Art.

523:

G.R. No. 130316 January 24, 2007

ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
BALTAZAR PACLEB,1 Respondent.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court originated from an action
for forcible entry and damages filed by petitioners Ernesto and Elsie Yu against
respondent Baltazar Pacleb.
The antecedent facts follow.
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered to sell Lot No. 6853-D to
petitioners for P75 per sq.m.lawphil.net The lot was approximately 18,000 square meters
and was located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarias, Cavite. Javier supposedly
purchased the lot from one Rebecca del Rosario who, in turn, acquired it from respondent
and his wife. The title of the property (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. T-118375),
however, remained in the names of respondent and his wife. The instruments in support
of the series of alleged sales were not registered.
On September 11, 1992, petitioners accepted the offer and gave Javier P200,000 as
downpayment for the lot. Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of title to
petitioners. After the execution of a contract to sell, he formally turned over the property
to petiti oners.
At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied by Ramon C. Pacleb,
respondents son, and his wife as tenants. On September 12, 1992, Ramon and his wife
allegedly surrendered possession of their portion to petitioners. Later on, petitioners
appointed Ramon as their trustee over the subject lot.
Aside from taking possession of the property, petitioners also caused the annotation on
TCT No. T-118375 of a decision rendered in their favor in Civil Case No. 741-93.2 This
decision attained finality on April 19, 1995.
Petitioners alleged that they exercised ownership rights as well as enjoyed open, public
and peaceful possession over the property from September 12, 1992 until the early part
of September 1995. During this time, respondent was in the United States.
Upon respondents return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly entered the
property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth thereby ousting
petitioners and their trustee, Ramon.
Despite repeated demands, respondent, asserting his rights as registered owner of the
property, refused to vacate the premises and surrender its possession to petitioners.
Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry3 in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Dasmarias, Cavite on November 23, 1995. Respondent filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim dated December 8, 1995. After the issues were joined, the MTC required
the submission of the parties position papers at a preliminary conference on March 11,
1996. Respondent failed to comply.
On June 17, 1996, the MTC ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [respondent] and other persons claiming right
under him are hereby ordered to surrender physical possession of Lot No. 6853-D in favor
of the [petitioners] and to pay the sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00)
PESOS as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal,5 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision affirming
the MTC decision in toto.6
Respondent elevated his case to the Court of Appeals (CA)7 which rendered the assailed
decision on March 18, 1997:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision dated October 25, 1996 of the
[RTC] of Imus, Cavite in Civil Case No. 052-96 and the Decision of the [MTC] of
Dasmarias, Cavite in Civil Case No. 182 are SET ASIDE; and Civil Case No. 182 for
Forcible Entry and Damages is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.8
In a resolution dated August 20, 1997, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Before us now come petitioners who claim that the appellate court erred in finding that
respondent had prior physical possession of the subject property.lawphil.net
"In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of
the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth."9 The plaintiff, however, cannot prevail where it appears that,
as between himself and the defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own.10
We are generally precluded in a Rule 45 petition from reviewing factual evidence tracing
the events prior to the first act of spoliation.11 However, the conflicting factual findings of
the MTC and RTC on one hand, and the CA on the other, require us to make an exception.
We overrule petitioners contentions.
The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right.12 In the grammatical sense, to possess means to have, to actually and physically
occupy a thing, with or without right.13 "Possession always includes the idea of
occupation x x x. It is not necessary that the person in possession should himself be the
occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his name."14 Without occupancy,
there is no possession.15
Two things are paramount in possession.16 First, there must be occupancy,
apprehension or taking. Second, there must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).17
Here, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical possession to justify a
ruling in their favor in the complaint for forcible entry against respondent.
In the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (a case for specific performance and damages
against Javier, the alleged vendor of the lot in question) upon which petitioners based
their right to possess in the first place, the trial court categorically stated:
The [petitioners were never placed] in possession of the subject property on which
[was] planned to be [site of] a piggery, nor [were they] given a clearance or certification
from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer.18 (emphasis ours)
The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in the face
of this factual finding. On the other hand, the tax declarations and receipts in the name of
respondent in 1994 and 1995 established the possession of respondent.19 The payment
of real estate tax is one of the most persuasive and positive indications showing the will
of a person to possess in concepto de dueo or with claim of ownership.20
"[P]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession."21 In this case,
Ramon, as respondents son, was named caretaker when respondent left for the United
States in 1983.22 Due to the eventual loss of trust and confidence in Ramon, however,
respondent transferred the administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January
1995 until his return in May 1995.23 In other words, the subject land was in the
possession of the respondents sons during the contested period.
Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan) dated March 10, 1995 executed by them
and Ramon to prove a turn over of possession. They also seek to prove their exercise of
rights over the land through alleged frequent visits and the designation of Ramon as their
own trustee as declared in a joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the
MTC. These instruments, however, fail to convince us of petitioners actual occupancy of
the subject land. First, petitioners themselves acknowledged that Ramon and his wife
occupied part of the land as tenants of respondent. Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had
no authority to sign such document dated March 10, 1995 waiving all rights to the land.
Third, there was no clear proof in the records of the appointment of Ramon as petitioners
trustee save their self-serving statements to this effect. Finally, at the time the Kusangloob
na Pagsasauli document was executed, the caretaker of the land was no longer Ramon
but Oscar.24
Most important, the title of the land in question (TCT No. T-118375) remained in the name
of respondent.25 "As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of ownership."26 The Civil Code states:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the
fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors,
the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper
proceedings.
In view of the evidence establishing respondents continuing possession of the subject
property, petitioners allegation that respondent deprived them of actual possession by
means of force, intimidation and threat was clearly untenable. In Gaza v. Lim, we held
that:
Where a dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having
actual possession is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law;
otherwise, a mere usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the property of
another and, by allowing himself to be ordered off, could acquire the right to maintain the
action of forcible entry and detainer, however momentary his intrusion might have
been.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 18, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42604 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199898 September 3, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LEO DELA TRINIDAD y OBALLES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal assailing the 24 March 2011 Decision1 of the Court of.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288. The CA affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Naga City, Camarines Sur finding the accused
guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
On 22 October 2008, an Information was filed against accused Leo Dela Trinidad
yOballes (appellant) before the RTC, Naga City, Camarines Sur for violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A No. 9165, to wit:
That on or about October 21, 2008, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, custody and
control nine and one-half (9 ) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting
tops weighing more or less 475 grams including its (sic) wrapper; two (2) big bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less 550 grams
including its (sic) wrapper; four (4) pieces of medium size cubes of suspected dried
marijuana leaves weighing more or less 41.1 grams including its (sic) plastic containers;
eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops
weighing more or less 55.4 grams including its (sic) plastic container; and seventy[-]seven
(77) pieces of small empty transparent plastic sachet, with a total weight of more or less
1,121.5 grams, which is a dangerous drug, inviolation of the above-cited law.2
Version of the Prosecution
On 27 September 2008, the Office of the Intelligence Section of the Naga City Police
(Intelligence Section) received an information concerning a certain Leo De la Trinidad
who was allegedly involved in drug trafficking. Police Senior Inspector Benigno Albao, Sr.
(PSI. Albao), Chief of the Intelligence Section, interviewed the informant and after having
been convinced that the information was true,3 he referred the matter to Senior Police
Officer 1 Feliciano Aguilar (SPO1 Aguilar) and SPO1 Fersebal Abrantes (SPO1 Abrantes)
for the conduct of a surveillance operation for further details.4
The surveillance operation confirmed the identity and exact location of appellant. The
police operatives also observed during the surveillance that some suspected drug
pushers visited the residence of appellant.5
After having verified the report thatappellant is indeed involved in drug trade, a test-buy
was conducted on 10 October 2008.6 The test-buy brought forth positive result as the
police asset was able to buy marijuana cubes, dried marijuana leaves and fruiting tops
worth 100.00 from appellant. After the initial test-buy, the informant was directed by the
police operatives to continue monitoring appellant because there was a report that the
latter is in possession of quantities of marijuana by the kilo.7
On 13 October 2008, a discussion onthe use of code names was made by the members
of the team in order to conceal the identity of appellant and to secure their operation.8
The code name is "Leonidas de Leon" and the name of the plan is "Code Plan Sativa."9
On 16 October 2008, around 5:30 P.M., another test-buy took place through SPO1
Aguilar and SPO1 Abrantesand again, the asset was able to purchase one brick of dried
marijuana leaves from appellant.10
On 17 October 2008, the bricks of marijuana purchased from appellant on 10 October
2008 and 16 October 2008 were submitted to the Camarines Sur Police Provincial
Office.11
On 20 October 2008, the police operatives applied for two search warrants from the RTC,
Branch 25 in Naga City.12 One search warrant was applied for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 while the other one was for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294 or for illegal possession of firearmsand ammunitions because
during the second test-buy, the police asset saw appellant with a gun which was tucked
in his waist.13 Upon receipt of the search warrants, the team coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), as shown by the Certificate of
Coordination. A pre-operation report was then submitted to the PDEA.14
The police operatives proceededto conduct a briefing for the execution of the search
warrants. The said briefing was made at the Conference Room of the Naga City Police
Office on 21 October 2008, at about 4:10 A.M.15 The briefing of the teamwas
photographed. Among those present are the members of the raiding team16 and the
mandatory witnesses, i.e.representative from the DOJ, Carlo Lamberto Tayo; media
representative, Roy Ranoco; elected punong barangayof Sabang, Naga City Jose Jacobo
and Kagawad Eugene Froyalde of Sabang, Naga City.
Around 5:10 AM of 21 October 2008, the group proceeded to the residence of appellant.
They wereaccompanied by the DOJ and media representatives together with the local
barangayofficials. Upon reaching appellants house, the raiding team knocked at his door
and identified themselves as police officers from the Naga City Police Office and informed
him that they are executing the search warrants issued by Judge Jaime Contreras. They
told appellant that they have witnesses with them, and read to him the contents of the
warrants and apprised him of his constitutional rights.17 PO2 Quintin Tusara took
picturesof everything that transpired while the operatives were executing the warrants.18
When appellant was asked to produce the items enumerated in the search warrant, if
indeed he really had them, appellant voluntarily presented the items which he took under
his pillow. The items consisted of nine and a half (9 ) bricks of suspected dried marijuana
leaves sealed with packaging tape, two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves
sealed with packaging tape, four (4) medium sizecubes of suspected dried marijuana
leaves placed inside the small transparent plastic sachet, and eighteen (18) pieces of
small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small transparent
plastic sachet.19 Also found were seventy-seven (77) pieces of empty transparent plastic
sachets. SPO1 Aguilar, placed his initial, "FBA," in the said items.20
No firearm was found at the residence of appellant. An inventory was then conducted
right inside the house of appellant and a certificate of inventory was prepared by SPO1
Louie Ordonez.21 The Certificate of Inventory and Certification of Orderly Search were
duly signed by the witnesses in the presence of appellant.22
After making the necessary markings, appellant and the items seized from him were
brought to the Naga City Police Station.23
The seized items were returned to the court of origin but were subsequently withdrawn
for laboratory examination.24 A request to the Camarines Sur Provincial Office was
subsequently madeby SPO1 Aguilar and the seized items were immediately brought to
the Crime Laboratory for field test examination.25 The seized items were duly received
by P/Insp. Edsel Villalobos (P/Insp. Villalobos).26
When subjected to both initial and final test examinations by P/Insp. Villalobos, the seized
items were found positive for the presence of marijuana.27
Version of the Defense
In the early morning of 21 October 2008, appellant was in his house located in Sabang,
Naga City together with his wife and children. Somebody knocked at their door, so
hepeeped through the window and asked who was knocking. He noticed a lot of people
outside and asked them who were they. Somebody answered that he was Kapitan, so
the witness opened the door. They entered appellants house and immediately took
pictures of it. He was told to just stay at the side and asked him to bring out the gun and
the illegal drugs. When asked to bring out the illegal drugs, he heard somebody shouted,
"I have already found it." They went near the table, but he was not able to see whatthey
were doing because the table was surrounded by men. At that time, the appellant was
seated on a bamboo chair with his hands placed on his nape. Thereafter, he was called
and asked to sign on a piece of paper. When he asked what was that for, they told him
that they were for the things found inhis house. A man approached him and read to him
the contents of the warrant. Then, he was handcuffed and brought to the police station.28
Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 16 November 2009,the trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The RTC found that the prosecution succeeded
in proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant for violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Two Million Pesos (2,000,000.00).
The RTC ruled that the evidence presented during the trial adequately proved all the
elements of the offense.It held that appellant, not being authorized by law, with full
knowledge that the items were dangerous drugs, had actual and exclusive possession,
control and dominion over the drugs found in his house.29 It likewise held that the officers
strictly complied with the guidelines prescribed by law on how drug operations should be
conducted by law enforcers and in takingcustody and control of the seized drugs.30 On
the other hand, accused failed to present any substantial evidence to establish his
defense of frame-up. The RTC placed more weight on the affirmative testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, rather than the denials of the accused because positive
testimonies are weightier than negative ones.31 With the positive identification made by
the government witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime, his self-serving denial is
worthless.32 Since there was nothing in the record to show that the arresting team and
the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motives, their affirmative
statements proving appellants culpability were respected by the trial court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements of illegal
sale of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. It found
credible the statements of prosecution witnesses about what transpired during and after
the test-buy, service of search warrant, and arrest of the accused. Further, it ruled that
the prosecution has proven as unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA
likewise upheld the findings of the trial court that the entire operation conducted by the
police officers enjoyed the presumption of regularity, absent any showing of illmotive on
the part of those who conducted the same.
The CA likewise found appellants defenses of denial and frame-up unconvincing and
lacked corroboration. Itnoted that appellant did not even present his wife, who was
allegedly present during the search, to corroborate his claim.33
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Appellant raised in his brief a loneerror on the part of the appellate court, to wit:
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged
despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant submits that the trial court overlooked and misapplied some facts of substance,
which if considered, could have altered the verdict. He maintains that he has no
knowledge as to where the illegal drugs were found as he was not in possession of the
same, and alleged thatthe bricks of marijuana were merely planted by the police
operatives.34
Appellants contention is belied by the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. It
bears to stress that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably
viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense
ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.35 They are self-
serving evidence, and unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot be
given weight over the positive assertions of credible witnesses.36
In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following
elements must beestablished: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which
isidentified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.37 As correctly ruled
by the CA, these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Jurisprudence is
consistent in thatmere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facieevidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused inthe absence of any
satisfactory explanation.38
The ruling of this Court in People v. Lagman39 is instructive.1wphi1 It held that illegal
possession ofregulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent
to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists whenthe drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where
it is found.Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or
building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge
and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.40 Here, accused-
appellant failed to present any evidence to overcome such presumption. He merely
insisted that he was framed and had no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came
from. In the absence of any contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and
dominion of the drugs found in his house. Accused-appellant argues that the corpus
delictihas not been clearly established. He points out that although SPO1 Aguilar
allegedly placed his markings on the confiscated items, no such marking was indicated
in the certificate of inventory, nor were the weight of the said specimens indicated thereon.
He further argues that the markings allegedly placed on the specimens seized were not
even indicated in the return of the search warrant.41 Thus, he centers his argument on
the contention that the integrity of the dangerous drugs was not ensured and its identity
was not established with moral integrity.
Relevant to appellants case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling
of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No.
9165, which reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/orseized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
inthe presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative orcounsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, thatthe physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long asthe
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, the aforecited provision of the IRR does not even require that the
certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and the weight of the seized items. In
fact, the rule even sanctions substantial compliance with the procedure to establish a
chain of custody, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
property preserved by the apprehending officers. In People v. Pringas,42 the Court
recognized that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always
be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and
cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus
delictiand the unbroken chain of custody. Aptly noting the findings of the trial court:
It was sufficiently established that representatives from the media and Department of
Justice and even two (2) barangay local officials were present during the briefing and
even until the conduct of the inventory. And that immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the same were inventoried and photographed in the
presence of appellant and said persons, who even signed copies of the inventory. The
seized illegal drugs were marked at accuseds residence and in his presence. P/S Insp.
Villalobos testified that the seized items he received from Aguilar already contained the
markings, "FBA". Besides, he also placed his own initials and signatures in blue markings
to preserve and maintain the integrity of the specimens. Thus, there was no cogent reason
why the court should doubt the trustworthiness and credibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.43
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-
appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in
order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.44
Accused-appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive
on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers
deserve full faith and credit.45 In fact, accusedappellant did not even question the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely on his allegation
of frame-up and denial and on the alleged broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.
In sum, we find no reason to modifyor set aside the decision of the CA. Accused-appellant
was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIEDand the 24 March 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288 is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 190889

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
January 10, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006
decision[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5,
Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as
amended.

The facts:

Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and
there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody
and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN
763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces
short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition
5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were
confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members
of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office,
Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge
Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]

When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] During pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of
facts:

[if !supportLists]1. [endif]The search warrant subject of this case exists;

[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the
search warrant in this case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao,
Kalibo, Aklan;

[if !supportLists]3. [endif]Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in
the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not live therein;

[if !supportLists]4. [endif]Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;

[if !supportLists]5. [endif]The search warrant was served in the house of accused
Elenita Fajardo in the morning of August 28, 2002; and

[if !supportLists]6. [endif]The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested
immediately upon the arrival of the military personnel despite the fact that the latter
allegedly saw them in possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27, 2002.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]

As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA,[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif] these are the chain of events that led to the filing of the
information:

In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence

Special Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police
Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of
concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III
Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the
residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.

Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of
the PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons
scampered and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two
.45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.

Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the
waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.

To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners
house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the
perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A
few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the
police troops. No agreement materialized.

At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2
Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw
Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects
landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring
residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega),
radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects,
which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with
serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number.
The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan),
Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.

The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay
captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team
proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and was able to confiscate the
following:

[if !supportLists]1. [endif]Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
[if !supportLists]3. [endif]Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.

Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their
authority to possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal
information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294,
was filed against them.

For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the
search warrant was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed
and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this
pertinent portion of the application:

That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial
Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]

They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since
petitioner, who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to
accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain
in the living room (sala).

Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the

inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to
her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.

Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when
the raiding team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she
was wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]

Ruling of the RTC

 The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same
were already denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005,
respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence.
The said Orders were not appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled
that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since
they participated in the trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by
applying for bail, they have effectively waived such irregularities and defects.

In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC
explained:

Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with
the Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on absence without
leave (AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is
familiar with and knowledgeable about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a
former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.

It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an
armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and
ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition were left behind by
Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government
property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those
items. The logical explanation is that those items are stolen property.

xxxx

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing
to ones control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to
be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes
exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower.
To accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have
no bearing whatsoever.

xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient
that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended
to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.

xxxx

To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866,
as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the
presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw
accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no
license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may
be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms
and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject
firearm or explosive (Exhibit G).

The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on the two
(2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model
M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber
and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their
possession during the search conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police
Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]

Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of

firearms and explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such
as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability
of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.

Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which

was denied in an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal
with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its
conclusions of law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following
observations:

[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have
personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as
required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during
the application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that effect from
the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification
is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license or permit to
possess a firearm. There was also no explanation given why said certification was not
presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the application for the warrant.
Such vital evidence was simply ignored.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]

Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were
declared inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen
outside the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence,
pursuant to the plain view doctrine.

Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part

of a firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and
twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] but the

motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated December 3, 2009.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] Hence, the present recourse.

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner
and Valerio charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses.

A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles
confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of
Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35)
pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45
ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such
as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]

On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber
pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced
serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states:

Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or

ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
 This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No.
8294, which categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without
a license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated
different penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above classification,
unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of
any kind of firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms

or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
deal in, acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)

By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should

now particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is
classified, and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and
then grouped according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending
P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information,
and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case,[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif] because different penalties are imposed by the law,
depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.

Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but

petitioner and Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes
a waiver, and they could be convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the
information.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] This accords propriety to the diverse
convictions handed down by the courts a quo.

Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2,
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the
search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review
since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively acquitted
from the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to the
conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.

The Issues

Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2)
receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no
valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was
with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any
of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly
seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is
there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of
the receivers.

Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized
in plain view, hence, admissible.

No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2)

of the same article

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus,
evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under
any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who
has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence
in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.

Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45
caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law
enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were
earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure
and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and
Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to
believe that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for
the policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search
warrant.

Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different
instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects.
Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or
evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when
subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.

The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:

Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?

A Yes, sir.

Q What were they doing?

A They were cordoning the house.

Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What
did he tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.

Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police
officers were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following day.

Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where
were you?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.

Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.

Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something
outside the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.

COURT: (to witness)

Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know him?

A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

xxxx

PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if
any?
A I shouted to seek cover.

xxxx

Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on
the place where something was thrown.

Q What did you see if any?

A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.

xxxx

Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall
another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.

Q And can you tell us what was that incident?

A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the
roof of another house.

Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was that person?

A Zaldy Valerio again.

xxxx

Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?
A I was on the road in front of the house.

Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?
A He was on top of the house.

xxxx

Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was that?

A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.

xxxx

Q And what did he tell you?

A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.
xxxx

Q What did you do if any?

A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.

xxxx

Q Who opened the fence for you?

A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.

Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)

The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial
discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized
contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law
enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.

Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence.
The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal
possession of part of a firearm.

In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches,
the following disquisitions in People v. De Gracia are instructive:

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing
to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to
be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes
exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower.
To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have
no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person
for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a
violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case
good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited
by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did
intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In
the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent
to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person
for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi
or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however,
without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have
harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the
accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important
in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may
be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority
or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a
firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this
kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical
or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no
offense committed.

Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed
when the holder thereof:

(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof

(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the
subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on
top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner
holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.

At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because
Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners
house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in
Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.

Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed
from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert
such assumption into concrete evidence.

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to

establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether
the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in
crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.The quantum of proof
required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.
 The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with
sufficient particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized
receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns
when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that
the receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.

These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner
conspired with Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no
evidence indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the
criminal act committed by Valerio.

Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable

doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately
overcome by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the
same does not have the corresponding license for it.

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a

firearm must yield these requisites:

(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and

(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to
which the seized part/component corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United States
Property and the other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as
Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm
parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.His testimony was corroborated by DYKR
radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was
ascertained that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind,
or caliber of firearms.To substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification to that
effect and identified the same in court. The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification,
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 525:

MARIA CARLOS, represented by G.R. No. 164823

TERESITA CARLOS VICTORIA,
Petitioner, Present:

Puno, J.
Chairman,
Austria-Martinez,
- versus - Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.

Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. August 31, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

Puno, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76824 entitled Re: Application for Land Registration of a Parcel of Land
in Taguig, Metro Manila, Maria Carlos represented by Teresita Carlos Victoria, Applicant-
Appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General,
Oppositor-Appellant.

On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita
Carlos Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel
of land with an area of 3,975 square meters located at Pusawan, Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, covered by Plan Psu-244418. Petitioner alleged, among others, that she is the
owner of said parcel of land which she openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and
occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership; that there
is no mortgage or encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it part of any military or
naval reservation; that the property is being used for industrial purposes; and that there
are no tenants or lessees on the property. Petitioner further claimed that she has been in
possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner; that her possession has been
peaceful, public, uninterrupted and continuous since 1948 or earlier; and tacking her
possession with that of her predecessors-in-interest, petitioner has been in possession of
the land for more than 50 years.[1]
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an opposition
to petitioners application.[2]
During the initial hearing, however, only petitioner and her counsel appeared. They
presented documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional
requirements.[3]
Petitioner later presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of her
neighbors, Sergio Cruz and Daniel Castillo, and Teresita Carlos Victoria herself.[4]
Sergio Cruz, 83 years old, a native of Ususan, Taguig, and neighbor of Maria Carlos,
testified that the property subject of the application was previously owned and possessed
by Jose Carlos. He planted it with palay and sold the harvest. Everyone in the community
knew him as the owner of said parcel of land. He also paid the taxes thereon. After the
death of Jose Carlos in 1948, his daughter, Maria Carlos, inherited the property and
immediately took possession thereof. Her possession was peaceful, open, public,
continuous, uninterrupted, notorious, adverse and in the concept of an owner. When
Maria Carlos died, her heirs took over the property.[5]
Cruzs testimony was corroborated by Daniel Castillo, 76 years old, Barangay Captain of
Ususan, Taguig.[6]
Teresita Carlos Victoria stated on the witness stand that her mother, Maria Carlos, was
in possession of the subject property until she passed away on January 6, 2001. Upon
the demise of Maria Carlos, Victoria took possession of the property with the consent of
her brothers and sisters. She characterized Maria Carloss possession as peaceful, open,
public, continuous, adverse, notorious and in the concept of an owner. She has never
been disturbed in her possession; the whole community recognized her as the owner of
the land; she declared the land for tax purposes; and she paid the taxes thereon. In
addition, Victoria informed the court that the heirs of Maria Carlos have not yet instituted
a settlement of her estate. However, they have agreed to undertake the titling of the
property and promised to deliver the certificate of title to Ususan Development
Corporation which bought the property from Maria Carlos. Victoria admitted that her
mother had sold the land to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 but failed to deliver
the title. Hence, the heirs of Maria Carlos made a commitment to the corporation to deliver
the certificate of title so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the purchase price.[7]
Petitioner also presented in court the concerned officers of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to establish that the land in question is
alienable and disposable.
Elvira R. Reynaldo, Records Officer, DENR Lands Management Bureau, appeared to
certify that their office has no record of any kind of public land application/land patent
covering the parcel of land situated at
Ususan, Taguig, Rizal, identified/described in Plan Psu-244418.[8]
Ulysses Sigaton, Land Management Inspector, DENR National Capital Region, stated
that he conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property and found that it is within
the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 27-B, LC Map No. 2623, certified by
the Bureau of Forest Development on January 4, 1968. He also noted that the land is
being used for industrial purposes. It had several warehouses, four big water tanks and
is enclosed by a fence.[9]
The trial court granted the application in its decision dated October 24, 2002. It held:
After considering the applicants evidence ex-parte which is based on
factual and meritorious grounds, and considering that the
applicant acquired the property under registration through
inheritance from her father, Jose Carlos, and considering further
that her possession thereof, tacked with that of her predecessor-
in-interest, is open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
undisturbed, under claim of ownership since time immemorial
up to the present time; and considering further that the subject
parcel of land is part of the disposable and alienable land (Tsn,
July 3, 2002, p.6) and considering further that the realty taxes
due thereon have been religiously paid (Exhs. HH, II, JJ, and JJ-
1), and considering finally that the subject parcel of land
belong[s] to the applicant and that she possess[es] a perfect title
thereto which may be confirmed and registered in her name
under the (P)roperty Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), the herein
application is hereby GRANTED.[10]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It
noted that:
In the instant case, the applicant at the time she filed her application for
registration of title was no longer in possession and occupation
 of the land in question since on October 16, 1996, the applicants
mother and predecessor-in-interest sold the subject land to
Ususan Development Corporation. This was admitted by
witness Teresita Carlos Victoria x x x

Clearly, as early as 1996, possession and occupation of the land in

question pertains not to the applicant but to Ususan
Development Corporation, thus it can be said that the applicant
has no registrable title over the land in question.[11]

Hence, this petition.

We affirm the findings of the appellate court.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945.[12]
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but not the
second.
The Court held in Republic vs. Alconaba[13] that the applicant must show that he is in
actual possession of the property at the time of the application, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction []and[], the clear intention of the
law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession
is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation,
it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not
be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had possession of
the property at the time of the application for the issuance of a certificate of title. The
application was filed in court on December 19, 2001. Teresita Carlos Victoria, the
daughter of Maria Carlos, admitted during the hearing that her mother had sold the
property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. They also presented as evidence
the deed of absolute sale executed by and between Maria Carlos and Ususan
Development Corporation on October 16, 1996.[14] The document states, among others:
xxx

4. That the VENDOR, by this Deed hereby transfer(s) possession of the

property to the VENDEE.[15]

This contradicts petitioners claim that she was in possession of the property at the time
that she applied for confirmation of title.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual possession of the
land at that time, such possession was no longer in the concept of an owner. Possession
may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession
of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who
claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges
in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right
or wrong.[16] Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan
Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate of title to
the corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since
1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the law, only he who possesses
the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is entitled to confirmation of title.
We therefore find that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the issuance of a
certificate of title to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 526- 529:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 71283 November 12, 1987
MIGUEL ESCRITOR, JR., ANGEL ESCRITOR, RAMON ESCRITOR, JUANA
ESCRITOR, CONCORDIA ESCRITOR, IRENE ESCRITOR, MATILDE ESCRITOR,
MERCEDES ESCRITOR, HEIRS OF LUIS ESCRITOR, represented by RUPERTO
ESCRITOR, HEIRS OF PEDO ESCRITOR, represented by SUSANA VILLAMENA,
LINA ESCRITOR, WENDELINA ESCRITOR, ALFREDO ESCRITOR, SUSANA
ESCRITOR and CARMEN ESCRITOR, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SIMEON ACUNA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-01264-R entitled "Simeon Acuna vs.
Miguel Escritor, Jr., et al," a case which originated from the Court of First Instance of
Quezon.
The record of the case discloses the following facts:
Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject of cadastral proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, Miguel Escritor, as claimant, filed
an answer thereto declaring his ownership over the lot alleging that he acquired it by
inheritance from his deceased father. 1 As required, a notice of hearing was duly
published, after which an order of general default was entered. 2 The lot having become
uncontested, only Miguel Escritor appeared in order to adduce his evidence of ownership.
On May 15, 1958, the Court rendered a decision in the abovementioned case, Cadastral
Case No. 72, adjudicating the lot with its improvements in favor of claimant Escritor and
confirming his title thereto. 3 Immediately thereafter, Escritor took possession of the
property. On July 15, 1958, the Court, in an Order, directed the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office to issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of Escritor,
the decision in Cadastral Case No. 72 having become final. 4
On August 2, 1958, Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a petition for review of
the above-mentioned decision contending that it was obtained by claimant Escritor
through fraud and misrepresentation. 5 The petition was granted on July 18, 1960 and a
new hearing was set for September 13, 1960. 6 While the proceedings were going on,
claimant Escritor died. His heirs, the petitioners in this case, took possession of the
property.
On February 16, 1971 or thirteen years after the disputed decision was rendered, the
Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in favor of respondent Acuna, ordering petitioners to
vacate the land. 7 A writ of possession was later issued and petitioners voluntarily gave
up their possession. 8
More than four years later, or on October 13, 1975 respondent Acuna filed with the same
Court in Civil Case No. 1138-G, a complaint for recovery of damages against petitioners
for the fruits of lot No. 2749 which was allegedly possessed by the latter unlawfully for
thirteen years. According to respondent Acua, the registration of the said lot was
effectuated by the deceased claimant Escritor through fraud, malice, and
misrepresentation. The lower court, however, rendered a decision dismissing Acua's
complaint for damages, finding that though petitioners enjoyed the fruits of the property,
they were in good faith possessing under a just title, and the cause of action, if there was
any, has already prescribed. 9
On Appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment of the lower court was
reversed in a decision promulgated on October 31, 1984, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and set aside and another one entered herein, ordering the
defendants-appellees jointly and severally (a) to pay the plaintiff- appellant the sum of
P10,725.00 representing the value of the fruits appellees received for the 13 years they
have been in unlawful possession of the land subject-matter; (b) to pay plaintiff-appellant
the sum of P3,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (c) to pay the
costs.
Hence this petition.
The main issue that has to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioners should
be held liable for damages.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the Intermediate Appellate Court made the
pronouncement that petitioners were possessors in bad faith from 1958 up to 1971 and
should be held accountable for damages. This conclusion was based on the statement of
the cadastral court in its August 21, 1971 decision, readjudicating Lot No. 2749 to
respondent Simeon Acuna, that "Miguel Escritor forcibly took possession of the land in
May, 1958, and benefited from the coconut trees thereon. 10 The Intermediate Appellate
Court observed that on the basis of the unimpeached conclusion of the cadastral court, it
must be that the petitioners have wrongfully entered possession of the land. 11 The
Intermediate Appellate Court further explains that as such possessors in bad faith,
petitioners must reimburse respondent Acuna for the fruits of the land they had received
during their possession. 12
We cannot affirm the position of the Intermediate Appellate Court. It should be
remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral court dated May 15, 1958, Lot No.
2749 was adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In
this decision, the said court found to its satisfaction that claimant Escritor acquired the
land by inheritance from his father who in turn acquired it by purchase, and that his open,
public, continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the
Filipino-Spanish Revolution. 13 It must also be recalled that in its Order for the issuance
of decrees dated July 15, 1958, the same Court declared that the above-mentioned
decision had become final. Significantly, nowhere during the entire cadastral proceeding
did anything come up to suggest that the land belonged to any person other than Escritor.
On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, Escritor honestly believed that he is the legal owner of the land.
With this well-grounded belief of ownership, he continued in his possession of Lot No.
2749. This cannot be categorized as possession in bad faith.
As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of property knowing
that his title thereto is defective. 14 Here, there is no showing that Escritor knew of any
flaw in his title. Nor was it proved that petitioners were aware that the title of their
predecessor had any defect.
Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith, this should
not prejudice his successors-in-interest, petitioners herein, as the rule is that only
personal knowledge of the flaw in one's title or mode of acquisition can make him a
possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from one person to another, not
even to an heir. 15 As Article 534 of the Civil Code explicitly provides, "one who succeeds
by hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession of the
decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; ..." The reason for
this article is that bad faith is personal and intransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be
suffered only by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled with
such consequences. 16
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. If no evidence is
presented proving bad faith, like in this case, the presumption of good faith remains.
Respondent Acuna, on the other hand, bases his complaint for damages on the alleged
fraud on the part of the petitioners' predecessor in having the land registered under his
(the predecessor's) name. A review of the record, however, does not indicate the
existence of any such fraud. It was not proven in the cadastral court nor was it shown in
the trial court.
Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of his machinations. What is clear
is that in the hearing of January 22, 1958, the Court permitted Escritor to adduce his
evidence of ownership without opposing evidence as the lot had become uncontested.
17 Respondent Acuna himself failed to appear in this hearing because of a
misunderstanding with a lawyer. 18 There is no finding that such failure to appear was
caused by petitioners in this case. On the contrary, all the requirements of publication
were followed. Notice of hearing was duly published. Clearly then, the allegation of fraud
is without basis.
Respondent having failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of petitioners, We
sustain the trial court's finding that petitioners were possessors in good faith and should,
therefore, not be held liable for damages.
With the above pronouncement, the issue of prescription of cause of action which was
also presented need not be passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another decision is rendered dismissing the complaint.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIEDA,
respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] in CA-G.R. CV No. 28549 entitled SPOUSES
TIMOTEO PIEDA, ET. AL. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif], Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-4590, for cancellation of
certificate of title and/or specific performance, accounting and damages with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The records show that respondent spouses Pieda (PIEDAS) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land (Lot 11-14-1-14) situated at barangay Astorga Dumarao, Capiz
containing an area of 238,406 square meters, more or less, and covered by Homestead
Patent No. 0844 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1930. On March 7, 1972, the
PIEDAS mortgaged the above described parcel of land to petitioner, Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) to secure their agricultural loan in the amount of P20,000.00. The
PIEDAS failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage compelling DBP
to extrajudicially foreclose on February 2, 1977. In the foreclosure sale, DBP was the
highest bidder and a Sheriff Certificate of Sale was executed in its favor. In the
corresponding Certificate of Sale, the sheriff indicated that This property is sold subject
to the redemption within five (5) years from the date of registration of this instrument and
in the manner provided for by law applicable to this case. The certificate of sale was
registered in the Register of Deeds of Capiz on April 25, 1977. On March 10, 1978, after
the expiration of the one-year redemption period provided for under Section 6, ACT 3135,
DBP consolidated its title over the foreclosed property by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership. Subsequently, a Final Deed of Sale was executed in DBPs
favor, which was registered together with the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership with
the Register of Deeds of Capiz on May 30, 1978. Consequently, Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1930 was cancelled and TCT No. T-15559 was issued in the name of DBP.
Thereafter, DBP took possession of the foreclosed property and appropriated the produce
thereof.
On July 5, 1978, the Ministry of Justice issued Opinion No. 92, Series of 1978[if
!supportFootnotes][3][endif] which declared that lands covered by P.D. No. 27[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif], like the herein subject property, may not be the object of
foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on Oct. 21, 1972.
On August 24, 1981, the PIEDAS offered to redeem the foreclosed property by
offering P10,000.00 as partial redemption payment. This amount was accepted by DBP
who issued O.R. No. 1665719 and through a letter, conditionally approved the offer of
redemption considering the P10,000.00 as down payment.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
However, on November 11, 1981, DBP sent the PIEDAS another letter informing them
that pursuant to P.D. 27, their offer to redeem and/or repurchase the subject property
could not be favorably considered for the reason that said property was tenanted.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif] On November 16, 1981, in deference to the above-
mentioned opinion, DBP through Ramon Buenaflor sent a letter to the Acting Register of
Deeds of Capiz requesting the latter to cancel TCT No. T-15559 and to restore Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1930 in the name of the PIEDAS. The Acting Register of Deeds,
in reply to such request, suggested that DBP file a petition in court pursuant to Section
108 of Presidential Decree 1529[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]. In compliance with said
suggestion, DBP petitioned for the cancellation of TCT No. T-15559 with then Court of
First Instance of Capiz, Branch II, docketed as Special Case No. 2653. The petition was
favorably acted upon on February 22, 1982. Thus, the foreclosure proceeding conducted
on February 2, 1977 was declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of Capiz was
ordered to cancel TCT No. 15559; OCT No. 1930 was ordered revived.
Meanwhile, on December 21, 1981, the PIEDAS filed the instant complaint against
DBP for cancellation of certificate of title and/or specific performance, accounting and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction averring that
DBP, in evident bad faith, caused the consolidation of its title to the parcel of land in
question in spite of the fact that the 5-year redemption period expressly stated in the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their offer to redeem the foreclosed
property was made well within said period of redemption.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the PIEDAS stating that DBP violated the
stipulation in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale which provided that the redemption period is
five (5) years from the registration thereof in consonance with Section 119[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif] of CA No. 141[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]. DBP should
therefore assume liability for the fruits that said property produced from said land
considering that it prematurely took possession thereof. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the
defendant Development Bank of the Philippines as follows:
1. Condemning the defendant DBP to pay the plaintiffs P201,138.28 less whatever
amount the plaintiffs still have to pay the said defendant DBP as balance of their loan
account reckoned up to the date of this decision; P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; P5,000.00
as litigation expenses and costs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
DBP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
Court of Appeals stated that since DBP was in evident bad faith when it unlawfully took
possession of the property subject of the dispute and defied what was written on the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, the PIEDAS were entitled to recover the fruits produced by
the property or its equivalent valued at P72,000.00 per annum or a total of P216,000.00
for the three-year period. Respondent court stated that said amount was not rebutted by
DBP and was fair considering the size of the land in question. The court added that any
discussion with respect to the redemption period was of little significance since the
foreclosure proceeding was declared null and void in Special Civil Case No. 2653[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] on February 22, 1982. Thus, the right of the PIEDAS to
redeem the property has become moot and academic. Finally, the award of attorneys
fees amounting to P10,000.00[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] was justified considering
that the PIEDAS were compelled to protect their interests.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
DBPs Motion for Reconsideration[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] was denied;
hence this petition where it assigns the following errors:
Ground No. 1 The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming The Court A
Quos Decision Awarding Actual Damages In The Amount Of P216,000.00 In Favor Of
The Private Respondents Notwithstanding The Absence Of Evidence Substantiating Said
Award. Thus, The Honorable Court Of Appeals Had Decided This Instant Case In A Way
Not In Accord With Applicable Law And Jurisprudence.
2. Ground No. 2 - The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming The Court
A Quos Finding That DBP Was In Bad Faith When It Took Possession Of The Property
In Question Notwithstanding the Contrary Evidence Adduced By Petitioner DBP. Thus,
The Honorable Court Of Appeals Departed From The Accepted And Usual Course of
Judicial Proceedings.
3. Ground No. 3 - The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming The Court
A Quos Decision Awarding Attorneys Fees And Litigation Costs In Favor Of The Private
Respondents Notwithstanding Absence Of Evidence Proving the Same. Clearly, The
Lower Court Committed Misapprehension Of Facts That Can Be Considered A Question
Of Law.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
DBP maintains that the valuation of the income derived from the property in dispute
allegedly amounting to P216,000.00 was not proven by the PIEDAS. DBP argues that
they granted the PIEDAS a loan of P20,000.00 in March 7, 1972 and up to the time of the
foreclosure of the property, the PIEDAS have paid only P2,000.00 on their principal. The
failure of the PIEDAS to pay this loan is attributable to the fact that said property did not
produce income amounting to P72,000.00 per annum. According to DBP, in the absence
of receipts or other evidence to support such a claim, the Court of Appeals should not
have granted said amount considering that the PIEDAS had the burden of proving actual
damages. Furthermore, Selfida Pieda herself admitted that the property never produced
income amounting to P72,000.00 per annum. At any rate, the actual amount earned by
the property in terms of rentals turned over by the tenant-farmers or caretakers of the land
were duly receipted and were duly accounted for by the DBP.
DBP also alleges that the mere fact that DBP took possession and administration of
the property does not warrant a finding that DBP was in bad faith. First, records show that
the PIEDAS consented to and approved the takeover of DBP. Second, Sec. 7[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif] of Act No. 3135[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] allows the
mortgagee-buyer to take possession of the mortgaged property even during the
redemption period. Third, DBPs act of consolidating the title of the property in its name
does not constitute bad faith as there is no law which prohibits the purchaser at public
auction from consolidating title in its name after the expiration of the one (1) year
redemption period reckoned from the time the Certificate of Sale was registered; and
neither is there any law or jurisprudence which prohibits the PIEDAS from exercising their
right of redemption over said property within five (5) years even if title is consolidated in
the name of the purchaser. When DBP consolidated title over the property in its name,
the new TCT issued in its favor was subject to the lien i.e. the right of redemption of the
PIEDAS; if there was a failure to register this in the TCT, DBP should not be faulted.
Besides, even if the five (5) year period of redemption was not indicated therein, Sec.
44[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] and 46[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] of Presidential
Decree No. 1529[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] attaches such lien by operation of law
even in the absence of an annotation in the title. Moreover, Sec. 119 of CA No. 141 also
makes said right of redemption a statutory lien, which subsists and binds the whole world
despite the absence of registration.
DBP also could not have been in bad faith when it denied the PIEDAS offer to
redeem the property since the denial was premised on Opinion No. 92 of the Minister of
Justice series of 1978 which stated that said land was covered under P.D. 27 and could
not be the subject of foreclosure proceedings. For this reason, DBP immediately filed a
petition to nullify the foreclosure proceedings which was favorably acted upon prior to the
service of summons and the complaint in the present case on DBP on June 30,1982. If
DBP was really in bad faith, it would not have filed said petition for said petition was
against its own interests.
Further, DBP asserts that PIEDAS appointed DBP as their attorney-in-fact or agent
in case of foreclosure of the property under Section 4 of the mortgage contract, which
provides:
4. xxx In case of foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment of the
mortgagee or any of its employees as receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the
mortgage property at once, and to hold possession of the case and the rents and profits
derived from the mortgaged property before the sale. xxx[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
DBP was therefore entitled to take possession of the property pursuant to the mortgage
contract.
Finally, considering that DBP lawfully had material possession of the property after
it consolidated its title, DBP was entitled to the fruits and income thereof pursuant to
Section 34, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 34. Rents and Profits Pending Redemption. Statement thereof and credit therefor
on redemption. The purchaser, from the time of the sale until a redemption, and a
redemptioner, from the time of his redemption until another redemption, is entitled to
receive the rents of the property sold or the value of the use or occupation thereof when
such property is in the possession of a tenant. xxx
Taking all this into consideration, DBP cannot be faulted for taking over possession of the
property in question.
The core issue in this case is whether DBP was in bad faith when it took possession
of the disputed lot.
We rule in the negative and find DBPs contentions meritorious.
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Good
faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor
rests the burden of proof.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] It was therefore incumbent on
the PIEDAS to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title i.e. the nullity of the
foreclosure. This, they failed to do.
Respondent PIEDAS argue that DBPs bad faith stems from the fact that DBP
consolidated title over the disputed property despite the statement in the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale to the effect that said land was subject to a five year redemption period.
The period of redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed land is provided under Section 6 of
ACT No. 3135 to wit:
Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent
to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same
at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such
redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to
four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure[if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif], in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act.
If no redemption is made within one year, the purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to
consolidate[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] and to possess[if
!supportFootnotes][27][endif] the property.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] Accordingly,
DBPs act of consolidating its title and taking possession of the subject property after the
expiration of the period of redemption was in accordance with law. Moreover, it was in
consonance with Section 4 of the mortgage contract between DBP and the PIEDAS
where they agreed to the appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and to hold
possession of the mortgage property in case of foreclosure. DBPs acts cannot therefore
be tainted with bad faith.
The right of DBP to consolidate its title and take possession of the subject property
is not affected by the PIEDAS right to repurchase said property within five years from the
date of conveyance granted by Section 119 of CA No. 141. In fact, without the act of DBP
consolidating title in its name, the PIEDAS would not be able to assert their right to
repurchase granted under the aforementioned section. Respondent PIEDAS are of the
erroneous belief that said section prohibits a purchaser of homestead land in a
foreclosure sale from consolidating his title over said property after the one-year period
to redeem said property has expired. Section 119 does not contain any prohibition to
convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to
repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he conveys said land.
This is in consonance with the policy of homestead laws to distribute disposable
agricultural lands of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.[if
!supportFootnotes][29][endif] The right to repurchase under Section 119 aims to preserve
and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had
gratuitously given him.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Such right is based on the
assumption that the person under obligation to reconvey the property has the full title to
the property because it was voluntarily conveyed to him or that he consolidated his title
thereto by reason of a redemptioners failure to exercise his right of redemption.[if
!supportFootnotes][31][endif] It is also settled that the five-year period of redemption fixed
in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure
begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase
allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] Thus DBPs
consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the right of the PIEDAS to redeem
the same under C.A. No. 141.
It may be argued that P.D. 27 was already in effect when DBP foreclosed the
property. However, the legal propriety of the foreclosure of the land was put into question
only after Opinion No. 92 series of 1978 of the Ministry of Justice declared that said land
was covered by P.D. 27 and could not be subject to foreclosure proceedings. The Opinion
of the Ministry of Justice was issued on July 5, 1978 or almost two months after DBP
consolidated its title to the property on March 10, 1978. By law and jurisprudence, a
mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may properly be the basis of good
faith.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
In the case of Maneclang vs. Baun,[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] we held that
when a contract of sale is void, the possessor is entitled to keep the fruits during the
period for which it held the property in good faith. Good faith of the possessor ceases
when an action to recover possession of the property is filed against him and he is served
summons therefore.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] In the present case, DBP was served
summons on June 30, 1982.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] By that time, it was no longer
in possession of the disputed land as possession thereof was given back to the PIEDAS
after the foreclosure of DBP was declared null and void on February 22, 1982. Therefore,
any income collected by DBP after it consolidated its title and took possession of the
property on May 30, 1978 up to February 22, 1982 belongs to DBP as a possessor in
good faith since its possession was never legally interrupted.
Finally, we delete the award for attorneys fees. Although attorneys fees may be
awarded if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it
is sought[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif], we hold that DBPs acts were clearly not
unjustified.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Development Bank of the Philippines is
absolved from any liability to Timoteo and Selfida Pieda in so far as it orders the DBP to
pay the PIEDAS P216,000.00 as annual produce value of the land; P20,000.00 in
attorneys fees, P5,000.00 in litigation expenses and the costs of the suit. This decision is
without prejudice to whatever liability the PIEDAS may still have to the DBP with respect
to their loan.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 530:

[G.R. No. 136438. November 11, 2004]

TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner, vs. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE
SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL MUNDO, ANDOKS LITSON CORPORATION
and MARITES CARINDERIA, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883, affirming in toto the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 259, dated November 14, 1996,
in Civil Case No. 95-044.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are:
Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Paraaque City, Metro
Manila with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds, same city.
Petitioners lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land
belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and
therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the
people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband
Beth Del Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion of said
government land. In November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andoks
Litson Corporation and Marites Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30
square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was
registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City.
In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Paraaque City, a complaint for accion
publiciana against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-044. He alleged inter alia
that respondents structures on the government land closed his right of way to the Ninoy
Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.
Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioners allegations, claiming that
they have been issued licenses and permits by Paraaque City to construct their buildings
on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the subject property as it belongs to the
government.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the defendants to have a better right of possession over the subject land
except the portion thereof covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 of the
Register of Deeds of Paraaque;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the subject premises described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 and gives its possession to plaintiff; and
3. Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiff against the defendants, and
likewise dismissing the claim for attorneys fees of the latter against the former.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the
public land in question. On the contrary, the defendants are the ones who have been in
actual possession of the area. According to the trial court, petitioner was not deprived of
his right of way as he could use the Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial courts
Decision in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment hereby appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In this petition, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignments of
error:
I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS CONTAINED A
CONCLUSION WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE SAME
WAS BASED.

II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE ONLY ISSUE
IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS ACQUIRED
A RIGHT OF WAY OVER THE LAND OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS BETWEEN
HIS PROPERTY AND THE NINOY AQUINO AVENUE.

III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCION
PUBLICIANA IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EXISTENCE
OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS RIGHT OF WAY DOES NOT CARRY POSSESSION
OVER THE SAME.
V
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO
HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LAND BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.[5]
In their comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that
petitioners action for accion publiciana is not the proper remedy in asserting his right of
way on a lot owned by the government.
Here, petitioner claims that respondents, by constructing their buildings on the lot in
question, have deprived him of his right of way and his right of possession over a
considerable portion of the same lot, which portion is covered by his T.C.T. No. 74430 he
acquired by means of exchange of real property.
It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioners alleged right of way exists belongs to
the state or property of public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article
420 of the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar
character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Public use is use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite
public.[6] Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the
people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be
alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired
by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4)
cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.[7]
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public
dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein
petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through
the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right
of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.

Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents
have better right of possession over the subject lot.
However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants buildings were
constructed on the portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioners
name. Being its owner, he is entitled to its possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of
possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a property of public
dominion. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.