You are on page 1of 18

DUE PROCESS

Opportunity to be Heard

Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006

CASE FACTS:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 for allegedly
misappropriating P450,000.00 funds, originally for the purchase of a road roller for the municipality,
which was then realigned for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan Modesto Bernaldez Street.
Thereafter, upon the commencement with the project, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance
approving the realignment of the funds.

A complaint against the petitioners was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no
fund appropriated for the purpose. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found probable
cause and recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioners. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the charge was modified from violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code to (1) violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information charging them with violation of
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and remanded the case to
the Office of the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. Finding that the Amended Information
contains all the material averments necessary to make out a case for the first mode of violating Section
3 of R.A. No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information in its Resolution.

Petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reinvestigation arguing that the above Informations were filed without affording them the opportunity to
file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the modified charges. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying the motion but granted leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a
motion for reconsideration (not a motion for reinvestigation) which was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed a petition. They maintain that the modification of the charge from
violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019
denied their rights to due process since they were not given the opportunity to answer and present
evidence on the new charge in a preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the petitioners argue that public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the challenged resolutions finding probable cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied their rights to due process?

RULING OF THE COURT:


No, the petitioners were not deprived of due process.

The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred
by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not
render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a
motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction
over the case.

Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not come
as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged
illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of
grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or
reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even without affording the petitioners
a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights.

Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest of the
petitioners under the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on December 2, 2005.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt."

Roxas v. Vasquez, G.R. 114944, June 21, 2001

CASE FACTS:
Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil were Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the PC-INP. The PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of sixty five (65) units of fire
trucks.
Accordingly, the public bidding was held. By majority vote, Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. was
voted as the lower bidder. Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale of sixty-five units of Nikki-Hino
fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd.
The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding and purchase of
the sixty five fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Ombudsman.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a preliminary investigation where respondents
submitted their respective counter-affidavits and it recommended the indictment of all respondents,
except for one.
On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee recommended the dismissal of
the complaints against petitioners. This latter recommendation was approved by the Special Prosecutor
and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum and filed before the Sandiganbayan.
However, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Without any
notice to or participation of petitioners, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued the first assailed Order,
recommending that herein petitioners be likewise indicted. Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer voted
for the approval of the recommendation, while Ombudsman Vasquez approved the recommendation.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended that the Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be
dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the
recommendation in the second assailed Order.
Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan
impleading petitioners as additional accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners indictment, on reinvestigation was without notice nor participation of
petitioners, null and void for being violative of their constitutional right to due process.

RULING OF THE COURT:


Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners at the reinvestigation render the
questioned issuances of respondent Office of the Ombudsman null and void. This was firmly settled in
the recent case of Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we held as follows --

xxx. And even without such notice, we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that under the
Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman [Administrative Order No. 07], particularly Sec. 7,
in relation to Sec. 4, while complainants in preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman actively
participated therein, their participation is no longer accorded to them as a matter of right in the stage of
the reinvestigation. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. (underscoring ours)

At any rate, petitioners cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is well
established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their
respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993 Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in
Criminal Case No. 18956.

Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004

CASE FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi
City, Lanao del Sur, charging him with gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion and conduct
unbecoming of a judge in connection with his issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a
preliminary restraining order in a civil case, entitled Ms. Yasmira N. Pangadapun vs. Ms. Bailinang P.
Marohombsar.

Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in a civil case for injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun. In the said complaint, Pangadapun
questioned the legality of Marohombsars appointment by DSWD Regional Secretary Salic-Malna as
provincial social welfare officer V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development Autonomous
Region for Muslim Mindanao (DSWD-ARMM). Prior to Marohombsars appointment, Pangadapun used
to occupy said position as officer-in-charge.

Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the
lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary
injunction the following day.

In his partial Comment, respondent denied that he issued the TRO in favor of Pangadapun and
granted the preliminary injunction without benefit of a hearing. He alleged that the complaint was purely
a harassment case filed by a disgruntled party because of the latters failure to obtain a favorable
resolution from him.

During the preliminary hearing of the complaint before Justice Labitoria, the parties agreed to have
the case decided based on the pleadings presented.

Respondent submitted additional evidence and exhibits to strengthen his case. On the other hand,
complainant filed her comment/objection to respondents formal offer of exhibits on the ground that all
the documents were irrelevant and immaterial to the instant case.

In his final report and recommendation, Justice Labitoria recommended that respondent judge be
absolved of all the charges against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complainants was denied due process because the preliminary injunction
was issued without hearing?

RULING OF THE COURT:


No, complainant was not denied due process.

In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing before
injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction need
undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in
all instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense.
In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question, hence
her right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that
he has been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his position.

Exceptions to notice and hearing requirements

Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

CASE FACTS:
By virtue of RA No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Company was granted a
franchise to establish, construct, maintain, and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee
may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications. Since 1968, it has been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global
Communications, and other telecommunication companies. It was exempt from the jurisdiction of the
National Telecommunications Commission. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196, it was
places under the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the NTC, including all its facilities and services
and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the
requisite certificate of public convenience. In September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an
application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities, to continue providing
the international satellite communications services, and to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can
continue to operate and maintain the facilities, provide the services, and charge therefor the aforesaid
rates. The NTC extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to
charge modified reduced rates through reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT
assailed said order.

ISSUE: Whether the NTC is required to provide notice and hearing to PHCOMSAT in its rate fixing order,
which fixed a temporary rate pending final determination of PHILCOMSAT's application

RULING:
YES. The order in question contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. This is
premised on the fact that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged based on an initial
evaluation of petitioners financial statements without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation
as to what particular aspect or aspects of financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction.
The NTC order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to
PHILCOMSAT and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an initial evaluation,
but had PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was
issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and consequent deterioration of the public service
could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC.

Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833 (1957)

CASE FACTS:
Petitioner Suntay assails the order of the CFI of Quezon City directing the NBI and the DFA for
them to take proper steps in order that Suntay, alleged to be in the USA, be brought back to the
Philippines and be dealt with in accordance with law
Suntay was accused of seducing a 16-year old girl Alicia Nubla by taking her form St. Pauls
College with lewddesigns and then taking her somewhere near the UP compound to have carnal
knowledge on or about June 21, 1954
Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint but the counsel for the
complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney and urged that petitioner be charged with seduction
On January 10, 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the DFA. Ten days
later, he left for San Francisco, California where he was enrolled in school
On January 31, 1955, Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with
seduction filed before the CFI of Quezon City
When the CFI issued the assailed order, the Ambassador to the US was notified and ordered
to cancel the petitioners passport
Petitioner contends that the CFI is without jurisdiction and the cancellation is illegal for lack of a
quasi-judicial hearing
He also contends that the right to travel or stay abroad is protected by the Constitution and he
cannot be deprived of such without due process of law

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process.

RULING:
NO.

It is within the jurisdiction of the court to direct the DFA to take proper steps in order that
accused may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law
Moreover, 25 of EO No, 19, s. of 1946 empowers the Secretary of Foreign Affairs as well as
any diplomatic consular officer duly authorized by law, in his discretion to refuse to issue a passport,
to restrict a passport for use only in certain countries, to restrict it against use in certain countries, to
withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting
its validity or use in certain countries.
While the law calls for the exercise of discretion, it was already a given fact that petitioner had
to answer a criminal charge for seduction
Respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction
Petitioners contention that there should be a hearing is bereft of merit. Hearing would have
been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear
but doubtful.
It was apparent that he left the country to evade the criminal charge.
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by
an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against
the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation
of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution;
and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because
of the absence of such hearing.
A hearing is not required at all times. If it were the case, then writs issued ex parte would be
violative of the due process clause.

De Bisshop vs. Galang, 8 SCRA 244 (1963)

CASE FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country
for three years. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. However Immigration
Officer Benjamin de Mesa reported that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than
the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is
suspect of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a
communication of Customs of Iloilo demanded from petitioner the paytion of 10 September 1959,
advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by
the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. to forestall his arrest and the filing
of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed an appeal. Writ of preliminary injunction
was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering herein respondent-appellant to desist
from arresting and detaining petitioner-appellee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to notice and hearing is essential to due process in administrative
proceedings.

RULING:
Order appealed is reversed. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive
responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. due process of law is not necessarily judicial
process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society
maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial
process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it
is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of all
administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and
hearing are not essential to due process of law.

Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 232 (1988)

CASE FACTS:
Var-Orient Shipping Co filed a complaint with POEA against crewmembers for having allegedly
violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners that supposedly resulted in damages. the
case was heard and the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case
would be submitted for decision. On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda, Tomas Achacoso,
POEA Administrator rendered decision in favour of the crew. A copy of the decision was sent by
registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners counsel. Petitioners allegedly learned
about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on them by the Sherriff. Petitioner filed
filed an urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution on the ground that the decision had not been received
by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator
resolved the case without any formal hearing?

RULING:
Petition denied. Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners allegation that they were denied due
process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The fact is
that at the hearing of the case it was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective
memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by
law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes.

Administrative Due Process

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940)


CASE FACTS:
An agreement was made by Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union. The NLU akleged that
the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
symetrically discharge all the members of the NLU from work. And this averment is desired to be oroved
by the petitioner with records of the Bureau of Customs and Nooks of Accounts of native dealers in
leather, that National Workers's Britherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
denominated by Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR decided the case
and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for a new trial was raised by the NLU. Ang Tibay filed another
motion to oppose the NLU's.

ISSUE: Whether the motion for a new trial should be granted.

RULING:
YES. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present
at the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. It must be noted that the CIR is a special court. It is more an administrative board than a part
of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It may be said that the CIR may be free from rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, but it does not entail that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.

Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)

CASE FACTS:
Felix Montemayor was a faculty of Araneta University Foundation serving as Head of
Humanities and Psychology Department. The Chaplain filed a complaint of immorality against him. A
committee was created to investigate the allegation. With the assistance of counsel, he filed a motion to
dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance. The committee found him responsible of the act complained
of and recommended for his demotion by one degree. The President adopted such recommendation
and thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of private respondent for appropriate action.
Subsequently new charges was filed by different faculty members against him and a new committee was
formed to investigate the allegations. Montemayor asked for postponement of the hearing and was
denied. The hearing proceeded without him and found him guilty of the same charges and recommended
for the discontinuance of his service. He then filed a complaint with NLRC. NLRC decided in favour of
the Foundation. Hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proceeding relating to Montemayors dismissal was done in violation of due
process?

RULING:
Petition dismissed. In Montemayors absence the matter was heard and was sufficiently found
by the committee to be guilty of his conduct unbecoming and recommended his removal. Such deficiency
was remedied when Montemayor was able to present his case with the Labour Commission. Records
will show that after all efforts on conciliation had failed parties agreed to submit their dispute for
compulsory arbitration. Several hearings were conducted. he legal aspect as to the procedural due
process having been satisfied was then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: All the foregoing
clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his day in court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that
petitioner claims denial of due process in the proceeding had before the investigating committees and
not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest
opportunity to present his case.

Meralco vs. PSC, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)

CASE FACTS:
On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two applications with the Public
Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other
nonresidential customers for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and
the other for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate, schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890).
These applications were approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24
August 1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general power rate,
Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on 31 August 1955. Previous to
these applications, Meralco filed 7 other applications for revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954,
upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and
examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited
the books and under date of 11 May 1956, it presented a report which was submitted to the Commission
on 28 May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset the hearing of
the cases for 22 June 1956 "for the purpose of considering such further revision of applicant's rates as
may be found reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta,
Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the PSC, who was duly authorized to
receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its
purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the
hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases
on the report of the GAO dated 11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the
Commission, in which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a rate of return of only
8% on its invested capital.". The Solicitor General submitted the case on the same report and letter of
Dr. Gil and on a letter-report addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the Commission on 21
November 1955. Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil. Meralco was given by the Commission
a period of 30 days within which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO. On
31 July 1956, the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying its objection, and prayed that
the cases be reset for hearing to enable the parties to present their proofs. Without having (1) first reset
the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the
Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested
by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and
controverted by Meralco, on 27 December 1957, the PSC handed down a decision, granting the petition
for the reduction of rates. The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision, filed on 14 January
1958 by Meralco, was denied by the Commission on a 2 to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958. Meralco filed the
petition for review with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose of proper notice and
hearing in administrative cases.

RULING:
The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before
"Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service
Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows that
the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own
words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to
some kind of understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of 27 December
1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing", as required by law, and that therefore it
can not serve as a legal basis for requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the
decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the Commission
is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate that
no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law, which binds not only the government of
the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. Due process of law guarantees
notice and opportunities to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
Ateneo vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 (1986)

CASE FACTS:
Juan Ramon Guanzon was a student-boarder at Cervini Hall who hurled abuses and laid hand
to the cafeteria server. This was witnesses by several boarders. The university investigated the slapping
incident and decided to expel Guanzon. He opted instead to apply for honorable dismissal which was
granted. Upon learning of the incident, his parents lodged a complaint for damages on the ground of
unfair trial. The University denied this and justified that such behavior of the student is subject to sanction;
and that the University has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop any student found to
be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline.
ISSUE: Whether Guanzon was denied due process on the ground of unfair trial

RULING:
NO. Guanzon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted slapping the
cafeteria server, was given notice of the proceedings, agreed to present his side where the Board acted
fairly and objectively. All the requisites of administrative due process were met. The court does not share
the view that there was no due process because the parents of Guanzon were not given any notice of
the proceedings. Guanzon at the time was 18 years old, a college student, therefore intelligent and
mature enough to know his responsibilities. He is assumed to have reported this serious matter to his
parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case was not the fault
of petitioner University.

Alcuaz vs. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (1988)


CASE FACTS:
Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on
certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the
students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new
agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades
of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students
received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete
out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the
commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was
answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the
students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On
28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student
Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the
President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding
their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap,
also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding,
no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them.

RULING:
After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either
with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more
contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students
and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law.
Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process
in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and
cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down
by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an
investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well settled
that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters
falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual
findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the
findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and
Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above
exceptions.

Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity,
students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the
school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.

Non vs. Hon. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 30, 1990
CASE FACTS:
Petitioners are all students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed
to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass
actions against the school in the preceding semester. Thus they filed a petition in the Regional Trial
Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court
dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this
was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted
for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for
the first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges
"to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College
Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the school excluded students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them relates to possible breaches of discipline.

RULING:
The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with
public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the
State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to
refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has
already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of
students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a
contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required
academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of
university authorities. Exclusion of students to enroll because of failing grades when the cause for the
action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of
due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one or
two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic
deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of information.
Herein, the students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass
actions, but the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed
and it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with
(Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings
and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic, as the students have
been refused readmission or re-enrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters,
have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that resulted in the disruption of classes.
To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further
aggravate the strained relations between the students and the officials of the school which necessarily
resulted from the heated legal battle.

Fabella v Court of Appeals GR 110379 November 28, 1997

CASE FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public
school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of
September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay,
allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed
administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge
sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part
in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990.
Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process
grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation
and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to
prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and
appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing
the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding
the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

RULING:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. Section
9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public school teachers administrative cases
should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the
local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against.
Private respondents did not include a representative of the local or in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees
were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance
and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process
is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues:
Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of
Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective
teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations
as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the
right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee.
Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools
or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the
DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers
organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807.
Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an
express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

Lao Gi Alias chia v Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

CASE FACTS:
1. The Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 finding Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias
Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino
citizen, being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua, Pampanga.
The Minster of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147, series of 1980 cancelling Opinion No. 191,
series of 1958 and setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was
founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A motion for reconsideration of said Opinion was denied
by the Minister of Justice.
2. Subsequently, a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children. An amended charge
was filed with the CID alleging that said respondents refused to register as aliens having been
required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such.
Said repondents (Lao Gi and family) filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on the
ground that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191, series
of 1958. However, said motion and motion for reconsideration were denied by the CID.
3. The respondents petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order filed within this Court was also dismissed for lack of merit.
First and second motions for reconsideration were also denied by this Court.
4. Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila for alleging that he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale
of certain real property. He was acquitted by the trial court on the ground that Opinion No. 191, series
of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice may be equated as res judicata and that revocation thereof by
Opinion No. 147, series of 1980 cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable.
5. On September 23, 1982 the CID set the deportation case against respondents for hearing and Acting
Commissioner Victor G. Nituda gave respondents three (3) days to move for reconsideration of the
order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest.
Respondents filed said motion for reconsideration and opposition but this was denied by Acting
Commissioner Nituda. The latter directed respondents to register as aliens within two (2) days
from notice thereof.
Respondents filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for injunctive relief in
the Court of First Instance of Manila whereby a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. But
this was dismissed for lack of legal basis and for want of supervisory jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court on the particular subject involved. The writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued was dissolved.
Both appeal and motion for reconsideration interposed to the Court of Appeals were dismissed.
6. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari wherein they seek to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals and ask that a new one be rendered setting aside the order of the CID dated September 28,
1982 and directing it to proceed with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against
the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lao Gi was denied due process?

RULING:
Yes. The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that they register as
aliens as required by the Immigration Act. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and
authority of the Commissioner to require an alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated
on a positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship
of the petitioners is in issue there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens
before the petitioners may be directed and required to register as aliens.

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable
to deportation proceedings.

Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
c No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must
be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on
what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned order of the respondent
Commission on Immigration and Deportation dated September 28, 1982 is hereby set aside. The
respondent Commission on Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to continue hearing the
deportation case against petitioners and thereafter, based on the evidence before it, to resolve the issue
of citizenship of petitioners, and if found to be aliens, to determine whether or not the petitioners should
be deported and/or otherwise ordered to register as aliens. No costs.

People v Nazario 165 SCRA 186

CASE FACTS:
The defendant (herein accused-appellant) is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal
Ordinance. The accused-appellant is an owner and operator of a fishpond situated in Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. In the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in spite of repeated demands made upon him by
the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refused and failed to pay the
municipal taxes in the total amount of P362.62.

The accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected
have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond
operators. Also, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said
municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there
is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction
during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected.

Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the
power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the
ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.

The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended
by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences
him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day,
and to pay the costs of this proceeding.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 4, series of 1965, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and
as further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966 is null and void for being ambiguous and
uncertain?
2. Whether or not the ordinances in question, as amended are unconstitutional for being ex post facto?

RULING:
No. For the first issue, the petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not
covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague
insofar as they reckon the date of payment. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.

In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. As the
actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term "manager." Suffice it to say that as the actual
operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the
appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair
notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.

Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. Ordinance No. 15, in making the
tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the
Bureau of Fisheries," is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12,
reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964," does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment
have been definitely established. As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for
fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their
approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance
No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother
ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail. To the
Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such
standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.

The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant
argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the
payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage,
that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor
General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. Hence, it cannot be said that
the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the
reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of
curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act,
Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955,
made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have
noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does
not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

Corona v United Harbor Pilots GR 111953 December 12, 1997


CASE FACTS:
Pursuant to Philippine Ports Authoritys (PPA) power of control, regulation, and supervision of
pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 on March 21, 1985, which
embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports. The said rule provides that it is only after they have achieved satisfactory
performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor
pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness
by the PPA General Manager. Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-
AO No. 04-92 on July 15, 1992. This was implemented by providing therein that all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain
valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts
shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.

Respondents through Capt. Alberto C. Compas questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), but they were informed by then DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative
issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. Compas appealed this ruling
to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.

The OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal/petition. On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and
its implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that PPA-AO 04-92 does not
constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those
affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services. PPA-
AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPAs
jurisdictional area.

Finally, as regards the alleged absence of ample prior consultation before the issuance of the
administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA
to consult with relevant Government agencies. Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the
Secretaries of the DOTC, the DPWH, the DOF, and the DENR, as well as the Director-General of the
NEDA, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector
representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he
concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed
administrative order.

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
trial court rendered the following judgment:
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92
including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Ports Authoritys (PPA) Administrative Order No. 04-92, limiting the term
of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, violates respondents
right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?

RULING:
Yes. The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents right against deprivation of property without due process of law. It is readily apparent that
PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their
compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or
physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance which is conducted only
after the license has already been cancelled. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes
PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-
AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92
is a surplusage and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order
setting forth the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports. It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation,
disciplining and removal of harbor pilots - matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its
implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
struck down.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court
a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Army Navy Club v Court of Appeals GR 110223 April 8, 1997


CASE FACTS:
On January 1983 petitioner and herein respondent entered into a contract of lease for a parcel of
land with an area of 12,705.30 sq. m. located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay, Manila. According
to the contract agreed upon by both parties, herein petitioner should construct a hotel on the land that
was leased upon, wherein such construction should commence within one year and should be completed
within five years upon the turnover of the property. Such improvements made upon the property should
be turned over to the respondent after the lease contract expires. Petitioner should also pay the
respondent a sum total of 250,000 Php annually, that would be equally divided to twelve months, such
sum should be paid to respondent within the first five days of each month without demand. Parties also
agreed to an increase of up to ten percent of the rent for every two years. Petitioner also agreed to pay
for the realty taxes that would be imposed upon the land and its would be improvements and other
necessary fees that would be incurred. Petitioner however failed to construct a hotel on the land that
was leased from petitioner and a building was built instead which eventually became the known building
of the Army Navy Club. Consequently herein petitioner failed to settle the rent that was agreed upon,
along with the realty taxes imposed upon the land and its improvements from 1983 up to May 1989.
Such rental fees has already totaled to an amount of 1,604,166.70, while the tax liabilities has already
reached 3,818,913.81. However, on June 29, 1992 the National Historical Commission the Army and
Navy Club as a historical landmark. Thus an ejectment case was filed with the MTC of Manila which
ruled in favor of herein respondent. Petitioner eventually filed for an appeal with the RTC of Manila which
consequently affirmed the decision of the MTC. Herein petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA, herein
respondent court also affirmed the decision of the MTC and RTC of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the herein respondent courts erred in not recognizing the declaration of the
disputed property as a historical landmark by the National Historical Commission in granting the
ejectment suit fled by the respondent.

RULING:
No,

The court ruled that such recognition does not grant the petitioner a claim of ownership over the
land. For there is no law which states that such recognition awards possessory rights over to the
petitioner. The law merely states that it shall be the policy of state to preserve and protect the important
cultural properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value.
J. Gonzales v NLRC and Ateneo de Davao. GR 125735 August 26, 1999
CASE FACTS:
Sometime in 1991 petitioner was sent a letter dated April 11, 1991 informing her that she has been
charged by two parents for alleged use of corporal punishments on her students. Petitioner questions
the fact that respondent only confronted her about the complaint two years after. On March 31, 1993
petitioner demanded from Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., that she be investigated and that she be formally be
informed of the complaint against her. On June 9, 1993 petitioner had been informed that an investigative
committee had been formed and was furnished of the schedule of hearings, rules of procedure, and
sworn affidavits of the students who testified against her. Petitioner questioned the fact why she wasnt
allowed to be accompanied or represented by a legal counsel, and that she could only be advised by
one. Thus, petitioner declined to take part in the investigation conducted by the said committee.
Subsequently the said committee decided to dismiss herein respondent. Herein respondent decided to
lodge a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC, wherein after trial, Executive Labor Arbiter
Conchita J. Martinez opined that such dismissal was illegal for failure to establish substantial evidence
as to the guilt of the accused. However, the NLRC sustained the dismissal of herein petitioner as valid
and legal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC erred in holding that the said dismissal of the petitioner was valid and
legal, and that such due process was rightfully accorded to herein petitioner.

RULING:
No,

Ample opportunity must have been afforded to the petitioner to defend herself either by herself or
through the assistance of counsel. She must have also been afforded the right to confront the witnesses
against her and to properly know the nature of her offense. Petitioner was denied compliance to these
requisites, which consequently resulted to her, demanding to revise the rules of procedure laid down by
the investigative committee.

Pichay v Office of Deputy Executive Secretary for legal affairs, GR 196425, July 24, 2012

CASE FACTS:
Petitioner sits as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). On April 6, 2011 Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima herein respondent filed before the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD) of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA) a complaint affidavit. IAD-ODESLA now holds the power and duties that were once
delegated upon the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) by virtue of E.O. 13 that was issued by
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. Petitioner along with the other board members of LWUA has been
charged for grave misconduct for the purchase of the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand
Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank. Consequently
petitioner alleges that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, thus he filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 13 Does not violate petitioners right to due process and equal protection
of laws.

RULING:
No,

Petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint that was filed
against him.The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written
explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure
to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,
which simply means having the opportunity to explain ones side. In administrative proceedings, the filing
of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the
opportunity to explain ones side.