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Tversky - Journal of Business - 1986

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Amos Tversky

Stanford University

Daniel Kahneman

University of British Columbia

Framing of Decisions*

emerged from a logical analysis of games of tions of a decision

chance ratherthan from a psychological analysis problemoften give rise

of risk and value. The theory was conceived as a to differentprefer-

ences, contraryto the

normativemodel of an idealized decision maker, principleof invariance

not as a description of the behavior of real peo- that underliesthe ra-

ple. In Schumpeter'swords, it "has a much bet- tional theory of choice.

ter claim to being called a logic of choice than a Violationsof this the-

psychology of value" (1954, p. 1058). ory are traced to the

rules that govern the

The use of a normativeanalysis to predict and framingof decision and

explain actual behavior is defended by several to the psychophysical

arguments.First, people are generallythoughtto principlesof evaluation

be effective in pursuingtheir goals, particularly embodiedin prospect

when they have incentives and opportunitiesto theory. Invarianceand

dominanceare obeyed

learn from experience. It seems reasonable, when their application

then, to describe choice as a maximizationpro- is transparentand often

cess. Second, competition favors rational indi- violated in other situa-

viduals and organizations.Optimaldecisions in- tions. Because these

rules are normatively

crease the chances of survival in a competitive essential but descrip-

environment,and a minorityof rationalindivid- tively invalid, no the-

uals can sometimes impose rationality on the ory of choice can be

both normativelyade-

* This work was supportedby contractN00014-84-K-0615 quate and descriptively

accurate.

from the Office of Naval Research to StanfordUniversity.

The present article reviews our work on decision making

underriskfroma new perspective,discussed primarilyin the

first and last sections. Most of the empiricaldemonstrations

have been reportedin earlierpublications.Problems3, 4, 7,

8, and 12 are publishedhere for the first time. Requests for

reprintsshould be addressedto Amos Tversky, Department

of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California

94705, or to Daniel Kahneman,Departmentof Psychology,

Universityof California,Berkeley, California94720.

? 1986by The Universityof Chicago.All rightsreserved.

0021-9398/86/5904-0010$01.50

S251

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

S252 Journal of Business

choice makes it plausible that the theory derived from these axioms

should provide an acceptable account of choice behavior.

The thesis of the present article is that, in spite of these a priori

arguments,the logic of choice does not providean adequatefoundation

for a descriptive theory of decision making. We argue that the devia-

tions of actual behaviorfrom the normativemodel are too widespread

to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as randomerror, and too

fundamentalto be accommodatedby relaxing the normativesystem.

We first sketch an analysis of the foundationsof the theory of rational

choice and then show that the most basic rules of the theory are com-

monly violated by decision makers. We conclude from these findings

that the normativeand the descriptive analyses cannot be reconciled.

A descriptivemodel of choice is presented, which accounts for prefer-

ences that are anomalous in the normativetheory.

I. A Hierarchyof NormativeRules

The majorachievement of the moderntheory of decision underrisk is

the derivation of the expected utility rule from simple principles of

rationalchoice that make no reference to long-runconsiderations(von

Neumann and Morgenstern1944). The axiomaticanalysis of the foun-

dations of expected utility theory reveals four substantive assump-

tions-cancellation, transitivity, dominance, and invariance-besides

the more technical assumptions of comparabilityand continuity. The

substantive assumptions can be ordered by their normative appeal,

from the cancellation condition, which has been challengedby many

theorists, to invariance, which has been accepted by all. We briefly

discuss these assumptions.

Cancellation. The key qualitative property that gives rise to ex-

pected utilitytheory is the "cancellation"or eliminationof any state of

the world that yields the same outcome regardlessof one's choice. This

notion has been captured by different formal properties, such as the

substitutionaxiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern(1944), the ex-

tended sure-thingprinciple of Savage (1954), and the independence

conditionof Luce and Krantz(1971).Thus, if A is preferredto B, then

the prospect of winningA if it rains tomorrow(and nothingotherwise)

should be preferredto the prospect of winning B if it rains tomorrow

because the two prospects yield the same outcome (nothing)if there is

no rain tomorrow. Cancellationis necessary to represent preference

between prospects as the maximizationof expected utility. The main

argumentfor cancellation is that only one state will actually be real-

ized, which makes it reasonable to evaluate the outcomes of options

separatelyfor each state. The choice between options shouldtherefore

depend only on states in which they yield differentoutcomes.

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S253

less choice is the transitivityof preference. This assumptionis neces-

sary and essentially sufficientfor the representationof preferenceby

an ordinalutility scale u such that A is preferredto B whenever u(A) >

u(B). Thus transitivity is satisfied if it is possible to assign to each

option a value that does not depend on the other available options.

Transitivityis likely to hold when the options are evaluatedseparately

but not when the consequences of an option depend on the alternative

to which it is compared, as implied, for example, by considerationsof

regret. A common argumentfor transitivityis that cyclic preferences

can support a "money pump," in which the intransitive person is

induced to pay for a series of exchanges that returns to the initial

option.

Dominance. This is perhapsthe most obvious principleof rational

choice: if one option is better than anotherin one state and at least as

good in all other states, the dominant option should be chosen. A

slightly stronger condition-called stochastic dominance-asserts

that, for unidimensionalrisky prospects, A is preferredto B if the

cumulativedistributionof A is to the right of the cumulativedistribu-

tion of B. Dominanceis both simplerand more compellingthancancel-

lation and transitivity,and it serves as the cornerstoneof the normative

theory of choice.

Invariance. An essential condition for a theory of choice that

claims normative status is the principleof invariance:differentrepre-

sentations of the same choice problem should yield the same prefer-

ence. Thatis, the preferencebetween options shouldbe independentof

their description. Two characterizationsthat the decision maker, on

reflection,would view as alternativedescriptionsof the same problem

should lead to the same choice-even without the benefit of such

reflection. This principle of invariance (or extensionality [Arrow

1982]), is so basic that it is tacitly assumed in the characterizationof

options ratherthan explicitly stated as a testable axiom. For example,

decision models that describe the objects of choice as randomvariables

all assume that alternative representationsof the same random vari-

ables should be treated alike. Invariancecapturesthe normativeintui-

tion that variations of form that do not affect the actual outcomes

should not affect the choice. A related concept, called consequential-

ism, has been discussed by Hammond(1985).

The four principlesunderlyingexpected utilitytheory can be ordered

by their normative appeal. Invarianceand dominanceseem essential,

transitivitycould be questioned, and cancellationhas been rejectedby

many authors. Indeed, the ingenious counterexamplesof Allais (1953)

and Ellsberg (1961) led several theorists to abandoncancellation and

the expectation principle in favor of more general representations.

Most of these models assume transitivity,dominance, and invariance

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S254 Journal of Business

1982;Weber 1982;Chew 1983;Fishburn1983;Schmeidler1984;Segal

1984;Yaari 1984; Luce and Narens 1985). Other developmentsaban-

don transitivity but maintain invariance and dominance (e.g., Bell

1982;Fishburn1982, 1984;Loomes and Sugden 1982).These theorists

responded to observed violations of cancellation and transitivityby

weakening the normative theory in order to retain its status as a de-

scriptive model. However, this strategy cannot be extended to the

failuresof dominanceand invariancethat we shall document.Because

invarianceand dominanceare normativelyessential and descriptively

invalid, a theory of rational decision cannot provide an adequate de-

scriptionof choice behavior.

We next illustrate failures of invariance and dominance and then

review a descriptive analysis that traces these failures to the joint

effects of the rules that govern the framingof prospects, the evaluation

of outcomes, and the weightingof probabilities.Several phenomenaof

choice that supportthe present account are described.

In this section we consider two illustrative examples in which the

conditionof invarianceis violated and discuss some of the factors that

produce these violations.

The first example comes from a study of preferencesbetween med-

ical treatments(McNeil et al. 1982).Respondentswere given statistical

informationabout the outcomes of two treatmentsof lung cancer. The

same statistics were presentedto some respondentsin termsof mortal-

ity rates and to others in terms of survivalrates. The respondentsthen

indicatedtheir preferredtreatment.The informationwas presentedas

follows.'

Problem 1 (Survivalframe)

Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through the post-

operative period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are

alive at the end of five years.

RadiationTherapy:Of 100 people having radiationtherapy all live

throughthe treatment,77 are alive at the end of one year and 22 are

alive at the end of five years.

Problem 1 (Mortalityframe)

Surgery:Of 100 people having surgery 10 die duringsurgeryor the

post-operativeperiod, 32 die by the end of the first year and 66 die

by the end of five years.

1. All problemsare presentedin the text exactly as they were presentedto the partici-

pants in the experiments.

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S255

duringtreatment,23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by the end

of five years.

The inconsequentialdifference in formulationproduced a markedef-

fect. The overall percentage of respondents who favored radiation

therapyrose from 18%in the survivalframe (N = 247) to 44%in the

mortalityframe (N = 336). The advantageof radiationtherapy over

surgeryevidently looms largerwhen stated as a reductionof the risk of

immediatedeath from 10%to 0%ratherthan as an increase from 90%

to 100%in the rate of survival. The framingeffect was not smallerfor

experienced physicians or for statistically sophisticatedbusiness stu-

dents than for a group of clinic patients.

Ournext example concerns decisions between conjunctionsof risky

prospects with monetary outcomes. Each respondent made two

choices, one between favorable prospects and one between unfavor-

able prospects (Tversky and Kahneman1981, p. 454). It was assumed

that the two selected prospects would be played independently.

Problem 2 (N = 150). Imagine that you face the following pair of

concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, then indicate

the options you prefer.

Decision (i) Choose between:

A. a sure gain of $240 [84%]

B. 25%chance to gain $1000and 75%chance to gain nothing[16%]

Decision (ii) Choose between:

C. a sure loss of $750 [13%]

D. 75%chance to lose $1000and 25%chance to lose nothing [87%]

The total numberof respondentsis denoted by N, and the percent-

age who chose each option is indicatedin brackets. (Unless otherwise

specified, the data were obtainedfrom undergraduatestudentsat Stan-

ford University and at the University of BritishColumbia.)The major-

ity choice in decision i is risk averse, while the majoritychoice in

decision ii is risk seeking. This is a common pattern:choices involving

gains are usually risk averse, and choices involving losses are often

risk seeking-except when the probabilityof winningor losing is small

(Fishburnand Kochenberger1979;Kahnemanand Tversky 1979;Her-

shey and Schoemaker 1980).

Because the subjects considered the two decisions simultaneously,

they expressed, in effect, a preferencefor the portfolioA and D over

the portfolio B and C. However, the preferredportfolio is actually

dominatedby the rejected one! The combined options are as follows.

A & D: 25%chance to win $240 and 75%chance to lose $760.

B & C: 25%chance to win $250 and 75%chance to lose $750.

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S256 Journal of Business

nantoption is invariablychosen. In the formatof problem2, however,

73% of respondents chose the dominatedcombinationA and D, and

only 3% chose B and C. The contrast between the two formats illus-

trates a violation of invariance. The findingsalso supportthe general

point that failures of invariance are likely to produce violations of

stochastic dominance and vice versa.

The respondentsevidently evaluated decisions i and ii separatelyin

problem2, where they exhibited the standardpatternof risk aversion

in gains and risk seeking in losses. People who are given these prob-

lems are very surprisedto learn that the combinationof two prefer-

ences that they considered quite reasonableled them to select a domi-

nated option. The same pattern of results was also observed in a

scaled-down version of problem 2, with real monetary payoff (see

Tversky and Kahneman 1981, p. 458).

As illustratedby the precedingexamples, variationsin the framingof

decision problems produce systematic violations of invariance and

dominance that cannot be defended on normative grounds. It is in-

structiveto examine two mechanismsthat could ensure the invariance

of preferences:canonicalrepresentationsand the use of expected actu-

arial value.

Invariancewould hold if all formulationsof the same prospect were

transformedto a standardcanonicalrepresentation(e.g., a cumulative

probabilitydistributionof the same randomvariable)because the vari-

ous versions would then all be evaluatedin the same manner.In prob-

lem 2, for example, invariance and dominance would both be pre-

served if the outcomes of the two decisions were aggregatedprior to

evaluation. Similarly,the same choice would be made in both versions

of the medical problem if the outcomes were coded in terms of one

dominantframe (e.g., rate of survival). The observed failures of in-

variance indicate that people do not spontaneouslyaggregateconcur-

rent prospects or transformall outcomes into a common frame.

The failureto construct a canonical representationin decision prob-

lems contrastswith other cognitive tasks in which such representations

are generated automaticallyand effortlessly. In particular,our visual

experienceconsists largelyof canonicalrepresentations:objects do not

appear to change in size, shape, brightness, or color when we move

aroundthem or when illuminationvaries. A white circle seen from a

sharp angle in dim light appears circularand white, not ellipsoid and

grey. Canonical representationsare also generated in the process of

languagecomprehension,where listeners quicklyrecode much of what

they hear into an abstractpropositionalform that no longer discrimi-

nates, for example, between the active and the passive voice and often

does not distinguishwhat was actually said from what was impliedor

presupposed (Clark and Clark 1977). Unfortunately,the mental ma-

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S257

does not automaticallyapply to the process of choice.

Invariance could be satisfied even in the absence of a canonical

representationif the evaluationof prospects were separatelylinear, or

nearly linear, in probability and monetary value. If people ordered

risky prospects by their actuarial values, invariance and dominance

wouldalways hold. In particular,there would be no differencebetween

the mortality and the survival versions of the medical problem. Be-

cause the evaluation of outcomes and probabilitiesis generally non-

linear, and because people do not spontaneously construct canonical

representationsof decisions, invariance commonly fails. Normative

models of choice, which assume invariance, thereforecannot provide

an adequatedescriptiveaccount of choice behavior.In the next section

we present a descriptive account of risky choice, called prospect the-

ory, and explore its consequences. Failuresof invarianceare explained

by framingeffects that control the representationof options, in con-

junction with the nonlinearitiesof value and belief.

Prospect theory distinguishes two phases in the choice process: a

phase of framing and editing, followed by a phase of evaluation

(Kahnemanand Tversky 1979). The first phase consists of a prelimi-

nary analysis of the decision problem,which frames the effective acts,

contingencies, and outcomes. Framingis controlled by the mannerin

which the choice problemis presentedas well as by norms, habits, and

expectancies of the decision maker. Additional operations that are

performedprior to evaluationinclude cancellationof common compo-

nents and the eliminationof options that are seen to be dominatedby

others. In the second phase, the framedprospects are evaluated, and

the prospect of highest value is selected. The theory distinguishestwo

ways of choosing between prospects: by detecting that one dominates

anotheror by comparingtheir values.

For simplicity, we confine the discussion to simple gambles with

numericalprobabilitiesand monetaryoutcomes. Let (x, p; y, q) denote

a prospect that yields x with probabilityp and y with probabilityq and

that preserves the status quo with probability(1 - p - q). According

to prospect theory, there are values v( ), defined on gains and losses,

and decision weights r(.), definedon stated probabilities,such that the

overall value of the prospect equals rr(p)v(x) + rr(q)v(y). A slight

modificationis requiredif all outcomes of a prospect have the same

sign.2

2. If p + q = 1 and eitherx > y > Oor x < y < 0, the value of a prospectis given by

v(y) + nr(p)[v(x) - v(y)], so that decision weights are not applied to sure outcomes.

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S258 Journal of Business

FollowingMarkowitz(1952), outcomes are expressed in prospect the-

ory as positive or negative deviations (gains or losses) from a neutral

reference outcome, which is assigned a value of zero. Unlike Mar-

kowitz, however, we propose that the value function is commonly S

shaped, concave above the reference point, and convex below it, as

illustratedin figure1. Thus the differencein subjectivevalue between a

gain of $100 and a gain of $200 is greaterthan the subjectivedifference

between a gain of $1,100 and a gain of $1,200. The same relationbe-

tween value differences holds for the correspondinglosses. The pro-

posed function expresses the property that the effect of a marginal

change decreases with the distance from the reference point in either

direction. These hypotheses regardingthe typical shape of the value

function may not apply to ruinouslosses or to circumstancesin which

particularamounts assume special significance.

A significantpropertyof the value function, called loss aversion, is

that the response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains.

The common reluctance to accept a fair bet on the toss of a coin

suggests that the displeasure of losing a sum of money exceeds the

pleasure of winning the same amount. Thus the proposed value func-

tion is (i) defined on gains and losses, (ii) generally concave for gains

and convex for losses, and (iii) steeper for losses than for gains. These

propertiesof the value function have been supportedin many studies

of risky choice involving monetary outcomes (Fishburnand Kochen-

berger 1979; Kahnemanand Tversky 1979;Hershey and Schoemaker

1980; Payne, Laughhunn,and Crum 1980) and human lives (Tversky

1977; Eraker and Sox 1981; Tversky and Kahneman1981; Fischhoff

1983).Loss aversionmay also contributeto the observeddiscrepancies

between the amountof money people are willingto pay for a good and

the compensation they demand to give it up (Bishop and Heberlein

1979; Knetsch and Sinden 1984). This effect is implied by the value

function if the good is valued as a gain in the formercontext and as a

loss in the latter.

Framing Outcomes

The framingof outcomes and the contrast between traditionaltheory

and the present analysis are illustratedin the following problems.

Problem3 (N = 126):Assume yourself richerby $300 than you are

today. You have to choose between

a sure gain of $100 [72%]

50%chance to gain $200 and 50%chance to gain nothing [28%]

Problem4 (N = 128):Assume yourself richerby $500 than you are

today. You have to choose between

a sure loss of $100 [36%]

50%chance to lose nothing and 50%chance to lose $200 [64%]

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S259

VALUE

LOSSES I GAINS

problem3 and risk seekingin problem4, althoughthe two problemsare

essentially identical. In both cases one faces a choice between $400for

sure and an even chance of $500 or $300. Problem4 is obtainedfrom

problem3 by increasingthe initialendowmentby $200and subtracting

this amountfrom both options. This variationhas a substantialeffect

on preferences. Additionalquestions showed that variationsof $200in

initialwealth have little or no effect on choices. Evidently, preferences

are quite insensitive to small changes of wealth but highly sensitive to

correspondingchanges in reference point. These observations show

that the effective carriersof values are gains and losses, or changes in

wealth, ratherthan states of wealth as implied by the rationalmodel.

The common patternof preferencesobserved in problems3 and 4 is

of special interest because it violates not only expected utility theory

but practicallyall other normativelybased models of choice. In partic-

ular, these data are inconsistent with the model of regret advancedby

Bell (1982) and by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and axiomatized by

Fishburn(1982).This follows from the fact that problems3 and 4 yield

identicaloutcomes and an identical regret structure.Furthermore,re-

gret theory cannot accommodate the combinationof risk aversion in

problem 3 and risk seeking in problem 4-even without the corre-

spondingchanges in endowmentthat make the problemsextensionally

equivalent.

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S260 Journal of Business

outcomes into risky and riskless components, as in the above prob-

lems. The reference point can also be shifted by a mere labeling of

outcomes, as illustrated in the following problems (Tversky and

Kahneman1981, p. 453).

Problem 5 (N = 152): Imagine that the U.S. is preparingfor the

outbreakof an unusualAsian disease, which is expected to kill 600

people. Two alternativeprogramsto combat the disease have been

proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the conse-

quences of the programsare as follows:

If ProgramA is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72%]

If ProgramB is adopted, there is 1/3 probabilitythat 600 people will

be saved, and 2/3 probabilitythat no people will be saved. [28%]

In problem 5 the outcomes are stated in positive terms (lives saved),

and the majority choice is accordingly risk averse. The prospect of

certainly saving 200 lives is more attractive than a risky prospect of

equal expected value. A second group of respondents was given the

same cover story with the following descriptions of the alternative

programs.

Problem 6 (N = 155):

If ProgramC is adopted 400 people will die. [22%]

If ProgramD is adoptedthere is 1/3probabilitythat nobody will die,

and 2/3 probabilitythat 600 people will die. [78%]

In problem6 the outcomes are stated in negativeterms (lives lost), and

the majoritychoice is accordingly risk seeking. The certain death of

400 people is less acceptable than a two-thirdschance that 600 people

will die. Problems 5 and 6, however, are essentially identical. They

differ only in that the formeris framedin terms of the numberof lives

saved (relative to an expected loss of 600 lives if no action is taken),

whereas the latter is framed in terms of the numberof lives lost.

On several occasions we presented both versions to the same re-

spondents and discussed with them the inconsistent preferences

evoked by the two frames. Many respondents expressed a wish to

remainrisk averse in the "lives saved" version and risk seeking in the

"lives lost" version, although they also expressed a wish for their

answers to be consistent. In the persistence of their appeal, framing

effects resemble visual illusions more than computationalerrors.

Discounts and Surcharges

Perhapsthe most distinctiveintellectualcontributionof economic anal-

ysis is the systematic considerationof alternativeopportunities.A ba-

sic principleof economic thinkingis that opportunitycosts and out-of-

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S261

on relevant differencesbetween options, not on how these differences

are labeled. This principleruns counterto the psychologicaltendencies

that make preferences susceptible to superficialvariationsin form. In

particular,a difference that favors outcome A over outcome B can

sometimes be framedeither as an advantageof A or as a disadvantage

of B by suggestingeither B or A as the neutralreferencepoint. Because

of loss aversion, the difference will loom largerwhen A is neutraland

B-A is evaluated as a loss than when B is neutraland A-B is evaluated

as a gain. The significanceof such variationsof framinghas been noted

in several contexts.

Thaler (1980) drew attention to the effect of labeling a difference

between two prices as a surchargeor a discount. It is easier to forgo a

discount than to accept a surchargebecause the same price difference

is valued as a gain in the formercase and as a loss in the latter. Indeed,

the credit card lobby is said to insist that any price differencebetween

cash and card purchases should be labeled a cash discount ratherthan

a credit surcharge.A similaridea could be invoked to explainwhy the

price response to slack demand often takes the form of discounts or

special concessions (Stiglerand Kindahl 1970).Customersmay be ex-

pected to show less resistance to the eventual cancellation of such

temporaryarrangementsthan to outrightprice increases. Judgmentsof

fairness exhibit the same pattern(Kahneman,Knetsch, and Thaler, in

this issue).

Schelling (1981) has described a strikingframingeffect in a context

of tax policy. He points out that the tax table can be constructedby

using as a defaultcase either the childless family (as is in fact done) or,

say, the modaltwo-childfamily. The tax differencebetween a childless

family and a two-child family is naturallyframedas an exemption (for

the two-child family) in the first frame and as a tax premium(on the

childless family) in the second frame. This seeminglyinnocuousdiffer-

ence has a large effect on judgments of the desired relation between

income, family size, and tax. Schelling reported that his students re-

jected the idea of grantingthe rich a largerexemption than the poor in

the first frame but favored a larger tax premiumon the childless rich

than on the childless poor in the second frame. Because the exemption

and the premiumare alternativelabels for the same tax differencesin

the two cases, the judgments violate invariance. Framingthe conse-

quences of a public policy in positive or in negative terms can greatly

alter its appeal.

The notion of a money illusion is sometimes applied to workers'

willingnessto accept, in periods of high inflation,increases in nominal

wages that do not protect their real income-although they would

strenuouslyresist equivalentwage cuts in the absence of inflation.The

essence of the illusion is that, whereas a cut in the nominal wage is

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

S262 Journal of Business

real income may be treated as a gain. Another manifestationof the

money illusion was observed in a study of the perceived fairness of

economic actions (Kahneman,Knetsch, and Thaler,in press). Respon-

dents in a telephone interview evaluated the fairness of the action

described in the following vignette, which was presented in two ver-

sions that differed only in the bracketedclauses.

A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community

experiencing a recession with substantial unemployment [but no

inflation/andinflation of 12%].The company decides to [decrease

wages and salaries 7%/increasesalaries only 5%]this year.

Althoughthe loss of real income is very similarin the two versions, the

proportionof respondentswho judged the action of the company "un-

fair" or "very unfair"was 62%for a nominalreductionbut only 22%

for a nominalincrease.

Bazerman (1983) has documented framing effects in experimental

studies of bargaining.He comparedthe performanceof experimental

subjects when the outcomes of bargainingwere formulatedas gains or

as losses. Subjects who bargainedover the allocation of losses more

often failed to reach agreement and more often failed to discover a

Pareto-optimalsolution. Bazermanattributedthese observationsto the

generalpropensitytoward risk seeking in the domainof losses, which

may increase the willingness of both participantsto risk the negative

consequences of a deadlock.

Loss aversion presents an obstacle to bargainingwhenever the par-

ticipantsevaluate their own concessions as losses and the concessions

obtainedfrom the other partyas gains. In negotiatingover missiles, for

example, the subjective loss of security associated with dismantlinga

missile may loom largerthan the incrementof security producedby a

similar action on the adversary's part. If the two parties both assign

a two-to-one ratio to the values of the concessions they make and of

those they obtain, the resulting four-to-one gap may be difficult to

bridge. Agreementwill be much easier to achieve by negotiatorswho

trade in "bargainingchips" that are valued equally, regardless of

whose handthey are in. In this mode of trading,which may be common

in routinepurchases, loss aversion tends to disappear(Kahnemanand

Tversky 1984).

In expected-utility theory, the utility of each possible outcome is

weighted by its probability.In prospect theory, the value of an uncer-

tain outcome is multipliedby a decision weight w(p), which is a mono-

tonic function of p but is not a probability.The weightingfunction wr

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S263

that is, r(0) = 0, and the scale is normalizedso that r(1) = 1, but the

function is not well behaved near the end points (Kahneman and

Tversky 1979). Second, for low probabilities, r(p) > p, but r(p) +

wr(1 - p) c 1 (subcertainty).Thus low probabilitiesare overweighted,

moderateand high probabilitiesare underweighted,and the latter ef-

fect is more pronouncedthan the former. Third, ar(pr)l/r(p)< r(pqr)l

-r(pq)for all 0 < p, q, r ' 1 (subproportionality).That is, for any fixed

probabilityratio r, the ratio of decision weights is closer to unity when

the probabilitiesare low than when they are high, for example, r(. 1)/

-r(.2) > r(.4)/Ir(.8).A hypothetical weighting function that satisfies

these propertiesis shown in figure2. Its consequences are discussed in

the next section.3

Nontransparent Dominance

The majorcharacteristicof the weightingfunctionis the overweighting

of probabilitydifferences involving certaintyand impossibility,for ex-

ample, r(1.0) - r(.9)or r(.1) - r(0), relative to comparablediffer-

ences in the middleof the scale, for example, r(.3)- r(.2).In particu-

lar, for small p, wris generally subadditive, for example, r(.01) +

-r(.06)> r(.07).This propertycan lead to violations of dominance,as

illustratedin the following pair of problems.

Problem7 (N = 88). Considerthe following two lotteries, described

by the percentageof marblesof differentcolors in each box and the

amount of money you win or lose dependingon the color of a ran-

domly drawn marble. Which lottery do you prefer?

Option A

90%white 6% red 1%green 1%blue 2% yellow

$0 win $45 win $30 lose $15 lose $15

Option B

90%white 6% red 1%green 1%blue 2% yellow

$0 win $45 win $45 lose $10 lose $15

It is easy to see that option B dominatesoption A: for every color the

outcome of B is at least as desirable as the outcome of A. Indeed, all

3. The extension of the present analysis to prospects with many (nonzero) outcomes

involves two additional steps. First, we assume that continuous (or multivalued) distribu-

tions are approximated, in the framing phase, by discrete distributions with a relatively

small number of outcomes. For example, a uniform distribution on the interval (0, 90)

may be represented by the discrete prospect (0, .1; 10, .1; . . .; 90, .1). Second, in the

multiple-outcome case the weighting function, 7ap(pi), must depend on the probability

vector p, not only on the component pi, i =1, . . ., n. For example, Quiggin (1982) uses

the function urp(pi) = 7Tr(pi)/[7Tr(p1)+ . . . + 7rT(Pn)].As in the two-outcomecase, the

weighting function is assumed to satisfy subcertainty, 7ap(pj) + . . + 7p(Pn) C 1, and

subproportionality.

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1.0

LIL

w

z

0

w 0

0 .51.0

STATEDPROBABILITY:p

FIG. 2.-A typical weightingfunction

because the relation of dominanceis highly transparent,so the domi-

nated prospect is rejected without furtherprocessing. The next prob-

lem is effectively identical to problem 7, except that colors yielding

identical outcomes (red and green in B and yellow and blue in A) are

combined. We have proposed that this operation is commonly per-

formed by the decision maker if no dominatedprospect is detected.

Problem8 (N = 124). Which lottery do you prefer?

Option C

90%white 6% red 1%green 3% yellow

$0 win $45 win $30 lose $15

OptionD

90%white 7% red 1%green 2% yellow

$0 win $45 lose $10 lose $15

The formulation of problem 8 simplifies the options but masks the

relationof dominance. Furthermore,it enhances the attractivenessof

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S265

which has two negative outcomes and one positive. As an inducement

to consider the options carefully, participantswere informedthat one-

tenth of them, selected at random, would actually play the gambles

they chose. Although this announcementaroused much excitement,

58%of the participantschose the dominatedalternativeC. In answer

to anotherquestion the majorityof respondentsalso assigned a higher

cash equivalent to C than to D. These results support the following

propositions.(i) Two formulationsof the same problemelicit different

preferences, in violation of invariance. (ii) The dominance rule is

obeyed when its applicationis transparent.(iii) Dominanceis masked

by a frame in which the inferior option yields a more favorable out-

come in an identifiedstate of the world (e.g., drawinga green marble).

(iv) The discrepantpreferencesare consistent with the subadditivityof

decision weights. The role of transparencymay be illuminatedby a

perceptual example. Figure 3 presents the well-known Miiller-Lyer

illusion:the top line appearslonger than the bottom line, althoughit is

in fact shorter.In figure4, the same patternsare embeddedin a rectan-

gularframe, which makes it apparentthat the protrudingbottom line is

longer than the top one. This judgmenthas the natureof an inference,

in contrast to the perceptual impression that mediates judgment in

figure3. Similarly,the finerpartitionintroducedin problem7 makes it

possible to conclude that option D is superiorto C, without assessing

theirvalues. Whetherthe relationof dominanceis detected dependson

framingas well as on the sophisticationand experience of the decision

maker.The dominancerelationin problems8 and 1 could be transpar-

ent to a sophisticateddecision maker, althoughit was not transparent

to most of our respondents.

The overweightingof outcomes that are obtained with certaintyrela-

tive to outcomes that are merely probablegives rise to violationsof the

expectation rule, as first noted by Allais (1953). The next series of

problems (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, p. 455) illustrates the phe-

nomenondiscovered by Allais and its relationto the weightingof prob-

abilities and to the framing of chance events. Chance events were

realized by drawinga single marblefrom a bag containinga specified

numberof favorable and unfavorablemarbles. To encouragethought-

ful answers, one-tenth of the participants, selected at random, were

given an opportunityto play the gamblesthey chose. The same respon-

dents answered problems 9-11, in that order.

Problem9 (N = 77). Which of the following options do you prefer?

A. a sure gain of $30 [78%]

B. 80%chance to win $45 and 20%chance to win nothing [22%]

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S266 Journal of Business

C. 25%chance to win $30 and 75%chance to win nothing [42%]

D. 20%chance to win $45 and 80%chance to win nothing [58%]

Note that problem 10 is obtained from problem 9 by reducing the

probabilitiesof winningby a factor of four. In expected utilitytheory a

preferencefor A over B in problem9 implies a preferencefor C over D

in problem 10. Contrary to this prediction, the majority preference

switched from the lower prize ($30) to the higher one ($45) when the

probabilities of winning were substantially reduced. We called this

phenomenon the certainty effect because the reduction of the probabil-

ity of winningfrom certaintyto .25 has a greatereffect than the corre-

spondingreductionfrom .8 to .2. In prospect theory, the modalchoice

in problem 9 implies v(45)ir(.80) < v(30)Tr(1.0),whereas the modal

choice in problem 10 implies v(45)wr(.20)> v(30)Tr(.25).The observed

violationof expected utilitytheory, then, is impliedby the curvatureof

7F (see fig. 2) if

'u(.25) v(45) *r(1.0)

Allais's problem has attractedthe attention of numeroustheorists,

who attemptedto provide a normativerationalefor the certaintyeffect

by relaxingthe cancellationrule (see, e.g., Allais 1979;Fishburn1982,

1983;Machina1982;Quiggin1982;Chew 1983).The followingproblem

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S267

that cannot be accommodatedby relaxingcancellationbecause it also

involves a violation of invariance.

Problem 11 (N = 85): Considerthe followingtwo stage game. In the

first stage, there is a 75% chance to end the game without winning

anything, and a 25% chance to move into the second stage. If you

reach the second stage you have a choice between:

E. a sure win of $30 [74%]

F. 80%chance to win $45 and 20%chance to win nothing [26%]

Your choice must be made before the outcome of the first stage is

known.

Because there is one chance in four to move into the second stage,

prospect E offers a .25 probability of winning $30, and prospect F

offers a .25 x .80 = .20 probabilityof winning $45. Problem 11 is

therefore identical to problem 10 in terms of probabilitiesand out-

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S268 Journal of Business

subjectsmade a risk-aversechoice in problem11but not in problem10.

We call this phenomenon the pseudocertaintyeffect because an out-

come that is actually uncertainis weighted as if it were certain. The

framingof problem 11 as a two-stage game encouragesrespondentsto

apply cancellation: the event of failing to reach the second stage is

discardedprior to evaluation because it yields the same outcomes in

both options. In this framingproblems 11 and 9 are evaluated alike.

Althoughproblems 10 and 11 are identicalin terms of finaloutcomes

and their probabilities,problem 11 has a greaterpotentialfor inducing

regret. Consider a decision maker who chooses F in problem 11,

reaches the second stage, but fails to win the prize. This individual

knows that the choice of E would have yielded a gain of $30. In prob-

lem 10, on the other hand, an individualwho chooses D and fails to win

cannot know with certainty what the outcome of the other choice

would have been. This differencecould suggest an alternativeinterpre-

tation of the pseudocertaintyeffect in terms of regret (e.g., Loomes

and Sugden 1982). However, the certainty and the pseudocertainty

effects were found to be equally strong in a modifiedversion of prob-

lems 9-11 in which opportunitiesfor regretwere equatedacross prob-

lems. This findingdoes not imply that considerationsof regretplay no

role in decisions. (For examples, see Kahnemanand Tversky [1982,p.

710].) It merely indicatesthat Allais's exampleand the pseudocertainty

effect are primarilycontrolled by the nonlinearityof decision weights

and the framing of contingencies rather than by the anticipationof

regret.4

The certaintyand pseudocertaintyeffects are not restrictedto mone-

tary outcomes. The followingproblemillustratesthese phenomenain a

medicalcontext. The respondentswere 72 physiciansattendinga meet-

ing of the CaliforniaMedicalAssociation. Essentiallythe same pattern

of responses was obtained from a larger group (N = 180) of college

students.

Problem 12 (N = 72). In the treatmentof tumorsthere is sometimes

a choice between two types of therapies:(i) a radicaltreatmentsuch

as extensive surgery, which involves some risk of imminentdeath,

eratedby drawinga numberfroma bag containing100sequentiallynumberedtickets. In

problem10', the event associatedwith winning$45 (drawinga numberbetweenone and

20) was includedin the event associated with winning$30 (drawinga numberbetween

one and25). The sequentialsetupof problem11was replacedby the simultaneousplayof

two chancedevices: the roll of a die (whose outcomedetermineswhetherthe gameis on)

and the drawingof a numberedticket from a bag. The possibilityof regretnow exists in

all three problems,and problem 10' and 11' no longer differ in this respect because a

decision makerwould always know the outcomes of alternativechoices. Consequently,

regrettheorycannotexplaineitherthe certaintyeffect (9' vs. 10')or the pseudocertainty

effect (10' vs. 11') observed in the modifiedproblems.

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S269

apy. Each of the followingproblemsdescribes the possible outcome

of two alternativetreatments,for three differentcases. In consider-

ing each case, suppose the patient is a 40-year-oldmale. Assume

that without treatmentdeath is imminent(withina month) and that

only one of the treatmentscan be applied. Please indicatethe treat-

ment you would prefer in each case.

Case 1

TreatmentA: 20%chance of imminentdeath and 80%chance of

normallife, with an expected longevity of 30 years. [35%]

TreatmentB: certaintyof a normallife, with an expected longev-

ity of 18 years. [65%]

Case 2

TreatmentC: 80%chance of imminentdeath and 20%chance of

normallife, with an expected longevity of 30 years. [68%]

TreatmentD: 75%chance of imminentdeath and 25%chance of

normallife, with an expected longevity of 18 years. [32%]

Case 3

Considera new case where there is a 25%chance that the tumoris

treatable and a 75% chance that it is not. If the tumor is not

treatable, death is imminent. If the tumor is treatable, the out-

comes of the treatmentare as follows:

TreatmentE: 20%chance of imminentdeath and 80%chance of

normallife, with an expected longevity of 30 years. [32%]

TreatmentF: certaintyof normallife, with an expected longevity

of 18 years. [68%]

The three cases of this problem correspond, respectively, to prob-

lems 9-11, and the same patternof preferencesis observed. In case 1,

most respondentsmake a risk-aversechoice in favor of certainsurvival

with reduced longevity. In case 2, the moderate treatmentno longer

ensures survival, and most respondents choose the treatmentthat of-

fers the higherexpected longevity. In particular,64%of the physicians

who chose B in case 1 selected C in case 2. This is anotherexample of

Allais's certainty effect.

The comparison of cases 2 and 3 provides another illustrationof

pseudocertainty.The cases are identical in terms of the relevant out-

comes and their probabilities,but the preferencesdiffer. In particular,

56%of the physicians who chose C in case 2 selected F in case 3. The

conditionalframinginduces people to disregardthe event of the tumor

not being treatablebecause the two treatmentsare equally ineffective

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S270 Journal of Business

pseudocertainty. It appears to ensure survival, but the assurance is

conditionalon the treatabilityof the tumor. In fact, there is only a .25

chance of survivinga month if this option is chosen.

The conjunction of certainty and pseudocertainty effects has

significantimplicationsfor the relationbetween normativeand descrip-

tive theories of choice. Ourresults indicatethat cancellationis actually

obeyed in choices-in those problemsthat make its applicationtrans-

parent. Specifically, we find that people make the same choices in

problems 11 and 9 and in cases 3 and 1 of problem 12. Evidently,

people "cancel" an event that yields the same outcomes for all op-

tions, in two-stage or nested structures. Note that in these examples

cancellation is satisfied in problems that are formally equivalent to

those in which it is violated. The empirical validity of cancellation

thereforedepends on the framingof the problems.

The present concept of framingoriginatedfrom the analysis of Al-

lais's problemsby Savage (1954, pp. 101-4) and Raiffa(1968, pp. 80-

86), who reframedthese examples in an attemptto make the applica-

tion of cancellation more compelling. Savage and Raiffa were right:

naive respondents indeed obey the cancellationaxiom when its appli-

cation is sufficiently transparent.5However, the contrastingprefer-

ences in differentversions of the same choice (problems10 and 11 and

cases 2 and 3 of problem12)indicatethatpeople do not follow the same

axiom when its applicationis not transparent.Instead, they apply(non-

linear) decision weights to the probabilitiesas stated. The status of

cancellation is therefore similar to that of dominance:both rules are

intuitively compelling as abstract principles of choice, consistently

obeyed in transparentproblems and frequently violated in nontrans-

parent ones. Attempts to rationalize the preferences in Allais's ex-

ampleby discardingthe cancellationaxiom face a majordifficulty:they

do not distinguish transparentformulationsin which cancellation is

obeyed from nontransparentones in which it is violated.

V. Discussion

In the precedingsections we challengedthe descriptivevalidity of the

majortenets of expected utility theory and outlined an alternativeac-

count of risky choice. In this section we discuss alternativetheories

much more effective in eliminatingthe commonresponses to Allais's paradoxthan the

partitionframingintroducedby Savage (see, e.g., Slovic and Tversky 1974). This is

probablydue to the fact that the conditionalframingmakes it clear that the critical

options are identical-after eliminatingthe state whose outcome does not depend on

one's choice (i.e., reachingthe second stage in problem 11, an untreatabletumor in

problem12, case 3).

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S271

yses. Some objections of economists to our analysis and conclusions

are addressed.

Descriptive and Normative Considerations

Many alternativemodels of risky choice, designed to explain the ob-

served violations of expected utility theory, have been developed in

the last decade. These models divide into the followingfour classes. (i)

Nonlinearfunctionals (e.g., Allais 1953, 1979;Machina 1982)are ob-

tainedby eliminatingthe cancellationconditionaltogether.These mod-

els do not have axiomatizationsleadingto a (cardinal)measurementof

utility, but they impose various restrictions (i.e., differentiability)on

the utility functional. (ii) The expectations quotient model (ax-

iomatizedby Chew and MacCrimmon1979;Weber 1982;Chew 1983;

Fishburn 1983) replaces cancellation by a weaker substitutionaxiom

and representsthe value of a prospect by the ratio of two linearfunc-

tionals. (iii) Bilinear models with nonadditive probabilities (e.g.,

Kahnemanand Tversky 1979; Quiggin 1982; Schmeidler 1984; Segal

1984; Yaari 1984; Luce and Narens 1985) assume various restricted

versions of cancellation(or substitution)and constructa bilinearrepre-

sentationin which the utilities of outcomes are weightedby a nonaddi-

tive probabilitymeasure or by some nonlineartransformof the proba-

bility scale. (iv) Nontransitive models represent preferences by a

bivariateutilityfunction. Fishburn(1982, 1984)axiomatizedsuch mod-

els, while Bell (1982)and Loomes and Sugden (1982)interpretedthem

in terms of expected regret. For furthertheoreticaldevelopments, see

Fishburn (1985).

The relationbetween models and data is summarizedin table 1. The

stub column lists the four majortenets of expected utility theory. Col-

umn 1 lists the majorempiricalviolationsof these tenets and cites a few

representativereferences. Column 2 lists the subset of models dis-

cussed above that are consistent with the observed violations.

Cancellation Certainty effect (Allais 1953, 1979; Kahneman and All models

Tversky 1979) (problems 9-10, and 12 [cases I

and 21)

Transitivity Lexicographic semiorder (Tversky 1969) Bivariate models

Preference reversals (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983)

Dominance Contrasting risk attitudes (problem 2) Prospect theory

Subadditive decision weights (problem 8)

Invariance Framing effects (Problems 1, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 10-11, Prospect theory

and 12)

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the above models (as well as some others) are consistent with the

violations of cancellationproducedby the certaintyeffect.6Therefore,

Allais's "paradox" cannot be used to compare or evaluate competing

nonexpectation models. Second, bivariate (nontransitive)models are

needed to explain observed intransitivities.Third, only prospect the-

ory can accommodate the observed violations of (stochastic) domi-

nance and invariance.Although some models (e.g., Loomes and Sug-

den 1982; Luce and Narens 1985) permit some limited failures of

invariance, they do not account for the range of framingeffects de-

scribed in this article.

Because framingeffects and the associated failuresof invarianceare

ubiquitous, no adequate descriptive theory can ignore these phenom-

ena. On the other hand, because invariance(or extensionality)is nor-

matively indispensable,no adequateprescriptivetheory shouldpermit

its violation. Consequently,the dream of constructinga theory that is

acceptable both descriptively and normatively appears unrealizable

(see also Tversky and Kahneman 1983).

Prospect theory differs from the other models mentioned above in

being unabashedlydescriptiveand in makingno normativeclaims. It is

designed to explain preferences, whether or not they can be

rationalized. Machina (1982, p. 292) claimed that prospect theory is

"unacceptable as a descriptive model of behavior toward risk" be-

cause it implies violationsof stochastic dominance.But since the viola-

tions of dominance predicted by the theory have actually been ob-

served (see problems 2 and 8), Machina'sobjection appearsinvalid.

Perhapsthe majorfindingof the present article is that the axioms of

rational choice are generally satisfied in transparentsituations and

often violated in nontransparentones. For example, when the relation

of stochastic dominanceis transparent(as in the aggregatedversion of

problem2 and in problem7), practicallyeveryone selects the dominant

prospect. However, when these problemsare framedso that the rela-

tion of dominanceis no longertransparent(as in the segregatedversion

of problem2 and in problem 8), most respondentsviolate dominance,

as predicted.These results contradictall theories that imply stochastic

dominanceas well as others (e.g., Machina1982)that predictthe same

choices in transparentand nontransparentcontexts. The same conclu-

sion applies to cancellation, as shown in the discussion of pseudocer-

tainty. It appearsthat both cancellationand dominancehave normative

appeal, althoughneither one is descriptively valid.

The present results and analysis-particularly the role of transpar-

ency and the significanceof framing-are consistent with the concep-

not discuss the important violations of canceilation due to ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961).

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S273

e.g., Simon 1955, 1978;March 1978;Nelson and Winter1982).Indeed,

prospect theory is an attempt to articulate some of the principles of

perception andjudgment that limit the rationalityof choice.

The introductionof psychologicalconsiderations(e.g., framing)both

enriches and complicates the analysis of choice. Because the framing

of decisions depends on the languageof presentation,on the context of

choice, and on the natureof the display, our treatmentof the process is

necessarily informaland incomplete. We have identifiedseveral com-

mon rules of framing, and we have demonstrated their effects on

choice, but we have not provideda formaltheory of framing.Further-

more, the present analysis does not account for all the observed fail-

ures of transitivityand invariance.Althoughsome intransitivities(e.g.,

Tversky 1969)can be explained by discardingsmall differencesin the

framing phase, and others (e.g., Raiffa 1968, p. 75) arise from the

combinationof transparentand nontransparentcomparisons,there are

examples of cyclic preferences and context effects (see, e.g., Slovic,

Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983) that

require additional explanatory mechanisms (e.g., multiple reference

points and variable weights). An adequate account of choice cannot

ignore these effects of framingand context, even if they are norma-

tively distasteful and mathematicallyintractable.

Bolstering Assumptions

accorded all the methodological privileges of a self-evident truth, a

reasonable idealization, a tautology, and a null hypothesis. Each of

these interpretationseither puts the hypothesis of rationalaction be-

yond questionor places the burdenof proof squarelyon any alternative

analysis of belief and choice. The advantageof the rationalmodel is

compounded because no other theory of judgment and decision can

ever match it in scope, power, and simplicity.

Furthermore,the assumptionof rationalityis protected by a formi-

dable set of defenses in the form of bolsteringassumptionsthat restrict

the significanceof any observed violationof the model. In particular,it

is commonlyassumed that substantialviolations of the standardmodel

are (i) restricted to insignificantchoice problems, (ii) quickly elimi-

nated by learning, or (iii) irrelevantto economics because of the cor-

rective function of market forces. Indeed, incentives sometimes im-

prove the quality of decisions, experienced decision makers often do

better than novices, and the forces of arbitrageand competition can

nullify some effects of errorand illusion. Whetherthese factors ensure

rationalchoices in any particularsituationis an empiricalissue, to be

settled by observation, not by supposition.

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S274 Journal of Business

It has frequently been claimed (see, e.g., Smith 1985)that the ob-

served failures of rationalmodels are attributableto the cost of think-

ing and will thus be eliminated by proper incentives. Experimental

findingsprovide little support for this view. Studies reported in the

economic and psychological literaturehave shown that errorsthat are

prevalent in responses to hypothetical questions persist even in the

presence of significant monetary payoffs. In particular, elementary

blundersof probabilisticreasoning(Grether1980;Tversky and Kahne-

man 1983), major inconsistencies of choice (Gretherand Plott 1979;

Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983),and violations of stochastic dominance

in nontransparentproblems (see problem2 above) are hardlyreduced

by incentives. The evidence that high stakes do not always improve

decisions is not restricted to laboratorystudies. Significanterrors of

judgment and choice can be documentedin real world decisions that

involve high stakes and serious deliberation.The highrate of failuresof

small businesses, for example, is not easily reconcilied with the as-

sumptionsof rationalexpectations and risk aversion.

Incentives do not operateby magic:they work by focusing attention

and by prolongingdeliberation.Consequently,they are more likely to

prevent errors that arise from insufficient attention and effort than

errorsthat arise from misperceptionor faulty intuition.The exampleof

visual illusion is instructive.There is no obvious mechanismby which

the mere introductionof incentives (withoutthe added opportunityto

make measurements)would reduce the illusion observed in figure 3,

and the illusion vanishes-even in the absence of incentives-when

the display is altered in figure 4. The corrective power of incentives

depends on the nature of the particularerrorand cannot be taken for

granted.

The assumption of the rationalityof decision making is often de-

fendedby the argumentthatpeople will learnto makecorrectdecisions

and sometimes by the evolutionary argumentthat irrationaldecision

makers will be driven out by rational ones. There is no doubt that

learningand selection do take place and tend to improveefficiency. As

in the case of incentives, however, no magic is involved. Effective

learningtakes place only undercertainconditions:it requiresaccurate

and immediate feedback about the relation between the situational

conditions and the appropriateresponse. The necessary feedback is

often lacking for the decisions made by managers,entrepreneurs,and

politiciansbecause (i) outcomes are commonlydelayed and not easily

attributableto a particularaction; (ii) variabilityin the environment

degradesthe reliabilityof the feedback, especially where outcomes of

low probabilityare involved; (iii) there is often no informationabout

what the outcome would have been if anotherdecision had been taken;

and (iv) most importantdecisions are unique and therefore provide

little opportunityfor learning (see Einhorn and Hogarth 1978). The

conditions for organizational learning are hardly better. Learning

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions S275

that a particularerror will be eliminatedby experience must be sup-

ported by demonstratingthat the conditions for effective learningare

satisfied.

Finally, it is sometimes arguedthat failuresof rationalityin individ-

ual decision makingare inconsequentialbecause of the corrective ef-

fects of the market (Knez, Smith, and Williams 1985). Economic

agents are often protected from their own irrationalpredilectionsby

the forces of competition and by the action of arbitrageurs,but there

are situations in which this mechanism fails. Hausch, Ziemba, and

Rubenstein(1981) have documentedan instructiveexample: the mar-

ket for win bets at the racetrackis efficient, but the marketfor bets on

place and show is not. Bettors commonly underestimatethe probabil-

ity that the favorite will end up in second or thirdplace, and this effect

is sufficientlylarge to sustain a contrarianbetting strategywith a posi-

tive expected value. This inefficiency is found in spite of the high

incentives, of the unquestioned level of dedication and expertise

amongparticipantsin racetrackmarkets,and of obvious opportunities

for learningand for arbitrage.

Situationsin which errorsthat are common to many individualsare

unlikely to be corrected by the market have been analyzed by Hal-

tiwangerand Waldman(1985) and by Russell and Thaler (1985). Fur-

thermore, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) have presented their near-

rationality theory, in which some prevalent errors in responding to

economic changes (e.g., inertia or money illusion) will (i) have little

effect on the individual(therebyeliminatingthe possibilityof learning),

(ii) provide no opportunityfor arbitrage,and yet (iii) have large eco-

nomic effects. The claim that the marketcan be trustedto correct the

effect of individualirrationalitiescannot be made without supporting

evidence, and the burden of specifying a plausible corrective mecha-

nism should rest on those who make this claim.

The main theme of this article has been that the normativeand the

descriptive analyses of choice should be viewed as separate enter-

prises. This conclusion suggests a research agenda. To retain the ra-

tional model in its customary descriptive role, the relevant bolstering

assumptions must be validated. Where these assumptions fail, it is

instructive to trace the implicationsof the descriptive analysis (e.g.,

the effects of loss aversion, pseudocertainty,or the money illusion)for

public policy, strategicdecision making,and macroeconomicphenom-

ena (see Arrow 1982;Akerlof and Yellen 1985).

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