Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's
order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition
which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29,
1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License
No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April
25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support
and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while
on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had
been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter
appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to
administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the
sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under
the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent
has no property which is in his possession.

On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is
illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second
marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal
and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is
not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit
terms, thus:

And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37
SCRA 316, 326)

The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the
Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
 Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence
of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the
lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there
being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case
prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and
subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status
of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in
this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court
has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy
ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on
appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5

Hence, this petition.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.

First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal
properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J
contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.

On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during
coverture.

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage
with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not
dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that
Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:

Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to
the courts. . . . 10

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In
granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death
certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there
was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. 15

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code
of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.

B. Article 39.

The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable
marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his
marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision
be modified to read:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that,
even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
 Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean
Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the
declaration that the marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring
the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the
other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack
on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the
marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no
liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be
no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding.
It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the
basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing
the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent
marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision
as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41. 17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the
defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that
"for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the
first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will
warrant dismissal of the same.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same
shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful
craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged,
did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which
case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society.
Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage,
but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the
parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage
license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive.
Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will
result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis
on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
 Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage."
Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis
only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only,"
which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that
private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired
during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed
with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing
to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.

The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved
and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in
bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in
order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom
the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706. March 29, 1995.]
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, Complainant, v. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 20, Manila, Respondent.

DECISION
QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy
Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he
is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not
bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for
him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing
in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his
arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of
the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De
Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges
that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the
same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent
went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a
marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto
can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as
a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations,
14 SCRA 674 [1965]).cralaw

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he
went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad
faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral
and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality
of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial
duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. (Imbing v.
Tiongzon 229 SCRA 690 [19941).cralaw

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage
having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25,
1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend
the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order
dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family
Code.2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein.3 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the
latter action may proceed.6 Its two essential elements are:7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime
have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on
the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is
not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 8 Whether or not the
first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its
nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. 9

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat
it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question.
A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on
the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More
specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years. 11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a
prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it
to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or
fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." 12 [] Hence, parties should not be
permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of
competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the
absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here by analogy since
both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse.16The
contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage
is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. 17 The legality of a marriage is a
matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial
declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If
he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his
evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests
upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be
stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.
Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared
indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a
potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed
above, this cannot be done.1awphi1

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void.19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision
in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with
Criminal Case No. Q98-75611. SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between
private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private
respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.

As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on
March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of
consent of the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein
petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they
also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.

On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his
marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married.
He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April
4, 1979.

Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario,
Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated
August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March
29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact
that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring
his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner
had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.1

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab
initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24,
1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the
appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without
a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we
are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for
himself for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a
competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the
least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.

xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:

1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and
defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;

2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to his
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and

3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court of Appeals
erred:

I.

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF
PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.

II

IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.

III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE
RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.

IV

IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to
shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null
and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The
appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case.
For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish
its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the
provisions of law previously obtaining.5

In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although decided by
the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the
instant case.

xxx

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent
cases of Bobis v. Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage
was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is
clearly required.

Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express
provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.

Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third
marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court
acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the
first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage
is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there
can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to
judge whether a marriage is void or not.

In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of the second wife who
entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of
the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of
the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of
the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. 14

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk
of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void,
since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v.
Paras.16

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a
petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her
previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:18

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner
and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).

In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration,
thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.20 Article 40 of said Code
expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first
wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the
first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),22 the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of
the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44,
48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).23

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero,
(1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant.
On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second
marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of
the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At
that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to
petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do
so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25 the Family
Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate
courts finding that despite private respondents "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could
benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner
married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that
petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation
that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was
the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to
recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to
raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court
from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the
inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and
private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of
the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the
marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might
have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have
tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded
we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own
deceit and perfidy."
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees.1wphi1 Although the appellate court
admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award
moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim. 26

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another
reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her
status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint
for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation
and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the
wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not
common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages
between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. 27There are other remedies.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its
Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of
P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel
Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

April 18, 2016

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the
Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the ground that
respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that
respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for
this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially
reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 4 praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological
incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as
they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision 6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to
Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the
Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his
Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the
fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time
she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied
respondent's demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.

In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage between RENATO
A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish
Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under
Article 41 of the Family Code. 13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January
1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains
that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a
judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were concerned. 15 His motion,
however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and
Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.

In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the
validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in
1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law
since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA
ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA
Resolution22dated 16 September 2009.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in
toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the
Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children
of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must
resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
80,2681,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
paragraph),30 8531and 86.32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is
nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by
legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. 33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil Code contains no express
provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage was
contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of
the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second
marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from
its performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat (
1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered
bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this
requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective
with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no
legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery
and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse
and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an
official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society.
Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.40(Emphases supplied)1wphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial
decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that
those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second
marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife
whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At
that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to
petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do
so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family
Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes
that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void
ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Paraaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and
Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its
decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for
four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did
not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
 The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can
still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and
he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving
the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity
by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted
 that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that
he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did.
At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and
he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go
to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through
proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
 unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it
is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994
is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36
(as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court
of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein
private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where
the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on
Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that
they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but
that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former
only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this
is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages?
In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented
to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage
to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for
divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when
the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his
point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the
lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage,
which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a
voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be
no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to
annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice
Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes
and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances
the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea
in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of
abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
 "On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are
they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes
and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

 1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,
the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed
as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has
been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed,
to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause
of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability
to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The
canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological
defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound
by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition
for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic
Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). 2 Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who
was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985
(Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged
that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his
obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time
engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and
that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually
transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the
duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give
support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their
children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with
him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992. 6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing
the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the
parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no
evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. 8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows: 9

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner,
who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private
respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in
February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.

Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner
provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty
member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products,
as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in
her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other
women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and
betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a
certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in
Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena.
Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent
said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned
petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private
respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in
San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991,
because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement
pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself
and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.

While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing
became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had
relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki";
Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he
cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September
15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up,
as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5,
1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F). 11

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As
a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote
Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then
barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly
spent time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) 13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she
agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias,
Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10,
inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14 was executed in her favor and TCT
No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15 was duly issued.

According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten

letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved
futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney 17 and to divide the
proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to fill a petition
for the annulment of their marriage.

It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had already abandoned
petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since
then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.

Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the
hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent
to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who was her
student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus
friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming
wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private
respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared
happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his
friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual
drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also
confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year
of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their
marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner. 18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: 20
 The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of
her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds
cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code)
not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the
same code reads as follows:

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one year.

xxx xxx xxx

If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as
a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated
circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as
grounds for legal separation.

In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article
46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the "gonorrhea"
transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph
(3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code,
and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground
(fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioner's marriage
with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally
accepted by the Court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision
of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court of Appeals held: 22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a
ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage.
More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-
husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's
character was on the "borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," could not
constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very good
looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to
be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her
respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
 The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is
no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to
constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred

I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID
NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.

II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY

INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD
OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.

IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE

PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00
PER CHILD.

V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS

HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.

The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private respondent's
psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of
incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to
the annulment of their marriage.

Art. 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 23

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
 Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case,
be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they
were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no
evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent
showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's parents and petitioner supported him through college.
After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his
employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private
respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in
philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable,
causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.

However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not
by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not
merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.
As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 27

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the
trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the
marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality. 28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical,
capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions on the issue of
permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of
petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal
separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 184063 January 24, 2011

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is yet another tale of marital woe.

Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decision 1 dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution2 dated
August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The CA affirmed the decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which denied petitioners Petition4 for the annulment of her marriage to respondent
Patricio E. Yambao (respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. 5 On July 11,
2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition6 before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be
declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 7

In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had
been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential
obligations of married life.8

Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took
care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends.
When respondent would find a job, he would not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into several
business ventures, which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever money
would come his way.

Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or
feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew
nothing about children.9 Later, respondent became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see
petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill petitioner, she
decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him. 10 She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded
that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. 11

In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent
job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay
long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were
not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various
economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitioners relatives
since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes.12

Respondent denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no income, he would not have the funds for such
activity. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the amortization of
their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City.

As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that is the duty
of the household help.13
Respondent also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence that he
had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown.14

He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.15

On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that
petitioners evidence failed to support her argument that respondent was totally unaware of and incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations such that the marriage was void from the beginning. The court said that, even as
petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and
the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems. The court
also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived
with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.17

The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility.
However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work was due to his not having obtained a college degree
and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him,
since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.18

The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said
that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the
family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial
burdens passed to her by her husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a supposedly horrible married
life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties with hardly any help from respondent. 19

The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his presence,
companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love,
fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code. 20

Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents overbearing jealousy. It found that
respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that
jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount
to psychological or mental torture on petitioner.21 Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties might have indeed entered
into a bad marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the marriage did not exist, given the 30 years they remained
together through the various ups and downs of their volatile relationship. 22

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on May 21, 2007. 23 Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of
Appeal,24 which was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated June 8, 2007.25 She then appealed to the CA.

In a Decision26 dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that petitioner failed to show
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It pointed out
that respondent exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable
job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered
"psychological incapacity" as contemplated under the law.

The CA also found that petitioners claims that she lived in misery during the marriage and that respondent failed to
keep his promises to her were not duly established. The CA held that the fact that the parties lived together for 35
years and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the
formers psychological incapacity. The CA also held that respondents refusal to care for the children was not
psychological incapacity but "merely constituted refusal to perform the task," which is not equivalent to an incapacity
or inability.27

The appellate court also rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable jealousy. It said that the same
must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. 28 The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced
respondents love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed the
purported threats to kill petitioner as "emotional immaturity" and not psychological incapacity. 29

Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by
sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said,
neither the report nor petitioners testimony established that respondents psychological condition was grave enough
to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was
medically permanent or incurable.30

Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 4, 2008.31

Petitioner is now before this Court in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage to respondent. In her petition
for review, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT
RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS MERELY REFUSING
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED
OR UNABLE

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS UNBEARABLE
JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A CHARACTER TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH,
INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE (sic)32

Petitioner argues that respondents Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently established by her testimony and
that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible considering that they have personal knowledge of the
circumstances prior to and during the parties marriage. On the other hand, respondents evidence consisted merely
of his sole testimony, which were self-serving and full of inconsistencies.33 Petitioner points out that what the CA
characterized as respondents "efforts" in finding jobs were merely the result of short-lived bursts of industry, failing to
note that the jobs were few and very far between. 34 The rest of the time, respondent did nothing but eat, sleep, and
party with his friends.35 Petitioner also alleges that respondent was given the opportunity to finish his studies, first by
his parents, and then by petitioner herself, but he never took up these offers.36

Petitioner also highlighted respondents failure to earn his keep, participate in household chores, or take care of their
children. She argues that respondent had the obligation to help and contribute to all the needs of the family, whether
the same be in the form of material or physical support.37

Petitioner also refutes the CAs conclusion that respondent was merely refusing to attend to his familys needs. She
insists that respondents inability is due to a psychological affliction, i.e., Dependent Personality Disorder, as attested
to by the expert witness she presented during trial.38 Part of this same disorder, according to petitioner, is
respondents jealous tendencies, which the CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity. 39

Finally, petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents laziness and dependence could not be
characterized as inability but just plain refusal. Petitioner contends that she has complied with the guidelines laid
down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the framers of the Family
Code never intended to give such a suppressed definition of psychological incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a
restrictive definition would limit the applicability of the provision. 40 Moreover, she asserts that she has proven that
respondents unbearable jealousy and Dependent Personality Disorder manifested themselves even before the
marriage of the parties, although not in the same degree as when they were already married. 41
The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the
foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.42 Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. 43

While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,44 the Court has reiterated the tenet that the factual
milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of
facts.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,45 the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." 46 What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.47

Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioners evidence establish
respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage?

The Court holds that it does not.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.48 Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated
spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants.49 It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 50

In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was
unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far between
they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success.
Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is
not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many
failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not
merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.51 This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must
refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality.52 It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. 53

That respondent, according to petitioner, "lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility" 54 does not
mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his
business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but
none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality.

Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established
that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
In his psychological report,55 Dr. Tolentino merely said, "[b]ecause ones personality or character is formed early in
life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of inner experience that deviates from the
expectations of the individuals culture,"56 without explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never
explained how the alleged psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.

Likewise militating against petitioners cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same was affirmed by the CA, that
respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the
children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. And still,
as found by the RTC and the CA, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood "without any major
parenting problems."57 Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage is a nullity.1wphi1

Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioners exacting
standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and
strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.

To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful and could have
made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however, does not mean that he is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the marriage null and void.

Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, "marred by bickerings, quarrels, and
recrimination." It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some
going through more rough patches than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage, as
characterized by the former, may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through 35
years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through
their problems.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the
Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February
3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision4 dated October 17, 2000
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S-665 declaring the marriage
of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines 5 (Family Code).

The Facts

Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga
del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda
R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and
January 15, 1972, respectively.7

On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations. In compliance with the Order8 dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public prosecutor
conducted an investigation to determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and found that there was
none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.

In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they were students at the
Barangay High School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in
light of her accidental pregnancy.11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of
age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero sa hantak." When he
decided to join and train with the army,12 Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his
consent.13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and
bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on
January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de
Oro City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma.
Rizza16 and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividads
psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17

For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of
summons.18Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl
T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfos claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.20

In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from
"utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who
abide by established norms of conduct."22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful
cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a
husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of
both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couples union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of
marriage."23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), filed an opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code. 25

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that Natividads
emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that
existed at the time of the parties marriage but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsoss
observation that Natividads condition is incurable since it is deeply rooted within the make-up of her personality.
Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she
was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27

The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividads personality traits constituted
psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert
witness was not conclusive upon the court.28

The CA Ruling

In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividads emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity, "their
degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so
profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations."30

The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution 31 dated February 3, 2006,
hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological
incapacity.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 32 of the Family Code, should refer to no
less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among others,34 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 35 In Santos v.
CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must
be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). 37 The Court laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, 38 whose
salient points are footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court
established in Santos.40

Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. 42 In the same light, the
Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly
failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the petitioner
therein had not established that her husband "showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is
grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of
a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically,
and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature." 44

The Court maintains a similar view in this case.1wphi1 Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient
factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity,
can be equated with psychological incapacity.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not,
however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of
psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of
Natividad's condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently
described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and
even self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report,
also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although
expert opm10ns furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given
considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent
evidence.45 After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to
uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume
her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level
of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically
or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what
has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 46 In the final
analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons,
coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family, 47 the
instant petition is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision
in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after
a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform
some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied
by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the
instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it

is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely
and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument
on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]
DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision [1] as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order [2] dated 21 January 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused
to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation
of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The Facts

On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-
23445 (first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. [3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to
state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on
forum shopping.Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in
Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring
resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for
reconsideration.However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997
an Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that
when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact
solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in
the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of
action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing
the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition
(Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing
the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration
on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on
the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration,
the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the
second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of
forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res
judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal
without prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no
final decision on the merits.

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4]

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Sufficiency of Cause of Action

Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of
action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A complaint states a cause
of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of
the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. [7] The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner
Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract
attached to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana
Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina
Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner
Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-
complied marital obligations in this manner:

xxx

5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or
would play tennis the whole day.

6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child,
respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-
evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further
insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued
that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of
plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.

8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled
to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.

9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner
waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present
time.

10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.

11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity
was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent.

12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and
needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.

xxx.[8]

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.[9] Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the
existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence which establish the material elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family
Code, by defining the term in this wise:

xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.

Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. [14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth
in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the
root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged
psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further,
the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the
petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital
obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules). [15] Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new
Rules provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages

x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis
supplied)

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. [16] The obvious effect of
the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege
the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to
allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the
root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body.
Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The
root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical
manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity.Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative
obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v.
Court of Appeals,[17] the Court held:

In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in
mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the
allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211
SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does
not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v.
Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the
factual averments in the complaint.[18] Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court
could render judgment over the case.

Forum Shopping

Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping
which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-
94.[19] Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-94-

1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding
which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or
agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed. [20]

Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he
had previously commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate
of non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
 The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one
belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such
violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that
the rule of substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a
statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the
petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:

xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis
pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings
considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled
in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is
to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not
also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second
petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-
23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace
between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive
pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal
of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal
order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and
applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.The Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects. [25] In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging
the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve
this issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and
defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges
a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by
a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated
7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the
marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later
lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On
November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money
to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a
copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer.
Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a
motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion
on November 7, 1996.

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the
parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her
evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary
evidence to support her testimony.

On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into
the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.

SO ORDERED.4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of
the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the
 needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly,
such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. 5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage,
and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But
except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent.
He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts
to contact Toshio, to no avail.

The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support"
pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:

But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a
family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other
spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the
upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code? 7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.

Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of
Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines
laid down in the Molina case.10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on
the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the
denial of the instant petition.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital responsibilities.

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them
a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to
the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been
done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the case at
bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person;
it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply
to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007

ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,

vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union,
they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma.
Cecilia, born in 1972.

On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was
granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations.

In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the latter's family; their
marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up their union;
greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with
contempt and without the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started a junk shop business,
Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his business became successful and he was
able to embark upon another business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which also became profitable;
Filipinas then became interested and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, because of her bad
attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her husband got along well with the employees; as
a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of
the business was being given to her husband's relatives; their continued fighting persisted and affected their children;
efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their differences had become irreconcilable and their marriage
impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for
dissolution of their property relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.

In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their
marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an
employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing
their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On
the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.

On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR
NOT RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND
INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A", hereof).

2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL" (p.
7, ibid.).

3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B", hereof).2

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity was defined as:

[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x4

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.5

While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 7 of the Family Code was laid down,
this Court finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
 and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.8

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 9 which
took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.-

xxxx

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing
that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas,
that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the behavior
exhibited by respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following reasons:

First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written evaluation regarding
respondent's psychological makeup:

xxxx

On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where the mother assumed a
more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.

The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-average. Sudden change
overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even minor pressures upset her and when
this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.

In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially with females, she became
(sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her basic feelings of rejection in early life. She coped
(sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her
mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.

At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further rejection. Additionally, she is
threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is consulting a neurologist.

Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol is suffering from some
depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of marital problems. On the other hand,
Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope with the
sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient psychological inner resources. 10

In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:

ATTY. VILLAREAL -

xxxx

Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?

A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her life, she could not function in
the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always been very much in doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.

Q- What about hysterical coloring?

A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological reactions to any stresses, Sir.

Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?

A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the husband talking to some
employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present some tantrums. In short, she cannot control her emotion
at the moment of stresses circulations, Sir.11

When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:

ATTY. RENDOR -
xxxx

Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?

A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a feeling of rejection from the
start of her development and this was carried on into her adult life. When the husband started having some good
relationship with his employees, then she started to get jealous and she would embarrass him in front of their
employees and insulted him and would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr. Tongol, Sir.

ATTY. RENDOR -

Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in such a way?

A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was already rejecting her as a wife
and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.

xxxx

Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol rendered her psychological (sic)
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage. What is your basis in saying that?

A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always gets what she wanted in the
house. In short, she was the authority in the house and during her growing up stage, she was given up to the aunt, for
the aunt to take care of her. She only came back to the family when she was already a sort of an early teenager. With
this, there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality development. Besides, she feels that she is
one of those not favor (sic) by the mother during her growing up stage, Sir.

Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the marriage is concerned,
considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?

A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of them
because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from
some depression, Sir.12

The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always felt
rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even when she became an
adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good
interaction with their employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr. Villegas failed to
link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
her obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to
Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential marital
obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, "to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." What has been established in the
instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of
difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support
for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or
a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.13 As held in Santos:

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.14

Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends that
respondent's exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her
dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her psychological condition. Even granting that
respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that there is no evidence to prove that such condition
is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did
Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent or
incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her
following statement:

I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of them
because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from
some depression, Sir.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychological incapacity as understood
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the
testimonies of both petitioner and respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses' differences and
misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their
business. In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose
solely from their disagreement on how to run their business. 17 This is confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's sister
who lived with the spouses for a considerable period of time. 18 However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. 19

In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code include the
mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family, which means that
compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and expenses of the household.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's marriage as to make the
wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void. In the present case,
respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the family's business and finances and her propensity to
start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of
psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands
and wives.

Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation toward
their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in
performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. 20

It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves.21 It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage.22 It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.23 In the instant case, the Court finds no
error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent
towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought about by their different family backgrounds as well
as their attitudes, which developed after their marriage.

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder.1wphi1 However, the totality of
the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.24 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid." 2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The
conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of
the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage
was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for
their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of
Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would
see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and
was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the
military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged
from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were
already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong
to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x
x."3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume
the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained
in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to
prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." 4

Hence, this Petition.5

Issues

In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."7

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show
such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

xxx xxx xxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the
 illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095."10

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as
a taxi driver.1wphi1

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided
under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements
for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological
incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of
any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close
friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996,
when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman. 3

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him
relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the
boat ticket.4

However, Edwards 80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance
fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to
her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.5

On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she,
20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not
allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave
Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at
their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get
his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. 8

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid
him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. 9

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents,
she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. 10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological
incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and
assist it in the scheduled hearings.13

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the
following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila.
He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married to
and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation
in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is
now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in
the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers
himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield
International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in
the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to
isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its
message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have
not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives.
From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated
because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow
manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping
and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped
to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her,
so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived
at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her
home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their
house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every
now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he
would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of
frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge.
Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when
the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so
many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going
home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform
them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for
counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic]
the home of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would
only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new
life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family.
When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop
harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job,
he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent
stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The
break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test

Draw A Person Test

Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test

Sachs Sentence Completion Test

MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to
their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to
marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too
akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to
that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type
of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen
to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as
she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to
have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the
realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows.
Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In
the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken
marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening
their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and
aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent
that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that
started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that
made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision 16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. 17 The
Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal. 18

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision 19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set
aside the trial courts ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 22 The CA faulted the
lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs
reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution. 24

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25

In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He
posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather
due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP
because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.27

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no
statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported
incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between
the parties is null and void.31

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate
opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to
then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36
in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as

a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages
on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.

Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.

xxxxxxxxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering
an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University,
as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack
of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have
found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:

"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even
comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided
the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate
the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a
valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same
as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least
not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and,
therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony."

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after
the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. 36

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 37 The law is then so designed as
to allow some resiliency in its application.38

Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious
of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second and
third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume
the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal,
example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive
law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different
locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them.
This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the
psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to
give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3
deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal
object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed
towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not
with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act
of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to
marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity
different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which
arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there
sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal
system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still
capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of
a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality].
However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a
person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume
those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent,
rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by
church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object
of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse,
is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the
intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion
that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this
is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain
cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what
marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the
object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would
seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this
tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one
hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually
understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no
difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne,
another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of
consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to
make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes
that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have
no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral
impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies
and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as
moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent
that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of
initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-
centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone
how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony.
Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good
and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are
general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on
the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
"constitutional immorality."

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision.
And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential
obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in
a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility
as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and
experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage
of in order to achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to
the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses
and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the
incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal
relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include
affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual
relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a
grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as
in the defect of the object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the
canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only
when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that
one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is
judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness
would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be
some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit
of some degree of freedom.42

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to
a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the
Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court
and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly,
the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,46 thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as
a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court."48

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too
much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions
for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. 52 The Court should rather be alarmed by
the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court.
First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant,
and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found
both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. 56

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.57

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but
to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on
the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of
one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is
that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered
into."581avvphi1

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise
cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to
suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in
the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not
dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality
disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way
in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an
awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties
in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead
to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus,
some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived
from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-
aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to
lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have
found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and
borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal
fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity
and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for
many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for other
specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term.64

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack
self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At
times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations
imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either
through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are prominent in
business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a
public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described
immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.
1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others being borderline,
histrionic and narcissistic.66

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive
the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand
view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to
blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision
and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009

MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,1 and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they
got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner
was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no
children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.

Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of this,
the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there was collusion between the
parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the
parties.

On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and
submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the States behalf under the supervision
and control of the Solicitor General.

In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally
immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities
and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial
assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and it
was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a
newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no
clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave
him money. Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed.
However, some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents
when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money
he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she confronted him about the matter,
Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that petitioner would stop nagging
him about applying for a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo
was so dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of
his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent
towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never
enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be
enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally,
when petitioner requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents,
Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did
not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993,
Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family. She corroborated petitioners testimony that
Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given
by his mother. This witness also confirmed that it was respondents mother who was paying the rentals for the room
where the couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mothers house in
business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also
stated that respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for
her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent, very responsible, focused and has
direction and ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that
based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.

She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary
way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his
own decisions and dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a
cross-identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondents father
was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but
manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe
because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable
because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.

Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his
commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he
has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of
the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the
wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and
cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital
obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of
respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared
null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.

The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into the
records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3

On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision4 to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was
erroneously typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based
solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was
no showing that the alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were
grave, permanent and incurable.

Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the
psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder existed prior to the marriage and was
grave and incurable. In setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:

The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his
mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.

xxx xxx xxx

Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that respondents supposed psychological malady existed
even before the marriage. Records however show that the parties were living in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage and were living on their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for financial
support may be brought about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers,
considering that it was his wife who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that respondent does
not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have one. However this is not at all a
manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he has a full grasp of reality and
completely understands the implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed. The only problem besetting
the union is respondents alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in
this case to be psychological-rooted.

The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional immaturity which by themselves,
do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events,
petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case
of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca,
356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13,
2007).

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween
petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains VALID. 5 (emphasis ours)

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate
to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality of
evidence presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouses psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code and settled jurisprudence.

We grant the petition.

Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 6 Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric
and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 7

Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. 9 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.11 It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.13

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina,
there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential
trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina
doctrine.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.

First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.

The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal examination of
Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners version of events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon
which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.18 Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was
corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to
elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof.19 Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute
the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witness. 20

Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas
from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice of the family
abode to the couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual
relations and Rodolfos refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his
mother.1avvphi1

These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical
causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of psychology in general and
psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the
psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:

Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be
the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and physically punished, in order to tow the
line. But on the other hand, she developed growing resentments towards her father and promised herself that with the
first opportunity, shell get out of the family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 months after they met,
without really knowing anything about him. Her obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that time and
she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she
came to realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring,
protection, financial support and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder
brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his mothers needs, became an easy prey,
easily engulfed into her system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged and abnormal
dependence to his mother. The mother, being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the
reversal of roles became confusing that led to ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the
boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting.
Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt
feelings of defying the mothers love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so
that his continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and
crippled him psychologically.

Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner,
that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible and is psychologically capacitated to perform
the duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she has difficulty in handling her
considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a parent of the
opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled his psychological functioning
related to sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but became
manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable
in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It
is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustment.21

These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of
which we quote below:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological evaluation?

A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very responsible,
focused, she has direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she wanted, maam, and therefore,
I concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage,
maam.

Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with regards to the
respondent?

A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification
as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings, maam.

Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean by Dependent
Personality Disorder?

A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary way of life are
ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with himself and inability to
make his own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother, maam.

Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?

A: Very much, maam.

Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a husband and as
a father, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological problem?

A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is the dominant
figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family while the father was a seaman
and always out of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive and
passive to the authority of the wife, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of psychological problem
manifested?

A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages in life, maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in
this case, before the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with thethat the manifestation came too
late?

A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses, no
demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college degree of Computer
Science, there is no demand on himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the
decision for him, maam.

Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?

A: Yes maam.

Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?

A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a married person,
maam.

Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?

A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply ingrained into his
personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?

A: It is permanent in nature, sir.

Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as far as the
marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?

A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard expectation is, the
husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual duties of a
husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced
once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that because husband was so closely
attached to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the mothers
 love when they will be having heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to
distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory according
to expectation, maam.22

In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."23

Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce
here for emphasis:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his
commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he
has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of
the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the
wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and
cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital
obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of
respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first
few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos
irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure,
these manifestations of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being
rooted in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CAs reasoning
that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to his embarrassment for failing
to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his "responsible" realization that he
should not have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support
these views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial
court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted
by evidence.

We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was
nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his
abnormal behavior.

In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one
afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital obligations, to wit:

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.24

Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means
an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in
their symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts,
as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring
the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his
own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations
to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself,
much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters
that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his
spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.

At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when it
is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people in a
society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only
developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional
gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material
support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an "autonomous" social
institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In
the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual
love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.

This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial
to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code is proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010

ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, Petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision dated
May 31, 20052 and the resolution dated December 6, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75207.The challenged decision reversed the resolution4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa
City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground
of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The petitioner, at that time,
was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their
meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the
respondents rented room, and soon entered into a common-law relationship.

On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend
Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family was apprehensive about this marriage because of
the nature of the respondents work and because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and
the respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.

On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He
alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she
was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their
house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch
doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.

The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became
"very close" to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them
inside his room several times.

The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was
not medically identified and alleged in the petition.6 The RTC denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.7

In her answer,8 the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained that it was the
petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled
because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took
care of their son at the hospital before he died.

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if collusion existed between the
parties.9 The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001, allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.10 The
petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that the respondent was carefree,
irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what she wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling;
refused to do household chores; refused to take care of him and their children; and consulted a witch doctor in order
to bring bad luck upon him.

The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick child, which led to the latters death. The
petitioner further stated that the respondent became very close to a male border of their house; he discovered their
love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.

The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent refused to change; he loves his
children and does not want their children to be affected by their mothers conduct. He intimated that he might remarry
if it would benefit their children.

Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract (Exh. "B")11and
the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. "A")12 of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.

In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the psychological report and the mental
status examination, Enrique is found to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He
coped with Erlindas selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed what she failed to do for the family.
He patiently tried to understand her and exerted every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect to
the family. Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the family. He engaged in other
business endeavors aside from his employment as he maintained to be financially productive.

The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. She manifested inflexible
maladaptive behavior even at the time before their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and uncaring who did
things her way without regard to the feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who selfishly ignored and
neglected her role as daughter to her parents as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a
young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room for herself and allowed Enrique to sleep
with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and after marriage and she maintained to be so with her
children. She abandoned and relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She never stayed long in their house
despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the death of one of
their children. Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a daughter who is presently manifesting behavioral
problem. She kept secrets as she never allowed her husband and children know where she stays when shes not at
work. She falsified documents as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden surname in her present
employment. She is having illicit affairs and is reported to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire to
bring bad fate and death to Enrique through her consultation with a "mangkukulam" point out her lack of care, love,
and respect to Enrique.

Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support to her family.

The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She has
been having this disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed
psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.

In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as Enrique underwent.13

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision of April 26, 2002. It saw merit in the
petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report, and concluded that:

Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor show that Respondent is indeed
suffering from "Mixed Personality Disorder" that render her incapable of complying with her marital obligations.
Respondents refusal to commit herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with Petitioner,
preferring to be with her lover and finally abandoning their home for a lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that
she was never prepared for marital commitment in the first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted from her family
upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good of society and of the parties themselves, it is best that this
marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it
never took place at all. The Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar, National Census and
Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby requested to make the necessary correction of the civil record
of the marriage between the parties and on their respective civil status.

The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY
AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate children.

It is SO ORDERED.14

The CA Decision

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The
CA, in its decision15 dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.

The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondents personality disorder
was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled
that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the respondents disorder had no definite treatment because he did not
subject her to a mental assessment.

The CA added that the "psychiatric remarks" in the Report were nothing but a showcase of respondents character
flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent
from accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give
rise to a legal separation suit.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution of December 6, 2005. 16

The Petition and Issues

The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling, based on
the following arguments:

I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]

II. THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]

III. THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR NOT
HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE RESPONDENT[; and]

IV. THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN SATISIFIED[.]

The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage,
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

The totality of evidence presented

failed to establish the respondents

psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "[a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization." It introduced the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage,
although this concept eludes exact definition.

The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not
involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision
committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage
but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."17

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."19 It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in
Republic v. Court of Appeals20 (the Molina case) where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v.
Marcos,21further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.

A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,22 declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into
and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect
to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into
question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.

Ting v. Velez-Ting23 and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo24 squarely met the issue and laid to rest any
question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far
from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo
that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity.

Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence insufficient to prove the
respondents psychological incapacity.

a. Petitioners court testimony

For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony that essentially confirmed what the
petition alleged:

Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with children, and how many?

A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.

Q: Where are they now?

A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the neglect and fault of my said wife who
abandone[d] him at the time of his illness.

Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?

A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.

Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?

A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and used to impose what she wanted to get, she
refused to do household chores, like cooking, caring for the husband and children, used to stay from the conjugal
dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and lately fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]

At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to be very close to a male renter in the ground floor
of their house and caught them several times alone in his room, thus explaining the reason why she refused to have
sex since 1993, up to and until the present time.

Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult "mangkukulam" to bring bad fate against the family and death for
me.

Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?

A: I gave her but she refused to reform.

xxxx

Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?

A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to change for the sake of our family. 25

These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioners testimony on the respondents
supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the petitioners theory that the
respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital
obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations
that characterize some marriages.26 The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders existing at the time of the marriage clearly demonstrating an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 27 The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 28

In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a
disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had
some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details
necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner
failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady was
incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners
declarations that the respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and "refused to reform" are
insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code.

In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown.

b. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report

The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally
evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to
"undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent."30 Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the
petitioner, the parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the
information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioners
own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition.
The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. 31

We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory.
We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be
personally examined by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.32 If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit.33 No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.

In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents condition by stating that
the respondent manifested "inflexible maladaptive behavior" before marriage, pointing out how the respondent
behaved before the marriage the respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and
allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish
that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed to elucidate
on the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for example, why she "defied her parents" and
decided to live alone; why she "neglected her obligations as a daughter;" and why she often slept with the petitioner.
This is an area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the respondent,
could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was gathered in this case. In the absence of such
evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondents so-
called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.

Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondents
condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by
third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the
"Background History" portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent employed
one of her siblings to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting the familys earnings; belittled the
petitioners income; continued her studies despite the petitioners disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became
"close" to a male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan;
threatened to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored their children; used her maiden name at
work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement
that "Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support to the
family,"34 there was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the respondents condition, why and to
what extent the disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in marriage. There
was likewise no showing of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively
incapacitated the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws
mentioned above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondents negative behavioral traits
without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as
the claim that the respondent refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner,
but these claims were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the
Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that antedated or
existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the respondent abandoned her sick child which
eventually led to the latters death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and
corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioners own questionable traits his flirtatious nature before marriage and
his admission that he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time he got jealous were not pursued. From
this perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the
respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of
seriousness of her condition.1avvphi1

The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the
respondents personality disorder had "no definite treatment." It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality
disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent
exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite
treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to support its
findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the respondents perceived behavioral defects,
and then associated these traits with mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not
called on the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
It would have aided petitioners cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.

Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.35 Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by
the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are
grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.

The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation The
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. We stress
that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital
obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The
State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should be available in this country. Neither
should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.36 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a
marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011

ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner,
vs.
MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioners prayer that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but initially,
petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each
other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though
petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioners other relationship and demanded more
time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love, time
and attention.

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor
Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison
and their marriage was blessed with five children.

As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common
occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels
increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became
worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner
gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it also became another
cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.

Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned
about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels
aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded
by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted
and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer,
petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and
respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to
Islam after dating several women.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition 4 for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
responsibilities of marital life.

In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm
life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His
father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioners
mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel
so he would be noticed.

Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined. He
rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President and
Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child
lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report 5 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist
from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial
Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is
rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-
absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners
psychological incapacity.

Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioners
psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she
give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court
emphasized that the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision.

Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly proven and
correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr.
Tayag and quotes the latters findings:

Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that he [has].
This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies,
violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his claim
for a much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, emotional
instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and changes. Changes must
come from within, it is not purely external.

Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial Personality
Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.

The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even before the
said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep feelings of
rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention.
Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the
relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological incapacity. 7

According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychological
incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover,
petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on
the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags findings. Also, petitioner maintains that the
psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because of irreconcilable differences between
the spouses, but due to petitioners personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his marital
obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to live under a "non-
existent marriage."

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment8 maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological
incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that
petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his
claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and
respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG argues
that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially
deviant person.

Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological incapacity,
the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioners psychologist was insufficient
and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to
some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be his general
dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities." These, however, do not constitute psychological incapacity.

Respondent also filed her Comment9 and Memorandum10 stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

The appeal has no merit.

The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual
bases.

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. 11 These are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she has contracted.12 Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.13

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36.
The Court held,

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
 (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition.

In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to
establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are
insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception
of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of
petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that
petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that
petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,15 the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to
declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags evaluation which became
the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly
specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there
was no established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.16

For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles17 and differences in handling finances and managing their business
affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which
may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they
had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage
and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal differences
do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons
why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful
as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal
history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a
psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned
of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of
a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held
in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity.18 It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.19 That not being the case with
petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that
the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 21

All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting.
The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his
essential marital obligations.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,

vs.
VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
82238.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have
two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In
addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of
the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to wit:

x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing and
complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of
the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of
drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust
towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited
arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even
in the presence of their children.

Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very
quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom
was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to
gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely.
Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential
obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological
aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was
evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their
marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality
disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. 5
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition
failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order7 denying petitioners motion.

On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an
Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the
allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:

A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198),
otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of
juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of
psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph
10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a
cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in turn,
will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court
finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail.
Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are
sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity. 9

On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari10 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the
existence of a sufficient cause of action.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE
THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY
TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY
REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this
present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-1013 prohibits the filing
of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the
arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases
involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.15

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements,
particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is
dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.16

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient to
support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the
petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in
the petition.17

First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and
alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner
and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a
competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a
disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers
from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the
petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the
Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital
obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that
the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and
that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6
and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to
ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate
a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must
be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 18 It would thus
be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the
evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert
witnesses presented by the parties.

Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It
must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 19 Even assuming arguendo that this
Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient and that the
RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal
and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 20

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an
interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to
dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse
decision, appeal the decision in due time.21 The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his
petition for certiorari in the CA.22

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between
respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a marriage on the ground
that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.

Antecedents

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her second
miscarriage.3

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,4 citing Catalinas psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but
prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. 5 After
conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and
Catalina.6

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with
him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by
gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home
in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a
psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of
Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalinas disorder was mainly
characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.9

Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, 10 whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardos consent and flirting with different men. She
insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence
because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is
hereby rendered:
 1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.

2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of the parties from
the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her
incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. It held that considering that the matter of determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated
was best left to experts like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best
evidence of Catalinas psychological incapacity.13

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT
CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO
EXIST.

On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that
Eduardo proved Catalinas psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not
have known her marital obligations;" and that Catalinas psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.

Issue

In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because:

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINAS ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE
THEY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

III

ABANDONMENT OF ONES FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.

IV

GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO

ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINAS INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE
INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.14
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down
by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);15 and that Catalinas refusal to do household chores, and her
failure to take care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting
the declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her
marital obligations.

The OSG further argues that Catalinas infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home were not
grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred
prior to the marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the
Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalinas psychological
incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalinas past life, attitudes, habits and
character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root
cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties
inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-
appearance in the trial.

The OSG postulated that Catalinas unsupportive in-laws and Eduardos overseas deployment that had required him
to be away most of the time created the strain in the couples relationship and forced her to seek her friends
emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to
her inability to bear children of her own.

Issue

The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalinas marriage to
Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling

We grant the petition for review.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a
married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.16

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the
Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the
confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we
then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, 18 viz:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x
x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
 xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. x x x.19

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases
grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations.20 Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during
trial,21making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 22

Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the gravity and severity of
Catalinas psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage. 23

We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the
gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their
appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without
Eduardos consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling),
were not even established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At
best, his testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that
was submitted to a court of law.

Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr.
Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalinas psychological incapacity. In
particular, they relied on the following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in several aspects of
the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what
is expected in a relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not
have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to as they might
end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for their
wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to
the detriment of their own lives and that of their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern of
traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required in marriage. It is expected that even
with future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the background of
the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as such.

xxxx

With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being
concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude
before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering her
psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina
miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in
marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will still change because
her traits have developed through the years and already ingrained within her.24

Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas supposed
psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the
report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality
disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have
brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalinas various acts or
omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her
behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina
was childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having
already reached an age "beyond maturity."25

Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 26 We
have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating:

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by
separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a
basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.28

But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons,
aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the
marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary
support for the conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalinas psychological incapacity to perform her
marital duties.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of
Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged
borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly
pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 29

What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalinas immaturity and apparent refusal to
perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. 30 To rule
that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were
manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity. 31

Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations, viz:

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an
adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal
home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the
Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under
Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity
was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her
infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based
on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in
order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part, 34 to wit:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG

Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de
Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is no longer attending and
represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?

A No, sir.

Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this case
you filed against her, is it not?

A No, sir. I did not.

Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this case?

A None, sir.

Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell
us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?

A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.

Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?

A Yes, sir.

Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?

A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of marriage which you filed
against her?

A She does not opposed [sic], sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of your conjugal
properties?

A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not
pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against her, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no longer around here?

A Yes sir, it could be.35

Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo.1wphi1 To
recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but
she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The
probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also
to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage
should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 36

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36
of the Family Code for lack of merit.

Costs to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of
legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were
not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result.
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that
could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent
during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that
respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but
it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of
NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state
that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when
they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment
and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second
elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The
trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did
not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its
December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what
constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three
expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated
to perform their respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the
party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its
meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the
Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision
Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less
specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." 4 Illustrative of the "less
specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of
psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of
ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law. 5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage
have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently
of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, althoughits manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
 Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence whatis
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code
must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according
to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court."10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of
experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-
depth diagnosis by experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a partys psychological incapacity
should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other
evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court
are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself
from substituting its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court
and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage
as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto
a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the
sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more
strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position and role of the
trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but
should be accorded due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioners version
of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of
the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological
incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions
reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual premises.17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioners testimony, as well as on her interviews of
the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such
circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the
issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the
issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se
invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos 19 that there is no requirement for
one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important
is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to."20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result
from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an
aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation. 21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay
that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and
technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her
psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties upbringing and psychodynamics. 23 In that context, Dr. Gates
expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the
expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondents own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent
tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondents psychological data, Dr.
Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although she
likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but she may not be
that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain
distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways.
She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit
lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-
dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test 26 conducted on the
respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to
wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several scores
wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as
acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84. 27

It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the
respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates
relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less,
could you please tell me in more laymans terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-centered
or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a
vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the
breadwinners role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against
the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena
Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena
Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother
because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in
her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a
script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, lets say some kind of deprivation, there is a
tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was
not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of
fourteen already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of
Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this.
In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention,
this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather
in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the
reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative
value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and
Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healys expert
testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by
canonical thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity
adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondents level of immaturity and irresponsibility with
regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you
read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility
with regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested running
through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and
then her being a model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of
prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an
obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the relationship of the
respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher children. She
had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with friends. They were the
priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for granted.
The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated to the marriage
withher. Its the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the
myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her
own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
 xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism afflicting
respondent, it is grave, slight or .?

A : I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations which she
has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at the time or
marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you dont develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the
marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you show
that you dont accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you dont care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she
was a model at Hyatt and then Rustans, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority in her
life. Its her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting such
fundamental obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?

A : Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation. Say,
almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her
job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the
family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the
pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healys opinions and findings commanded
respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties
psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the
malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical
insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard
his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the
cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but
to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
`other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on
the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of
one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that
at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's
failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise
cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in
Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much
regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions
for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the
rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial
to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that
could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the
duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such
duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong
sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life,
particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw 37
the parties eldest son in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been
hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parents separation, do you remember any habit or activity or practice which
your mother engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I cant remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I cant

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuzwe would go to my aunts house in White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch
then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought
you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess shed go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article
220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example,
and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-
reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the
duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental
to their health, studies and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that
both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the
respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from
psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:

ATTY. BRETAA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper of the
petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were together, that
they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because
she is also dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those
kinds of problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr.
Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking of
marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he was not
also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger
years he was often out seeking other women. Im referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the
thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is,
is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he
was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, its difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?

A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to
perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to
Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and that
the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the
defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless
of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already accepted and
come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond
repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own
children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them
and their children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.1wphi1 It is not, in effect,
directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit
relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied
by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is
legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes psychological incapacity to perform
an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent
was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not
hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude
striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV
need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed
State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring
the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to
the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015

GLENN VIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
MARY GRACE PAREL-VIAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage between
Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Vifias (Mary Grace) as null and void.

Antecedents

On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa
City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and
malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infants death was caused by Mary Graces heavy drinking and smoking
during her pregnancy.

The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.

Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out
that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged
that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able
to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was
pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking.
According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship. 6

Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she delivered. She
lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husbands needs. She was self-centered, selfish and immature.
When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left their home without
informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas employment in Dubai. 7

Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the
latters friends. They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left to be cared for by her
aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in
adjusting to married life.8

To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological
evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his marital
roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship." 9

On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Graces personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and
his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college.

Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her
father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report,
Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with another man.10
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the couples fights. Mary
Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.11

Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr.
Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenns relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment
and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couples
marriage.12

In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:

The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic in proportion
and is incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her system as it was
found to have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible,
maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.

Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along
with her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted her perceptions and views
especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting
apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened
sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that
most of the time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay close attention to what her husband needed.
She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too
considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her
friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present time. x
x x.

The root cause of [Mary Graces]personality aberration can be said to have emanated from the various forms of
unfavorable factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial stage in the life of a
person as thisis the time when the individuals character and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a
dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their children.
Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who
were supposed to bethe first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as she was
not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from her caregivers and also because she
grew up to be the eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards to making
decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of morality
[and] has certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals
and values were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself
from doing ill-advised things even if she isamply aware of the depravity of her actions.

The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already inher system even prior to
the solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining ours)

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace. Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana Rosita. 14 Mary Grace
filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.

During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito
described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn, who is
conservative and preoccupied with his work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological
report dated December 29, 2008.

Ruling of the RTC

On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null
and void on account of the latters psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as grounds:

The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the petition. Reconciliation between the
parties under the circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond between them
be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a
Narcissistic Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn]
and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter
where to go. x x x Had it not for the insistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his wife. The law
provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x
For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on what it really means. x x x.

From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic marital obligations
of mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage saved but [Mary Grace]
did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital obligations.

The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak
on the subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to gather sufficient data and
information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her
personality make-up, so grave and so permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal
incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested
after. It has become grave, permanent and incurable.17 (Underlining ours and italics in the original)

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order18dated
December 1, 2010.

The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA

On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers
from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC
decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Graces disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and
merely relied on Dr. Tayags statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Graces condition. The RTC
resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions sansdetails. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is
downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the grant of Glenns petition. Mary
Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a psychological illness. 19

Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSGs appeal.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the
marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons below:

In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, asso expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which
made her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged that she refused to
communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our mind, the above
actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of psychological incapacity on her part.

While it is true that [Glenns] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a
psychological examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was conducted only on him and no evidence was
shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability.

Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in determining the psychological incapacity of a
person as she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the psychological condition of the couple, she
being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she makea conclusion
as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence,
the information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving. Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root
causeof the spouses psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriageand shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in
Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly
be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish the root cause of the psychological
incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court
on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b)
alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.

Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this
to say:

"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,]
nevertheless[,] suchroot cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists."

The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves". It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party evenbefore the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume." Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.

From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn]
to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.

Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. 20 (Citations omitted,
underlining ours and emphasis and italics in the original)

The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration22filed
by Glenn.

Issue

Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the
RTCs declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.

In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged
according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge
should pains takingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.23 Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non
requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage
could be declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be
considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses
should be respected.27
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration
are mere reiterations of the matters already resolved by the CA.28

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition lacks merit.

The lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily
fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to."29

In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary
evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Graces condition. The
evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores.
Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines
of communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is
conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess
incompatible personalities, the latters acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v.
Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:

In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown and was not shown in this
cited case.

In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but
it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondents act of living with
another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially
when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact,
petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after
their marriage; their problems only came in later.

x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations.
Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is
different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness
that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the original)

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006.
The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary
Graces departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to
comply with her obligation to live with her husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to
present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the formers condition.
Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenns testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is
a blood relative of Glenn. Glenns statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to
Mary Graces traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof on the
antecedence of Mary Graces alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they
saw each other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayags assessment of Mary Graces condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded.1wphi1 Rumbaua34provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological incapacity were based on
the information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does notdisqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and
conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctors probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners narrations, and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around
him"; and who "used love as adeceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." x x
x.

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that
a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondents narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayags conclusion in her Report i.e., that the
respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be
grave and incurable" is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and
portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondents condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondents psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

xxxx

A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were
married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain howshe came to the conclusion
that respondents condition was grave and incurable. x x x

xxxx

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition except in a very
general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most
notably on how the respondent can besaid to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what
extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the
effects of the disorder on the respondents awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities
of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioners case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner
related toher. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears on record
to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondents early life and associations, and about events
on orabout the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be no
more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all
slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because
only the baser qualities of the respondents life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed
and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through
studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention
also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondents family
opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this
allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of
psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital
developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x x x. 35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)

In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Graces status as the eldest among her siblings, 36her
fathers being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife. 37 These, however, are not
sufficient to establish and explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration of
the nullity of the couples marriage.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the
antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying
with what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenns marital woes, the totality of the evidence
presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenns spouse.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

February 24, 2016

G.R. No. 209180

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209253

OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Petitioner,

vs.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions1 for review on certiorari assailing the Decision2 dated March 21, 2013 and
the Resolution3 dated September 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated November 5, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 225 (RTC Branch 225)
in Civil Case No. Q-98-34627 declaring the marriage of Reghis M. Romero II (Reghis) and Olivia Lagman Romero
(Olivia) null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 5 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code), as amended.

The Facts

Reghis and Olivia were married6 on May 11, 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San Juan City and were blessed
with two (2) children, namely, Michael and Nathaniel, born in 1973 and 1975, 7 respectively. The couple first met in
Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis helped Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then,
Reghis developed a closeness with Olivias family, especially with the latters parents who tried to play matchmakers
for Reghis and Olivia. In the desire to please Olivias parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they became
sweethearts.8

Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his
siblings and parents. Thus, less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt
that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Olivia, however, refused
to end their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latters dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and,
instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory. The next day, Reghis
brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between them the previous night, Olivias parents believed that they
had eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage as he was
unemployed and still unprepared. However, Olivias parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and
would support them until they are financially able. As Olivias parents had treated him with nothing but kindness,
Reghis agreed.9

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could
not forgive Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented her condescending attitude towards him. They became
even more estranged when Reghis secured a job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career
and focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family, causing Olivia to
complain that Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways. 10

On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage11 before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 94,12 docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-34627, citing his psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations.13 In support of his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the
desire to please the latters parents who were kind and accommodating to him. Reghis further maintained that he was
not prepared to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time, as his mind was geared towards finishing his
studies and finding employment to support his parents and siblings. 14 He also added that Olivia is in a relationship
with a certain Eddie Garcia (Mr. Garcia) but he (Reghis) has no ill-feelings towards Mr. Garcia, as he and Olivia have
been separated for a long time.15

Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a clinical psychologist, who submitted a
Psychological Evaluation Report16 dated April 28, 1998 and testified that Reghis suffered from Obsessive Compulsive
Personality Disorder (OCPD).17 According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for
whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as those
pertaining to his roles as father and husband. Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis OCPD was the root of the couples
disagreements and that the same is incurable, explaining too that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was
farthest from his mind at the time and, as such, felt cheated into marriage. 18

For her part,19 Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations
before, at the time, and after the celebration of their marriage. She also averred that the petition is barred by res
judicata inasmuch as Reghis had previously filed petitions for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the
ground the she is allegedly psychologically incapacitated, but said petitions were dismissed.20 Olivia, however, was
unable to present evidence due to the absence of her counsel which was considered by the RTC as waiver of her
right to present evidence.21

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the
petition.22

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision23 dated November 5, 2008, the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis
and Olivia null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.24 It relied on the findings and testimony of
Dr. Basilio, holding that Reghis suffered from a disorder that rendered him unable to perform the obligations of love,
respect and fidelity towards Olivia as it gave him a strong obsession to succeed in his career, to the exclusion of his
responsibilities as a father and husband. It also concurred with Dr. Basilios observation that Reghis is still deeply
attached to his parents and siblings such that he pursues his business ventures for their benefit. Likewise, it agreed
that Reghis behavioral disorder existed even before his marriage or even his adolescent years and that the same is
incurable.25

Anent the issue of res judicata, the RTC remarked that there is no identity of causes of action between the petitions
previously filed, which ascribed psychological incapacity on Olivias part, and the present case which is brought on the
ground of Reghis own psychological incapacity. 26

The Republic and Olivia moved for reconsideration,27 which was, however, denied by the RTC in a Resolution28dated
July 3, 2009. Undaunted, both appealed29 to the CA. 30

The CA Ruling

In a Decision31 dated March 21, 2013, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC, holding that the OCPD from which
Reghis suffered made him yearn for professional advancement and rendered him obligated to support his parents and
siblings, at the expense of his marital and filial duties. It ruled that Reghis condition amounts to psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code as it is permanent in nature and incurable. It
observed that Reghis OCPD started early in his psychological development and is now so deeply ingrained in his
structure and, thus, incurable because people who suffer from it are of the belief that nothing is wrong with them. It
further concluded that Reghis condition is severe considering that it interrupted and interfered with his normal
functioning and rendered him unable to assume the essential marital obligations.

The Republics and Olivias respective motions for reconsideration32 were denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated
September 12, 2013.

The Proceedings Before the Court

On November 19, 2013, the Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari34 before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
209180, where it maintained that Reghis has not established that his alleged psychological incapacity is grave, has
juridical antecedence, and is incurable. It averred that the psychological report prepared and submitted by Dr. Basilio
has no factual basis to support the conclusions found therein as she failed to describe in detail the "pattern of
behavior" showing that Reghis indeed suffered from OCPD. The Republic also claimed that the methodology
employed in evaluating Reghis condition is not comprehensive enough 35 and that based on Reghis own testimony,
he was able to perform his marital obligations as he lived together with Olivia for years and attended to his duties to
their children.36 It pointed out that Reghis condition was not shown to have existed before their marriage and that the
same is incurable.37

On November 13, 2013, a separate petition for review on certiorari,38 docketed as G.R. No. 209253 was filed by
Olivia. Like the Republic, she pointed out that Reghis himself admitted knowing his marital obligations as husband to
Olivia and father to their children.39 Olivia added that if Reghis indeed felt that he was being forced into the marriage,
he could have simply abandoned her then or refused to take his vows on their wedding day. 40

In a Resolution41 dated February 17, 2014, the Court consolidated the present petitions.

The Issue Before the Court

The lone issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs declaration of nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petitions.

The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and
marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.42 Thus, it has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a
ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.43 It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.44

Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality
disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases.45 Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological
incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.46

In Republic v. CA,47 the Court laid down definitive guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Among others, it clarified that the illness must be grave enough to bring about the incapacity or inability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage such that "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.48

After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not
concur.1wphi1As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis testimony shows that he was able to comply with his
marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part.
Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both
of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Paraaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take
care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to
them.49 That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latters parents, does not mean that Reghis
is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Albios,50 the Court held
that:

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life
that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy
and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical antecedence. Other than
Dr. Basilios conclusion that Reghis "behavioral disorder x x x existed even prior to the marriage or even during his
adolescent years,"52 no specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years were shown which would explain his
behavior during his marriage with Olivia. Simply put, Dr. Basilios medical report did not establish that Reghis
incapacity existed long before he entered into marriage.

In like manner, Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis disorder is incurable but failed to explain how she came to
such conclusion. Based on the appreciation of the RTC, Dr. Basilio did not discuss the concept of OCPD, its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this
disorder in order to create a necessary inference that Reghis condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. To
the Courts mind, this is a glaring deficiency that should have prompted the RTC and the CA to be more circumspect
and critical in the assessment and appreciation of Dr. Basilios testimony.

Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie.53 After all, marriage is an inviolable institution protected
by the State. Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence
presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties. 54

The Court is not unaware of the rule that factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this
Court. However, this principle does not apply when such findings go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the
admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,55 such as in the case at bar.

The Court can only commiserate with the parties plight as their marriage may have failed. It must be reiterated,
however, that the remedy is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.56Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;57 rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright
incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 58 Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity
within the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie. 59

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated
September 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as amended, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

February 15, 2017

G.R. No. 222541

RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner

vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed the
Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891
declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.6

The Facts

Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party
in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they became romantically involved.8

Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly
provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named
Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the
Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9

In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since,
only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and
lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.10

In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In
support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his
duties as husband and father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the
shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation
expenses of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to
leave Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle of
the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to
perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair
which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly),
stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito."12 Another text message
read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together
with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she
claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.13

Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their
marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.14

Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15 and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which
corroborated her allegations, as well as the testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the
Psychological Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on
her interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD)
characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking
attitude that catered only to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it
comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.19

For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of
his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for his family's financial and
emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that
although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their
first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate
through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her
family the financial aid that they need so long as she would not sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged
extra-marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino
Rigos to support his allegations.21

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes with
his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his actions,
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against him.23

Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering of their money on vices,
violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent psychological condition that incapacitates him
to perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be considered as grounds for legal separation
under Article 5525 of the same code.26

The CA Ruling

In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence
Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek
employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were
not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible,
insensitive, or emotionally immature which nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that the law
requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating
nature, and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation
between Jose's "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent
psychological malady, on the other. Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered a
general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder. 30

Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution32 dated December 1,
2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
psychological incapacity.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution,33 and marriage as
the foundation of the family.34 Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage
under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.36 It should
refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as
provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code, among others,38 include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. 39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.40

In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 42 The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted below,44 that incorporated the basic requirements
the Court established in Santos.

Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. 45 The evidence need
not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the
spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at
or about the time of the marriage.46 In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application calls for
a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.47 To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid
down: gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.

Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could
not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely
due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.49 In Taring v. Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal,
or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of
the Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning
spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v. Encelan,53 Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a
few, and thus dismissed their petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.

The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity
amount to psychological incapacity.

Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking
sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and
as a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4)
engaged in an extra-marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions.
Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other
hand, simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to
conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded within his
adaptive systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component of his life [and]
[t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form of intervention."56

It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as
grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing
psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers
from, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder
or how and to what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that
Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report
specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to
understand and comply with his marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a
"deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological
incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating the
marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the
marriage.

Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already
existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness
personally examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence
are presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters. 57 Considering that her Report was based solely
on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more
rigid and stringent standards which the RTC failed to apply.

In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification
of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. 58 There must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be
linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.59

A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is
not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context
of Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 1,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the
October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual
Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his
family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi
Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly
left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated.
On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home
because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home.10He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he
learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the
National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major
psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-
workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad
signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA originally18 set aside the RTCs verdict, finding that Lolitas abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and
infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply
with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only
a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CAs decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside
its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTCs decision. In its amended decision,20 the CA
found two circumstances indicative of Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolitas willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG then filed the present petition.

The Petition

The OSG argues that Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering
from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and
abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolitas infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and
incurable psychological incapacity.

The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The Courts Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolitas

psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the
dates when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely
mentioned in passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No
evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were
manifestations of any psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our
mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a
wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from
human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be
compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores
prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar
abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by
facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolitas psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.1wphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.32 It
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to
the time of the marriage.

Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her marriage with
respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.

Antecedents

Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea.
They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in college she, at
Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business management course. After a month of
courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom
they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay
City on June 24, 1991,2 after which they moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for
support.

When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioners best friend to settle the
hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college course
in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the familys needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in
1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the
fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their childs
educational needs).

On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from college before he
started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales
commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and
their childs schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she
discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication
between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual
relationship.4

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to
issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars insurance coverage. She soon found out,
however, that the checks were not paid for the cars insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she
also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost
of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging
to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he
was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that
he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister
themselves.5

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time and space
to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit
suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with
Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) opposed the petition.

Ruling of the RTC

In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and
Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.

On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity,6 holding
in part:

xxx. The result of Dr. Samsons clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued
together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible
individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also
believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to
respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was found to have a
personality that can be characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present
time are mere extensions of his misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of separations
and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.

She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as a husband and
father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and lack of true
remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.7

The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability,
as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant, establishing Dominics psychological
incapacity, viz:

Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life
and work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide
support to his wife and child. Ever since the start of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns
and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued
even when he finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had
the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondents propensity to
borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often
than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.

Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondents personality disorder and it was
only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondents behavioral equilibrium
started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct
in childhood which generally attributable to respondents childhood experiences of separation and emotional
deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and
influence of the environment although its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.

Incurability Respondents personality disorder having existed in him long before he contracted marriage with
petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper outlook,
disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way by
which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be a mockery and brought
pain and dishonor to petitioner.9

Ruling of the CA

The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominics personality traits either
constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive
upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties separation had been their frequent quarrels over
financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic.10

On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.11 Specifically, it
refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioners expert witness, holding:

It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondents condition, assuming it is serious enough,
was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although petitioners expert witness concluded that
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by
such finding, in view of the fact that the witness findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of
information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already head
strong in her resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings against
respondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson.12

The CA held the testimonies of petitioners witnesses insufficient to establish Dominics psychological affliction
to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements
in Republic v. Dagdag,13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v. Pesca,15 the CA observed:

In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his
dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of
psychological incapacity. A persons inability to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his
misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not
necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.

Even the respondents alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological incapacity,
although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal
separation provided the respondent is convicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than
six (6) years.16

Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

Issues

Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had
presented in the trial of the case, and the CAs reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and
Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more than
complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995,
240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No.
136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or psychological examination was
not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

We consider the CAs refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and
warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she
admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert
witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric
evaluation by petitioners expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings
and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial
descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.

Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to verify the
facts derived from petitioner about Dominics psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she harbored
towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom
petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:

Fiscal Zalameda

Q: So youre saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time you interviewed?

A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.

Q: How about during the subsequent interview?

A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital problems
which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition herself regarding her problems,
Sir.

Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?

A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.

Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned, would you say
that the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the respondent?

A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.

Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the petitioner,
Madame Witness?

A: Yes, Sir.17

In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samsons
findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly
given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the establishment of Dominics
psychological incapacity.

The CAs reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.

In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband."18 But here, the
experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his
psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report
but simply relied on other peoples recollection and opinion for that purpose.

In Hernandez, we ruminated that:

xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.19

but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological
incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.

The Court in Pesca observed that:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make
out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.20

Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical experts testimony
alone that was crucial but rather petitioners failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the
existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence
proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has
reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight
to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Petitioners view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity22 is not
entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as follows:

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be
dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.

But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the
opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not
to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not
solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
their proceedings.23

We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage.

We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and
support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for
nullification of marriage, a persons psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter
incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations
between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions
indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His
alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a
medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not
equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses
manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no
longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be deemed to have become
functus officio if not totally disregarded.25

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG
were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all
stages of the proceedings, to wit:

a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of
the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof
of such service within the same period.26

b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the
date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum
if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without
leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.27

c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of
the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.28

d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
1wphi 1

judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.29
 e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal
within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall
serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.30

The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity
of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor
of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the
meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
on March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
NESTOR GALANG, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), challenging
the decision2 dated November 25, 2004 and the resolution3 dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision affirmed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void
on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the
respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at
the Clark Development Corporation, earning 8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a
housewife. They have one child, Christopher.

On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He
alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was
a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often
asked money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital.
According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and
total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child." He posited that Juvys incapacity was
"extremely serious" and "appears to be incurable."5

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. Prosecutor Angelito
I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the
parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial
and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not
want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the
market when Juvy brought him there.6

The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the 15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He added that Juvy
stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the respondents) fathers
pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing "mahjong" and "kuwaho" three (3) times. Finally, he
testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.7

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that
she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for
an interview, but the latter did not respond.8 In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following
findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-
adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration
tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and
emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained
emotional tensions caused by his wifes behavior.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very
irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling
activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality
disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid
behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital
obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the
defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.

xxx

The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:

1. After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on such occasions
wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because the defendant doesnt want to
wake up early; this became the daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to work;

2. After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was the one
cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her gambling activities and never attended to
her husbands needs;

3. There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of the irresponsible
attitude of the defendant;

4. That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an occasion wherein
the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them for gambling;

5. Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place, wherein the
defendant would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity on her and give her money. Through
false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors, relatives and other
people.

6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the defendant
never listened to his advices;

7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff will leave for work,
the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to] some place. This act reflects the
incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible mother;

8. That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the couples
separation.

Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders.
These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesnt
manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.

The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and hoping she would
change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating her to places for a weekend
vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash
clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that there is sufficient
reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife
and mother to their only son.9

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:

After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, this Court
is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a)
gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered
by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the
root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt
manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary
means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in this case.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted and the marriage between petitioner and
defendant is hereby declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.10

The CA Decision

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its
decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It
explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her acts of gambling and
swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist
characterized Juvys condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her
marriage with the respondent.11

The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9,
2005.12

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was
insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The
petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and
incurability of Juvys condition.13 The respondent took the exact opposite view.

The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from
complying with her essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code

and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."14

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,15 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage."16 We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel
Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.17 These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements we established in Santos.18

In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,19 we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)20 which provided that "the complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged."

Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te21 placed some cloud in the
continued applicability of the time-tested Molina22 guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to
fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can
be considered as completely on "all fours" with another.

Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting23 and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,24 however, laid to rest
any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.25 In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te26 did not
abandon Molina.27 Far from abandoning Molina,28 Ngo Te29 simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. We also explained that Suazo30 that Ngo Te31 merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.32

The Present Case

In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents evidence the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation
insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

a. The respondents testimony

The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left
their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the
15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to
withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check;
(f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.

These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We
stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,33 we
ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not
physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.34 A cause has to be shown and
linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality
rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her
essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and
lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,35 we emphasized that irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty,
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the
respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the 15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her,
while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when
the evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant
for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her
child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of
marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact,
admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as "swindling") only
two (2) years after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The
evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their
marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.

b. The Psychologists Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by
Article 36 of the Family Code.

To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the
information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a
considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can
hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos36 that
the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a
condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent evidence
has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew
Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added
weight to the psychologists report.

Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative
traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and
irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and
declared that "psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral
disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be
incorrigible."37 In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion
that "there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son."38

We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even
identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys
psychological condition. We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred
during the marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage.
Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what
extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the
report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed
to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the initiative to
change" and that her mental incapacity "appears incorrigible"39 are insufficient to prove that her mental condition
could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

c. The Psychologists Testimony

The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of
Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was
lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived
people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause.
Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any
information or insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the
marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to
trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely
1wphi1

stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this
premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very
hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the
Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.40

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.41 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation
where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility
of the marital tie.42

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011

JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, Petitioner,

vs.
BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1dated October 11, 2004 as well as the Resolution2 dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 11, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial
court granted petitioner Jose Reynaldo Ochosas (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).

The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a
seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual
intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan.
The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In
1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as
their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.

During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the
AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona
visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.

Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and
Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their
military aides.

In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup detat. He was
incarcerated in Camp Crame.

It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in
various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways
when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out
of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex
with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military community.
When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.

During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar
admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.

In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of
Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.

Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon Bona who failed to file any
responsive pleading during the reglementary period.

Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine whether
there was collusion between the parties. Said prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena to both
parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably determined whether or not there was collusion
between them.

Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides, Gertrudes Himpayan
Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about respondents marital infidelity during the marriage.

The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that after conducting several
tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she
described as follows:

"Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking behavior. So therefore they dont
1wphi1

develop sympathy in feelings and they have difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr.
Ochosa he has been a military man. It is his duty to be transferred in different areas in the Philippines. And while
he is being transferred from one place to another because of his assignments as a military man, Mrs. Bona
Alano refused to follow him in all his assignments. There were only few occasions in which she followed him.
And during those times that they were not living together, because of the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she
developed extra marital affair with other man of which she denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their
relationship she admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had relationship with respondents driver. I believe with this
extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and seeking emotions from other person and not from the
husband. And of course, this is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage."

According to Rondain, respondents psychological disorder was traceable to her family history, having for a
father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure
since respondent does not have an insight of what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.

With the conclusion of the witnesses testimonies, petitioner formally offered his evidence and rested his case.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition on the ground that "the factual
settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity
of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])."

In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the parties
marriage on the following findings, viz:

xxxx

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity must exhibit GRAVITY,
ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.

From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological incapacity of the respondent exhibited
GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family
shouldered by any average couple existing under everyday circumstances of life and work. The gravity was
manifested in respondents infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his witnesses.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to respondents history as testified to by
the expert witness when she said that respondents bad experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty
in achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit relations with several men before and during the
marriage.

Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder have no insight of their condition, they
will not submit to treatment at all. As in the case at bar, respondents psychological incapacity clinically identified
as Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain incurable.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999 read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING the marriage of JOSE
REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October 27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground
of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with all the
effects and consequences provided for by all applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.

After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil Registrar of Basilan City who is
directed to cancel the said marriage from its Civil Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its
information and guidance.5

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of Appeals which sided with the
OSGs contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite Joses abject failure to discharge the
burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its assailed Decision dated October
11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11 January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-
2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another is entered DISMISSING the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.6

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit in its
assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.

Hence, this Petition.

The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petition is without merit.

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the
Family Code, to wit:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.

Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we
laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
 "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject
to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9 (Citations omitted.)

In Marcos v. Marcos,10 we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinicallyidentified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the partys psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.

It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family
Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first
place because the affliction already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted
party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.11

A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the
same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,12 to wit:

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the
"most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which,
like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.13

However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the
contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case that there is a need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.14
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr.
Elizabeth Rondains testimony15 and her psychiatric evaluation report16 as well as the individual testimonies of
Jose17 and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal18 and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.19

We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had
been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are
persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Joses
thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the
Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects" were already present at the inception of,
or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of "juridical antecedence."

With regard to Bonas sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have only the uncorroborated
testimony of Jose made in open court to support this allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the transcript:

Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several years -

A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture because of the gossips that she
had an affair with other men, and finally, when I have a chance to confront her she admitted that she had an
affair with other men.

Q: With other men. And, of course this her life with other men of course before the marriage you have already
known

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: So, that this gossips because you said that you thought that this affair would go to end after your marriage?

A: Yes, I was thinking about that.

Q: So, that after several years she will not change so thats why you cant bear it anymore?

A: Yes, maam.20

Dr. Rondains testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful
veracity of Joses one-sided assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrists conclusion that Bona
harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition
purportedly made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible
proof of antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in
terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.

The psychiatrists findings on Bonas personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the
subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows:

Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how about the respondent, did she
come for interview and test?

A: No, maam.

Q: Did you try to take her for such?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?

A: There was no response, maam.21

As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal,
as well as the court record of the testimonies of other witnesses, to wit:

Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?

A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, maam.

Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who testified in this court?

A: Yes, maam.

xxxx

Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of the parties?

A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of other witnesses, maam.

xxxx

Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation report?

A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the other witnesses, your
Honor.22

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered solely from
Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the
psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.

Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the trial court judge had found them to
be credible enough after personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot lower the
evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Bonas pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of
antecedence in this case because we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bonas dysfunctional family
portrait which brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based solely on
the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed
psychologically incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bonas family history or her behavior prior to or at the
beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their
employment in petitioners household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona were married in
1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with petitioners family only in 1980 and 1986,
respectively.

We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this,
we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such
examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes
estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete personality profile,
information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally
obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of
information.23

However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and generalizations on a spouses
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the
case at bar, is, to the Courts mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence.24

Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did not wish to be with Jose as a further
manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we need only to look at the testimonial records of Jose and his
witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:

JOSE OCHOSAS TESTIMONY:

Q: How long did you stay with your wife?

A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there were only few occasions that
we were staying together because most of the time Im in the field.

Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not your wife come with you in any of your
assignments?

A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then

Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?

A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.

Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?

A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.

Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is not very far

A: No, maam, once in a while only.

Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?

A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3) days every other month.

Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were supposed to have been living
together?

A: No, actually in 19 middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.25

GERTRUDES PADERNALS TESTIMONY:

Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?

A: 1979.

Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this case because in fact, you lived
with them together in the same quarters. Does the quarters have different rooms?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: But very near each other?

A: Yes, maam.
Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that you have a chance to be with
the spouses?

xxxx

A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.

xxxx

Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your husband?

A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.

Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived together?

A: Yes. Maam.

Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent stay?

A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.

Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?

A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.

Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?

A: Yes, maam, G-3.

Q: May we know where this G-3 is?

A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.

Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?

A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.26

DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINS TESTIMONY:

Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in different Provinces or
Barangays in the Philippines?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband in different places of his
assignment did you ask her why what was the reason why she did not like to go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because by transferring from one place to another,
she just dont want to go, she just wanted to stay in Basilan where her hometown is, maam.

Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent dont want to go with him?

A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with him because she did not
want him to be appointed to far away places.

Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far away different assignments she
also assumed that the assignments were in this war regions they were always fighting considering the place in
Basilan they were in fighting atmosphere?

A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in Manila, maam.

Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?

A: I think, sometime in 1983, maam. She did not follow immediately. She stayed with him only for four (4)
months, maam.

Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as husband and wife for this
period of time during the relationship?

A: Yes, maam. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few months until he was
transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they were together the husband was giving an attention to
her. The husband was always there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not there
anymore, maam.27

It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses assertion, had no manifest desire to
abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the
contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties
and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the
seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with
Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.

In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the
inception of the said marriage.

We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.28

While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly appalling and shocking behavior of his
wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological
incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.

In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological
incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand,
blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an
inviolable social

institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity,
trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted
upon its hapless partners for life.

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No.
897612which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854.3

First, we unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines
(UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one
university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. The casual
acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to
respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions.4 Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together
from the university.

Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other
couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the
family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished
by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By
1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.

On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death, petitioner and
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the
Population Center Foundation.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were
shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal
needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of 1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of 1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further,
respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the
respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family
business. Respondents game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and
restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his
young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the
situation will change.

To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-
laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to
make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter,
another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the parties relationship
was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did
not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in
Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioners
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A
week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to
find out how the hospital bills were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any
means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came
up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents
business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent,
but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard
respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondents
gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but
he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for
the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany
her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.

Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached
respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even
respondents siblings waved the white flag on respondent.

Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with
petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted
and did not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their
house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.

With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his
children.

Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article
36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to
petitioner and father to their children.

After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled,
thus:

Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES
contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared
null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.

Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.

Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are
already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their
studies, are free to decide for themselves.

The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment
shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no
properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.

The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued
by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the
parties have properties.

The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and
Quezon City.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public
Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar,
Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.

SO ORDERED.6

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the
respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the
validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and
declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members
dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order
dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.7

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY

INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
BINDING ON IT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY
WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE
PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT
MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE, WHICH IS
UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE
INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED
BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.

VIII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY
AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on
the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained
from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after solemnization."

and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support."

Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and Articles
220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.

Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely to
the Court on a case to case basis.

xxxx

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to
the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent
and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on
the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its
inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the parties
to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential
duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68
Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which
created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the
personality disorder of the respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering
from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being
professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is]
as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This
psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious,
incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is
beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his
consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from
his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a
normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original
family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital
atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that
she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their
marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the
conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the
seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.

xxxx

The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also
requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by
the parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the
parties did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent
which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in
his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.

The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra.
Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized
with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a
perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent
cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.

Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on their
inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that
though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity
which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful
and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to
any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their
psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the
funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court
finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper
only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and
diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.9

In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged
from the findings of the RTC in this wise:

On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence
presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated.
Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder
(Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found
[respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features,
while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may
place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are
inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical
psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].

Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are
"unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the
[respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself.

xxxx

[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of
[respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent]
was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the
assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered and
interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent]
through individual therapy and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give
regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence
presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

xxxx

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged mixed personality
disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his
family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his
business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities,
taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
[Respondents] "defects" were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony
in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her
Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the
tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-
owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however,
that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was
stipulated upon by the [petitioner].

xxxx

As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report states that
[petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional
needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing
that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration
xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring
the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage
x x x.

xxxx

What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is
jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State.

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction
with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should
not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.10

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the
psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring
the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors
characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical
antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12

As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to
wit:

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE

[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status,
intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high
intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his
handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent,
his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.

Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and community
services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern
came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive
and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to
nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to
subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.

Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is organized,
planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic).
But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her
to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels
(sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to
her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his
intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to
reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when
others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more
[petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping
mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their
marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).

On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic), where
there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as
the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he
manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high
intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by untraditional,
unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no
anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and
quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).

His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his family
employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This
became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each
other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which
impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of
inadequacy (sic).

As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with
emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and
confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to
go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions
especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of
pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such
as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.

His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He seemed to
feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself,
(sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-
son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures,
stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine
strivings is projected.

For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.

Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies
along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that
he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that
ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake
[marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious
mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine
strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and
forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic
supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and stresses.
It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore
became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it
hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis
supplied)13

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them, respondent
has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be
full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are
suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent]
is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish that hed be
more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family
because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really
disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know
what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.

When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993. His
brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been
hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he
mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife
[have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not given
the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is
taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He
does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.

xxxx

Interpretation of Psychological Data

A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning

xxxx

B. Vocational Preference

xxxx

C. Socio Emotional Functioning

xxxx

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he
tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a
result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid
personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency
to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better
when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to
interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and
is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being
hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong
need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive
and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite

his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety. He
is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and
is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving
[for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he cant accomplish
anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by
the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder

[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:

Severe

He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give
priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)14

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion

From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological assessment, and despite
the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on
the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with
narcissistic and dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has
tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in

this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human situations is
very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married
RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her
situation.

Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)

Severity: 4-severe

Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)

Severity: 4 (severe)

xxxx

One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial
personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared
of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his
mother. Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so
she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was to act
outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums,
etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model.

However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks and
his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted
to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed
money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot
sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.

[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to
Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g.
he would just "come and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt
entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative
(e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked
to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic
personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife
when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume
responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and
aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable
as it is permanent and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is]
null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)15

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and
Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of
one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In
this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from
the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to
interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical
psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration or
personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and
sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions
with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors
assessments.

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM IV),19 instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.

D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental
disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:

A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years,
as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are grounds for arrest

(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or
pleasure

(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead

(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults

(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others

(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or
honor financial obligations

(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen
from another

B. The individual is at least 18 years.

C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.

D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic
episode.20

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based
on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested
in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors
separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of
respondent is not incurable.

The appellate court is mistaken.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy
are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks
textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all
the listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that
respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological
incapacity is incurable.

Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate
opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:23

[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about
the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of
Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed
business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is
valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed psychological
incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list
found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26 the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of
Appeals27must be independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of
the Family Code. We declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn
between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr.
Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr.
Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect
on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported by
psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made,
could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure
specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

xxxx

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported
by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual
finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the
facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events)
alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.

In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical
features:

Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating.
Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from
home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as
beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their
mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they
frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal
intelligence.

x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any
conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they
appear to lack a conscience.28

In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs;
(3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is
not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruling thereon:

A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In
fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the
marriage x x x

At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform to
the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is
supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage. In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a
1avv phi 1

glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her
best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr.
Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20
years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing
evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.29

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate
statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:30

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis
to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the
time of his marriage to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is
REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code
is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010

RICARDO P. TORING, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,2 nullifying Ricardo's marriage with
respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousins teacher
in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunts house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five
years), the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita
and they became sweethearts after three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of
another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon
City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before
the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to
declare his marriage to Teresita null and void.

At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his
expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective testimonies. Teresita did
not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.3

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer.
He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the familys living expenses and
their childrens tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many
times, Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid
embarrassment.

Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she
collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left the familys utility bills and their
childrens tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo
acquired for the family, so their children had to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by
Ricardos parents. When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds
Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.

Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another mans child.
During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresitas stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to
convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy
confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of
sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by "withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual contacts
with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in
Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on
dates with other men when he was not around.

Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who
mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife;
was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his
hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him.4 He believed that their
marriage had broken down beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one
another.5

Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresitas
Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:

Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of behaviors: a sense of
entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally
exploitative as on several occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as
she was unwilling to recognize her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings
and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to blame others for her
failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which
started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact
that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in
them. Because of that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.6

She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and
Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and
examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but
the notice remained unanswered.

In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no
basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted
on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties personality
traits but not on Teresitas psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not
clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the
evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that
the incapacity was grave and incurable.

The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr. Albarans
psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardos evidence, found Teresita to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision
to the CA.

The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial courts findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines
set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.7 The RTC failed to specifically point out the root
illness or defect that caused Teresitas psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity
already existed at the time of celebration of marriage.

The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to have been
drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the
CA found that Ricardos allegations on Teresitas overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds
for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true,
could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
 THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the expert testimony of
Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court in declaring the nullity of the marriage fully complied with Molina.

In its Comment,8 the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTCs decision, particularly in its
conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Courts guidelines for the proper interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence
adduced before the trial court failed to show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the
psychological incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist,
likewise, failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital obligations due to her
alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Ricardos Reply9 reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresitas
psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof
had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo
further argued that alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no
longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.10

These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside the RTCs
decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held that psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be
sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."12

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
 (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.13

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual
situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is
concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to
confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these
are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must
have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of
the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in
the first place because the affliction already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the
afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume
or had assumed.14

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence to be
insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already
mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latters
psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of
Teresita.

a. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony

Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her
findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she
narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresitas disorder
manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable.

To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became the
basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the
parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with
the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient
basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been
negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided
sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.

In So v. Valera,15 the Court considered the psychologists testimony and conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth
and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondents psychological incapacity because the facts, on which
the conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioners statements whose bias in favor of his cause
cannot be discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,16 the Court declared that while the
various tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-husbands
psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresitas psychological condition,
based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.17

To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be
personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.18 This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence,
we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature,
requires.

Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential although from
sources other than the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the
time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the
gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition.

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as
relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated
spouses condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to
the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.

In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for
purposes of Teresitas psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses eldest son who would not have
been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses
were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long
after his birth.

We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardsons interview with the
pyschologist: Richardsons statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the
psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of
their house, his fathers alleged womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while
Teresita is a Mormon).19

We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some
psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be
indicative of problems traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one,
these points of dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital
problems finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between
mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due to a previous argument a money problem
involving Ricardos financial remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologists evaluation never
explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the time of the spouses marriage,
showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time.

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation to
fully explain the details i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply
stated out of the blue that Teresitas personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby
that the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too,
the incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital
obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological
evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresitas psychological disorder.

Dr. Albarans testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to provide
the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In
fact, Dr. Albarans cross-examination only made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had
difficulty pinpointing the root cause of Teresitas personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered
from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresitas personal and family history. To directly quote from the
records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the
respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory
to the development of the personality disorder."20 Dr. Albarans obvious uncertainty in her assessment only
proves our point that a complete personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
could not be determined from meager information coming only from a biased source.

b. Ricardos testimony

Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardos
characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part
of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.21

Ricardos testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the familys finances by not
paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresitas spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo,
even resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility,
however, does not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At
most, Teresitas mismanagement of the familys finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during
the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the familys financial support.

Teresitas alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondents
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the
respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;22 there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to
her spouse.23

In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered personality of
this kind. Even Ricardos added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresitas dates with other men and her
pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse
integral element and link to Teresitas allegedly disordered personality.

Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their
marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.24 In the
absence of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.

Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment under Article
36 of the Family Code

Citing Barcelona,25 Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment
under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance with
Ricardos main argument against the assailed CA decision i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed
thoroughly the root cause of Teresitas psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These
conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement in
Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present petition that "since the new
Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is
also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity."26

In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root cause" of the
respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently
stated a cause of action because the petitioner instead of stating a specific root cause clearly described
the physical manifestations indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be
sufficiently compliant with the first requirement in the Molina case that the "root cause" of the psychological
incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.

Thus, contrary to Ricardos position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling
simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in
nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely
allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2,
paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (Rules)27 in fact provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

xxxx

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article
36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated
was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further
held that the Rules, being procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
adoption.1avvphi1

To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological
incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had
been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care of their familys finances a fault or
deficiency that does not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We
reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to
a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.28

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. NO. 168796 April 15, 2010

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner,

vs.
MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner
Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that,
during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He
described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he
claimed, characterized their marital relations.

Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had
watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in
a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were
ignored. His persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical violence.

In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their
children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to
reconcile with her.

The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May
was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that
she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a
male lover.

Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.

With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage;
and that the same was serious and incurable.3

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based
on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the
incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that "the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture
and, therefore, issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction."4

The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her
but to no avail.

Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with
the public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition
deserves outright dismissal.

Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court,5 the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to
lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.6

In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the
assailed CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its
findings.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.7 The Court likewise laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in
Republic v. Court of Appeals.8 Relevant to this petition are the following:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. 1avv phi1

Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish
respondent Mays psychological incapacity.

Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents condition.
Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained
and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.9
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity"
that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.10

Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some
character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the
time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.11

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,

vs.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.2 The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns
marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that
time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for
three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Bian,
Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3,
1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents after their
marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged
Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above
historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:

xxxx

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had been marred
with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because
defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and
his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making
life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage and became very
apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination with
psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the parties.
Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents of
physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but
significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern
before you got married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married (sic), is
there any signs (sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).3

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the
respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently
incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined her, the
petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the last page, last
paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had
already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature,
irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful
relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to
provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing
in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and became
manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he entered
marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological disorder are not
detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of
disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of the
wedding or became manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, maam."

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative and silent
(sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering that kind of
disorder (sic).

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he even
shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).

Court:

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.
 Court:

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this
kind of personality affect the other party (sic).

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence of
alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing
what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and
the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the
petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but what he
need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).

Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good
for nothing person.4

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently states:5
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage" versus
ANGELITO D. SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

[This pertains to Jocelyns]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest
among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler.
While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an
illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were
part and parcel of their day to day living.

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so that it does
not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in
uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of
containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate
environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of difficulties she had
gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is (sic)
commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to
direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping
mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.

REMARKS :

[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above]6

The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly opposed the petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as psychologically
incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his
marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next
drink and the next drinks" (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one
thing that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the
respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being irresponsible,
immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer
the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave
the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the respondent,
she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was the one who
worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were
living with her husbands family, she was obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is a
battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage,
she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and
the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the
petitioners family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court
of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:

The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony quoted above] would only tend to
show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also
incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA
198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the
psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and
clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and
conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner
will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder
of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The
law on annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will
be an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.8

THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and
Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the
fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of
the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be
sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically incapable
of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an underlying
psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is
inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to
the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the
respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the
product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner,
anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA
588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that
he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more stable
relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of
psychological incapacity is not present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner
with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the
Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to
separate and divorce.

THE PETITION

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on
the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the
RTC in declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should
be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-
existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us
(the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly
and manifestly erroneous";

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was intentional to
give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory parameters.
Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three
conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:

"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic
nature."

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with
discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the
law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity.
On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to
the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.

Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
 THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC
decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and its related jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept
psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without any
concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how
the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."10

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v.
Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
 assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.12

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.13

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.15

Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the
reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the
law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute
is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules
pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including expert
opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b)
requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and
such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the
grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.

All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were invariably decided
based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the
Court decided Te v. Yu-Te17 (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so
designed to allow some resiliency in its application.19

Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings,
the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the
lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept should
be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina.
Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly,
the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that,
following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting20 follows Tes lead when it
reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages:21

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to
attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this
stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the
court during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,22 merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also
noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code,
what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of
the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.25 It is not enough that the respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral
element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations must be shown.26Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.27

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity to perform
essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which
we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts
appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity
and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence the psychologists
testimony and the psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open
court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all
her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.
Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and
incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement.
While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the
oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete personality
profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the partys close relatives and
friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same
time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based
entirely on doubtful sources of information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed
an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate
a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists. 1avvphi1

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a
general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of
this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases
for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply
not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito has
long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental
stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In
her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her
conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and
upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelitos
personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his
capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or requisites of
psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.

b. Jocelyns Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologists testimony
impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with
sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of
which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of
violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not
before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took
place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear
evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform
marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may concede that
physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing
alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the
psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of the physical beatings
she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and
manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in
Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this
case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts
and the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009

RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
AURORA A. ASPILLAGA, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated September 9, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated
December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179, entitled "Rodolfo A. Aspillaga v. Aurora
A. Aspillaga."

The facts culled from the records are as follows:

Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five months later, they
became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and language.
Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication.

In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot two children, but
Rodolfo claimed their marriage was "tumultuous." He described Aurora as domineering and frequently
humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the
family budget and made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless,
suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latters filing against him a criminal case
(concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora
failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to
assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon her return to
Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita
Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led to the
disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal
home to live with Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.

During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his psychiatric evaluation of the parties as well as his
recommendation that the petition be granted. In this report, he stated,

"x x x x

Psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, Rodolfo Aspillaga, showed that he is an intelligent adult male, who is egoistic
and harbors an inner sense of inadequacy, helplessness and anxiety in losing agility. He, however, projects
himself as dominant person, to cover his deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy. He tends to be suspicious and
blames others for his mistakes. He claims for adulation, reassurance and attention from other people. These can
be traced from an unhealthy familial relationship during the early maturational development specifically in the
form of a domineering and protective maternal image.

Self-esteem was fragile.

Psychiatric evaluation of respondent, Aurora Apon Aspillaga, showed history of traumatic childhood
experiences. Her parents separated when she was about one month old and was made to believe that she was
the youngest daughter of her disciplinarian grandfather. Her surrogate sister maltreated her and imposed harsh
corporal punishment for her slightest mistakes. She felt devastated when she accidentally discovered that shed
been an orphan adopted by her grandfather. Attempted incestuous desire by an uncle was reported.

Psychological test results collaborated the clinical findings of sensitivity to criticism. Tendency for self
dramatization and attention getting behavior. Lapses in judgment and shallow heterosexual relationship was
projected. Sign of immaturity and desire to regress to a lower level of development were likewise projected. Self-
esteem was also low. Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness and emptiness hamper her objectivity.

In summary, both petitioner and respondent harbor psychological handicaps which could be traced from
unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering, disciplinarian role models. However,
respondents mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with
the obligation of marriage.

It is recommended that the petition to annul their marriage be granted, on the grounds existing psychological
incapacitation of both petitioner and respondent, which will hamper their capacity to comply with their marital
obligations. Dissolution of the marital bond will offer both of them, peace of mind." 3

On May 31, 2000,4 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into
marriage.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 9, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the motion was also denied in a Resolution dated December 20, 2005.

Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:

[WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE DEFINITION OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY" TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE CELEBRATION OF
THEIR MARRIAGE.5

Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological
incapacity.

The petition must fail.

As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 we categorically said that:

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.7 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the instant case, while the psychological examination conducted on respondent found her to be mistrustful, to
possess low self-esteem, given to having shallow heterosexual relationships and immature, Dr. Maaba failed to
reveal that these personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties
personality disorder; however, he failed to link the parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are
psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. We cannot see how their
personality disorder would render them unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to a marriage. The
fact that these psychological conditions will hamper (as Dr. Maaba puts it) their performance of their marital
obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each
partys condition is so grave or is of such nature as to render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable and
permanent.

Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent,8 but failed to discharge it.

It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.9 The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.10

Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union
for several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983, showing love
and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed
to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during their marriage for about eight
years from the time they married each other. From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply
with their obligations to each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children
and remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the family
income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It
was only when Rodolfos acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail.

As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of ones marriage as to make the
wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void.11 In the present case,
petitioners disagreement with his wifes handling of the familys finances can hardly be considered as a
manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even
normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.12

At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological
disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the
marriage void due to psychological incapacity. We must emphasize that said disorders do not manifest that both
parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows
incurability of these disorders. Even assuming their acts violate the covenants of marriage, such acts do not
show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which will prevent them from undertaking the
basic obligations of marriage in the future. At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the parties proved only
incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as
understood juristically.

As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume.13 1avv ph!1

As regards respondents claim for support, we find no basis to award the same as it was not passed upon by the
trial court in view of the agreement of the parties on the issue presented for resolution, which agreement,
however, was not put into writing.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated September 9, 2005
and Resolution dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan
Alcazars Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.

The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August
2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived
for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the
newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose
Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but
respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed
petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not
advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go
home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his
parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not
aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus,
petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing
sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and
respondent.

Per the Sheriffs Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioners Complaint, was
served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order6 directing the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report
thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or
suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting
that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but
respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place
between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether petitioners Complaint was meritorious
or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist
Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan
corroborated petitioners testimony.

Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any
underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly
impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm
opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the
diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to
properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically
classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion
and incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in
fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a
variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be

recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate
with, other special or high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or

automatic compliance with his or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondents personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with
predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first
child of his mothers second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate
environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his father
who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs.
More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses
and overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to
help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed."
Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy
sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed
long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his
system and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and
incurable.7

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist
and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential
obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support,
and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-
mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent.8

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa
(Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioners
evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint for annulment of her marriage to
respondent, holding in substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not
living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to
a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a
Decision12dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondents psychological
incapacity. Other than petitioners bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondents
personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that
at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have
known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed
the same. At most, respondents abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article
5 of the Family Code. 1avv phi1

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution14 dated 28 August
2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.15

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment
of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.16 Incapacity to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.17 Non-
consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical
or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such
mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
act.18

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable
to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and
respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously
being no physical incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to
respondent. Petitioners Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.

One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by
petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity to
comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsels mistake or
gross ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioners Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural
technique.20 Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of
counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his clients substantive
rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.

Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence
presented by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.23
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article
36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged
in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized
the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely established that respondent left
petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a
year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad.
These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondents psychological state.

Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioners cause. It must be noted
that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite
Tayags invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had to rely on information provided
by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondents psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to
the latters experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion.
Tayag did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent indeed had a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made
respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the
burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that
such psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioners marital life and,
as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each
other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the
marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us
under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation a relationship where no
marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave
and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the
obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.27
1avvphi1

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitute psychological incapacity.29

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and
sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in
Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.31

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondents failure to
communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to
the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage
that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-
M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009

DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal
separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts are as follows:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains.1

Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently
living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro
Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.2 They are childless.

Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after
marriage as shown by the following facts:

(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of
the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort
to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother,
who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew
Shipping Agency.

(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she
had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.

(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989,
when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her
of having an affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it.
When she refused, he insulted her and uttered "unprintable words" against her. He would go out of the
house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.

(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every
year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked
marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted
physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with
her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr.
Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
 (e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother
at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.

Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator of
their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage
void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation
of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in

favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the
Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.

On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication as
provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer3 wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and
averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity.
He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As counterclaim,
respondent prayed for the award of 200,000.00 as moral damages, 45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and
1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.

On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order4 terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a
Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains
and divide equally their conjugal properties.

On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after
conducting an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties.5 The initial hearing of the
case was held on November 23, 1998.

Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana;
psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a government
agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage
contract.6 At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the
Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of 5,000.00. It
was petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in
Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment
of 1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months.
Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another
man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and
returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in
drugs.7

In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a
house on the lot.8

On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners sister.
Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at around
midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but
he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at
the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped
and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a
bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to
sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and
went out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone
out and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and
proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to
stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr.
Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went home.9

When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about 300
meters away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She
found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.10

Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.11

Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.12

Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondents parents were separated.
Respondents brothers were also separated from their respective wives.13

Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.14

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She
confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:

It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the
kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondents
father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana
habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.

His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-
seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and
anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality
Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-
destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras psychological impairment as traced to his
parents separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage
to Petitioner Digna Aldana.

Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable
damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his
impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be
annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his
marital duties and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.15

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were
nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly
afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.16

Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he
received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and
mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was
entered in the police blotter.17

On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo

Najera;

2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and

respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.18

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution19 dated May 2, 2000.

Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.20

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5,
2004.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.

2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent
Eduardo Najera.

3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same
set of facts established by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore the same
conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.

4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in

Psychology.21

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22

Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent
which is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

The Court is not persuaded.

Republic v. Court of Appeals23 laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 1avv phi1

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence --
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
 This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."24 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.25 In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."26 What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.27

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner
failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge
and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.28 Moreover, the trial court correctly
found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was
incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder. [D]id
you find any organic cause?

A No, sir.

Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the respondent?

A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family] background, there was strong
basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.

Q Did you interview the respondents family?

A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).

xxxx

Q Have you [seen] the respondent?

A He is not in the country, sir.

Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly
affected, is this curable?

A The chances are nil.

 Q But it is curable?

A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.

Q What is this organic damage?

A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.

Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?

A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline personality
disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.

Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?

A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.29

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical
violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of petitioner
without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation30 only and not for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve days
before the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to
follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

Petitioners argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to
consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved
petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very
same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was
devoid of merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this
Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in
effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court
to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract:
First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his
own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom
[he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs
and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very
talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now
lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that
wounded her; this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on
the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant
offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother),
Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said
witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an
attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-
appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the
contents and veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
1avv phi 1

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
[canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is
offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of
which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.

Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court
(Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to
reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31

Santos v. Santos32 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which
drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

 2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a
psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave
lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his
right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with
moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on
the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not
based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of
Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated
February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition."2

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
are the (a) Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They
begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.

Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and

(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu
City.5 He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her,
she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7

After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon.8 Upon returning to Bindoy,
they resided at her parents house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house
of their own.9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he
shouldered his sisters schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using
the income from her "Botica" and store.11

Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of
the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide
for their childrens well-being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was
her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their
rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter
has the habit of climbing the rooftop.15

To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported them
throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the
Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses
heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal
piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station
free of charge.

She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was
the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in
1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17

As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.

He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in
her store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided
to get married. However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in
1964 upon his mothers signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa.20

He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged
profligacy.21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand
their store, establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her
signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he
and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the banks authorized employee.22

As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas attitude after her return from the United States.
She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the familys businesses.23 He tried to reach her but
Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their
relationship was blissful.24

He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When they were
there, their childrens tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part,
he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the
Philippines.25

He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law
practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted
though that there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income.26

What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration
in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with
his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied his
request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area.28

As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law
Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is
not his daughter.

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found
that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the
gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no
need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC
observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared
to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage.33

Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333,
premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18,
2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents,
immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of law, thus:

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHSon the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents and other related loan
instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges
of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let
notice of this Decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney, and notice of the same served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff
(Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged
defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:

Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record first, the income which supported their
children came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosas
industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit
smaller than that derived from the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from their conjugal
dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth,
although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justos alleged infidelity came after he was
driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.

The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her
case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her
allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.35

Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present
case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she
filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Courts pronouncement in Molina relied upon
by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justos
psychological incapacity had she been required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be
annulled on the bases of the Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand
this case to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process.

In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely foreign and
removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this case.
Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and
documents.

The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:

first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;
 second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of
Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and

third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that
she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but
concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
pertinent portion of the Decision reads:

Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justos alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such
traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological
incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his
alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the
covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.36

The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosas motion for reconsideration, thus:

Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case appellant
filed against her husband, namely, appellees falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity,
these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively establish appellees psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to presume the
existence of such seeming depravities in appellees character in our earlier judgment. However,
as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such eventualities is not necessarily
conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments
of marital obligations as required under Article 36.37

Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present
case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of Justos
depravities, however, even doing so could not bring about her (Rosas) desired result. As Rosas prayer for relief
suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No.
5333.38 Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true,
justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Her premise is of course non-sequitur.

Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.39 The Courts exposition in In re Almacen40 is
instructive, thus:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
 prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones unfitness as a husband or vice
versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case
cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently proved
Justos unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty
party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be
seen in the following discussion, Justos acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically
incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.

II

Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.

The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the
Guidelines set forth therein states:

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition."

Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held
in Republic v. Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.

Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of
expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete
facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
 essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.

In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said
incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their adoption.

Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established
by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court,
in its Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision, applying
the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this Court,
the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely
advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted
only a remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to
remand Pesca51 on the premise that the Santosand Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law as of the
date the statute is enacted," thus:

The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the
courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is
only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine
and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non replicit.

The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The
Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.

Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to
remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the
psychological condition of Justo.

III

Whether the totality of evidence in the case

shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in question.

At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the States policy on marriage. Article XV of the
Constitution mandates that:

SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.

This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states
that:

ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that any
doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.

Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not
create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse
under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
x x x.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosas main
grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which
includes the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children,
and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue.
However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of
sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus:

ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE

The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of
complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y.
Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument,
yielded the following results:

CONCLUSION:

1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one
and the same person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by
one and the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
 The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant.
However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or
falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified
signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor
by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City.
Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so
authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wifes signatures in the
bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for
and on behalf of the principal using his own name.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three
other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more
than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of
Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108);
his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn
Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is
carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless,
there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other
words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.

The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4)
children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa,
even persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire
several properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care
of their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on
their relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences
between them caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the
mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well
as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and lowered his self-esteem.

There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects"
surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he
failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these
circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.

Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects" are incurable or grave.

The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should
not be annulled.

In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her many
paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the
marriage, thus:

x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
 blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four
children.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or
sexual promiscuity.

In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wifes inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he could
fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation
of psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that
a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological
incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a family by him, which
she flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the
latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or mental defect of an incurable
nature present at the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36.

What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting
relationship with his wife and her family and repeated lifes setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are
not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.59 As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.60

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.61

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court
commiserates with Rosas plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007

BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 5, 1999 and January 24, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525,
entitled "Bernardino S. Zamora v. Norma Mercado Zamora," which affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

The facts1 are:

Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage, they lived
together at No. 50-A Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any child. In 1972, private
respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She returned to the Philippines for a few months, then
left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S.
citizen.

Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological
incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,
he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she
had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in
the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived
together for not more than three years.

On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one
who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would from time to time borrow her husbands
niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging
that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three
children with them.

On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision thus:

...

Plaintiff consented to defendants trip to the United States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there
because she wanted to help her husband build a big house at the Beverly Hills, Cebu City. Defendants
testimony was corroborated by Paulina Martinez, a former househelp of the Zamoras.She always wanted to live
in the Philippines before her husband committed infidelity.

One reason why defendant seldom saw her husband while she was in the Philippines was because of the
infidelity committed by her husband. No less than plaintiff himself admitted that he has a child with a certain [x x
x]. The court is also convinced that he has two children with a certain [y y y]. The infidelity on the part of the
plaintiff was one of the contributing factors which led to the estranged relationship between him and defendant.
 [N]othing in the evidence of plaintiff show[s] that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or
that she failed to comply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological incapacity
on the part of defendant so that she could not carry out the ordinary duties required in married life. Neither has it
been shown that there was an incurable defect on the part of defendant.

...

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint.

Without special pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner appealed to the CA which rendered a Decision on August 5, 1999 affirming the ruling of the trial court.
The pertinent portions of the CA decision read:

Without delving further into both parties allegations, we must deny this appeal.

In the case of Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals,3the High Court ruled that, "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."

Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,4 it was held that "mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."

This appeal does not fall in the category of psychological incapacity as defined in the aforementioned cases.
The mere refusal of the appellee to bear a child is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, since even if such
allegation is true, it is not shown or proven that this is due to psychological illness.

As correctly stated by the appellee in her brief, the appellant even failed to present any psychologist or other
medical expert to prove the psychological incapacity of defendant-appellee. This WE feel is a fatal omission on
the part of the appellant, considering the doctrine laid down in the Santos and Molina cases (supra).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Cebu City is
hereby AFFIRMED. Appeal DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated January
24, 2000.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the result of
the present case;

2) Whether or not Article 68 of the Family Code is applicable to this case;

 3) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if evidence in
this case already shows the psychological incapacity of private respondent;

4) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, considering that
the private respondent is a resident of the United States and living far away from the Philippines for
more than twenty (20) years:

5) Whether or not private respondents refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for more than twenty
(20) years, her refusal to bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary life in the United States for
almost three (3) decades are enough indications of psychological incapacity to comply with essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.6

Briefly, the issue is whether there can be a declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues as follows:

First, there is nothing in Santos v. CA,7 upon which private respondent relies, that requires as a conditio sine
qua non the presentation of expert opinion of psychologists and psychiatrists in every petition filed under Article
36 of the Family Code. This Court merely said in that case that "[t]he well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable."
However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable to determine whether private respondent has been living
abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a child; and whether she has made her
residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship; and

Second, Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Among the essential
marital obligations embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the same Code is to procreate children through sexual
cooperation which is the basic end of marriage. To live together under one roof for togetherness spells the unity
in marriage. The marriage had been existing for twenty four years when private respondent filed a legal
separation case against petitioner. Throughout this period, private respondent deliberately and obstinately
refused to comply with the essential marital obligation to live and cohabit with her husband.

This Court rules as follows:

It is true, as petitioner noted, that the case of Santos v. CA8 did not specifically mention that the presentation of
expert opinion is a vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
grounded on psychological incapacity referred to under Article 36 of the Family Code. Even in the subsequent
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 9 (also known as the Molina case10 ), wherein the Court laid down the
guidelines11in the interpretation and application of the aforementioned article, examination of the person by a
physician in order for the former to be declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not considered a
requirement.12 What is important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos,13 is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.

Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, states: 1aw phi 1.net

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.14
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in totality, should be
sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed
to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to
her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out.
Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and
there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions reached by the
trial court and the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 5,
1999 and January 24, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525 are AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering
from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence
on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or
that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals
also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity;
that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality
disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and
complying with the essential marital obligations.5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show
that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.

Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file
comment8but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the
Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration
which it complied on March 2, 2006.

After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is
beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case,
run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing
in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely
no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are
incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure
to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave,
permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the
marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that
relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x
x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner,
and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack
of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not
relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.

xxxx

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr.
Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for
decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr.
Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's
answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family
upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their
relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling
factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or
mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner,
for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than
his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more
of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the
sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction
with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed
into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to
the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any
trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of
age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City
Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)
months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy
to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group.
In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and
even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent
the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos
and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that
she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it
from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from
other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He
tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondents persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached
the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the
needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies
and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids
act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig
Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done
three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and
Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under
contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious.
Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was
employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in
a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly
budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies
attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations
anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his
assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale
(CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends,
were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was
not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of
only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying
about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been
duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been
satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He
contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to
the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the
trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate
their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute
the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence
was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial
question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set
for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively
laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and
indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only
one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of
the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding
cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the
declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment
of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in
the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys
mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either
party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the
Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce
law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable
marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of
the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on
consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted
the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may
have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code
committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only
voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the
marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the
Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court,
through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of
Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this
Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision
committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological
and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers
that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has
proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this
evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of
canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled
by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of
Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has
expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be
emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36.
Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of
the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he
State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution
and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage
and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems
proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal
effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped
to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their
will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for
nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
 children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with
following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition
for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from
the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great
weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the
veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently
establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart
from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and
certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents
claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity.
In any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to
establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code
likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by
expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of
things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated
over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of
love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is
based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified
that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the
petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on
her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that
the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having
an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform
the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Maam.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent,
but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did
not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination
of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We
deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged
heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court
itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has
that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She
practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage
as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year
of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree
of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by
the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth
from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to
them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal
or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent
and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the
spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to
bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in
question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the
Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunals consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective
and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a
discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the
conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications
of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the
Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent
made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to
the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this
case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the
appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition
was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondents condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It
would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.
Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as
incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.

The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10
August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the
requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing
the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity
must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating
the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling
that remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not
clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of
nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only
with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not
apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that
law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case,
there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there
would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity
of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-
to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect
at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we
are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by
the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed
undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003,
reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001,
which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel
Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").

Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on
27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a
child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.

On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was
exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost
everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her
liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that
she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal
Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated
resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents
since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted,
it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured
and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.

In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in
Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour;
that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family
obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was
raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.

In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:

1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;

2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated on the
allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope
that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard
time being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting
signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness
which became the common source of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during
that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it was then
that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were
greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when
she would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can
across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly
opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having
an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to
celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she
was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he
was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties
and obligations.18

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to
respondent Manuels office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains
and the cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through
respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a
conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter that
she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested
by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita
ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified
that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka
anak mo yan sa labas?"22

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications
as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:

To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital
collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond
with love, support and understanding.

The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel
and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the love and respect that they should
give to each other.

Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to use healthy
strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical,
argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and
suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt or
imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his
failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along
with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to
each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive
marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply
with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which
warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per
DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits
which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25

In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. She insisted that they were a normal
couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having
extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to
preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously
supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even
when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-
trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that
he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report.
Said report stated in part:

Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who
possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term heterosexual
relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of society like the
institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is
capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and
therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.

In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.32

CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple,
sweet to each other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were
likewise leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple
and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there.36

On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:

The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence.
The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life
together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.

The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later
in the parties relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters
that the plaintiff is playing footsy.

xxx xxx xxx

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the
Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her
jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand,
the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws
do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may
sound like a firetruck.37

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.38

On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation
of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals.39 Thus:

The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel
and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals,
266 SCRA 324).
 This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in
its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set
aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself.40

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred

I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED

II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH
1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE
TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT

III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA

IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID
ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE

The Courts Ruling

Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the
facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be
no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.

The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual
milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the
time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The
perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the
Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."

On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a
husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes
obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support
and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner
Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.

It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 we expounded:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family
Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged
in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.45

With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or
respondent Manuel.

A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own
evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or
not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
 She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar,
masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is
sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest
problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started his
relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it was the girl who
encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit,"
but, that she still is willing to pursue it.

x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically incapacitated.
He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered
and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and
their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any,
is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a
child at that particular point."52

B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her
jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to
his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise
as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54

The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case
any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On
the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from
the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-
laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted
no less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who
grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and
busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel
himself during his direct examination.58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the
Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming
strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in
Marcos v. Marcos:60

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
 We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being
shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this
one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005

JAIME F. VILLALON, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition1 for the annulment of his marriage to respondent
Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917
and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed
existed even prior to his marriage.

According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity
and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his
desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.

On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer2 denying petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18-
year marriage to petitioner has been "fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth
in their relationship" and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioners
success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent
claimed that petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.

On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was
collusion between the parties.3 The report submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such collusion.4

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines5 and submitted an opposition6 to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at
Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had
a romantic relationship soon thereafter.7 After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were
married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that he married
respondent because he believed that it was the right time to raise a family and that she would be a good mother
to his children.8

In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent. According to him, their marriage reached
a point where there was no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of
love, affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women.9 Moreover, their relationship
tended to be "one-sided" since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants
and emotions.10

Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He
also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent.11 Respondent
learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner.12 Petitioner surmised that it was respondents nature to
be silent and withdrawn.13
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes
away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old,
respectively.14 Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to his children.15 He considered himself as
a good and loving father and described his relationship with the children as "great".16

Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends.
He voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the
childrens medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.17

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder
of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with "Casanova Complex". Dr. Dayan described the said disorder
as "a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main symptoms of
"grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one
followed, the I personality." A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his
emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with "Casanova
Complex" exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.18

Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and
psychological tests.19

Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was having
an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut short
when the woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their
relationship and overcome the crisis.20

When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know whether her
husbands acts could be deemed "womanizing" since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred
13 years apart.21 She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could marry
her old friend.22 She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up
his extra-marital relationship.23

To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were incomplete because a "team approach" was necessary in
evaluating an individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity requires the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker. 24

Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.25 The OSG likewise filed a
certification26 pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals.27 In due course, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.

As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the
three (3) children Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria shall remain with the
respondent subject to visitation rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.

In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract between herein parties appearing in the Book of
Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as
well as the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.28
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioners petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.29

Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that
petitioners psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a finding.
Dr. Dayan also stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity
but failed to elaborate thereon or link the two variables. Moreover, petitioners sexual infidelity was made to
appear as symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a
general dissatisfaction with the marriage.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision which was denied in an order dated
October 28, 2004.30 Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the
Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

The petition has no merit.

The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to
respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a
psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,31 the court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.32 It should

... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated....33

In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife,
such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several
affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioners general claim that on certain occasions he had
two girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations were given of such circumstances that would
demonstrate petitioners inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.

Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his
alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder as "self-centered", "characterized by grandiose ideation" and "lack of empathy in
relating to others", and one with Casanova Complex as a "serial adulterer", the evidence on record betrays the
presence of any of these symptoms.
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a "serial or habitual adulterer", as he wants the court to
believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13
years apart could be deemed "womanizing", especially considering that these instances involved the same
woman. In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been going on for six
years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from "Casanova Complex" who, according
to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another.

Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.34 The evidence on record fails to convince
us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when
he was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.

In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,35 we held that the cause of the alleged psychological incapacity must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Further

The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.36

In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently
refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of
respondents life and that the latter did not need or want him.37 Respondents uncommunicative and withdrawn
nature apparently led to petitioners discontentment with the marital relationship.

However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,38 refusal to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.39

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

x-------------------x

G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his
petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.1

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and
defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorneys
fees of P100,000.00;

3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;

4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiffs
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving
and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with
12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of
stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;

5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount
of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;

6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein
defendant; and

7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
 SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate
court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh
Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral
argument.3

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite to P20,000.4Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.5

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit
and affirming in toto the trial courts decision.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the
son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.

On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered consolidated
by this Court.10

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord
with law and jurisprudence, thus:

1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5

MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF

LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;

3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF

OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK
AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS
SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES; AND

4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT
THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO
HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.11

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING. 12

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.13

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE

COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY
 ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS
"TOO MINIMAL."14

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO

PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS
SUPPORT.15

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only
of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded
damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by
professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and
that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in
fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to
defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to
make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving
defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned
caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights
not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach
in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is
correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the
performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such
award for damages may be made.

Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in
the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full
justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court.16

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as
follows:

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendants wrongful act or omission.

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which
moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that
Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is
willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done
willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code
states:
 A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriagewhich, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .18

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and
hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be
predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the
same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived,
it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact.

Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand
since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.19

With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:

Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has
compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and
where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered. (par. 11)20

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of
attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.21

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act
in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private
respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained
above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither
can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and
exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without
basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:

The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has
held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property
(Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586).
Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.

The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family
Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership
properties. Among others they are the following:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;

3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .

Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the
parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed
during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as
Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the said bank
in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net
amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not
having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay,
under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case, however, there had
been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid
forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and
transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No.
S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in
their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision
dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past
support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for
were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what
was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim
anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his
presumptive legitime.

Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership
properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said defendant
husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to
 one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies.22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of
his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding
shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the
latters share in the conjugal partnership.

On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth,
their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which
plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President
of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants service for the bank
for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial court
adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at
the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in
the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.23

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in
relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in
case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.

In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court expounded on the consequences of a
void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
 belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacityof a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership
of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil
Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership
in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of
nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the
trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions
on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of
the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family
Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before
the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy
and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity
by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to
ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and
Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the
obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
 Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.25

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-
ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in
said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not
of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he
is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 200526 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to
the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December
10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order
giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half
of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained
but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of
September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties
son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising
business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of
marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church
wedding on May 20, 1967.2

The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born
on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The
conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However,
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim.
Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on
December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then,
Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.

Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the
Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication
in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not
reside and could not be found in the Philippines.7

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of
petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.8

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and
SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a
regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article
52 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.9

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING

BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.

The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.10

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant
petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion
that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.

The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived
prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism
or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined
and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or
even desirable.13

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondents
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the
Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In
short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church
marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court
of the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief,
1w phi 1

frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like
in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.19 While
we sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter
how harsh it may be.20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the
marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the
Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M.
Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their
in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear
for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his
family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5

On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to
look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification
therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to
date.

On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda
and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only
witness.

Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but
they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda
and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that
Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until
January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that
should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was
no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5,
1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, disposing thus:

"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975
to be null and void.

The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage
this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .

SO ORDERED."

On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was
presenting controverting evidence.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that
the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December
27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere
alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment.
These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological
incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.

In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983.
The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support
his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the
Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt

Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only
after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and
appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for
themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.

Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the
more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order
to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.

WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED"

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG

NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER,
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST. 14

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing
thus:
 "Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic,
and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of
nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any
of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the
plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16

Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts
of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.

At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity
as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides -

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code20 as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he
was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.

In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals
of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein
that -

"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV,
Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22,
1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No.
52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-
island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially,
the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had
to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the
young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in
Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the
year that they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year
old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize
his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun
and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical
violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her
sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to
forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not
so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in
the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at
the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He
was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they
decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor
children and prayed for support pendente lite .

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal
service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary
period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties.
Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to
establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1w phi1.nt

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed
late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and
the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal
property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred,
particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion
to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable;
that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness;
that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by
an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that
the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have
no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the
guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case,
petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is
absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been
so defined in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity'
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
 meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated."

The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a
part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith5 under the
familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute
books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make
out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.