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Roe vs.

410 US 113 ( 1973 )


This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the declaratory relief
prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal abortion laws; but denied
issuing an injunction against enforcement of such statutes.

In 1970, Norma L McCorvey ( Jane Roe ), a pregnant single woman (allegedly a result of rape), filed
a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws which proscribe
procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mothers life. She
argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy as
guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, she amended
her complaint as to represent or sue on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated; thereby
becoming a class suit.


Whether or not a womans right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the right to abort
her child.


Yes. The right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encompass a womans decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes abortion decision,
but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.

A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts from criminality only a
lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the
interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion,
sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas
statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory
judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant
Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried
and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because
her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to
travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all
other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged
her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her
pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendments Due
Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or
its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?

Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from
statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion
performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an
indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime
even when it destroyed a quick fetus.

Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is
that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this
argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that
the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the States concern is to protect pregnant women.
However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe
particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the States interest is in protecting the prenatal
life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted
for the act of abortion.

For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant womans attending physician, and may not be criminalized by

For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate
abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the States interest in promoting
the health of the mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except
where necessary for the preservation of the mothers life, based upon the States interest in the
potential of the potential life of the unborn child.

Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to
privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.

Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case of a
life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy.
However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored
to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court
declined to address the question of when life begins.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
Brief Fact Summary. A Pennsylvania statute required notification of the husband or various other
stringent notifications prior to permitting an abortion

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Requiring spousal notification prior to an abortion is unduly burdensome
and unconstitutional. Requiring parental notification in the case of minors is constitutional so long as
there is a medical emergency exception and a judicial bypass procedure.

Facts. A Pennsylvania abortion law permitted abortion on a married women only after having
received a signed statement from the woman that she has notified her husband, except in cases of
medical emergency. The woman also had the option of providing a signed statement that her
husband was not the man who impregnated her; that her husband could not be located; that the
pregnancy was the result of a reported sexual assault; or that notifying the husband will cause him or
someone else to inflict bodily injury upon her. Physicians performing abortions without the required
statement will have their licenses revoked and are liable for damages to the husband.

Issue. Does the spousal notification requirement place an undue burden on married women who
seek abortions in violation of the United States Constitution?

Held. The Court rejects the common law view of the married couple as one and finds that the spousal
notification requirement is unduly burdensome and a violation of the Constitution.
Common law provided that a married woman had no legal existence separate from her husband.
However, it is clear that state regulation of abortion has a far greater impact on the mothers liberty
than the fathers. Although the husband has a substantial interest in the unborn fetus, when balancing
between the mother and fathers interest, the balance weighs in the mothers favor.

It is well documented that spousal abuse occurs in a variety of different ways, and can be brought on
by knowledge of pregnancy. A significant number of women would be deterred from receiving
abortions under this law as if the state had completely outlawed abortion. Spousal notification would
essentially enable many husbands to wield a veto over his wifes decision.

So long as there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure permitting minors to petition a court to
allow their abortions, it is constitutional to require unemancipated minors to receive parental or
guardian consent. Medical emergencies are the exception.

Dissent. The spousal statute requires notification, not consent. We believe that the spousal
notification statute furthers legitimate state interests, such as promoting the integrity of the marital

Discussion. The majoritys holding was largely based on testimony suggesting that the spousal
notification requirement would result in either spousal abuse or the decision to not receive an abortion
solely to avoid such abuse. The dissent feels that open discussion between spouses might lessen
concerns and allow births when abortion seemed to be the only option to the wife.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which
the constitutionality of several Pennsylvania state statutory provisions regarding abortion was challenged. The
Court's plurality opinionreaffirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade[1] stating that "matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."[2] The Court's plurality opinion upheld the
constitutional right to have an abortion while altering the standard for analyzing restrictions on that right, crafting the
"undue burden" standard for abortion restrictions. Planned Parenthood v. Casey differs from Roe,however, because
under Roe the state could not regulate abortions in the first trimester whereas under Planned Parenthood v. Caseythe
state can regulate abortions in the first trimester, or any point before the point of viability, and beyond as long as that
regulation does not pose an undue burden on women's fundamental right to an abortion. Applying this new standard
of review, the Court upheld four regulations and invalidated the requirement of spousal notification.

In Casey, the plaintiffs challenged five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 authored by
Rep. Stephen F. Freind,[3] arguing that the provisions were unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade. The Court
in Roe was the first to establish abortion as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority in Roe further held that women have a privacy interest protecting their
right to abortion embedded in the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The five provisions at issue
in Casey are summarized below.

3205 Informed Consent. A woman seeking abortion had to give her informed consent prior to the procedure.
The doctor had to provide her with specific information at least 24 hours before the procedure was to take place,
including information about how the abortion could be detrimental to her health and about the availability of
information about the fetus.
3209 Spousal Notice. A woman seeking abortion had to sign a statement stating that she had notified her
husband prior to undergoing the procedure, unless certain exceptions applied.
3206 Parental Consent. Minors had to get the informed consent of at least one parent or guardian prior to the
abortion procedure. Alternatively, minors could seek judicial bypass in lieu of consent.
3203 "Medical Emergency" definition. Defining a medical emergency as
"[t]hat condition, which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical
condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or
for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function."

3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f) Reporting Requirements. Certain reporting and record keeping mandates
were imposed on facilities providing abortion services.
The case was a seminal one in the history of abortion decisions in the United States. It was the first case that
provided an opportunity to overturn Roe since the two liberal Justices, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall,
were replaced with the Bush-appointed Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas. Both were viewed as ostensible
conservatives compared with their predecessors. This left the Court with eight Republican-appointed justicessix of
whom had been appointed by Presidents Reagan or Bush, both of whom were well known for their opposition to
Roe. Finally, the only remaining Democratic appointeeJustice Byron Whitehad been one of the two dissenters
from the original Roe decision.
At this point, only two of the Justices were obvious supporters of Roe v. Wade: Blackmun, the author of Roe,
and Stevens, who had joined opinions specifically reaffirming Roe in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.
The case was argued by ACLU attorney Kathryn Kolbert for Planned Parenthood, with Linda J. Wharton serving as
Co-Lead Counsel. Pennsylvania attorney general Ernie Preate argued the case for the State. Upon reaching the
Supreme Court, the United States joined the case as amicus curiae and Solicitor General Ken Starr of the Bush
Administration defended the Act in part by urging the Court to overturn Roe as having been wrongly decided.
The District Court's ruling
The plaintiffs were five abortion clinics, a class of physicians who provided abortion services, and one physician
representing himself independently. They filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to enjoin the state from enforcing the five provisions and have them declared facially unconstitutional.
The District Court, after a three-day bench trial, held that all the provisions were unconstitutional and entered a
permanent injunction against Pennsylvania's enforcement of them.
Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding all of the regulations
except for the husband notification requirement. The Third Circuit concluded that the husband notification was
unduly burdensome because it potentially exposed married women to spousal abuse, violence, and economic duress
at the hands of their husbands.[4] Then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito sat on that three-judge appellate panel and
dissented from the court's invalidation of that requirement.
The Supreme Court's consideration
At the conference of the Justices two days after oral argument, Justice Souter defied expectations, joining Justices
O'Connor, Stevens, and Blackmun, who had likewise refused to do so three years earlier in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services. This resulted in a precarious five Justice majority consisting of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, Byron White, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas that favored upholding all five
contested abortion restrictions. However, Justice Kennedy changed his mind shortly thereafter and joined with
fellow Reagan-Bush justices Sandra Day O'Connor and David Souter to write a plurality opinion that would
reaffirm Roe.[5]

The Court's opinions

Except for the three opening sections of the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter opinion, Casey was a divided judgment, as
no other sections of any opinion were joined by a majority of justices. However, the plurality opinion jointly written
by Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy is recognized as the lead opinion with precedential weight because each
of its parts was concurred in by at least two other Justices, albeit different ones for each part.
The O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter plurality opinion
The authors of the plurality opinion began by noting the U.S. government's previous challenges to Roe v. Wade:
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution
protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade (1973), that definition of
liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done in five
other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe."
Upholding the "Essential Holding" in Roe[edit]
The plurality opinion stated that it was upholding what it called the "essential holding" of Roe. The essential
holding consists of three parts: (1) Women have the right to choose to have an abortion prior to viability and to
do so without undue interference from the State; (2) the State can restrict the abortion procedure post viability,
so long as the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the womans life or health; and (3) the
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life
of the fetus that may become a child.[6] The plurality asserted that the fundamental right to abortion is grounded
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the plurality reiterated what the Court had said
in Eisenstadt v. Baird: "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Stare Decisis Analysis
The plurality's opinion included a thorough discussion on the doctrine of stare decisis (respect of precedent), and
provided a clear explanation for why the doctrine had to be applied in Casey with regards to Roe. The authors of
the plurality opinion emphasized that stare decisis had to apply in Caseybecause the Roe rule had not been
proven intolerable; the rule had become subject "to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation"; the law had not developed in such a
way around the rule that left the rule "no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine"; and the facts had not
changed, nor viewed differently, to "rob the old rule of significant application or justification." [7] The plurality
acknowledged that it was important for the Court to stand by prior decisions, even those decisions some found
unpopular, unless there was a change in the fundamental reasoning underpinning the previous decision. The
authors of the plurality opinion, making a special note of the precedential value of Roe v. Wade, and specifically
how women's lives were changed by that decision, stated,
"The sum of the precedential enquiry to this point shows Roe's underpinnings unweakened in any way affecting
its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An entire generation has
come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to
make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's central
holding a doctrinal remnant."[8]
The authors of the plurality opinion also acknowledged the need for predictability and consistency in judicial
decision making. For example,
"Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of
intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension
that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national
division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution." [9]
The plurality went on to analyze past judgments refusing to apply the doctrine of stare decisis, such as Brown v.
Board of Education. There, the authors of the plurality opinion explained, society's rejection of the "Separate but
Equal" concept was a legitimate reason for the Brown v. Board of Education courts rejection of the Plessy v.
Ferguson doctrine.[10]Emphasizing the lack of need to overrule the essential holding of Roe, and the Court's need
to not be seen as overruling a prior decision merely because the individual members of the Court had changed,
the authors of the plurality opinion stated,
"Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our understanding of it has changed (and
because no other indication of weakened precedent has been shown), the Court could not pretend to be
reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently
from the Court of 1973.[11]
The plurality further emphasized that the Court would lack legitimacy if it frequently changed its Constitutional
decisions, stating,
"The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the
Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures
having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make." [12]
Since the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter plurality overruled some portions of Roe v. Wade despite its emphasis on
stare decisis, Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent argued that this section was entirely obiter dicta. All these
opening sections were joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens for the majority. The remainder of the decision
did not command a majority, but at least two other Justices concurred in judgment on each of the remaining
Viability of the fetus
Although upholding the "essential holding" in Roe, and recognizing that women have some constitutional liberty
to terminate their pregnancies, the O'ConnorKennedySouter plurality overturned the Roe trimester framework
in favor of a viability analysis. The Roe trimester framework completely forbade states from regulating abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy, permitted regulations designed to protect a woman's health in the second
trimester, and permitted prohibitions on abortion during the third trimester (when the fetus becomes viable)
under the justification of fetal protection, and so long as the life or health of the mother was not at risk. [13] The
plurality found that continuing advancements in medical technology had proven that a fetus could be considered
viable at 22 or 23 weeks rather than at the 28 weeks previously understood by the Court in Roe.[14] The plurality
thus redrew the line of increasing state interest at viability because of increasing medical accuracy about when
viability takes place. Likewise, the authors of the plurality opinion felt that viability was "more workable" than
the trimester framework.[15]
Under the new viability framework, the plurality held that at the point of viability and subsequent to viability,
the state could promote its interest in the "potentiality of human life" by regulating, or possibly proscribing,
abortion "except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother."[16] Prior to viability, the plurality held, the State can show concern for fetal development, but it
cannot pose an undue burden on a woman's fundamental right to abortion. [17] The plurality reasoned that the new
pre- and post-viability line would still uphold the essential holding of Roe, which recognized both the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty, and the State's "important and legitimate interest in potential life." [18]
The undue burden standard
In replacing the trimester framework with the viability framework, the plurality also replaced the strict scrutiny
analysis under Roe, with the "undue burden" standard previously developed by O'Connor in her dissent in Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.[19] A legal restriction posing an undue burden is one that has "the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus."[20] An undue burden is found even where a statute purports to further the interest of potential life or
another valid state interest, if it places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's fundamental right to
choice.[21] The Supreme Court in the 2016 case Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt clarified exactly what the
'undue burden' test requires: "Casey requires courts to consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access
together with the benefits those laws confer." [22][23] In this case the court described the undue burden standard in
its overall context with these words:
We begin with the standard, as described in Casey. We recognize that the "State has a legitimate interest in
seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure
maximum safety for the patient." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 150 (1973). But, we added, "a statute which,
while furthering [a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a womans
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends." Casey, 505 U. S., at 877
(plurality opinion).Moreover, "[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right." Id., at 878.[24]
In applying the new undue burden standard, the plurality overruled City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986),[25] each of which applied "strict scrutiny" to abortion restrictions.[26]
Applying this new standard to the challenged Pennsylvania Act, the plurality struck down the spousal notice
requirement, finding that for many women, the statutory provision would impose a substantial obstacle in their
path to receive an abortion.[27] The plurality recognized that the provision gave too much power to husbands over
their wives ("a spousal notice requirement enables the husband to wield an effective veto over his wife's
decision"), and could worsen situations of spousal and child abuse.[28] In finding the provision unconstitutional,
the authors of the plurality opinion clarified that the focus of the undue burden test is on the group "for whom
the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant." [29] Otherwise stated, courts should not
focus on what portion of the population is affected by the legislation, but rather on the population the law would
restrict.[30] The plurality upheld the remaining contested regulations the State's informed consent and 24-hour
waiting period, parental consent requirements, reporting requirements, and the "medical emergencies" definition
holding that none constituted an undue burden.[31]
Notably, when the authors of the plurality discuss the right to privacy in the joint opinion, it is all within the
context of a quotation or paraphrase from Roe or other previous cases. The authors of the plurality opinion, do
not, however, explicitly or implicitly state that they do not believe in a right to privacy, or that they do not
support the use of privacy in Roe to justify the fundamental right to abortion. Justice Blackmun would not agree
with an implication asserting otherwise, stating "[t]he Court today reaffirms the long recognized rights of
privacy and bodily integrity."
The concurrence/dissents
Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, who both joined the plurality in part, also each filed opinions
concurring in the Court's judgment in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice William Rehnquist filed an
opinion concurring in the Court's judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justices Byron
White, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, none of whom joined any part of the plurality. Justice Scalia also
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was also joined by Rehnquist,
White, and Thomas.
Rehnquist and Scalia, joined by White and Thomas
Rehnquist and Scalia each joined the plurality in upholding the parental consent, informed consent, and waiting
period laws. However, they dissented from the plurality's decision to uphold Roe v. Wade and strike down the
spousal notification law, contending that Roe was incorrectly decided. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
questioned the fundamental right to an abortion, the "right to privacy," and the strict scrutiny application
in Roe.[32] He also questioned the new "undue burden" analysis under the plurality opinion, instead deciding that
the proper analysis for the regulation of abortions was rational-basis.[33]
In his opinion, Justice Scalia also argued for a rational-basis approach, finding that the Pennsylvania statute in its
entirety was constitutional.[34] He argued that abortion was not a "protected" liberty, and as such, the abortion
liberty could be intruded upon by the State.[35] To this end, Justice Scalia concluded this was so because an
abortion right was not in the Constitution, and "longstanding traditions of American society" have allowed
abortion to be legally proscribed.[36] Rehnquist and Scalia joined each other's concurrence/dissents. White and
Thomas, who did not write their own opinions, joined in both.
Stevens and Blackmun
Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote opinions in which they approved of the plurality's preservation of Roe and
rejection of the spousal notification law. They did not, however, agree with the plurality's decision to uphold the
other three laws at issue.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Stevens joined the plurality's preservation
of Roeand rejection the spousal notification law, but under his interpretation of the undue burden standard ("[a]
burden may be 'undue' either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate rational
justification"), he would have found the information requirements in 3205(a)(2)(i)(iii) and 3205(a)(1)(ii),
and the 24-hour waiting period in 3205(a)(1)(2) unconstitutional.[37] Instead of applying an undue burden
analysis, Justice Stevens would have preferred to apply the analyses in Akron and Thornburgh, two cases that
had applied a strict scrutiny analysis, to reach the same conclusions. [38] Justice Stevens also placed great
emphasis on the fact that women had a right to bodily integrity, and a constitutionally protected liberty interest
to decide matters of the "highest privacy and the most personal nature."[39] As such, Justice Stevens felt that a
State should not be permitted to attempt to "persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion"; he felt this
was too coercive and violated the woman's decisional autonomy.[40]
Justice Blackmun concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. He joined the
plurality's preservation of Roe of which he wrote the majority and he too rejected the spousal notification
law.[41] Justice Blackmun, however, argued for a woman's right to privacy and insisted, as he did in Roe, that all
non-de-minimis abortion regulations were subject to strict scrutiny.[42] Using such an analysis, Justice Blackmun
argued that the content-based counseling, the 24-hour waiting period, informed parental consent, and the
reporting regulations were unconstitutional.[43] He also dissented from the plurality's undue burden test, and
instead found his trimester framework "far less manipulable" and "administrable." [44] Blackmun even went
further in his opinion than Stevens, sharply attacking and criticizing the anti-Roe bloc of the Court.