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FIFTH ARMY HISTORY

5 JANUARY - 6 OCTOBER 1943

Classification changed t9

REST?I

by authority of ^

of S, G-2, WDGS

Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Army Commander [to 16 December IQ44)

IF1H ARMY
HISTORY
***
-I
* #

PARTI

&rom Activation to

the &all ofTlaples

Registered Copy No.

Foreword

OHORTLY after our landings in North Africa, on 8 November 1942, orders were received from the War Department directing the activation of the United States Fifth Army. This took place on 5 January 1943. This Army, created in the field and dedicated to offensive operations, has had a varied and glorious history since its earliest days in French Morocco. Even while its units were train ing, the Army staff was preparing plans for carrying the war to the Italian mainland. Then, when all was ready, we struck. The American soldiers of Fifth Army who went ashore at Salerno on 9 Sep tember 1943 were the first Americans to plant themselves on the soil of Europe in this war. Our invasion virtually destroyed the Rome-Berlin Axis; yet more, for long months Fifth Army bore the entire brunt of our participation in the land war against Germany. Our men fought the more valiantly and boldly for the knowledge that the prestige of our armed forces rested on their shoulders. The enemy dipped deep into the pool of his already strained resources, first to prevent our landings, and then to hold us south of Rome. The ensuing struggle in the rugged Italian mountains was bloody, protracted, and at times our advances were measured in yards; but Fifth Army was not stopped. On 4 June 1944 we entered Rome, and today, as I write, we are engaged in a bitter struggle south of Bologna300 miles north of the Salerno beaches. Field conditions do not encourage the writing of history. To my know ledge this work is the first attempt to set down the history of an American army while it is still engaged in active operations. Nevertheless I have considered it desirable to secure an authentic story of the action of this Army as we pro ceeded. A trained group of officers and men has been steadily occupied since our arrival in Italy, studying the terrain and operations, going over the records, interviewing commanders and staffs while events were still fresh. Though any history written so soon after the battle must necessarily be incomplete, I feel that the Fifth Army Histbfry possesses an immediacy and freshness which cannot

be gained later. Above all, it is a complete, straightforward story, so far as we know it, which gives due credit to the units of all the nations which have served in Fifth Army. The world knows the names Salerno, Cassino, Anzio, and Futa Pass; this History should explain why these names are glorious in military annals. MARK W. CLARK lieutenant General A US Commanding Headquarters Fifth Army In the Field, Italy 27 October 1944

VI

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. A.

ACTIVATION TRAINING

OF FIFTH OF FIFTH

ARMY ARMY

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B.

Training Centers 1 . Invasion Training Center 2. Airborne Training Center 3. leadership and Battle Training Center 4. Field Officers Training Center 5. Tank Destroyer Training Center 6. Engineer Training Center 7. Air Observation Post Center 8. French Training vSection Completion of Training PLANNING FOR INVASION

CHAPTER III. A. B.

Early Planning Planning for Avalanche 1. General Planning 2. Plans for Airborne Support C. Outline Plan for Avalanche 1. The Army Plan 2. Naval and Air Support Plans 3. The Invasion Beaches 4. Landing Plans D. German Forces in Italy E . Approaching H Hour

VII

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CHAPTER IV. INVASION OF ITALY A. D Day at Salerno, 9 September 1. The Landing 2. Fighting Inland B. Consolidating the Beachhead, 10-11 September C. The German Counterattacks, 12-14 September 1. The Loss of Altavilla 2. Shifts in the Center 3. Attacks and Counterattacks 4. Summary of the Situation . . . < D. The Enemy Withdraws, 15-19 September CHAPTER V. THE DRIVE ON NAPLES A. Plans for the Advance B. T h e F a l l of N a p l e s a n d A v e l l i n o , 2 1 S e p t e m b e r - 1 O c t o b e r . . . . 1. B r e a k i n g T h r o u g h t h e M o u n t a i n s 2. T h e E n e m y R e t r e a t s 3. T h e C a p t u r e of N a p l e s C. Advance to the Volturno, 1-6 October CHAPTER VI. THE ACTION A. Naval Action B. Air Operations C. The British Eighth Army OF ALLIED ARMS 31 3* 31 33 34 3/ 57 38 39 41 41 43 43 44 44 46 47 48 51 51 52 56

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Number One. Letters and Orders of Activation A. War Department Letter on Activation of Fifth Army, 8 Decem ber 1942 B. Fifth Army General Order No. 1, 5 January 1943 C. Fifth Army General Order No. 2, 5 January 1943 D. Fifth Army General Order No. 3, 11 January 1943 Number A. B. C. Two. Orders and Instructions Outline Plan for Avalanche, 26 August 1943 Field Order No. 1, 25 August 1943 Change No. 1 t oField Order No. i , 1 September 1943 59 61 63 64 65 j$ 75 81 8 3

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VIII

D. E. F. G. H. I. /. Number A. B. C. D.

F i e l d Order N o . 2, 16 F i e l d Order N o . 3, 18 F i e l d Order N o . 4, 19 Operations Instruction Operations Instruction Operations Instruction Operations Instruction

September September September No. i, 20 No. 2, 20 No. 3, 22 No. 4, 29

1943 1943 1943 September September September September

1943 1943 1943 1943

page 84 86 %y 89 90 91 93 95 9 7 98 99 101 103

Three. Statistics Casualties, U . S . Forces,. 9 S e p t e m b e r - 6 October 1 9 4 3 . . . . Prisoners of War, 9-30 September 1943 Major Ordnance Losses, 9-30 September 1943 vSupply Troop L i s t of Fifth A r m y , 2 9September 1943 . . . .

Number Four.

Maps

* * * * * * * * * *

opposite page 1. Plans for the Invasion of Italy 16 2. The Invasion of Italy 22 3. VI Corps Beaches at Paestum 26 4. Plans of Landing, D Day at Salerno 30 5. Consolidating the Beachhead, 10-11 September 1943 34 6. Fifth Army Hightide, 12 September 1943 38 7. Counterattacks against VI Corps, 13 September 1943 42 8. Advance to the Volturno, 16 September - 6 October 1943 50 9. Advance of the Allied Armies in Italy, 3 September - 6 October 1943 58

Paintings
Invasion beach at Paestum (Red Beach) Altavilla and Hill 424 in the background Looking across the olive groves to Altavilla opposite page opposite page opposite page 15 37 47

IX

CHAPTER I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Activation of Fifth Army

F I F T H Army was constituted effective i December 1942 by a War De partment letter addressed to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations. (See Annex No. iA.) The letter stated that the following elements of the newly created force would be activated in the European Theater of Operations: Headquarters, Fifth Army; Headquarters Company, Fifth Army; and Special Troops, Fifth Army. It further directed that the foregoing units be organized and equipped in accordance with appropriate tables and that personnel and equipment be drawn from the Western Task Force (formerly Task Force A), II Corps (reinforced), and other available sources. The Western Task Force, which had sailed directly from the Uni ted States, had received its baptism in battle during the North African in vasion at Casablanca, French Morocco, on 8 November 1942. On the same date II Corps had made its landing at Oran, Algeria, coming from England, where it had spent several months. I Armored Corps was assigned to Fifth Army by the War Department letter, which called for reactivation of the Corps by transfer of units, personnel, and equipment from the Western Task Force. II Corps (reinforced) after reorganization as II Corps (non-reinforced) would likewise come under Fifth Army. By virtue of further authority given in the letter the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, could assign additional units, per sonnel, or equipment to Fifth Army. Concurrently with the formation of the Army, headquarters elements and provisional units of the Western Task Force were to be disbanded. On 12 December 1942, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, published General Order No. 67, which constituted the United States Fifth Army in accordance with the War Department authority noted above and al-

CONFIDENTIAL

located the new army to the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, North Africa. This order directed activation of Fifth Army at the proper time by its commanding general, who was announced as being lieutenant General Mark W. Clark. Upon activation of Fifth Army General Clark was to be relieved as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force. Pursuant to further instructions contained in this order Allied Force Head quarters on 30 December 1942 addressed a letter to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, directing the activation of his command on or about 4 January 1943. The major elements of the United States Army then under control of the Western and Center Task Forces were transferred to Fifth Army, effective on the date of its activation; all units, however, under the Mediterranean Base Section and the new Atlantic Base Section (formerly SOS Task Force A) would remain with those commands. Initially the basic organization of Fifth Army would comprise I Armored Corps in French Morocco; II Corps in Western Al geria; and XII Air Support Command. At this time the American and British forces in North Africa still retained a certain measure of supervision over the French territory. Fifth Army was assigned French Morocco and Algeria west of a north-south line through Or leansville; within this area General Clark was responsible for all matters in volving relationships with local civil officials, including military police regu lations, air raid precautions, health and sanitation, and similar responsibilities. Fifth Army had disciplinary jurisdiction over the entire district except within areas actually occupied by troops of Twelfth Air Force, the Atlantic Base Sec tion, and the Mediterranean Base Section. The initial missions of Fifth Army were laid down by the Allied Force letter. Fifth Army was to prepare a well organized, well equipped, and mobile striking force with at least one infantry division and one armored division fully trained in amphibious operations. It was to ensure, in co-operation with French forces, the integrity of all territory of French Morocco and of Algeria within its zone, to act with French civil and military authorities in the preservation of law and order, and to assist in organizing, equipping, and training French forces. Fi nally, Fifth Army was to prepare plans for and execute special operations under directives issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force. To implement these instructions lieutenant General Mark W. Clark estab lished the Army headquarters in Oujda, Morocco, converting the buildings and grounds of a school for -young women into the nerve center of a powerful army. Here on 5 January 1943, at one minute past midnight, he activated and assumed command of Fifth Army. General Order No. 1 of Fifth Army {see Annex No. iB), dated 5 January 1943, actually created Fifth Army and

named its commander. It was followed on the same date by General Order No. 2 (see Annex No. iC), which announced the following assignments to the staff of Fifth Army: Chief of Staff Secretary, General Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, G-i Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Adjutant General Air Officer Artillery Officer Chemical Officer Civil Affairs Engineer Officer Headquarters Commandant Provost Marshal Public Relations Quartermaster vSignal Officer Surgeon Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther Maj. Ira W. Porter Lt. Col. Francis A. Markoe Col. Edwin B. Howard Brig. Gen. Arthur S. Nevins Col. Clarence Iv. Adcock Col. Cheney L. Bertholf Col. Guy H. Gale Col. Thomas E. Lewis Col. Maurice E. Barker Col. Charles E. Saltzman Col. Frank O. Bowman Lt. Col. C. Coburn Smith, Jr. Col. Charles R. Johnson Maj. Kenneth W. Clark Col. Joseph P. Sullivan Brig. Gen. Richard B. Moran Brig. Gen. Frederick A. Blesse

On 6 January 1943 General Clark dedicated his army to its tasks in the following brief words: Our duty is clear to be prepared for battle at the earliest possible moment. All else must be subordinated to that end. Every man and every officer of the Fifth Army, no matter what his job, must prepare at all times for that moment when we march into battle to destroy the enemy. This calls for peak mental and physical condition. It calls for complete devotion to duty, for long, tiring hours of work, for initiative, for resourcefulness, for staying power. Men make the army, and all of you, I know, will make this the Fifth a great army. The preceding paragraph stated the training objective for subsequent months. Initial units assigned to Fifth Army {see Annex No. iD) and those which later came under Fifth Army control were destined to undergo training well calculated to achieve the goal set forth by General Clark. These units later emerged as the great striking force which landed on the west coast of Italy on 9 September 1943.

C H A P T E R I I . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Training of Fifth Army

l\.T THE outset of its existence Fifth Army faced the prospect of undertaking operations of great difficulty and complexity. In its primary task it was committed to one of the hardest operations in modern warfare, an amphibious movement in force to land on a defended hostile shore. Aside from its routine responsibilities of controlling substantial portions of Morocco and Algeria its mission had initially been defined to be that of a mobile striking force with emphasis strongly placed on amphibious operations. Its ultimate employment in the first American landing on the mainland of Europe stemmed naturally from its careful preparation for just such a type of campaigning. Accordingly the Army very early in its career began a highly specialized program of train ing to develop the skills and to increase the mobility necessary for landing operations, building on the experience gained in the North African landing operations and grounding all the units in the complicated techniques of amphib ious movements. These require both technical proficiency and the highest sort of discipline, physical hardihood, and initiative, and General Clark saw to it that thorough training should be undertaken in order that the men he sent into forthcoming battles would be ready for the test. In addition to the training carried on within the units of Fifth Army, cer tain training centers were created to handle instruction in vital subjects and in new techniques throughout the Army, based on deficiencies observed in the Tunisian campaign and on the intended employment of Fifth Army. The of fice of the Director of Training Centers was established under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, on 18 March 1943. Brig. Gen. William H. Wilbur was des ignated as director, and as the representative of General Clark he was charged with the operation of the Fifth Army training centers. In all, eight such centers were utilized by the Army.

A.

TRAINING CENTERS

i. Invasion Training Center. To develop doctrines, technique, and in struction for invasion and to build up a reserve of trained troops for invasion operations, training of designated divisions was conducted by the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center, established on 14 January at Port aux Poules, Alge ria. Brig. Gen. John W. O'Daniel organized the center and was assisted by Rear Admiral Andrew C. Bennett, U. S. Navy, in the amphibious part of the program. Units given this training included the Tst, 3d, 34th, and 36th Infantry Divisions and the ist Armored Division, together with the staffs of several French divisions. The training consisted of individual and unit instruction of the regimental combat teams and the armored combat commands which were to be used in prospective landings, and also covered combined operations of those troops with the U. S. Navy, the Army Air Forces, and the ist Engineer Amphibian Brigade. It aimed to develop aggressive, fast-moving, hard-hitting, sustained action. All phases of landing and invasion were covered, including night attacks, infiltration, demolitions, destruction of armored vehicles and obstacles, air-ground communications, support fire and smoke, and supply, especially of operations involving sustained advances. The program prepared units for a ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore operation and gave them experience with the new landing craft. Particularly valuable was the battle inoculation given by the training at this school. Using live ammunition in all types of weapons, the course offered practice in attacking under fire conditions which approximated action. Men became accustomed to being under fire and learned to take care of themselves and to work in teams effectively. Dummy houses were constructed to provide training in street fighting, and the activities of teams were timed so closely that soldiers advanced through the covering fire of their own supporting elements in perfect, confidence. This exercise in timing produced remarkable results, and men grew battle-wise so successfully that few casualties occurred from the training with live ammunition. Similarly, pillboxes and other de fensive works were built and were used in training in the reduction of field works. Again, the course gave practical experience under actual fire, and later operations proved the soundness of the training. Some units remained at the Invasion Training Center for four months and more; one battalion of the 36th Division underwent training here from about 15 April until it embarked for the assault on the Italian mainland. This preparation gave the troops considerable experience in perfectly executed,

combined movements of a variety of military, naval, and air units, which in actual operation rarely last much over 24 hours. It might be, as one command ing officer said, that a great deal of training was being spent on an operation for 1 day out of the year and that officers and troops should not lose sight of the operations which they would be conducting for the remaining 364 days, but it must be pointed out in rebuttal that the necessary invasion lessons were soundly learned. 2. Airborne Training Center. To develop doctrines, technique, and equip ment and to provide a reserve of units prepared for airborne operations, train ing of designated units was conducted by the Fifth Army Airborne Training Center, established 14 March at Oujda, French Morocco. Col. Rosenham Beam organized and commanded the center. One squadron of transport aircraft was made available for initial training. The preparation covered individual and unit instruction of airborne and parachute troops and combined training of airborne, parachute, and transport organizations. It welded all units into an efficient, hard-hitting team, ready for day or night operations. In executing its training mission the Fifth Army Airborne Training Center was charged with the following activities: 1) Co-ordination of training schedules and procedures of airborne and
troop carrier units engaged in combined training.
2) Providing training and administrative facilities needed by airborne units
to carry out their air and ground training.
3) Development of technique and procedures for parachute, glider, and
troop carrier units.
4) Development and testing of air-ground support methods.
5) Development of air-ground communication and also drop zone locator
methods.
6) Qualification of parachutists.
7) Training of glider replacements.
8) Training of individuals and units in parachute delivery of supplies.
3. Leadership and Battle Training Center. The Fifth Army leadership and Battle Training Center was set up 9 May to train platoon leaders and non commissioned officers of the higher grades in leadership, to instruct them in battle procedures found to be effective in the Tunisian campaign, and to offer battle inoculation of all types. The program., which was designed to teach leaders how to train small units, comprised drills, physical hardening, and the tactical employment of squads and platoons. The principal effort was placed

tactical training and battle inoculation. The latter consisted of requiring personnel to advance under all types of friendly as well as hostile fire, includ ing field artillery. Iyive ammunition was used in all such instruction. Co operation of the various arms was stressed. Instruction was given in combined operations of infantry and tanks, infantry and tank destroyers, infantry and artillery. Exercises were conducted in which infantry provided fire support for units clearing a minefield. In all training major emphasis was placed on "learning by doing" with a minimum of talks and lectures. The site chosen for this center was a bivouac area three and one-half miles south of Slissen, Algeria, on the Chanzy-Magenta-Bedeau road, together with two training areas. The terrain of this area approximated in character the terrain of France and Italy, and the elevation (3000 feet) generally provided cool nights. The first personnel, including the commanding officer and three instructors, were assigned on 13 May. Between that date and 24 May addi tional officers for administrative and instructional staffs and enlisted men for the headquarters company were assigned. On the opening date 4 administra tive officers and 14 instructors were present. This number was gradually in creased to 14 administrative officers and 29 instructors. The first class, consisting of 45 officers (platoon commanders) and 44 non commissioned officers of the first three grades, was enrolled on 23 May, start ed the course of training the following day, and completed it on 21 June. The second class, consisting of 56 officers and 149 non-commissioned officers, was enrolled 15 June, began its training the following day, and was relieved 8 July. Instruction for this class was curtailed four days to permit the adop tion of a different plan of training whereby cadres from divisions, rather than individuals, were designated to take the course. For a period of three weeks cadres were given intensive instruction and upon completion of the course acted as instructors for their respective units. The cadres from the 34th and 36th Divisions, consisting of 267 officers and 147 non-commissioned officers, began training on 10 July and were released to their respective divisions on 30 July. The first two regimental combat teams arrived in the area and com menced their training on 2 August in accordance with the plan which provided for a two weeks' period for each team. Combat teams of the 34th and 36th Divisions were given training at this school. 4. Field Officers Training Center. The Fifth Army Field Officers Training Center was established at Chanzy, Algeria, on 7 April under Col. D'Alary Fechet. The purpose of the school was to provide an intensive refresher course in tactics and in utilization of terrain. It was contemplated that students would be drawn from division staff officers, battalion commanders, and battalion and
on

regimental executives. The instruction was practical and applicatory. After each course a six-day trip was made to selected battlefields where officers from the troops that had fought over the ground explained the action and comment ed on the lessons to be learned. After two courses had been completed, the center was discontinued owing to shortage of qualified students who could be spared from other duties. 5. Tank Destroyer Training Center. The Fifth Army Tank Destroyer Training Center was activated 5 May. A location for the center, with head quarters at a point approximately seven miles south of Sebdou, Algeria, was selected. The site was a high plateau (3000 feet) bordering on the bunch grass country and offered a fine variety of terrain in sparsely occupied areas. Water in the area was limited, but a mobile water unit was installed at the source of the Tafna River, six miles north of Sebdou, with an auxiliary point located at El Gor. The original staff consisted of L,t. Col. John W. Casey, Commanding; Capt. Charles F. Wilbur, Executive; Maj. John W. Dobson, S-3; Capt. Francis E. Kramer, S-2 and Co-ordinator of French Training. The headquarters detach ment, commanded by Capt. Edward I. Kaufman, together with housekeeping facilities was moved from Mascara to provide the necessary enlisted personnel. Units trained at the center included the 636th, 701st, 776th, 804th, 805th, 894th, and 899th Tank Destroyer Battalions; and the 191st, 756th, and 760th Tank Battalions. The center also undertook the training of French tank de stroyer battalions. French units attached for this purpose were the 8th, 9th, and n t h Tank Destroyer Battalions (Regiments des Chasseurs d'Afrique). 6. Engineer Training Center. The Fifth Army Engineer Training Center was activated 12 March. Iyt. Col. Aaron W. Wyatt, Jr., was designated as com manding officer. Instruction in mine warfare and demolitions commenced 21 March. The original staff and faculty included Maj. Harold E. Wetzel, Execu tive Officer; Capt. Eric J. Schellenberger, Camp Executive. British instructors were Maj. Cecil L. Stephenson, R.E., Maj. Stanbury J. Hawkins, R.E., Capt. Eric H. Yeo, R.E., Capt. Robin R. Hoskyn, R.E. For French students two French officers were attached as instructors. As originally established, courses were of seven days' duration. Many students were sent to the Tunisian front for a short period before the courses opened- Be ginning with the seventh course, however, the period was increased to nine days. Student quotas were originally set at 20 officers and 40 non-commissioned officers. Subsequent quotas were increased to 40 officers and 60 non-commis sioned officers; and finally 80 officers, 40 non-commissioned officers, and 20 French officers were allowed. In each course additional students were accepted

up to the capacity of the school by informal arrangement with unit com manders. Training schedules included all phases of mine warfare with considerable instruction in military demolition. The greatest part of the students' time was spent in practical work. Battle conditions were simulated wherever possible. The final night problem was conducted under fire, using TNT, flares, and placed charges. Armed mines were employed throughout the course. The object of the course was threefold: 1) To train officers and non-commissioned officers as unit instructors, so that they could go back to their units with sufficient knowledge, informa tion, and enthusiasm to " put it across " to the men. 2) To train officers and non-commissioned officers in the recognition, arm ing, disarming, clearance, and laying of mines and booby traps, and in practical demolitions. 3) To train officers and non-commissioned officers to help save lives and to help speed up operations by minimizing the fear of mines which is nat urally prevalent in the uninitiated. Great stress was placed on military courtesy and discipline, physical con ditioning, and alertness and cleanliness. Four engineer combat companies and one engineer armored company were attached to this center for demonstration, construction, and security. These units as well as two camouflage companies, two camouflage platoons, one bomb disposal squad, and one signal repair de tachment were trained in mine warfare, military courtesy and discipline, and other basic subjects. Up to and including the 16th class a total of 1350 officers and non-com missioned officers attended the school, of whom 1108 completed the course satisfactorily. Only those whose performance was satisfactory or higher were awarded certificates upon graduation. Of the 177 French students included in the figures above, 130 successfully completed the course. Despite the danger involved in most of the exercises there were but 27 student casualties, only 1 of which was fatal. Shortly after the activation of the center a research department was added under the direction of Capt. Robert G. Reuther. Personnel were equipped and prepared to investigate, develop, and test mechanical devices and aids related to engineer operation, particularly in connection with mine warfare. Extensive experimentation was conducted with the Scorpion, technically known as the T-3 Exploder, and resulted in valuable suggestions for impro vements.

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y. Air Observation Post Center. The Fifth Army Artillery Air Observation Post Center was activated 22 March and filled a real need. When II Corps ar rived in England in August 1942, the artillery units were lacking Air Obser vation Post Sections. Inasmuch as it was not known when the school at Fort Sill would be able to supply an adequate number of pilots and mechanics, the Corps Commander (General Clark) directed the establishment of The II Corps Air Observation Post School, to be commanded by Iyt. Col. John D. Salmon, with a small group of trained personnel from Fort Sill acting as instructors. A cricket field near Andover served admirably for training, and the buoyant English air began " lifting " cubs that were then untried but later were defi nitely proved in combat. Upon arrival in North Africa the school was placed under the direction of Fifth Army and continued under lieutenant Colonel Salmon at Sidi Bel Abbes, from which the first graduates were immediately sent to the Tunisian front. On 1 March 1943 the school moved to the friendly and fascinating town of Mascara, where the municipal airfield was given over com pletely to the Americans. By late March pilots and mechanics in sufficient numbers were arriving from the United States. The school then became a center and served to speed the movement of personnel and supplies to the fast-climaxing Battle of Africa. The center closed on 1 June. 8. French Training Section. On 23 April Fifth Army started its French Training Section. The section was not formally activated and so designated until 16 May, with Brig. Gen. Allen F. Kingman as its chief. The duties of the section were clearly defined, namely to teach and train French personnel in the technical handling of American equipment (less 3d and 4th echelon main tenance). To each of the five French divisions an American officer was assigned to act as adviser to the division commander and as a channel of communication between Fifth Army and the individual divisions. In carrying out its program the French Training Section secured technical training assistance for the divi sions, conducted formal inspections of the units of the divisions, and co-ordi nated the movements of French units with Fifth Army Headquarters. Original divisions (as of April 1943) of the new French Army were: 1) 1st Armored Division (iere Division Blindee), Rabat, Morocco: Brig adier General du Vigier, Commanding. 2) 2d Armored Division (2e Division Blindee), Rabat, Morocco: Brig adier General de Vernejoul, Commanding. (Inactivated July 1943 and reac tivated the same month as the 5th Armored Division.) 3) 3d Moroccan Infantry Division (3e Division dlnfanterie Marocaine), Casablanca, Morocco : Major General Martin, Commanding. (Reorganized in June 1943 as the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division.)

II

4) 2d Moroccan Infantry Division (2e Division d'Infanterie Marocaine), Meknes, Morocco: Major General Dody, Commanding. 5) 3d Algerian Infantry Division (3e Division d'Infanterie Algerienne), Constantine, Algeria: Major General de Monsabert, Commanding. Assigned to duty with General Kingman were the following officers: Iyt. Col. John D. Salmon, Executive, French Training Section; Iyt. Col. Robert W. Burke, Adviser, 5th Armored Division; I,t. Col. Robert Shaw, Adviser, 3d Algerian Infantry Division; Iyt. Col. Roy A. Stephens, Adviser, 2d Moroccan Infantry Division; Maj. A. W. Green, Adviser, 4th Moroccan Mountain Divi sion; Capt. J. G. Paterson, Assistant to Executive, French Training Section; and 1st Lt. D. H. K. Flagg. During the month of June the French Training Section received a detachment of 15 officers and 150 men, who had been on duty in the Middle East instructing British units equipped with American ma teriel. Upon assignment to Fifth Army its personnel was promptly sent as in structors to the various French units.

B.

COMPLETION OF

TRAINING

Fifth Army Headquarters moved from Oujda to Mostagenem, Algeria, during the latter part of July. This movement over a distance of some 480 miles was made by echelon, the forward echelon using motor and the rear echelon moving by rail. Here, near the Fifth Arnry Invasion Training Center at Arzew, General Clark minutely checked the training of his troops prior to the invasion of Italy and completed his staff for the operation. At the time of embarkation this staff was as follows: Chief of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff Secretary, General Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, Antiaircraft Officer Adjutant General Artillery Officer Chaplain Chemical Officer Engineer Officer Finance Officer Inspector General Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther Col. Charles E. Saltzman Iyt. Col. Ira W. Porter G-i . . . . Col. Cheney L. Bertholf G-2 . . . . Col. Edwin B. Howard G-3 . . . . Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann G-4 . . . . Col. Ralph H. Tate Col. Joseph S. Robinson Col. Melville F. Grant Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Lewis Lt. Col. Patrick J. Ryan Col. Maurice E. Barker Col. Frank O. Bowman Col. Clarence B. Ivindner Col. Irving C. Avery

12

Judge Advocate Ordnance Officer Quartermaster Signal Officer Surgeon

Col. Claude M. Mickelwait Col. Urban Niblo Col. Joseph P. Sullivan Brig. Gen. Richard B. Moran Col. Joseph I. Martin

The training of Fifth Army ended with an examination in the form of practice landing operations, carried out by the 36th Division under Maj. Gen. Fred Iy. Walker in the area between Porte aux Poules and Arzew. The 45th Infantry Division in Sicily and the British 10 Corps, which were to be part of Fifth Army in its first combat operations, had also conducted practice landings. The areas had been especially selected to duplicate or at least to approximate those to be found at Salerno. The example of the 36th Division may be cited. Its ships had been loaded, and everything except the last-minute touches had been given; the troops were embarked on their respective vessels, and the convoy put out to sea, soon to assemble for the dry run, Operation Cowpuncher. The same plans and orders for the invasion were used, wherever practicable, with a simple substitution of geographical names. During the night 26-27 August the practice operation was conducted against troops of the 34th Division, who had wired the beaches and manned the defenses. The assault troops came ashore in small craft, and a portion of all types of weapons and vehicles were landed. This rehearsal brought out a few changes in manner of loading and unloading, but above all it gave officers and men a feeling of confidence in their ability to carry out the task confronting them.

C H A P T E R III Planning for Invasion

A.

EARLY

PLANNING

I N addition to providing a well organized, well equipped, and mobile striking


force, fully trained in amphibious operations, General Clark was charged with
the preparation of plans for and the execution of special operations under di rectives issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force. The first mission
given Fifth Army was announced prior to its activation. On 24 December 1942
Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower notified the Commanding Generals
of Twelfth Air Force, the Center Task Force, the Western Task Force, and the
Northern Task Force that Fifth Army would be activated at an early date with
General Clark commanding and that these forces would come under his command
F m t h e preparation of plans for the occupation of Spanish Morocco in event of Spanish hostility or if Spain should fail to resist German invasion. The plan provided for the Center Task Force from the southern Mediter ranean coast to launch an overland operation to capture Melilla, the Western
Task Force to conduct an overland operation from the Port Iyyautey area to
capture Tangier, and the Northern Task Force by an amphibious operation to
occupy the International Zone which bordered the Strait of Gibraltar on the
south. This operation was known as Backbone II. Backbone I was the name which
had been given to an operation having the same objective, planned prior to
the Allied landings in North Africa on 8 November 1942. The limited forces
available for the carrying out of Backbone II were a matter of much concern
to General Clark during the first part of 1943. The situation was much relieved
after the visit of General Orgaz to Fifth Army Headquarters in Oujda early
in June, where parades and demonstrations involving the use of paratroopers
I and air force units were staged. """From the middle of June 1943 the Fifth Army planning staff, working under the direction of the Army G-3, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Donald W. Brann,

15
UL MODIH NtBUNi !6 AUTHORIZED
Authority

was busy on several projects for the invasion of Axis territory in Europe. In all, the staff planned five operations, one against vSardinia (Brimstone), and the rest against various parts of the Italian mainland (Barracuda, Gangway, Musket, and Avalanche). {See Map No. i.) The last plan, Avalanche, was fi nally put into operation as a full-scale invasion of the Italian mainland from the Gulf of Salerno. The work of the planning staff can best be considered in relation to the strategy for the Mediterranean and along with the planning of the British 5 Corps, 10 Corps, and Eighth Army. When Operation Husky against Sicily was about to be launched, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, to prepare plans for the next mission which was to eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German forces. In view of the military resources that might be available after the Sicilian campaign the alternatives at the end of June 1943 appeared to be either an amphibious attack on one of several places on the Italian mainland or an operation against the island of Sardinia. The alternatives were based on the assumption that Husky would be successful, but that Italian resistance elsewhere had not col lapsed. It seemed reasonable to assume that Italian morale might be so low that Axis resistance would be less effective and less able to withstand prolonged attack than before Husky. If that proved to be the case at the end of our Sicilian operation, the Commander-in-Chief stated that he would recommend an assault of the Italian mainland with six divisions. If his appreciation were that this attack could not occupy the heel of the peninsula or exploit as far as Naples, he would then recommend Operation Brimstone, the assault on Sardinia. As far back as the Anfa (Casablanca) conference between President Roose velt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Allied military leaders in January 1943, Sardinia had been considered a possible objective of our first European operation instead of Sicily. The capture of Sardinia would deprive the enemy of airfields for attacking Mediterranean shipping, would give us bases for air attacks on the continent, and would furnish a steppingstone for future operations against Italy or southern France. Although the decision was to attack Sicily first, Sar dinia remained under consideration as a later objective. On 10 June 1943 the Commander-in-Chief directed the Commanding Gen eral of Fifth Army to prepare plans for the Sardinian operation. A second directive from Allied Force Headquarters on 17 June 1943 instructed General Clark to take responsibility for making contact with the staffs of Commander in-Chief Mediterranean (Naval) and of Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and informed him that he was to retain his existing commitments in Northwest Africa. Much of the detailed planning for Brimstone was to be carried out in

16

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the Fifth Army area, while a specialized planning staff from Fifth Army in Bou zerrea, near Algiers, co-ordinated the other services and dealt with the larger aspects. So long as the Sardinian invasion remained under consideration, the planning for Brimstone lay entirely in the hands of Fifth Army. Further plans drawn up by Fifth Army included Operation Musket, a pro posed landing on the heel of Italy near Taranto; Barracuda, which contem plated landing a small force on a week's notice near Naples to advance on that city; Gangway, a plan to sail directly into the Bay of Naples. The landings near Naples were expected to encounter slight resistance because of increasing indications of Italian weakness. The planning staffs of the British components were also engaged in planning three operations: Baytown, an assault on Reggio di Calabria across the Straits of Messina by Eighth Army; and Buttress and Goblet, operations of 10 Corps and 5 Corps directed against the toe and instep of Italy respectively. The possibility of putting these Allied plans into action was delimited on 29 June 1943 when General Eisenhower cabled (NAF 256) the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he considered it impossible to mount the Taranto operation by Fifth Army (Musket) that year and that he was arranging for the planning of three possible actions in order to take advantage of any opportunity which might suddenly arise as the situation developed. These three were: (1) landings on the toe (Buttress) and instep (Goblet); (2) landing on the toe followed by a rapid overland exploitation to the heel, Naples, and Rome, and the reinfor cement by sea of three divisions into Naples; (3) the Sardinian attack, both on a full and on a modified scale. On 17 July 1943 the Combined Chiefs accepted for planning purposes Gen eral Eisenhower's strategical concept outlined above (FAN 16$) and expressed their interest " i n the possibilities of a direct amphibious landing operation against Naples in lieu of an attack on Sardinia, the indications regarding Italian resistance should make the risks involved worth while. " Three days later Gen eral Eisenhower cabled General Clark (Freedom, outgoing No. 2747) to cease planning on Brimstone. This decision was dictated by the collapse of the Axis forces in Sicily and by the expectation that Italy could be eliminated from the war by rapid and continued attacks on the mainland. The consequent shift of interest from Sardinia to the Naples area eventually resulted in the planning of Avalanche by Fifth Army against Naples and the airfields nearby. On 26 July the Combined Chiefs cabled General Eisenhower (FAN J75), urging that he plan at once for Avalanche. On the same date the meetings of the Commanders in-Chief at Tunis had determined to rush preparations for Avalanche if it could possibly be carried through.

B.

PLANNING FOR AVALANCHE

i. General Planning. To meet the new demands Allied Force Headquarters issued a letter directive to the Commanding General of Fifth Army on 27 July 1943, instructing him to develop plans for seizing the port of Naples and se curing the airfields nearby, " with a view to preparing a firm base for further offensive operations. " In later paragraphs this letter of 27 July directed that the target date for the operation should be 7 September and called for a brief outline plan to be submitted by 7 August. The directive specified that joint commanders for navy and air should be appointed by the chiefs of those ser vices in the Mediterranean and that the Commanding General of Fifth Army should co-ordinate his plan with the joint commanders. Rear Admiral J. I,. Hall, Jr., (U.vS.) and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder (Br.) were later named to the positions in question. This divided authority placed General Clark at a disadvantage in the planning stage, but the naval and air forces co-operated effectively with Fifth Army during the subsequent invasion. The planning and mounting of Avalanche were to be carried out under the direction of Allied Force Headquarters. The execution of the operation, how ever, was to be under command of 15th Army Group, the group headquarters command which had been set up under General Sir Harold R. L. Alexander to co-ordinate the operations of Seventh and Eighth Armies in Sicily. 15th Army Group was to continue in the chain of command under Allied Force Headquar ters, since at this time the projected operations in Italy promised to involve the American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army, or in lieu thereof 5 Corps, 10 Corps, or 13 Corps. The ground forces made available to General Clark for Operation Avalanche were the troops allotted for the Sardinian assault plus the British 10 Corps, then assigned to the landing on the Italian toe (Buttress). Initially they comprised the following units: VI Corps 34th Division 36th Division ist Armored Division 82d Airborne Division 10 46 56 7 1 Corps Division Division Armoured Division Airborne Division

American

British

At the time the directive was issued, it was stated that the employment of air borne troops would depend on the available lift, and the plans for this portion

18

of the force were changed several times as facilities came to hand. Sufficient naval and air forces were to be provided by the respective commanders from resources in the Mediterranean Theater. In the original directive there was an unusual and prophetic paragraph to the effect that a sudden change in the situation might permit an earlier descent on the Italian mainland than had been envisaged in Avalanche and hence that Fifth Army should be prepared to send one division on very short notice. The division was to sail on seven da}'s' warning direct to Naples and to hold that port for the reception of further forces and supplies. The directive also stated that the 82d Airborne Division would be available to aid this operation as far as air transportation would permit. This provision indicates the influence of the secret knowledge of political developments in Italy, developments which were to come to a head fast in the next few weeks. At the time of the Allied Force Headquarters directive to plan for Avalanche, 10 Corps was already well along with its plans for Buttress. The Commander in-Chief cabled General Clark on 27 July that the only solution to the time factor in the problems of shipping, mounting, and equipping the forces for Buttress and Avalanche was to have 10 Corps prepare for both operations as alternatives and devise loading plans common to both. If Avalanche were launched before Buttress, the 10 Corps loading scheme for Buttress would be fitted into Ava lanche. Shipping was limited, particularly landing craft; since the Sicilian attack, which had begun on 10 July, was going on and required considerable tonnage, the available craft had to be spread with great care. The 10 Corps plan for But tress called for the use of all available IyST's. From the beginning General Clark opposed this plan, which would not provide a sufficient amount of suitable landing craft for the 36th Division, se lected to lead the VI Corps assault. He considered it necessary to have some of the 36th Division Artillery, attached tank and tank destroyer units, and some engineers carried in LST's. As a result of General Clark's insistence three IyST's were promised. This number was increased from time to time as more craft became available, thus resulting in revised loading plans with each increase. Ultimately 15 I^ST's were allotted for the 36th Division and attached troops. At the very last date the 179th Regimental Combat Team from the 45th Division was added to be a floating reserve, and additional craft were fi nally secured to lift that force from Sicily. Even after these arrangements had been completed two battalions of the 157th Infantry were inserted in the troop list and were brought in the X) Day convoy. The target date had been set on the basis of two factors: the phase of the moon, and the availability of landing craft. Since the landing craft had already

been used in Sicily, some time was required to repair the ravages of action and to make them serviceable. The following table shows the moon stages (1) : rise *5O5 1605 17 0 1 set 7 0100 200
000

8 September (first quarter) 9 September 10 September

Furthermore, General Clark was eager to set the date as early as possible to avoid the gales and deterioration of the weather normal to October. D Day was finally fixed for 9 September. A major question was the site for the Avalanche landings. The possibil ities were the Gulf of Salerno area south of Naples and the coast of the Gulf of Gaeta north of Naples. The latter region offered two beach strips, one north and the other south of the Volturno River. The Allied Force Headquarters directive specified the Salerno area for several reasons, chief among them being that it lay within the range of air support from bases in Sicily. Beach study by G-2 indicated that the character of the beaches was better at Salerno than north of Naples. On the coast of the Gulf of Gaeta more small streams flow into the sea; at their mouths a shelf is built up and much more shoal results offshore. The advantages of better fighter cover and of more favorable beach conditions at Salerno were offset by the fact that the terrain and the tactical situation favored the Gaeta region. In contrast to the broad Campanian Plain with its flat expanse and numerous roads to the north of Naples, the shallower and nar rower plain south of Salerno is ringed and dominated by a great mountain mass providing observation and commanding positions for the enemy. Another ar gument for landing in the Gaeta area was the tactical consideration that a foot hold there would cut Naples off from the German forces in central and northern Italy. These considerations led the enemy to expect us to land in the Gaeta region. The Germans had mined the beach there more heavily than at Salerno. In fact, after the Avalanche landings had taken place, they left elements of two divisions on the coast either side of the Volturno for three days in the expec tation that we would also land in that district. When General Clark received the directive to plan for Avalanche and began to study the approaches to Naples, he examined the landing possibilities and was impressed with the area north of Naples. The longer he studied the terrain
(x) Standard Army time was B Time, two hours ahead of Greenwich Standard Time (Z). At 0200, 25 September 1943, the time was shifted to A Time, one hour ahead of Z Time.

20

and the situation, the more convinced he grew that the area of the Gaeta coast, especially the beach strip south of the Volturno, was preferable to the Salerno region. He saw the advantage of the absence of mountains north of Naples and the opportunity to drop'airborne troops on his left along the Volturno and thus block the access roads from the north, down which German reinforcements would have to come. Following an air drop he could get his infantry in touch with the airborne division very early and reunite his forces. So strong was General Clark's con viction that the landing should be north of Naples and that it could be sup ported adequately by air strength that he flew to Algiers twice to discuss the problem. He forcibly presented the case for a landing south of the Volturno and found all factors favorable except for firm assurances from the air officers that they could furnish air cover that far from the Sicilian airfields. Air Marshal Tedder was away, and none of the staff of the Air Commander-in-Chief Medi terranean would make an official commitment on the possibility of air cover north of Naples, though unofficially they held it feasible. When General Clark did reach Air Marshal Tedder, the latter returned a negative to the question, so the site north of Naples was abandoned. Another consideration bearing on the location of the landings was the de sire of General Montgomery to have Avalanche farther south than Salerno so as to secure support for the attack of Eighth Army up the Italian toe. Since there was slight opposition to the Eighth Army advance from Calabria, no ad vantage would have been gained by shifting the invasion beaches of Fifth Army to the south. The Gulf of Salerno remained the landing site, and consequently the plans were drawn for that area. ^Deception and cover plans received attention early. By the first week of August, when Buttress and Baytown were both being planned, deception plans were prepared to reduce to a minimum the initial opposition to those assaults. These plans had to avoid compromising Avalanche, for it was expected then that the latter would follow either Buttress or Baytown or both. Cover plans were devised for Sardinia and Corsica and served for Avalanche. TRe planning staff at Allied Force Headquarters on 24 August considered the need for an alternative plan for Avalanche to meet unforeseen contingencies and to provide another objective for Fifth Army if Avalanche should prove impracticable. In view of the proximity of D Day for Avalanche, the time ele ment offered difficulties. It was suggested that Fifth Army substitute a direct attack on the heel of Italy for Avalanche, but in order to meet Avalanche target date that plan would entail advancing the sailing date from Oran and Bizerte by one and one-half days. It would also present the problem of completing and

21

issuing maps for the new area and require the preparation and dissemination of new orders to troops spread over North Africa from Oran to Tripoli and from North Africa to Sicily. After careful consideration of all factors the planning staff decided that the alternative operation could not be launched on Avalanche D Day but that it could be set up on 21 September, 12 days later. It therefore recommended the alternative plan for that date. The latter target date would not allow much time but would still have a margin adequate for satisfactory progress before October weather conditions could be expected to interfere with air operations in support. While the Fifth Army planning for Avalanche was going forward, the Com manders-in-Chief at a meeting on 16 August had come to a series of decisions on the future action. Now it was definitely fixed that the invasion by Eighth Army should take place as early as possible. The Sicilian campaign was success fully concluded on 17 August, and Eighth Army forces could be used as planned to launch Baytown from Messina. (See Map No. 2.) The date for the attack was to be decided by the Commanding General of 15th Army Group. The Eighth Army bridgehead in Calabria would use only troops and resources already in Sicily. But the danger had been foreseen that we might be led into penning up a large body of men in the toe of Italy where the enemy could easily contain us. Such a contingency would have the further ill effect of tying up landing craft for supplying our forces over the beaches in Calabria and keeping them from availability for Avalanche. Since Naples was the main objective, Baytown was set up for not over three divisions or at most three divisions and one ar mored brigade. At the same meeting it was determined that of the other possible opera tions Avalanche should be the one next undertaken. The target date approved for 9 September might be postponed for not more than 48 hours if necessary, landing craft for the two operations were to be set aside in accordance with orders to be issued by the Commander-in-Chief. Fifth Army came under com mand of 15th Army Group, and General Alexander's Headquarters assumed command of the two operations in Italy. Planning for the attack on the instep (Goblet) was to proceed to completion as far as practicable, and when it was finished 5 Corps was to revert to Allied Force reserve. At this time, in mid-August, another factor arose to influence the main lines of strategy for the United Nations. On 18 August General Eisenhower received a cable (FAN ig6) from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, then at the Quad rant meeting of the President and Prime Minister at Quebec. The cable di rected the Commander-in-Chief to send two staff officers, one American and one British, to Lisbon to report to the British Ambassador for the purpose of

22

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negotiating with Italian representatives who were seeking an armistice. For several weeks the progress of these negotiations affected our forthcoming oper ations. If the armistice were accepted, the prospects of success for Avalanche would be greater, but no one could predict what result the removal of Italian forces would have on German resistance in the peninsula. While our negotia tions were going on, General Clark drew up a list of items to secure from the armistice. Chief among them was the demand that the Italians continue to man the coastal defenses and not turn them over to the Germans, a condition the Italians were unable to fulfill because of German pressure. Once signed, the armistice was not to be announced to the world until we should give out the news. The timing of this announcement was important to Avalanche. 2. Plans for Airborne Support. The complexity and the difficulty of plan ning operations of such magnitude as a large landing in force on a defended coast are nowhere more clearly shown than in the employment of the airborne component of the assault. The original Allied Force Headquarters directive of 27 July allotted two airborne divisions to Fifth Army, the British 1 Airborne Division and the 82d Airborne Division (U.S.). General Clark conferred with the commanding generals of these two divisions at Mostagenem on their uti lization. It was his desire to drop one division on the southern edge of the Naples plain, north of Vietri sul Mare (Vietri) and southeast of Mount Vesuvius. This force could control the northern mouths of the passes across the Sorrento Ridge and thus prevent the two German panzer (armored) divisions in the Naples area from crossing to oppose us in the plain of Salerno. Neither of the airborne division commanders nor the troop carrier com mander would approve of trying a drop on that zone, since they would only make the dropping run from the sea and could expect the heaviest of flak and the obstacle of the mountains at the end of their run. Since General Clark was unable to convince the air commanders that the run could be made in the opposite direction, this airborne objective had to be abandoned. Accordingly the Ranger Force had to be sent up from Maiori to take the Sorrento Ridge and had to be maintained there with great difficulty. Later the British 1 Airborne Division was taken away from the Fifth Army troop allotment, placed initially in Army reserve, and finally removed entirely. General Clark then decided to drop a task force of the 82d Airborne Division in the Volturno Valley to destroy the bridges over the river from Triflisco to the sea and to prevent the moving of German forces from the north. The airborne troops were to delay enemy forces crossing the Volturno and were to concen trate at Capua, thence withdrawing southeast along the high ground to rejoin elements of Fifth Army. The chances were good for an early junction of the

paratroopers with the landing force. At one stage of the planning it was pro posed to handle the resupply of this task force through nightly drops while it was separated from the infantry, using bombers for the purpose if the enemy defenses in the area were, still heavy. On 30 August General Clark cabled the commander of the Western Naval Task Force to limit antiaircraft fire in the area where the airborne elements were to operate to a range of not over 500 yards inland from the beaches. The next alteration in the airborne plan came on 1 September, when it was decided to reduce the 82d Airborne Division force from a strongly reinforced regimental combat team to a regimental combat team less one battalion. (See Annex No. 2C.) The reason for this reduction was the apparent impossibility of maintaining resupply for the larger force from the air. With the force reduced by one battalion, a greater quantity of supplies could be carried in the initial drop. The mission for the reduced force, which was to drop by parachute and glider on the night of D minus 1 to D Day, was to seize and destroy the Capua bridge over the Volturno and then to retire southeast as previously planned. One reinforced regimental combat team of the 82d Airborne Division was placed in the Army floating reserve; the balance of the division was to come by sea from Sicily with the follow-up troops. Shortly before Fifth Army left Africa, General Clark attended a conference with the Commander-in-Chief in Sicily. The negotiations for the armistice with Italy were in their final stages, and an Italian general was present. The latter urged that we make an air drop on Rome to secure the airfields, for Marshal Badoglio was insisting that an Allied force be placed in Rome to protect the government against German troops near the capital. Accordingly, when it was decided at the conference to carry out an airborne operation in Rome at the time of Avalanche, the 82d Airborne Division was taken from the Fifth Army striking force on 3 September, although it was to remain under command of General Clark. To provide for this new plan the Volturno airborne operation had to be sacrificed. This loss was a serious handicap to the carrying out of the plans of the Army Commander. That the employment of the division as orig inally scheduled would have been operationally valuable is indicated by the fact that parts of three German divisions crossed the Volturno and marched down unopposed to throw their weight against Fifth Army.

24

OUTLINE PLAN FOR AVALANCHE

i. The Army Plan. After weeks of work at high pressure and in closest secrecy the Fifth Army planning staff completed its Outline Plan for Avalanche. A large volume of material had been assembled, evaluated, and co-ordinated with the various services and staff departments. All the strategic information on terrain, military resources and dispositions, economic potential and pro duction centers, enemy defenses and strength, beaches, physiographic and geo detic detail, weather, medical history, and disease prevalence had been com piled and studied. The vital and complicated matters of supply had been worked out and consolidated in an annex to the Outline Plan. The Avalanche Oper ations Plan with eight annexes (G-2 Intelligence Plan, Troop Iyist, Allocation of Shipping, G-4 Supply Plan, G-i Administrative Plan, Signal Plan, Antiair craft Artillery Plan, Harbor Defense Plan) was published on 15 August. A cor rected version of the Outline Plan was issued on 26 August to meet changes in the strategic situation. The Outline Plan, as revised, assumed that Italian resistance would be approximately that encountered in Operation Husky and that Germany's com mitments in Russia would continue to hold the bulk of her ground and air forces on the Russian front. It further assumed that Operation Baytown would be mounted. The plan envisaged an assault by two corps and follow-up troops to form an invading army of 125,000 against enemy forces estimated at 39,000 on D Day with a probable increase to over 100,000 by D plus 3. The mission of Fifth Army was to seize the port of Naples and to secure the airfields nearby with a view to preparing a firm base for further offensive operations. To carry out this mission General Clark planned to employ the British 10 Corps and the American VI Corps in simultaneous assaults on the beaches south of Salerno. Troops assigned to 10 Corps, commanded by I^t. Gen. Sir Richard I/. McCreery, included the British 46 and 56 Infantry Divisions, the 7 Armoured Division, the 2 and 41 Commandos, and the American 1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions. VI Corps under Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Dawley had the American 36th Division (reinforced). Various supporting troops were assigned to each of the two corps. The Outline Plan also provided for an Army floating reserve divided be tween two forces. Force I, commanded by Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, con sisted of one reinforced regimental combat team of the 45th Division (U.S.) with the mission of embarking from Sicily prepared to land on D Day over any of the previously assaulted beaches. Force II, under Maj. Gen. Matthew B.

Ridgway, had one reinforced regimental combat team of the 826. Airborne Di vision (U.S.), which was " to be prepared to land with light equipment on beaches which have not been previously established. " The changes in the mission of this division have already been noted; during the first days of the Salerno oper ation the 82d Airborne Division remained idle. When it was returned to the control of Fifth Army, the division could only be employed in a drop behind a protected beachhead in support of VI Corps, where reinforcements were badly needed to hold our line. Follow-up troops included the balance of the 45th Division, the 34th Di vision, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, the 1st or 26. Armored Division, one American tank battalion (medium), and the 3d Division, together with many supporting troops. The maintenance for both corps was to be primarily over the beaches until the port of Naples became available, although 10 Corps might count on a small amount of supply through the port of Salerno. 2. Naval and Air Support Plans. The naval plan, entitled Western Naval Task Force Operation Plan No. 7-43 (short title " Avon/Wi "), had appeared on 14 August. It laid down the organization and missions of the Control Force, the Southern Task Force, the Northern Task Force, and the Support Carrier Force. Appended were lengthy annexes containing detailed strategic and theater information. Naval support fire was to be available on call from sub-task force commanders. A special naval force, set up by the Western Naval Task Force and placed under the command of Captain Charles Andrews, U. S. Navy, had the mission of making a feint against the beaches northwest of Naples to divert enemy forces to the coast above Naples and away from the main assaults. The air plan, published on 18 August, laid out air activity for the following periods: up to D minus 7, D minus 7 to D minus 1, night of D minus 1 to D Day, D Day. Operations subsequent to D Day would depend on the situation. Mis sions were prepared for protection of the assault convoy and the landing area, fighter cover, ground support, tactical bombing, air-sea rescue, troop carrier flights, and other purposes. In particular, ground support would be secured by prearranged strategic missions and by tactical missions either prearranged or on call. The teamwork displayed in integrating so varied activities of army, navy, and air force was of high order, and the degree of secrecy maintained was remarkable. 3. The Invasion Beaches. (See Map No. 3.) The final beaches, which all lay south of the town of Salerno, were by no means ideal for an amphibious operation. The arc of mountains enclosing the plain of Salerno was too far from the beaches for the assaulting troops to reach before daylight. Kven after a successful landing the Allied forces would have to defend an open plain under

26

TROOP ASSEMBLY* AREA

-L
SYMBOLS

MAP N? 3

VI CORPS BEACHES PAESTUM


BEACHES AS PLANNED SIGNAL I I I I | BEACHES AS ESTABLISHED EXIT ROADS AS CONSTRUCTED SCALE YAROS 500 1000

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46 SURVEY COY S A EC. FOR ENGR H.Q. FIFTH ARMY

possible constant enemy observation and artillery fire. Yet certain favorable characteristics made the selection advisable. The offshore gradient permitted transports to come close to shore; the strip of sand between the water and the dune line was fairly narrow and made the construction of exit routes relatively easy; the low dunes themselves offered no serious obstacles to bulldozers; and the existing road net lay close to the beaches. Finally, the terrain immediately behind the beaches was suitable for the dispersion of dumps. With the exception of the narrow beaches at Maiori and Vietri, where the Rangers and Commandos were to land, all 10 Corps would come ashore at beaches between Picentino Creek and the Sele River. Initially the landings were to take place on three principal beaches. Red Beach extended from the mouth of the Picentino south for one and one-half miles to the Asa. Green Beach began at the mouth of Tusciano Creek and extended south for one and one-quarter miles. A gap of more than a mile lay between Green Beach and White Beach to the south. These beach areas lie five to nine miles southeast of Salerno. In the VI Corps area four landing beaches, situated between II Fiumarello and Solofrone Creek and just west of the ancient village of Paestum, had been designated. The beaches were named Red, Green, Yellow, and Blue, and when in operation were identified and delimited by their colored lights and panels. Previous photo reconnaissance had provided accurate information on the beaches. German defenses of the immediate landing areas were not especially well organized. Some minefields were laid along the beaches, barbed-wire obstacles were erected, numerous machine guns were sited to cover the most likely landing spots, and a few artillery pieces were emplaced inland. The Germans appar ently put considerable faith in the ability of tanks, roving behind the beaches, to throw a landing operation into confusion. Furthermore, with unexcelled observation posts on such terrain features as Mount Soprano, the enemy could direct artillery fire upon the plain, the beaches, and landing craft beyond. An Italian-laid minefield in the Gulf of Salerno prevented convoys from approaching close to the shore and would be a hazard to the landing craft. 4. Landing Plans. (See Map No. ^.)VI Corps and 10 Corps were to make simultaneous landings, with the first waves hitting the beaches at H Hour, set at 0330, 9 September. 10 Corps on the left was to deliver the Fifth Army main aisSdTwith the mission of capturing Naples. Immediate objectives were the port of Salerno, the Montecorvino Airfield, the important rail and highway center of Battipaglia, and Ponte Sele on Highway 19 over the Sele River. The 10 Corps zone extended nearly 25 miles from Maiori around the coast to the mouth of the Sele River. The left flank was entrusted to three battalions of Rangers and two battalions of Commandos, all. under I,t. Col. William O. Darby. The

Rangers were to land at Maiori and advance north to seize the Mount di Chiunzi Pass and the broad Nocera-Pagani Pass between Salerno and Naples. The Com mandos were to land at Vietri, turn east along the coastal road, and occupy Salerno. Meanwhile the bulk of 10 Corps would land on the three beaches south of Picentino Creek, with the 56 Division under Maj. Gen. G. W. R. Templer on the right and the 46 Division under Maj. Gen. J. I,. I. Hawkesworth taking over the center of the Corps zone. A gap of more than ten miles lay between the 56 Division and the beaches of VI Corps to the south. This gap would be closed as the two corps moved inland, and the junction of forces was planned to take place at Ponte Sele. VI Corps was to make the assault with the 36th Division (reinforced). Two regimental combat teams were to land at H Hour, advance to the railroad, reor ganize, and move on to their objectives. On the left the objective of the I42d Regimental Combat Team was the high ground running in an arc from Ponte Sele through Altavilla Silentina (Altavilla), Albanella, and Rocca d'Aspide to Mount Vesole and Magliano. On the right the 141st Regimental Combat Team was to maintain contact with the I42d Infantry at Mount Vesole and Magliano and occupy key points in the mountain arc to Agropoli at the southern end of the Gulf of Salerno.

D.

GERMAN

FORCES IN

ITALY

See Map No. 2

To counter the Fifth Army invasion the enemy could count on eight di visions. Two of these were in or north of Rome, two others were in the vicinity of Naples, and the other four were south of Naples. Most of the divisions had incurred heavy losses in personnel and especially in equipment in Sicily. On 8 September the 16th Panzer Division was in the Bboli-Battipaglia area, where it had moved some ten days previously from the southeast coast of Italy near Bari. At that time it had taken over some of the Italian beach defenses; it occupied the rest on the news of the Italian armistice. In general the 16th Panzer Engineer Battalion held the Sorrento Peninsula; the 64th Pan zer Grenadier (Armored Infantry) Regiment, the area from Salerno to the Sele; and the 79th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the sector from the Sele River to Agropoli. The 2d Panzer Regiment at Battipaglia was in position to strike either west or south. Despite rumors on 8 September of a movement of half

28

of the 64th Panzer Grenadier Regiment north to Capua, the 16th Panzer Di vision was still defending the Salerno beaches on D Day. The Hermann Goering Panzer Division was apparently dispersed in the plain of Naples from Caserta south, and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was probably northwest of this force, generally in the Gaeta area. Both units had been reorganizing after their losses in Sicily. The 2d Parachute Division garrisoned the vicinity of Rome from the Alban hills on the south to the rail junction of Viterbo on the north; the movement of this division into the Rome area had been the chief factor deterring the proposed drop of the 82d Airborne Division at Rome immediately after the announcement of the Italian armistice. Some elements of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division were at Frascati south of Rome, probably to guard the headquarters of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commanding the German forces in central and southern Italy, but most of this division was apparently well north of Rome as far as Orvieto. Three enemy divisions remain to be considered. One of these, the 1st Par achute Division, held the Adriatic coast with part of its strength south of Bari. The other two, generally speaking, were in Calabria, but only to a minor extent in direct contact with Bighth Army. The 26th Panzer Division was located half way up the toe at the end of August. Headquarters and some troops of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division were at Potenza, but Eighth Army met part of its 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment not far from Reggio on 4 September. It does not appear that any major shifts were being made at the moment when the enemy learned of the approach of Fifth Army to the Gulf of Salerno. Warning orders were undoubtedly transmitted on 8 September to all units, but actual execution of these orders did not follow until after our landing early on the morning of the 9th. Then German motors began to roar, and column upon column swung out onto the roads of southern Italy, driving rapidly north toward the plain of Salerno. Meanwhile the 16th Panzer Division had received warning of what lay ahead. On 8 September the Chief of Staff, Italian XIX Corps, informed Headquarters, Port Defense, at Salerno: " From 2330/7 hrs inst. this zone is declared to be in < coastal alarm ' following departure of enemy convoy from Sicily heading for Salerno. " At 1600, 8 September, the 16th Panzer Division was informed that 36 ships escorted by destroyers had been sighted 25 miles south of Capri, and put into operation the second alarm phase " ready for battle. "

29

E.

APPROACHING

HOUR

Fifth Army likewise was " ready for battle. " Its long period, of training and its careful planning for invasion were about to be tested. Field Order No. i, dated 25 August 1943 (see Annex No. 2B)', put the Outline Han for Avalanche into operation. By 5 September convoys were loaded at many North African ports and the bulk of Fifth Army was aboard ship. On that day the ships cast off from Oran and Mers-el-Kebir, the most distant of the embarkation centers. Moving precisely on skillfully planned schedules, the hundreds of craft bearing the forces for Avalanche converged on the Gulf of Salerno by the evening of 8 September. At 1830 the ship radios picked up the voice of General BisenhQw er: "Hostilities between the United Nations and Italy have terminated, ef fective at once. " The troops received the news joyfully, but the senior officer on board each ship made it clear that the original plans would be carried out. D Day was the morrow, 9 September, and H Hour was 0330. Operation Ava lanche was about to start. Fifth Army was swinging into action for its initial attack on Fortress Europe.

MAP N9 4

PLANS oft LANDING, D DAY at SALERNO

SaJkrao
45w
CFIoating Reserve}

PRINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FO ENGR HQ FIFTH ARMY

CHAPTER IV , Invasion of Italy

A.

D DAY AT

SALERNO

9 SEPTEMBER

THE night of 8-9 September the Fifth Army convoy stood off the Sa lerno beaches. The moon went down just before midnight, and under cover of the ensuing darkness the troopships moved in closer to the transport area where men were to board the landing craft. Minefields blocked a close approach to shore, and the reported presence of coastal batteries and railway artillery, located inland about a mile from the beach, constituted another threat to the larger vessels. It was therefore necessary for the troopships to drop anchor some 12 miles from the beaches, a definite disadvantage to the invading forces. The troops were required to remain aboard the landing craft for a longer period of timeand with even a small sea running, a landing craft pitches and rolls. Fur thermore, the time needed to reach shore and to return was greatly extended, thus slowing up unloading operations. The mine sweepers immediately pro ceeded to their work to open gaps for the entrance to the bay. 1. The Landing. Fortunately the sea was smooth when initial waves de barked from the troopships. There was some confusion. Difference in signals used by the American and British navies resulted in occasional misunderstanding among the mixed coxwains, and the circuitous routes the craft had to follow through the minefields caused delay in reaching shore. I^anes had been swept through the field, but occasional mines, having broken free, drifted into the cleared paths where they destroyed a few landing craft. At 0330 everything was working as planned. All assault troops and the nec essary vehicles were en route to the beach. Back at the transport area ships' crews were working quietly and efficiently to load the follow-up tanks, antiair craft artillery, and ammunition vehicles. Iyight artillery and antitank guns were already moving shoreward in Dukws those amazing amphibious craft which were so indispensable in the entire operation. On the American front

there was an unnatural quietness as the landing craft approached the beach. The pre-dawn darkness and stillness were broken only by the naval gunfire preparation to the north where the British were firing. The tense quiet did not last long, however, and any hope of surprise was dispelled when what sounded like a public address system called out in English: " Come on in and give up. We have you covered ! That grim invitation was only accepted in part the troops came in. As though on signal the Germans opened fire with artillery, machine guns, and mor tars. Machine guns had been emplaced among the dunes, but much of their fire was too high to produce casualties. It was still dark, and the invading troops, impressed with the unhealthy state of the beach, cut paths through or crawled under the wire and dashed inland to find protection among the sand dunes. From there they could go about the task of destroying the machine-gun and mortar crews near the beach. The hostile fire of artillery, mortars, and machine guns from positions farther inland was heavy. A few of the landing craft were hit; others were forced to turn back. Confusion was added to the .scene when some coxswains attempted to change direction and go round the hostile fire. Others started to return to their mother ships; some simply milled about. The assaulting troops continued to fight their way inland while additional troops were constantly arriving. Although the plan called for seven organized waves before the landing craft began shuttling, only three waves came in as such. Just behind the assaulting troops were provisional batteries of antiair craft artillery formed from the caliber .50 machine-gun squads of the battalions participating. Their purpose was to provide for early beach defense and to meet any contingency which might prevent heavier equipment from getting ashore. Their employment gave adequate security until the 40-mm guns could be emplaced. Beach groups of shore engineers and naval beach battalions went quickly to work under fire to organize the landing areas for supply and communications, light artillery and antitank guns, all on Dukws, and antiaircraft guns on I^CM's landed shortly after dawn. By daylight the assault forces of VI Corps were approaching their scheduled objectives but were still short of them. Although each battalion was acting as a unit, enemy resistance had caused much internal disorganization, resulting in the separation of troops in the darkness. Members of radio teams and crewserved weapons, such as mortars, machine guns, and bazookas, had become casualties or separated. Consequently many teams were inoperative. By night fall, however, commanders were being rewarded for the many hours spent in describing the terrain, for large numbers of the missing reported in at the initial objectives of their units.

io Corps met essentially the same kind of opposition as that encountered by VI Corps on the Paestum beaches. British troops in the first waves hit the beaches at H Hour and the enemy opened up with heavy fire, especially from the Iyilien thal strongpoint just south of the mouth of Asa Creek. Allied warships took up the challenge and blasted the areas behind the beaches. In the face of bitter resistance troops of the assault waves rushed ashore from landing craft and started inland. 2. Fighting Inland. {See Map No. 5.) The principal opposition encoun tered by VI Corps on D Day came from at least four groups of tanks which at tacked the beaches. One group of tanks, about 15 in number, came in from the south, overrunning the assault troops of the I42d Infantry and passing on toward the north after creating some confusion. A second group of similar size appeared on the front of the 141st Infantry south of Paestum soon after daylight and kept that regiment pinned down near the beaches most of the day. During the afternoon the enemy armor was driven east by gunfire from the U.S.S. Sa vannah. A third attack by 15 tanks struck toward Paestum from the north at about 1020. This force split, and four of the tanks went east toward Capaccio while the others continued south. One-half mile from Paestum they were met by a 105-mm howitzer of the 151st Field Artillery Battalion; a 75-mm gun from the Cannon Company, 143d Infantry; a 37-mm gun of the 36th Cavalry Re connaissance Troop; and an A-36 plane. Five tanks were destroyed in the area around Casa Vannulo, about a mile from the beach, and the others withdrew. A fourth attack involving about 13 tanks came from the north about noon and attempted to reach the beaches. Once more the tanks were driven back before they could get to the beach, again with a loss of five. At about 1300 ten tanks advancing down Highway 18 from the north were stopped by artillery fire, which destroyed three. During these attacks our infantry made good defensive and offensive use of their smaller weapons. One battalion., for example, destroyed six tanks with bazooka fire, two with rifle grenades, and one with a hand grenade dropped in an open turret. Despite these tank attacks the two assault regiments of the 36th Division reached their D Day objectives. At nightfall the I42d Infantry under Col. John D. Forsythe occupied positions from Tempone di San Paolo, the high ground just west of Iya Cosa Creek, to the nose of Mount Soprano (Hill 386), and the 143d Infantry under Col. William H. Martin held positions from Hill 386 to Capaccio and Mount Soltane (*). Except for some mixed units, the 141st Infantry under Col. Richard J. Werner was unable to advance throughout the day.
(i) All elevations are given in meters throughout this and succeeding parts of the Fifth Army History. The elevation of a hill may differ on maps of different scale; the authority of the 1 : 50,000 series has generally governed.

33

Resistance encountered by io Corps was even more determined than that in front of VI Corps. A strong enemy tank force attacked the 167 Brigade on the Tight flank of the 56 Division, but naval fire was decisive in breaking up this assault. As the 46 and the 56 Divisions pushed forward, the 6^th Panzer Grenadier Regiment fell back slowly. By nightfall the leading British troops were inland an average distance of 3000 yards and were attacking the Monte corvino Airfield, one of their major objectives. Patrols entered Battipaglia, but enemy infantry and tanks immediately moved into that town and forced a withdrawal. At the end of the day patrols of the 46 Division were approaching Salerno from the east. On the left flank the Ranger Force landed unopposed at Maiori. The 3d, Ranger Battalion moved north about five miles to the pass below Mount di Chiunzi and reconnoitered routes to Pagani and Nocera Inferiore, while the 4th Battalion secured the beachhead. After eliminating minor opposition at Vietri the Commandos turned east toward Salerno. North and west of Pagani the Germans concentrated forces to meet the Ranger threat, and a f nightfall they < launched a futile attack against the Ranger positions. At the end of D Day all units had reached their initial objectives with the exception of most of the 141st Infantry, which remained pinned down near the" beaches. Artillery, tanks, and other supporting units were delayed in landing by heavy fire from prepared enemy positions and from tanks employed as roving artillery. These tanks delivered the strongest opposition encountered by Fifth Army, but the remarkable success of the infantry in meeting enemy armor/ together with excellent supporting naval gunfire, prevented the enemy from defeating our landing. Throughout the day our forces were handicapped by jack of observation.I The hedgerows surrounding each field presented a screen, and only by taking advantage of houses as observation posts could a view be had in any direction. By nightfall the beaches were not fully organized, but they were functioning efficiently under the most difficult conditions.

B.

CONSOLIDATING THE

BEACHHEAD
10-11 SEPTEMBER

VI Corps met practically no enemy opposition on D plus 1 while its troops were getting into position to carry on the attack, for the German strength was concentrated at the time on the left flank against 10 Corps. On the right flank the 141st Regimental Combat Team completed its reorganization and moved

34

MAP N9 5

ALiTlinr 1

"-.?(' -''P, .'i.'*^\',t'':*iii ..' '

R CAMPANELLA

MAP N? 5

CONSOLIDATING#k BEACHHEAD
SCALE
4 - 3

PRINTED BY 66TH ENGfl TOP CO FOR ENGR HO FIFTH ARMY

out to block enemy access from the south. (See Map No. 5.) In the center of the 36th Division zone the 143d Regimental Combat Team occupied positions from the nose of Mount Soprano to Capaccio and Mount Soltane, and sent patrols across the upper Calore River. Meanwhile the 143d Regimental Combat Team moved up to attack the Altavilla hill mass. At the close of the day battalions of the I42d Infantry held Albanella, controlled the ridge line to Rocca d'Aspide, and were ready to attack on the n t h . During the morning of 10 September the 179th Regimental Combat Team came ashore. On n September the I42d Regimental Combat Team continued its at tacks, and captured Altavilla and Hill 424 against light opposition. The 179th Regimental Combat Team under Col. Robert B. Hutchins was committed on its left to drive on Ponte Sele through the salient formed by the Sele and Calore rivers, which run west and then south before joining south of Persano. The infantry met stiff resistance. The 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, thrust toward Ponte Sele from the south but was unable to cross the Calore River into the sa lient, being stopped by tanks and German engineers north of Hill 424. The rest of the combat team advanced up the salient from the southwest, with as sault companies nearly reaching Ponte Sele and Highway Ig. Struck by enemy tanks and artillery from their rear at Persano and by infantry and tanks on their front, these advance elements fell back to a position northeast of Persano. Meanwhile the 157th Regimental Combat Team under Col. Charles Ankcorn, committed from Army reserve, advanced up the west side of the Sele River, but enemy resistance, centering in a strongpoint at the Tobacco Factory just west of Persano across the Sele, prevented their attack from keeping pace with the 179th Regimental Combat Team. During the day the 45th Division under General Middleton assumed command of the left flank of VI Corps. On the 10 Corps front, mountainous terrain reaching almost to the shore added to the difficulties to be overcome. In the area between the sea and High way 18 to Battipaglia the country was generally flat with gently rising slopes well covered with apple, orange, and olive orchards. Immediately beyond Eboli, Battipaglia, and Montecorvino the country rises to hills, mostly 500 to 700 meters high, which dominate the plain below. The enemy, determined to hold at all costs in this important pivotal area, resisted the advance stubbornly on 10 Sep tember. On the extreme left, in the Pagani-Nocera zone, German patrols probed the positions of the 3d Ranger Battalion on Mount di Chiunzi. Sharp skirmishes occurred, but the Rangers held their ground. The 4th Ranger Battalion sent patrols more than ten miles west on the coastal road to Positano. Commandos and units of the 46 Division moved north of Vietri astride the road, while other troops of the 46 Division continued to clear Salerno. A strong force of German

35

infantry supported by tanks failed in an effort to drive through the Commando defenses. In the center the 46 Division reached a line through the mountains about two miles inland and controlled nearly eight miles of Highway 18 south east of Salerno by 0300. Opposed by elements of the 16th Panzer Division and reconnaissance troops of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, the 46 Division could make no further gain through the rugged terrain during the day. On the right the 56 Division exerted its main effort along Tusciano Creek and pushed patrols into Battipaglia before dawn. Knemy reinforcements came up, and fighting continued throughout the day. At nightfall a counterattack by German tanks and infantry drove the 9 Royal Fusiliers (167 Brigade) out of the town. Heavy fighting also occurred around a tobacco factory two miles west of Battipaglia on Highway 18. Here the 201 Guards Brigade was unable to advance. The outcome of the struggle for the Montecorvino Airfield, a major objective of the 56 Division, was still in doubt by nightfall. On 11 September the battle for Battipaglia continued with indecisive results, but 10 Corps troops captured the Montecorvino Airfield. This victory did not make the field available for our planes, however, since it was under artillery fire from nearby hills. In order to tighten tHe Fifth Army hold on the passes leading to Naples.; General Clark ordered VI Corps to send additional troops to assist the Ranger Force in that area. The Army directive was received shortly after 0001, 11 Sep tember, and by iloo the reinforcements were in position. These reinforcements consisted of the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry; an antiaircraft battery; a battery of artillery; a company each of paratroopers, tanks, tank destroyers, and chem ical mortars; and two engineer companies. The enemy on the 10th and n t h concentrated his efforts against 10 Corps, which experienced bitter fighting around Battipaglia. Operating from a firmly established beachhead, 10 Corps absorbed the strongest counterattacks without permitting the enemy to register any decisive gains. The Ranger Force success fully penetrated to the Mount di Chiunzi and Nocera-Pagani passes and denied the use of this route to the German troops to the north, preventing them from moving against the~west flank of the Salerno beachhead. VI Corps was able to move out rapidly and occupy the high ground from Hill 424 around to Agropoli and thus control all the routes of access to the beachhead from the south and southwest. (See Map No. 5.) This success compelled the enemy to throw re serves into the fight in order to prevent Fifth Army from driving a wedge between his forces at Salerno and those withdrawing before Eighth Army. The night of io-11 September and the following day also saw the greatest enemy air activity so far. During this period no less than 120 hosjtile aircraft were reported over the beaches. Barrage balloons, antiaircraft artillery and

36

our fighter planes prevented these attacks from being very effective; the most serious damage was caused to the U.S.S. Savannah, probably by a radio-con trolled rocket bomb. The lack of mass air attack, however, seemed to prove groundless the belief that the Luftwaffe had been withholding a large air reserve to use in repelling an invasion.

C.

THE GERMAN

COUNTERATTACKS
12-14 SEPTEMBER

By 12 September it became apparent that the enemy was rushing rein forcements into the Salerno area to support the 16th Panzer Division. On 9 Sep tember long columns of motor vehicles headed north from the south of Italy. Elements of the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division were racing north to escape being trapped by the Eighth Army threat to their rear. Both these divisions entered the battle of Salerno with substantial portions of their strength thrown against VI Corps. As early as II September elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, coming south from beyond Naples, were identified in front of 10 Corps, and on the next day units of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division were spotted. At least one battalion of the 3d Panzer Gren adier Division was in the line on 14 September. This enemy build-up in the Salerno battle resulted in a large mixture of units from at least six divisions. The 16th Panzer Division was apparently the only complete division which eventually entered the battle. Under the supreme command of XIV Panzer Corps units from the various divisions were combined into battle groups some what resembling our combat teams. 1. The Loss of Altavilla. (See Map No. 6.) VI Corps felt the weight of these enemy reinforcements on 12 September. The enemy had begun a counterattack against the 1st Battalion.. I42d Infantry, even before the battalion commander could organize his position on Hill 424, which had been taken late on 11 Sep tember. Hill 424, with the town of Altavilla perched on its lower slopes, formed an important part of the Fifth Army beachhead, since its possession would deny the enemy a commanding view of landing operations and the movement of troops below. The hill was, however, of even greater importance to the Germans. Not only did it provide them with observation, but it covered access to the routes of withdrawal which must be used by forces to the south in the event of a retrograde movement. These forces were in double danger from Fifth Army on the north and from the British Eighth Army, moving up from the south.

37

Bach side, therefore, sought to control this key terrain feature; but the hill mass was neither easy to attack nor easy to defend. The slopes rise abruptly from the plain and are covered by scrub growth and olive groves. Numerous ravines cut through this vegetation, adding to the irregularity of the hillside. There is but little level ground on top of the hill, and terracing has been em ployed to convert its steep sides to agricultural use. Ridge lines radiate down ward from the hilltop, eventually forming a junction with the plains below. No central point exists of sufficient size for occupancy by a company in a good defensive position. The terraces and ravines restrict fields of fire to a maximum of 150 yards, and also limit visibility of the slopes of Hill 424 so severely that large attacking forces could approach within striking distance without being discovered. Unless an unnumbered hill to the south, separated from Hill 424 by a deep ravine with heavily wooded sides, were also occupied, Hill 424 would be difficult to hold. The enemy enveloped the positions of the 1st Battalion, I42d Infantry, during daylight on 12 September. Whren the counterattack struck, Company B was occupying the high ground above the road north of Altavilla, Company A was just north of the summit,.and Company C was on the south slope of Hill 424. The 2d Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, began to infiltrate around the hill, and active enemy artillery pounded our communications se verely. The main enemy attack was directed against the area defended by Com pany C. Iyt. Col. Gaines J. Barron, commanding the 1st Battalion, I42d In fantry, ordered the other two companies to move to its support, but enemy infantry prevented the movements from being executed. When the situation appeared serious, the battalion executive officer ordered a withdrawal since Iyieutenant Colonel Barron could not be located. Although the infantry fought magnificently, the hill was untenable and had to be abandoned. Under cover of darkness the various companies, isolated from one another, fought their way through the German lines and dug in on a knoll southwest of Hill 424. The enemy had regained this important terrain feature. 2. Shifts in the Center. {See Maps Nos. 6 and 7.) While the fight was in prog ress for the possession of Hill 424, our positions improved considerably on the left flank of VI Corps. The 179th Regimental Combat Team captured Persano; west of the Sele the 157th Regimental Combat Team drove the enemy from the Tobacco Factory and advanced to the Grataglia Plain just west of Persano. Nevertheless the left flank of VI Corps was weak. Except for the 23 Armoured Brigade (reconnaissance) there was a gap of five miles between 10 Corps and VI Corps. General Dawley ordered extensive shifts in the front-line units of VI Corps to take place during the night of 12-13 September. After these shifts had been completed, VI Corps planned to drive again toward Hill 424.

38

*>v
oo
Monttcorvino Airport

isim
sKjAostsys

MAPN9 6 FIFTH ARMY HIGHTIDE

PRINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGR HO. FIFTH ARMY

On 12 September the enemy launched another unsuccessful assault against the Rangers on the left flank of 10 Corps. Later in the day a Ranger attack against Gragnano likewise failed. The Ranger Force appeared strong enough to hold the Sorrento Peninsula and maintain control over the Nocera-Pagani Pass, but it could not exploit its commanding positions. The 46 Division made no significant gains during the day, and the 167 Brigade (56 Division) was driven out of Battipaglia. Although the enemy was held on the outskirts of the town, the 167 Brigade lost heavily and was relieved by the 201 Guards Brigade at the first opportunity. The shifting of units within VI Corps was well under way by daybreak on 13 September. Taking up positions on the left of the 157th Regimental Combat Team, the 179th Regimental Combat Team greatly strengthened the left flank of VI Corps. Later in the day two battalions of the 141st Infantry also arrived on the left flank, having been moved by truck from the Ogliastro area, which the enemy had evacuated. One of these battalions was moved again to rein force the Cosa Creek line during the night of 13-14 September. In order to fill the gap in the Sele-Calore salient caused by withdrawing the 179th Regimental Combat Team, the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was ordered on 12 September to take up positions east of Persano. This battalion, which had come from Tempone di San Paolo to Mount San Chirico earlier in the day, accordingly moved again to the banks of the Calore River during the afternoon and prepared to cross into the salient under cover of darkness. By early morning of the 13th the battalion had reached its positions.
3. Attacks and Counterattacks. (See Map No. 7.) While these movements

were taking place on the left flank of VI Corps, the Martin Force under the command of Colonel Martin of the 143d Infantry was assembling for the attack on Altavilla. The 3d Battalion, I42d Infantry, marched from Albanella; the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, moved from the vicinity of Capaccio to Hill 140 and then on to the assembly area below Altavilla. These two battalions, with the 1st Battalion, I42d Infantry, in reserve, were to attack Altavilla, Hill 424, and the unnumbered hill at 0600, 13 September. Although there was no time for a daylight reconnaissance of the terrain, the attack jumped off as scheduled. The 3d Battalion, I42d Infantry, occupied the unnumbered hill with a portion of its force but was compelled to withdraw after dark.^The 3d Battalion, 143d In fantry, succeeded in occupying the high ground north of Altavilla. Though enemy counterattacks surrounded the battalion, it remained on the hill until the night of 14-15 September, when it was ordered to withdraw. Late on the 13th all units in front of Altavilla were ordered to organize a defensive line along La Cosa Creek. On the left flank of VI Corps the Germans also attacked strongly on 13 Sep tember in an apparent effort to break through to our beaches. Early in the

morning the 157th Infantry attempted to advance to form a junction with the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, in the Sele-Calore salient but could make no prog ress. In the afternoon the Germans launched a tank-infantry attack that drove -the 157th Infantry back beyond the Sele River crossing at Persano. The enemy then crossed into the salient, hit the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, from front and rear, and smashed the battalion. After this success the German infantry and tanks drove on down the salient to attack our rear areas. This attempted breakthrough near the junction of the Sele and Calore rivers was stopped by the 189th and 158th Field Artillery Battalions (45th Division), which gathered up every availa ble man to form a defensive line and also poured heavy fire on the enemy armor. On 14 September VI Corps made readjustments along its entire front. The 45th Division organized a defensive line from Bivio Cioffi on Highway 18 to the Sele-Calore junction, and the 36th Division was reinforced with troops of the 504th Parachute Infantry which had dropped on the night of 13-14 September. During the day the enemy made several efforts to break through this line, but each attack was thrown back with heavy losses. On the 14th General Clark visited the front line, passing through the enemy artillery and small-arms fire personally to impress upon his soldiers the necessity for holding their positions. He stopped again and again to talk to them telling them that under no circum stances must any ground be yielded. While there he observed a tank attack forming up and personally took charge of the situation, placing antitank guns into positions so that the attack was broken up. Six of the enemy tanks engaged in the thrust were destroyed. 10 Corps troops held their ground against the enemy onslaught of 13-14 Sep tember. The 167 Brigade came into the line on the right of the 56 Division sector and established contact with VI Corps. Slight adjustments were made along the line, but the division spent most of the day in reorganizing. General McCreery had now committed all available troops and felt considerable anxiety about the situation around Salerno town. The 16th Panzer Division opposed him north of the Sele River, and the greater part of the 29th Panzer Division was in reserve near Contursi, some 16 miles east of Battipaglia. The enemy had at least 30 tanks in the Battipaglia area, where the main German weight might be thrown against 10 Corps. Stabs down the Avellino-Salerno and Cava-Vietri roads could be ex pected to occur on the left. During the night of 13-14 September the Germans attacked with infantry and tanks from Battipaglia. All attacks were repulsed. The 128 Brigade on the right of the 46 Division and the 169 Brigade on the left of the 56 Division pushed ahead slightly on 14 September. ^Enemy units on the road between Battipaglia and Bboli were brought under accurate naval fire, and the air forces heavily bombed German positions in the area. The British

40

7 Armoured Division under Maj. Gen. G. W. B. Brskine was unloading on 14 Sep tember, bringing needed strength to cope with enemy armor. 4. Summary of the Situation. During this phase of the operation Fifth Army had penetrated to positions which were of utmost importance to the enemy. His counterattacks against our forces at Hill 424, in the Sele-Calore salient, at Battipaglia, toward Salerno from the north, and against the Ranger Force on the Sorrento Peninsula indicated clearly that each of these areas was vital to the successful execution of his planned defense against the invasion. German units had raced up from the south and had come down from the north, thanks to the cancellation of the proposed drop by the 82d Airborne Division at the Volturno, with the result that the enemy counterattacks were mounted with force as well as determination and skill. They had succeeded in forcing VI Corps to take up the defensive line from Bivio Cioffi around the Sele-Calore junction and behind I*a Cosa Creek. The enemy's greatest success occurred during the last hours of daylight on 13 September when he threatened to break through VI Corps south of the Calore River. Extensive shifting of troops enabled VI Corps to strengthen the weakest portions of its line sufficiently to throw back the enemy thrusts on 14 September. The decisive period in the battle for the beachhead therefore occurred on 13-14 September. Having held the full weight of the enemy forces on those days, Fifth Army was enabled to complete a nec essary reorganization and build up its strength to continue the attack.

D.

THE ENEMY WITHDRAWS

15-19 SEPTEMBER

By the morning of 15 September the crisis had passed, and the enemy began to revert to the defensive all along the Fifth Army front. The reasons for his shift are clear. The British Eighth Army was continuing its advance, though more slowly than expected, and had reached Sapri about 40 miles to the south; the most desperate attacks of the Germans had not driven Fifth Army into the sea; and the build-up of supplies and reinforcements on the beaches was steadily increasing the Fifth Army strength. The 505th Parachute Infantry was dropped behind our lines south of Paestum the night of 14-15 September; and the 325th Glider Regimental Combat Team came in by IvCl's on the 15th. The 180th Regimental Combat Team (45th Division), which had landed early on the 14th, went into Army reserve. American forces were further augmented on 18 Sep tember with the arrival of the 3d Division.

41

The situation in front of 10 Corps during the German counterattacks had been so grave that General Clark ordered the drop of a parachute battalion in the Avellino area to block the road net at that important point and to disrupt communications in the rear areas of the German forces opposing 10 Corps. This drop was originally scheduled for the night 12-13 vSeptember, but preparations could not be finished by that date; and the 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute In fantry, under Lt. Col. Doyle R. Yardley did not finally drop until the night 14-15 September. The paratroopers were rather widely scattered and took to the hills, where they coalesced into small groups and made raids against supply trains and down into the plains during the next week. From the 15th on, the enemy dug in along most of the Fifth Army front and was content with minor jabs, easily repelled. German artillery was fairly active and also difficult to neutralize, for the enemy shifted his gun positions often to avoid our counterbattery fire. By the 17th the enemy in front of VI Corps was withdrawing up Highway 91 through Contursi, thinning out his po sitions from his left flank. Two battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry under Col. Reuben H. Tucker accordingly attacked the hill mass by Altavilla during the night and morning of the 17th, but they were pinned by enemy artillery fire until the 18th, when our troops took Altavilla for the third time. By then the enemy had withdrawn his covering screen in front of VI Corps, and patrols reported no contact. The 131 Brigade (7 Armoured Division) occupied Batti paglia without resistance late in the afternoon of 18 September. During the 19th the 56 Division extended its bridgehead slightly while the 46 Division held its positions. All units of VI Corps made substantial advances in accordance with Fifth Army Field Order No. 3, 18 September 1943. {See Annex No. 2E.) The 45th Division moved up through Persano and the Tobacco Factory to the heights on both sides of Eboli, and units of the 36th Division occupied Serre and Ponte Sele. Fifth Army now held the Salerno plain, and the bridgehead was completely secure. Commenting on this situation, the Secretary of War, the Honorable Henry Iv. Stimson, wrote to General Clark on 23 September 1943: I have been following your Salerno operation with keenest interest... I send you and your brave men my heartiest congratulations on the suc cessful accomplishment of one of the most difficult and hazardous oper ations in the history of warfare. Meanwhile on 15-16 September reconnaissance elements of Eighth and Fifth Armies met at points 15 to 20 miles southeast of Agropoli. Eighth Army continued to concentrate toward the right flank of Fifth Army in order to drive on up the east and center of the Italian peninsula.

42

DEFENSIVE LINE 13-14 SEPTEMBER

MAP N ? 7 <

COUNTERATTACKS AGAINST VI CORPS

September 1943

DEFENSIVE LIN 13-14 SEPTEMBER ROCCADASP

PRINTED BY No. I LITHO SEC. M.M.PBP COY. ATT. 46 SURVEY COY. SA.E.C FOR ENGR HO. FIFTH ARMY

CHAPTER V, ,
The Drive on Naples

1 HE first phase of the. operation could now be considered complete, for the enemy withdrawal in front of VI Corps indicated clearly that the German High Command considered it impossible to destroy our bridgehead. The land ing was a definite success. On 20 September Maj. Gen. John P. Iyucas assumed command of VI Corps. The 36th Division was withdrawn to Army reserve to guard the Salerno beaches; the 3d Division took its place in VI Corps. Headquarters, S26. Airborne Division, under General Ridgway arrived at Sa lerno, and the units of the division which had previously been attached to VI Corps were ordered by Operations Instruction No. 2, 20 September 1943 (see Annex No. 2H), to concentrate in Army reserve on the right flank of Fifth Axmy at Controne.

A.

PLANS

FOR THE

ADVANCE

See Map No. 8 With the Salerno plain in its possession Fifth Army could now proceed to its mission, the capture of Naples harbor and the nearby airfields. Avail able information suggested that the Germans intended to fight a delaying action up to the Volturno River, where enemy fortifications were reported in progress. As it turned out, the German High Command had ordered XIV Panzer Corps in front of Fifth Army to fall back toward the northwest in a vast pivot movement based on the Sorrento Peninsula. The forces on this flank were to hold the mountain passes as long as possible to permit a thorough wrecking of the port of Naples and to safeguard the enemy evacuation of the Campanian Plain. Then they too would fall back on the Volturno and link up with IyXXVI Panzer Corps in front of Eighth Army to form a solid line across

43

the Italian boot. This plan called for stubborn resistance in front of 10 Corps and rearguard action in front of VI Corps; Eighth Army would have almost no contact with the enemy until it had pushed north of Foggia. Field Order No. 4, 19 September 1943 (see Annex No. 2F), together with Operations Instruction No. 3, 22 September 1943 (see Annex No. 2I), were issued by Fifth Army to pave the way for the capture of Naples and to permit the planning of subsequent operations. The general plan required both corps to attack abreast, with 10 Corps on the lef^delivering the principal thrust. Accordingly 10 Corps was directed to secure the Vietri-Nocera and SalernoSan Severino passes, push on to the northeast to reach the flat Naples plain, and capture Naples; the next move was to drive the Germans north of the Volturno River. To carry out this order 10 Corps moved the 46 Division to Vietri and brought up the 56 Division to push north from Salerno itself. The main attack was assigned to the 46 Division, aiming at Nocera; when the di vision had reached this point, the 7 Armoured Division would pass through and strike for Naples. The Ranger Force, after assisting 10 Corps, was to revert to Army control for the protection of Naples. The Rangers and a force not to exceed one brigade were to furnish security in the city until the 82d Airborne Division could take over. VI Corps was directed to continue its advance, secure the line Avellino-Teora, and then be prepared on Arm}'- order to secure the line Benevento-Teora, moving the eastern end of the line forward as Eighth Army advanced. The enemy retreat before these attacks did not at any time become a rout. In front of 10 Corps the German forces, consisting of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division with detachments from the 3d and 15th Panzer Gren adier Divisions, held tenaciously in positions which they had had two weeks to prepare. German routes of withdrawal before VI Corps were through moun tain passes and across deep gorges where the use of small delaying forces and mines, coupled with the destruction of roads and bridges, allowed the enemy to retreat in comparatively good order.

B.

THE FALL OF NAPLES

AND

AVELLINO

21 SEPTEMBER-1 OCTOBER

1. Breaking Through the Mountains. 10 Corps required two days to shift its troops for the impending attack. Meanwhile the 3d and 45th Divisions of VI Corps began their flanking push into the mountains. The 3d Division under Maj. Gen. Iyucian K. Truscott, Jr., moved up the road from Battipaglia

44

through Acerno toward Highway 7, with the 15th Regimental Combat Tea m on the left crossing the mountains north of Curticelle to get into position for a drive on Avellino. The 45th Division advanced up Highway 91 through Contursi to secure the junction of Highways 7 and 91. Both divisions ran into opposition on the 21st which held up their advance guards for a day. The 30th Regimental Combat Team (3d Division) was stopped just south of Acerno by a blown bridge commanded by enemy rifle and machine-gun posi tions on the opposite side of the Tusciano Gorge, but by cross-country marches across the mountains the regiment drove out the enemy opposition and oc cupied Acerno on 22 September. The 180th Regimental Combat Team (45th Division) met enemy positions to the west of Oliveto, which it outflanked and captured on the 22d. Field Order No. 4 had ordered a co-ordinated attack with the mission of securing the line Teora-Montemarano-Avellino-Castellamare preparatory to a further advance on Naples. This attack jumped off 23 September. The 3d and 45th Divisions pushed forward on the right flank of Fifth Army despite the rugged terrain, which canalized movements to a narrow road net. The Germans left a few delaying detachments in front of the 45th Division, but relied chiefly on extensive demolitions. Division engineers worked night and day to bulldoze by-passes where these were possible, or to build temporary bridges; and the 36th Bngineer Combat Regiment of VI Corps followed up closely behind. The fall rains, which began the night of 26-27 September, washed down dirt and rocks on the roads, damaged several key bridges, and thereby slowed the advance of VI Corps. On Highway 91 the 45th Division advanced on a two-regiment front, the 179th Infantry on the west bank of the Sele and the 157th Infantry on the east bank. Colliano was occupied on 23 September, Quaglietta and Valva on the 24th. By the morning of 26 September the 45th Division securely held Teora and the junction of Highways 7 and 91. The 3d Division on the left of VI Corps reached Highway 7 by 27 September, at which time its three infantry regiments were disposed in a wide arc about Avellino. The 15th Infantry was in the Sabato Valley south of the town, the 7th Infantry was crossing the mountains west of the Acerno road to take Volturara, and the 30th Infantry held Montemarano on Highway 7. Supply of some units in the 3d Division devolved on pack trains or even upon human pack trains from the reserve companies of the infantry regiments. While VI Corps was moving ahead almost without opposition apart from that afforded by the terrain and demolitions, 10 Corps led the main effort on the left to secure the Nocera-Pagani Pass. When 10 Corps attacked at dawn

45

on 23 September, the Germans were making an orderly withdrawal and resisted stubbornly. A strong force held up the 46 Division near Cava, about two miles north of Vietri. The advance of the 56 Division boggedTHown short of le CappeUe, five miles north of Salerno. Only slight gains could be made on 24 September. The Germans had blown every bridge of any importance in front of the 56 Division and resisted with their usual annoying but effective rearguard actions. Mount Stella, a series of razorback ridges east of Highway 88, was held with particular determination, and it was not until 26 September that the 169 Brigade (56 Division) could dislodge the enemy. This action opened the way for further advance of the 56 Division. On 27 September the 201 Guards Brigade pushed patrols into Baronissi, six miles north of Salerno; at the same time elements of the 46 Division occupied the town of Camerelle near the Nocera Pass. Command of the left flank of 10 Corps, including the Ranger Force, passed to the 82d Airborne Division on 26 September, following the transfer of the division by I^Cl's from the Paestum beaches to Maiori. The Rangers had held their positions, gained in the first rush of the original landings, against all attacks and now began to push forward so as to bring pressure on the German right flank. 2. The Enemy Retreats. By 28 September the east flank of Fifth Army had swung around to a point from which it could close in and threaten the German defenses pivoted on the Sorrento Peninsula. The left flank had been reinforced and had driven across the major barriers of that peninsula. The German forces all along the front started a withdrawal, and the tempo of our advance sped up. For the drive on Avellino VI Corps was reinforced by the 133d Regimental Combat Team (34th Division) under Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, which had begun landing 21 September. The three infantry regiments of the 3d Division closed in quickly on Avellino from the south and west while the 133d Regi mental Combat Team drove west above Highway 7 to cut the main road from Avellino to Benevento; the 45th Division meanwhile guarded the right flank and kept contact with Eighth Army. After a night attack 29-30 September Avellino fell to the 3d Division on the morning of 30 September. Fifth Army had already directed VI Corps by Operations Instruction No. 4, 29 September 1943 (see Annex No. 2]), upon taking Avellino to shift the mass of its forces to the left along the general line Avellino-Montemarano-Teora, leaving screening forces to cover its supply route east of Montemarano. VI Corps was further directed to prepare plans to attack west with a force not to exceed one reinforced division, seizing the line Nola-Avella, and then to

46

assist 10 Corps in the capture of Naples. The Corps was also to prepare pi; lans for the capture of Benevento, all plans subject to execution on Army order. 10 Corps itself was quick to follow up the advantages gained in the pre vious fighting. On 28 September the Ranger Force occupied Sala on the north west side of the Sorrento Mountain chain, overlooking the plain of Nocera. The 23 Armoured Brigade debouched into the level country north of Sala and advanced to Castellamare while the 131 Brigade (7 Armoured Division) took Nocera. This brigade passed through the 46 Division and formed the advance guard for the 7 Armoured Division. On the 29th the bridge at Scafati was seized intact, although it had been prepared for demolition. By this action we secured the only bridge over the Sarno not destroyed by the Germans. Even so the many vehicles of the armored division were impeded by a bottle neck until three more bridges were thrown across the Sarno; then the British armor was ready for the dramatic plunge on Naples. Pushing closely upon the heels of the retreating enemy, the King's Dra goon Guards and the 11 Hussars, both armored reconnaissance units, swept along leading the attack. Pompeii, Torre Annunziata, and many other cities fell without opposition. On the left patrols of the 82d Airborne Division reached Torre del Greco, where the Germans held for a short time. At nightfall on 30 September troops of 10 Corps were surrounding Mount Vesuvius. Naples, with its demolished port, was within our grasp. 3. The Capture of Naples. On 1 October General McCreery, commanding 10 Corps, sent the following welcome message to General Clark: Today has given us one of the highlights of the campaign and Naples has fallen to 10 Corps. Armoured patrols of the First Kings Dragoon Guards were the first to enter the city at 0930 hours, followed by the Greys later reinforced by troops of the 82d Airborne Division. Naples had paid a very heavy price. Allied air raids had destroyed most of the harbor installations, and the damage was augmented by German destruction. In an attempt to deny dock and harbor facilities to Fifth Army the enemy scuttled ships at the piers and sank others in the harbor. Between Allied bombings and German demolitions the docks and storehouses along the water front of Naples were left a mass of ruins, crumbled stones, and fire-twisted steel. A normal port capacity of 8000 tons daily had been cut to a mere fraction of that figure, but clearing away of debris was so rapidly accomplished that 3500 tons daily were coming in at the port only 12 days after its capture. Enemy destruction was not confined to the port. A determined effort was made to wreck all public utilities. Naples was a city without electricity, transportation, or a sewage system. The Germans had destroyed the aqueduct

47

which supplied most of the water to the city. Water was available at only a few hydrants from two emergency reservoirs. Engineers of Fifth Army estab lished water points at various places throughout the city where the 600,000 people who had remained behind during the general exodus could fill their bottles, pans, and jugs. So great was the demand that armed guards had to be placed at these water points to prevent the larger and the stronger from driving the women and children away. This system of water supply was continued until about 9 October, when the engineers had rebuilt 160 feet of the Napoleonic Aqueduct. Visible destruction was merely a part of the havoc wrought by the Ger mans. They planted powerful time bombs in public buildings in anticipation of their occupancy by Fifth Army troops. Despite the efforts of sappers and engineers, who removed many of these hazards, there were a number of explo sions, one of which killed 14 and wounded 58 American soldiers quartered in an Italian artillery barracks. A time bomb in the Naples Post Office took a horrible toll of civilians.

C.

ADVANCE

TO THE

VOLTURNO
1-6 OCTOBER

The capture of Naples gave General Clark a much needed port, but mere possession of the city itself did not fully constitute a fulfillment of the Fifth Army objective. The airfields at Capodichino and Pomigliano were not yet in Allied hands, and the enemy must be driven well away from Naples harbor. Troops of Fifth Army, accordingly, did not pause with the capture of the city. The usual delaying tactics of the Germans were in evidence along the entire front during the next five days, as Fifth Army drove to the Volturno River; but there were now indications that the enemy was running short of explosives. Some structures prepared for demolition were discovered to be lacking explo sive charges. Tellermines were used in lieu of TNT, and artillery shells were converted to use for prepared demolitions. Further evidence of at least a temporary shortage in mines was given by reports that the enemy was taking up his own minefields. Road blocks were numerous, however, and some were elaborately prepared. Booby traps also continued to make their appearance m varied forms. In one instance a tempting bunch of grapes was wired to an antipersonnel mine.

On the 10 Corps front the 7 Armoured Division pressed on north across the Campanian Plain, while the 56 Division secured the edges of the high ground overlooking the plain from the east. Forward units of the 7 Armoured Division were in Piazzolla and Somma by the evening of t October, and the 56 Division had reached Palrna. On 2 October the 56 Division occupied Nola; the following day the badly demolished Pomigliano Airfield was taken. In swinging toward Cancello to aid the 3d Division attack on that town the 56 Division was held up by demolitions on 4 October, but Aversa and Qualiano fell to the 7 Armoured Division. The Volturno River, along which the Germans prepared strong defensive positions, was the next major obstacle before 10 Corps. The Greys, a reconnaissance unit of the 23 Armoured Brigade, reached this barrier on 5 October opposite Cancello ed Arnone; the 169 Brigade (56 Di vision) took Caserta without opposition; and by 6 October the 56 Division had occupied the town of Capua. On the right VI Corps had slower going in the mountains, but by 6 Octo ber the 3d Division had driven through Cancello and Maddaloni into the mountains above Caserta. The 34th and 45th Divisions moved on Benevento, which the 45th Reconnaissance Troop entered at 1210, 2 October. The 3d Battalion, 133d Infantry (34th Division), occupied the city at 2330 on the same day and secured a bridgehead over the Calore River. The 45th Division passed through the 34th Division on 4 October, preparatory to advancing on the high ground north of the junction of the Calore and Volturno rivers. The 34th Division, thus relieved, went into assembly areas to prepare for the crossing of the Volturno. By 6 October both corps of Fifth Army were on the general line of the Volturno River, and paused briefly to regroup their forces before crossing the river. The past month, which had tested Fifth Army in combat, had been extremely successful. The combined American and British forces had accom plished one of the most difficult military operations a landing on hostile shores. They had beaten off a severe enemy counterattack, and had pushed forward relentlessly to their objectives despite every obstacle of terrain and enemy opposition. They had completed their mission: "To seize the Port of Naples and to secure the airfields in the Naples area with a view to prepar ing a firm base for further offensive operations."

49

*/^fef tfj'l

MAPN9 8

ADVANCE i 5 ^ VOLTURNO

w&m^\mmsKsm

The Salerno Beachhead 15 September

PRINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOfl ENGR HO FIFTH ARMY

CHAPTER VI
The Action of Allied Arms

A.

NAVAL ACTION

1 HE task of the U.S. and. Royal Navies in Avalanche was twofold: to transport and convoy an army from several foreign ports to the invasion beaches, and to support the ground forces on the beaches with supply and with gun fire. The transport of thousands of troops meant anxious days of loading and reloading. The army's demands were often heavy and unexpected, but the navies met them. The crowded voyage to the coast of Italy was made ex peditiously, and the thousands of troops were landed on the beaches designated in the plans. In addition to their duties in manning landing craft and sweeping mines, the sailors worked through the dawn of D Day to set up communica tions and beach installations. The effectiveness of naval gunnery against targets set a new high. A few hours after daylight on the morning of 9 September 1943, when destroyers were able to come in towards the shore, their supporting gunfire was employed with considerable effect in the destruction of guns in position and in the destruction of assembled German fighting vehicles. The fire was accurate and was tied in with the maneuver of ground troops. This co-ordination was made possible to a great degree because of previous practice and training by combined army and navy artillery observer-spotter parties. Naval gunfire was an im portant factor in breaking up many German tank attacks from D Day on during the whole operation. It was also instrumental in repelling the counterat tack, which aimed to drive our forces into the sea. Following the counterattack, General Clark on 16 September sent a message to General Alexander which read in part: For the splendid and wholehearted cooperation and support given by the allied navies during our operations in this area, please convey to Admiral Cunningham my deep appreciation. Naval gun-fire support has

51

been most effective. I have been favorably impressed by the eagerness of all naval commanders to give this support. Admiral Hewitt has done everything in his power to assist us. He usually anticipates our needs and always executes his support missions promptly and efficiently. With observers ashore and air spotters communicating with the ships dur ing the establishment of the beachhead, cruiser and destroyer fire searched out enemy defenses, batteries, and strongpoints. Five-inch naval gunfire pen etrated with great accuracy and effectiveness observation posts and machinegun nests which the enemy had set up in stone buildings and houses inland beyond the range or striking power of the light and medium artillery. The big guns of the battleships were our chief weapon for blocking roads and defiles and for destroying defenses at long distances. At the conclusion of the Salerno operations General Clark cabled the Naval Commander in Northwest African Waters: Amphibious operations require closest cooperation between naval, air and ground forces. The Allied landings in Salerno were an outstanding example of such coordination. Air, naval or ground forces alone could not accomplish a beachhead and then drive the enemy out of heavily defended positions, on the beaches, in the mountains, on the plains. The Allied Navies, British and American, deserve the highest commendation for the brilliant support of the Fifth Army landings. All those who took part in the landings will long remember and honor what the U.S. and Royal Navies did in contributing so brilliantly to the success of the Salerno operations.

B.

AIR

OPERATIONS

Air support for Avalanche was summed up briefly in the Outline Plan as: 1. Fighter protection from hostile air interference. 2. Direct and indirect support of ground operations by: a) Prearranged strategic missions.
b) Tactical missions, prearranged or on call.
c) Reconnaissance and photo missions.
Prior to D Day the Northwest African Air Forces were engaged in two missions of importance to the success of the landing: to neutralize the enemy aircraft in the area and to disrupt the lines of communication necessary to a proper defense of the landing area.

52

Weather conditions limited the accomplishment of the first mission, but beginning on the night of 3-4 September a co-ordinated series of attacks were made on fighter bases at Capua, Capodichino, and Foggia. Two of the landing grounds at Grazzanise were rendered unserviceable; Capodichino and the other landing ground at Grazzanise were damaged. At Foggia no attempt was made to destroy the fields and runways, since they were desired for our own use. In stead, fragmentation bombs were directed against enemy personnel and aircraft on the ground. To carry out the second mission of destroying communications leading to the Salerno area the marshalling yards at Villa Iyiterno and Batti paglia were bombed, and many roads and bridges in the Naples area were at tacked with good results. On D Day the Northwest African Air Forces did not face an extreme enemy air effort. Five raids by formations of eight fighter-bombers were made against our troops on the beach during the morning of 9 September, and several attacks of small formations were sent against our ships offshore. During the week fol lowing the landing the limited amount of enemy air action was almost entirely devoted to raids on the beach and on our shipping. The Germans flew from 75 to 120 sorties daily, but by D plus 5 our planes had established effective cover over the occupied area. Enemy fighter action opposing our 40 strategic missions during this period was almost negligible. During 9-17 September the Tactical Air Force was used to a great extent on the roads and railroads leading into the Salerno area,, with particular attention to the crossings over the Volturno River, Eboli, and Battipaglia. In order to provide for the most effective use of the Tactical Air Force in co-operation with the Fifth Army ground plan, XII Air Support Command was set up with its headquarters adjoining the head quarters of Fifth Army, where close liaison was maintained in conformance with the methods employed by other supporting arms. Air officers were fur nished to corps and divisions to provide liaison with these units. An organization was perfected whereby air missions could be accomplished within one and onehalf hours from time of call. During the critical days of 12-14 September the entire effort of the air forces was used in support of the ground operations. To accompany the counterattack the enemy appeared to be concentrating his fighter forces against our troops in the Salerno area. In reply our air forces dropped hundreds of tons of bombs on the roads and areas surrounding the beachhead and on enemy concentrations and supplies. On the night of 13-14 September 90 aircraft of the Troop Carrier Command dropped approximately 1300 troops of the 504th Parachute Infantry to reinforce the 36th Division, some four miles behind the right flank of Fifth Army. On 14-15 September 40 aircraft dropped 638 troops of the 2d Battalion,

53

509th Parachute Infantry, over a wide area about Avellino to assist 10 Corps. On the same night the 505th Parachute Infantry was dropped near Paestum in the VI Corps zone. On 17 September General Alexander, commanding 15th Army Group, wrote in part to Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, commanding Northwest African Air Forces: I have just returned from an extensive tour of the Fifth Army front during which I talked with the Army and many subordinate commanders, their staffs and other ranks. General Clark has asked me to convey to you and to the officers and men of the North West African Air Force whom you command, the sincere thanks and appreciation of Fifth Army for the magnificent air support which has been given them. It has greatly heartened the ground forces and has contributed much to the success of their operations. All were most enthusiastic in their acclaim of the close and continuous support which has been given them by the Air Force. After Fifth Army had recovered from the German counterattack and the beachhead was secure, our Tactical Air Force was engaged in surrounding the enemy with transport blocks to prevent his escape from within and assistance from without. To carry out this task the major effort was given to the destruction of all road and railroad bridges over the Volturno River from Benevento to the sea. Additional efforts were made to destroy the roads and railroads farther to the north to interfere with supply. To accomplish this plan roads and rail roads at Formia and Frosinone were selected as the most suitable targets. These road blocks served to create traffic jams and allowed our air force to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy motor transport columns. The Strategic Air Force with its heavy bombers and long-range fighters was first employed in the destruction of the enemy air force, landing fields, and installations. During this phase the airdromes at Cisterna-Littorio, the twin Ciampino fields near Rome, the Practica di Mare field, and the bomber base at Viterbo were heavily bombed and some 270 enemy aircraft destroyed. After these missions the important enemy harbor at Iyeghorn on the western coast was well covered, and attacks were made against the railroads and mar shalling yards in northern Italy. In these attacks the marshalling yards at Ci vitavecchia, Bologna Mestra, Pisa, and Bolzano were temporarily crippled. The following table shows the purpose of air attacks and tons of bombs dropped in the critical areas in support of Avalanche: To interfere with Eighth Army. the German forces withdrawing in front of
243 310

Auletta (roads and bridges) Sapri (roads and bridges)

54

In support of ground troops in the Salerno area. Battipaglia Castelnuovo Pompeii Salerno Torre Annunziata Torre del Greco Attacks against enemy air. Capua Airdrome Capodichino Airdrome Ciampino Airdrome Foggia Airdrome Frosinone Airdrome Grazzanise Landing Ground Practica di Mare Airdrome Viterbo Airdrome 408 134 264 180 323 444 214 486 ,-980
39O

Destruction of routes in rear of the enemy in the Fifth Army area. Cancello Grazzanise Capua Triflisco Amorosi Guardia Benevento Isernia Marshalling yards. Bologna Bolzano Civitavecchia Road nets. Formia . . . Mignano
T

382 *6i X 72
Il6

4 8 2 5 403
i0

I2

37 4 4

564
107

Leghorn

55

Against numerous other targets of lesser importance, including troop concen trations, motor transport, and gun positions, over 7000 tons of bombs were used. A total of 435 missions were flown and 17,667 tons of bombs dropped.

C.

THE BRITISH

EIGHTH

ARMY

See Map No. 9

The British Eighth Army opened the Allied invasion of the Italian main land with Operation Baytown, an amphibious assault across the Straits of Mes sina. The landing was to precede Avalanche,, the main Allied attack of Fifth Army, by six days. The initial objective of Eighth Army was to capture Reggio and San Giovanni, establish itself in the Calabrian peninsula, and be prepared to advance north through the toe. It was hoped that this operation would draw German forces to the south before the main operation at Salerno or, failing that, create a threat to the enemy south flank, should he heavily oppose the Salerno landing by Fifth Army. After landing the major portion of its force at Reggio against slight re sistance on 3 September, Eighth Army fought small dela}dng groups of the Italian Army until it reached Bagnara, where some opposition was encountered. German withdrawal was accelerated on the 9th, when Fifth Army landed below Salerno and the British 1 Airborne Division came in by sea at Taranto. "Troops of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, facing the danger of being cut off, moved northward rapidly to reinforce the German XIV Panzer Corps on the Fifth Army front. The 26th Panzer Division was left originally to block the advance of Eighth Army but withdrew towards the Salerno beachhead, leaving one battle group to face Eighth Army and prevent the junction of Fifth and Eighth Armies. The Italian government in the meantime had surrendered to the Allies, and hostile action by the Italian Army in the south ceased. Eighth Army, lacking its full complement of motor transport, continued its advance to the north by using vehicles turned over by Italian divisions. It also pushed reconnaissance units to the north and west well in advance of the main body, and by 1800, 14 September, its patrols were some 65 miles south of the beachhead at Paestum, where Fifth Army had just sustained a severe counterattack. The next day elements of Eighth Army were about 40 miles to the south. On the 15th and 16th reconnaissance patrols of the two armies met south of Agropoli at Laureana, Vallo, and Mercato. Fifth and Eighth Army

patrols also met on the 19th at Rocca d'Aspide. At this time the main western column had reached Scalea, some 75 miles to the south of Paestum. The Eighth Army move on the left to threaten the rear and left flank of the enemy force at the Salerno beachhead was delayed by demolitions prepared by the retreating Germans. On the 20th, however, the 15 Brigade (5 Infantry Division) reached Brienza, some 24 miles to the southeast of the right flank of the 45th Division at Oliveto. Potenza, the most important road center in the enemy's rear, was occupied on the 20th; Avigliano on the 23d, Muro on the 26th, and Melfi on the 28th. On this date reconnaissance patrols reached Foggia and by 1 October the 78 Division had occupied the plain about Foggia in force and controlled its important airfields. With the capture of the airfields at Foggia and the fall of Naples the invading Allied armies had accomplished their mis sions and were beginning their co-ordinated advance to the north.

57

CASSINO

man

Sea

MAP NP 9

ADVANCE ojjik ALLIED ARMIES'^. ITALY 3 September - 6 October 1943

SICILY

PRINTED BY No. I LITHO SEC M.M.PSP COY ATT 4 6 SURVEY COY. S.A.E.C. FOR ENGR. H.O. FIFTH ARMY

ANNEX NUMBER ONE

Letters and Orders of Activation

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D.C.
AG 320.2 (12-3-42) OB-I-E-M
SUBJECT:

December 8, 1942

Constitution and Activation of Fifth Army.

Commanding General, European Theater of Operations. 1. Effective as of December 1, 1942, the Fifth Army is constituted and the following elements thereof will be activated in the European Theater of Operations, as indicated, by transfer of such units, personnel and equipment as necessary from Western Task Force (formerly Task Force " A "), II Corps (Reinforced) and from other sources available to you, and equipped in accord ance with appropriate tables of basic allowances.
Unit In Accordance with:

To:

Hq, Fifth Army Hq Co, Fifth Army Special Troops, Fifth Army

T/0 200-1, July 1, 1942 T/0 200-2, July 1, 1942 T/0 200-3, July 1, 1942

2. The I Armored Corps is assigned to the Fifth Army and will be reacti vated by transfer of units, personnel and equipment from Western Task Force (formerly Task Force " A ") as may be determined by you which are in excess of the personnel and equipment assigned to the elements of the Fifth Army listed in paragraph 1 above. 3. The II Corps (Reinforced) will be reorganized as the II Corps (Non reinforced), utilizing such units, personnel and equipment of the II Corps (Rein forced) as may be determined by you. Upon reorganization, the II Corps (NonReinforced) is assigned to the Fifth Army.

61

4. Any units, personnel or equipment of the Western Task Force (formerly Task Force " A "), II Corps (Reinforced) or Allied Force Headquarters, not specifically assigned to the units listed in paragraph I above, the I Armored Corps, or the II Corps (Non-reinforced), will be assigned to the Fifth Army, as determined by you. 5. Concurrently with the action taken as prescribed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, Western Task Force (formerly Task Force " A "), headquarters elements and the provisional units of Western Task Force (formerly Task Force " A ") in the European Theater of Operations will be disbanded. 6. Direct correspondence between commanders concerned is authorized. 7. A report will be submitted to this office showing the assignment of units to the elements of the Fifth Army. By order of the Secretary of War: D. T. SAPP Adjutant General

62

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER I

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army In the Field 5 January 1943

Activation of United States Fifth Army Assumption of Command United States Fifth Army . . . .

I
II

I. ACTIVATION OF FIFTH ARMY: Pursuant to authority contained in Section I, General Orders Number 67, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, 12 December 1942 the United States Fifth Army, consisting of Head quarters and Headquarters Company and such other units as may be assigned thereto, is activated effective 0001Z 5 January 1943. II. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND FIFTH ARMY: Pursuant to au thority contained in Section II General Orders, Number 67, Headquarters Eu ropean Theater of Operations, 12 December 1942 the undersigned assumes com mand of the United States Fifth Army. MARK W. CLARK Lieutenant General, U.S.A.

GENERAL NUMBER

ORDER 2

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army 5 January 1943

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT

Announcement is made of the assignment of the following named of ficers as Chiefs of the General and Special Staff Sections indicated: Chief of Staff: Brigadier General Alfred M. Gruenther, 012242,
GSC

Major Ira W. Porter, 0349700, Inf Secretary General Staff: lieutenant Colonel Francis A. Markoe, 0901219, GSC Asst Chief of Staff G-i: Asst Chief of Staff G-2: Colonel Edwin B. Howard, 015361, GSC Asst Chief of Staff G-3: Brigadier General Arthur S. Nevins, 07110, GSC Asst Chief of Staff G-4: Colonel Clarence L. Adcock, 09310, GSC Adjutant General: Colonel Cheney L. Bertholf, 07482, AGD Artillery: Colonel Thomas E. Iyewis, 015020, FA Engineer: Colonel Frank O. Bowman, 012090, CE Chemical: Colonel Maurice E. Barker, 06779, CWS Signal: Brigadier General Richard B. Moran, 05399, AUS Air: Colonel Guy H. Gale, 010554, AC Medical: Brigadier General Frederick A. Blesse, 06265, AUS Quartermaster: Colonel Joseph P. Sullivan, 05328, QMC Civil Affairs: Colonel Charles E. Saltzman, 0275984, AUS Public Relations: Major Kenneth W. Clark, 0907752, AUS Provost Marshal: Colonel Charles R. Johnson, 05299, Cav Headquarters Commandant : lieutenant Colonel C. Coburn Smith, Jr., 018434, FA By command of lieutenant General CLARK : A. M. GRUENTHER Brigadier General, G.S.C. Chief of Staff

64

GENERAL ORDER
M NuMBER

| \ 1

Headquarters Fifth Army - p O . No. 464, U.S. Army 11 January 1943

1.

The following units are assigned to the Fifth Army: a. Army Troops. Hq & Hq Co, Fifth Army Hq & Hq Det, Spec Troops 1st Plat 21st Cml Co (Decon) 34th CA Brig (AA) consisting of: Hq & Hq Btry, 34th CA Brig (AA)
62d CA Regt (AA) (-Btry H)
68th CA Regt (AA)
103d CA Bn (AA) (AW)
213th CA Regt (AA)
437th CA Bn (AA) (AW)
658th CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
689th CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
690th CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
691st CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
692d CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
693d CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
694th CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
695th CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
696th CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
697th CA Btry (AA) (AW) (AB)
343d Kngr Regt (GS)
175th Engr Regt (GS)
40 2d Engr Bn (WS)
601st Engr Bn (Cam)
450th Engr Co (Dep)
470th Engr Co (Maint)
Engr Utilities Plat (Prov)
16th Med Regt
Co A, 36th Amb Bn

65

8th Bvac Hosp (750 bed) 9th Bvac Hosp (400 bed) n t h Bvac Hosp (400 bed) 38th Bvac Hosp (400 bed) 59th Bvac Hosp (750 bed) 77th Bvac Hosp (750 bed) 91st Bvac Hosp (Mtzd) 47th Surg Hosp 2d Med Iyab 2d Med Sup Dep Vet Det Hq & Hq Det 63d Ord Bn (Amm) w/atchd Med 64th Ord Co (Amm) 69th Ord Co (Amm) 603d Ord Co (Amm) 604th Ord Co (Amm) 608th Ord Co (Amm) 609th Ord Co (Amm) Hq & Hq Det 62d Ord Bn (Amm) w/atchd Med 53d Ord Co (Amm) 58th Ord Co (Amm) 66th Ord Co (Amm) 45th Ord Co (MM) 5th Ord Co (MM) 29th Ord Co (MM) 108th Ord Co (MM) 112th Ord Co (MM) 83d Ord Co (HM) (Tk) Hq & Hq Det, 5th Ord Bn (MM) Hq & Hq Det, 197th Ord Bn (HM) (Q) 339th Ord Co (Mot Sup) (Q) 905th Ord Co (HM) (Q) 907th Ord Co (HM) (Q) Hq & Hq Det, 55th Ord Bn (HM) (Q) 330th Ord Co (MT) (Q) (Was Co A, 55th Ord Bn (HM) (Q)) 878th Ord Co (HM) (Q) (Was Co B, 55th Ord Bn (HM) (Q)) Hq 87th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) w/atchd Med Co C, 67th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) 79th Ord Co (Dep)

66

Co D, 67th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) Co D, 87th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) 85th QM Co (Dep) 1 Plat 21st QM Co (Car) 62d Sig Bn (Const) (-Co C) 251st Sig Co (Const) 205th vSig Co (Dep) 128th Sig RI Co 163d Sig Photo Co 9th MRU 2d Bn 509th Parachute Inf Hq & Hq Sqd, 68th Obsn Gp 2d Air Support Communication Sqd Prov Air Support Sig Co Det Hq XII Air Support Command b. I Armored Corps. 2d Armd Div
3d Inf Div
9th Inf Div
Hq & Hq Co, I Armd Corps
91st Ren Sq
436th CA Bn (AA) (AW)
443d CA Bn (AA) (AW)
20th Bngr (C)
36th Bngr (C)
401st Engr Bn (WS)
66th Engr Co (Topo)
62d Armd FA Bn
58th Armd FA Bn
Hq & Hq Det Prov Ord Regt (Field) (Activated locally)
Hq & Hq Det, 43d Ord Bn (M & S)
87th Ord Co (HM) (Tk)
89th Ord Co (HM) (FA)
3d Ord Co (MM)
101st Ord Co (MM)
201st Ord Co (Dep)
67th Ord Bn (-Cos C & D) (HM) (Q)
Hq & Hq Det, 205th QM Bn (G Sup)

67

Co C, 205th QM Bn (G Sup)
138th QM Co (Trk)
144th QM Co (Trk)
Co A, 23d QM Regt (Tk Trk)
1st Armd Sig Bn
Postal Sec
70th Tk Bn (L)
756th Tk Bn (L)
Prov Tk Co (Iv)
Fin Disb Unit No 6055-E
Co C, 101st MP Bn
c. II Corps. 1st Inf Div 1st Armd Div Hq & Hq Co, II Corps 202d MP Co 209th CA Regt (AA) 431st CA Bn (AA) (AW) 432d CA Bn (AA) (AW) 19th Bngr Regt (C) 62d Engr Co (Topo) 13th FA Brig Hq & Hq Btry 1st Obsn Bn 17th FA 36th FA 178th FA 51st Med Bn Hq & Hq Det Prov Ord Regt (Field) (Activated locally) Hq & Hq Det 42d Ord Bn (M & S) w/atchd Med 78th Ord Co Dep 14th Ord Co (MM) 9th Ord Co (MM) Hq & Hq Det, 87th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) 3485th Ord Co (MM) (Q) 3486th Ord Co (MM) (Q) 30th Ord Co (MM) (Tk) Co D, 244th QM Bn (Serv)

Co A, 205th QM Bn (Gas Sup)


1st Engr Amph Brig
1st Ranger Bn
53d Sig Bn
601st TD Bn
d. VI Corps. 34th Inf Div
Det Hq & Hq Co, 105th CA Bn (AA) 106th CA Bn (AA) 107th CA Bn (AA) 701st TD Bn
VI Corps
(AW)
(AW)
(AW)

The following units are attached as indicated. a. To Atlantic Base Section. 1) From Fifth Army. 175th Engr Regt (GS) 1 Co 4O2d Engr Bn (WS) 205th Sig Co (Depot) Vet Det Co A, 36th Amb Bn 2d Med Ivab Hq & Hq Det 63d Ord Bn (Amm) w/atchd Med 64th Ord Co (Amm) 603d Ord Co (Amm) 604th Ord Co (Amm) 608th Ord Co (Amm) 609th Ord Co (Amm) 5th Ord Co (MM) 29th Ord Co (MM) 83d Ord Co (HM) (Tk) 339th Ord Co (HM) (Q) 905th Ord Co (HM) (Q) 907th Ord Co (HM) (Q) Co C, 67th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) Co D, 67th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) Hq & Hq Det 197th Ord Bn (HM) (Q) w/atchd Med 8th Evac Hosp

69

n t h Evac Hosp 59th Evac Hosp 91st Evac Hosp 1st Plat, 21st Cml Co (Decon) 437th CA Bn (AA) (AW) 68th CA Regt (AA) Hqs Btry & S/Iv Bn, 213th CA Regt 69th Ord Co (Amm)
2) From I Armored Corps.

Det 66th Engr Co (Topo) (1 off, 25 EM)


138th QM Co (Trk)
144th OM Co (Trk)
Co A, 23d QM Regt (Tk Trk)
201st Ord Co (Depot)
To the Mediterranean Base Section. 1) From Fifth Army. 62d CA Regt (AA) (-S/Iv Bn and Btry H) 103d CA Bn (AA) (AW) 343d Engr Regt (GS) 4O2d Engr Bn (WS) (-1 Co) 470th Engr Co (Maint) 450th Engr Co (Depot) Co B, 601st Engrs (Cam) Hq & Hq Det, 87th Ord Bn (MM) (Q) w/atchd Med Hq & Hq Det, 55th Ord Bn (HM) (O) 3488th Ord Co (MM) (Q) (Was B-87th) 108th Ord Co (MM) 112th Ord Co (MM) Hq & Hq Det, 5th Ord Bn (MM) 79th Ord Co (Depot) 45th Ord Co (MM) Hq & Hq Det, 62d Ord Bn (Amm) w/atchd Med 53d Ord Co (Amm) 58th Ord Co (Amm) 330th Ord Co (MT) (Q) (Was Co A, 55th Ord Bn (HM) (Q)) 878th Ord Co (HM) (Q) (Was Co B, 55th Ord Bn (HM) (Q)) 16th Med Regt

38th Evac Hosp (750 bed)


77th Evac Hosp (750 bed)
48th Surg Hosp
4th Sec, 2d Med Supply Depot
85th QM Co (Depot)
128th Sig Co (RI)
9th MRU
66th Ord Co (Amm)
2) From II Corps.
1st Engr Amph Brig
62d Engr Co (Topo)
By command of lieutenant General ClyARK: A. M. GRUENTHER Brigadier General, G.S.C. Chief of Staff. Official:
F. W. ROBERTS

Major, A.G.D.
Asst. Adjutant General

71

ANNEX NUMBER TWO.

Orders and Instructions

OUTLINE PLAN OPERATION AVALANCHE

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.vS. Army 26 August 1943

(CORRECTED COPY)

(Supersedes Outline Plan ~ Operation AVALANCHE,

15 August)

SECTION I

SITUATION 1. Assumptions
a.
HUSKY.

Italian resistance is approximately that encountered in operation

b. Germany's commitments in Russia continue to hold the bulk of her ground and air forces on the Russian front. c. Operation BUTTRESS is not mounted. d. Operation BAYTOWN has been mounted. 2. Enemy: See Annex 1 G-2 Plan. 3. Friendly: See Annex 2 Troop List (U.S.) and Order of Battle (Br.).

SECTION I I

MISSION 4. To seize the Port of NAPLES and to secure the airfields in the NAPLES area with a view to preparing a firm base for further offensive operations.

75

SECTION III

OPERATIONS 5. General a. Boundary between VI and 10 Corps: Right (north) bank of $Ei,E River to junction of TANAGRO River except that PONTE SEI,E (bridge at N 9522), will be the responsibility of 10 Corps until relieved by VI Corps. b. D Day: Day on which main assaults are launched in Gui,F of
SALERNO.

c. H Hour: Time at which first landing craft touch the beaches in


GUI,F of SALERNO.

MODIFY

6. Preparatory measures Prior to D Day. a. Naval and Air Action: To be undertaken with the object of reduc ing the naval and air power of the enemy and his other capabilities of inter fering with the operation. -? \f II Plan: To be luTnished by 7. Assaults a. BRAVE Assault 1) Commander: lieutenant General Sir Richard If. McCreery, K C . B , D.S.O., M.C.; GOC 10 Corps (Br.). 2) Troops Hq, 10 Corps 46 Division 56 Division 7 Armoured Division 3 Ranger Battalions (U.S.) 2 Commandos Supporting Troops (See Annex 2 Troop List) 3) Missions a) Phase 1 1. To launch simultaneous assaults at H Hour on beaches in the GUI,F of SALERNO north of the SEI<E River. 2. To seize and secure SALERNO, the MONTECORVINO airdromes and the mountain passes NW of SALERNO. 3. To capture by H Hour hostile gun batteries capable of interfering with the operation.

76

4- To advance inland, seize the high ground covering SAUSRNO plain and to establish a beachhead coordinated with beachhead established by CUB Assault. (See par. 7b below.)
b) Phase 2 T. To advance from the east and southeast to capture the Port of NAPLES and the CAPODICHINO and POMI GUANO D ' A R C O airdromes. 2. To secure the Army right flank north of PONTE SEI,E. 4) 5) 6) Maintenance: Over the beaches and through the Port of SALERNO until the Port of NAPI.ES is operative. Transport: Ship to shore and shore to shore (As planned for operation BUTTRESS.) Support Navy By naval gunfire on call from sub-task force commanders. b) Air 1. 2. Fighter protection from hostile air interference. Direct and indirect support of ground operations by: a) Prearranged strategic missions. b) Tactical missions, prearranged or on call. 3. b. Reconnaissance and photo missions. CUB Assault 1) Commander: Major General Ernest J. Dawley, VI Corps (U.S.). 2) Troops Hq, VI Corps
36th Infantry Division
One Tank Bn (M)
vSupporting Troops (See Annex 2 Troop Iyist)
3) Missions a) To launch simultaneous assaults at H Hour on beaches in the GUI,F of SALERNO south of the SEI,E River. b) To advance inland, seize the high ground covering the SALERNO plain and establish a beachhead coordinated with beachhead established by BRAVE Assault. (See par ya above.) a)

77

c) To secure the Army right flank south of PONTE SELE. d) To prevent the movement of hostile forces into the SA LERNO plain within VI Corps sector. 4) Maintenance: Over the beaches until the Port of NAPLES is operative. 5) Transport: Ship to shore. (See AnnexAllocation of shipping.) 6) Support a) Navy By naval gunfire on call from sub-task force commanders. b) Air 1. 2. Fighter protection from hostile air interference. Direct and indirect support of ground operations by: a) Prearranged strategic missions. b) Tactical missions prearranged or on call. c. GIANT Assault 1) 2) 3) Commander: Troops: vision. Mission To drop a parachute task force during the night D-i/D in the VOI/TURNO Valley; destroy t h e crossings over the VOL TURNO from T R I F U S C O to t h e sea; to delay enemy forces moving south across the VOI/TURNO; t o be prepared to withdraw along the high ground southeast of CAPUA to rejoin elements of the Fifth Army; and also to be prepared to withdraw from the CAPUA area on N A P L E S . 4) 5) Transport: By arrangement with Troop Carrier Command. Maintenance: By air until t h e Port of N A P L E S is operative. If the Parachute RCT makes contact with 16 Corps (Brk) prior to the time that t h e Port of N A P L E S is operative, the responsibility for supply will be t h a t of 10 Corps (Brit.) Major General Matthew B. Ridgway. One Parachute RCT Reinforced, 82d Airborne Di

d. NAT Assault 1) 2) Commander: Captain Charles Andrews, U.S.N. Force: Naval Force provided by Commander Western Naval Task Force.

3)

Mission To create a diversion by a feint against the beaches NW of NAPLES with a view to diverting a maximum of hostile forces to that sector and away from the main assaults.

4)

Transport: By arrangement with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. (Available D Day) (Two Sep

e. ARMY FLOATING RESERVE arate Forces.) Force I 1) 2) 3) Commander: (U.S.). Troops:

Major General Troy Middleton, 45th Division

Reinforced RCT, 45th Division (U.S.).

Mission To embark from SICILY and to be prepared to land on D Day over any of the previously assaulted beaches. Maintenance: ative. Transport: Support: Over the beaches until Port of
NAPLES

4) 5) 6) 1) 2) 3)

is oper

Shore to shore in craft as allotted. Fighter protection from hostile air interference. Major General Matthew B. Ridgway.

Force II Commander: Troops: Mission To be prepared to land with light equipment on beaches which have not been previously established. Probable lo cations of these beaches will be indicated later, 4) 5) /. Transport: is operative. Follow-Up Troops 1) The following troops will be prepared to embark from NORTH AFRICA or SICILY for NAPLES area as shipping becomes avail able in order of priority indicated in follow-up lists to be issued at later date: Balance 45th Division (U.S.) Shore to shore. Over the beaches until the Port of
NAPLES

One Reinforced RCT, 82d Airborne Division.

Maintenance:

79

34th Division (U.S.) 13th Field Artillery Brigade (U.S.) Balance 82d Airborne Division 1st or 2d Armored Division One Tank Bn (M) (U.S.) Supporting troops (To be designated) 2) The 1st Airborne Division (Br) will remain initially in Army reserve and be prepared to land such forces, as can be trans ported in available aircraft to execute assigned missions. g. Anti-Aircraft Plan See Annex 7.

SECTION

IV

ADMINISTRATIVE 8. See Annexes 4 and 5 G-4 and G-i Plans.

SECTION V

COMMUNICATIONS 9. See Annex 6 Signal Communication Plan. CLARK Commanding GRUENTHER Chief of Staff
Official:
BRANN

G-3

80

FIELD ORDER i TTQ , , -..^ .

XT

NuMBER

r \ )

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army 25 August 1943

MAPS:

Special Operation Map No. 1, 1:250,000.

1.

INFORMATION.

a. Enemy. See current intelligence summaries; Annex No. 1, O-2 Plan, Outline Plan, Operation AVALANCHE; and overprinted maps. b. Friendly. 1) Fifth Army (U.S.) and Eighth Army (Br.) under 15th Army Group are conducting Operation AVALANCHE in the NAPLES area and Operation BAYTOWN in the toe of ITALY respectively. 2) XII Air Support Command and Western Naval Task Force are supporting Fifth Army Operation AVALANCHE. 3) Allied Troops in NORTH AFRICA and SICILY. 2. MISSION. Fifth Army, with Corps abreast, VI Corps on the right, will launch attacks in the SALERNO area on " H " hour, " D" Day. a. b. c. and French 3. To seize and secure the Port of NAPLES. To seize and secure the Airfields in NAPLES area. Secure a firm base for future operations. Troops: U.S., British forces. See Annex 2, Troop Iyist, Outline Plan, Operation AVALANCHE.

TACTICAL MISSION FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS. a. Brave Force: See Special Operation Map No. 1. b. Cub Force: See Special Operation Map No. 1. c. Giant Force: See Special Operation Map No. 1. d. Antiaircraft Artillery: See Annex 7, AAA Plan, Operation AVA

LANCHE.

e. Floating Reserve: One RCT 45th Division (U.S.) and one RCT 82d AB DivisionSee Special Operation Map No. 1.

81

4. ADMINISTRATION: See Administrative Order No. i to Field Order No. i. 5. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS a. vSee Signal Annex 6, to Field Order No. 1, Signal Communications. b. CP's: Fifth Army: U.S.S. A neon; SAI^KRNO. Cub Force: U.S.S. Samuel Chase; AGROPOiyi. Brave Force: H.M.S. Hilary; SAI+ERNO. Others: To be reported as set up. CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

G-3

82

CHANGE, N O , I

to

) j
N

FIELD ORDER NO. I

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army I September 1943

OPERATION AVALANCHE 1. Change mission of GIANT FORCE (Special Operation Map No. 1, GSGS 4230, Sheets 35, 36 and 41) as' follows: a. To land one RCT (-1 Bn); 82d Airborne Division by parachute and glider under cover of darkness during night of D-i/D Day south of the VOI/TURNO; seize and destroy the crossing at CAPUA. b. If compelled to withdraw, to move SB through foothills of the APENNINES to rejoin elements of the FIFTH ARMY. c. To be prepared to withdraw, on Army Order, to the NAPLES area. CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

G-3

FIELD ORDER NUMBER

/ I

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army Vicinity PAESTUM, ITALY 16 September 1943

MapSecond Edition, 1/100,000. 1. Enemy forces may be forced to withdraw northward from present positions confronting Fifth Army as a result of increasing pressure on their front. 2. Fifth Arnw continues on present mission of seizing NAPLES and adjacent airfields with a view to establishing a firm base for further operations. 3. a. A force, directly under Fifth Army, commanded by Brig. Gen. W. H. Wilbur, U.S.A., and consisting of troops listed in b and c below, will be prepared on four (4) hours notice from this Headquarters to move rapidly on BENEVENTO via EBOURJ at O 1049VAI^ATA with the object of seizing and holding BENEVENTO. The force commander will await further orders at
BENEVENTO.

b. Troops. 180th RCT


753d Tk Bn
Troops to be designated by CG, VI Corps. One Btry, 155-mm How One TD Company One Reconnaissance Company One Engineer Company (C) One Engineer Company (Bridge) Sig Det with SCR 299 Two Batteries AA (SP) One Truck Company or equivalent

c.

4.

a. c.

Basic loads will be carried. Resupply from VI Corps dumps using force transportation.

b. Engineers will carry extra mine detectors.

5.

Reports to Fifth Army will be rendered every hour on the hour. CLARK Commanding

pfficial:
BRANN

G-3

FIELD ORDER NUMBER

) I (

Headquarters Fifth Arm}' A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army Vicinity PAESTUM, ITALY 18 September 1943

1. Enemy situationSee G-2 Estimate dated 18 September. on the front of the Fifth Army is believed to be withdrawing.

The enemy

2. The Fifth Army resumes the offensive with a view to accomplishing its mission of seizing NAPLES, securing the airfields in that vicinity and estab lishing a bridgehead. 3. a. The VI Corps will conduct patrolling during the night 18/19 Sep tember to the line indicated on overlay. At 0610B this Corps will advance its left to secure the high ground in its zone of action west of EBOLI. If this high ground is held in such force that a coordinated attack is necessary to secure it, the attack will be coordinated by the Division Commanders of the 45th and 56 Divisions. On arrival on its objective, the 45th Division will be prepared on Army Order to advance via the road EBOLICONTURSIQUAGLIETTA with the mission of securing the line NuscoTEORA. b. The 10 Corps will be prepared to assist the VI Corps in the capture of the high ground west of EBOLI by having the 56 Division prepared to launch an attack on this objective in coordination with the 45th Division. Details of coordination by Division Commander concerned. 4. 5. Administration details omitted. Command Post:
Corps Headquartersno change.
Army Headquartersno change.
CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

G-3

86

FIELD ORDER
M NuMBER

( \

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army Vicinity PAKSTUM, ITALY 191500 September 1943

1. a. Enemy situation See G-2 Report No. 12. 6. The Eighth Army operating on the right of the Fifth Army will secure the POTENZA Area. Point of junction between Armies and boundary as shown on operations overlay. 2. The Fifth Army will hold the high ground north of MAIORI on which it will pivot to secure the line TEORA - MONTEMARANO - AVELXINO - NOCERA CASTEIXAMMARE - Preparatory to a further advance on NAPL.ES. 3. a. On Army orders the VI Corps, constituted as shown in Annex No. 1, will move, with the 45th Infantry Division on the right, via roads within its zone of action to seize the line TEORA - MONTEMARANO - AVELLINO. The VI Corps is responsible for the protection of the right flank of Fifth Army and for maintaining contact with the Eighth Army. b. 10 Corps will secure the line NOCERA - CASTELLAMMARE, maintain contact with VI Corps and hold the SAI,ERNO bridgehead within its zone of action. c. The 36th Infantry Division, reinforced as indicated in Annex No. 1 (Troop List), operating under Fifth Army, will secure the SALERNO bridgehead indicated on Operations overlay within VI Corps boundaries. d. The 82d Airborne Division (less detachments) will assemble in Army Reserve. See Operations overlay. 4. a. Fifth Army will operate beaches and dumps now operated by VI Corps, administrative details later. b. See Administrative Order No. 2.

5. a. Current SOP and SOI, Fifth Army govern. b. Command Posts: Fifth Army: N 875070. (no change) Fifth Army Rear Echelon: PAESTUM. Eighth Army: To be announced. VI Corps: Junction Highway No. 18 and >Sele River (N 858107). 10 Corps: PONTKCAGNANO FAIANO. 36th Division: N 885059. 82d Airborne Division: To be announced. c. Axis of vSignal Communication. VI Corps: N 858107, ACERNO (N 894375), RJ at N 874553. 10 Corps: PONTECAGNANO FAIANO, NOCERA (N 540380). (1. Points designated as future CP locations will be points of contact for liaison personnel and messengers. Actual CP locations, if changed from points indicated will be reported immediately. e. Additional details in Annex 2 (Signals). CLARK Commanding Official: Kammerer
for BRANN

G-3

88

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION.
NuMBER

' \

Headquarters Fifth A r m y A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army Near PAESTUM, ITAI,Y. 201700 September 1943

(Note: This is t h e first of a series of Operations Instructions t h a t will be published b y this H e a d q u a r t e r s . Such instructions will contain directives, orders or other m a t t e r s dealing with operations t h a t normally apply to portions only of Fifth Army. Distribution of these instructions will be made, however, to all interested units.) 1. T h e 36th I n f a n t r y Division (less 1st Bn, 143d Inf, Btries A and C, 155th F A Bn, a n d B t r y A, 133d F A Bn) will assemble in the area west of Ai/TAvn,i,A between F . CAI,ORE, T. IVACOSA and V A U , E ACAVA. (1/50,000 Map). Movements into this area will be completed b y 1200B, 21 September 1943. 2. T h e situation permitting, it is planned t h a t t h e 36th Infantry Division will remain a p p r o x i m a t e l y seven (7) days in this area for reorganization and t h e reception of replacements, after which t h e Division will be used to assist in t h e operations against N A P L E S . 3. I n addition t o t h e local defense of the assembly area indicated above,

t h e 3 6 t h I n f a n t r y Division will outpost t h e line A G R O P O U (S 8495) - OGWASTRO (S 8995) - T R E N T I N A R A ( N 9 4 o o ) - M . SOPRANO (N 9303), with not to exceed one rifle c o m p a n y or its equivalent. CLARK Commanding

Official:
BRANN

G-3

89

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION NUMBER

/ (

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.vS. Army Near PAESTUM, ITAI,Y 201700 September 1943

1. a. The 8-2d Airborne Division, with Forces listed below, will concen trate in the CONTRONE area by 1800, 21 September.
b. Forces

Div Hq and Spec Troops (-)


505th Parachute Inf
504th Parachute Inf (-3d Bn)
320th FA Bn
si -T^A ^ 1 On arrival. 376th FA Bn S 2. Effective at 1800, 21 September, this force will be prepared on Army Order to assist the advance of the VI Corps by: a. b. c. d. Protecting the right flank of the Corps. Extending the right of the Corps. Maintaining contact with the Eighth Arm}7. Offensive operations against the left and rear of enemy forces delaying the advance of the Corps.

3. Transportation as listed below will be temporarily transferred from units indicated to the 82d Airborne Division. Details of transfer will be made between division commanders concerned. 40 2% ton trucks from 36th Div 41 14 ton C & R from 36th Div 40 1 ton tlrs from 468th QM Truck Bn CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

G-3

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION

' \

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Armv Near PAESTUM, ITALY 222100 vSeptember 1943

1. After the 10 Corps has secured the VIETRI - NOCERA and SALERNO SAN SEVERINO passes and advanced sufficient force onto the plains of NAPLES, it will press on to the northwest, capture NAPLES and continue the advance until the enemy is driven north of the VOLTURNO. The U.S. Ranger Force, after assisting 10 Corps in the capture of NAPLES, will revert to Army control in NAPLES. When 10 Corps troops have reached the VOLTURNO, the Corps will be responsible for protection of NAPLES in its zone of action (See Overlay). A force not to exceed one brigade will remain in NAPLES and assisted b}r the U.S. Ranger Force police the city of NAPLES until relieved by the Commanding General, 82d Division. It is desired that the defense of the line of the VOLTURNO be conducted with the minimum number of troops in forward de fense. After the area south of the VOLTURNO has been cleared of the enemy and the VI Corps has reached the line BENEVENTO - TEORA the boundary between Corps will be as shown on overlay. 2. The VI Corps will continue its advance to secure the line AVELLINO TEORA. When this line is secured, the Corps will be prepared on Army Order to secure the line BENEVENTO - TEORA (the eastern end of this line will be advanced as the Eighth Army advances) with not to exceed two divisions. 3. Two divisions (34th and 36th) will be moved onto the plains of on Army Order (See Overlay).
NAPLES

4. The 82d Division (less elements), now in the CONTRONE area, will be prepared on Army Order to move overland or by sea to the city of NAPLES.

91

All elements of 82d Division now with the Ranger force, will pass to control of Commanding General, 82d Division, on his arrival in NAPLES. The Com manding General of this division is placed in command of the city of NAPICES, on arrival, charged with restoring order and the prevention of rioting and looting. CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

G-3

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION
NuMBER

\ / \

Headquarters Fifth A r m y A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army Near P A E S T U M , ITAI,Y 291800 September 1943

1. After t h e c a p t u r e of A V E W J N O t h e VI Corps will have completed t h e mission of securing t h e line A V E U J N O - MONTEMARANO - T E O R A . 2. I t is directed t h a t , as soon as A V E I X I N O is captured, VI Corps shift t h e mass of its forces t o t h e left along t h e above general line leaving screening forces only t o cover its supply route east of MONTEMARANO. 3. P l a n s for further operations of VI Corps will be prepared at once as follows : a. On A r m y order t o a t t a c k west with not t o exceed one reinforced division, seize t h e line N O L A - A V E I X A and be prepared t o assist 10 Corps in t h e c a p t u r e of N A P L E S . b. On A r m y order t o seize B E N E V E N T O . 1) 2) Plans for this operation

will b e based on t h e following assumptions: T h a t t w o divisions are available for the operation, one division T h a t t h r e e divisions are available for the operation. CLARK Commanding h a v i n g been c o m m i t t e d in t h e plan outlined in a. above.

Official:
BRANN

G-3

93

ANNEX NUMBER THREE

Statistics

CASUALTIES, U. S. FORCES

9 SEPTEMBER - 6 OCTOBER 1943

Killed in Action

Wounded in Action

Missing in Action 104

Total
604

9 September
10 11 12

136

7 54
36

364 54
209

143
208

7 68 8
286

68
33i

187

13 14 15 36 17 18 19
20 21 22

A
) )

55 54
56
33

549
426

287
190

85
118 25 12
12

364
151 172

93
116

44 8 5
12 12

78 63
4i

98
529
60

461 (i)

) )

46
5i

68 164
130 80 90

7 94
1

*74
211

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

) ) ) )

184 125 109

37
17

8
2

9 6
2

43
14 30

6 3
1 0 1

58
23

33
5i 4i

43
33

(1) The large number reported missing on 19 September is the result of the reorganization accomplished by that date, which showed those previously missing and not reported.

97

Killed in Action I October


2

Wounded in Action

Missing in Action
0 1 1 2 1 1

Total

12 20 10 22

30

42

55
52

76
63 63 63
92

3 4 5 6

17
12

39 45 79
2841

Total

788

1318

4947

Casualties were not recorded daily by 10 Corps but the British total for the period was:
Killed 982 Wounded 4060 Missing 2230 Total 7272

Total Fifth Army


1770 6901 354 8 12,219

PRISONERS OF WAR

9-30 SEPTEMBER 1943

VI Corps

502

10 Corps

1019

MAJOR

ORDNANCE

LOSSES

9-30 SEPTEMBER 1943

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP A

Gun, 37-mm, Mi, AT Gun, auto., 40-mm, Mi Gun, MG, cal .30, M1917A1 Gun, MG, cal .30, M1919A4 Gun, MG, cal .50, M2, HB Gun, MG, cal .50, M2, WC Gun, sub MG, cal .45, Thompson, Ml Rifle, auto., cal .30, M1918 Mortar, 60-mm, M2 Mortar, 81-mm, Mi

T o

x
52
44
52
16
44
43
34
48

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP B

Bayonet, M1905 Carbine, cal .30, M1A1 Knife, trench, Mi Iyauncher, grenade, Mi launcher, rocket, AT, Mi Pistol, auto., cal .45, M1911 Pistol, pyro, AM, M8 w/mount Pistol, Very, 10-gauge, Mk III Projector, pyro, M9, hand Projector, signal, ground, M4 Rifle, US, cal .30, M1903A1 Rifle, US, cal .30, Mi

435 48 263 97 88 *68


1

4
2 2

Io8 J

45

99

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP C

Gun, 57-mm, Mi Gun, 155-mm, Mi

8
i

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP G

Car, scout, M3A1 Carriage, motor, 75-mm howitzer, M8 Carriage, motor, 75-mm howitzer, T30 Carriage, motor, 75-mm gun, M3 Carriage, motor, 3-inch gun, Mio Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M13 Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3 Motorcycle, chain driven, Harley-Davidson Tank, medium, M4 & M4A1 Trailer, 1/4 ton payload, 2 wheel cargo Trailer, 1 ton payload, 2 wheel cargo Trailer, 1 ton 250 gal water tank Trailer, armored, M8 Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4 , amphibian Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4 , Ford Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4, WC Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4 , C & R Truck, 2 y2 ton, 6 x 6 , amphibian Truck, 2 % ton, 6 x 6 , cargo Truck, 2 y2 ton, 6 x 6 , special body Truck, 4 ton, 6 x 6 , cargo Truck, 4 ton, 6 x 6 , wrecker Truck, 6 ton, 6 y 6 , cargo

26 4 8 4 11 1 12 2 24 41 16 4 4 9 93 8 8 6 30 3 1 1 2

100

SUPPLY

A detailed report on supply 9 September-15 November 1943 may be found in Annex Number One to Fifth Army History, Part II. Until the Army could capture Naples, an integral part of the plans for Avalanche, its supply had to come over the Salerno beachhead and thence over difficult terrain, which included the western slopes of the Apennine Mountains. By 20 September the Fifth Army beachhead was free from hostile threats on the ground, but on 28 vSeptember a severe storm destroyed many landing craft and prevented unloading for two days. The following figures indicate the extent of supply over the beaches, despite such handicaps, during the period 9-30 September: 1) IyCT's in operation (daily average) IvCM's in operation (daily average) Dukws in operation (daily average) Total tonnage disembarked Average tonnage disembarked per day Total vehicles disembarked Maximum tonnage disembarked over U.S. beaches in one day 63 28 146 121,496 5>522 29,440 5,491

2)

3)

101

ANNEX NUMBER FOUR

. . . . . . . . .

Troop List of Fifth Army

29 SEPTEMBER 1943

TROOP LIST OF FIFTH ARMY

29 SEPTEMBER 1943

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS Headquarters, Fifth Army vSpecial Troops, Fifth Army Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops Headquarters Company, Fifth Army
Attached:

Battery A, 630th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion 2616th Engineer Utilities Platoon Detachment, 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment 22d Quartermaster Car Company [-1 Platoon] 63d Signal Battalion [-Detachment]; attached: Detachment A, 71st Signal Company (Special) 163d Signal Photo Company, Laboratory Unit Detachment A, 117th Signal Company (Radio Intercept) Detachment, 6662d Signal Sendee Company Detachment, 6663d Signal Service Company 180th vSignal Repair Company [-2 Radio Repair Sections and Detach
ments]; attached:

1 vStorage and Issue Section, 812th Signal Port Service Company 541st and 542d Army Postal Units Company C, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion 101st Military Police Battalion 33d Finance Disbursing Section Antiaircraft Artillery: 45th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 1st Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA); attached: Batteries A and B, 409th AAA Gun Battalion (Semi-Mobile)

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS

(continued)

403d AAA Gun Battalion


435th and 534th AAA Automatic. Weapons Battalions
630th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion [-Battery A]
iO2d Barrage Balloon Battery (Very Low Altitude)
Detachment, 104th Barrage Balloon Battery (Very Low Altitude)
6673d Gun Operations Room Platoon

Attached:

400th and 451st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions 168 th Chemical Company (Smoke Generating) 2d Battalion, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) Armored Force: 753d Tank Battalion (Medium) Chemical; Detachment, 6th Chemical Company (Depot)
24th Chemical Company (Decontamination)
Engineers: 337th and 343d Engineer General Service Regiments Company A, 405th Engineer Water Supply Battalion [-Detachment] Company C, 405th Engineer Water Supply Battalion [-Composite Platoon] 427th Engineer Dump Truck Company Detachment (Reconnaissance), 696th Petroleum Distributing Company i2O2d Engineer Firefighting Platoon General: Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 6665th Base Area Group 29th Replacement Battalion Inf antry: Companies E and F, 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment [-Detachment]; attached: Band, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment

I06

36th Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company 36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) ^ n i t h Engineer Battalion 36th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 155th Field Artillery Battalion [-Batteries A and C] [155-mm Howitzer] 131st and I32d Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer] 133d Field Artillery Battalion [-Battery A] [105-mm Howitzer] 1 n t h Medical Battalion
736th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
36th Quartermaster Company
36th Signal; Company
Military Police Platoon
141st Infantry Regiment
I42d Infantry Regiment
143d Infantry Regiment [-1st Battalion]

Attached:

8th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery Battery A, 105th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled) Detachment A, 72d Signal Company (Special) 48th Finance Disbursing Section Medical: Detachment, 4th Medical Supply Depot 8th, 38th, and 56th Evacuation Hospitals (750 Bed) 16th Evacuation Hospital (750 Bed); attached: 28th and 42d Malaria Control Units Surgical Teams 7, IT, 15, 20, and 25 (2d Auxiliary Surgical Group) Shock Teams 1, 2, and 4 93d Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile); attached:
Surgical Team 10
Orthopedic Team 5
94th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile); attached:
Surgical Teams 1, 4, and 12
95th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed); attached:
Surgical Teams 14 and 19
Shock Team 3

107

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS

{continued)

161st Medical Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 401st, 4O2d, and 403d Collecting Companies 601st Clearing Company i62d Medical Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 404th and 406th Collecting Companies 6o2d Clearing Company [-2d Platoon]
Attached:

Company B, 36th Ambulance Battalion Military Police: 379th Prisoner of War Escort Company Ordnance: 6694th Ordnance Base Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 42d Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance and Supply), Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 79th and 189th Ordnance Depot Companies
Attached:

Company A, 302d Ordnance Base Regiment 45th Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance and Supply), Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 28th, 29th, and 46th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies Detachment, 112th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q) 3485th, 3486th, and 3488th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies (Q)
Attached:

77th Ordnance Depot Company [42d Ordnance Battalion] 62d Ordnance Battalion (Ammunition), Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 58th.. 66th, and 26^26. Ordnance Ammunition Companies Company R, 3O2d Ordnance Base Regiment (Ammunition) 87th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 87th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank) 3497th Ordnance Maintenance Company (Q) 188th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 477th Ordnance Evacuation Company 529th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)

108

Quartermaster: ist Platoon, Company D, 6ist Quartermaster Laundry Battalion


204th Quartermaster Gas Supply Battalion [-Companies A and D]
242d, 530th, and 53 6 th Quartermaster Service Battalions
263d Quartermaster Service Battalion [-Company B]
47th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration) [-2d and 3d Platoons]
ist Platoon, 67th Quartermaster Refrigeration Company
85th Quartermaster Depot Company [-Detachment]
90th Quartermaster Company (Railhead) [-3 Platoons]
93d and 94th Quartermaster Companies (Railhead)
vSupply: 6th Port; attached: 531st Engineer Shore Regiment; attached: 2699th Engineer Map Detachment Companies A and C, 52d Quartermaster Battalion (Dukw) 74th Signal Company (Special) 540th Engineer Shore Regiment [-Company F]; attached:
Detachment, 286th Signal Company
Transportation: Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 6th Port (Mobile) Headquarters, Staging Area Detachment, 2d Group Regulating Station Company A, 53d Quartermaster Battalion (Dukw) 56th Quartermaster Truck Battalion 389th and 480th Port Battalions (Transportation Corps) 2d Battalion, 27th Quartermaster Truck Regiment 1st Battalion, 468th Quartermaster Truck Regiment
Attached from AFHQ:

9th Machine Records Unit


Attached from Military Railway Service:

Detachment.. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 703d Railway Grand Division

109

VI CORPS Headquarters and Headquarters Company Antiaircraft Artillery [attached); 35th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
Chemical {attached):

84th Chemical Battalion [-Company A] Engineers: 36th Engineer Combat Regiment [-Company H] 39th Engineer Combat Regiment [-2d Battalion] 661st Engineer Topographic Company
Attached:

Company B and Detachment, Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion Detachment, Company A, 405th Engineer Water Supply Battalion 1st Platoon, 451st Engineer Depot Company [from Atlantic Base Section] Field Artillery {attached): 13th Field Artiller}' Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer] [- Anti tank PlatoonJ 36th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Gun] [-2d Battalion] 1st Battalion, 178th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer] 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion [-Detachment] Infantry: 3d Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) 10th Engineer Battalion 3d Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 9th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer] 10th, 39th, and 41st Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer 3d Medical Battalion 703d Ordnance Light Maintenance Company 3d Quartermaster Company 3d Signal Company Military Police Platoon

110

7th Infantry Regiment


15th Infantry Regiment
30th Infantry Regiment

Attached:

1st Battalion, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment; attached:


409th AAA Gun Battalion (Semi-Mobile) [-Batteries A and B]
441st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
3d Platoon, 48th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
751st Tank Battalion (Medium)
34th Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company
34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
109th Engineer Battalion
34th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
185th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer] 125th, 151st, and 175th Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer] 109th Medical Battalion 2634th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company 2635th Quartermaster Company 34th Signal Company Military Police Platoon 133d Infantry Regiment [-2d Battalion] 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) [-Companies E and F]
135th Infantry Regiment
168th Infantry Regiment

Attached:

5th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 105th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled) [-Battery A] 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion 45th Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company 45th Cavalry Reconnaisance Troop (Mechanized) 120th Engineer Battalion 45th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 189th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer] 158th, T6oth, and 171st Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer]

III

VI CORPS (continued} 120th Medical Battalion


700th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
45th Quartermaster Company
45th Signal Company
Military Police Platoon
157th Infantry Regiment
179th Infantry Regiment
180th Infantry Regiment

Attached:

. . .

2d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)


106th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
191st Tank Battalion (Medium)
756th Tank Battalion (Light)
645th Tank Destroyer Battalion Medical: 52d Medical Battalion Military Police: 206th Military Police Company
Attached:

Company A, 504th Military Police Battalion


Quartermaster [attached):
Company A, 204th Quartermaster Gas Supply Battalion
Company B, 263d Quartermaster Service Battalion
2d and 3d Platoons, 47th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
2d Platoon, 48th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
2d and 3d Platoons, 90th Quartermaster Company (Railhead)
Company D, 27th Quartermaster Truck Regiment
Signal: 57th Signal Battalion; attached:
Detachment C, 71st Signal Company (Special)

Attached:

Detachment, 128th Signal Company (Radio Intercept)


Detachment, 180th Signal Repair Company

112

Detachment, 849th Signal Intelligence Service


Detachment B, 726. Signal Company (Special)
Tank Destroyer (attached): 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion [-Company C] 10 CORPS Headquarters 10 Corps 10 Corps Protective Squadron Anti-Aircraft Artillery: 12 Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Royal Artillery (RA) 9, 57, and 87 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA [each 24 3.7-inch Guns] 13, 14, and 52 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA [each 54 40-mm Guns] 56 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment [54 40-mm Guns] Armoured Force: 2 Forward Tank Delivery Squadron, Royal Armoured Corps 7 Armoured Division Headquarters 7 Armoured Division i r Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) [armoured-car squadron] Headquarters 7 Armoured Division Royal Artillery 3 Royal Horse Artillery [24 25-pounders] 5 Royal Horse Artillery [24 25-pounders] 65 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm guns; 12 17-pounders] 15 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns] 7 Armoured Division Royal Engineers 7 Armoured Division Royal Signals 7 Armoured Division Royal Army Service Corps 7 Armoured Division Ordnance Field Park 7 Armoured Division Provost Company 2 and 121 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps) Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 22 Armoured Brigade Workshop Company (REME) 131 Armoured Brigade Workshop Company (REME)

io

CORPS

{continued)

22 Armoured Brigade i Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment 5 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment 4 City of Iyondon Yeomanry [tank battalion] i Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment [motorized infantry] 131 Infantry Brigade
1/5 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
1/6 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
1/7 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
23 Armoured Brigade 23 Armoured Brigade Royal Signal Squadron 331 Armoured Brigade Company (Royal Army Service Corps) 23 Armoured Brigade Ordnance Field Park 150 Iyight Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps) 23 Armoured Brigade Workshop (Royal Electrical and Mechanical En gineers)
40 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment
Royal Scots Greys (2d Dragoons) [tank battalion]
Engineers: 10 Corps Troops, Royal Engineers
14 GHQ Troops, Royal Engineers
15 Airfield Construction Group, Royal Engineers
Field Artillery: 2 Army Group Royal Artillery 23 and 121 Army Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders]
24 Army Field Regiment RA [24 105-mm SP]
142 Army Field Regiment RA [24 25-pounders SP]
146 Army Field Regiment RA [24 15-pounders]
5 and 74 Medium Regiments RA [16 5.5-inch Gun/Howitzers]
51 and 69 Medium Regiments RA [8 4.5-inch Guns; 8 5.5-inch Gun/How itzers]
56 Medium Regiment RA [16 7.2-inch Gun/Howitzers]
57 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [48 6-pounders]

114

654 Air Observation Post Squadron


8 Survey Regiment RA
Attached American Unit: 2d Battalion, 36th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Gun] Infantry and Commandos: King's Dragoon Guards [armoured-car squadron]
Company C, 1 Battalion, (22) Cheshire Regiment [machine-gun battalion]
2 Commando
41 Royal Marine Commando
46 Infantry Division
Headquarters 46 Infantry Division 2 Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers [minus Bn Hq and 3 Sup port Group] [weapons battalion] 46 Division Royal Artillery 70, 71, and 172 Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders] 58 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders] 115 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns] 46 Infantry Division Royal Engineers 46 Infantry Division Royal Signals 46 Infantry Division Royal Army Service Corps 46 Infantry Division Ordnance Sub Park 46 Infantry Division Provost Company 183, 184, and 185 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps) 46 Infantry Division Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 46 Reconnaissance Regiment [battalion] 128 Infantry Brigade
1/4 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
2 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
5 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
138 Infantry Brigade
6 Battalion, Iyincolnshire Regiment
2/4 Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Iyight Infantry
6 Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment

io

CORPS

{continued)

139 Infantry Brigade


2/5 Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment
2/5 Battalion, Sherwood Foresters
16 Battalion, Durham Light Infantry
56 (London) Infantry Division Headquarters 56 (London) Infantry Division 6 Battalion, (22) Cheshire Regiment [machine-gun battalion] 56 Infantry Division Royal Artillery 64, 65, and 113 Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders] 67 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders] 100 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns] 56 Infantry Division Royal Engineers 56 Infantry Division Royal Signals 56 Infantry Division Royal Army Service Corps 56 Infantry Division Ordnance Field Park 56 Infantry Division Provost Company 5, 167, and 214 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps) 56 Infantry Division Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 44 Reconnaissance Regiment [battalion] 167 8 9 7 Infantry Brigade Battalion, Royal Fusiliers Battalion, Royal Fusiliers Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry

169 Infantry Brigade


2/5 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
2/6 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
2/7 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
201 6 3 2 Guards Brigade
Battalion, Grenadier Guards
Battalion, Coldstrearn Guards
Battalion, Scots Guards

82d Airborne Infantry Division [attached] Headquarters and Headquarters Company


307th Airborne Engineer Battalion

116

82d Airborne Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 319 t h and 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalions [75-mm Pack How itzer]
80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion
307th Airborne Medical Battalion
782d Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company
407th Airborne Quartermaster Company
82d Airborne Signal Company
Military Police Platoon
325th Glider Infantry Regiment [-Company G]
504th Parachute Infantry Regiment [-Band]
505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

Attached:

1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions


1st Battalion, 143d Infantry Regiment
Battery A, 133d Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
Batteries A and C, 155th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer]
Detachment, 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion
Company F, 540th Engineer Shore Regiment
Companies C and D, 83d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
405th Medical Collecting Company; attached:
2d Platoon, 602d Clearing Company 1st Platoon, 90th Quartermaster Company (Railhead) Company H, 36th Engineer Combat Regiment Detachment, 63d Signal Battalion Detachment C, 72d Signal Company (Special) Detachment, 180th Signal Repair Company Detachment, 286th Signal Company
Medical {attached American Units):

Surgical Teams 5, 6, and 23 (2d Auxiliary Surgical Group) Service Troops: 10 15 10 10 Corps Transport Column Iyine of Communication Transport Column (Royal Army Service Corps) Corps Troops, Ordnance Field Park Corps Troops, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

117

io

CORPS

{continued)

Beach Groups Nos. 3, 4, and 21


Brick No, 35
Signal: 10 Corps Royal Signals 2 Companies, 16 Iyine of Communications Royal Signals Attached, American Units: Detachment A, 71st Signal Company (Special)
Detachment A, 72d Signal Company (Special)

118

This part of the Army History was prepared under the direction of Col. John D. Forsythe, Historian, by Maj. Chester G. Starr, Jr., Maj. Roy Lamson, Jr v and Capt. Harris G. Warren with the aid of Lt. Col. E. Dwight Salmon. The maps were drawn by S/Sgt. Alvin J. Weinberger and Sgt. Charles W. Petersen. The text was printed and the volume bound by L'Impronta Press, Florence, Italy. The printing ofthe maps and illustrations was executed by the Army Topographic Section.

FIFTH ARMY HISTORY

7 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER 1943


5
Classification changed to hf autfaqwiy of AC of S, G-2, by - - J t A M J U - l i S fcAY MSTROUPE 1st Lt Inf Ass't Custodian

FTH ARMY
STORY

* * *

"

PAfvrn

Across theUolturno
to thfWinter^ine
************
IAL * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Registered Copy No. O>O

Lieutenant General MARK W. CLARK * , * commanding

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. A. B.

APPROACH

TO THE VOLTURNO

page
i
2
4
7
7
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
15
15
16 16
17 19
21
21 21
23
24
24
26

Terrain Before Fifth Army Bnemy Use of Terrain PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER II. A. B.

C.

E n e m y Forces and Their Positions A l l i e d F o r c e s and. t h e i r P o s i t i o n s 1. B r i t i s h F o r c e s 2. A m e r i c a n F o r c e s Plans for Continuing the Campaign 1. 1 5 t h A r m y G r o u p S t r a t e g y 2. F i f t h A r m y O p e r a t i o n s I n s t r u c t i o n 3. F i f t h A r m y O p e r a t i o n s I n s t r u c t i o n 4. F i f t h A r m y O p e r a t i o n s I n s t r u c t i o n 5. F i f t h A r m y O p e r a t i o n s I n s t r u c t i o n THE FIRST

No. No. No. No.

5, 6, 7, 8,

2 October 7 October 14 October 20 October

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

CHAPTER III. A. B.

VOLTURNO CROSSING

C.

D.

Plans for the Crossing The Crossing of VI Corps, 13-14 October 1. Plans and Terrain 2. The Crossing of the 3d Division 3. The Crossing of the 34th Division 4. The Advance of the 45th Division The Crossing of 10 Corps, 12-14 October 1. Plans and Terrain 2. The Assault of the 56 Division 3. The Crossing of the 7 Armoured Division 4. The Crossing of the 46 Division Summary of the First Volturno Crossing

VII

C H A P T E R IV. A.

CONSOLIDATING

T H EBRIDGEHEAD

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The Advance of VI Corps, 14-25 October 1. Plans and Terrain 2. The Advance of the 3d Division 3. The Advance of the 34th Division 4. The Advance of the 45th Division B. The Advance of 10 Corps, 14-25 October 1. Plans and Terrain 2. The Advance of the 56 Division 3. The Advance of the 7 Armoured Division 4. The Advance of the 46 Division C. Summary of the Advance CHAPTER V. A. THE DRIVE TO THE WINTER LINE

B.

C.

10 Corps Drive t o t h e Garigliano, 2 6 October-4 N o v e m b e r . . . . 1. P l a n s a n d T e r r a i n 2. T h e A c t i o n The Third Volturno Crossing of V I Corps, 26 October-4 N o v e m b e r . . . 1. Plans a n d Terrain 2. Moving u p for t h e Third Volturno Crossing 3. T h e Crossing of t h e 45th Division 4. T h e Crossing of t h e 34th Division Summary of the Drive BATTERING THE WINTER LINE

CHAPTER VI. A. B.

10 Corps at Mount Camino, 5-15 November The Advance of VI Corps, 5-15 November 1. The 3d Division at the Mignano Gap 2. The 45th Division Batters at the Mountains 3. The 34th Division Breaks into the Winter Line C. Summary of Operations CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN

A. B. C. D.

The Advance of Fifth Army, 7 October-15 November Fifth Army Casualties The Advance of the British Eighth Army Air Operations 1. Allied Air Operations 2. Enemy Air Activity

VIII

fl'fl(sJ(,/d Number One. Number A. B. C. D. E.

* * * * * * * * * * * Quartermaster Supply

* * * * * * * * * * page 63 73 75 76 78 80 81 83 8 5 8 7 91 95

Two. Operations Instructions 15th Army Group Message, 30 September 1943 Operations Instruction No. 5, 2 October 1943 Operations Instruction No. 6, 7 October 1943 Operations Instruction No. 7, 14 October 1943 Operations Instruction No. 8, 20 October 1943

Number Three. Statistics A. Casualties, U . S . Forces, 7 October-15 November 1943 . . . . B. Major Ordnance fosses, 30 September-11 November 1943 . . . Number Four. Fifth Army Staff Number Five. Troop List of Fifth Army, 15 November 1943

Maps * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

opposite 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Disposition of Allied a n d E n e m y Forces, 7 October 1943 Original P h a s e Lines a n d Boundaries Changes in Phase Lines a n d Corps Boundary Fifth A r m y Crosses t h e Volturno, 12-14 October 1943 Fifth A r m y Consolidates its Bridgehead Across t h e Volturno, 14-25 October 1943 10 Corps Drive t o t h e Garigliano, 26 October-4 November 1943. . . T h e T h i r d Volturno Crossing, 26 October-4 November 1943 . . . . Fifth A r m y Reaches t h e Winter Line, 5-15 November 1943 . . . . Advance of Fifth Army, 7 October-15 November 1943 Area of t h e Fifth A r m y Campaign, 7 October-15 November 1943 . . . page 8 12 14 26 38 42 48 56 58 62

Paintings
1. 2. 3. 4. The Volturno Valley near the Triflisco Gap The Volturno River bridge at Capua Antiaircraft battery in the Mignano Gap Soldiers b r e w coffee before t h e ruins o f M i g n a n o . . . . Frontispiece opposite page 21 opposite page 3 5 opposite page 5 3

IX

CHAPTER I . , , .
Approach to the Volturno

1 HE end of the first week in October 1943 found the American Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, generally along the southeast bank of the Volturno River and south of the Calore River. The British 10 Corps was deployed along the Volturno from its mouth at Castel Volturno northeast to Mount Tifata beyond Capua. The American VI Corps held a line curving northeast along the Volturno to its junction south of Amorosi with the Calore and then along that stream to Benevento. The British Eighth Army, under the command of General Sir Bernard I,. Mont gomery, had driven up on the right and had reached a line running from Termoli on the Adriatic Sea to a point slightly north of Benevento, where it was in contact with the American 45th Infant^ Division. These lines had been reached after a month of hard fighting against the forces of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's German Tenth Army. The British 13 Corps, composed of the 1 Canadian Division and the 5 Division, had crossed from Sicily and made Eighth Army's assault on the Italian mainland on the morning of 3 September. The British 1 Airborne Division had landedat Taranto on 9 September, and the British 5 Corps, made up of the 8 Indian Division and the 78 Division, had come across the Straits of Messina from Sicily. Eighth Army then took up the pursuit of the retreating Germans. Fifth Army had landed on the beaches of Salerno on the morning of 9 Septem ber and started its drive north and northwest toward Naples, Benevento, and the banks of the Volturno River. After days of hard fighting along the coast against the determined German forces, the tide of battle turned definitely in favor of Fifth Army, and it threw its full weight into the chase. The British 10 Corps fought its way up the coast and entered the rubble-filled streets of Naples on 1 October, the day
CONFIDENTIAL

that Foggia and its airfields fell to the onrushing Eighth Army. The American 34th Infantry Division occupied Benevento on 3 October, and the 45th Division passed through the bomb-blasted town the following day to drive on across the Calore against the retreating 26th Panzer (Armored) Division. 10 Corps pushed on past Naples toward the Volturno River, the next natural line of defense for the Germans. Elements of the 23 Armoured Brigade reached this barrier on 5 October, and the 56 Division occupied Capua the next day. VI Corps found the opposition stronger in the mountains on the right, but by 6 October the 3d Infant^ Division had driven above Caserta and had reached the Volturno. Enemy outposts still remained on the southeast side of the river, but for all practical purposes Fifth Army had reached the Volturno-Calore river line. The port of Naples and the surrounding airfields were secure and were being repaired for use in the forthcoming operations of Fifth Army on its way north toward Rome. The month of hard fighting, which had thoroughly tested the mettle of the carefully trained Fifth Army, had been extremely successful. The combined American and British forces had accomplished one of the most difficult of military operationsa successful landing on hostile shores. They had beaten off everything the enemy could throw against them and had pushed forward relentlessly to their objectives. The next problem that faced them was also a difficult military operationan assault on a defended river line. A. TERRAIN BEFORE FIFTH ARMY

See Map No. 10 The section of the Italian peninsula which Fifth Army faced on 7 October is just about as difficult for offensive operations as could be found in Europe. The terrain, together with rainy weather, severely limited the opportunity for varied tactics. Armor, wide envelopments, and swiftly striking spearheads could not be used to speed up the advance. Frontal attack was the only method available to General Clark in pursuing the enemy across the Volturno and through the mountains toward Rome. The area that lay before Fifth Army is a series of river valleys, coastal plains, and hill masses stretching toward Rome between the Tyrrhenian Sea on the left and the Apennine Mountains on the right. It may be divided more or less arbitrarily into three main sections as follows: the VolturnoCalore Valley, the Garigliano-Rapido Valley, and the divide between the two valleys. The bald, steep, and lofty Matese Mountains, a part of the Apennines,

on the northeast side of the route of advance may be disregarded except as being an almost impenetrable barrier between Fifth and Eighth Armies. The Calore River rises some 20 miles southeast of Benevento and flows north and west almost 40 miles to join the Volturno south of Amorosi. From its source the Calore winds through mountain gorges and narrow farm valleys until it reaches the Volturno. Steep hills and towering mountains rise on either side of its valley and in places are impassable to the vehicles of modern warfare. This is particularly true of the hill mass south of the river and west of Benevento. On the other side the rugged foothills rise to 736 meters at Mount Acero before they start falling off to the flat Volturno Valley. The Volturno River rises high in the mountains northwest of Isernia and drains more than 1500 square miles of fertile farm valley and steep mountain slopes on its tortuous way 94 miles to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Its intensively cultivated farm valley, lined with scrub-covered hills and barren mountains, is from two to seven miles wide between Montaquila and the Triflisco Gap above Capua. The river runs generally south some 15 miles from its headwaters to a point northeast of Presenzano, turns southeast to its junction with the Calore below Amorosi, and then flows southwest to Castel Volturno on the coast. These two lower sections almost form a perfect V and enclose a hill mass about 15 miles long and 10 miles wide. After the. river passes through the narrow Triflisco Gap about 18 miles from the sea, it meanders in large tight loops through the olive groves of the Campanian Plain and by the towns of Capua, Santa Maria la P\)ssa, Grazzanise, and Cancello ed Arnone before reaching Castel Volturno at its mouth. The Rapido River rises in the mountains near Atina and flows south some ten miles between terraced mountain slopes to Sant'Elia, where it emerges into a fertile valley which broadens into the Iyiri Valley below Cassino. At the southern edge of the Liri Valley it joins the Liri River to form the Garigliano River. This stream then cuts through the hill mass between Mount Camino and Mount Ma jo, flows into a triangular coastal plain below Sessa Aurunca (Sessa), and empties into the Tyrrhenian near Minturno. The slopes into the valley of these rivers are generally less precipitous than those that descend into the Volturno-Calore Valley. The divide between the Volturno-Calore and the Garigliano-Rapido valleys is a mountain range generally 3000 feet high, running some 40 miles from the crest of the Apennines south to an abrupt ending at Mount Massico and its foothills, which tower above the narrow beach north of Mondragone. This mountain mass, which was a source of great annoyance to our troops, did not resemble anything with which the men were familiar. It does not consist of

a long mountain range with rolling foothills at the approaches, as is usually found in the native land of the Fifth Army soldier. Instead, it is a large area cut by deep gorges into numerous isolated peaks, often devoid of vegetation, which rise from the flat valleys almost as walls from the floor of a room. Few roads or trails enter these forbidding areas, and mule pack trains at times failed to negotiate the jagged ridges and overhanging cliffs of these hills. Southwest of the section of the Volturno that runs from Presenzano to Amorosi the mountain masses fall away into the coastal plains, except for the ridge that extends on to the sea near Mondragone. A slight rise might normal^ be expected to divide the watersheds of two river valleys that flatten to the plains along the coast. Such is not the case, for a high spur, cut off from the main ridge by a low pass at Mignano and a narrow valley southeast of Mount Camino, separates the valleys of the lower Volturno and the Gari gliano. The high points on this brush-covered and wTooded divide are Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico, rising 1005 and 812 meters above sea level. A good road net exists in the open terrain, although many of the roads are not hard-surfaced. The main routes along the axis of the advance of Fifth Army were two first-class roads known as Highways 6 and 7. The latter of these runs from Benevento to Capua, continues across the plain and through a gap to Sessa, crosses the Garigliano below Minturno, and follows the coast northwest toward Rome. Highway 7B from Naples joins this route at Capua. Highway 6 branches off Highway 7 across the Volturno from Capua, goes northwest through the Mignano Gap to Cassino, and continues on to Rome. Highways 87 and 85 are two first-class lateral roads that were useful in mov ing troops and supplies. The first extends from Naples through Caserta, crosses the Volturno at Triflisco and again at Amorosi, and then passes through Pon telandolfo on its way over the Matese Mountains. Highway 85 leaves Highway 6 below Presenzano and runs up the Volturno Valley to Isernia.

B.

ENEMY

USE OF

TERRAIN

The operation which lay before Fifth Army, that of continuing an advance along the mountain ranges running some 550 miles down the center of the narrow Italian peninsula, was as difficult as could be conceived. The terrain and the direction of advance in the face of such staunch fighters as the Germans meant that every river, gully, ravine, and spur jutting out from the Apennines would have to be stormed. Although the Germans were committed

to fighting a delaying action, they stubbornly defended the river lines, the mountains, and other obstacles as they slowly fell back before Fifth Army. Demolitions and mining were used extensively by the Germans to delay the progress of the hard-driving forces of Fifth Army. Almost every bridge and culvert on main highways and secondary roads was destroyed by the thoroughly trained and experienced German demolition experts. Where roads ran through the narrow streets of the stone villages, buildings were blown down to block traffic. Trees were blown across highways wherever possible. Often these road blocks were mined and booby-trapped to present greater obstacles to the engineers. Some concrete obstacles were used to block strategic points on routes of advance. Intersections and shoulders of the roads were mined and had to be cleared before armor, artillery, and transport could be moved up to support the troops. The use of mines and booby traps often caused the infantrymen more difficulties than enemy machine-gun and artillery fire. Not onty did the Germans mine the roads, but they were also lavish in the use of mines and booby traps in vineyards and orchards, along the beds and banks of streams, in trails and likely avenues of approach, in possible bivouac areas and buil dings that might be used by troops, and even in shell and bomb craters where the soldier might take refuge. Their S-niines and Tellermines could be detected by mine sweepers, but some areas were sown with mines made of concrete, wooden, and plastic materials. The content of the soil and numerous shell fragments often made the problem of minesweeping arduous and dangerous. The Germans did not use their artillery extensively in a campaign that consisted mostly of dela^dng action. This was particularly true during October, but the situation changed when Fifth Army reached the mountain divide between the Garigliano-Rapido and the Volturno valleys. The Germans were in the mountains with their artillery well defiladed and enjoyed superior ad vantages of observation. In the first half of the campaign the enemy used self-propelled guns, mortars, rocket launchers, and tanks as roving artillery efficiently and with good effect. The rocket launchers, such as the six-barreled Nebelwerfer and the ten-barreled weapon mounted on a half-track, were first encountered in the Volturno Valley about the middle of October. Mortars and artillery were often zeroed on draws, road intersections, stream crossings, and probable strongpoints before they were used or occupied. Early in the Italian campaign the Germans attempted to block highways and prevent movement by placing self-propelled guns and machine guns in well protected positions near sharp curves in the roads. During October they tended to change to delaying action from forward slopes and crests of hills,

with mortars and artillery on the reverse slopes or in the valleys behind them. The infantrymen fought from hastily scooped foxholes on the slopes, from behind boulders and stone walls, and from the brush and olive groves on the hills. Small groups were often left behind with machine guns after a village or position had been abandoned. After the third crossing of the Volturno the enemy was found to have the forward slopes of the hills lightly organized, while the reverse slopes were strongly held and fortified. Automatic weapons were sited to cut down anything that came over the crests. When Fifth Army reached the mountains across the upper Volturno, the enemy defenses became more formidable. Caves in the mountains were enlarged and fortified, holes were dug and blasted in the rocks for foxholes and machinegun positions, observation posts were underground and covered with as much as two feet of timber and rock, wire obstacles became more numerous, tank traps had been constructed, and minefields were greatly increased. One of the most anno}dng tactics of the resourceful enemy was his method of with drawing from hills and strongpoints and then infiltrating back if they were not immediately occupied by our troops. The numerous peaks in the mountain mass were usually so situated that each was dominated by one or more on either side. This meant that the attackers of one hill were often subjected to cross fire from rifles, machine guns, and mortars on the slopes of adjacent hills to the right and left. If forces were directed at the hills on either side, they were then taken under fire from other dominating slopes. The Germans were most efficient in siting their weapons from mutually supporting positions on the slopes, so that they could take advancing forces under fire day or night. These tactics employed by a stubborn and resourceful foe presented great obstacles to the advance of Fifth Army and resulted in much fierce and determined fighting.

CHAPTER II Plans for the Campaign

A.

ENEMY

FORCES AND THEIR

POSITIONS See Map No. I

W H E N Fifth Army invaded Italy, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring had eight divisions, four of which had been evacuated from Sicity, available to oppose it and Eighth Army. Two of these were in or north of Rome, two were in the vicinity of Naples, and four were south of Naples. The 16th Panzer Division was in the Eboli-Battipaglia area. The Hermann Goering Panzer Division was apparently dispersed in the plain of Naples from Caserta south. The 15th Panzer Grenadier (Armored Infantry) Division was probably northwest of this force, generally in the Gaeta area. Some elements of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division were at Frascati, but most of it apparently was north of Rome. The 2d Parachute Division garrisoned Rome and the vicinity from the Alban hills to Viterbo. The 1st Parachute Division was on the Adriatic coast, with part of its strength south of Bari. The 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division were gen erally in Calabria. When Fifth Army reached the Volturno and Calore rivers early in October, Kesselring's forces were generally recognized as the German Tenth Army. The German Fourteenth Army, commanded by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, was in control of northern Italy, with its southern boundary some distance north of Rome. Tenth Army was composed of XIV Panzer Corps, which was oppos ing the advance of Fifth Army, and IyXXVI Panzer Corps, which stretched generally from the Apennines to the Adriatic Sea. Rommel was believed to have at least 12 divisions in northern Italy and Yugoslavia, not more than 4 of which were thought to be south of Bologna. There was some probability that he had been reinforced with four additional divisions. With the 8 divisions in Tenth Army, there was a possibility that the German forces in Italy might reach a total of 24 divisions.

On the British Eighth Army front the Germans had the 1st Parachute Division, the 16th Panzer Division, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, and elements of the 26th Panzer Division on a line extending south from the Adriatic Sea. The 26th Panzer Division was falling back before the American 45th Division and was gradually withdrawing over the mountains from the Fifth Army front. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which composed XIV Panzer Corps, held a defensive line along the Volturno from the VolturnoCalore junction to Castel Volturno on the coast. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division held a line in front of the British 10 Corps from the mouth of the Volturno up to Grazzanise. The 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was deployed along the river, while the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was echeloned back along the coast. The 382d Panzer Grenadier Regiment had not been identified by 10 Corps, but was thought to be in reserve north of Cancello ed Arnone. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was believed to have had its origin in the 33d Grenadier (Infantry) Division, which fought in France in 1939 and was reorganized the following year as the 15th Panzer Division. After fighting in Libya it entered Tunisia and was virtually destroyed in 1943. The Division Sicily, which was formed in May and June 1943; first was called the 15th Panzer Division and then became the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. The new division assimilated the part of the 999th Grenadier Division that did not get to Tunisia, and fought in Sicily with two panzer grenadier regiments. Some of its elements were in the Naples area in September, but the 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which had been a part of the 15th Panzer Division in Africa, was with the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. The 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had been in the 21st Panzer Division in Africa, the 129th Panzer Grenadier Reg iment was originally the Regiment Fullrieder, and the 382d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which was probably used to replace casualties in the other two regiments, had been in the 164th Division in Africa. The Hermann Goering Panzer Division, which was divided into two battle groups, was responsible for the line from Grazzanise to Piana di Caiazzo. The Corwin Battle Group was deployed from Grazzanise to Capua, while the Mauke Battle Group was defending the valley from Triflisco to Piana di Caiazzo. The division was formed in 1942 by the expansion of the Hermann Goering Brigade. Elements of the division fought in Tunisia and suffered considerable losses in 1943. It was then reformed in the Naples area and appeared in Sicily in July. After suffering further losses it returned to Naples, where its rehabilitation was interrupted by the landing of Fifth Army on the beaches of Salerno.

MAPN? 1

DISPOSITION
ALLIEDawLENEMY FORCES
/ Octo&er 1943

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ARMY

The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division was brought down from the Rome area early in October and thrown in line between the Hermann Goering Panzer Division and the 26th Panzer Division. Originally it appeared to take over a sector from Piana di Caiazzo to the junction of the Volturno and Calore rivers, but its left boundary was gradually extended across the Volturno toward the mountains as the 26th Panzer Division withdrew to the Eighth Army front. The 1st Battalion, 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was in the vicinity of Caiazzo, while the 3d Battalion was deployed east to the river. The 8th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, reported to be fighting in Russia,, was encountered by the 45th Division as it advanced up the northeast side of the river. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division fought in the Polish and French cam paigns, was motorized in 1940, and participated in the Russian campaign from the beginning. After being destroyed at Stalingrad it was reformed in France, incorporating elements of the 386th Grenadier Division. It saw duty on the Spanish border, moved into Italy north of Rome, and had elements in the Naples area in September. Tenth Army continued its delaying action against the Allied Fifth and Eighth Armies throughout October without reinforcement. The German order ot battle in northern Italy remained obscure in some respects, but by the end of the month Rommel appeared to have more than 14 divisions under his command. Ten of the 20 divisions destroyed at Stalingrad had been reformed and were now in Italy. As the British 10 Corps approached the Garigliano River and the American VI Corps prepared for its third crossing of the Vol turno River early in November, the Germans sent down the 94th Grenadier Division to take over their right flank on the coast and the 305th Grenadier Division to hold their left flank in the mountains. The German policy seemed to be to put in these two fresh infantry divisions, which had been reformed in France after their destruction at Stalingrad, to hold the coastal hills and inland mountains, while the three panzer and panzer grenadier divisions de fended the main axis along Highway 6. The terrain in this sector was the most passable, the most important to defend, and better for the movement of semi-armored mobile formations. The 3d Battalion, 6th Parachute Reg iment (2d Parachute Division), appeared in the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division sector. On 9 November elements of the 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (26th Panzer Division) also entered the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division area as a vanguard of the division, which was being withdrawn from the Eighth Army front to help halt the advance of VI Corps.

B.

ALLIED

FORCES AND THEIR

POSITIONS

1. British Forces. When the British io Corps reached the Volturno River early in October, its commander, Lt. Cen. Sir Richard Iy. McCreery, had three battle-tested divisions to throw across the river against the Germans. The 46 Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. L. I. Hawkesworth, was deployed along the river from Castel Volturno on the coast to Cancello ed Arnone. The 7 Armoured Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. M. G. G. Erskine, was responsible for the zone from Cancello ed Arnone to a point about midway between Santa Maria la Fossa and Capua. The 56 (London) Division, com manded by Maj. Gen. D. A. H. Graham, occupied the Capua area from the 7 Armoured Division boundary to Mount Tifata. These three divisions had been fighting since their landings at Salerno and were destined to continue the 10 Corps drive to the Garigliano River without reinforcements. 2. American Forces. Fifth Army had five well trained and battle-expe rienced American divisions available for future operations as it prepared for the first Volturno crossing. VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, had three divisions in line along the Volturno and across the Calore. The 45th Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, was advancing northwest of Benevento and was responsible for the zone between the Matese Mountains and the Volturno River. The 34th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, had moved up to the river from its assembly area near Montesarchio and held a line from the Volturno-Calore junction to a point south of Caiazzo. The 3d Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., was deployed through the hills from the 34th Division boundary to that of the 56 Division slightly west of Mount Tifata. The 36th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker, was in Army reserve, and the 826. Airborne Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, was policing the city of Naples. C. PLANS FOR CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN

See Map No. 2 1. 15th Army Group Strategy. Fifth and Eighth Armies were making excellent progress in their drives up the Italian peninsula during the last week in September. Just before midnight on 29 September, General Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, commanding 15th Army Group, instructed General Clark that future operations of his Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army were to be con

10

ducted in two phases.

(For text of message see Annex

No. 2A.)

The first

phase was designed to secure the Foggia airfields and the port of Naples, together with the airfields north of that city, and included the capture of a line running southwest from Termoli on the Adriatic Sea along the Biferno River to Castropignano and then through Isernia, Venafro, and Sessa to the Tyrrhenian Sea. .Airfields, ports, and centers of road communications were to be secured in this area before the second phase was started. When the first phase line was reached by Fifth and Eighth Armies, they were to consolidate their gains and prepare to advance to the second line. The instructions specifically stated: " Firm base will be established on the areas gained but light mobile forces will operate ahead and keep up active patrolling against enemy rearguards." The second phase, conducted to secure the airdromes and airfields in the area, was to include the capture of a line running west from San Benedetto del Tronto on the Adriatic Sea to Visso and then southwest through Terni to Civitavecchia on the Tyrrhenian Sea above Rome. This line would place Fifth Army in secure possession of Rome and would give both armies numerous airfields much closer to German}7. The boundary between Fifth and Eighth Armies was to be extended to include Benevento in the Fifth Army zone. Eighth Army was to have the road from Pontelandolfo to Isernia. The boundary was then to run from Isernia to the road junction southwest of Celano, up the Salto River to Rieti, and thence along the road through Terni, San Gemini, and Todi. 15th Army Group probably contemplated changing the boundary when the first phase line was reached, for it stated that it intended to transfer the British 10 Corps to Eighth Army at a suitable date, possibly when both armies had completed the first phase of their advance.
2. Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 5, 2 October. On 2 October

General Clark issued Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 5 from his head quarters near Pontecagnano Faiano. (See Annex No. 2B.) Fifth Army was ordered to continue its advance to the Isernia-Venafro-Sessa line. The drive toward this objective was to be made with VI Corps on the right and 10 Corps on the left along the sea. The boundary between the two corps extended from Formo northwest along the eastern edge of the Campanian Plain to the Volturno east of Capua and thence northwest across the plain to Sessa. This boundary confined the efforts of 10 Corps to the coastal plain and to the high ridge separating the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano rivers. VI Corps would have the valley of the upper Volturno, the steep foothills of the Apennines on the right, and the hill mass northwest of the section of the river between the Volturno-Calore junction and Triflisco. Its main effort would

II

have to be directed across the Volturno between the junction and Triflisco. Across the flat river valley the rugged hills rose abruptly and extended from 10 to 15 miles northwest until they dropped off into another flat valley before the towns of Presenzano and Teano. General Clark directed 10 Corps to " push its attack to the Volturno, force the crossings of that river and continue the advance on the first phase line." He further instructed General McCreery: " Due to the present location of the VI Corps, the advance of 10 Corps will not await the arrival of the VI Corps abreast of it, but will advance as rapidly as the situation permits." VI Corps was ordered to use not more than one division to capture Benevento on the right, secure the crossing of the Calore River in that area, and advance by road northwest to the first phase line. The remainder of VI Corps was directed to continue to move forward with all speed by road between Benevento and the Corps boundary. The 36th Division, in Army reserve, was to be available after 6 October to VI Corps in exchange for another division. 3. Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 6, 7 October. VI and 10 Corps had both reached the Volturno in their zones of action by the morning of 7 October. General Clark then issued from his headquarters near Naples Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 6 (See Annex No. 2C) directing VI Corps to cross the Volturno on the night of 9-10 October and 10 Corps to force a cross ing on the following night. VI Corps was to concentrate one division along the Volturno and one division in the Montesarchio area without delay. The 36th Division was ordered to move immediately into an area northwest of Nola. This movement was to be co-ordinated by VI Corps in order not to interfere with the flow of supplies from Avellino. VI Corps was ordered to force a crossing of the Volturno on the night of 9-10 October in the vicinity of Triflisco and then attack toward Teano along the high ground northwest of Triflisco. 10 Corps was directed to force a cross ing in its zone of action on the night of 10-11 October and to drive northwest to seize the ridges north and northeast of Mondragone. 10 Corps was made responsible for arranging for naval gunfire in support of its advance. The corps commanders were instructed to secure mutual support of the operations in the Capua-Triflisco area. Fifth Army would obtain an intensive air bom bardment of all appropriate targets on the fronts of both corps, and the corps were to submit requests for specific missions. The 82d Airborne Infantry Division was ordered to continue its mission of patrolling Naples, but was also directed to make plans for dropping one parachute battalion in the Sessa area. This battalion was to have the mission of interrupting communications and blocking the withdrawal of the enemv to

12

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^ \ I SAN BENEDETTO fel TBONTO

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CELANO

FIFTH J EIGHTH x

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MAP N9 2 ORIGINAL PHASE a>ndL LINES LFORMO GROTTAMINARDA

BOUNDARIES

15 th Amy group Ms^.. - 29 September 9 Fifth Army O.IJJo.5* '2 Odto&er 194-3 Scale
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the northwest. This plan was later canceled because of the strength of the enemy forces in the area around Sessa. It was feared that the Germans had sufficient reserve troops in the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Her mann Goering Panzer Division to defeat a parachute battalion before the forces crossing the Volturno could reach its position. Operations Instruction No. 6 further explained that Fifth Army was pre paring plans for an amphibious landing on the beaches north of Mondragone with one regimental combat team from the 36th Division. This force would have the mission of assisting 10 Corps in the capture of the high ground north and northeast of Mondragone and of blocking the retreat of the enemy to the northwest. The indications were that the enemy had strong forces in the area of the proposed landing, and the operation would not be ordered unless the main attacks of VI and 10 Corps drew a major portion of the enemy in that district to other localities. The crossings of the Volturno failed to cause the enemy to move his forces from the Mondragone area, and the plan for the amphibious operation was canceled.
4. Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 7, 14 October. (See Map No. 3.)

A number of factors, including the weather, difficulties in moving troops and supplies, and strong enemy rearguard action, caused changes in the plans out lined in Operations Instruction No. 6. The crossings of the Volturno were not attempted until the night of 12-13 October, and the failure of the 56 Division to force its way across at Capua resulted in another modification of plans. After the 56 Division was not successful in its initial efforts, it made a feint attack on 14 October. The strong resistance to this effort made it apparent that the division could not cross in its zone without heavy losses. The lack of success on the part of the 56 Division resulted in the 3d Division's left flank becoming dangerousty exposed, as it continued to exploit its successful crossing. General Clark then decided to alter the boundary between the two corps so as to include in the 10 Corps area the ridges running north and north west from Triflisco. This boundary change would give the 56 Division access to the 30-ton bridge constructed in the 3d Division zone at Triflisco. He issued verbal orders to that effect at 1530, 14 October, and confirmed them the same day with Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 7. (See Annex No. 2D.) The zones of action of the 56 Division and the 3d Division were now separated by a line running from the demolished bridge at Triflisco along the east side of the ridge line above Triflisco to the road junction south of Ponte latone, then across the ridge just east of Formicola, and northwest over the plain along Highway 6. The 56 Division was directed to make arrangements with the 3d Division for the use of the bridge at Triflisco.

5. Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 8, 20 October. {See Map No. 3.) VI and 10 Corps were making good progress after the middle of October in consolidating their Volturno bridgehead when Fifth Army reached the decision that an immediate advance to the second phase line previously delimited was beyond the capacities of the limited forces at its disposal. General Clark then issued from his headquarters in Naples Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 8, dated 20 October. (See Annex No. 2E.) The first phase line was moved forward from the Isernia-Venafro-vSessa objective to the line Isernia-Mount Passero-Garigliano River to the sea. When the mission of seizing this line was completed, Fifth Army was to continue its advance without delay to the general line Opi (exclusive)-Alvito-Arce-Fondi. The area between this new phase line and the general line occupied by Fifth Army on 6 October is bounded on the southeast by the Calore and Vol turno rivers, on the southwest by the Tyrrhenian Sea, on the northeast by the barren ranges of the Apennines, and on the northwest by a line running from Isernia across Mount Passero to the Garigliano River west of Mignano and then down the river to the sea. The distance straight across the hills and plains from Castel Volturno to Benevento is approximately 50 miles, some 45 miles of rugged mountains separate Benevento and Isernia, the mouth of the Gari gliano is approximately 35 miles from Isernia, and the distance straight from the Garigliano along the sea to the Volturno is about 17 miles. VI and 10 Corps were ordered to continue their advances in their respective zones. 10 Corps was to make its main effort against the mountains on its right, while VI Corps pushed on across the upper Volturno and made its main effort on the left. VI Corps was to continue to maintain contact with Eighth Army on the right, and 10 Corps was charged with maintaining contact with VI Corps on its right. Both corps were directed to push forward rapidly within their zones of action in order to facilitate the advance of one another. Opera tions to be conducted by either corps in the zone of action of the other were to be co-ordinated between corps commanders prior to execution, and Fifth Army Headquarters was to be notified of any such arrangements.

V
LINE. KJkMero
ISERNIA

if
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MAP N9 3

CHANGES
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PHASE LINESo^iCORPS BOUNDARY


Fifth Army O.I. H?7- 14October 1943 Fifth Army O.I. A W -2OOetokr194d Scale
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C H A P T E R III

* * * * * * * * * * *

The First Volturno Crossing

A.

PLANS

FOR THE

CROSSING

See Map No. 4 LOURING the first week in October Fifth Army reached the Volturno-Calore river line, the next, natural obstacle behind which the German Tenth Army could attempt a stand on the Mediterranean side of the Apennine Mountains. General Clark intended to send the British 10 Corps across the river in its zone along the coast as soon as it cleared the south side of the retreating enemy. When 10 Corps was delayed by rains, demolitions, and determined rearguard resistance, the decision was finally made to send both VI and 10 Corps across in a co-ordinated assault on the night of 12-13 October. Meanwhile the 45th Division had crossed the Calore at Benevento on 4 October and was pushing on northwest along the Apennines in contact with the British Eighth Army. After 10 Corps was delayed in its preparations for the crossing of the Volturno, General Clark first decided to send VI Corps across the river 24 hours ahead of 10 Corps. General Lucas, commander of VI Corps, was accord ingly instructed to force a crossing with one division in the vicinity of Tri flisco on the night of 9-10 October. The occupation of the ridges running north and northwest of Triflisco would endanger the enen^'s main gun area west of the junction of Highways 6 and 7 and would facilitate the advance of 10 Corps, which was ordered to cross during the night of 10-11 October. General Lucas made a careful estimate of the situation taking into con sideration that he had a three-to-one superiority in men, tanks, and guns, and decided that one division could cross the Volturno successfully, but that two divisions would probably be needed to continue the advance to the north west. He believed that he could get a second division into position to make the crossing on the night of 9-10 October. Having secured approval of his plan, he issued Field Order No. 7 on 8 October ordering the 34th Division to move from its assembly area at Montesarchio to relieve the 3d Division along

the river from the junction below Amorosi to a point south of Caiazzo. The 34th Division started moving up that night, but was greatly hampered by a lack of roads and by the extremely muddy condition of those that existed. When the division could not get in line and bring up sufficient supplies in time for the attack, some consideration was given to postponing the crossing 24 hours. General Clark then visited both corps areas on 9 October to see what progress was being made in preparations for the crossing. After taking into account the delays over which his forces had no control, he ordered a co-ordinated attack all along the river for the night of 12-13 October. B. THE CROSSING OF VI CORPS
13-14 OCTOBER

1. Plans and Terrain. VI Corps had for all practical purposes reached the Volturno River by 7 October and had one division advancing northwest of Benevento beyond the Calore River. The 3d Division, with the 15th In fantry on the left and the 30th Infantry on the right, had pushed through the hills behind Caserta and held a line stretching some 15 miles along the river from its junction with the Calore south of Amorosi to the Triflisco Gap. Although some enemy posts remained south of the river, the division was securely in possession of the hills dominating the valley. After the enemy had evacuated Benevento, the 45th Division had moved through the town and had driven on along the slopes of the Matese Mountains toward the Volturno Valley. The final plans for the attack of VI Corps called for two divisions to force a crossing of the Volturno at 0200 on the morning of 13 October. The 3d Di vision (reinforced) was to cross^between Triflisco and a point south of Caiazzo, secure a bridgehead, and assist the advance of 10 Corps. The 34th Division (reinforced), which had relieved the 30th Infantry and part of the 15th Infantry along the upper eight miles of the VI Corps front, was to force crossings in its zone, secure a bridgehead, assist the advance of the 45th Division, and prepare to attack on Corps order toward Teano. The 45th Division (reinforced) was ordered to advance vigorously to the northwest, protect the right flank of Fifth Army, maintain contact with Eighth Army, and prepare on Corps order to attack in the direction of Teano. In order to have a secure bridgehead the three divisions were to advance to a line running generally from Raviscanina across Mount degli Angeli to Rocchetta e Croce. The terrain that faced VI Corps was a river valley bounded on either side by steep and barren hills. The valley of the Volturno from the Triflisco Gap

16

northeast to the junction with the Calore varies in width from one to four miles. The hills on the south side of the river start with Mount Tifata (604 meters), extend east with Mount Castellone (405 meters), and gradually flatten out beyond Umatola. Both Mount Tifata and Mount Castellone come down to the bank of the river, but the hills swing away to the southeast to form a wider valley. Immediately across the river from Mount Tifata a high ridge rises abruptly and runs northwest to Mount Grande (367 meters). A pleasant farm valley extends from the Volturno on the northeast side of this ridge toward Pontelatone. The hills start on the east side of this valley with Mount Fallano (319 meters) and Mount Majulo (502 meters) and run east beyond Caiazzo. The flat valley of the Volturno is broken south of Piana di Caiazzo by Hills 141 and 246, which rise steeply from the level farm land like solitary outposts. The river in this area varies in width from 150 to 200 feet, its depth ranges from 3 to 5 feet, and its banks rise from 5 to 15 feet above the water level. The intensively cultivated valley is cut by small tree-lined streams and sunken roads, and is covered with grain fields, vineyards, and orchards. The brush and the olive groves on the slopes of the hills on either side provide some concealment, but the valley itself offers little protection. The road net available for the use of VI Corps was wholly inadequate for the speedy movement of large bodies of troops or supplies. The best road in the zone is Highway 87, which runs from Naples through Caserta, crosses the river at Triflisco and again at Amorosi, and then runs northeast to Pon telandolfo. Highway 7 runs from Benevento through Caserta to Capua in the British 10 Corps zone. Another road leaves Highway 7 at Maddaloni and goes northeast through Dugenta to Amorosi. The only other road of any con sequence was the muddy one used by the 34th Division during its move to the Volturno. This route branches off Highway 7, runs northwest through Sant'Agata to I.imatola, and continues on to Caiazzo. All bridges and culverts had been blown by the retreating Germans, and temporary by-passes constructed by the engineers were in many instances becoming almost impassable. 2. The Crossing of the 3d Division. The main effort of VI Corps was to be made by the 3d Division against the section of the river defended by the Mauke Battle Group of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. General Truscott was well aware that the enemy would be prepared for an attack at the Triflisco Gap. He therefore planned to make a fake attack on the left flank, while he sent the 7th Infantry, commanded by Col. Harry B. Sherman, across the valley to make the main assault in the center. In order to effect this deception he ordered the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, and the heavy weapons companies of the 30th Infantry to concentrate all their available fire

17

power on the enemy defenses across the gap. The demonstration was to start at midnight, two hours before the jump-off time, and continue throughout the night. If the enemy showed any signs of withdrawing, the 26. Battalion, 30th Infantry, was to cross the river. The ridges above Triflisco were to be blan keted with smoke until they were cleared of the enemy. On the right flank the 2d and 3d Battalions, 15th Infantry, were to attack north from Mount Castellone. Their first objectives were the German strongpoints on Hills 141 and 246. When these heights were occupied, they were to capture the high ground behind Piaua di Caiazzo and then move west behind the 7th Infantry. The 3d Division was in position and ready for the assault by the evening of 12 October. The various delays had given the regiments sufficient time for thorough reconnaissance and planning. The demonstration against the Tri flisco Gap started promptly at midnight. An hour later the division artillery opened up with a terrific concentration on enemy positions across the river. This bombardment continued until 0155, wrhen smoke shells were mixed with the high explosives to screen the crossing areas. The three battalions of the 7th Infantry had come down the valley between Mount Tifata and Mount Ca stellone, slogged quietly across the muddy fields, and started crossing at 0200. vSome elements crossed in assault boats and on rafts, some used life preservers, and others forded the river with the use of guide ropes. The 1st Battalion crossed below the hairpin loop southwest of Piana di Caiazzo, while the other two battalions crossed above it. They then pushed on across the plowed fields, hampered by machine-gun and rifle fire from posi tions in the valley and by occasional mined areas, toward Mount Majulo. Forward elements of the 1st Battalion had almost reached the foot of the mountain by 0800, and the other two battalions were slowly working their way across the valley. Later the 1st Battalion was ordered to hold the flat ground on the left, south of Highway 87. Waterproofed tanks and tank destroyers forded the river during the middle of the day and added their weight to the attack. The 2d and 3d Battalions took Mount Majulo during the afternoon and prepared to seize Mount Fallano on the left. The day's fighting was difficult for the men of the 7th Infantry, but they did an ex cellent job in battling their way across the river and in gaining the domina ting heights on the other side. Their mission was so successful that General Clark called Colonel Sherman the next morning and personally congratulated him on the achievements of his regiment. The 15th Infantry, temporarily commanded by Brig. Gen. William W. Eagles, assistant division commander, sent two battalions across the river south of Piana di Caiazzo. The 2ci Battalion crossed at the west end of Mount

18

Castellone and broke through fierce enemy resistance to take Hill 141. The 3d Battalion climbed down the steep sides of Mount Castellone, forded the river at the island below, and drove on to take Hill 246. The enemy slowly pulled back, subjecting the two hills in the valley to intense artillery fire. The two battalions then reorganized and fought their way to the slopes above Piana di Caiazzo during the afternoon. After the ;th and 15th Infantry were across the river and on their objectives, the key ridge above Triflisco remained to be taken. The 2d Bat talion, 30th Infantry, made two unsuccessful efforts during the afternoon to cross and drive the enemy off the ridge. After dark the 1st Battalion crossed the jeep bridge that had been completed below the hairpin loop, advanced down the valley, and cleared the slopes above the gap. The 2d Battalion, followed by the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, came across the next morning. The 30th Infantry, under the command of Col. Arthur H. Rogers, then began to drive along the ridges toward Pontelatone and Formicola. In a little more than 24 hours of fighting General Truscott's hard-driving infantrymen had won control of the Yolturno Valley from the Triflisco (rap to Hill 246 south of Piana di Caiazzo. By the morning of 14 October every battalion of the 3d Division was across the river. There remained the problem of getting supplies and artiller}^ over to support the advance. The engineers managed to get a light bridge in below the hairpin loop and an 8-ton bridge across at the foot of Mount Castellone during the first day of the assault. Compam^ B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion, then built a 30-ton bridge just above the destroyed bridges at Triflisco. The victory won by the infantry was matched by the superb work of the engineers in constructing three bridges under observed artillery fire.
3. The Crossing of the 34th Division. The plan for the crossing of the

34th Division divided a front of approximately eight miles between the 168th Infantry, which was to make the main effort toward Caiazzo, and the 135th Infantry, which was to attack on the right. Col. Frederick B. Butler, com mander of the 168th Infantry, ordered his 1st and 2d Battalions to cross the river northwest of Limatola to capture the village of San Giovanni and then drive northwest through Caiazzo. Col. Robert W. Ward, commander of the 135th Infantry, directed his 1st Battalion and Company E to lead the assault below the Volturno-Calore junction. Company E was ordered to ford the river south of Squille and take Hill 131, while the 1st Battalion crossed the Vol turno just below its junction with the Calore and advanced northwest over the rolling hills beyond Squille. The remainder of the 2d Battalion was then to cross over and drive on Hill 283 southeast of San Giovanni.

The various delays in starting the attack had given General Ryder's regi ments sufficient time to make thorough reconnaissance, and points of attack had been chosen carefully. While the 3d Division was forcing its crossings on the left, the 34th Division was making its assault on the right. The 96 guns and howitzers representing the division and supporting artillery opened up at 0145. Fifteen minutes later the men of the 135th and 168th Infantry slipped down the muddy banks of the Volturno and waded through the icy water to press their attack. Re connaissance had revealed that the strongest resistance might be expected in the flat valley below Caiazzo, but the men of the 34th Division knew that the enemy was waiting for them all along the river and that the battle ahead was not going to be an easy one. The 168th Infantry sent one company of the 1st Battalion across north of Iyimatola, while the remainder of the battalion crossed 800 yards down the river. The 2d Battalion crossed in columns of companies east of Limatola. Company L went over on the extreme left to protect the flank of the 1st Battal ion. The leading elements of the 1st Battalion got across without difficulty, but the swift current of the river began to carry their assault boats downstream and the enemy discovered their position. Enemy machine guns in the flat fields and in the olive groves on the slopes and artillery behind Caiazzo opened up on them. The battalion was pinned down during the morning between the river and the road to Caiazzo and made little progress, but managed with the aid of the artiller)' to drive on up the slopes during the afternoon. The 26. Battalion crossed without resistance and then fought its way into the hills southeast of San Giovanni. The 3d Battalion came across that night and aided the 1st Battalion in taking Caiazzo the next morning. The 135th Infantry sent Company K across the river below Squille at 0200, and it had little difficulty in occupying Hill 131 southwest of the village. The 1st Battalion forded the river just below the junction with the Calore and made good progress during the early morning. The enemy appeared to be withdraw ing without attempting to make a determined stand. Later in the morning the advance of the battalion was slowed down by tank fire from Amorosi. The remainder of the 2d Battalion came across during the day and had to fight its way through a pocket of Germans by-passed during the morning advance. The 1st Battalion occupied Hill 283 the next morning and drove on toward the hamlet of Ruviano. The drive of the 34th Division was considerably slowed by its inability to get supplies and artillery over the river. The 135th Infantry put a small ferry into operation early on the morning of 13 October, but the engineers experienced

20

great difficulty in building their bridges. The enemy was in direct observa tion of all bridge sites and placed accurate artillery concentrations on the engineers whenever they approached the river. They finally managed to get a small bridge in near Squille on the morning of 14 October, but were unable to construct the 30-ton bridge below Caiazzo until 15 October. 4. The Advance of the 45th Division. While the 3d and 34th Divisions were forcing a crossing of the Volturno, the 45th Division was launching an attack on the right flank up the rugged slopes of Mount Acero. General Middleton had been assigned the task of breaking through the enemy defenses extending from the Matese Mountains above Faicchio to the Calore River south of Telese. This line was the enemy's last natural defensive position blocking the approach to the Volturno Valley. A good start had been made on 12 Octo ber when the 180th Infantry, commanded by Col. Forrest E. Cookson, took the high ground northeast of Telese and advanced on to San Salvatore. This success opened the way for an attack around the west side of Mount Acero and forced the enemy to give up the whole western flank of his line. General Clark was considerably concerned about the right flank of his Army during 13 October and kept in close touch with the progress of the 45th Division. By the end of the day there were indications that the enemy would only fight a delaying action while withdrawing across Titerno Creek. The 45th Division drove on toward Faicchio and the Volturno Valley. C. THE CROSSING OF 10 CORPS
12-14 OCTOBER

1. Plans and Terrain. 10 Corps reached the Volturno on 6 October, but delays from swampy terrain, demolitions, and enemy rearguard resistance pre vented it from making an immediate assault on the river line. General McCreery planned at first to exert his main effort on the right in order to make maximum use of the approaches and exits through Capua and to gain a position suitable for helj>ing the 3d Division during the early stage of its attack. Reconnaissance soon indicated that the Capua area would be the most difficult in which to force a crossing, while reports from the 46 Division along the coast were more optimistic. The decision was then made to attack on as wide a front as possible, with the main weight on the left. A rapid assault appeared not to be feasible, and plans and preparations were made accordingly, as information about the river and surrounding terrain was built up over a period of several days.

21

The final plan of 10 Corps for the assault across the Volturno called for the 56 Division to cross one battalion immediately west of Capua, while the 201 Guards Brigade made a demonstration from the hills east of Capua. The 7 Armoured Division was to make a holding attack in the Cancello ed Arnone and Grazzanise areas and to harass 1>y artillery fire movements of enemy re inforcements along the roads north of the river. The 46 Division was to cross on a two-brigade front between Cancello ed Arnone and the coast. The 40 Royal Tanks was to be moved by sea in LCT's to land north of the mouth of the Volturno. The attacks of the 46 and 56 Divisions were to be preceded by intense artillery concentrations. The terrain along the lower Volturno was most difficult for an assault against a determined enemy. The distance from Mount Tifata above Capua to Castel Volturno on the coast is approximately 17 miles. The land is flat on both sides of the river, and toward the sea it has been reclaimed from marshes. Numerous canals provide drainage for the areas on both sides of the river. The most important of these is the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal, which parallels the north side of the river from Capua to the sea. There are few trees on the south side to provide concealment, but a thick belt of olive groves, vineyards, and scattered timber runs along the north bank of the river. The enemy had good observation from Mount Massico and the ridges running north and south, while 10 Corps was denied observation except from the slopes of the hills above Capua. The two-storey modern farmhouses dotting the plain provided some view of the enemy lines, but their use was limited. The Volturno meanders between high banks from Capua to Castel Vol turno. The width of the river varies from 150 to 300 feet, while the banks rise from 12 to 20 feet above the water. I^evees 10 to 15 feet high, which had been built on both sides to prevent the flooding of the plain during the rainy season, provided defilade positions for the enemy. This factor gave the enemy a considerable advantage, for it made the use of the fire of supporting weapons difficult. Tanks and antitank guns could not get a good field of fire from the south bank. The depth of the water averaged about six feet, and no fords were found that could be used by equipped infantrymen or tanks. Poor roads and ground soft from recent rains made approaches to the river difficult except on main roads. The 56 Division was limited to one road, the Naples-Rome highway (Highway 7B and 7), which crosses the river at Capua. The 46 Division had the use of two roads leading into Castel Voltumo and Cancello ed Arnone. The 7 Armoured Division had only the road which crosses the Volturno at Grazzanise. A hard-surfaced road parallels the river on the south side from Castel Volturno to Capua, but it could not be used until the

22

enemy was driven away from the north banks. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed with care and thoroughness, and the enemy had his guns in position to harass any movements along the highways. io Corps faced the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Corwin Battle Group of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division across the Volturno. The 15th Panzer Division was responsible for the line from the sea to Grazzanise and had all three battalions of the 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment deployed along the river. The Corwin Battle Group defended the area between Grazza nise and Capua. The 115th Panzer Battalion had between 30 and 40 tanks and self-propelled guns around Mondragone and Carinola. The main gun area of the enemy was centered behind the junction of Highways 6 and 7 beyond Capua. The strength of the enemy was disposed to cover the three chief axes of advance through Capua, Grazzanise, and Cancello ed Arnone. In addition to his artillery he had numerous machine-gun nests situated to cover the approaching roads. The belt of trees, the canals and dykes, and occasional concrete pillboxes on the north side of the river aided the enemy's defenses. 2. The Assault of the 56 Division. The 56 Division planned for the 167 Brigade to make a crossing just south of the demolished railway bridge at Ca pua, while the 201 Guards Brigade made a demonstration on the right to lead the enemy to believe that a main effort was being directed at the Triflisco area. The site chosen for the crossing was the most obvious one and was well covered by enemy small-arms posts, pillboxes, mortars, and artillery. Reconnaissance, however, had indicated that no other suitable place for assault boats existed within the division boundaries. The depth of the river and the strength of the enemy positions made it impracticable to attempt to put an adequate force across at any other point by swimming or wading, with the mission of attacking the main crossing site from the rear. The 56 Division began its assault west of Capua before midnight on 12-13 October. The 201 Guards Brigade started its deception near Triflisco, and the 167 Brigade sent the 7 Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Iyight Infantry across below the railway bridge. Surprise was not achieved, and the leading elements immediately met heavy opposition. Ten assault boats loaded with men were sunk before they reached the far bank, and the attack was then discontinued. The intense artillery preparation preceding the attempt to cross had failed to knock out the enemy along the river, although the forward troops had previously been withdrawn 400 yards in order to give the artillery a free hand. The dem onstration by the 201 Guards Brigade resulted in one company securing a footing across the river, but the enemy strongpoints on the ridges above Tri flisco made its position untenable. The company was withdrawn before daylight.

The 56 Division decided on the morning of 14 October that no crossing was feasible in its zone. All attacks in the VI Corps zone had been successful, and the 3d Division had completed three bridges over the Volturno. One of these was a 30-ton bridge just above the demolished highway and railway bridges at Triflisco. General Clark therefore decided to alter the corps boundary so as to include in the 10 Corps area the line of hills running north and north west from Triflisco. This boundary change deprived the 3d Division of its proposed means of communication around the ridges above Triflisco, but it gave the 56 Division approaches to the 30-ton bridge in the Triflisco Gap. After General Clark issued verbal orders at 1530, 14 October, changing the boundaries, the 50 Division arranged for the use of the bridge. 3. The Crossing of the 7 Armoured Division. The 7 Armoured Division in the center was ordered to make a feint attack at Grazzanise to hold enemy troops and reserves in that area. In conjunction with the feint attack it was to infiltrate on one or both sides of Grazzanise with the mission of capturing the village of Brezza across the river and protecting the right flank of the 46 Division. The large loop between Brezza and Grazzanise was chosen for one crossing, because its shape made possible the placing of tanks, mortars, and other weapons on both sides of the enemy positions across the river. The approaches on both banks of the river were good, for the Italians had operated a ferry at one point and the Germans had built and later demolished a wooden bridge at the ferry site. The wet and soft ground made it impracticable to attempt a crossing at any place that could not be approached by existing roads. The Queen's Brigade (131 Brigade) was given the task of carrying out the plan of deception and of throwing the infiltrating elements across the river on the flanks of Grazzanise. The 131 Brigade sent small parties of the 1/5 and 1/7 Queens across the loops at Grazzanise and below Santa Maria la Fossa before midnight on 12-13 October. The elements of the 1/5 Queens, which crossed near Santa Maria la Fossa, were withdrawn, but the small bridgehead in the loop north of Graz zanise was enlarged during 14 October. 10 Corps then decided to construct a Class 9 bridge at Grazzanise, and work on it was begun that night. This bridging operation was interrupted frequently by enemy shelling, but was completed successfully. Meanwhile the 7 Armoured Division gradually ex tended its bridgehead up the loop toward Brezza. 4. The Crossing of the 46 Division. The 46 Division was given the task of making the main effort of 10 Corps on the left flank along the sea. Its objective was a bridgehead 3000 yards deep from a point east of Cancello ed Arnone to the coast. Reconnaissance indicated that the steep and wooded

24

banks of the river would provide good concealment for the infantry, but would restrict the fields of fire of machine guns, tanks, and antitank guns. No suitable ford could be discovered nor could satisfactory exits for vehicles be found on the north bank opposite any possible approaches from the south. The assistance of the navy made it desirable to force one crossing near the sea to take full advantage of the naval gunfire. The use of I X T ' S and Dukws to ferry tanks, guns, and supplies around the mouth of the river also made an initial bridgehead near the sea necessary. Since the enemy was covering the main roads and was accustomed to the British habit of advancing under heavy concentrations of artillery, the division commander decided to attempt to achieve surprise by playing on these points. The decision was made to cross on the flanks of Castel Volturno and Cancello ed Arnone, while placing an intense artillery preparation on the latter town. The crossings of the 46 Division were, with one exception, all successful. On the 139 Brigade front the 16 Durham Iyight Infantry and the 2/5 Iyeicesters got across northeast of Castel Volturno and repulsed an immediate counterattack. The two battalions then dug in along a secondary canal. On the extreme right the 5 Foresters reached a precarious and exposed position northeast of Cancello ed Arnone. Two counterattacks were beaten off during the da}7", but the enemy attacked again at last light and overran the battalion's positions. Most of the men were later able to get back across the river. The 128 Brigade was most successful and had the 1/4, 2, and 5 Hampshires over by daylight. They dug in along the road running northwest of Castel Volturno or west of it toward the sea and slowly pushed their positions forward a few hundred 3'ards during the day. On their left one squadron (17 tanks) of the 40 Royal Tanks was ferried around the mouth of the Volturno and landed successfully. The ground, how ever, was too boggy in most places along the sea for the movement of tanks. The higher dry ground had been mined and had to be cleared before the tanks could proceed. Several were lost and the remainder immobilized until the slow process of removing the mines was completed. This task took longer than usual, for the mines were non-metallic. During 14 October the leading troops of the 128 Brigade and left elements of the 139 Brigade were able to gain on an average of about 600 yards. No other advances were made during the day on the 10 Corps front, but by nightfall the 46 Division had six battalions across the river. All three battalions of the 128 Brigade, the 16 Durham Light Infantry and the 2/5 Leicesters of the 139 Brigade, and the 6 York and Lancasters of the 138 Brigade were on the north bank and ready to push forward over the coastal plain. Thirty-six 6-pounders and a troop of 17-pounders had been brought over, while other 17-pounders were doing a

good job in helping repel counterattacks, especially those directed at the 139 Brigade. Another squadron of tanks in LCT's was ready to land when needed. Two ferries were operating in the 46 Division zone without being molested by enemy artillery, and the division commander decided that there was no im mediate necessity for building a bridge across the Volturno in his zone. The ene my began to show signs of withdrawing before the 46 Division, and by the eve ning of 15 October forward elements of the 128 Brigade reached the banks of the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal.

D.

SUMMARY

OF THE

FIRST

VOLTURNO

CROSSING

Fifth Army was extremely successful in its first crossing of the Volturno on 12-13 October. The 34th Division had two regiments across, and the 3d Division had every battalion north of the river by the morning of 14 October. The 45th Division was pushing its drive on the right flank toward the Volturno Valley. The main assault of the 46 Division had succeeded on the io Corps front, and it had six battalions dug in between the river and the Regia Agnena Nuo va Canal. The 7 Armoured Division was slowly extending its bridgehead toward Brezza, while the 56 Division was preparing to cross on the 3d Division bridge above Triflisco. The efforts of both corps had been somewhat costly. VI Corps lost 544 men during 13 October. The 3d Division suffered 314 of these casual ties, while the 34th Division had 130 men killed, wounded, and missing. Gen eral Clark's forces had within 37 days completed two of the most difficult of military operations a landing on defended hostile shores and an assault against a defended river line and were ready to continue their drive toward Rome.

26

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PRINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGA HO FIFTH ARMY

CHAPTER IV * * * * * * *
Consolidating the Bridgehead

V 1 CORPS had successfully fought its way across the Volturno, and the enemy had started his withdrawal by the evening of 13 October. The following morn ing found the 168th Infantry in the olive groves on the hills north and east of Caiazzo. The engineers, hampered by observed artillery fire, had been unable to construct either of the bridges in the 34th Division zone. Water, rations, and ammunition had to be carried across the river by hand or in assault boats and then transported by carrying parties over approximately six miles of rugged terrain. The wounded were being evacuated with extreme difficulty. General Ryder ordered the regiment to advance no farther until the supply situation was improved and strength was built up on the right flank. The 135th In fantry pushed up during the da}r to the high ground south of Ruviano. On the 3d Division front the 15th Infantry had reached the heights northeast of Piana di Caiazzo, the 7th Infantry had fought its wa}^ into the hills east of Pontelatone, and the 30th Infantry was driving along the ridges from Triflisco toward Formicola. On the right flank the 45th Division was pushing forward northwest of Benevento against stiff enemy resistance. The 180th Infantry was cleaning out the town of San Salvatore, the 157th Infantry was moving around the south side of Mount Acero, and the 179th Infantry was driving over and north of the mountain toward Faicchio. The crossings on the 10 Corps front had been partially successful, and ef forts were being made to enlarge the bridgehead. The 56 Division had no troops over the river in its zone across from Capua. The 7 Armoured Division enlarged its small bridgehead at Grazzanise, but had withdrawn the elements which had crossed near Santa Maria la Fossa. The only gain during the day was an ad vance of about 600 yards made by the 128 Brigade, but by nightfall the 46 Di vision had six battalions north of the river.

27

A.

THE ADVANCE

OF VI CORPS
14-25 OCTOBER

1. Plans and Terrain. {See Map No. 5.) The change in the boundary lines between VI and 10 Corps would have pinched out the 3d Division, for its objectives were now assigned to the 56 Division. VI Corps accordingly is sued Field Order No. 8 at 2100, 14 October, changing the routes of advance of its forces. Originally the 45th Division was to push northwest between the Volturno and the Matese Mountains on the right to capture Alife, Sant'Angelo d'Alife, and Raviscanina. The 34th Division was to advance northwest through the valley on the southwest side of the river and over the high ridges to the left to seize the mountains and valleys around Baja e L,atina, Roccaromana, and Pietramelara. The 3d Division was to drive northwest toward Teano over the Triflisco ridges and occupy Pignataro, Rocchetta e Croce, Mount Maggiore, and the Calvi Risorta feature northwest of Capua. The new order directed the 34th Division to advance up the valley be}'ond Alvignano and then turn north east across the river into the 45th Division zone. The 3d Division was to turn northeast to Dragoni and then prepare to advance northwest in the area previous ly assigned to the 34th Division. The 45th Division was to revert to Corps reserve when it reached the high ground west of Piedimonte d'Alife. The hill mass through which the 3d and 34th Divisions were ordered to advance stretches from 10 to 15 miles northwest of the section of the Volturno Valley running from the Volturno-Calore river junction to Triflisco and is about 10 miles wide. The area is bounded on the southeast and northeast by the wind ing V-shaped river, on the southwest by the plain along the Volturno to the sea, and on the west by an extension of the plain up into the wide valley below Teano and Presenzano. It is a series of high, rocky, brush-covered hills and ridges rising at Mount Sant'Angelo to 870 meters and at Mount Maggiore to 1057 meters above sea level. The mass is interspersed with deep ravines, narrow farm valleys, and small broken tablelands. The high ridges fall off sharply on the northwest side to Pietramelara and Roccaromana in the valley east of Teano. On the northeast side the hills drop steeply to the fertile valley of the Volturno, which is from two to three miles wide on the southwest side and somewhat wider on the northeast side of the river. Evenrwhere across the valley, on the right flank of VI Corps, the precipitous Matese Mountains tower over Piedimonte d'Alife, Alife, vSant'Angelo d'Alife, and Raviscanina. The struggle through this rugged hill mass was not to be just against the determined resistance of the retreating Germans. Poor roads, demolished bridges,

28

and the problem of bringing in supplies slowed the advance of VI Corps. The only road through the hill area branches off from Highway 87 northeast of Triflisco and winds through defiles and around mountains, passing through the villages of Cisterna, Prea, Villa, I.iberi, and Majorano di Monti, until it descends into Dragoni in the Volturno Valley. Another road runs northwest from Caiazzo along the foot of the northeast side of the ridges through Alvignano, Dragoni, and Baja e Latina. Along these roads the enemy was fighting a stubborn delaying action from the slopes and valleys. Ridge after ridge had to be taken; demol ished bridges had to be by-passed; roads had to be built and repaired; and mines, booby traps,, and road blocks had to be cleared. The enemy had to be driven from his well selected machine-gun positions and from his hastily scooped fox holes in the brush, from behind stone walls, and back over the crests of ridges. 2. The Advance of the 3d Division. The 3d Division was pushing its drive to the northwest when the news arrived during the afternoon of 14 October that the boundaries between VI and 10 Corps had been altered. The 7th In fantry was in the hills east of Pontelatone when it received verbal orders to change the direction of its advance and drive up the road through liberi to Dra goni. The 3d Battalion, supported b}^ tanks and tanks destroyers, led the attack at 1645 in an effort to take I4beri before dark. The battalion encountered stiff resistance at Cisterna, a village in a saddle on the forward slopes of Mount Fallano, and the fighting continued there all night. The 2d Battalion was committed at midnight to drive up the valley on the left and pass along the slopes of Mount Friento above the village of Prea. Opposition from tanks used as roving artillery in the broken tableland north of Cisterna caused some de lay, but the 2d Battalion was on the slopes above Prea by daylight and was making rapid progress above the road toward I/iberi. The drive continued on 15 October over the rough terrain and against de termined pockets of enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion moved up to the right through Strangolagalli, a village in the ravine east of Mount Fallano, to drive straight north over the tableland and ridges toward Liberi. The enemy had withdrawn from Cisterna and offered the battalion no opposition until it hit the scrub-covered ridges northwest of the small village of Sasso. The battalion gained a footing during the afternoon on Hill 561, a high point on the ridge running northwest from Sasso through Villa, but the enemy was not completely driven off until after daylight the next morning. The 2d Battalion on the left made steady progress during the day around the slopes of Mount Friento. Shortly after midnight it was stopped by strong resistance southwest of Villa, a small village in a pass across the ridge between Hill 561 and Hill 524.. and suffered heavy casualties in the dark.

29

All three battalions of the ;th Infantry were engaged in sharp fighting around Liberi on the morning of 16 October. Elements of the 29th and 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiments were putting up a determined defense of Hill 524, a low knob less than 50 meters above the little tableland between Villa and Iyiberi, and twice repulsed the efforts of the 3d Battalion to storm it. The 1st Battalion beat off counterattacks on Hill 561 throughout the day and contin ually drove the enemy back down the slopes toward Iyiberi. The attack on Iyi beri was continued on the morning of 17 October, but most of the enemy forces had withdrawn. In the meantime the 3d Battalion; 15th Infantry, had been attached to the 7th Infantry and had come up the road from Pontelatone to assist, on the left flank. This battalion and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Infantry, drove on through Villa and I^iberi and reached Hill 667 and Hill 618. The 1st Battalion pushed on into the narrow farm valle}' on the other side, but was pinned down by rifle, machine-gun, tank, and artillery fire before noon and was held south of Majorano di Monti until dark. On the morning of 17 October the 15th Infantry was ordered to drive through the mountains west of Iyiberi and seize the high ridges east of Pietramelara. This move over rocky slopes, across deep valleys, and through narrow ravines was to protect the left flank of the division. At midnight the 1st Battalion reached castle-crowned Hill 446 above Roccaromana. The 2d Battalion occu pied Hill 330 to the southeast and sent patrols to block the road running east to Dragoni. The 1st Battalion moved over Hill 446 the next morning and attacked Roccaromana, situated along a deep stream at the base of the hill. Pockets of enemy resistance on the slopes and out in the valley caused consid erable difficulty, but the battalion temporarily cleaned out the village. The 2d Battalion moved to the slopes on Hill 446 vacated by the 1st Battalion and drove on that night to seize Mount della Costa to the north. The enemy began to withdraw in front of the 7th Infantry late in the af ternoon of 17 October. The 3d Battalion was then ordered to move up the road through Iyiberi toward Dragoni and was informed that General Truscott expec ted it to be in Dragoni by daylight. The battalion advanced rapidly up the winding road, reached Hill 371 south of Dragoni after midnight, and sent patrols down the slopes to the left toward the town. After daylight the battalion moved across the road to Hill 507. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion had occupied Mount Iyongo west of Dragoni and sent patrols down the slopes to cut the road toward Baja e I^atina. General Truscott then ordered the 7th Infantry to stop its advance and rest its men. VI Corps did not consider the Volturno bridgehead secure until the enemy had been forced out of the hill mass northwest of the river and into the valley

beyond it. General Truscott rested his men and gradually moved them up toward Baja e Latina. The 7th Infantry was then directed against Mount degli Angeli and Mount Monaco, two mountain masses northwest of Baja e patina. The regiment occupied Mount degli Angeli on 22 October and spent the next three days driving the enemy from the slopes of Mount Monaco. When these areas were cleared, the 3d Division was in position to push across the valley and its obstructions toward the Mignano Gap. 3. The Advance of the 34th Division. The next immediate task of the 34th Division after it took Caiazzo was to drive the enemy up the southwest side of the valley beyond Dragoni. The main bridge in the 34th Division zone was not completed during 14 October. The 168th Infantry needed food, supplies, and artillery, and the 135th Infantry could not advance much farther without bringing up its supporting artillery. Late that night General Ryder secured permission from General Lucas to confine most of his activity on 15 October to patrolling. A few minutes later General Clark called General Lucas, explained that there were indications that the Germans were pulling out, and directed that the 34th and 45th Divisions push their advance. General Lucas immediately telephoned General Ryder and General Middleton and informed them that their units " must not lose contact and must push on as hard and vigorously as possible." The 135th Infantry moved up to the low ridge south of Ruviano during the night of 14-15 October and prepared to attack the village the next morn ing. Shortly after midnight General Ryder postponed plans for the advance, but later sent Brig. Gen. B. F. Caffey. assistant division commander., up to direct an attack on the village. The regiment drove on through Ruviano on the morning of 15 October and swept across the rolling grain fields, vineyards, and olive groves of the valley. Enemy delaying action was at times stubborn, but a line from Hill 204 east of Alvignano to the Volturno was occupied by the evening of 17 October. There the tired infantrymen could look from their foxholes and see on their left the round towers of the old castle above Alvignano. Everywhere on the right, when the clouds lifted, the Matese Mountains rose gaunt and gray. Before daylight on 16 October the 168th Infantry moved up the valley dotted with stone farmhouses and along the brush-covered slopes to the left to seize Alvignano. The 3d Battalion met some resistance on the slopes above the road, but drove the enemy off after a spirited engagement. The regiment reached the dominating hillsides south of Alvignano shortly after dark, and the 2d Battalion occupied the village the next morning. Orders were then re ceived to outpost the area until passed through by the 133d Infantry on 19 October on its way to seize Dragoni.

31

The 135th Infantry continued to clear the valley during 18 October and prepared to use one battalion that night to force a bridgehead across the Vol turno. Plans were changed during the morning, and General Ryder ordered the 168th Infantry to drive on toward Dragoni, while he sent the 133d Infantry, commanded by Col. Ray C. Fountain, across the valley to seize the highwayrailway, bridge over the Volturno north of the town. The 168th Infantry met strong resistance during the afternoon in the vicinity of Hill 371, where ele ments of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, supported by self-propelled guns, attempted a counterattack. The fire of the 175th Field Artillery Battal ion drove off the supporting artillery, and the enemy infantry withdrew. The threatened counterattack, which proved to be an effort to cover the evacuation of Dragoni, caused General R}^der to postpone plans for the river crossing during the night by the 135th Infantry. All three battalions of the 133d Infantry were struggling across the valley to block the road from Dragoni to Piedimonte d'Alife and to force a bridgehead just north of the bridge over the Volturno. The 7th Infantry was on the high ridges above Dragoni threat ening the escape of the enemy up the road toward Baja e L,atina. General Ryder knew that the enemy was trying to retreat up the road toward Piedi monte d'Alife and was particularly insistent that the 133d Infantry drive on the bridge with all speed. The three battalions of the 133d Infantry were not on their objectives until nearly daylight on the foggy morning of 19 October. The 1st Battalion crossed the river during the afternoon of 18 October, made a wide sweep around to the right, and reached the bridge before midnight. The 3d Battalion arrived after midnight, and the 100th Battalion came up at dawn. The German dem olition experts had thoroughly destroyed the bridge, and only its low gray stone abutments and one arch could be seen through the willows. All battal ions immediately dug in under the grapevines and fruit trees and prepared to complete the crossing. The 34th Division pushed on up and across the valley during 19-20 October. The 135th Infantry started its delayed crossing of the Volturno after midnight on 19 October; the 168th Infantry advanced early in the morning and occupied Dragoni without opposition. The 100th and 3d Battalions, 133d Infantry, forded the river after dark and closed into areas in the flat country south of Alife, with the enemy in the olive groves on the slopes overlooking them. The 135th Infantry completed its crossing just before 0200 on the misty morning of 20 October and drove toward Alife, which had already been visited by our air force. The infantrymen were delayed during the dark and foggy morning by swampy ground cut by swift canals fed by rippling mountain streams and

32

were hampered by sporadic artillery fire and occasional minefields; nevertheless they entered the rubble-filled streets of Alife before daylight. The 34th Division then continued its advance up the valley on the right of the river. The 133d Infantry started a drive at 1800, 20 October, against Sant'Angelo d'Alife, a village nestling among the olive groves in a draw between Hills 630 and 529 northwest of Alife. The regiment met stiff enemy resistance from positions along the terraced slopes and encountered intense artillery fire from guns behind Hill 529. Stubborn fighting went on for three days, and two tank attacks on the left flank had to be repulsed. During the night of 23-24 October the enemy withdrew from Sant'Angelo d'Alife and Raviscanina, and the 133d Infantry moved up and occupied both towns the next day. This success completed the occupation of all objectives designated by VI Corps in its orders for crossing the Volturno and securing a bridgehead. 4. The Advance of the 45th Division. While the 3d and 34th Divisions were driving up the valley and through the hills on the southwest side of the Volturno, the 45th Division was securing the right flank and was maintaining contact with Eighth Army across the mountains. During 14 October the 180th Infantry had patrols operating through the valley west of the Volturno and north of Titerno Creek. The 179th Infantry, commanded by Col. Robert B. Hutchins, drove on Faicchio on the northeast side of Mount Acero and the 157th Infantry, commanded by Col. John H. Church, came up around the west side of the mountain. The advantages of terrain lay with the enemy, for the 179th Infantry had to fight its way down the narrow gorge of Titerno Creek between Mount Acero and the Matese Mountains, while the 157th Infan try had to advance up a road flanked on the left by the Titerno and on the right by Mount Acero. Despite a bombing and strafing attack by 20 enemy planes the 179th Infantry on 14 October reached the slopes northeast of Faic chio. When the regiment attacked the town the next day, it was beaten back by tank fire. Elements of the 157th Infantry forded the Titerno below Faic chio on 15 October and tried to drive up the west side of the river, but were stopped by fierce enemy resistance and a bombing and strafing attack. When the 157th Infantry continued the attack the next morning, it found that the town had been evacuated during the night. The 26th Panzer Division was gradually withdrawing to the Eighth Army zone, and the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division was extending its front across the Volturno to the Matese Mountains. The 180th Infantry continued on up the valley across Titerno Creek and maintained contact with the 34th Division on the west side of the Volturno. The 157th Infantry drove through Gioia on 17 October. The regiment pushed on the next day along the slopes in the face of determined rearguard resistance.

33

The enemy apparently completed his withdrawal during the night, and the 157th Infantry entered Piedimonte d'Alife at 1700, 19 October. The right flank of VI Corps was secure, and the 34th Division was advancing on up the Volturno Valley toward Sant'Angelo d'Alife. B. THE ADVANCE OF 10 CORPS
14-25 OCTOBER

1. Plans and Terrain. The assaults of the 7 Armoured Division and the 46 Division in the center and on the left of the 10 Corps front had been suc cessful during the night of 12-13 October, but the 56 Division on the right had failed in its efforts to force a crossing of the Volturno in the Capua area. After it became apparent on 14 October that the 56 Division could not cross in its zone without heavy losses, General Clark changed the boundaries between his corps. 10 Corps issued Operations Instruction No. 9 on 15 October, which gave in detail the new corps boundary. The ridges north and northwest of Triflisco were placed in the 10 Corps zone so that the 56 Division might use the 3d Division bridge at Triflisco and also have high ground for observation over the coastal plain. The zones of action of the 56 Division and the 3d Di vision were now separated by a line running from the demolished bridge at Triflisco along Highway 87 to its junction with the road to Pontelatone and thence generally northwest to Formicola. The area that faced 10 Corps was the flat coastal plain from the Volturno toward the Garigliano River, which is broken by a high ridge of mountains running southwest from Mount Santa Croce above Roccamonfina through Mount Massico to Mondragone on the sea. This broad stretch of land is approximately 7 miles long on the coast from Castel Volturno to Mondragone and is some 13 miles long along the foot of the ridges running northwest from Triflisco. The depth of the plain along the Volturno is about 17 miles, while the distance across the west side from Mondragone to the Calvi Risorta feature is approx imately 14 miles. The coastal plain from the mouth of the Volturno to Mon dragone is rimmed with sand dunes and marshes. The terrain soon rises inland to fertile grain fields,, vineyards, orchards, and olive groves. Several drainage canals run immediately northwest of the river, and the plain is cut by numerous tree-lined streams, deep ravines, and sunken roads. The only high ground of any consequence that breaks the wide expanse is the series of low hills south west of the Calvi Risorta feature. The most prominent elevations in this mass are Mount Maro, which is 212 meters high; Hill 226, a flat-topped knob above

34

Sparanise; and Hill 143, across a little farm valley, on which the hamlet of Francolise is situated. 2. The Advance of the 56 Division. The 56 Division started the 201 Guards Brigade across the 3d Division bridge at Triflisco on 15 October and moved northwest along the ridges toward Mount Grande. Most of the brigade and a squadron of the Greys (a tank battalion) were over by the evening of 16 Octo ber. The bridge was still under artillery fire, and a number of casualties were sustained during the crossing. The Guards pressed their attack along the ridges toward Mount Grande. After extremely hard fighting this height was taken by the 6 Coldstream Guards on 17 October. The brigade then swung to the west and continued its pursuit of the slowly retreating Germans. The spur northwest of Villa Volturno was stubbornly defended and caused considerable difficulty until cleared by the 2 Scots Guards. Although the 56 Division originally had no interest in occupying the hills north of Mount Grande, the 30th Infantry had to be relieved southwest of For micola. The enemy was dug in between the British and American forces south west of the town and could shell the 3d Division zone whenever the 30th In fantry tried to withdraw to the east. The 6 Grenadier Guards accordingly turned north toward Formicola to effect the relief. Considerable difficulty was encountered on the ridge southeast of Camigliano, where the crest was so narrow that only one platoon could be deployed against the well situated enemy. The terrain through the area is extremely rugged, and the 3 Coldstream Guards had to be used as porters to maintain the 6 Grenadiers. A man could carry only two rounds of 3-inch mortar ammunition and required four and one-half hours for the round trip. The Grenadiers finally reached Formicola on the afternoon of 18 October and relieved the 30th Infantry. The rest of the 201 Guards Brigade had pushed on in the meantime against stubborn delay ing action to a line running through Formicola to Camigliano. The 169 Brigade began crossing the bridge at Triflisco during the early hours of 17 October. One battalion and a squadron of Greys were directed westward on the north side of the river to cut off the enemy forces still resisting stubbornly in front of Capua. Meanwhile small parties of the 167 Brigade crossed in the Capua area to assist the 169 Brigade. The remainder of the 169 Brigade pushed up Highway 6 northwest of Capua. A determined effort was made to rush the bridge over the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal below the junction of Highway 6 and Highway 7; but this effort was stopped by minefields. By the evening of 18 October the 169 Brigade had occupied Villa Vol turno and Pignataro on the right and was in line with the advancing 201 Guards Brigade. Part of the troops of the 167 Brigade had come across the

35

river at Capua and had reached the area west of the airport; the remaining elements were crossing at Triflisco. The 169 Brigade drove on up Highway 6 to the vicinity of Calvi Vecchia and up Highway 7 across Lanzi Creek southeast of the town of Sparanise. The 56 Division was strengthened on 19 October, when the 168 Brigade, newly arrived from Sicily, closed into the Caserta area and came under its command. Fresh troops were most welcome at this time, for the division had been fighting continually since its landing at Salerno. The supply situation was greatly improved on the s a me day by the completion of a Bailey ponton bridge across the 240-foot gap over the Volturno in front of Capua. Despite bad approaches and 20-foot banks the engineers built the bridge and had supplies flowing up Highway 6 within 48 hours after the enemy was driven back sufficiently for them to start to work. The 168 Brigade then moved up on 22 October to help the 201 Guards Brigade improve its positions in the mountains overlooking the Calvi Risorta hills and ridges, the 168 Brigade reached the high ground north of the Guards, and the Greys worked up Highway 6 to its junction with the road to Teano. 3. The Advance of the 7 Armoured Division. The 7 Armoured Division in the center of the 10 Corps zone continued to push the 131 Brigade across the river at Grazzanise and captured the village of Brezza on the morning of 16 October. Its Class 9 bridge at Grazzanise was completed later in the day, and it began to get supplies and artillery across to support its drive over the flat plain. Progress was slowed by low wet terrain, good concealment for the enemy, extensive demolitions, and stubborn rearguard resistance. The high banks and the wide water span of the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal caused considerable difficulties, but a bridgehead was finally forced across it. The brigade pushed on over the grain fields and through the olive groves of the coastal plain. Its leading elements, supported by the City of London Yeomanry (a tank battalion), were just short of Sparanise and Francolise by 22 October, but were unable to occupy Sparanise until 25 October. 4. The Advance of the 46 Division. The crossing of the 46 Division had been most successful, but it encountered stiff enemy resistance as it attempted to drive on across the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal. The enemy withdrew from the area between the canal and the river during the night of 14-15 October, and elements of the 128 Brigade pushed on to the south banks of the wide and deep canal. This withdrawal cleared the district around Cancello ed Arnone, and bridging operations were started across the Volturno there at 1400, 15 October. The 138 and 139 Brigades, which had been slowly extending their bridgehead north and west, regrouped in front of the town to protect the

36

engineers who were building the bridge. Ivate in the evening of 18 October the 2/4 King's Own Yorkshire I,ight Infantry finally forced a bridgehead across the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal on the road running north from Cancello ed Arnone. By 20 October the division had three ferries in operation across the canal and was ready to continue its drive along the coast. Its advance, however, was stopped while TO Corps paused briefly to regroup and prepare for an attack on Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico, the high points on the ridge between the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano.

C.

SUMMARY

OF THE

ADVANCE

The troops of Fifth Army continued to push back the forces of Marshal Kesselring. The enemy retreated slowly, depending upon demolitions, road blocks, mined and booby-trapped areas, self-propelled guns, and small rearguard units to slow our advance. Villages and ridges in the hills were often defended stubbornly for a few hours or for days and then evacuated at night. On the VI Corps front the 45th Division had reached Piedimonte d'Alife and had gone into reserve. The 34th Division had forded the Volturno a second time and had fought up to Raviscanina. The 3d Division had driven up beyond Baja e I,atina and had cleared Mount degli Angeli and Mount Monaco. The 56 Di vision, leading the advance of 10 Corps after it got across the Volturno, was in possession of the ridges northeast of the coastal plain and had crossed the hill mass that runs southwest to Sparanise and Francolise. The 3d, 34th, and 56 Divisions had thus gained the line originally designated by VI Corps as nec essary to secure the Volturno bridgehead. The 7 Armoured Division in the center of the 10 Corps zone had crossed the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal and had reached Sparanise. The 46 Division along the sea still had most of its elements behind the canal, which continued to obstruct its advance. VI Corps was now in a position to drive on up the Volturno Valley and toward the Mignano Gap, while 10 Corps pushed across the valleys and ridges toward the Garigliano. The rains were becoming more frequent, the weather was getting cooler, and the men of both corps were becoming tired and worn after weeks of steady fighting against the elusive enemy.

37

\-.:-J.JykjiJ:: : - - -f-iir. : : .. . ;

Map N? 5 FIFTH ARMY CONSOLIDATES M BRIDGEHEAD ACROSSXkVOLTURNO


f4-25 October 194-3

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PRINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGR HQ FIFTH ARMY

C H A P T E R V *.*. *. *. * * * * * * * * * * * * * ,, The Drive to the Winter Line

JDEFORE VI and 10 Corps had completed the occupation of territory consid ered adequate to secure the Volturno bridgehead, General Clark issued new orders for future operations. These orders, outlined in Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 8 of 20 October, changed the phase lines next expected to be reached. The first phase line originally ran from Isernia through Venafro and Sessa to the Tyrrhenian Sea, while the second line stretched southwest from Terni to Civitavecchia on the sea above Rome. Fifth Army was now ordered to advance to a line running from Isernia through Mount Passero to the Gari gliano River west of Mignano and then down the river to the sea. When this phase of operations was completed, Fifth Army was to drive on without delay to a line extending southwest from Opi to Fondi. (See Map No. 3.) There was hardly a pause in the fighting by either VI or 10 Corps after they secured their bridgeheads across the Volturno. The 34th Division continued its thrust up the right side of the Volturno, while the 3d Division drove down out of the liills and plunged on across the valley toward the Mignano Gap. The 56 Division on the right flank of 10 Corps kept up pressure on the slowly re treating enemy and prepared to advance on Mount Santa Croce above Rocca monfina. The 46 Division and the 7 Armoured Division exchanged zones along the coast, but kept driving against the enemy rear guards. A. 10 CORPS DRIVE TO THE GARIGLIANO

26 OCTOBER - 4 NOVEMBER

1. Plans and Terrain. [See Map No. 6.) The next immediate task of 10 Corps was the capture of Mount Santa Croce behind Roccamonfina, Mount Mas sico south of Sessa, and the steep ridges running southwest to the sea. This

39

advance was to be in preparation for an attack on the Mount Caminp-Monnt la Difensa-Mount Maggiore hill mass to the northwest. These five features are high points below the Mignano Gap in the chain of mountains that divides the valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano rivers. The problem that faced 10 Corps was not an easy one. In the first place Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico, together with the precipitous ridges that end with Mount Crestagallo on the coast, completely dominate the lower ground to the south and east over which 10 Corps had to advance. Mount Santa Croce, towering above Roccamonfina, rises 1005 meters above sea level, while Mount Massico is 812 meters high and Mount Crestagallo is 437 meters above Mondragone. In the second place the roads on the axis of the advance were few, mostly in poor condition, and their bridges were numerous and easily demolished. One rock road branches off High way 6 below Calvi Risorta, runs across the valley to Teano, and then winds through the mountains to join the Sessa-Mignano road below Roccamonfina. Highway 7. a hard-surfaced road, which forms a junction with Highway 6 north west of Capua, runs along the plain below Sparanise and Francolise, gradually rises to pass through the mountain chain approximately 200 meters above sea level, and then descends below Sessa to the flat valley of the Oarigliano River. A third road, with a gravel surface, leads northwest from Cancello ed Arnone across the plain to Mondragone on the coast, skirts the end of the mountain chain near the sea, and then turns northeast through Carano to Sessa. It was therefore necessary to secure the Sessa road pass between Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico for supply purposes. The terrain in the center of the 10 Corps zone was not suitable for the em ployment of tanks. General McCreery accordingly issued Operations Instruction No. 11 on 24 October, directing the 7 Armoured and 46 Divisions to exchange areas along the coast. Operation Instruction No. 12 was also issued on 24 Oc tober designating the attack on Mount Massico and Mount Santa Croce as Oper ation Thruster. On 26 October Operation Instruction No. 13 outlined the 10 Corps plan of attack and set the date for the advance as 31 October, the day determined for the continuation of the VI Corps drive toward the upper Vol turno and the Mignano Gap. The 56 Division, using the Teano-Roccamonfina road as the axis of its advance, was to make the main attack between that route and the road south of Teano which winds through the terraced hills to Highway 7 at Cascano. The 46 Division was to drive up Highway 7 through the Cascano defile and take the road junction below Sessa. The 7 Armoured Division's primary mission was to protect the left flank. If the two infantry divisions could penetrate the mountain chain and plunge into the valley of the Ga rigliano, any enemy troops left on the coastal plain before the 7 Armoured

Division would be in danger of being cut off as they attempted to withdraw through Mondragone. During the first phase of the attack the 56 Division was to advance west through the Teano area to a line running southwest from Hill 507 west of Teano to the ridges above San Giuliano. The 46 Division was to move up Highway 7 in close contact with the 56 Division, while the 7 Armoured Division was to gain ground preparatory to opening the coast road through Mondragone. During the second phase the 56 Division was to continue on to a line running southwest through Hills 532 and 576 southeast and south of Torano. The 46 Division was to keep abreast by taking Hill 291 northwest of San Giuliano, another hill of the same height west of San Giuliano, and the village of Ventaroli south of High way 7. The 56 Division was then to seize the line running from Mount Mattone southwest to Hill 202, while the 46 Division was to advance on the left to Mount Vallerovina and Hill 542 southeast of Sessa. The 7 Armoured Division, in co operation with the Royal Navy, was to exert maximum pressure on the extreme left and simulate a dangerous threat to the coastal route through Mondragone. The successful completion of these drives, together with the attack of the 3d Di vision toward the Mignano Gap, would threaten the enemy on Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico with encirclement and force his withdrawal. Meanwhile all divisions were ordered to work their way forward in order to push in enemy outposts, to obtain all possible information about his disposi tions, and to secure suitable positions from which to start the main attack. The Germans were believed to be holding strong defensive positions, named by them the Barbara Line. The interchange of the 7 Armoured and 46 Divisions was completed early on the morning of 28 October, and elements of the 7 Armoured Division had the day before secured a bridgehead across the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal. The 56 Division was regrouping in the Rocchetta e Croce-Fran colise area. Contact with the enemy was maintained along the entire front. 2. The Action. On 28 October the 56 Division had the 201 Guards Brigade in line on the right and the 168 Brigade on the left. The 167 and 169 Brigades were in divisional reserve. The 46 Division had the 139 Brigade forward, while the 128 and 138 Brigades were in reserve. The 7 Armoured Division had the 1 Rifle Brigade and the 11 Hussars over the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal. The 131 Brigade had crossed the Volturno at Capua and was in the Grazzanise area. The 5 Royal Tanks and the City of London Yeomanry were near Villa Liturno. On 29 October it became apparent that the enemy was thinning out along the 10 Corps front. Advances of the 56 Division brought it within a mile of Teano, while the 46 Division established itself at Francolise, a weather-beaten village perched around the ruins of a castle on a hill southwest of Sparanise. Patrols

41

of the 7 Armoured Division found that the enemy was withdrawing in the coastal reaches. In view of this withdrawal of the German rear guards, 10 Corps pushed forward on 30 October. Although the co-ordinated attack of VI and 10 Corps was scheduled to begin on 31 October, it really began on the 10 Corps front one day early. It might be more accurate to say that 10 Corps never ceased advan cing and attacking during this period. On 30 October the 56 Division, with the 168 Brigade on the right and the 167 Brigade on the left, made local gains in the Teano area. The fresh troops of the 168 Brigade took Hill 333 northwest of Teano with considerable dash against determined enemy resistance. This advance cut the road leading into Teano from the northeast. The Teano railway station was then taken after a stiff fight. On the left the 167 Brigade met slight opposition in taking two small clusters of buildings a mile east of San Giuliano. The result was a partial encirclement of the town, and the enemy continued his retreat. In the center the 46 Division, with the 139 Brigade on the right and the 128 Brigade on the left, made good progress by occupying Nocelleto. The 139 Brigade then took Hill 127 and the road junction to the left, opening up the roads to the south. The 7 Armoured Division was meeting little opposition on the left, but was unable to exploit the situation. The 131 Brigade had not had time to complete its forward con centration, while the 22 Armoured Brigade was bogged down in low ground made unsuitable for movement by the recent rains. On 31 October the 131 Brigade captured the badly damaged town of Mon dragone and the dominating hill above it. On 1 November the 168 Brigade, still going strongly, occupied Roccamonfina, and the 139 Brigade took Giusti. The 7 Armoured Division drove the enemy from Mount Cicola, which completely freed the coastal route through Mondragone of enemy observation from the end of the mountain chain. The division then passed a tank battalion through and directed it northeast against Carano on the road to Sessa. The enemy grad ually fell back, and the 56 Division continued on through the hills on the right. On 2 November patrols of the 7 Armoured and 46 Divisions reached the Gari gliano River. The enemy was cleared from the low ground on the south side of the river except for some posts in a loop northwest of San Castrese. The Ger mans then began a series of demolitions along the sea north of the Garigliano, obviously fearing a seaborne landing on their flank and rear. Operation Thruster was over and the battle for the Barbara Iyine was suc cessfully concluded. Originally the line had been thought to be a belt of strongly defended positions from which the enemy would attempt to halt the advance of 10 Corps. Actually the struggle for it consisted of no more than the laborious wrinkling out of small but determined enemy machine-gun posts and the over

42

..

PRESENZANO

^VENTAROLJ

MapN9 6 10 CORPS DRIVE to the GAR/GUANO


26 October ~4 November 194-3

PRINTED

BY 6 6 T H

ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGR

HO FIFTH

ARMY

coining of delays caused by numerous demolitions. 10 Corps was later to learn that the enemy's main positions were farther back on the way to Rome, but it was now ready to make its assault on Mount Camino to help open that route. B. THE THIRD VOLTURNO CROSSING OF VI CORPS
26 OCTOBER 4 NOVEMBER

1. Plans and Terrain. (See Map No. 7.) The plan of the next operation of VI Corps, as outlined in Field Order No. 12 ot 29 October and Field Order No. 13 of 3T October, was for two divisions to cross the Volturno during the night of 3-4 November to seize a line running from Isernia through Mount Pas sero to Mignano. The 504th Parachute Infantry (82c! Airborne Infantry Di vision), which had come up the valley through Ailano to Valle Agricola in the mountains, was to drive along the slopes of the Apennine Mountains to protect the right flank. The 3d Division on the left flank was to make a demonstration toward Terra Corpo and then seize the mountains west of Presenzano. The 34th Division was directed to cross the Volturno east of Venafro and drive into the mountains southwest of Colli, while the 45th Division crossed the river south of Venafro to seize the high ground east of San Pietro and the 4th Ranger Bat talion crossed to block Highway 6 north of Mignano. The phase line that Fifth Army was next directed to reach in the VI Corps zone starts high on the slopes at Isernia, runs across the headwaters of the Vol turno, and crosses the mountains to Mount Passero. Then it turns sharply south west and passes through tangled hills and desolate mountains to a point on the Garigliano River west of Mignano. The area enclosed between this line and the upper Volturno is a great arc of mountains extending 15 miles south to the Mignano Gap and varying in width from 6 to 10 miles. The arc starts on the east side with the Roccaravindola spur, curves around Venafro, and ends with the high hills between Presenzano and Mignano. The brush-covered hills back of Roccaravindola and Santa Maria Oliveto rise from 400 to 600 meters above sea level, drop off into the narrow and desolate valley of Ravindola Creek, and then rise to 1036 meters at Alto Hill. The great rocky barriers of Mount Santa Croce and Mount Corno tower 1025 and 1052 meters above the olive groves around Venafro. Between Sesto Campano and Mignano and northwest of Presenzano the peaks reach 1120 meters at Mount Cesima. Through this rugged mass from Montaquila to Mignano numerous hills and mountains rise between other hills and mountains until it is a series of rounded hills, precipitous cliffs, jagged peaks, rocky slopes, high tablelands, deep gorges, and innumerable ravines and valleys.

43

The intensively cultivated valley of the Volturno is less than two miles wide at Roccaravindola, widens to five miles at Venafro, and narrows down to less than two miles northeast of Presenzano. The river in this sector flows in numerous streams, varying in depth from 10 to 20 inches, through clumps of willows and over a gravel bed reaching a width of 800 feet. The valley on both sides is cut by numerous streams and sunken roads and is covered with grain fields, vineyards, orchards, and olive groves. 2. Moving up for the Third Volturno Crossing. Several days of fighting still faced VI Corps before it was in position to make its third crossing of the Volturno River. The 34th Division had to drive on up the valley, the 45th Di vision had to move forward from Piedimonte d'Alife, and the 3d Division had to cross the valley toward the Mignano Gap to secure the left flank. The 135th Infantry took up the chase for the 34th Division on the morning of 26 October, with the high ground around Ailano and Mount Cavuto across Iyete Creek south west of Pratella as its objectives. The enemy, however, chose to make one of his most stubborn stands on Hill 235, an insignificant little obstruction rising less than 25 meters above the broken valley west of Raviscanina, and held up the advance for two days. The 168th Infantry came up and drove on past Hill 235 to Iyete Creek on 28 October. The 135th Infantry pushed through Pratella and Prata the next day. The 133d and 168th Infantry then advanced up the I^ete Creek valley and down into the valley of the rapid little vSava Creek during 31 October and 1 November, occupying the area as far as Capriati a Volturno. Meanwhile the 504th Parachute Infantry had moved up the valley through Ailano and closed into positions at Valle Agricola on the right flank of VI Corps. While the 34th Division was driving up the right side of the river, the 3d Di vision was clearing the mountains and v a l ^ s on the left. The 30th Infant^ attacked Mount San Nicola on 26 October and occupied Pietravairano, stairstepped below the ruins of an old castle in the saddle between Mount San Nicola and Mount Gaievola. The 15th Infantry pushed from Roccaromana through Pietramelara and occupied Hill 342 to the west and the San Felice hills to the northwest. The regiment moved on across the valley and drove the Germans from the rocky slopes of Mount Gaievola and Mount Sant'Angelo. On 3 November the 34th Division was poised in the olive groves on the slopes overlooking the flat valley of the Volturno east of Venafro. The 45th Di vision had moved up the valley from Piedimonte d'Alife and was in position for its first crossing of the Volturno. The men of both divisions could look west ward across Highway 85 and the railroad running up the valley and see the moun tain masses stretching beyond and towering over Santa Maria Oliveto, Venafro, Sesto Campano, and Presenzano. Men who thought they had seen mountains

44

in Africa and Sicily were about to learn what real mountain fighting was. The enemy had withdrawn west of the river, destroying bridges and leaving behind him his infernal minefields, and was waiting in the bald and rugged mountains. On the right of VI Corps the 504th Parachute Infantry, commanded by Col. Reuben H. Tucker, had plunged into the great gray Gallo bowl high in the mountains and v/as advancing northwest toward Isernia in contact with the British Eighth Army across the Apennine Mountains. On the left the 3d Di vision was following elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, retreating slowly over the valley and through the lower hills toward Mignano. The British 10 Corps had completed its laborious struggle through the Barbara Iyine south of VI Corps toward the sea. 3. The Crossing of the 45th Division. Since the 3d Division had made excel lent progress on the left flank, VI Corps decided to send the 45th Division across the Volturno ahead of the 34th Division to direct its first efforts against Venafro and toward cutting Highway 6 north of Mignano. Company F, 180th Infantry, crossed the Volturno on the night of 2 November and went into position around Sesto Campano, a village high on the terraced hillside. The 4th Ranger Bat talion, commanded by L,t. Col. Roy A. Murray, Jr., then went across the river in the 45th Division zone at 1800, 3 November, to drive across the mountains back of Sesto Campano and block Highway 6. The remainder of the 2d Bat talion, 180th Infantry, crossed the river southeast of Presenzano at 2000, climbed up the steep ridges north of the town, and advanced northwest to occupy the ridge running northwest of Rocca Pipirozzi and east of Vallecupa and Ceppagna. The 6th Parachute Regiment (2d Parachute Division) had reinforced this area the day before and put up a determined defense of Rocca Pipirozzi, a little stone village clustered around an old castle on one of the peaks of the narrow ridge. The battalion drove the enemy off the ridge during the day and then made contact with the 4th Ranger Battalion, which had been stopped on Cannavi nelle Hill to the southwest. [/ The 179th Infantry was ordered to advance on Venafro and the surrounding slopes during the morning of 4 November. The 3d Battalion crossed the river after midnight and made good progress after dawn over the grain fields and through the vineyards of the valley. About the middle of the morning most of the battalion was pinned down a mile southeast of Venafro by machine-gun fire from the slopes below Mount Corno. Company K stubbornly fought its way forward through the town, but the remainder of the battalion was unable to reach the protection of the high ground until after dark. The 1st Battalion crossed the river during the morning of 4 November to pass through the 3d Bat

45

talion the next day and drive on Pozzilli, a village scattered along a canal in the draw between Mount Santa Croce and Hill 540. 4. The Crossing of the 34th Division. The immediate objectives of the 34th Division across the wide Volturno were the villages of Santa Maria Oliveto and Roccaravindola on the hills to the northwest. The 168th Infantry was ordered to cross northeast of Venafro and seize Roccaravindola, a hamlet on a high spur jutting out into the valley. The 133d Infantry was to cross east of Venafro and drive northwest to take Santa Maria Oliveto and the ridges to the south west. Shortly before midnight the 2d and 3d Battalions, 168th Infantry, and the 133d Infantry moved carefully down out of the hills and through the farms of the muddy valley to their positions along the low river banks. The division artillery opened up at 2330 with a terrific concentration on enemy positions across the river. Thirty minutes later the men of the 34th Division waded through the swift and icy waters of the Volturno for the third and last time. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 168th Infantry, forded the Volturno abreast. Mortar and artillery fire from the hills was heavy, but the worst thing encoun tered in the valley was the extensive use of mines and booby traps. S-mines and Tellermines, separately and together, were planted thickly in the valley and along the embankment leading up to Highway 85. Trip wires were numer ous and many were attached to grapevines, fruit trees, and haystacks. At the regimental command post high in the hills east of the river, the progress of both assault battalions could be followed by the explosions of the mines. The 3d Bat talion, 133d Infantry, waded quickly through the wide and shallow water and advanced rapidly up into the hills. The 1st Battalion followed on the left, and the 100th Battalion splashed across to get astride of the road net in the valley and to protect the left rear of the division. The 168th Infantry reached the hills early in the morning despite the minefields. The 3d Battalion climbed the slopes of Hill 400 and quickly mopped up its area. The 2d Battalion reached the rocky saddle between Hill 400 and its objective by the middle of the morning, but was held up by a mortar and machine gun in the draw north of Roccaravindola. This position was soon wiped out by a patrol, and the battalion was in the village by noon. The two assault battalions then reorganized, but their heavy losses from mines and booby traps prevented a renewal of the attack. The 1st Battalion came across the river after dark to pass between them and seize the ridge extending from Hill 518 to Hill 558 northwest of Roccaravindola. All three battalions of the 133d Infantry were over the Volturno shortly after midnight and made good progress through minefields against small-arms, machine-gun, and artillery fire. Enemy delaying elements were disposed along

46

Highway 85 and the railroad, and resistance stiffened as the troops reached the hills. The 3d Battalion climbed the slopes into Santa Maria Oliveto after daylight; the 1st Battalion was on Hill 550 to the southwest by the middle of the morning. Casualties from mines and booby traps were particularly heavy in the 3d and 100th Battalions, and they made little progress after noon. The 34th and 45th Divisions had completed the third Volturno crossing and had fought their way into the hills and up the mountain slopes on the other side. The 3d Division continued its advance on the left flank, while the 504th Parachute Infantry kept pace along the foothills of the Apennine Mountains on the right. Although the river was not strongly defended by an enemy in fixed positions, the artillery of the 34th Division expended 4122 rounds during the crossing to drive him back into the hills. The casualties in VI Corps were almost as heavy as they were in the first crossing, for 491 men were killed, wounded, and missing during 4 November. VI Corps had now hit the German Winter Iyine and was in position to start battering to break through it.

C.

SUMMARY

OF THE

DRIVE

The tired men of Fifth Army continued to drive the Germans before them during the last week in October and the first in November. 10 Corps pushed across the divide between the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano. Forward elements of the 7 Armoured Divisioil and the 46 Division reached the Gaiigliano on 2 November and soon cleared most of the southeast side of the river. The 56 Division had driven through Teano and Roccamonfina and was now preparing for an assault on the towering and jagged mass of Mount Camino. VI Corps had sent the 3d Division across the valle}^ toward Mignano, and it had fought its way up to the Mignano Gap and the hill masses on either side. The 34th and 45th Divisions had made the last crossing of the Volturno and had pushed their way into the mountains on the other side. The rains were increasing, the weather was becoming steadily colder, and the German resistance was stif fening as Fifth Army hit the German Winter I,ine.

47

sipfii&imi^

'ySift^P^V5*

VOLTURNO CROSSING
26 October - 4 November 1943
5CALS
WX> 0 1 2 3 * 5

PRI NTEO

BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGR HO FIFTH ARMY

CHAPTER VI . * * * * * * *** * * * * * *
Battering the Winter Line

JT'lFTH Army had now reached some of the most formidable obstacles that it was to face in Italy. 10 Corps had crossed the divide that separates the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano rivers and was getting ready to attack the Mount Camino-Mount la Difensa-Mount Maggiore mass southwest of Mignano. VI Corps had one division driving on the Mignano Gap, while two divisions had crossed the upper Volturno successfully and were on the slopes of the mountain arc west of the river. The winter rains, which had started late in September, were increasing steadily, making roads and by-passes ex tremely difficult to maintain and turning the farm valleys into seas of mud. The enemy was reinforcing both of his flanks with fresh infantry divisions and was bringing a panzer division across the mountains from the Eighth Army front to oppose VI Corps. The men of all divisions of Fifth Army were tired and worn from long weeks in the line and suffered from the cold, wet weather. The barriers that faced Fifth Army on its way to Rome were the moun tains from Montaquila to Mount Camino below Mignano. The great arc through which the 34th and 45th Divisions were fighting extends from Mon taquila to Mignano. The 3d Division was trying to drive the enemy from the slopes on either side of the Mignano Gap and cross into the valley south of Cassino. 10 Corps was moving up to make its main effort against Mount Ca mino in the great mass below the Mignano Gap. The chain of mountains im mediately west of the Volturno ends above Mignano with Mount Cesima and Cannavinelle Hill which rise 1120 and 689 meters above sea level. The Mignano Gap, a wide pass from 100 to 150 meters high, separates this tangled mass from the Mount Camino (963 meters)-Mount la Difensa (960 meters)-Mount Mag giore (630 meters) obstacle to the southwest.

49

A.

10 CORPS AT MOUNT

CAMINO

5-15 NOVEMBER

10 Corps was now in position to make an assault on Mount Camino, Mount la Difensa, and Mount Maggiore, which compose a huge dominating hill mass below the Mignano Gap overlooking the southern part of the I,iri Valley. (See Map No. 8.) These mountains, some 3000 feet above the valley of the Garigliano River to the southwest, rise gauntly from the low ground around the villages of Galluccio and Cavelle. The slopes are steep and rocky; there is little cover and few feasible approaches. That part of Mount Camino, the highest of the mass, facing the 56 Division consists of two main spurs running approximately north and south. The westernmost of these spurs runs from Point 819 (Hill 819) southward through Point 727. The eastern spur runs par allel to it from Point 963. Both of these ridges are steep and razorbacked. The 56 Division was assigned the difficult task of taking Mount Camino. This division, with the exception of the 168 Brigade, had been fighting con tinually since 9 September. It needed a pause for rest and reorganization as well as an opportunity to assimilate its numerous replacements. However, the enemy could be given no time for rehabilitation and strengthening his posi tions at this time. The attack began on 5 November, with the 201 Guards Brigade on the right and the 168 Brigade on the left. The Guards took Cavelle and the 168 Brigade occupied Sipicciano. On the right of the 56 Division the 3d Division was starting its assault on Mount la Difensa. On 6 November the Guards attacked toward the north at 1600, with the 6 Grenadier Guards on the right and the 2 Scots Guards on the left. The 2 Scots Guards took the village of Calabritto, while the 6 Grenadiers made some progress on the right. After repulsing a counterattack on Calabritto the 2 Scots Guards tried to find a route up the mountain sides by which they could take the village of Cocuruzzo from the rear. When this effort failed, they withdrew and attacked the following night through the Grenadiers. This assault proved costly, for the battalion encountered formidable defenses consisting of weapons pits blasted out of solid rock and heavily wired. All usable approaches were carefully mined and booby-trapped. On 8 November two fierce counterattacks on Calabritto were beaten off with considerable loss to the enemy. Over on the right the 3d Division was also up against the enemy main positions" on Mount la Difensa, Mount Lungo, and the heights above San Pietro, and was being subjected to determined counterattacks. During the night of 8-9 November another counterattack on

Calabritto was repulsed, while the Grenadiers gained a footing on Mount Ca mino by driving the enemy from Point 727. Meanwhile the 168 Brigade on the left was incurring casualties from the infernal German S-mines, the enemy weapon most hated by the infant^. The Guards began to show signs of exhaustion by the morning of 10 No vember. The weather was becoming colder and wetter, and small enemy counterattacks were, a continual source of annoyance. The 7 Oxfordsliire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry was brought up from the 167 Brigade to help the Guards., while the 10 Royal Berkshires of the 168 Brigade relieved the 3 Coldstream Guards at Calabritto. The 7 Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Ivight Infantry then made a strong attack east through the Guards and fought their way to the top of Point 819. They were driven off the peak by an im mediate counterattack, but the fact that they reached Point 819 at all was a magnificent achievement. Ivosses and continued action had seriously reduced the combat efficiency of the 56 Division, so that it was doubtful if Mount Caniino could be held if taken. The positions of the division on the mountain slopes were impractical to hold. On 12 November General Templer decided to assist the 201 Guards Brigade with an attack by the 167 Brigade on the right. The 23 Armoured Brigade and the 44 Reconnaissance Regiment therefore started taking over the 167 Brigade zone. Meanwhile the 201 Guards and 168 Brigades were fully occupied in tr}dng to hold what they had won. Enemy artillery was very active, and frequent determined counterattacks were directed on Calabritto. Maintenance of troops on Mount Camino was becoming increasingly difficult. A battalion was required to manhandle supplies up to forward elements. Extreme difficulty was being experienced in getting the wounded down the steep mountain sides. On the right the 3d Division was everywhere held up and in a similar plight. The 7th Infantry was on the eastern slopes of Mount la Difensa. North of Mignano only the southern slopes of Mount Lungo were held, while toward the northeast Mount Rotondo and the high ground east of San Pietro was in the possession of the 3d Division. In view of these facts it was decided on 12 November, with the approval of General Clark, to withdraw from Mount Camino. The plan for the attack by the 167 Brigade was canceled, and the 169 Brigade moved up on the afternoon of 14 November to occupy San Clemente and cover the withdrawal of the Guards. The 23 Armoured Brigade was to hold the Ponte area, the 168 Brigade was to hold the Sipicciano Gap, and the 167 Brigade was to occupy a position covering the Roccamonfina-Conca road. The Guards started with drawing through the 169 Brigade during the night of 14-15 November, and

51

that somewhat hazardous operation, thanks to very bad weather, was accom plished without any enemy reaction. The indications were that it was not until 36 hours later that the enemy realized that the Guards were no longer on the slopes of Mount Camino. B. THE ADVANCE OF VI CORPS
5-15 NOVEMBER

1. The 3d Division at the Mignano Gap. (See Map No. 8.) The 3d Division continued to make the main effort of VI Corps on the left flank to drive past Mignano and into the valley south of Cassino. Mignano is situated in a wide gap across the mountain chain which separates the valleys of the Volturno and Ga rigliano rivers. The brush-covered sides of Cannavinelle Hill and Mount Cesima rise to the northeast, and the huge mass of Mount Camino-Mount la DifensaMount Maggiore towers on the other side. The Mignano Gap itself contains two formidable barriers in the shape of Mount Rotondo and Mount Iyungo. Mount Ro tondo rises 357 meters just west of Cannavinelle Hill and is densely covered with brush. Mount Iyungo is a long barren ridge with several peaks which thrusts itself up 351 meters almost in the middle of the gap. If the 3d Division was to break through the Mignano Gap and pour into the valley south of Cassino, the enemy had to be driven from the dominating heights to the northeast and southwest. Patrols found that minefields, tank traps, and machine-gun positions on Mount Rotondo and Mount Iyungo made an attack through the gap a hazardous operation. General Truscott then sent the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, over Mount Cesima to Cannavinelle Hill, while the 30th Infantry went around to Rocca Pipirozzi to launch an attack across Cannavinelle toward Mount Rotondo, which protected the gap from the north. The regiment passed through the 180th Infantry during the night of 5-6 November and made an unsuccessful attack the next afternoon on Mount Rotondo. At the same time the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, made an unsuccessful effort to seize the southeast nose (Hill 253) of Mount Iyttngo. Another co-ordinated attack was launched, under cover of the fire of eight battalions of artillery, on the foggy morning of 8 November. The 30th Infantry occupied the crest of Mount Rotondo, and the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, took Hill 253. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, then moved up and beat the enemy off Hill 193 in the horseshoe curve of Highway 6. Both regi ments spent the next few days in repulsing almost continual German counter attacks, in digging deeper for protection against mortar and artillery fire, and in trying to keep reasonably warm and dry.

52

On the left the 2 d Battalion, 7 th Infantry, attacked on 5 November through Casale and Caspoli toward the high ridge between the jagged peaks of Mount Camino and the perpendicular cliffs of Mount la Difensa. The resistance of the enemy there demanded that the remainder of the regiment be brought, up to assist the 2d Battalion. During the next ten days these battalions tried in vain to scale the heights of Mount la Difensa. Their every effort was balked by a cliff from 50 to 60 feet high running north and south some 1500 yards along the top of the mountain. They were met at every turn by commanding observation, by rifle and machine-gun fire from holes blasted in the rocky slopes, and by accurate mortar and artillery fire. The enemy paid heavily for holding his ground and his counterattacks were often costly, but he was always able to shift his reserves to replace his losses. The difficulties of supply were tremendous in this terrain cut by deep gorges and precipitous ridges. Everything had to be brought up by carrying parties, and a man could carry only a small amount when he needed both hands for climbing. Unsuccessful efforts were made to drop sup plies from planes to relieve the situation. Six hours were required to bring down the wounded. The men of all battalions suffered from exposure to rain and cold and from a lack of proper food and clothing. 2. The 45th Division Batters at the Mountains. The advance of the 45th Division to the northwest was continued on 6 November by the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, on its way between Mount Corno and Mount Santa Croce toward Concacasale. The jagged cliffs and peaks of these precipitous mountains had to be cleared before the battalion could drive across the high saddle between them. Enemy resistance was strong, and the mountainous terrain made progress almost impossible. Supplying the forward elements was an arduous task, for the 1st Battalion reached heights that could not be negotiated by the surefooted Italian pack mules that had been acquired. Positions blasted and dug into the solid rock had to be taken one by one, and if they were not immediately occupied, the enemy infiltrated back at night. His positions on the forward slopes were lightly organized, but the reverse slopes were held in strength and his guns were sited to wipe out anything coming over the crests. On 10 November the 1st Ranger Battalion, commanded by I,t. Col. William O. Darby, relieved the 180th Infantry on Mount Corno. On the following day the 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, commanded by lyt. Col. William P. Yarborough, came up and drove the enemy from the saddle on Mount Santa Croce between Peaks 970 and 1025 to the right of Venafro. On the morning of 6 November the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, moved through Pozzilli to seize the great, dome-like mass of Hill 769 west of Filignano. Fighting over the slopes and through the valleys was fierce, for the enemy stitb

53

bornly defended every inch of ground in the mountains. During the next six days the battalion pushed steadily forward across mined ravines and valleys, over bullet-swept slopes, and through fog, rain, and bitterly cold nights. On 9 November the ist Battalion occupied Hills 570 and 580 south of Filignano and east of Hill 769. Three days later it relieved the 26. Battalion, which was still fighting on the east slopes of Hill 769. The 3d Battalion then moved to Hill 873 northeast of Filignano and sent patrols to Hill 1036 to gain contact with the 168th Infantry on its right. The 157th Infantry reached Venafro on 7 November and prepared to pass between the 179th and 180th Infantry and drive across the desolate hills toward Acquafondata. Threats of counterattacks on the 45th Division front delayed the committing of this reserve until 11 November, when the ist Battalion jumped off to take Hill 759 southwest of Hill 769, which was being attacked by the 179th Infantry. The terrain was extremely difficult, but the battalion reached the crest of the hill the next day. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion pushed forward at daylight on 12 November to seize Hill 640, a massive knob on the southwest side of Hill 769. In order to reach Hill 640 the battalion had to pass over Hills 460 and 470, which are slight rises on a ridge running southeast from Hill 640, and then drive across the road running from Pozzilli to Acquafondata. The top of Hill 460 is flat and partly cultivated; its left side falls away steeply into the narrow valley of a rippling mountain stream. The 3d Battalion made little progress during 12 November, for its line of advance was dominated by Hill 769. Elements of one company climbed the steep slopes of Hill 460 early in the following morning and drove a score of the enemy across the road toward Hill 640. The company then reorganized to push on, but soon began to receive intense mortar and artillery fire. The enemy coun terattacked with about 50 men at noon, at 1330, and again during the middle of the afternoon, following his artillery concentrations closely and supported by small-arms fire from Hill 769. The top of Hill 460 was open to fire from three sides, and artillery fire finally forced a withdrawal late in the afternoon. Colonel Church, commander of the 157th Infantry, then decided that this was just another one of the hills in the area that was flanked by more hills. He advised Colonel Hutchins of the 179th Infantry that Hill 460 was untenable for both sides and that he could advance no farther until Hill 769 was cleared of the enemy. 3. The 34th Division Breaks into the Winter Line. The main efforts of the 34th Division to break into the upper end of the Winter Line were to be made by the 133d and 135th Infantry. The 133d Infantry continued its struggle north west of vSanta Maria Oliveto over the series of scrub-covered hills against an enemy that was no longer retreating and with problems of supply that could

54

not be solved with Italian pack mules. The enemy continued to hold positi ons on the reverse slopes of hills and to infiltrate back through ravines and valleys. Fighting and patrolling went on steadily until the regiment was pinched out on 12 November by the 135th and 179th Infantry. The casualties of the 133d In fantry in the third crossing of the Volturno and the fighting around Santa Maria Oliveto were extremely heavy. Four officers and 81 enlisted men were killed, 24 officers and 216 men were wounded, and 6 men were missing. Exposure to rain and cold, however, struck down more men than did the enemy. On 7 November General Ryder ordered the 135th Infantry; the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion; the 191st Tank Battalion; Company A, 3d Chemical Bat talion; and Company B, 109th Engineer Battalion, to assemble in the vicinity of the highway-railway crossing in the valley southeast of Roccaravindola. This group, under the command of General Caffey, was to be known as Task Force A and was to drive up the road to secure Montaquila. The 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, led the attack the next morning and took the town and Hill 864 to the west. The 1st Battalion drove across the hills back of Santa Maria Oliveto and occupied Hill 1036. The 135th Infantry spent the next few days patrolling north across Chiaro Creek and west over the terraced hills toward Mount Pantano. Routes through mined areas were located by driving sheep and goats through them, and extensive minefields were discovered north of Chiaro Creek. Contact was made with the 504th Parachute Infantry, which had pushed along the right flank of VI Corps to Colli.

C.

SUMMARY

OF

OPERATIONS

Fifth Army was everywhere held up by bad weather, mountainous terrain, and stubborn enemy resistance. The 56 Division, which had been making the main effort for 10 Corps, had given up its attempt to drive the enemy from Mount Camino. The 34th and 45th Divisions had been stopped in the mountains west of the Volturno River. The 3d Division had been successful in clearing the right side of the Mignano Gap, but Mount I.ungo in the center and Mount la Difensa on the left were proving to be difficult to capture. The enemy had strengthened his right flank along the sea with the 94th Grenadier Division and his left flank in the mountains with the 305th Grenadier Division and the 26th Panzer Division. The rains had increased since October and the nights were bitterly cold. Problems of supply were becoming increasingly difficult as the Volturno rose, as the mud got deeper, and as the hills became steeper.

55

Men suffered from the rain and cold and from a lack of hot meals and proper clothing. The divisions needed rest and replacements if they were to maintain efficiency and high morale. The enemy's main defensive line had been reached and more men and materiel were needed to break through it. The resistance in this area caused 15th Army Group to direct Fifth Army to stop its attack and regroup its forces. General Clark took these factors into consideration and stopped the advance on 15 November. Our exhausted men could now rest and prepare for another assault to smash through the German Winter Line.

ACQUARJNDATA^

^I^S^ S

COCURUZZ CALABRffTO

FIFTH ARMY REACHES ih WINTER LINE


r 1943

^J T

|SESSA^-vV
BINTFD BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGR HO FIFTH ARMY

CHAPTER VII

* * * * * * * * * *

Summary of the Campaign

A.

THE ADVANCE

OF FIFTH

ARMY

7 OCTOBER - 15 NOVEMBER

r IFTH Army made rapid progress during October and the first part of November until the German Winter I^ine halted the advance. (See Map No. 9.) VI Corps gained approximately 45 miles on its right flank and about 25 on its left flank during the period 7 October - 15 November. 10 Corps moved from the Volturno River to the Garigliano River, a distance of some 17 miles, during the same time. Its advance from Capua to Mount Camino covered approxi mately 20 miles on its right flank. The Fifth Army front stretched some 50 miles from the vicinity of Benevento to the mouth of the Volturno at the begin ning of this campaign, but eventually narrowed down to approximately 35 miles between the Colli area and the mouth of the Garigliano. The troops of Fifth Army could well take pride in their achievements when they paused for rest and reinforcement in the middle of November. They had made a successful landing on the Salerno beaches on 9 September and had in the next month driven up to the Volturno-Calore river line, the next natural defen sive positions of the enemy. On 13 October these indomitable infantrymen fought their way across the Volturno and continued to drive the enemy back toward Rome. During the month they drove across coastal plains and over moun tains, twice more forced crossings of the Volturno, and finally hit the German Winter Iyine above Venafro and Mignano.

B.

FIFTH ARMY

CASUALTIES

The effective strength of Fifth Army rose from 130,246 on 7 October to 243,827 on 15 November. Most of these additional troops were in service units and were not available for combat duty. The total battle casualties in the Army

57

during this period were 9690. The American units had 6843 casualties, as fol lows: 1374 killed, 5183 wounded, and 286 missing in action. The 3d Division suffered 2699 casualties, the 34th Division 1660, and the 45th Division lost 1370 men. The heaviest losses in the American VI Corps occurred on 13 October and 4 November, the days during which the first and third crossings of the Volturno were made. The first crossing cost 544 men, while 491 casualties were suffered in the last. The British 10 Corps had a total of 2847 battle casualties, of which 443 were killed, 2007 wounded, and 397 missing in action. Non-battle casualties during the period were about equal to the number of the battle losses. The German losses cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. A total of 1994 enemy prisoners fell into the hands of Fifth Army during the period 1 October - 15 November. VI Corps accounted for 1617 of these, while 10 Corps took 377. The enemy order of battle remained somewhat confused during the period, but practically all of the prisoners reported heavy casualties.

C.

THE ADVANCE

OF THE BRITISH

EIGHTH

ARMY

When Fifth Army had reached the Volturno-Calore river line at the end of the first week in October, the Britisli Eighth Army, under the command of General Montgomery, had driven up on the right and had reached a line run ning generally south from Termoli on the Adriatic Sea to a point slightly north of Benevento. 5 Corps, with the 78 Division on the right and the 8 Indian Di vision on the left, was advancing along the coast. 13 Corps was pushing over extremely rugged mountain terrain between 5 Corps and the American VI Corps. The 5 Division was on the right, while the 1 Canadian Division was on the left and in contact with the American 45th Division across the Apennines. Marshal Kesselring's Tenth Army was delaying the advance of Eighth Army with TyXXVI Panzer Corps, composed of the 1st Parachute Division, the 16th and 26th Panzer Divisions, and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. The 1st Parachute Division was fighting a delaying action along the coast in front of the 78 Division. The lines of the 16th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division stretched south into the 13 Corps zone. The 26th Panzer Division front ran over the mountains to the Volturno, but the division was withdrawing over the Apennines to throw its full strength against Eighth Army. General Montgomery's forces continued their drive to the northwest, ham pered by demolitions, mountains, numerous streams, and stiff enemy resistance. 5 Corps drove on along the coast, with the 78 Division making the main effort.

58

*****

^v

< 1 5

> S ^ ^
MS

After 13 Corps advanced beyond Campobasso, the 1 Canadian Division and the 5 Division exchanged zones for a continuation of the pursuit ol the enemy. By the middle of November nearly all of the area east of the Sangro River from Alfedena through Castel di Sangro to the sea was cleared of the Germans. In five weeks Eighth Army had advanced along a front averaging about 35 miles in width, with a gain of some 30 miles along the coast and approxi mately 55 miles on the left flank. I^XXVI Panzer Corps fought a persistent and stubborn delaying action during this period and was now ready to make a deter mined stand before Eighth Army.

D.

AIR

OPERATIONS

i. Allied Air Operations. Throughout the month of October and the first half of November the Strategic Air Force and XII Air Support Command con tinued to be of material assistance to the advance of Fifth Army. The Strategic Air Force slowed up the movement of enemy supplies and troops toward the front by continually bombing communications. XII Air Support Command made direct attacks on enemy troop concentrations and installations immedi ately in front of Fifth Army, and hindered the shifting of forces and the bring ing up of supplies in the battle areas by bombing bridges and road junctions. The efforts of both groups practically swept the enemy air forces from the skies. During October and November the Strategic Air Force unceasingly pounded enemy rear areas from the Volturno River to northern Italy. The weather was often bad for aerial operations, but the attacks continued on airfields, bridges, viaducts, railroad yards, road junctions, gun positions, troop concentrations, and factories. In the five weeks 9 October-13 November, 9563 y2 tons of bombs were dropped during 493 attacks by Wellingtons, B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, B-26's, and P-38's. Although the Strategic Air Force gave some attention to enemy installations in Greece and Yugoslavia, its principal strength was directed toward aiding the advance of Fifth and Eighth Armies. XII Air Support Command continued its tactical and reconnaissance mis sions during October and the first half of November. One of the main efforts of the tactical fighter-bombers in direct support of ground troops was made on 28 October. Twenty-four A-36's bombed Pratella and the bridge over I,ete Creek south of the village in support of the 168th Infantry. During the same morning A-36's bombarded Mount Sant'Angelo for almost an hour and ma terially assisted the advance of the 30th Infantry. Throughout the period road

59

junctions, enemy transport, gun installations, and troop concentrations behind the lines felt the power of the fighter-bombers. Fifth Army troops were almost unmolested by enemy air power. 2. Enemy Air Activity. The German fighter-bomber effort on the Fifth Army front was small during the period of the drive from the Volturno River to the Winter Line. The power of the Allied air force available for Italian oper ations was too great for the enemy's air resources. The ground troops advanced during October almost without interference from the Luftwaffe,, but during the first half of November began to receive sporadic raids from limited numbers of planes. Air cover of Fifth Army was sufficient to prevent continued and effective bombing, while ample antiaircraft artillery had been brought in to offer strong protection from raiders. Only about 16 Messerschmitt ioo/s appeared over the Fifth Army front on 13 October, the day VI and 10 Corps crossed the Volturno River. At least 75 fighter-bombers attacked bridges and communications in the vicinity of Caiazzo 2 days later, when 7 planes were destroyed and 5 damaged. During the next 7 days not more than 100 fighter-bomber sorties were flown against the Fifth Army forces and installations. Fighter cover forced many of these planes to jettison their bombs or to turn back before reaching their objectives. Toward the end of the month a few small formations of fighter-bombers ap peared over the battle areas, but did little damage. The Germans attempted to raid Naples on 21 October and again on the 23d. During the first raid 15 twin-engined aircraft, probably Junkers 88's, drop ped some 30 flares and more than 20 500-pound bombs on the water front at Bagnoli and in the Naples harbor. The planes came in low over the sea from the northwest and carried out their attack from low and medium altitudes. The only damage reported was a hit on a gun emplacement. An unsuccessful attack was made on one of the Volturno River bridges at the same time. About 20 Junkers 88's raided Naples again on the night of 23 October., but did little damage to our installations. Enemy air activity during November was hampered by weather. Some days were completely unsuitable for air operations, while hardly one passed that did not have poor conditions for activity during at least a portion of the day. The Luftwaffe raided the front lines, artillery positions, command posts, and bridges at intervals. Formations of from 2 to 25 fighter-bombers were used to carry out bombing and strafing missions. These raids were usually made forward of the rear boundaries of the corps, but on at least one occasion during the first half of November fighter-bombers attacked the rear areas. Early on the morning of 12 November 9 Focke-Wulf 190's and Messerschmitt iO9's bom

60

bed and strafed the Pomigliano Airfield, causing six casualties and damaging six aircraft. Shipping in the Naples harbor was the primary target for three raids. On I November approximately 20 aircraft, some identified as Junkers 88's, were over Naples from 1850 to 1938. High level bombing, shallow dive-bombing, and aerial torpedo attacks were employed by the enemy. HMS Linet, a cable ship, was struck by a torpedo and had to be beached, but no military damage was suffered. Six enemy aircraft were destroyed by antiaircraft artillery and night fighters. On the night of 5-6 November between 20 and 30 aircraft bombed the Naples harbor, dropping 40 bombs from altitudes of 4,000 to 16,000 feet. One IyST con taining ammunition was hit and exploded, one LCT was slightly damaged, a power station was damaged, the quartermaster warehouse on Pier K was hit, and a gasoline dump was hit and fired. The antiaircraft artillery claimed three planes destroyed and one probably destroyed. On 10 November 25 enemy air craft were over Naples from 0322 to 0420, but no damage was done. Two air craft were shot down by the antiaircraft artillery. The enemy apparently was unable to put many fighters in the air to op pose either strategic or tactical bombers in Italy. His greatest effort during the period was on 14 October, when between 35 and 40 Messerschmitt 100/s, FockeWulf 190's, Reggiane 2001 's, and Macchi 202Js attacked 34 B-17's in the vicinity of Terni. Few fighters were met during the remainder of October, and planes on bombing and strafing missions proceeded almost at will to any point in Italy. The principal defensive effort of the enemy during the first half of the next month occurred on 14 November, when 15 Messerschmitt 109's aggressively attacked 75 B-17's on their run over the Bolzano marshalling yards and for 25 minutes after they left the target.

61

vT7
MONTAOUILA

Map N910

AREA ofFIFTH ARMY CAMPAIGN


7 Odober~i$ November
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PHINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGR HO FIFTH ARMY

MONDRAGONE

CANCEL ed ARNO

CASTEL VOLTURNO

ANNEX NUMBER ONE

Quartermaster Supply

QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY

OCTOBER. NOVEMBER

I. Summary. During the Army's advance to the Winter Line quarter master supply was hampered by a combination of circumstances. Perhaps the most important was the damage to the harbor and port installations of Naples, which severely limited the amount of supplies that could be unloaded during most of October. While Fifth Army was never without the amount of rations and petroleum required for operation, the port's limited capacity sharply re duced the supply levels. Other factors seriously affected the flow of adequate supplies to the Army and in some cases caused shortages which threatened to become serious. Unex pectedly high maintenance rates, shortage of shipping, the demands of other theaters of operations, inadequate stocks in North Africa and the United States, the delay of shipments from the Zone of the Interior or Base Sections, and the time-lag between the order and the delivery of supplies all contributed to the Quartermaster's problems. To one or more of these factors could be attributed the shortages of soap, socks, intrenching tools, components of the B rations, and waterproof footwear. Along with the slow discharge of cargoes at Naples, they largely explain the fact that Fifth Army did not receive an adequate supply of woolen clothing until after i November. Another serious problem was the transportation of quartermaster supplies from Naples and the Salerno beaches to the forward areas. German demolitions at bridges and culverts, an inadequate network of supply routes, and the lim ited usefulness of railroads clogged the roads with traffic and put a serious strain upon the motor transport system. Though required in mountainous ter rain, pack trains were hard to procure and at best were a slow means of pushing supplies forward. The difficulties of transportation were surmounted, though in some cases barely in time to meet the needs of tactical situations.

65

2. Reduction of Supply Levels. When the Allies entered Naples on Septem ber 30, they found the port a shambles and its normal capacity of 8000 tons cut to 10 % of its usefulness. Allied air raids and German demolitions had wrecked the docks and warehouses along the waterfront. The pipelines had been ripped up and the unloading machinery systematically destroyed. Allied bombers, moreover, had taken a heavy toll of German shipping at Naples, leaving a trail of sunken and half-sub merged hulks. As if that were not enough to prevent the Allies from using the port facilities, the Germans had scuttled ships at their berths and had sunk others in the harbor. In spite of the herculean labors of the port personnel the facilities at Naples were not easily or quickly restored to use. While repairs were being made, sup plies were transferred from Liberty sliips to Dukws and small landing craft which ferried them ashore. This method of unloading slowed up the transfer of supplies from the harbor to the port and reduced the levels in Army dumps to danger ously low points. Although the ships in the harbor were bursting with rations on 6 October, the Army had only enough for four days' supply. During most of the period 25 vSeptember-17 October the troops received only occasional tobacco issues, while convoys loaded with millions of cigarettes awaited discharge. By 12 October the levels of gasoline had been so reduced that the Army had only three days' supply on hand. Throughout the first half of October Class I and III supplies were being issued from Army dumps faster than they were being received from the ships. On 1-14 October the average daily receipts of Class I supplies were 427 tons; the issues, 501 tons. For the same period the average daily receipts of Class III were 445 tons; the issues, 582 tons. Until repairs restored the port's facilities, some ships continued to discharge their cargoes at the beaches south of vSalerno. There the limited unloading ca pacity and a violent wind and rain storm on 28 September curtailed the flow of supplies and reduced the levels in Army dumps. For two and one-half days high winds and a rough sea prevented unloading at the beaches. Fifty-six small craft, LCM's and IyCVP's, as well as 28 LCT's, were put out of commission; 1 coaster was beached; and the 6 cubicle-ponton-bridge unloading ramps were broached. Nevertheless, by 14 October repair of the port installations had prog ressed so far that unloading of American supplies was stopped at the Salerno beaches and transferred to Naples. At the same time the British 10 Corps, which in the early phase of Operation Avalanche had supplied its forces through the port of Salerno (capacity, 3000 tons daily), was unloading at Naples, Torre An nunziata, Castellamare, and Salerno. The loss of rations due to enemy action, handling by civilian personnel, and the arrival of some 15,000 troops not originally planned for was more than

66

offset by the small numbers of prisoners to be fed. In planning, provision had been made for the feeding of some 50,000 prisoners, most of whom were expected to be Italians. The armistice, which was announced on 8 September, made most of these rations surplus. 3. Transportation. The transportation of supplies to forward troops was made extremely difficult throughout the entire period by the demolitions created by the retreating forces. While the engineer troops performed a magnificent job of building bridges and by-passes, the extent of these demolitions did not permit a two-way traffic throughout the mountainous supply routes. Strict traffic control materially aided the delivery of supplies. Difficulty was encoun tered with the roads when the rainy season arrived and by-passes had to be hard-surfaced. In one instance 1200 tons of rock were necessary to make the approaches to one bridge passable. For the transportation of quartermaster supplies the railroads had a lim ited usefulness. The Germans had torn up the tracks, damaged the locomo tives, most of which were electric, and rendered the power lines useless. During the Army's advance to and across the Volturno the repair of the railroad from Naples to Caserta proceeded slowly. By 15 October the number of locomotives in service had increased to 6 and an additional 16 were being repaired. The line, completed as far as Aversa by the end of October, was extended to Mad daloni on 4 November and to Caserta a few days later. The Army's advance into the mountains where no roads or trails existed required increasing use of pack trains. In many cases only mules or horses could reach the forward areas. The only pack train in Fifth Army was the one which the 3d Division had used in Sicily and brought with it to Italy. During the early days of the Italian campaign General Clark foresaw the use of this means of trans portation. On 27 September he wrote to the Chief of Staff: " As I look at the map it appears that our future operations, as we wind our way to the north in Italy, will be through mountainous terrain. I am impressed with the pack train which the 3d Division has. We are going to need more of this type of transpor tation. Please have a study made, estimating our future requirements and rec ommending to me the best way to fulfill them. " As a result of this study it was determined that 1300 mules were needed by the Army and that few could be secured from local sources. A requisition, placed with Peninsular Base Section for 900 animals, produced a total of 316, although the countryside was scoured for three weeks. There was a noticeable shortage of pack equipment in Italy and North Africa. Shoes, nails, halters, and saddles were not available in sufficient quan tities. Because of the inadequate supply of horseshoeing equipment, a daily

67

average of 72 animals from the 34th Division Pack Train could not be used during November. In the main the equipment was secured from local sources or was made by Italian blacksmiths and saddlers. Suitable feed was equally hard to find. In North Africa the grain stocks were needed for the French units, and in Italy the retreating Germans had taken or destroyed much of the forage. Not only were hay and straw scarce, but the Italian grains lacked proper nutritive content. Over a two-week period in No vember the 3d Division mules lost 50 pounds each, using pressed Italian feed. The damage to the installations at Naples hampered the delivery of petro leum from supply ships to the Army. Before evacuating the port the Germans had destroyed storage tanks with a capacity of 1,500,000 barrels, ripped up the pipelines, and left the unloading machinery a mass of rubble and scrap iron. Although tankers could enter the harbor, they could not unload until, extensive repairs were made. During October much reconstruction work was accomplished. By the end of the month petroleum storage tanks with a capacity of 600,000 barrels had been repaired, one 4-inch pipeline had been laid from the docks to the tanks, and the construction of another line was well advanced. When the first tanker arrived on 29 October, bulk unloading was possible. According to the plans of Allied Force Headquarters a pipeline would follow the advance of Fifth Army up the Italian peninsula. A double 4-inch pipeline would be laid to Cassino or Frosinone, from which a single 4-inch line would be built to Rome. The petroleum requirements of Fifth Army were not expected to exceed the capacity of one single 4-inch line., leaving the second for the use of Eighth Army. After the capture of the Italian capital and the reconstruction of the port facilities at Civitavecchia, the pipeline from Naples would be salvaged and relaid north of Rome. Work on the first leg of the pipeline from Naples to Fertilia was begun on 30 October and completed on 12 November. By this means a daily average of 250 tons of truck cargo space was saved and diverted to other purposes, and traffic was reduced on 12 miles of the overcrowded highway. Beginning on 8 November, 2000-gall.on tankers were used to transport bulk gasoline to the Army Base Dump at Caserta. There it was placed in 5-gallon cans or 55-gallon drums and shipped by truck to forward distributing points. During 12 November-12 December tankers delivered 80,000 gallons daily from Fertilia to Caserta. The remaining petroleum requirements of the Army were filled by truck delivery of packaged petroleum directly from the port of Naples. 4. Class I. Although supply levels dropped during the first part of October, there was always enough food to provide each man with rations, and in spite of some deficiencies the B ration was made available. During the period I'OC tober-30 November the issue of B rations increased from 43% to 76%, while

68

the issue of C rations decreased from 2 1 % to 8%. The issue of the D type re mained negligible. By far the greatest change made was in the issues to non combat troops. As for the hard-type rations, the C and K types, complaints were made as to their lack of variety and their unpalatability. Most disliked were the meat and vegetable stew and hash in the C type and the biscuits and dextro-maltose tablets in the K rations. Vitamin and caloric deficiencies in the rations were revealed by medical studies. The vitamin deficiency in all types was found to be an important cause of pyodermia, a skin disease that became a problem in the 3d Division. Re lief of this deficiency was hampered by the shortage of multi-vitamin tablets. Owing to depleted theater supply, few tablets were received by Fifth Army during October and November. Besides the vitamin deficiency the C rations were found to have a caloric deficit for troops who were undergoing strenuous exercise in mountainous terrain and cold weather. Notwithstanding their shortcomings the B rations were improved consid erably. As the weather grew colder, efforts were made to provide more hot drinks each day for combat troops. On 11 October General Clark requested an increase of the coffee allowance from 4 pounds per 100 men to 8 pounds per 100 men. Although the request was approved promptly by Services of Supply, Na tousa, shortages in the North African Theater and the time required to secure supply from the United States prevented issue of the increased allowance until 12 November. Coffee then began to be issued to front-line troops at the rate of 4 pounds per 100 men with the C, K, and 5-1 types. The increased issue was made possible by the reduction or elimination of the coffee allowance in the Army rear areas and the Peninsular Base Section. The repair of the cold storage facilities in the Naples area and the arrival of refrigerator ships from the United States late in October resulted in the first issue of fresh frozen fruits and meats. By the use of 10 five-ton mobile refrig eration vans, these items were delivered to the forward truckheads 3 times each week. Owing to the fact that civilian needs were given priority, only a few issues of fresh fruits and vegetables were made during October. The following month they were issued 15 times. During this period two quartermaster bakery companies were brought into the theater. They provided approximately one-half of the bread ration; the remainder was made up by issue of bread ingredients or C ration biscuits. Before leaving North Africa General Clark had requested an issue of Cole man stoves to heat the C rations for the front-line troops. Receipt of these stoves began in October, but the needs of the troops were not met until some months later.

69

One result of the limited harbor facilities at Naples was the low level of the tobacco supply. Priority of issue during this period was given to front-line troops, but the rear area units were more seriously affected. Even though issues to the former were omitted only eight days, General Truscott considered this a " serious threat to the morale and efficiency of combat troops. " Temporary relief was obtained by emergency air shipments from the Island Base Section in Sicily. On 15 and 16 October General Clark sent his personal plane to Palermo for to bacco components. Bach day a truck met the plane at Capodichino Airport and rushed the tobacco to front-line troops. In compliance with the Army Commander's instructions none of these emergency shipments were issued to troops in rear areas or even to hospital patients, except when the amounts exceeded the needs of the combat troops. In this manner enough tobacco was obtained to supply the front-line troops until the convoys at Naples discharged their cargoes and other shipments arrived by coaster from Sicily. Besides shortages the issue of off-brand cigarettes caused considerable dissatisfaction. The troops wanted only the more popular brands to which they were accustomed. The shortage of soap was seriously felt in the early months of the campaign. Frequently the supply was insufficient for the operation of the laundries ser vicing the hospitals. On one occasion germicidal rinse was issued to meet the emergency when this critical item could not be secured. 5. Class II. Owing to the slow unloading at Naples and the delay in ship ments from New York, the troops did not receive full issues of T/BA woolen cloth ing until after cold weather had started. Before 1 November few units were equipped with heavy underwear, overcoats, wool gloves, or the second pair of O.D. trousers. Although the Army Quartermaster requested that these items be shipped on D plus 12, priority could not be obtained until the D plus 24 con voy. As it happened, even that schedule was not followed. Shipments from New York arrived in the theater later than expected, and the damage to the port of Naples delayed the dispatch of woolens from North Africa. After the clothing arrived at Naples, delivery to the troops was further hampered by the slow rate at which ships could discharge their cargoes. On 1 November the need for woolens was so acute that the Army Quar termaster urgently requested the Peninsular Base Section to expedite the shipments. One hundred truckloads of clothing were needed each day to meet the immediate requirements of the Army, especially the front-line units. Finally, to speed up the issues, the Army unloaded the clothing directly from shipside to trucks which carried it to the Class II and IV dump at Santa Maria. By this means 80 % of the divisions' requisitions were filled by 7 November.

70

The issue of woolen clothing did not meet the needs of combat conditions in Italy. The field jacket was not warm or durable enough; the overcoat was too heavy and cumbersome. Even the O.D. shirts and trousers were not suf ficient for use in extremely cold weather. All the infantry divisions regarded the combat suits as the only desirable clothing for winter operations. Fifth Army's needs were recognized by the War Department and the Theater Com mander before Operation Avalanche was mounted. On i September General Dwight D. Eisenhower informed the War Department that a restudy of Fifth Army's requirements revealed that mountain or arctic clothing was needed for 50,000 men. They were expected to be fighting in altitudes above 2500 feet and in temperatures of zero or below. An order was placed for 60,000 combat jackets and trousers which Fifth Army would use. An attempt to increase the order for combat suits was not successful. Al though Fifth Army asked for 100,000, only half that amount could be furnished. At the time when the request was made, combat suits were no longer being pro cured in the Zone of the Interior and were not available in North Africa. Other theaters placed heavy demands upon the stocks in the United States. In spite of the efforts to secure combat suits and arctic clothing, none arrived in Italy until the end of November. Although frequent rains required that the troops be supplied with wool socks and waterproof footwear, neither was available in sufficient quantities until after 1 December. It was estimated that only 10 % of the Army's sock re quirements were filled during October. So critical was the shortage at one time that the Army Quartermaster could scrape up only 500 pairs for the 45th Divi sion, which had requested 16,000. The shortage of socks was caused by an unex pectedly high rate of maintenance, due primarily to the rough terrain over which the troops were operating. This shortage was instrumental in a large number of trench-foot cases and similar ailments. An increase in maintenance require ments, which was requested by the Army Commander, relieved the situation. The number of arctics which were received was sufficient to equip no more than a handful of troops. The need for arctic overshoes, estimated at 230,000, could not be met because of the rubber shortage. Nevertheless, a limited number were made available. The clothing normally carried in the individual barracks bag was of little use to the soldier, as it could not be stored near the front lines. The long period that troops remained in action prevented their making use of these articles. Accordingly all outer clothing not worn by the men was turned into supply channels and reissues were made as requested.

71

QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES

OCTOBER NOVEMBER

CHART

TONNAGE ISSUED

Class I Oct. Nov. Total


14,381.84 12,435-71 26,817.55

Class II & IV 785


2,181 2,966

Class III 15,997.68


13,612.81 29,610.49

Total 31^64.5
28,229.5

59394-0

CHART II
Total Oct. Nov.

RATION ISSUES

[individual)

Daily Average

CD I)

5-1 & 10-1 1,433,432 438,918

5768,685 186,087 2,473,621 1,205,941 18,772 636,919 5,279,693 1/5,99 4,022,300 372,5!/ 29,420 416,473

CHART III

OTHER CLASS I ISSUES

Tobacco Toilet Arts. Oct. Nov.

Candy

Soap

Bread Meat Butter [pounds) (issues)

2,427,978 2,534,404 2,939,284 126,635 730,788 None None 3,555,io8 3,257,334 4,221,887 318,745 1,732,380 15 9

CHART IV
V-80 Oct. Nov. 4,326,514
3,820,960

PETROLEUM ISSUE

(all in gallons except grease in pounds) Lubricating Oils


72,927 78,048

Diesel 283,299
119,781

Kerosene 5,491
16,130

Greases
52,640 40,89.5

72

ANNEX NUMBER TWO

Operations Instructions

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM:

Hq. 15th Army Group REF No: 0-1202

PRIORITY:

Urgent DATE: 292330 Sept/43 DATE REC'D: 300448 Sept/43

To:

5 Army, 8 Army, repeated AFHQ, C-IN-C, Med, MAC, TAF, No. 2 District.

1. Before beginning the second phase of future operations, certain air fields, ports, and centers of road communications will be secured. These future operations will be conducted in two phases. Firm base will be established on the districts gained, but light mobile forces will operate to the front against enemy rearguards and keep up active patrolling. 2. Phase I: To secure Port of NAPLES together with airfields north of that city, and FOGGIA Airfields. In Phase I will be included capture general line SESSA AURUNCA (H 9392) - VENAFRO (H 0320) - ISERNIA (H 1931) - CA STROPIGNANO (H 4635) - BIFERNO River - TERMOU (H 8278). Above references to 1/100,000 map. 3. Phase I I : To include capture of general line CIVITAVECCHIA - TERNI Visso - SAN BENEDETTO DEL TRONTO, airdrome, and airfields in the area. 4. Between Fifth and Eighth Armies the present boundary will be ex tended as follows (1/100,000 map refers): inclusive Fifth Army BENEVENTO - thence (all inclusive Eighth Army) road PONTELANDOLFO-ISERNIA to road junction southwest CELANO - thence SALTO River to RiETi - thence road
TERNI-S. GEMINI-TODI.

5.

Points of junction:

Phase I ISERNIA; Phase II TERNI.

6. At a suitable date it is intended to transfer 10 Corps to Eighth Army. This will probably be when Phase I has been completed by both armies.

75

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION NUMBER

I (

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U. S. Army Near PONTECAGNANO, Italy 2 October 1943

1. In accordance with 15th Army Group instruction, future operations of the Fifth and Eighth Armies will be conducted in two phases as follows: a. Phase 1 1) Fifth Army to secure the Port of NAPI.ES together with airfields north of the city. 2) Eighth Army to secure FOGGIA airfields. 3) This phase will include capture of the general line TERMOU (H 8275) - BIFERNO River - CASTROPIGNANO (H 4635) - ISERNIA (H 1931) VENAFRO (H 0320) - SESSA AURUNCA (M 9392). Point of junction ISERNIA. 4) Before beginning the second phase, a firm base will be estab lished in the areas gained but light mobile forces will operate to the front and keep up active patrolling. b. Phase 2 1) Both Armies to secure airdromes and airfields in respective zones of action. 2) This phase will include capture of general line SAN BENEDETTO DEiv TRONTO (R) (B 9184) - Visso (R) (B 2582) - TERNI (R) (A 8941) CIVITAVECCHIA (R) (F 1790). 3) Point of junction - TERNI. 2. Boundary between Armies: Inclusive Fifth Army, GROTTAMINARDA (N 8975) - thence all inclusive Eighth Arm}', PONTEI,ANDOI,FO (N 5898) - road through ISERNIA (H 1932) to RJ at G 5281 - thence SAI/TO River to RiETi (B 0623) - thence road TERNI (A 8941) - S. GEMINI ( A 8146) - TODI (A 6965). 3. The Commanding General, 15th Army Group, has indicated his inten tion to transfer 10 Corps to Eighth Army at a suitable date, after phase 1 has been completed. 4. a. In accordance with the above instructions, Fifth Army will continue its present advance to secure phase line 1.

b. The advance to the objective will be made with Corps abreast VI Corps on the right. c. Boundary between Corps: Inclusive VI Corps, Road FORMO (N 6251) LAURO (N 5353) - RJ at N 4359 - thence point N 3565 - thence inclusive 10 Corps CR at N 273727 - RJ at N 144846 - FONTANBIAB (N 0193) - SBSSA (M 9392). d. 10 Corps will push its attack to the VOI/TURNO, force the crossings of that river and continue the advance on the first phase line. Due to the present location of the VI Corps, the advance of 10 Corps will not await the arrival of the VI Corps abreast of it, but will advance as rapidly as the situa tion permits. Operations outside of zone of action by either Corps will be co ordinated with the other Corps and this headquarters notified. e. VI Corps will capture BENEVENTO and secure the crossing of the CAI,ORE River in that area using initially not to exceed one division. As soon as the crossings are secured, this division, moving by roads northwest of BE NEVENTO, will advance to the first phase line. The remainder of the Corps, moving northwest by road between BENEVENTO and Corps boundary, will move forward with all speed in the Corps zone of action. 5. After 6 October the 36th Division, now in Army Reserve, is available to VI Corps on call in exchange for another division to be placed in Army Reserve. CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

G-3

77

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U. S. Army Near NAPLES, Italy 7 October 1943

1.
ISERNIA

a. The Fifth Army continues its attack northwest to seize the line (exclusive) - VENAFRO - SESSA AURUNCA. b. Boundaries: See Overlay. Plan of Operations: a. VI Corps will: 1) Concentrate a force of two divisions (less dets) as indicated on the overlay without delay. This force to be prepared on Army order to attack in the direction of TEANO. 2) On the night of 9-10 October with one division force the cross ing of the VOI/TURNO in the vicinity of TRIFUSCO and attack NW along the high ground running NW from TRIFUSCO. 3) Protect the right flank of the Army. 4) Maintain contact with Eighth Army. b. 10 Corps will: 1) On the night of 10-11 October force the crossings of the VoivTURNO within its zone of action and attack to the NW to seize the high ground N and N E of MONDRAGONE. 2) Be responsible for arranging for Naval gun fire in support of the Corps. c. Coordination: 1) In order to meet the dates set for the above operations, it is essential that the VI Corps concentrate two divisions in the area indicated with the utmost speed. 2) Corps Commanders will arrange for mutual support of the operations in the CAPUA - TRIFWSCO area. d. Army Reserve. 1) The 36th Division with present, attachments will be moved immediately into the area NW of NOI.A. Movement to be

2.

coordinated by VI Corps with Army Traffic Control so as not to interfere with movement of supplies to AVEIXINO. 2) The 82d Airborne Division will continue on present mission and will make plans to drop one parachute battalion in the SESSA AURUNCA area with the mission of interrupting communica tions and blocking the withdrawal of enemy forces to the NW. e. Air Support. Fifth Army will arrange for an intensive bombardment of all appropriate targets on the front of both Corps. Corps will submit requests for specific missions. Amphibious Landing. Army is preparing plans for an amphibious landing on the beaches north of MCXNDRAGONE with one RCT (36th Div). The force will have the mission of assisting TO Corps in the capture of the high ground N and NE of MONDRAGONE and of blocking the retreat, of enemy forces to the NW. Present indications are that the area in which the landing will be made is strongly held by enemy forces. This operation will be ordered only if the indications are that the main attacks by 10 Corps and VI Corps have drawn a major portion of enemy forces now in the landing area to other localities. CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

/.

0-3

79

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION NUMBER

/ \

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U. vS. Army NAPI.ES, Italy 14 October 1943

1. Confirming verbal orders issued by Army Commander at 1530, 14 Octo ber, boundary between Corps north of VOI/TURNO River changed as shown. 2. No change in boundary south of the VOI/TURNO River. Movement of 10 Corps troops within VI Corps zone of action south of the VoiyTURNO River and over bridge near TRIFUSCO (N 213806) by agreement between Command ing General, 3d Division, and Commanding General, 56 Division. CLARK Commanding Official:
BRANN

G-3

80

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION
XT

NUMBER

o 8

\ /

Headquarters Fifth Army A.P.O. No. 464, U.S. Army NAPI.ES, Italy 201600 October 1943

a. The Eighth Army continues its advance on our right. The present positions of its leading elements are: BojANA (H 3919) - BARANEU,O (H 4625) MONTAGANO (H 5638) - LUCITO (H 5747) - M. PEIX>SI (H 6958) - PETACCIATO (H 7280). b. The XII Air Support Command continues to support the Fifth Army. The number of all weather fields from which this force can operate during iuclement weather is steadily being increased. The Fifth Army continues its attack to the northwest to seize the line ISERNTA (H 1932) (exclusive) - M. PASSERO (G 9629) - GARIGUANO River from G 9011 to the sea. b. Boundary between Armies and between Corps as shown on overlay. 10 Corps. 1) The 10 Corps making its main effort on its right will secure terrain objectives as shown on overlay and push light forces forward to seize the indicated phase line within its zone of action. 2) Maintain contact with VI Corps on its right. b. VI Corps. 1) The VI Corps making its main effort on its left will seize the terrain objectives indicated and push light forces forward to seize the indicated phase line within its zone of action. 2) Maintain contact with Eighth Army on its right. 3) Protect the right of the Army. c. Both Corps will push rapidly forward within their zones of action thereby facilitating the advance of the other Corps. d. Operations to be conducted by either Corps in zone of action of the other will be coordinated between Corps Commanders prior to execution. This headquarters will be notified. 3. a. 2. a.

1.

81

4. On completion of the current mission of seizing the line indicated in 30 the Fifth Army will, without delay, continue its advance to the general line OPI (G 8353) (exclusive) - ALVITO (G 7943) - ARCE (G 6431) - FONDI (G 5206). The general plan of advance to this line is as follows: a. Main forces of 10 Corps to remain in positions; light forces to maintain pressure on the enemy along the entire Corps front and, by patrols, movements of troops and massing of fire, give indications of forcing the cross ing ot the GARIGUANO with a main effort in the MINTURNO area. It is not planned to force the crossing of this river with large forces. b. The II Corps, consisting of the 36th Division, one other division and certain supporting troops, will be put into action generally in the zone of action now held by 10 Corps. When the hill mass that, lies between FORMIA and PONTECORVO has been cleared of the enemy by the II Corps, 10 Corps less corps artillery and certain engineer and other service troops as may be required, will pass to Army Reserve, on Army Order, in the general area south of Highway No. 6 (exclusive) between the GARIGUANO and VoiyTURNO Rivers. Exact area later. c. VI Corps, consisting of two divisions and certain supporting troops, will continue operations as the right (north) Corps, generally north of Highway No. 6. CLARK Commanding
Official:
BRANN

G-3

82

ANNEX NUMBER THREE .

Statistics

CASUALTIES, U. S. FORCES

7 OCTOBER - 15 NOVEMBER 1943

Killed in Action 7 October 8

Wounded in Action

Missing in Action

Total

28 17

9
10
II

56 56 47
118

6
2

90

77
11

4 4
2

75 59
199

52
62

12 13

14
120

14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23

26 52

57
21

416 177 176 186

3 8
26

65 79 544
203

254
252

9
1

74
42

32

88 95

7
8

4* 57
262

3 3
14
1

51
68
352

76 5
30
1

40
125

46
162

7
2

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

44
18

47
21

1 2

17 35
12

78 89

95
126

81
42 36 32

10

96 57
40 37

4 5

Killed in Action

Wounded in Action

Missing in Action

Total

i November
2

27

5
24

3 4 6 7 8 9
10 II 12 13 14 15

94 44 65
73
90

158 73 85 363
230

13

198

78
109

34 8
29

491
282

276
217 290 223
200

6 9
15 14
2
1

370 296

389
312

74 55 46 37 57
13

269
242

194 149
171

187 237

76
7i
<U8^5

9 8
286

14

97 85
6843

Total

i374

Casualties were not recorded daily by 10 Corps, but the British total for the period 7 October - 15 November was (as available on 16 November): Killed in Action 443 Wounded in Action 2007 Missing in Action 397 Total 2847

86

MAJOR ORDNANCE LOSSES


30 SEPTEMBER n NOVEMBER 1943

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP A

Gun, 37-mm, M 3 & M3A1 Gun, M G , cal .30, M1917A1 Gun, M G , cal .30, M1919A4 Gun, M G , cal .50, M2, H B Gun, M G , cal .50, M2, W C Gun, s u b M G , cal .45, Thompson, M1928A1, M i & M1A1 Rifle, auto., cal .30, Browning, M1918, Ai &A2 Mortar, 60-mm, M2 Mortar, 81-mm, Mi

T X6

58 14 16 50 55 21 52

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP B

Bayonet, M1905 & M1917 Carbine, cal .30, Mi & MAi Knife, trench, Mi, M2, M3 Launcher, 'grenade, Mi Launcher, grenade, M2 Launcher, rocket, AT, Mi Pistol, auto., cal .45, M1911, M1911A1 Pistol, pyro, M2 Pistol, Very, 10 Gauge, MK ITI, IV & V Projector, signal, ground, M4 Rifle, US, cal .30, M1903 & M1903A1 Rifle, US, cal .30, M1903A4, snipers Rifle, U S , cal .30, M i

620 121 277 ni 67 73 4


2

13
8

86 7 2I
X

87

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP C

Gun, 57-mm, carriage M I A T , M1A2 Gun, 57-mm, Mi & carriage M1A1, M1A2 (w/o mount or telescope) Howitzer, 75-mm (pack), Mi, M1A1 & carriage M1A1, M3A2 Howitzer, 105-mm, M2, M2A1, CRG, M1A1, M2 Howitzer, 155-mm, M1917, MT918 & carriage M1917, M1918

1 1 3 1 3

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP D

Gun, 90-mm, Mi & M1A1

STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP G

Ambulance.. 3/4 ton, 4 x 4 , Dodge Car, half-track, M2 Car, half-track, M9 Car, scout, M3A1 Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M13 Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M15 Carriage, motor, 3-inch gun, Mio Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3 Motorcycle, chain driven, Harley-Davidson Semi-trailer, 2 wheel, cargo, 10 ton Tank, light, M5 Tank, medium, M4 & M4A1 Trailer, 1/4 ton payload, 2 wheel cargo Trailer, 1 ton payload, 2 wheel cargo Trailer, 45 ton, tank transporter, M9 Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4 , amphibian Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4 , Ford Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4 , WC Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4 , carryall Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4 , C & R . Truck, 1 y2 ton, 4 x 4 , dump Truck, 2 Y2 ton, 6 x 6 , amphibian Truck, 2 y2 ton, 6 x 6 , cargo, IAVB Truck, 2 y2 ton, 6 x 6 , IVWB, w/winch

iS
30
1
1
2
1
1
2
5
10
3
9
40
10
3
T
51
10
3
2
1
2
27
8

88

Truck, 2 y2 t o n > 6 x 6 , T r u c k , 2 V2 t o n , 6 x 6 , T r u c k , 2 % t o n , 6 x 6, Truck, 2 % ton, 6 x 6 , Truck, 2 % ton> 6 x 6 , Truck, 4 ton, 6 x 6 , Truck, 4 ton, 6 x 6 , T r u c k , 4-5 t o n , 4 x 4 , Truck, 6 ton, 6 x 6 , Vehicle, t a n k recovery,

c a r g o , S W B w/o w i n c h cargo, S W B C O E 1 5 ' special b o d y w / t r o o p s e a t s dump 750 gal. gas t a n k wrecker cargo w/winch tractor prime-mover T-2

. . .

i 13 9 4 1 1 3 1 4 8

89

ANNEX NUMBER FOUR

Fifth Army Staff

FIFTH ARMY STAFF


7 OCTOBER i 9 4 3

Chief of Staff D e p u t y Chief of Staff . Secretary, General Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, G-i .

Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther . Col. Charles E. Saltzman . . L t . Col. I r a W. P o r t e r . Col. Cheney L. B e r t h o l f . Col. E d w i n B. H o w a r d Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann Col. Ralph H. Tate

Assistant Chief of Staff, O-2 . Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 .

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 . Antiaircraft Artillery Officer Adjutant General Artillery Officer Chaplain Chemical Officer Engineer Officer Finance Officer Inspector General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Col. Joseph S. Robinson . Col. Melville F . Grant Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Lewis . Lt. Col. Patrick J. Ryan Col. Maurice E . B a r k e r Col. F r a n k O. B o w m a n Col. Clarence B. Lindner . Col. Irving C. Avery Col. Claude B. Mickelwait . Col. Joseph I. Martin . Col. Urban Niblo

J u d g e Advocate General Medical Officer Ordnance Officer Quartermaster Signal Officer . . . .

Col. Joseph P . S u l l i v a n Brig. Gen. Richard B. Moran

93

ANNEX NUMBER FIVE. * * * * * * * * *

Troop List of Fifth Army

15 NOVEMBER 1943

TROOP LIST OF FIFTH ARMY

15 NOVEMBER 1943

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS Headquarters, Fifth Army Special Troops, Fifth Army Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops Headquarters Company, Fifth Army Attached: Band, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
Battery A, 630th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
2616th Engineer Utilities Platoon
22d Quartermaster Car Company
541st, 542d, 543d, 547th, and 549th Army Postal Units
Company A/ 756th Tank Battalion (Light)
101st Military Police Battalion
13th and 33d Finance Disbursing Sections
30th Signal Construction Battalion [-Company A]
51st Signal Battalion
63d Signal Battalion; attached:
Detachment D, 71st Signal Company (Special) Detachment A, 117th Signal Company (Radio Intercept); attached. 4119-S and 4119-T Radio Direction Finding Detachments 6681st Signal Pigeon Company (Provisional) Attached from 15th Army Group: Detachment, 55 Wireless Section, 15th Army Group Signals Teams 2 and 6, 2650th Signal Radio Relay Station Company 105 Special Wireless Section Attached British Units: 44 Wireless Telegraphy Intercept Section
31 Cipher Section

97

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS

(continued)

71st Signal Company (Special) [-Detachments A, C, and D]


163d Signal Photo Compan}'
180th Signal Repair Company [-2 Detachments]; attached:
89th Signal Inspection and Maintenance Team
212th Signal Depot Company
229th Signal Operating Company

Attached from AFHQ:

Detachment, 2680th Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Inter rogation of Prisoners of War (Provisional) 305th Counter Intelligence Corps Section Detachment, AFHQ, Cen Public Relations Office and I,iaison Group Detachment, AFHQ, G-2 Section Detachment, AFHQ, Document Section Detachment, Office of Strategic Services Attached British Units: " Q " Air Iyiaison Section (Photo Reconnaissance Unit) 3 Special Intelligence (B) Unit Type A Antiaircraft Artillery: 45th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 4th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached: 3d Battalion, 68th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) 3d Battalion, 209th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) 3d Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) 3d Battalion, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) 351st AAA Searchlight Battalion 9th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached: 410th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion; attached: 3d Platoon, Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion Battery A, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) 630th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion [-Battery A] 107th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached: 400th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion [-Battery D] 409th AAA Gun Battalion (Semi-Mobile)

98

209th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-2d and 3d Battalions] 213th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-3d Battalion]; attached: 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-Battery A, 3d Battalion, and Band] 6673d Gun Operations Room Platoon (Provisional) 201st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Semi-Mobile) 439th and 532d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions iO2d Barrage Balloon Battery (Very Low Altitute); attached: Detachment, 104th Barrage Balloon Battery (VlyA) 688th, 689th, 690th, 691st, 692d, and 693d AAA Machine Gun Batteries (Airborne)
6672d Gun Operations Room Platoon (Provisional)
401st AAA Gun Battalion

Attached:

24th Chemical Company (Decon) [-Detachment] 168th, I72d, and 179th Chemical Companies (Smoke Generating) Attached British Units: 22 Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade
574 Coast Regiment [Headquarters only]
Armored Force: 1st Armored Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company
Service Compan}r
1st Armored Division Trains, Headquarters and Headquarters Company Maintenance Battalion Supply Battalion 47th Armored Medical Battalion 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion 16th Armored Engineer Battalion [-Company E] 27th, 68th, and 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer] 6th Armored Infantry Regiment 1st Armored Regiment 13th Armored Regiment 141st Armored Signal Company Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Combat Command B

99

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS

(continued)

Attached:

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion


2d Battalion, 209th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
Chemical: 6th Chemical Company (Depot) [-Detachment] Engineers: 1st Engineer Special Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 531st Engineer Shore Regiment
161st Ordnance Platoon
361st Quartermaster Truck Battalion
261st Medical Battalion
3497th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q)
286th Signal Company
337th and 343d Engineer General Service Regiments 540th Engineer Combat Regiment Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion [-2d, 3d, and 4th Platoons] Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, 85th Engineer Battalion Company A, 85th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion Company A, 1105th Engineer Water Suppty Battalion [-1st Platoon] 425th Engineer Dump Truck Company 427th Engineer Dump Truck Company [-2d Platoon] 469th Engineer Maintenance Company 2699th Engineer Map Depot Detachment Field Artillery: 18th P'ield Artillery Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 932d, 936th, and 937th Field Artillery Battalions [155-mm Howitzers] General: 29th Replacement Battalion
Fifth Army Photo Center

100

Infantry: 82d Airborne Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company 8oth Airborne Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion [-Company C] 82d Airborne Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 319th and 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalions [75-mm Pack Howitzer] 325th Glider Infantry Regiment 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment 307th Airborne Medical Company 782d Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company 407th Airborne Quartermaster Company 82d Airborne Signal Company Military Police Platoon Medical: 3d Convalescent Hospital
8th, 16th, 38th, and 56th Evacuation Hospitals (750 Bed)
10th Field Hospital
12th Medical Depot Supply Company
15th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile); attached:
Surgical Teams 14 and 19, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group
93d Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile)
94th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile); attached:
Surgical Teams 1, 4, 10, and 12 Orthopedic Teams 3 and 5 95th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) 161st Medical Battalion (Separate), Headquarters and Headquarters De tachment
401st, 4O2d, and 403d Collecting Companies
601st Clearing Company
i6 2 d Medical Battalion (Separate), Headquarters and Headquarters De tachment 404th and 405th Collecting Companies 6o2d Clearing Company
Attached:

Company B, 36th Ambulance Battalion [-3d Platoon]

101

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS

(continued)

Military Police: 504th Military Police Battalion [-Company B]


379th Military Police Escort Guard Company
Ordnance: 6694th Ordnance Base Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (Provisional) 77th, 79th, and 189th Ordnance Depot Companies 330th Ordnance Company (Motor Transport Service) (Q) 411th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company 684th Ordnance Ammunition Company 878th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Q) 42d Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med) 46th and 94th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies 3488th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q) 45th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med) 14th, 45th, and 101st Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies 3485th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q)
Attached:

29th and 112th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies 62d Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med) 53d, 58th, 66th, and 2652d Ordnance Ammunition Companies 3d Platoon, 236th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Company 87th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med) 109th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company 3407th and 3487th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies (Q) 188th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med) 86th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company

102

87th, 525th, and 529th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Companies (Tank) 477th Ordnance Evacuation Company 1st Provisional Ordnance Recovery and Evacuation Platoon 197th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med) 82d Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (FA) 476th Ordnance Evacuation Company 907th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Q) 991st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank) 2622d Ordnance Tank Transporter Company 2630th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med) 28th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company 93d, 261st, and 262d Ordnance Maintenance Companies (AA)
Attached:

48th Finance Disbursing Section Quartermaster: 94th Quartermaster Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 204th Quartermaster General Service Battalion [-Company B]; attached: Company A, 205th Quartermaster Gas Supply Battalion 242d Quartermaster Service Battalion [-Company C]; attached: 1st Platoon, 212th Military Police Company 249th Quartermaster Service Battalion [-1 Company] 263d Quartermaster Service Battalion [-Company B] 47th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration) [-2d Platoon] 90th, 93d, 94th, and 98th Quartermaster Companies (Railhead) iO2d Quartermaster Bakery Company 1st Platoon, Company B, 95th Quartermaster Bakery Battalion 230th Quartermaster Salvage Collecting Company [-1st Platoon] 487th Quartermaster Laundry Company Rangers: 3d Ranger Infantry Battalion

103

FIFTH ARMY TROOPS

(continued)

Tank Destroyer: ist Tank Destroyer Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Group 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion; attached: Detachment, 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion Transportation: 2618th Quartermaster Truck Battalion; attached: 53d Quartermaster Battalion (Dukw) [-2 Companies] 56th Quartermaster Truck Battalion 468th Quartermaster Truck Battalion (Mobile), Headquarters and Head quarters Detachment 3641st, 3642d, and 3643d Quartermaster Truck Companies
Attached from AFHQ:

2675th Headquarters Company, Allied Military Government


Mobile Stars and Stripes Unit
Attached from NATOUSA:

9th Machine Records Unit


Attached British Units:

7 Arm}' Air Support Control


Detachment A, Field Press Censor Section
46 Survey Company (South African Expeditionary Corps)
II CORPS Headquarters and Headquarters Company Antiaircraft Artillery (attached): 2626th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (Provisional) 8th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached: 403d AAA Gun Battalion 534th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion 68th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-26. and 3d Battalions]

IO4

I I

C O R P S

{ c o n t i n u e d ) .

Attached:

4th Platoon, Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion Armored Force (attached): 1st Tank Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
757th Tank Battalion (Light)
Cavalry (attached): 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance vSquadron Engineers: 1108th Engineer Combat Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 235th Engineer Combat Battalion 19th Engineer Combat Regiment; attached: 434th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled) 66th Engineer Topographical Company Field Artillery (attached): 194th Field Artillery Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 194th Field Artillery Battalion [8-inch Howitzer]
985th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Gun]
995th Field Artillery Battalion [8-inch Howitzer]
77th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]
Finance (attached): 30th Finance Disbursing Section Infantry: 36th Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company
36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
1 n t h Engineer Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
36th Infantry Divisional Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
155th Field Artillery Battalion [i55" m m Howitzer]

I0

II CORPS {continued) i n t h Medical Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C] 736th Ordnance light Maintenance Company 36th Quartermaster Company 36th Signal Company [-Detachment] Military Police Platoon 141st Regimental Combat Team 141st Infantry Regiment 131st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company A, 111th Engineer Battalion Company A, i n t h Medical Battalion Detachment, 36th Signal Company I42d Regimental Combat Team I42d Infantry Regiment I32d Field Artiller}^ Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company B, i n t h Engineer Battalion Company B, i n t h Medical Battalion Detachment, 36th Signal Company 143d Regimental Combat Team 143d Infantry Regiment 133d Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company C, i n t h Engineer Battalion Company C, i n t h Medical Battalion Detachment, 36th Signal Company
Attached:

636th Tank Destroyer Battalion [-1st Platoon, Company C] 443d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled) 753d Tank Battalion (Medium) Medical: 54th Medical Battalion
Attached:

n t h Field Hospital
Shock Team 3, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group
Military Police: 2O2d Military Police Company

I06

Ordnance (attached): 55th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad (Separate) Quartermaster (attached): Company C, 242d Quartermaster Service Battalion Signal: 53d Signal Battalion; attached: Detachment A, 128th Signal Company (Radio Intercept); attached British Unit: 52 Wireless Telegraphy Intercept Section Transportation (attached): 3644th Quartermaster Truck Company
523d Quartermaster Car Company
Attached Italian Unit: 1st Motorized Brigade Attached from NATOUSA: 25th Machine Records Unit VI CORPS Headquarters and Headquarters Company Antiaircraft Artillery (attached): 35th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 5th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached: 432d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled) 435th and 451st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions 67th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-3d Battalion]; attached: 450th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion Battery D, 400th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
Attached:

2d Platoon, Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion

107

VI CORPS (continued) Armored Force (attached): 755th Tank Battalion (Medium)


Company B, 756th Tank Battalion (Iyight)

Chemical (attached):

2d Chemical Battalion (Motorized) [-Companies C and D] Engineers: 36th and 39th Engineer Combat Regiments
661st Engineer Topographical Company

Attached:

48th Engineer Combat Battalion Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion 1st Platoon, Company A, 405th Engineer Water Supply Battalion 2d Platoon, 427th Engineer Dump Truck Company Field Artillery (attached): 13th Field Artillery Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 17th Field Artiller}^ Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]
36th Field Artillery Regiment [-2d Battalion] [155-mm Gun]
178th Field Artillery Regiment [-Batteries B and E] [155-mm Howitzer]
1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion
71st Field Artillery Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 35th Field Artillery Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 15th Field Artillery Observation Battalion 939th Field Artillery Battalion [4.5-inch Gun] 976th and 977th Field Artillery Battalions [155-mm Gun] 6th Armored Field Artillery Group, Headquarters and Headquarters De tachment 69th and 93d Armored Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer] Infantry: 3d Infantry Division

108

Headquarters and Headquarters Company


3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
ioth Engineer Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
3d Infantry Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
9th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer] 3d Medical Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C] 703d Ordnance Light Maintenance Company 3d Quartermaster Company 3d Signal Company [-Detachments] Military Police Platoon 7th Regimental Combat Team 7th Infantry Regiment ioth Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company A, ioth Engineer Battalion Company A, 3d Medical Battalion Detachment, 3d Signal Company 15th Regimental Combat Team 15th Infantry Regiment 39th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company B, ioth Engineer Battalion Company B, 3d Medical Battalion Detachment, 3d Signal Company 30th Regimental Combat Team 30th Infantry Regiment 41st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company C, ioth Engineer Battalion Company C, 3d Medical Battalion Detachment, 3d Signal Company
Attached:

Companies C and D, 2d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)


441st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
Battery B, 178th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]
Orthopedic Team, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group
2d Platoon, 48th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
751st Tank Battalion (Medium)
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion

109

VI

CORPS

(continued)

34th Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company 34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) 109th Engineer Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C] 34th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 185th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm HowitzerJ 109th Medical Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C] 2634th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company 2635th Quartermaster Company 34th Signal Company Military Police Platoon 133d Regimental Combat Team
133d Infantry Regiment [-26. Battalion]
100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) 151st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company A, 109th Engineer Battalion Company A, 109th Medical Battalion 135th Regimental Combat Team 135th Infantry Regiment 125th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company B, 109th Engineer Battalion Company B, 109th Medical Battalion 168th Regimental Combat Team 168th Infantry Regiment 175th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Company C, 109th Engineer Battalion Company C, 109th Medical Battalion
Attached:

3d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)


105th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
Battery E, 178th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]
406th Collecting Company
2d Platoon, 47th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
Detachment B, 72d Signal Company (Special)
191st Tank Battalion (Medium)
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion

110

45th Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company 45th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) 120th Engineer Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C] 45th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 189th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer] 120th Medical Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C] 700th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company 45th Quartermaster Company 45th vSignal Company [-Detachments]
Military Police Platoon
157th Regimental Combat Team
157th Infantry Regiment
158th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
Company A, 120th Engineer Battalion
Company A, 120th Medical Battalion
Detachment, 45th Signal Company
179th Regimental Combat Team
179th Infantry Regiment
160th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
Company B, 120th Engineer Battalion
Company B, 120th Medical Battalion
Detachment, 45th Signal Company
180th Regimental Combat Team
180th Infantry Regiment
171st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
Company C, 120th Engineer Battalion
Company C, 120th Medical Battalion
Detachment, 45th Signal Company

Attached:

84th Chemical Battalion (Motorized)


106th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment
3d Platoon, 48th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
756th Tank Battalion (Light) [-Companies A and B]
645th Tank Destroyer Battalion

III

VI CORPS (continued) . ist Ranger Infantry Battalion; attached:


83d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
504th Regimental Combat Team 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion [75-mm Pack Howitzer Company C, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion Medical: 52d Medical Battalion Attached: 33d Field Hospital
Surgical Teams 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 20, 23, and 25
Shock Teams 1, 2, and 4
Orthopedic Teams 1 and 2
Military Police: 206th Military Police Company Attached: Company B, 504th Military Police Battalion Ordnance (attached): 56th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad (Separate) Quartermaster: 3404th Quartermaster Truck Company Attached: Company B, 263d Quartermaster Service Battalion Signal: 57th Signal Battalion Attached: Detachment C, 71st Signal Company (Special)
Detachment B, 128th Signal Company (Radio Intercept)
Detachment, 894th Signal Intercept Company

112

Tank Destroyer (attached): 805th and 894th Tank Destroyer Battalions Attached British Unit: 1 Special Iyiaison Detachment (Cipher) Attached from AFHQ: 6655th Pictorial Service Company (Provisional) 10 CORPS Headquarters 10 Corps 10 Corps Protective Squadron Anti-Aircraft Artillery: 12 Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Royal Artillery (RA) 9, 57, and 87 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA [each 24 3.7-inch Guns] 13, 14, and 152 Iyight Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA [each 54 40-mm Guns] 56 Iyight Anti-Air craft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns] Armoured Force: 2 Forward Tank Delivery Squadron, Royal Armoured Corps 7 Armoured Division Headquarters 7 Armoured Division 11 Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) [armoured-car squadron] Headquarters 7 Armoured Division Royal Artillery 3 Royal Horse Artillery [24 25-pounders]
5 Royal Horse Artillery [24 25-pounders]
65 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders]
15 Iyight Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns]
7 Armoured Division Royal Engineers
7 Armoured Division Royal Signals
7 Armoured Division Royal Army Service Corps
7 Armoured Division Ordnance Field Park
7 Armoured Division Provost Company

" 3

io

CORPS

(continued)

2 and 121 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps) Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
22 Armoured Brigade Workshop Company (REME)
131 Armoured Brigade Workshop Company (REME)
22 Armoured Brigade 1 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment 5 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment 4 City of London Yeomanry [tank battalion] 1 Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment [motorized infantry] 131 Infantry Brigade
1/5 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
1/6 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
1/7 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
23 Armoured Brigade 23 Armoured Brigade Royal Signal Squadron 331 Armoured Brigade Company (Royal Army Service Corps) 23 Armoured Brigade Ordnance Field Park 150 Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps) 23 Armoured Brigade Workshop (Royal Electrical and Mechanical En gineers)
40 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment
Royal Scots Greys (2d Dragoons) [tank battalion]
Engineers: 10 Corps Troops, Royal Engineers
14 GHQ Troops, Royal Engineers
15 Airfield Construction Group, Royal Engineers
Field Artillery: 2 Army Group Royal Artillery 23 and 121 Army Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders]
24 Army Field Regiment RA [24 105-mm SP]
142 Army Field Regiment RA [24 25-pounders SP]
146 Army Field Regiment RA [24 15-pounders]

114

5 and 74 Medium Regiments RA [16 5.5-inch Gun/Howitzers] 51 and 69 Medium Regiments RA [8 4.5-inch Guns; 8 5.5-inch Gun/ Howitzers] 56 Medium Regiment RA [16 7.2-inch Gun/Howitzers] 57 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [48 6-pounders]
654 Air Observation Post Squadron
8 Survey Regiment RA
Attached American Units: 2d Battalion, 36th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Gun] 935th Field Artillery Battalion [4.5-inch Gun] 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer] Infantry and Commandos: King's Dragoon Guards [armoured-car squadron]
Company C, 1 Battalion, (22) Cheshire Regiment [machine-gun battalion]
2 Commando
41 Royal Marine Commando
46 Infantry Division
Headquarters 46 Infantry Division 2 Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers [minus Bn Hq and 3 Sup port Group] [weapons battalion] 46 Division Royal Artillery 70, 71, and 172 Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders] 58 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders] 115 I4ght Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns] 46 Infantry Division Royal Engineers 46 Infantry Division Royal Signals 46 Infantry Division Royal Army Service Corps 46 Infantry Division Ordnance Sub Park 46 Infantry Division Provost Company 183, 184, and 185 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps) 46 Infantry Division Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 46 Reconnaissance Regiment [battalion]

"5

io CORPS (continued) 128 Infantry Brigade


1/4 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
2 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
5 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
138 Infantry Brigade
6 Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment
2/4 Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
6 Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment
139 Infantry Brigade
2/5 Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment
2/5 Battalion, Sherwood Foresters
16 Battalion, Durham Light Infantry
56 (London) Infantry Division Headquarters 56 (London) Infantry Division 6 Battalion, (22) Cheshire Regiment [machine-gun battalion] 56 Infantry Division Royal Artillery 64, 65, and 113 Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders] 67 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders] 100 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns] 56 Infantry Division Royal Engineers 56 Infantry Division Royal Signals 56 Infantry Division Royal Army Service Corps 56 Infantry Division Ordnance Field Park 56 Infantry Division Provost Company 5, 167, and 214 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps) 56 Infantry Division Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 44 Reconnaissance Regiment [battalion] 167 8 9 7 Infantry Brigade Battalion, Royal Fusiliers Battalion, Royal Fusiliers Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry

168 Infantry Brigade


10 Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment
1 Battalion, London Scots
1 Battalion, London Irish Rifles

116

169 Infantry Brigade


2/5 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
2/6 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
2/7 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
201 6 3 2 Guards Brigade
Battalion, Grenadier Guards
Battalion, Coldstream Guards
Battalion, Scots Guards

Medical (attached American Unit): Surgical Team 6, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group Service Troops: 10 15 10 10 Corps Transport Column Iyine of Communication Transport Column (Royal Army Service Corps) Corps Troops, Ordnance Field Park Corps Troops, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Signal: 10 Corps Royal Signals


2 Companies, 16 Iyine of Communications Royal Signals
Attached American Units: Detachment A, 71st Signal Company (Special)
Detachment A, 72d Signal Company (Special)

117

This part of the Army History was prepared under the direction of Col. John D. Forsythe, Army Historian, by Capt. William D. McCain with the assist ance of Capt. John Bowditch, III, and Sgt. Sidney T. Matthews. The maps were drawn by S/Sgt. Alvin J. Weinberger and Sgt. Charles W. Petersen. The text was printed and the volume bound by L'Impronta Press, Florence, Italy. The printing of the maps and illustrations was executed by the Army Topographic Section.