits or cases invested with public interest by claim that what is involved here is contract law, not constitutional
requiring strict compliance with the rule on real party in interest in law. True, contract law is involved. We are not, however, dealing
here with an ordinary contract between private parties, but a chooses not to sue, the patently unconstitutional and illegal
contract between a corporation wholly owned by the government contracts or transactions will be placed beyond the scrutiny of this
hence, an instrumentality of the government and a private Court, to the irreparable damage of the Government, and
corporation for the conduct of the lotto, which is invested with prejudice to public interest and the general welfare.
paramount and transcendental public interest and other public
policy considerations because the lotto has counter-productive By way of illustration, the first lotto contracts would not have
and retrogressive effects which are as staggering as the billions reached this Court if only the so-called real party in interest could
of pesos it is expected to raise and provokes issues that bring an action to nullify it. Neither would the ELA in question,
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being since for reasons only known to them, none of those who had lost
of the people. We said so in the first lotto case. in the bidding for the first lotto contract showed interest to
challenge it.
Second. The attempt to use the real-party-in-interest rule is to
resurrect the abandoned restrictive application of locus standi. The majority opinion posits that a denial to the petitioners of the
This Court, speaking through the constitutionalist nonpareil, right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived
Justice and later Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, has already illegality in the contract because:
declared in Tan vs. Macapagal 15 that as far as a taxpayer's suit
is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether [q]uestions as to the nature or validity of public contracts of
or not it should be entertained. In his concurring opinion in Aquino the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made
vs. Commission on Elections, 16 he said: can be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission
on Audit of before the Ombudsman. . . . In addition, the
Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo
vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not warranto if it should be thought that a government
protecting their rights as individuals. [Respondents' corporation, like the PCSO, has offended against its
Comment, 5]. This is to conjure the specter of the public right corporate charter or misused its franchise.
dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public
officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so That proposition delivers the coup de grace to taxpayers' suits,
well put by Jaffe [Standing to Secure Judicial Review, 74 discourages involvement of citizens in public affairs, and negates
Harvard Law Review, 1265 (1961)]: "The protection of private or renders ineffective Section 16, Article XIII of the Constitution
rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, which provides:
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, The right of the people and their organizations to effective and
both in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and
totality of the legal order." [Ibid., 1266. Cf. Berger, Standing economic decision-making shall no be abridged. The State
to Sue in Public Actions, 78 Yale Law Journal 816 (1969)]. shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their consultation mechanisms.
capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal Besides, it is fraught with unimaginable danger to public interest
approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works if neither the Commission on Audit (COA), nor the Ombudsman,
[110 Phil. 331 (1960)], foreshadowed by the very decision of or the Office of the Solicitor General, would take any action on the
People v. Vera [65 Phil. 56 (1937)] where the doctrine was matter.
first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we
are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would In the instant case, the COA refused to directly act on Morato's
hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon request and, instead, referred it to the Department of Justice
v. Frothingham [262 US 447 (1923)], with their claim that what (DOJ) which, in turn, merely indorsed an opinion to the COA. On
petitioners possess "is an interest which is shared in common the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General is taking the
by other people and is comparatively so minute and side of the PCSO, as it did in the first lotto case. The observation
indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the then of Justice Cruz in his concurring opinion in the first lotto case
judicial process can act on it." [Respondents' Comment, 5]. is apropos:
That is to speak in the language of a bygone era, even in the
United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out Locus standi is not such an absolute rule that it cannot admit
in the later case of Flast v. Cohen [391 US 83 [1968)], the of exceptions under certain conditions or circumstances like
barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been those attending this transaction. As I remarked in my dissent
lowered. [Ibid., 92-95]. The weakness of these particular in Guazon vs. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623, "It is not only the
defenses is thus quite apparent. [Cf. Tan v. Macapagal, 43 owner of the burning house who has a right to call the firemen.
SCRA 677]. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire
from spreading even if he lives in the other block.
Third. Such attempt directly or indirectly restricts the exercise of
the judicial authority of this Court in an original action and there The majority opinion does not entirely foreclose the possibility of
had been many in the past to determine whether or not there according the petitioners locus standi if only they would allege
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess "that public funds are being misspent so as to make this action a
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the public one and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action
Government. Only a very limited few may qualify, under the real- must be prosecuted by the real party in interest." While it may be
party-in-interest rule, to bring actions to question acts or contracts true that there is no such specific allegation, the totality of the
tainted with such vice. Where, because of fear of reprisal, undue petitioners' allegations points to illegal expenditures of public
pressure, or even connivance with the parties benefited by the funds due to or arising out of violations of the exception clause in
contracts or transactions, the so-called real party in interest paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, and the
public bidding law, and by reason of the grossly disadvantageous requirements of public bidding imposed under Executive Order
provisions of the contract. The public character of the sums due No. 301 (1987) and the pertinent government accounting and
the PGMC under the ELA cannot be disputed. The PCSO is solely auditing rules. The request was based on the following
owned by the Government and is authorized to raise funds for the submissions:
public purposes specified in its Charter. The funds thus raised are
public funds. This Court must take judicial notice of these facts. 1. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1169, as
amended, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
Before I take up the defined issues, I find it necessary to meet (PCSO), with the approval of the Office of the President,
squarely the majority opinion's interpretation of paragraph B, decided to operate an On-line lottery System.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. This is, of course, on 2. In August 1993, Request for Proposals (Annex "A") were
the assumption that this Court may now disregard the doctrines issued seeking lessors for the On-Line Lottery System
of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. under a build-lease basis at no expense or risk to PCSO.
3. The bids were evaluated by the Special Prequalification
I respectfully submit that the best authority on the intention or Bids and Awards Committee and its bid report was further
rationale of a legislative amendment is its author. Fortunately, I evaluated by a Special Review Committee of the Office
happened to be the author of the exception clause in said of the President.
provision. The language of that clause is very short and simple, 4. On 12 October 1993, the Office of the President announced
and the elaboration given therefor, as earlier shown, is equally that it was awarding the Lease Contract to Philippine
short and simple. The sponsor of the measure, then Gaming and Management Corporation (PGMC) as
Assemblyman, now Congressman, Ronaldo Zamora did not even lessor, provided that the contract would similarly be
ask for an explanation or clarification; he readily accepted the awarded to two (2) other bidders if they matched the
amendment. Nobody from the floor interpellated me for an terms of PGMC.
explanation or clarification.
Morato invoked the following grounds to justify his request for
I regret then to say that neither the letter nor the spirit of the confirmation:
exception clause in paragraph B supports the interpretation a. A lease of equipment, with option to purchase, by a
proposed in the majority opinion. The reason given in the majority government corporation such as the PCSO, provided
opinion for the alleged prohibition from investing in "activities this is approved by its governing board, is not
mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" (i.e., the holding or generally subject to the public bidding requirement
conducting of charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other (Section 4.3, second paragraph, COA Circular No.
similar activities) is that "these are competing activities." In that 85-55-A dated 8 September 1985);
aspect alone, the majority opinion has clearly misconstrued the b. The new lease contract is still the result of an award
exception clause. The prohibition is not directed against such made after public bidding; and
activities, since they are in fact the franchised primary activities of c. In this case, its is apparent that the lease of the needed
the PCSO. What is prohibited is the conduct or holding thereof "in equipment through negotiation is the most
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, advantageous to the Government since so many
association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign." In studies, plans and procedures had already been
the first lotto case, this Court explained the principal reasons for worked out with PGMC since October 1993 as a
such prohibition. If the purpose of the prohibition in the exception result of the previous bidding (Section 1. e, Executive
clause is indeed to prevent competition, it would be with more Order No. 301 [1987]).
reason that no other person, natural or juridical, should be allowed
to share in the PCSO's franchise to hold and conduct lotteries. In The COA indorsed Morato's letter to the DOJ and requested an
short, the argument in the majority opinion sustains the rationale opinion on the propriety or legality of the proposed ELA which was
of the prohibition. entered into without the benefit of a public bidding under E.O. No.
301 and the pertinent government accounting and auditing rules.
II
As to the defined issues, my answers are in the affirmative. To In its Opinion No. 4, series of 1995, 19 contained in a 2nd
better appreciate them, the minute details of the undisputed Indorsement addressed to the COA, dated 16 January 1995, the
operative facts which are crucial to their resolution must have to DOJ, through Acting Secretary Demetrio G. Demetria:
be bared.
(a) Disagreed with the statement of Morato that any of the
After its setback n G.R. No. 113375, the PGMC and the PCSO three justifications he enumerated in his letter to the COA
prepared a draft of a new ELA. may constitute valid basis for the exemption from public
bidding.
On 26 July 1994, the Board of Directors of the PCSO approved (b) Declined to express an opinion on the first justification that
Resolution No. 445, 17 series of 1994, resolving as follows: under COA Circular No. 85-55-A of 8 September 1985 a
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby lease of equipment with option to purchase is not
resolved, that the draft Equipment Lease Agreement, hereto generally subject to public bidding, since it involves an
attached, is APPROVED, and the Chairman of the Board is interpretation of a COA circular which is best left to the
AUTHORIZED to enter into and execute the said Agreement, COA's determination.
SUBJECT to the confirmation by the Commission on Audit (c) Expressed doubts on the accuracy of Morato's statement
that PCSO can enter in the said Agreement. that the new lease contract is still the result of the award
made after public bidding and opined that since the
On the same date, PCSO Chairman Morato sent a letter to Hon. original lease contract was nullified by this Court, such
Celso D. Gangan, Chairman of the COA, 18 seeking confirmation nullification necessarily implied the nullification of the
on whether the Equipment Lease Agreement is exempt from the public bidding which preceded its execution.
(d) Agreed, nonetheless, with Morato that the new ELA is Agreement, as observed earlier, may be deemed to be an
exempt from the public bidding requirement under agreement for furnishing of supplies because by its terms,
Section 1 (e) of E.O. No. 301, and ratiocinates as follows: what will be consumed by the PCSO, as Lessee, would be
the use of the equipment, and not the equipment itself.
The cited provision reads:
Sec. 1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision Based thereon, the aforesaid Equipment Lease Agreement
of Law, decree, executive order or other issuances to the may be the subject of negotiation pursuant to Section l(e) of
contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for E.O. No. 301 if it be determined to be the most advantageous
furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the to the government by the Department Head concerned.
government or any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without As earlier stated, on 25 January 1995, the PGMC, represented by
public bidding except under any of the following situations: Alfredo C. Ramos, its Vice-Chairman, and the PCSO,
xxx xxx xxx represented by Manuel L. Morato, its Chairman, signed the
(e) In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the assailed ELA.
needed supplies through negotiated purchase is most
advantageous to the government to be determined by the A. The PGMC avers that the old contract was reformed to
Department Head concerned; and expunge therefrom the features and provisions which were
xxx xxx xxx held by this Court as indicative of the statutorily proscribed
It should be noted that while public bidding is generally collaboration, association, or joint venture. 20 For their part,
required for contracts for public services or for furnishing the public respondents claim that "as can be glaringly seen
supplies, materials and equipment, paragraph (e), from the face of the ELA, none of the terms and conditions in
abovequoted, would exempt from the requirement of public the old contract of lease which this Honorable Court found as
bidding "the requisition of the needed supplies" and would vestiges of a joint venture is present in the subject ELA." 21
allow the acquisition thereof through negotiated purchase if
deemed most advantageous to the government as I am not persuaded. To my mind, the parties only performed a
determined by the Department Head concerned. superficial surgery on the nullified contract by merely deleting
therefrom provisions which this Court had considered in the first
In the instant case, it is believed that the new lease lotto case to be badges of a joint venture contract and by
agreement, although denominated, "Equipment Lease engrafting some modifications on rental, which include an option
Agreement", may be considered a contract for furnishing to purchase. The PGMC and the PCSO conveniently forgot that
supplies and may fall under the exception provided for in per this Court's findings in the first lotto case, they had an
paragraph (e) if entering into such agreement, through indivisible community of interest in the conception, birth and
negotiation, is determined to be the most advantageous by growth of the on-line lottery and that each is wed to the other for
the Department Head concerned. better or for worse. The surgery affected only the post-natal
activities of the union, but not the indivisibility of their community
The words "supplies" and "equipment" are not synonymous. of interest at conception and at the birth of the on-line lottery
The word "equipment" imports "the outfit necessary to enable system. Put differently, it only separated one from the other from
the contractor to perform the agreed service, the tools, bed and board but did not dissolve the bonds of such indivisibility
implements, and appliances which might have been or community of interest. This was confirmed by respondent
previously used or might be subsequently used by the Morato when he candidly confessed in his letter to the COA
contractor in carrying on other work of like character" Chairman that:
(Standard Boiler Works v. National Surety Co., 71 Wash. 28,
127 Pac. 573). The word "supplies", on the other hand, is [I]t is apparent that the lease of the needed equipment
defined as "any article entirely consumed by its use in the through negotiations is the most advantageous to the
work" (National Surety Co. v. Bratnober Lumber Co., 67 Government since so many studies, plans and procedures
Wash. 601, 122, Pac. 337). had already been worked out with PGMC since October 1993
as a result of the previous bidding (Sec. 1.e, Executive Order
It has been held, however, that the true distinction between No. 301 [1987]). (emphasis supplied)
"supplies" and "equipment" rests on the effect the use has
upon the article, rather than upon the degree of use to which Although Mr. Morato did not volunteer to disclose what those
it is subjected. Thus, a "supply" would be any article furnished studies, plans, and procedures are, it is logical to presume that
for carrying on the work which from its nature is necessarily they refer to, among other things, (1) the building of the on-line
consumed by use in the work, while "equipment" would lottery system, at no expense of or risk to the PCSO, which was
consist of those articles that are not necessarily so precisely the specific purpose of the Request for Proposals and
consumed, but which may survive the particular work and be which Morato admitted in his "presentation" in his letter to the
further used on work of like character (United States Rubber COA Chairman; and (2) those that this Court had noted in the first
Co. of California v. Washington Engineering Co., 149 P. 706). lotto case, to wit: (a) the preparation of the detailed plan of all
games and the marketing thereof; and (b) the determination of the
In case of lease of equipment, it was held that the rental value number of players, value of winnings, and the logistics required
of machinery hired by the contractor for use in carrying on to introduce the games, including the Master Games Plan. The
work within the terms of the contract is recoverable from the indispensable role of the PGMC as a collaborator, associate, or
bondsman as a supply, the reason for this being that what joint venturer up to that point where actual operation of the on-line
was consumed in the work was the use of the machinery and lottery system shall begin was unaffected by the superficial
not the machinery itself (United States Rubber Co. vs. surgery on the text of the nullified contract. Atty. Eleazar Reyes,
Washington Eng'g. Co., supra, citing cases). Applying this co-counsel of Atty. Cayetano for the PGMC, was candid enough
ruling to the instant case, the subject Equipment Lease to admit during the oral arguments that it would be extremely
difficult for the PGMC and the PCSO to avoid the proscribed PERCENT (4.3%) of the gross amount of ticket sales from all
"collaboration, association, or joint venture" under the exception of LESSEE's on-line lottery operations in the Territory, which
of paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. He, rental shall be computed and payable bi-weekly, net of
nevertheless, hastened to add that an outright purchase by the withholding taxes on income, if any: provided that, in no case
PCSO of the PGMC's equipment would be the best and safest shall the annual aggregate rentals per year during the term of
recourse. Thus: the lease be less than the annual minimum fixed rental
computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial
JUSTICE DAVIDE: operation per annum, provided, further that the annual
Mr. Counsel you just admitted a while ago that it is extremely minimum fixed rental shall be reduced pro-rata for the number
difficult to comply with the revised charter of the Philippine of days during the year that a terminal is not in commercial
Charity Sweepstakes Office insofar as collaboration, joint operation due to repairs or breakdown. In the event the
venture, association are concerned? aggregate bi-weekly rentals in any year falls short of the
ATTY. REYES: annual minimum fixed rental computed at P35,000.00 per
Yes, Your Honor. terminal in commercial operation, the LESSEE shall pay such
JUSTICE DAVIDE: shortfall from out of the proceeds of the then current ticket
But if given the chance to rewrite this contract, what proposal sales from LESSEE's on-line lottery operations in the
would you give, what recommendation would you give to your Territory (after payment first of prizes and agents'
client? commissions but prior to any other payments, allocations or
ATTY. REYES: disbursements) until said shortfall shall have been fully
Your Honor, that is why I said I would leave it to the business settled, but without prejudice to the payment to LESSOR of
judgment of my client. the then current bi-weekly rentals in accordance with the
JUSTICE DAVIDE: provisions of the first sentence of this paragraph 2.
As a lawyer what kind of a contract would you recommend to
be rewritten, to satisfy the law, to satisfy the judgment of this This is an unusually novel arrangement which insures and
Court in the first case? guarantees the PGMC full participation in the gross proceeds of
ATTY. REYES: ticket sales even if, ultimately, a draw could mean losses to the
The safest, Your Honor, is a sale. PCSO. It allots to the PGMC only a very limited share in the losses
JUSTICE DAVIDE: since, under any circumstance and the most unfavorable
Sale, meaning the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office will business climate, the PGMC is assured of an irreducible minimum
buy everything? "rental" per terminal. The term "rental" is then a very deceptive,
ATTY. REYES: yet poorly contrived, disguise to cloak the real role of the PGMC.
Yes, Your Honor. At the hearing, Atty. Eleazar Reyes feigned ignorance on how the
JUSTICE DAVIDE: "rental" of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales was arrived
Why did you not recommend that to your client instead you at. This Court should not wait for the end of the world for any
went into the process [of drafting the] ELA. acceptable explanation therefor. The explanation can easily be
ATTY. REYES: had by relating it to the rental of 4.9% of gross receipts from ticket
Because, Your Honor, they do not have the money. They are sales under the nullified contract. The reduction of only 0.6%
going to use the proceeds from the gains for the payment of (4.9% 4.3%) is negligible considering the PCSO's assumption
the rental but they do not have the cash. of, among other things, all business risks; operation of the
JUSTICE DAVIDE: equipment with the use of its own personnel; risks of loss of and
In the event that this Court will now strike down this damage to the equipment; responsibility for maintenance and
agreement as also void, would you recommend that to your repairs, all of which were the PGMC's duties, obligations, and
client as a third contract? responsibilities under the nullified contract. I am convinced that
ATTY. REYES: such rate was pre-determined to approximate the profits which
Yes, Your Honor, if the PCSO can pay for it. 22 the PGMC expected to realize under the nullified contract. The
rental clause is, indeed, a subtle scheme to unconditionally
Besides, even on the face of the new ELA, the elements of the guaranty PGMC's share in the profits.
proscribed joint venture or, at the very least, collaboration or
association, can be detected, albeit they are hidden behind the If read in conjunction with the upgrading provision buried under
skirt of the following: (a) the Rental Clause; (b) the upgrading the clause "Repair Services" it becomes clear that the parties do
provision under the Repair Services Clause; and (c) the details of have a different purpose for the use of the term rental.
what are embraced in the term Lottery Equipment and
Accessories subject of the contract, which are found in Annex "A" The Repair Services clause provides as follows:
of the ELA. 23
REPAIR SERVICES
The Rental Clause provides for a flexible rate based on a LESSEE shall bear the costs of maintenance and necessary
percentage of the gross amount of ticket sales, payable bi- repairs, except those repairs to correct defective
weekly, with an annual minimum rental fixed at P35,000.00 per workmanship or replace defective materials used in the
terminal in commercial operation, any shortfall of which shall be manufacture of Equipment discovered after delivery of the
paid out of the proceeds of the current ticket sales. This clause Equipment, in which case LESSOR shall bear the costs of
provides in full as follows: such repairs and, if necessary, the replacements. The
LESSEE may at any time during the term of the lease, request
RENTAL the LESSOR to upgrade the equipment and/or increase the
During the effectivity of this Agreement and the term of this number of terminals, in which case the LESSEE and
lease as provided in paragraph 3 hereof, LESSEE shall pay LESSOR shall agree on an arrangement mutually satisfactory
rental to LESSOR equivalent to FOUR POINT THREE
to both of them, upon such terms as may be mutually agreed Into New Contracts, Providing Exceptions Therefor," states this
upon. policy:

The upgrading provision is full of mischief and is, perhaps, the Whereas, as a matter of general policy, it is in the interest of
most deceptive provision in the ELA that puts to naught any the public service that Government contracts for public
pretense of good faith in expunging from the old contract all services or for furnishing of supplies, materials, and
indicia of the statutorily proscribed collaboration, association, or equipment to the Government be submitted to public bidding.
joint venture. It is a provision which is entirely unrelated to the
clause under which it is placed Repair Services. It should have This was restated in E.O No. 301 28 of President Corazon C.
been either set forth as a separate clause or at least placed under Aquino, entitled "Decentralizing Actions on Government
the clause on Equipment. 24 Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts and Records Disposal,"
whose Section 1 reads:
It should be stressed here that in the old contract the upgrading
clause is under facilities, which include among other things all Sec. 1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision
capital equipment, computers, terminals, and softwares. Under of law, decree, executive order or other issuances to the
the upgrading provision, new equipment may be used; the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for
number of terminals may be increased; and new terms and furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
conditions, including rates of "rentals" and the purchase price in government or any of its branches, agencies or
case of exercise of the option to buy, may be agreed upon. This instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without
makes the ELA not just a sweetheart contract, but one which will public bidding, except under any of the following situations:
preserve the parties' indivisible union and community of interest,
thereby giving further credence to this Court's observation in the The Court agrees with DOJ Opinion No. 4, series of 1995, which
first lotto case that each is wed to the other for better or for worse. states that the bidding conducted for the nullified contract could
be a valid basis for the new ELA and that, therefore, a new bidding
The term Equipment, which is allegedly the subject of the ELA, was in order. The DOJ erred, however, when it further stated that
includes, per its definition in Annex "A" thereof, the "associated or the ELA is exempt under Section 1(e) of E.O. No. 301 from the
incidental hardware equipment, furnishing and fixtures, public-bidding requirement.
technology, intellectual property rights, knowhow, processes and
systems." Technology, knowhow, processes, and systems Sections 1 and 2 of E.O. No. 301 under subdivision A
necessarily include transfer of technology and other expertise (Decentralization of Negotiated Contracts) read in full as follows:
which could only be carried out over a number of years of
continuing training and supervision of personnel, which the Sec. 1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision
PGMC is necessarily and logically required to do. Intellectual of law, decree, executive order or other issuances to the
property rights can only refer to, among other things, the detailed contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for
plans of all games and the Master Games Plan which, under the furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
nullified contract, are to be prepared by the PGMC. government or any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without
It may be observed that the term facilities in the old contract public bidding, except under any of the following situations:
included all capital equipment but excluded "technology, a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an
intellectual property rights, knowhow, processes and systems." emergency which may involve the loss of, or danger
As this Court found in the first lotto case, there was a separate to, life and/or property;
provision on the PGMC's obligations (1) to train PCSO and other b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection
local personnel and (2) to effect the transfer of technology and with a project or activity which cannot be delayed
other expertise. 25 Clearly, the inclusion of "technology, without causing detriment to the public service;
intellectual property rights, knowhow, processes and systems" in c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive
the term Equipment was a ploy to hide, again, the continuing distributor or manufacturer who does not have
indispensable collaboration of the PGMC in the conduct of the on- subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no
line lottery business. suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at
more advantageous terms to the government;
B. Even assuming that the subject ELA is not a joint venture d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been
contract, still it must be nullified for having been entered into unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
without public bidding and for being grossly disadvantageous to consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the
the Government. It has been said: offers received in each instance were exorbitant or
non-conforming to specifications;
In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the policy and medium e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the
adhered to in Government procurement and construction needed supplies through negotiated purchase is
contracts under existing laws and regulations. It is the most advantageous to the government to be
accepted method for arriving at a fair and reasonable price determined by the Department Head concerned; and
and ensures that overpricing, favoritism and other anomalous f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the
practices are eliminated or minimized. And any Government government.
contract entered into without the required bidding is null and Sec. 2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. In line with
void and cannot adversely affect the rights of third parties. 26 the principles of decentralization and accountability,
negotiated contracts for public services or for furnishing
The opening paragraph of E.O. No. 298, series of 1940, 27 of supplies, materials or equipment may be entered into by the
President Manuel L. Quezon, entitled "Prohibiting the Automatic department or agency head or the governing board of the
Renewal of Contracts, Requiring Public Bidding Before Entering government-owned or controlled corporation concerned,
without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject carrying on the work. The appellant argues, however, that the
to availability of funds, compliance with the standards or distinction is not sound; that there is no just ground for holding
guidelines prescribed in Section 1 hereof, and to the audit that one who rents to a contractor the tools and working
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit in accordance with appliances necessary for the prosecution of a particular work
existing rules and regulations. may have recovery against the contractor's bondsmen for the
rental value of the articles furnished, while one who sells the
Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 contractor the same character of articles on credit has no
shall be signed by the Secretary and two other Undersecretaries. claim against the bondsmen for any part of the purchase
price. But, if this be true, and it be true that the contractor's
It is clear that Sections 1 and 2 refer to contracts for public working equipment is not to be deemed a supply, it argues
services, or for furnishing supplies, materials, and equipment to that the decisions cited are erroneous, rather than that the
the government. In no uncertain terms, the Executive Order itself appellant's goods fall within the meaning of the term
distinguishes the terms supplies, materials, and equipment from supplies."
each other, i.e., it did not intend to consider them as synonymous
terms. If such were the intention, there would have been no need On the contrary, United States Rubber Co. explicitly distinguished
to enumerate them separately and to limit subparagraphs (a), (b), supplies from equipment, thus:
and (e) to supplies; subparagraph (c) to materials; and
subparagraph (f) to all three (supplies, materials and equipment). So construing the statute, the definitions of "equipment" and
The specific mention of supplies in Subparagraphs (a), (b), and "supply" coincide, and a certain and natural dividing line is
(e) was clearly intended to exclude therefrom materials and found between them. A "supply" would be any article
equipment, and the specific mention of materials in subparagraph furnished for carrying on the work which from its nature is
(c) was likewise intended to exclude supplies and equipment. necessarily consumed by use in the work, while "equipment"
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. would consist of those articles that are not necessarily so
consumed, but which may survive the particular work and be
Elsewise stated, the Executive Order leaves no room for a further used on work of like character. In this view also the
construction that confuses supplies with materials or equipment question actually decided in the case of National Surety Co.
or either of the last two with the first or with each other. According v. Bratnober Lumber Co. harmonizes with the other cases
to Sutherland: 29 cited, since coal, like powder and other explosives, and like
electricity used for power and other forms of energy used for
It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be the same purpose, is necessarily consumed by its use, and
given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a cannot survive for like uses in a similar character of work.
statute. A statute should be construed so that effect is given
to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or Tested by these rules, it is plain that the articles furnished by
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will the appellant are not supplies, but are a part of the
not destroy another unless the provision is the result of contractor's equipment. While they were actually worn out by
obvious mistake or error. use in carrying on the work, they were not articles of such a
nature as to be necessarily consumed by such use, and might
In a last-ditch effort to save the ELA, the DOJ opined that the have survived, had their use therein been of less duration, for
subject ELA could be deemed as an agreement for furnishing use in subsequent work of like character.
supplies and, in support thereof, cited United States Rubber Co.
vs. Washington Eng'g. Co. 30 wherein it was allegedly held that in Besides, subparagraph (e) of Section 1 unequivocally refers to a
a lease of equipment, the rental value of machinery hired by the contract of purchase of supplies. The ELA in question is not a
contractor for use in carrying on work was the use of the contract of purchase of supplies. The parties themselves proclaim
machinery and not the machinery itself. The DOJ opinion is to the whole world and solemnly represent to this Court that it is
outlandish, as the case it cited did not make the attributed a contract of lease of equipment. They titled it, in bold big letters,
pronouncement. It must have miscomprehended or "EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT," and devote the first clause
misappreciated the ruling in United States Rubber Co. . The said thereof to EQUIPMENT. Accordingly, since the ELA is not a
pronouncement is found in Hurley-Mason Co. vs. American contract of purchase of supplies, we are unable to understand
Bonding Co., 31 which was cited by the appellant in the United why the DOJ applied Section 1(e) of E.O. No. 301 to exempt the
States Rubber Co. case, and which the court did not, in fact, ELA from the public-bidding requirement.
accept. Thus, the court stated:
The submission of the petitioners that the ELA violates paragraph
But the appellant cites as supporting its contention the case 4.3 of the COA Rules and Regulations for the Prevention of
of Hurley-Mason Co. v. American Bonding Co., 79 Wash. Irregular, Unnecessary, Excessive, and Extravagant
564, 140 Pac. 575, to which may be added the more recent Expenditures is not persuasive. The said paragraph covers Lease
case of National Lumber & Box Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Purchase contracts. It reads:
Co., 149 Pac. 16, which hold that the rental value of
machinery hired by the contractor for use in carrying on work 4.3 LEASE PURCHASE
within the terms of the contract is recoverable from the
bondsman as a supply furnished the contractor. These cases The national government may enter into agreement for the
proceed on the theory that it was the use of the machinery lease purchase of equipment subject to public bidding, the
that was consumed in the work, not the machinery itself, and approval of the Office of the Management, and to other
that this use being distinguishable from the machinery could pertinent accounting and auditing religions. Details of the
be recovered for against the bondsman as a supply. If this payments shall be indicated in the lease purchase agreement
distinction is sound, then the cases are in line with the other and accompanied with a certification of availability of
cases cited, as such "use" was necessarily consumed in equipment outlay authorized for the agency to cover the full
contract cost. The lease purchase agreement may be entered warned that "the proponent must be able to stand to the acid
into only for specialized equipment such as typewriters, test of proving that it is an entity able to take on the role of
adding machines and automobiles, the purchase price of responsible maintainer of the on-line lottery system." The
which is at least P50,000.00. All lease purchase agreement PCSO, however, makes it clear in its RFP that the proponent
of equipment the total value of which exceeds P200,000.00 can propose a period of the contract which shall not exceed
shall be subject to the approval of the President. fifteen years, during which time it is assured of a "rental"
Corporations/local governments may adopt the mechanisms which shall not exceed 12% of gross receipts. As admitted by
of these lease-purchase agreement subject to the approval of the PGMC, upon learning of the PCSO's decision, the Berjaya
their legislative or governing boards. Group Berhad, with its affiliates, wanted to offer its services
and resources to the PCSO. Forthwith, it organized the
The ELA in question hardly qualifies as a lease purchase contract PGMC as "a medium through which the technical and
because there is no perfected agreement to purchase (sale) but management services required for the project would be
only an option on the part of PCSO to purchase the equipment for offered and delivered to PCSO.
P25 million. It is, in fact, an option which is not supported by a
separate and distinct consideration, hence, not really binding Undoubtedly, then, the Berjaya Group Berhad knew all along
upon the PGMC. that in connection with an on-line lottery system, the PCSO
had nothing but its franchise, which it solemnly guaranteed it
An optional contract is a privilege existing in one person, for which had in the General Information of the RFP. Howsoever
he had paid a consideration, which gives him the right to buy viewed then, from the very inception, the, PCSO and the
certain specified property from another person, if he choses, at PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between
any time within the agreed period, at a fixed price. Said contract them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical,
is separate and distinct contract from the contract which the operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery
parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option. 32 system while the PCSO would, primarily, provide the
The second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code expressly franchise. The words Gaming and Management in the
provides that "[an accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a corporate name of respondent Philippine Gaming
determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor Management Corporation could not have been conceived just
if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the for euphemistic purposes. Of course, the RFP cannot
price. substitute for the Contract of Lease which was subsequently
executed by the PCSO and the PGMC. Nevertheless, the
C. A comparison between the nullified contract and the assailed Contract of Lease incorporates their intention and
ELA to prove that the latter is grossly disadvantageous to the understanding.
PCSO is not at all hampered by any perceived difficulty. As to the xxx xxx xxx
almost unrestricted benefits and advantages which the PCSO Consistent with the above observations on the RFP, the
were supposed to obtain under the former, the following findings PCSO has only its franchise to offer, while the PGMC
of this Court in the first lotto case bind the parties: represents and warrants that it has access to all managerial
and technical expertise to promptly and effectively carry out
The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC the terms of the contract. And, for the period of eight years,
reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the the PGMC is under obligation to keep all the Facilities in safe
expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, condition and if necessary, upgrade, replace, and improve
and that although it wished to have the system, it would have them from time to time as new technology develops to make
it "at no expense or risks to the government." Because of the on-line lottery system more cost-effective and
these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses competitive; exclusively bear all costs and expenses relating
and assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in to the printing, manpower, salaries and wages, advertising
its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall and promotion, maintenance, expansion and replacement,
build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate security and insurance, and all other related expenses
and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, needed to operate the on-line lottery system; undertake a
operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks"; and positive advertising and promotions campaign for both
submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan institutional and product lines without engaging in negative
. . . which will include the game, the marketing of the games, advertising against other lessors; bear the salaries and
and the logistics to introduce the game to all the cities and related costs of skilled and qualified personnel for
municipalities of the country within five (5) years"; and that the administrative and technical operations; comply with
operation of the on-line lottery system should be "at no procedural and coordinating rules issued by the PCSO; and
expense or risk to the government" meaning itself, since it to train PCSO and other local personnel and to effect the
is a government-owned and controlled agency. The facilities transfer of technology and other expertise, such that at the
referred to means "all capital equipment, computers, end of the term of the contract, the PCSO will be able to
terminals, software, nationwide telecommunications network, effectively take over the Facilities and efficiently operate the
ticket sales offices, furnishings and fixtures, printing costs, on-line lottery system. The latter simply means that indeed,
costs of salaries and wages, advertising and promotions the managers, technicians or employees who shall operate
expenses, maintenance costs, expansion and replacement the on-line lottery system are not managers, technicians or
costs, security and insurance, and all other related expenses employees of the PCSO, but of the PGMC and that it is only
needed to operate a nationwide on-line lottery system. after the expiration of the contract that the PCSO will operate
the system. After eight years, the PCSO would automatically
In short, the only contribution the PCSO would have is its become the owner of the Facilities without any other further
franchise or authority to operate the on-line lottery system; consideration.
with the rest, including the risks of the business, being borne
by the proponent or bidder. It could be for this reason that it
For all the above representations, duties, obligations, and which the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is
responsibilities, as well as the automatic loss of its ownership over disadvantageous to the government.
the facilities without any further consideration in favor of the
PCSO after the expiration of only eight years, the PGMC gets only That postulation is flawed. It forgets that no other contract
a so-called rental of 4.9% of gross receipts from ticket sales, proposed by other parties were available for comparison precisely
payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, which may, because no public bidding was conducted. To demand a
however, be drastically reduced, or in extreme cases, totally comparison with non-existing contracts would be unreasonable.
obliterated because the PGMC bears "all risks if the revenue from
ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the The challenged ELA must then be declared void for the following
entire prize money. reasons: (1) it is a joint venture contract prohibited under the
exception in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
Under the assailed ELA, however, the PGMC is entitled to receive amended by B.P. Blg. 42; (2) it was entered into without the
a flexible rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross ticket sales (or mandatory public bidding; and (3) it is grossly disadvantageous
only 0.6% lower than it was entitled to under the old contract) for to the PCSO and, ultimately, the Government.
the use of its on-line lottery system equipment (as distinguished
from facilities in the old contract), which does not anymore include I therefore vote to GRANT the instant petition and to declare VOID
the nationwide telecommunications network, without any and INVALID the challenged EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT
assumption of business risks and the obligations (1) to keep the (ELA) entered into between the public respondent Philippine
facilities in safe condition and if necessary, to upgrade, replace, Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the private respondent
and improve them from time to time as technology develops, and Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).
bear all expenses relating thereto; (2) to undertake advertising
and promotions campaign; (3) to bear all taxes, amusements, or Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
other charges imposed on the activities covered by the contract;
(4) to pay the premiums for third party or comprehensive
insurance on the facilities: (5) to pay all expenses for water, light,
fuel, lubricants, electric power, gas, and other utilities used and
necessary for the operation of the facilities; and to pay the salaries
and related costs of skilled and qualified personnel for
administrative and technical operations and maintenance crew.
The PGMC is also given thereunder a special privilege of
receiving P25 million as purchase price for the equipment at the
expiration of eight years should the PCSO exercise its option to
purchase.

Unlike in the old contract where nothing may at all be due the
PGMC in the event that the ticket sales, computed on an annual
basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money, under the
new ELA the PCSO is under obligation to pay rental equivalent to
4.3% of the gross receipts from ticket sales, the aggregate
amount of which per year should not be less than the minimum
annual rental of P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation.
Any shortfall shall be paid out of the proceeds of the then current
ticket sales after payment of prizes and agents' commissions but
prior to any other payments, allocations, or disbursements. The
grossness of the disadvantage to the PCSO is all too obvious and
why the PCSO accepted such unreasonable, unconscionable,
and inequitable terms and conditions confounds us.

The majority opinion, however, glosses over these considerations


because it believes that the determination of the issue of gross
disadvantage should not be done through a comparison of the
first lotto contract and the ELA in question.

It says:
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former
joint venture agreement the present lease contract is "[more]
advantageous to the government." The question is whether
under the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous
contract that could be obtained compared with similar lease
agreements which the PCSO could have made with the other
parties.

It then concludes:
Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could
have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA,
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963 other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, stipulation of facts.
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing
of the Philippines, in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde"
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor
Central Bank, respondents. General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding
otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas
CONCEPCION, J.: "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of
denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Science and Technology has expressed, through its
Co., Inc. Commissioner, the view that:

The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the
Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost
the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times
in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is
Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as
synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however,
the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
raw materials in the production of said glues and paid therefor conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde",
the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor. manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon
P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-
issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of 15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games &
said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore,
approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea
granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14,
for review. 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without
"urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
Republic Act No. 2609 reads: the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to
the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
following:.
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and
hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing


stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
G.R. No. 106724 February 9, 1994 On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year
THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to the local
Acting Chairman, Cesar Sarino, Teodolo C. Natividad, Vice- police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60)
Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen. Virgilio H. David, for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33,
Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P. Enriquez, Commissioners, PD 1184); while the retirement age for the PC had already been
and Chief Supt. Levy D. Macasiano Director for Personnel, set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
petitioners,
vs. On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a restraining
Honorable Judge Salvador de Guzman, Jr., Chief Supt. order followed by a writ of injunction on January 8, 1992 upon
Norberto M. Lina, Chief Supt. Ricardo Trinidad, Jr., Sr. Supt. posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private respondents.
Manuel Suarez, Supt. Justito B. Tagum, Sr. Supt. Tranquilino
Aspiras, Sr., Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the
Sr. Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, Sr. Supt. Jose P. Suria, Sr. Supt. case was submitted for resolution and on August 14, 1992, the
Agaton Abiera, Chief Insp. Bienvenido Torres, and the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision, the decretal
National (ROTC) Alumni Association Inc. (NARRA), portion of which reads:
represented by its President Col. Benjamin Gundran, and
Director Hermogenes Peralta, Jr., respondents. WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term "INP"
in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the
BIDIN, J.: present Philippine National Police, irrespective of the original
The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the status of the present members of the Philippine National
compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec. 39, Police before its creation and establishment, and that Section
RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine 39 thereof shall become operative after the lapse of the four-
National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior year transition period.
and Local Government", which took effect on January 2, 1991. The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.
Among others, RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30)
for PNP members. Section 39 thereof reads:
Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992 seeking
Sec. 39. Compulsory Retirement. Compulsory retirement, the reversal of the above judgment. On January 12, 1993, the
for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age Court resolved to treat the respondents' Comment as Answer and
fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the gave due course to the petition.
rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director
general, the Commission may allow his retention in the In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge
service for an unextendible period of one (1) year. observed, among others, that:

Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local
retirement to private respondents who are all members of the police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define
defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the
fifty-six (56). court is to trace the source of the "INP" as courts are
permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to
In response, private respondents filed a complaint on December investigate the antecedents involved. There is nothing extant
19, 1991 for declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of an in the statute books except that which was created and
ex parte restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as Civil established under PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article
Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, XV of the 1973 Constitution providing that the "State shall
Branch 142. In their complaint, respondents aver that the age of establish and maintain an integrated national police force
retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be whose organization, administration and operation shall be
applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof provided by law." Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the said
which provides: law categorically declared the PC "as the principal component
of the Integrated National Police" (Sec. 5, PD 765).
Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and
within the transition period of four (4) years following the The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein)
effectivity of this Act, the following members of the INP shall with excerpts taken from the discussion amongst the
be considered compulsorily retired: members of Congress concerning the particular provision of
a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year Section 89. The court is not persuaded by said discussion; it
of the effectivity of this Act. was a simple matter for the members of the legislature to
b) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the state precisely in clear and unequivocal terms their meaning,
second year of the effectivity of this Act. such as "integrated police" as used in PD 765. Instead, they
c) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third employed "INP", a generic term that includes the PC as the
year of the effectivity of this Act. principal component of the INP, supra. In failing to
d) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the categorically restrict the application of Section 89 as the
fourth year of the effectivity of this Act. members of legislature are said to have intended, it gave rise
to the presumption that it has not limited nor intended to limit
It is the submission of respondents that the term "INP" includes the meaning of the word when the bill was finally passed into
both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary and the law. It is not difficult for the court to also presume that in
local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated drafting the wording of the PNP Law, the legislators were
National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975. aware of the historical legislative origin of the "INP".
xxx xxx xxx
The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of the
found in the Transitory Provisions of the law which do not Department of National Defense, to be completed within six
provide for any distinction between the former PC officers and (6) months from the date of the effectivity of this Act. At the
those belonging to the civilian police forces. These provision end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC, technical
are specifically enacted to regulate the period covering the Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation
dissolution of the PC and the creation of the PNP, a period and Intelligence Branch shall have been covered by official
that necessarily would be attended by imbalances and or orders assigning them to the PNP . . .
confusion occasioned by the wholesale and mass integration. xxx xxx xxx
In fact, the retirement payment scheme of the INP is still to be . . . Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the
formulated, leaving the impression that nothing is really twelve-month period from the effectivity of this Act, retire . .
settled until after the transition of four years has lapsed. .Phase III . . . To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the
Section 89 therefore prevails over Section 39 up to the year Commission shall create a Board of Officers composed of the
1995 when the retirement age for the members of the PNP following: NAPOLCOM Commissioner as Chairman and one
shall then be age 56; after the year 1995, Section 39 shall (1) representative each from the PC, INP, Civil Service
then be the applicable law on retirement of PNP members. Commission and the Department of Budget and
(Rollo, pp. 27-28; emphasis supplied) Management.

Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP in Sec. Section 86 of the same law further provides:
89 does not imply the same meaning contemplated under PD 765
wherein it is provided: Sec. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions. The
PNP shall absorb the functions of the PC, the INP and the
Sec. 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police. Narcotics Command upon the effectivity of this Act.
There is hereby established and constituted the Integrated
National Police (INP) which shall be composed of the From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears
Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated therefore that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the
police forces as established by Presidential Decrees Nos. PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a
421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine
Department of National Defense. National Police (PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the
INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be
On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of
nucleus of the Integrated National Police (INP) under PD 765, the PC.
former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) should not
be discriminated against from the coverage of the term "INP" in And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the
Sec. 89, RA 6975. Clearly, it is argued, the term "INP" found in law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975
Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP in PD 765. Thus, where has in fact defined the same. Thus,
the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
Sec. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. Upon
Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC? Petitioners the effectivity of this Act, the present National Police
submit that it does and cite Sections 23 and 85 to stress the point, Commission and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
viz.: National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine
Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the Philippine
Sec. 23. Composition. Subject to the limitations provided Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to be a
for in this Act, the Philippine National Police, hereinafter major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
referred to as the PNP, is hereby established, initially Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component of
consisting of the members of the police forces who were the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall
integrated into the Integrated National Police (INP) pursuant cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new
to Presidential Decree No. 765, and the officers and enlisted police force shall be established and constituted pursuant to
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). . . this Act. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP, It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature
Narcotics Command, CIS and the technical command of the failed to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it
AFP assigned with the PC, including NAPOLCOM hearing is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict
officers holding regular items as such, shall be absorbed by the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in
the Department as employees thereof, subject to existing favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity
laws and regulations. as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-
xxx xxx xxx six (56).
Sec. 85. Phase of Implementation. The implementation of
this Act shall be undertaken in three (3) phases, to wit: Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have
belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term.
Phase I Exercise of option by the uniformed members of Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not
the Philippine Constabulary, the PC elements assigned with without recourse in determining the construction of the statute
the Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of the with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual
technical services of the AFP assigned with the PC to include proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a
the regular CIS investigating agents and the operatives and provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
agents of the NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and during the legislative deliberations may be adopted (De Villa v.
Intelligence Branch, and the personnel of the absorbed Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 722 [1991] citing Palanca v. City of
Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 real intent of the legislators based on the deliberations of the
SCRA 318 [1978]). Bicameral Conference Committee that preceded the enactment
of RA 6975.
Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that
law if it runs counter to the legislative intent (Yellow Taxi and Section 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force
Pasay Transportation Workers' Association v. Manila Yellow Taxi is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid.
Cab. Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]). The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to
the following requirements:
Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference Committee, (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
we find that the legislature did intent to exclude the members of (2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
is concerned, thus: (4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People
vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what
people really want is one common rule, so if it is fifty-six, fifty- The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC,
six; of course, the PC wants sixty for everybody. Of course, it before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were already retirable
is not acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this up really at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at 60, and
to the question of: If you are lax in allowing their (the PC) entry governed by different laws (P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The
into the PNP, then tighten up the retirement. If we will be strict distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to
in, like requiring examinations and other conditions for their enable the local police force to plan for their retirement which
original entry, then since we have sifted out a certain amount would be earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is
of undesirables, then we can allow a longer retirement age. merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and effect
That was the rationale, that was the tie-up. Since we are once the four-year transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it applies
relaxing the entry, we should speed up . . . not only to some but to all local police officers.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). Exit.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA) . . . the retirement, the It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd
exit. that a law will grant an extension to PC officers' retirable age from
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56 without any cogent
clear, Mr. Chairman. Fifty-six, let's say, that will not make any reason at all. Why should the retirement age of PC officers be
adjustment in the PC because there (they) are (retirable at increased during the transitory period to the exclusion of other PC
age) fifty-six. officers who would retire at age 56 after such period? Such
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat
masasabi. its purpose of providing a uniform retirement age for PNP
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police, members.
since they are retireable now at sixty, for the officers, it will be
applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a total WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction
period of four years transition. (Bicameral Conference issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the assailed
Committee on National Defense, March 12, 1990) decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will SO ORDERED.
retire at 60 years.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.
REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.
REP. GUTANG. On the third year, 58.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So 'yung 55,
on the third year, 58, doon siya re-retire.
REP. GUTANG. Oo.
SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes
effective . . .
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon
siya aabot.
REP. UNICO. Pwede.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil 'yon, may time to . . .
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito
sa transition ng pulis, acceptable ito, eh.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala
sa kanila, 56 ang retirement age nilang talaga, eh. Kaya ayaw
ko
ngang dagdagan 'yung 56 nila at 'yon din ang sa Armed
Forces, 56. (Ibid., May 22, 1990)

In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police


force as established in PD 765, the Court does not, in any
manner, give any undue preferential treatment in favor of the
other group. On the contrary, the Court is merely giving life to the
G.R. No. L-43760 August 21, 1976 participates. Following the analogy of political elections, the
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS courts have approved this practice of the Board.9
(PAFLU), petitioner 2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at present
vs. embarked on a wide-scale industrialization project. As a
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE CARMELO matter of fact, respondent firm is engaged in such activity.
C. NORIEL, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE LABOR Industrialization, as noted by Professor Smith, Merrifield and
UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., Rothschild, "can thrive only as there is developed a. stable
INC., respondents. structure of law and order in the productive sector."10 That
objective is best attained in a collective bargaining regime,
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.: which is a manifestation of industrial democracy at work, if
A certification by respondent Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo there be no undue obstacles placed in the way of the choice
C. Noriel, that respondent National Federation of Free Labor of a bargaining representative. To insist on the absolute
Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the majority where there are various unions and where the
employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. possibility of invalid ballots may not be ruled out, would be to
disregarding the objection raised by petitioner, the Philippine frustrate that goal. For the probability of a long drawn-out,
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), is assailed in this protracted process is not easy to dismiss. That is not unlikely
certiorari proceeding. Admittedly, in the certification election held given the intensity of rivalry among unions capable of enlisting
on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes as the allegiance of a group of workers. It is to avoid such a
against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the contingency that there is this explicit pronouncement in the
Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a implementing rule. It speaks categorically. It must be obeyed.
majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the That was what respondent Director did.
victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent.1 There were four votes cast by employees who did not 3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be imputed to
want any union. 2 On its face therefore, respondent Union ought respondent Director presumably because of failure to abide
to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable by the doctrine or pronouncement of this Court in the
rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine aforesaid Allied Workers Association case. The reliance is on
announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the this excerpt from the opinion: "However, spoiled ballots, i.e.,
Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations3 that spoiled ballots those which are defaced, torn or marked (Rules for
should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Certification Elections, Rule II, sec. 2[j]) should be counted in
Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the determining the majority since they are nevertheless votes
submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part cast by those who are qualified to do so." 11 Nothing can be
of respondent Director. Implicit in the comment of respondent clearer than that its basis is a paragraph in a section of the
Director of Labor Relations, 4 considered as an answer, is the then applicable rules for certification elections. 12 They were
controlling weight to be accorded the implementing rule above- promulgated under the authority of the then prevailing
cited, no inconsistency being shown between such rule and the Industrial Peace Act. 13 That Legislation is no longer in force,
present Labor Code. Under such a view, the ruling in the Allied having been superseded by the present Labor Code which
Workers Association case that arose during the period when it took effect on November 1, 1974. This certification election is
was the Industrial Peace Act 5, that was in effect and not the governed therefore, as was made clear, by the present Labor
present law, no longer possesses relevance. It cannot and should Code and the Rules issued thereunder. Absent a showing that
not be applied. It is not controlling. There was no abuse of such rules and regulations -are violative of the Code, this
discretion then, much less a grave one. Court cannot ignore their existence. When, as should be the
case, a public official acts in accordance with a norm therein
This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of respondent contained, no infraction of the law is committed. Respondent
Director, not to mention the decisive fact appearing in the Petition Director did, as he ought to, comply with its terms. He took
itself that at most, only ten of the spoiled ballots "were intended into consideration only the "valid votes" as was required by
for the petitioner Union,"6 thus rendering clear that it would on its the Rules. He had no choice as long as they remain in force.
own showing obtain only 424 votes as against 429 for respondent In a proper showing, the judiciary can nullify any rule it found
Union. certiorari does not lie. in conflict with the governing statute. 14 That was not even
attempted here. All that petitioner did was to set forth in two
1. What is of the essence of the certification process, as noted separate paragraphs the applicable rule followed by
in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Pilipino v. Benguet respondent Director 15 and the governing article. 16 It did not
Consolidated, Inc.7 "is that every labor organization be given even bother to discuss why such rule was in conflict with the
the opportunity in a free and honest election to make good its present Labor Code. It failed to point out any repugnancy.
claim that it should be the exclusive collective bargaining Such being the case, respondent Director must be upheld.
representative."8 Petitioner cannot complain. It was given that
opportunity. It lost in a fair election. It came out second best. 4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support from the
The implementing rule favors, as it should, respondent Union, deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by
It obtained a majority of the valid votes cast. So our law the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of
Prescribes. It is equally the case in the United States as this applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing
excerpt from the work of Cox and Bok makes clear: "It is a the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople
well-settled rule that a representative will he certified even of the Department of Labor and took effect on February 3,
though less than a majority of all the employees in the unit 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to
cast ballots in favor of the union. It is enough that the union the public as far back as May 1, 1974, although its date of
be designated by a majority of the valid ballots, and this is so effectivity was postponed to November 1, 1974, although its
even though only a small proportion of the eligible voters date of effectivity was postponed to November 1, 1974. It
would appear then that there was more than enough time for
a really serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and
regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This
Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter
embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen," 17 a 1903
decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt
from the leading American case of Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The principle that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive
officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is
entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be
cited to support it." 18 There was a paraphrase by Justice
Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty," 19 a
1918 decision: "Courts will and should respect the
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless
such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby." 20 Since then, such a doctrine has been
reiterated in numerous decisions . 21 As was emphasized by
Chief Justice Castro, "the construction placed by the office
charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a
Code should he given controlling weight. " 22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs


against petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU).
G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979 On July 25, 1969, however, the Office of the Solicitor General
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and brought an appeal from the said order by way of certiorari to the
THE FAIR TRADE BOARD, petitioner, Supreme Court. 1 In view thereof, the respondent court in the
vs. meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in view of the
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First absence of any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme
Instance of Manila, Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED Court, it resumed action on them until their final disposition
FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., therein.
CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK
INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents. Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for
prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction.
DE CASTRO, J.: Petitioners therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. I . entitled
the decision rendered by respondent judge, in Civil Case No. "Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated Milk
52276 and in Special Civil Action No. 52383 both of the Court of Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc." pending final determination
First Instance of Manila. of Civil Case No. 52276. The facts of this special civil action show
that on December 7, 1962, Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio
Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are Carrasco, both in their individual capacities and in their capacities
engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk as Public Relations Counsel and President of the Philippine
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private Association of Nutrition, respectively, filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair
respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold Trade Board for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or
under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, misbranding. Among other things, the complaint filed include the
General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and charge of omitting to state in their labels any statement sufficient
those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand to Identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an
"Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled imitation of genuine cows milk. and omitting to mark the
Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words:
for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one
highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the year of age or with other equivalent words as required under
other private respondents are members. Section 169 of the Tax Code. The Board proceeded to hear the
complaint until it received the writ of preliminary injunction issued
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex- by the Court of First Instance on March 19, 1963.
parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for
an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case No. 52276 and Special
relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code Civil Action No. 52383 were heard jointly being intimately related
against their filled milk products. with each other, with common facts and issues being also
involved therein. On April 16, 1971, the respondent court issued
The controversy arose from the order of defendant, its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein,
requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from the Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the
inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen In Civil Case No. 52276:
(15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that (a) Perpetually restraining the defendant, Commissioner of
failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to comply with said order Internal Revenue, his agents, or employees from requiring
will result in the institution of the necessary action against any plaintiffs to print on the labels of their filled milk products the
violation of the aforesaid order. Section 169 of the Tax Code words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants
reads as follows: less than one year of age" or words with equivalent import and
declaring as nun and void and without authority in law, the
Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. All order of said defendant dated September 28, 1961, Annex A
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from of the complaint, and the Ruling of the Secretary of Finance,
which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold dated November 12, 1962, Annex G of the complaint; and
or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly
marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language In Special Civil Action No. 52383:
in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This (b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board, its
milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one agents or employees from continuing in the investigation of
year of age," or with other equivalent words. the complaints against petitioners docketed as FTB I.S. No.
2, or any charges related to the manufacture or sale by the
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated February petitioners of their filled milk products and declaring as null
16, 1963 restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from the proceedings so far undertaken by the respondent Board
requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to print on the labels of on said complaints. (pp. 20- 21, Rollo).
their rifled milk products the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words of From the above decision of the respondent court, the
similar import, " as directed by the above quoted provision of Law, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board
and from taking any action to enforce the above legal provision joined together to file the present petition for certiorari with
against the plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their preliminary injunction, assigning the following errors:
rifled milk products, pending the final determination of the case, I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC. TION
Civil Case No. 52276, on the merits. 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY
IMPLICATION.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION implement administrative laws command much respect and
169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE, AND weight. (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Commissioner of
THAT COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS Customs, G. R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617;
AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE Tan, et. al. vs. The Municipality of Pagbilao et. al., L-14264, April
PROPER AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 887; Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara
INFANTS IS THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE L-12347, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 103).
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN RA 3720, NOT THE This Court is, likewise, induced to the belief that filled milk is
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. suitable for nourishment for infants of all ages. The Petitioners
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE themselves admitted that: "the filled milk products of the
POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious,
VIOLATIONS OF FOOD LAWS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44,
AND DRUG INSPECTION, THE FOOD AND DRUG Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE attributable to their having been fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).
BOARD IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND
PROSECUTE ALLEGED MISBRANDING, MISLABELLING There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled milk is
AND/OR MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Being so, the declaration
PRODUCTS. (pp, 4-5, Rollo). required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that filled milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age
The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax would, in effect, constitute a deprivation of property without due.
Code has been repealed by implication. Section 169 was enacted process of law.
in 1939, together with Section 141 (which imposed a Specific tax
on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent
skimmed milk without payment of the specific tax and without the manufacturers of filled milk product and not as against
legend required by Section 169). However, Section 141 was manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk
expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in which, as
Section 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express admitted by the petitioner, the fatty part has been removed and
repeal of Sections 141 and 177, Section 169 became a merely substituted with vegetable or corn oil. The enforcement of Section
declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction. 169 against the private respondents only but not against other
persons similarly situated as the private respondents amounts to
Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code an unconstitutional denial of the equal pro petition of the laws, for
does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying the law, equally enforced, would similarly offend against the
terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed Constitution. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,30 L. ed. 220).
milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of
the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of
pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its
general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose,
under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce
unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms the same. This was so held by his predecessor immediately after
they follow in the statute. Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-
85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts
Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the entered into by the parties, to wit:
"Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of the
Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form ... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the
from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement
other hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated of the requirement in regard to the placing of the proper
concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been legend on its immediate containers is a subject which does
added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or not come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal
oil other than milk fat so that the resulting product is an imitation Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the said
or semblance of milk cream or skim milk." The difference, Code having been repealed by Republic Act No. 463. (p. 102,
therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the Rollo).
former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the
fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of the Tax Code which provides
assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall also "give effect to and
milk. administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by this
Code or other laws" is untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement
opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview of Section of its principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of
169, it being a product distinct from those specified in the said all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the
Section since the removed fat portion of the milk has been enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected
replaced with coconut oil and Vitamins A and D as fortifying therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion
substances (p. 58, Rollo). This opinion bolsters the Court's stand of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax
as to its interpretation of the scope of Section 169. Opinions and purpose. This is the exclusive function of the Food and Drug
rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in
Republic Act No. 3720. In particular, Republic Act No. 3720
provides:

Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug
Inspection), conformably with the rules and regulations, to
hold hearings and conduct investigations relative to matters
touching the Administration of this Act, to investigate
processes of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture and to
subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator,
recommending food and drug standards for adoption. Said
Board shall also perform such additional functions, properly
within the scope of the administration thereof, as maybe
assigned to it by the Food and Drug Administrator. The
decisions of the Board shall be advisory to the Food and Drug
Administrator.

Section 26. ...


xxx xxx xxx
(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be
conducted by the Board of Food and Drug Inspection which
shall submit recommendation to the Food and Drug
Administrator.
(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from
the reports of the Food and Drug Laboratory that any article
of food or any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to Section
28 of this Act is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice
thereof to be given to the person or persons concerned and
such person or persons shall be given an opportunity to
subject evidence impeaching the correctness of the finding or
charge in question.
(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to the
knowledge of the Food and Drug Administrator of such
character that a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted
against the offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary
of Justice through the Secretary of Health, together with the
chemists' report, the findings of the Board of Food and Drug
Inspection, or other documentary evidence on which the
charge is based.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the Food
and Drug Administrator to certify for prosecution pursuant to
subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this Act
whenever he believes that public interest will be adequately
served by a suitable written notice or warning.

The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that petitioners,


Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are
without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged
misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of
filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the
Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food and Drug
Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of
Justice, also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be
instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as
would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only
cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce
confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical
nor desirable.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed en


toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, Petitioner contends that the special import tax under Republic Act
vs. No. 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly: Standard- prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the
Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent. exemption enjoyed by respondent ESSO from the payment of
customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include
ESGUERRA, J.: exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing R.A. No. 1394.5
the Commissioner of Customs' decision holding respondent
ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc., (formerly the Standard-Vacuum For its stand petitioner puts forward this rationale:
Refining Corporation (Phil.) and hereinafter referred to as ESSO)
liable in the total sum of P775.62 as special import tax on certain A perusal of the provisions of R.A. No. 1394 will show that the
articles imported by the latter under Republic Act No. 387, legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct
otherwise known as the Petroleum Act of 1949. from customs duties as witness the fact that Section 2(a) of
the said law made separate mention of customs duties and
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, special import tax when it provided that ... if as a result of the
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on application of the schedule therein, the total revenue derived
December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining plant in from the customs duties and from the special import tax on
Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which goods, ... imported from the United States is less in any
provides: "During the five years following the granting of any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax
concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, imposed under Republic Act Numbered Six Hundred and
all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and One, as amended, on such goods, articles or products during
accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special the calendar year 1955, the President may, by proclamation,
import tax (which it paid under protest) on the following separate suspend the reduction of the special import tax for the next
importations: succeeding calendar year .
1) One carton, scientific instruments with C & F value of
assessed a special import tax in the amount of P31.98 If it were the intention of Congress to exempt the holders of
(Airport Protest No. 10); petroleum refinery concessions like the protestant
2) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $221.56; (respondent herein), such exemption should have been
assessed special import tax in the amount of P43.82 clearly stated in the statute. Exemptions are never presumed.
(Airport Protest No. 11); They must be expressed in the clearest and most
3) One carton of valves with C & F value of $310.58; unambiguous language and not left to mere implication.6
assessed special import tax in the amount of P60.72
(Airport Protest No. 12); Specifically, petitioner in his brief submitted two assignment of
4) One box of parts for Conversion boilers and Auxiliary errors allegedly committed by the Court of Tax Appeals in the
Equipment with C & F value of $2,389.69; assessed controverted decision, to wit:
special import tax in the amount of P467.00 (Airport
Protest No. 15); 1st assignment of error:
5) One carton of X-ray films with C & F value of $132.80; THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
assessed special import tax in the amount of P26.00 THE TERM "CUSTOMS DUTY" IN ARTICLE 103 OF
(Airport Protest No. 16); and REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES THE SPECIAL
6) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $750.39; IMPORT TAX IMPOSED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1394;
assessed special import tax in the amount of P147.00
(Airport Protest No. 17).1 2nd assignment of error:
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF CUSTOMS DUTIES
respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of the special UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES EXEMPTION
import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by FROM PAYMENT OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX.
R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.2
On the other hand, the Court of Tax Appeals rationalized the
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the ground for its ruling thus:
Collector of Customs to the Commissioner of Customs who, on
March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of If we are to adhere, as we should, to the plain and obvious
Customs.3 meaning of words in consonance with settled rules of
interpretation, it seems clear that the special import tax is an
On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into the
of Tax Appeals for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Philippines of all goods, articles or products subject thereto,
Customs. for the phrase "import tax on all goods, articles or products
imported or brought into the Philippines" in explicit and
The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the unambiguous terms simply means customs duties. It is hardly
decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and necessary to add that "customs duties" are simply taxes
ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to respondent ESSO assessed on merchandise imported from, or exported to a
which the latter had paid under protest.4 foreign country.

This decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is now before this Court
for review.
And being a charge upon importation, the special import tax
is essentially a customs duty, or at least partakes of the Petitioner further argues:
character thereof. Customs duties are prescribed by the Tariff and Customs
Citing numberous American decisions and definitions of terms Code, while the special import tax is provided for by Republic
"customs duties," "duties," "imposts," "levies," "tax," and "tolls," Act No. 1394. If our legislature had intended to classify the
and their distinctions, including some pronouncements of this special import tax as customs duty, the said Art would not
Court on the subject, the Court of Tax Appeals in its decision, have expressly exempted from payment of the special Import
went to great lengths to show that the term "special import tax" as tax importations of machinery, equipment, accessories, and
used in R.A. No. 1394 includes customs duties. It sees the special spare parts for use of industries, without distinguishing
import tax as nothing but an impost or a charge on the importation whether the industries referred to are the industries exempt
or bringing into the Philippines of goods, articles or products.7 from the payment of Customs duties or the non-exempt ones
(Sec. 6). It is sufficient that the imported machinery, etc., is
To clinch its theory the Court of Tax Appeals cited the similarity in for the use of any industry. 11
the basis of computation of the customs duty as well as the
similarity in the phraseology of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1394 A study of petitioner's two assignments of errors shows that one
(which established the special import tax) and Section 9-01 of the is anchored on practically the same ground as the other: both
Tariff & Customs code (the basic law providing for and regulating involve the interpretation of R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act of
the imposition of customs duties and imposts on importations).8 1949) in relation with R.A. No. 1394 (The Special Import Tax
Law).
For its part, private respondent, ESSO, in its answer to the
petition, leaned heavily on the same arguments as those given by While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and phrases
the Tax Court, the burden of which is that the special import tax found in the two cited laws, which in a way was likewise resorted
law is a customs law. 9 to by the respondent ESSO, it would do Us well to restate the
fundamental rule in the construction of a statute.
It is clear that the only issue involved in this case is whether or
not the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by Republic particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken
Act No. 387, or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should embrace or as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394, or the part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
Special Import Tax Law. parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as
will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws.
We have examined the records of this case thoroughly and Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted and existing or
carefully considered the arguments presented by both parties and previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention
We are convinced that the only thing left to this Court to do is to of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one
determine the intention of the legislature through interpretation of amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.
the two statutes involved, i.e., Republic Act No. 1394 and
Republic Act No. 387. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take
judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they
It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which
as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts may examine affect their derivation, validity and operation. 12
both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those
extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the Applying the above stated rules and principles, let us consider the
statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the history, the purpose and objectives of Republic Act No. 387 as it
passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the relates to Republic Act No. 1394 and other laws passed by the
measure. 10 Congress of the Philippines insofar as they relate to each other.

Petitioner in the first assignment of error took exception to the Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949, has this for its
finding of the Court of Tax Appeals that "The language of Republic title, to wit:
Act No. 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law
intends that the phrase 'Special import tax' is taken to include AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION,
customs duties" and countered with the argument that "An DEVELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND UTILIZATION OF
examination of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1394 will THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES;
indubitably reveal that Congress considered the special import TO ENCOURAGE THE CONSERVATION OF SUCH
tax as a tax different from customs duties, as may be seen from PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO AUTHORIZE THE
the fact that Section 2(a) of said law made separate mention of SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
customs duties and special import tax ..." Thus: RESOURCES TO CREATE AN ADMINISTRATION UNIT
AND A TECHNICAL BOARD IN THE BUREAU OF MINES;
... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein the TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFORE; AND FOR
total revenue derived from the customs duties and from the OTHER PURPOSES.
special import tax on goods, ... imported from the United
States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the Art. 103 of said Act reads:
exchange tax imposed under Republic Act Numbered Six
Hundred and One, as amended, on such goods, articles or ART. 103. Customs duties. During the five years following
products during the calendar year 1955, the President may, the granting of any concessions, the concessionaire may
by proclamation, suspend the reduction of the special import import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery,
tax for the next succeeding calendar year material, instruments, supplies and accessories.
xxx xxx xxx It would appear that by the provision of Section 1 of this Act, the
pertinent provision of the Petroleum Law, for which there appears
Art. 102 of the Same law insofar as pertinent, provides: to be no proviso to the contrary has been modified or altered.

ART. 102. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 declares that the tax provided
charged. ...; nor shall any other special taxes or levies be for in its Section I shall not be imposed against importation into
applied to such concessions, nor shall concessionaires under the Philippines of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by
this Act be subjected to any provincial, municipal, or other new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with
local taxes or levies; nor shall any sales tax be charged on R A. No. 901 and a long list of other goods, articles, machinery,
any petroleum produced from the concession or portion equipment, accessories and others.
thereof, manufactured by the concessionaire and used in the
working of his concession. . We shall now examine the six statutes repealed by R.A. No. 1394,
namely:
Art. 104, still of the same Act, reads:
R.A. No. 601 is an Act imposing a special excise tax of 17%
ART. 104. No export to be imposed. No export tax shall be on foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank or its agents.
levied upon petroleum produced from concessions granted This is known as the Exchange Tax Law;
under this Act.
R.A. No. 814 amended Sections one, two and five and
The title of Republic Act No. 387 and the provisions of its three repealed Sections three and four of R.A. No. 601;
articles just cited give a clue to the intent of the Philippine
legislature, which is to encourage the exploitation and R.A. No. 871 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601,
development of the petroleum resources of the country. Through as amended earlier by R.A. No. 814;
the instrumentality of said law, it declared in no uncertain terms
that the intensification of the exploration for petroleum must be R.A. No. 1175 amended further Sections one and two of R.A.
carried on unflinchingly even if, for the time being, no taxes, both No. 601, as amended;
national and local, may be collected from the industry. This is the
unequivocal intention of the Philippine Congress when the R.A. No. 1197 amended furthermore R.A. No. 601 as
language of the Petroleum Act is examined. Until this law or any amended previously by R.A. No. 1175;
substantial portion thereof is clearly amended or repealed by
subsequent statutes, the intention of the legislature must be R.A. No. 1375 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No.
upheld. 601 as amended by R.A. Nos. 1175 and 1197.

Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is the As can be seen from the foregoing, in one fell swoop,
subsequent legislation, R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import Tax Republic Act No. 1394 repealed and revoked six earlier
Law, which, according to the herein petitioner, shows that the statutes which had something to do with the imposition of
legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from special levies and/or exemption of certain importations from
customs duties. the burden of the special import taxes or levies. On the other
hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387, the Petroleum Act, had
Republic Act No. 1394, otherwise known as the Special Import been spared from the pruning knife of Congress, although this
Tax Law, is entitled as follows: latter law had granted more concessions and tax exemption
privileges than any of the statutes that were amended,
AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394. The answer must be
GOODS, ARTICLES OR PRODUCTS IMPORTED OR that the Congress of the Philippine saw fit to preserve the
BROUGHT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL privileges granted under the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order
REPUBLIC ACTS NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND ONE, to keep the door open to the exploitation and development of
EIGHT HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN, EIGHT HUNDRED the petroleum resources of the country with such incentives
AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY- as are given under that law.
FIVE. ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN AND
THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE. This ascertained will and intention of the legislature finds a
parallelism in a case brought earlier before this Court.
The title indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior
statutes. As will be seen later, all these laws dealt with the A fishpond owner was slapped with taxes as a "merchant" by the
imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or other Collector of Internal Revenue. He paid under protest and filed an
form of levy on importation of goods into the country. action to recover the taxes paid, claiming that he was an
agriculturist and not a merchant. When this Court was called upon
Section I of Republic Act No. 1394 reads as follows: to interpret the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law on whether
fish is an agricultural product which falls under the exemption
SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall provisions of said law, it inquired into the purpose of the
be levied, collected and paid as special import tax on all legislature in establishing the exemption for agricultural products.
goods, articles or products imported or brought into the We held:
Philippines, irrespective of source, during the period and in
accordance with the rates provided for in the following The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose the
schedule: legislature had in mind in establishing the exemption
xxx xxx xxx contained in the clause now under consideration. It seems
reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the part
of the law-making body that by exempting agricultural
products from this tax the farming industry would be favored
and the development of the resources of the country
encouraged. .... 13

Having this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic aids


the history of the enactment of the statute and purpose of the
legislature in employing a clause or provision in the law had been
applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking body, We
are convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was
intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and
development of the petroleum resources of the country by giving
it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is
the raison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those
who would invest their financial resources towards the
achievement of this national economic goal.

On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions


enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A. No. 387 have been
abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication is
not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full
knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere
with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter,
unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable
but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or
unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter of the
earlier. 14

As observed earlier, Congress lined up for revocation by Republic


Act No. 1394 six statutes dealing with the imposition of special
imposts or levies or the granting of exemptions from special
import taxes. Yet, considering the tremendous amount of
revenues it was losing under the Petroleum Law of 1949, it failed
to include the latter statute among those it chose to bury by the
Special Import Taw Law. The reason for this is very clear: The
legislature wanted to continue the incentives for the continuing
development of the petroleum industry.

It is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to the


theory of the herein petitioner, R.A. No. 387 had not been
repealed by R.A. No. 2352 which expressly abrogated Section 6
of R.A. No. 1394 but did not repeal any part of R.A. No. 387.
Therefore, the exemption granted by Republic Act No. 387 still
stands.

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by this


Court to the findings and conclusions of the Court of Tax Appeals
on a matter it is well-equipped to handle, which findings and
conclusions We find no reason to overturn, the petition of the
Commissioner of Customs to reverse the decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.