You are on page 1of 11

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OTIS WILLIAMS
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
Chief of Staff
This manual supersedes EM 1110-2-2701, dated 7
December 1962.
i
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
EM 1110-2-2701
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
CECW-ED
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC 20314-1000
EM 1110-2-2701 Manual
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers No. 1110-2-2701
CECW-ED 30 November 1997
Washington, DC 20314-1000 Engineering and Design
Manual VERTICAL LIFT GATES
No. 1110-2-2701 Table of Contents
30 November 1997 Subject
Engineering and Design Paragraph
VERTICAL LIFT GATES Page
1. Purpose.The purpose of this manual is to provide Subject
guidance in the structural design of vertical lift Paragraph
gates. Page
2. Applicability.This manual applies to all USACE Chapter 1
Commands having responsibility for design of civil Introduction
works Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
projects. 1-1
3. Discussion. Several types of vertical lift gates Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
are used in a variety of hydraulic structures, 1-1
including spillways, Applicability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
low-level inlets/outlets, powerhouses, and 1-1
navigation locks.In recent years, there have been References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1-1
considerable problems with Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
the performance of vertical lift gates.The majority 1-1
Chapter 2
of these problems have occurred as result of
Description and Application
fatigue, causing fracture General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
in main structural framing members of the 2-1
Gate Types and Applications. . . . . . . . . . 2-2
gate.New criteria address methods to reduce
2-1
fatigue and fracture through Types of End Supports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
design and construction techniques.Research has 2-2
Advantages/Disadvantages. . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
proven that the serviceability of the gate can be 2-3
improved by using Chapter 3
proper material selection and fabrication Navigation Lock Lift Gates
General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
techniques.These fabrication techniques include 3-1
the use of proper joint Framing Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
3-1
detailing and welding procedures.Proper material
Load Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
selection and material compatibilities are essential 3-1
parts of providing Load and Resistance Factor Design. . . . . 3-4
3-5
a long service life of the structure.
Commentary on Loads and Load Factors .3-5
4. Distribution Statement.Approved for public
3-5
release, distribution is unlimited.
Serviceability Requirements. . . . . . . . . . 3-6 Component Design and Detailing. . . . . . . 6-2
3-7 6-2
Fatigue and Fracture Control. . . . . . . . . . 3-7 Chapter 7
3-7 Operating Equipment
Material Selection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8 General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
3-9 7-1
Weldments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 Types of Hoists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
3-9 7-1
Design Details. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10 Dogging Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
3-10 7-2
Chapter 4 Lifting Beams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Spillway Crest Gates 7-2
General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 Chapter 8
4-1 Corrosion Control
Framing Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
4-1 8-1
Load Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 Coating Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
4-1 8-1
Load and Resistance Factor Design. . . . . 4-4 Cathodic Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3
4-3 8-1
Commentary on Loads and Load Factors .4-5 Control Contamination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4
4-4 8-1
Serviceability Requirements. . . . . . . . . . 4-6 Design Details. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5
4-4 8-1
Fatigue and Fracture Control. . . . . . . . . . 4-7 Commentary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6
4-4 8-2
Material Selection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7
4-5 8-2
Weldments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 EM 1110-2-2701
4-5 30 Nov 97
Design Details. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 ii
4-5 Subject
Chapter 5 Paragraph
Outlet Gates Page
General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Subject
5-1 Paragraph
Framing Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Page
5-1 Chapter 9
Load Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 Plates 1-12
5-1 Maintenance Considerations
Load and Resistance Factor Design. . . . . . 5-4 General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
5-2 9-1
Commentary on Loads and Load Factors . .5-5 Bulkheads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
5-2 9-1
Serviceability Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 Lubrication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
5-3 9-1
Fatigue and Fracture Control. . . . . . . . . . . 5-7 Inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
5-3 9-1
Material Selection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Appendix A
5-3 References
Weldments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9 Appendix B
5-3 Case Histories
Design Details. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10
5-3
Chapter 6
Design Analysis and Detail Requirements
Gate Analysis Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
6-1
using three-dimensional solid elements.The final
design includedtension ties consisting of 50- by686-
mm (2-in. by 2-ft 3-in.) plate lying flat, with
verticalbracing at 3353-mm (11-ft) intervals.Vertical
bracing andhydrostatic loads were resisted with a
plate girder located at thetop spanning thewidth of
the gate.The skin plate was 32 mm(1 1/4 in.) thick
with intercostals spanning the arch plates inthe
upper third of the gate.The arch consisted of 38-
by610-mm (1-1/2 in. by 2-ft) plate.Loads were
transferred toend bearing plates in the concrete
through an 89-mm-(3-1/2-in.-) thick end post
(plate).Side rollers were replacedwith a compressible
shoe to eliminate crushing of the steel
b. Material.ASTM A572/A572M, Type 2, Grade 345
(50) steel (ASTM 1994a) was selected based on
EM 1110-2-2701 materialtoughness, strength, availability, and
30 Nov 97 weldability.The higherstrength steel helped reduce
B-4
Figure B-3.Connection of compression arch to the the overall weight of the gate,which was a
tension tie and end bearing plate for the consideration for using the existing
replacement gate
hoistingequipment.This provided a significant cost
a rolled or plate girder, and providing a continuous
plate with a savings in theoverall design of the gate.
rollers that had occurred on the existing gate.Other c. Gate operation.The existing drum, bull wheel,
structural and
radius at the inside corner, category E connections hydraulic drive system remained in place.The
could be
existing selsyndrive was modified to include a zero
replacements included new wire ropes, new 305-
mm-(12-in.-) backlash speed reducerand couplings, along with
avoided.Figure B-3 represents the structural new limit switches.
configuration for d. Fabrication.Because the gate was 27 432 mm
diameter stainless steel lift pins, and additional
concrete ballast (90 ft) high by 26 670 mm (87 ft 6 in.) wide, the
connection of the compression arch to the tension gate wasfabricated in three sections.Individual
tie. sections of the gatewere welded in the fabricator’s
and support plates for the counterweight.
yard, barged to the site, anderected in the gate
Preliminary member sizing was performed using
slot.Because most of the welds in thetension tie
handcalculations.Final design was performed using a
and arch were considered fracture critical,
three-dimensional finite element analysis.A refined
weldingprocedures, including welder qualifications,
model of theconnection of arch to tension tie was
joint preparation,
performed todeterminethe radius required and EM 1110-2-2701
resultant stresses. The general gatemodel consisted 30 Nov 97
of 8,931 three-dimensional single-orderquadrilateral B-5
electrode type, and pre- and post-heating
shell elements and 1,506 three-dimensional temperatures
beamelements. Because of large, out-of-plane recesses in the lock walls at each end of the gate,
adjust the
friction forces thatdevelop under hydrostatic load,
followed AWS D1.5-96 (AWS 1996a).The design
stress analysis of the end post(plate) was performed was
elevation of the gate leaves.The upper gate leaf alterations were made to the lift gates to accom-
(downstream
modified during construction to require a full modate the higher head caused by the addition of
penetration weld the low-water dam.
gate leaf) is operated (lowered and raised) for each B-7.Original Design and Construction
lockage.
Each lift gate consists of two welded structural steel
joining the gate section skin plate and end
post.Scheduled leaves thatspan the width of the lock chamber.Each
The lower gate leaf (upstream gate leaf) is gate leaf is9144 mm (30 ft) high.A skin plate on the
operated
upstream side ofeach gate leaf forms the vertical
lock outage for the erection of the gate was from 1
Januaryto damming surface. Plate girderstransfer horizontal
infrequently, only to adjust for varying pool loads acting on the skin plate to thereactions at the
elevations.Plate 4,
29 Feburary 1996, which was extended to 9 March lock walls.The top girder of the upstream gateleaf
1996. forms a horizontal damming surface, with pressure
main text, shows gate geometry.For large fromthe upper pool acting on the top surface and
hydrostatic heads,
e. Corrosion.Corrosion protection for the gate uses pressure from thelower pool acting on the bottom of
a the girder.The bracing onthe downstream side of the
paint system for its primary defense, with cathodic gate leaf between the girders formsa truss to support
protectionapplied at the top of the gate where vertical loads.Sealed buoyancy chambersare
painted mild steel platesconnect to a stainless steel intended to be watertight and provide a reduction
pin and cables.Other areas forcorrosion potential invertical load.Chains and associated machinery,
are where stainless steel bolts were used located in
forconnecting seal angles to the gate and seals to which occur at minimum upper pool levels, the
the seal angles.All mild steel surfaces are upstream gateleaf is required to be supported on
painted.The seal angle mountingdetail was revised the gate rests at the bottom of the lock.
to provide a neoprene gasket between thestainless B-8. Structural Failures
steel seal angle and the gate.This will help Severe cracking in the upstream gate leaf was
preventleakage as well as provide a separation discovered inMarch 1989 during an unrelated
from the two dissimilar metals. construction contract at themain lock.Under normal
Section II conditions, the upstream gate leaf issubmerged
Locks No. 7, Upstream Gate, Downstream Gate and is not visible.An inspection of the gate
Leaf
Replacement leafrevealed numerous cracks in the girders and
B-6. Background bracing, adjacentto connections, on the
Locks No. 27 are located on the Chain of Rocks Canal downstream face of the upstream
(whichbypasses the Chain of Rocks stretch of the gateleaf.Additionally, all buoyancy chambers were
Mississippi River)at Granite City, Illinois.Construction found to beflooded.It is believed the cracking was a
of the locks was com-pleted in 1953.The locks result of fatigue asthe gate leaf had undergone
consist of a main lock, 365 760 by33 528 mm (1,200 approximately 250,000 loadingcycles at that
by 110 ft), and an auxiliary lock, 182 880by 33 time.Additionally, almost all of the
528mm(600 by 110 ft).The lock gates consist numerousdownstream bracing connections were
ofvertical lift gates at the upstream end and miter fatigue category E or E’according to AISC Appendix
gates at thedownstream end of the locks.Prior to the K (AISC 1995).As part of thealterations in 1960,
addition of a low-water dam at the Chain of Rocks on additional vertical members were added tothe
the Mississippi River inthe early 1960's and a downstream bracing, and cover plates were added
subsequent raise in pool elevation atLocks 27, to thetension flanges of the girders.The
connections for thesemembers resulted in of the gate leaf using a three-dimensional
computer model of
additional category E’ fatigue details. yield strength, ultimate strength, and percent
B-9. Corrective Actions elongation.The
Because the damage was considered to be severe, the upstream gate leaf was conducted.The
purpose of the
an emer-gency contract was written for initial
yield strengths varied from 200 to 241 MPa (29 to
repairs to the gate leaf sothat the lock could open 35 ksi) (the
as planned for the unrelated con-struction analysis was to determine member stresses.A
three-
contract.After completion of the initial repairs,
material was ASTM A7.)Elongation values were
aplan of action for permanent repairs was appropriate.
established.The planinvolved material testing, dimensional finite element model was used to
analyze the gate
review of the original structuralcomputations, (3)Chemical analyses.Chemical analyses determined
placement of strain gauges on the gate leaf, andan the
in-depth structural analysis using a three- were used to represent the skin plate, girder
webs, buoyancy
dimensionalcomputer model.Frequent inspections percentage of 10 different elements.These
of the gate leaf wereconducted while permanent analyses provided
repairs were being considered. chambers, end framing, and reaction girder
a. Initial repairs.The intention of the initial repairs web.Beam
information that was used to evaluate two aspects
was to return the gate leaf as much as possible to its concerning
originalcondition while permanent repairs were being elements were used to represent the girder
flanges, skin plate
considered.Cracks in girder flanges were gouged and
the weldability of the material:the susceptibility to
fastened using fullpenetration welds.Cracks in girder underbead
webs were gouged andwelded closed.The crack tips intercostals, downstream bracing, chain girder,
reaction girder
were located using dyepenetrant and a 25.4-mm-(1- cracking and the potential for heat-affected zone
in.-) diameter hole was drilled atthe crack tip; the cracking.The
holes were left open.Gusset plates were usedwhere flanges, and apron braces.
The model consisted of
the downstream bracing members tied into carbon content was found to exceed the limit for
thehorizontal girder flanges to stiffen the joints and ASTM A7.
to facilitate therepair. Weld repairs were approximately 600 nodes and 1,300 elements.
As carbon content increases, a material will tend to
nondestructively examined. behave in a
EM 1110-2-2701 more brittle manner.
30 Nov 97 (1)Instrumentation.Because of the complex nature
B-6b.Material testing.Samples of material from the of
original construction contract and alteration (4)Micro hardness survey and Brinell
hardness.Brinell
contract wereremoved and tested.Plate, angle, bar,
indication of service stress would be helpful in
and weld material weretested.The following tests determining the
were performed: hardness tests (ASTM 1996e), along with micro
hardness
(1)Charpy V-Notch.This test provides an
validity of some assumptions concerning the
indication of amaterial's ability to absorb energy, analysis.Strain
which is directly related totoughness (a material's surveys and chemical composition tests, provided
information
ability to resist crack propagation).The data from gages were placed on several downstream bracing
the testing for all samples indicated that members.
thismaterial had poor toughness compared to to evaluate the susceptibility to cracking.The test
data showed
historical data forsimilar material. For the original loading cases, the strain gages
(2)Tensile.Tensile tests were performed to indicated
determine
that all samples had hardness values below the horizontal direction.It was also assumed that the
maximum
member forces much higher than those indicated downstreambracing prevented local buckling of the
by the downstream girderflanges as well as supporting
suggested limiting values to assure satisfactory
the vertical load.
performance
structural analysis.These data indicated a problem T
with the hedownstream bracing was assumed to act as five
against underbead cracking and heat-affected zone
separatetrusses, stacked on top of one
cracking,
loading and/or the structural model.These were another.Each truss wasassumed to carry a portion
later of the total vertical load, the portionbeing the ratio
thus indicating the material was satisfactory in this
respect. of the panel height to the total gate leaf
investigated and corrected in the computer height.Buoyancy chambers located in the bottom
analysis, and better two truss panelswere designed to provide a
(5)Fracture analysis.A fracture analysis of a crack
located in the angle was performed to determine buoyant force of 50 percent of thetotal gate weight.
additional d. Structural analysis.An in-depth structural
(2)Conclusions from structural analysis.The control- analysis
information concerning how the crack developed.The
fracture
ling load condition was found to be a combination
of the case
analysis revealed that the fracture was of a fatigue
nature due to
added to account for the removal of the seal at the
sill
one-way bending and low to moderate overload in
an area of
(removed in the 1960's in an attempt to abate
vibration of the leaf.Bending and stretching (6 degrees of freedom)
concentrated high stresses.
gate leaf) and the case added to account for the
ineffectiveness
c.Original structural computations.The original
and
alteration design computations were obtained and
reviewed todetermine what assumptions were
made so they could becompared to the actual
operating conditions.The gate leaf wasanalyzed
using hand methods.Vertical water loads and elementsthe structural analysis of the lift gate, it
deadloads (which included ice and mud loads) were
assumed to bedivided equally between the skin
plate on the upstream faceand the bracing on the
downstream face.Horizontal loadingwas assumed
to be transferred from the skin plate to
thehorizontal girders.It was further assumed that
the threevertical diaphragms prevented differential
loading betweengirders and caused the gate to
deflect uniformly in the was felt that someagreement was obtained.
of the buoyancy chambers.For the case of no seal at affected by the distribution of the horizontal load.
The
the sill,the net pressure varied from full net category E and E’ according to AISC (1995)
horizontal pressure at thetop of the sill to zero net Appendix K, and
additional compression in the downstream bracing
pressure at the bottom of the gate leaf(Figure 3-5,
face, caused
main text.)The results of the analysis using no consideration was given to fatigue in the design.
theloading cases described above showed improved by vertical loads due to water and weight of the gate,
combined
agreementbetween overstressed members and
with horizontal loads resulted in overstress in the
members with observedfailures, and also improved downstream
agreement with strain gageinformation. The results (3)Operating procedures.The operating procedures
bracing members.
of the analysis indicated that the gateleaf underwent were such that under certain conditions the gate
bending in both vertical and horizontaldirections, not was not on the
just horizontal bending as was assumed in (b)Omission of important load case.The original
design.This resulted in additional load in the
theoriginal computations.Bending in the vertical bracing.The
direction causedan increase in compression in the designers did not consider a load case for the
downstream bracing forcertain loading conditions. buoyancy
EM 1110-2-2701 limit switches for the gate leaf have since been
30 Nov 97 reset to account
B-7 chambers zero percent effective while the gate
(a)Improper assumption of load distribution.It was was supported
material being produced presently.These materials for tolerances in the gate position indicating
did not equipment to
apparent that horizontal loading of the lift gate had on the chains.During the gate repairs many of the
a greater chambers
have the ability to resist crack propagation once a prevent the condition from occurring again.
crack were found to be filled with water.The additional
effect on member forces in the downstream vertical load
bracing than was of the water in the buoyancy chambers caused
initiated from overstress or fatigue. further
believed by the original designers.The original (4)Fabrication procedure.There was no evidence of
designers overstress in the downstream bracing members.
believed all horizontal loads were distributed to low hydrogen welding practice.This is poor
the girders practice con-
(2)Design assumptions.Some of the original design (c)Operating procedures.For higher heads the gate
through the vertical diaphragms and the leaf
downstream bracing during the winter months.These practices made the
assumptions concerning load distribution, load welds
cases, and should be supported on the gate rests at the
prevented only local buckling of the girder flanges bottom of the lock.
under susceptible to cracking.Also many of the welds
modeling technique were unconservative.This were under-
resulted in Lock personnel identified that the gate leaf had
horizontal loading.However, it was clear from the been routinely
computer cut, which reduced the cross-sectional area of the
actual member stresses (as indicated by the bracing and
computer analysis supported on the chains for conditions when
analysis, and substantiated by the strain gage hydrostatic head
testing, that the caused stress risers and susceptibility to
and instrumentation) higher than those predicted in cracking.Approxi-
the original exceeded the limiting value.This was due to
lift gate acted as a unit under load with the conflicting
downstream bracing mately 90 percent of the welds connecting the
design.In addition, the bracing connection details downstream
were fatigue
information given in the operating manual and supports for some loading conditions, as assumed
tolerances in the in the
bracing to the girder flanges were found to be sidering the alterations to the gate leaves in 1960
deficient (did not were made
gate position indicating equipment.This contributed meet AWS (1996a) profile and porosity
greatly to requirements.The
meet AWS (1996a) bridge specifications) by an B-10.Design and Construction of New Gate Leaf
independent The five factors identified in the investigation of the
high stresses in the downstream bracing as
indicated by the existinggate leaf as contributing to the cracking of
testing laboratory that performed an inspection as the gate leaf, as wellas altering the structural
part of the
configuration, were considered in thedesign of the
computer analysis of this loading condition.
repair contract.In addition to undercutting, the new gate leaf.
welds did not a. Material toughness.For adequate material tough-
(d)Modeling technique.The original designer's ness a minimum toughness requirement for all
assump-
members waswritten into the specification. To
deficient welds were repaired during the initial
repair contract. minimize gate weight, ASTMA572/A572M Grade
tion of truss behavior of the downstream bracing 345 (50) steel (ASTM 1994a) was used.Deflections
members is
unconservative.Furthermore, the gate was were considered and kept within acceptable limits.
fabricated with EM 1110-2-2701
(5)Corrosion.As cracks initiate and begin to 30 Nov 97
propagate, B-8b.Design assumptions.A three-dimensional
many eccentric joints.Both of these items finite
introduced bending element model was used for the design of the new
corrosion occurs at the crack tip and reduces the gateleaf.Much information concerning overall gate
critical stress
moments into the downstream bracing members, leaf behaviorand distribution of loads was obtained,
which minimizing the numberof assumptions
intensity factor, thus promoting crack necessary.Because of concerns regarding the
growth.Corrosion also d. Operating procedures.The original gate leaf
increased the stress.The simplified assumption that used
the down- reliability of buoyancy chambers, they were not used
causes reduction in the net area of members, in the new
resulting in float-operated selsyn transmitters to report the
stream bracing behaved as a truss was made position of the
necessary by the gate leaf.Loading cases generally followed the
increased stresses. original gate
crude analysis tools available at that time. gate leaf.This type of device is unreliable for
e. Final conclusions.Based on the results from the determining if
material testing program, structural analysis, and leaf except for an additional case to account for the
other infor-mation obtained, at least five factors, missing
the gate leaf is supported on the rests or on the
discussed below, con-tributed to the cracking of the chains.Hence,
gate.Based on the cost ofrepairs and the fact that water seal at the sill.
much of the gate leaf would still havedeficient operating restrictions with regard to when the
gate leaf was
material and welds, the final district c. Structural configuration.Similar to the existing
recommendationwas to replace the upstream gate gate
leaf of the main lock lift gate. leaf, the new gate leaf is horizontally framed. The
(1)Defective material.The material used to horizon-tal girder spacing was altered to provide
fabricate thegate and the material used for the uniformity, which isthe most efficient when
alterations made to the gatein 1960 both had very considering all possible loadingconditions.Based on
poor toughness relative to similar the results of the structural model andgate testing,
it was determined that additional Corrosion.Elimination of crack potential was a
verticaldiaphragms were necessary.A vertical major goal in the design of the new gate leaf;
diaphragm was placed however, shouldcracking occur during the service
e. Fabrication.The majority of the new gate leaf life of the new gate leaf,corrosion will be minimized
was through the use of passivecathodic protection
at each panel point.Panel point spacing remains
the same as devices mounted at regular intervals.
fabricated in the shop, where conditions are readily
controlled.
the original gate leaf and corresponds to the
spacing of the gate
Strict control of welding procedures, including
welder
rests at the bottom of the lock.For the downstream
bracing, a
qualification, joint preparation, electrode
preparation, and pre-
perforated skin plate was used instead of discrete
bracing
and post-heating temperatures, was maintained.Low
hydrogen
members.The rounded perforations provide access
for
welding practice, in accordance with AWS D1.1
(AWS
inspection as well as a reduction in gate weight.The
system of
1996b), was specified for all welded connections.
discrete downstream bracing members was flawed in
that itwas difficult to obtain connections that were
not susceptible tofatigue.The skin plate with smooth
rounded perforations hasvery good resistance to
fracture and fatigue.All connectionsthroughout the
new gate leaf were designedin accordance withAISC
(1995), Appendix K.Improving fatigue
performanceinvolved stopping transverse stiffeners
short oftensiongirder
flanges, and coping vertical diaphragms so that no
contact ismade with girder flanges.All joint details
were designed sothat allowable stress ranges
would not be exceeded.
required to be on the rests or on the chains could not
be met.Asystem of digital encoders was installed,
replacing the originalselsyn transmitting
equipment.The new system, mounted onthe existing
chain sprocket,accurately indicates when the
gateleaf is supported on the rests or on the chains
and thereforeensures that operating restrictions
can be met.
f.
EM 1110-2-2701
30 Nov 97
Plate 1