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Statutory Construction is essentially judicial 1. Endencia vs. David, 93 SCRA 696 2. NAPOCOR vs. Province of Lanao del Sur, 264 SCRA 271 II. Judicial Authority and Duty A. Court¶s primary duty to apply the law. 1. Silva vs. Cabrera, 88 Phil, 381 2. People vs. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164 3. Cebu Portland Cement vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708 4. United Christian Missionary vs. SSC, 30 SCRA 982 5. Quijano vs. Development Bank, 35 SCRA 270 B. Courts have no power to change the law 1. Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 2. Floresca vs. Philex Mining 136 SCRA 141 C. Courts must not distinguish where the law does not distinguish 1. Phil. British Association vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 2. Banco de Oro vs. Equitable Banking Corporation 157 SCRA 188 3. Salenillas vs. CA, 169 SCRA 829 D. Duty of Courts to effectuate policy or purpose of the law 1. Vda. De Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., 32 SCRA 382 2. De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 E. Legislative findings of fact bind the Courts 1. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 III. Parts of the Statute A. The Title 1. Del Rosario vs. Carbonell, G.R. No. L-32476, October 20, 1970 2. Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967 B. The Preamble 1. People vs. Echavez, 95 SCRA 663  C. The Enacting Clause D. The Body E. Exceptions and Provisos F. Interpretative, repealing, separability and saving clauses G. Date of Effectivity
Rules of Construction A. In General 1. Purpose of construction to discover the intentions of the statute. 1
2. Definitions and interpretations clauses in statutes being construed 3. Presumption to aid construction (a) In general (1) That the act expresses the intention of the legislature; that the legislature acted with full knowledge as to existing conditions; and that it did not intend unjust or unreasonable consequences. (2) That the legislature intended to enact an effective law and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. - Paras vs. COMELEC, 261 SCRA 49 (b) As to words, phrases, and provisions (1) Espino vs. Cleofe, 52 SCRA 92 B. Intention of Legislature 1. In general (a) People vs. Conception, 44 Phil. 126 (b) Alonzo vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 259 2. Ascertainment of Intention (a) Intent Ascertained from the language used. 1. Unambiguous language - Tañada vs. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515 - Commissioner of Customs vs. Phil. Acetylene, 39 SCRA 70 - Davao Light vs. Commissioner 44 SCRA 122 - Ramos vs. CA, 108 SCRA 728 - Globe Mackay vs. LRC 206 SCRA 70 - Re: request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the 2nd 25% Grant of the Special Allowance for Judges be Included in the Computation of his Retirement Benefits, 436 SCRA 377  2. Ambiguities - People vs. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 - Commissioner vs. TMX, 205 SCRA 184 - Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485  (b) Intent ascertained from the whole statute 1. Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA, 73 SCRA 162 2. Aisporna vs. CA, 113 SCRA 459 Intent ascertained from the whole statute 1. Director of Lands vs. Abaya 63 Phil. 559 2. Smart vs. City of Davao, G.R. No. 155491, Sep. 16, 2008
Construction to effect legislative purpose (a) Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (b) Litex employees vs. Edwala, 79 SCRA 89 (c) Ursua vs. CA, 256 SCRA 147 Spirit or letter (a) Casela vs. ca, 35 SCRA 279
Matabuena vs. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284 Melchor vs. Commission on audit, 200 SCRA 704
5. Effect and consequences (a) Commissioner vs. Esso Standard, 1728 SCRA 364 6. Implication and inferences (a) Chua vs. CSC, 206 SCRA (b) Pepsi-Cola vs. Secretary of Labor, 312 SCRA 104  C. Meaning of Language 1. In general (a) General Considerations (b) Natural and commonly understood meaning (1) Alfon vs. Republic, 97 SCRA 858 (2) Capati vs. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 794 (3) Rura vs. Lopnea, 137 SCRA 121 (4) Baranda vs. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 (5) Jumawan vs. Eviota, 234 SCRA 524  (6) Baybay Water District vs. Commission on Audit, 374 SCRA 482  (7) Board of Medicine vs. Ota, G.R. No. 166097, July 14, 2008 (c) Right to vary meaning of words (1) Diokno vs. RFC, 91 Phil. 608
(d) Reasonable and effectiveness formation (1) Morales vs. Pineda, 55 Phil, 565 Technical Terms (a) Manila Herald vs. Ramos, 88 Phil 94 (b) Javellana vs. Kintanar, 115 SCRA 627 (c) Heirs of Delgado vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 184337, Aug. 7, 2009 (d) Orceo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 190779, Mar. 26, 2010 (concurring opinion of J. Brion) 3. Associated words (Noscitur a sociis) (a) Caltex (Phils.) vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 (b) San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719 (c) Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp. 234 SCRA 255 General and specific words (a) Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis (1) When applicable -Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228 - Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 - Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485  - Emin vs. De Leon, 378 SCRA 143  - BSU vs. COA, G.R. No. 169637, 08 June 2007 (2) At what time not applicable - US vs. Santo Niño, 13 Phil. 141 - Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. SSC, 1 SCRA 10 - Cagayan Valley Ent. Vs. CA, 179 SCRA 218 2.
Express mention and implied exclusion (expressio unius est exclusio alterius) 3
Rufino 90 SCRA 437 (c) Centeno vs. and marginal notes (a) People vs. 89 SCRA 199 (b) Empire Insurance vs. vs.R. 60 Phil 233 (b) Roldan vs. G. November 3. 15. vs. Extrinsic aides to construction 1. 86 Phil 350 2. 5 SCRA 684 6. Manantan. Title. 69 Phil 12 7. Collector. In general (a) People vs. 92 Phil. Relative and qualifying terms and relation to antecedents (a) Roldan vs. Conjunctive and disjunctive words (a) Centeno vs. 2008 A. De Aquino. Yabut. 264 SCRA 49 4. Villaroman. Secretary of Finance. Villaroman. China Banking Corp. Villalon-Pornillos 236 SCRA 197 (d) Finman vs. 02 September 1992) (e) GR No. Limitations of Rule (a) Manabat vs. headings.(a) Vera vs. Fernandez. NAPOCOR. Palawan. 10. Villalon-Pornillos 236 SCRA 197 (b) Herrera vs. Manantan. Giving effect to entire statute (a) People vs. 85 Phil. Purisima. 1025 (b) People vs. 11. 235 SCRA 630 E. 14. Statute as a whole and intrinsic aid to construction 1. 16. 58 Phil 499 (b) Tolentino vs. Garcia. 18. COMELEC. 2009 8. 95 SCRA 663 5. 157870. Muñoz. 86 SCRA 542 (b) People vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Social Justice Society v. CA. 13. No. Negatives and Affirmatives Singular and Plural words Particular words and Phrases Different Languages and translations (a) Employees Club. No. Echaves. 69 Phil 12 Rules of Grammar Punctuation Verbal or Clerical errors Surplusage and unnecessary matter Words Omitted (a) People vs. 5 SCRA 684 D. Preamble and Recitals (a) People VS.R. G. 9. Context and related clauses (a) Paras vs. 170 SCRA 107 4 . 100970. 166570. Inc. Conflicting Provisions (a) General and special provisions (1) Manila Railroad Co. 12. Dec. 52 Phil 950 3. 651 (b) People vs.
Motives and Opinions of Legislature or its members or of third persons (a)Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. 1. 51 Phil 131 (b) Manila Jockey Club vs. No. San Miguel Brewery. Assn. 21. 51 Phil131 (2) Phil. Legislative debates and reports of committees or commissions (a) Manila Jockey Club vs. 27 SCRA 396 (3) IBAA Employees Union vs. Collector. COMELEC. GAB. Jr.Legislative Construction 11. 1999 10. 4 SCRA 727 3. CA.R. 107 Phil 4. 175 SCRA 597 2. Construction with reference to civil law (a) People vs. Collector. History and passage of Act (a) Oliva vs. Contemporaneous Construction (a) Bengzon vs. 132 SCRA 663 (4) Melendres. Statutes relating to same subject matter in general (in pari material) (a) Generals (b)Limitations of rule of pari material 5 . BLR. Acting Commissioner 5. 37 SCRA 64 8. 97 Phil 67 (b) People vs. 21 SCRA 737 (b) Commissioner vs. Inciong. Dec. November 25. Secretary of Justice 62 Phil 912 (b) Araneta vs. Contemporaneous circumstances (a) Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Executive Construction (a) In general (b) Qualification of Rules (c) Application of Rules (1) Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Existing general or public policy of the state 3. GAB 107 Phil 151 (b) China Banking Corporation vs. Central Bank 102 Phil 477 (b) Mayon Motors vs.R. Villegas. Lamadrid. COMELEC. Ortega. 56 SCRA 714 7. of Free Labor Unions vs. Inc. Construction with reference to other laws. Dinglasan 84 Phil 368 (c) UP vs.(b) League of Cities vs. 129958. 2009 2. G. vs. Reyes. G. Construction with reference to other statutes (a) Escosura vs. Practical construction or usage generally 9. 176951. Evidence to aid construction F. Esso Standard 66 SCRA 113 6. No. 49 SCRA 355 (c) Astorga vs. Del Rosario.
FEATI bank. Determination of characters of provisions (a) General rules (1) Chartered Bank vs. 98 Phil 458 (b) Butuan Sawmill vs. 57 Phil 227 (2) Romualdez-Marcos vs. Conflicting statutes (a) Gordon vs. vs. 162 SCRA 446 (c) Time of performance of duties (1) Portfolio vs. COMELEC. Aquino. 93 SCRA 462 7. Se. COMELEC.(c) Cases . 2009 5. Agna. or Exclusive words (1) McGee vs. CMS stock Brokerage. Arteche. 16 SCRA 755 (c)Lagman vs. City of Manila. 315 SCRA 226  10. 188456. 10. de Guzman.Tan vs. 30 Phil 416 (b) Zamora vs. CA 265 SCRA 327 8. City of Butuan. G. 22 SCRA 267 6.R. 94 SCRA 533 (b)Construction by courts of original state after adoption G. CA. Prohibitory. Soriano. COMELEC. Veridiano. General and Special Statutes (a) Sitchon vs. 94 Phil 820 (2) Fule vs. 164 SCRA 192 (b) China Banking Corp. Centtral Bank. Teotico. vs. 271 SCRA 90 (c) Roque vs. 162. 17 SCRA 580 (d) City of Manila vs. Pagpaguitan. Limitations or Qualifications of Rule (a) In general (1) Ortigas & Co. Commissioner on Elections. 149 SCRA 58 (b) Negative. Construction of Statutes adopted from other jurisdictions (a) US vs. Statute Prevails over administrative regulations (a) Hijo Plantations vs. Collector. Reenactment of. or reference to former statutes (a) Adoption of Provisions previously construed (1) Previous construction by courts (2) Previous executive or legislative construction 9. vs. 97 SCRA 734 11. Municipality of Urdaneta. Republic. Education Co.City of Naga vs. 39 SCRA 587 (b) Carolina Industries vs. 71 SCRA 176 . 142 SCRA 727 (d) Particular statutes 4. 167 SCRA 51 (b) David vs. Municipal Ordinance inferior to statute (a)Primicias vs. 248 SCRA 300 6 . National Government Auditing Office. No. 8 SCRA 163 (c) People vs. Construction as mandatory or directory 1. Statutes Construed by other courts (a) Phil.
Amendments. 91 Phil 35 (2) LLDA vs.Republic Planters Bank vs.Amandy vs..´ ³must. 179 SCRA 319 7 . Uniwide. 82 SCRA 318 2. People. 269 SCRA 1 H. No. Dec. Provisos. or reports 3. Railway Co.Almeda vs.Mecano vs. revisions. 234 SCRA 678 (b) Restriction or enlargement of enactment (c) Conflict between proviso and enacting clause (1) Arenas vs. Repealing Acts (a) Legislative intent to change the law (1) People vs. Agana. Collector. vs. NLRC. 50 SCRA 10 . vs.Ramirez vs.Villegas vs. 161 SCRA 436 2. G. Florentino 15 SCRA 514 . Sr. 55 SCRA 267 3. Amendatory and amended acts (a) Operation and effect of amendment (1) Presumption of intent to change law . CA. 271 SCRA 90  (b) Special law no repealed by general law by implication (1) Phil. and saving clauses 1. exceptions. I. Comelec. CA. 21 SCRA 500 -Tiangco vs. CFI. Inc. 66 SCRA 617 (b) Implied exceptions (c) Construction and effect (1) Samson vs. 14. Almuete. 84 SCRA 176 . Proviso (a) To what provision proviso applicable (1) ALU-TUCP vs. 69 SCRA 410 (2) David vs. Revisions and Codes (a) Conflicting provisions (b) Legislative and judicial construction (c) Notes.R. 2009 (d) When implied repeal cannot be given retroactive effect (1) Tac-an vs. Exceptions (a) Arabay. Enrile.(d) Construction of Particular word (1) ³May. Salvador. 145 SCRA 654 Saving Clauses (a) Ocampo vs. Buenaventura. 168697. CA. codes and repealing acts 1. 182 SCRA 281 . City of San Carlos. COA. 71 SCRA 231 (2) Implied Repeals not favored . comments.Maddumba vs. and ³shall´ .Bersabal vs. 251 SCRA 42 (c) Implied repeals (1) When implied repeals operate . GSIS. CA.
CA. 423 (b) Genero V. Concepcion. Construction of Particular Statutes 1. COMELEC. Language of the Constitution construed in the ordinary meaning (a) Ordillo vs. Hamoy. the law itself ceases. 151 SCRA 719 (b) International Corporate Bank vs. 47 Phil 385 (b) Herras Teehankee vs. 5. Constitutional Construction 1. Reyes Construction vs. (1) Comendador vs.R. Penal Statutes (a) Construction (1) In general (2) Application of general rules of construction . Trinidad. Gaite. 165276. No. 248 SCRA 400 C. Remedial Statutes (a) Del Rosario vs. Intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it given effect. 2009 4. 267 SCRA 408 B. 234 SCRA 116 7. 194 SCRA 317 (c) CO vs. Purisima . COMELEC. Terrado -Malinias vs. The constitution is superior to a statute (a) Aquino vs. 62 Phil 461 2. Commission on Election. 104 SCRA 786 3. 192 SCRA 100 (b) Manila Prince Hotel vs.(e) When reason of the law ceases. Reyes. Rules of Construction in relation to issue of constitutionality (a) Victoriano vs. Legislative Grants (a) Manila Lodge No. 237 SCRA 279 3. 152 SCRA 284 (b) Civil Liberties Union vs. de Villa. NP vs. 59 SCRA 54 (b) Manila Trading vs. (a) Nitafan vs. 390 SCRA 480  -Angeles vs. COMELEC. 163 SCRA 296 (c) Perla Compania vs. Liberal or Strict construction as affected by nature of Act in general 2. Director of Prisons 76 Phil 756 (c) Garcia vs. 6. Elizalde Rope worker¶s Union. 199 SCRA 692 2.People vs. G. COMELEC. 200 SCRA 80 V. HRET. Manantas -People vs. Executive secretary. 25. Construction of statute to harmonize it with the Constitution (a) Yee Cong Eng vs. Construction of Statute to harmonize with constitution 1. 73 SCRA 162 Statutes both penal and remedial Statutes in derogation of sovereignty Statutes in derogation of fundamental rights (a) Provincial Chapter of Laguna. Construction of the Constitution and particular Classes of Statutes A. CA. Commissioner. IAC.People vs. 761 vs. Nov. 122 SCRA 8 .
Castañeda. 205 SCRA 419 Co. PVA vs. ECC. Probation Laws (a) Santos To. 230 SCRA 391 17. 205 SCRA 419 Balatbat vs. 12 SCRA 59 (c) Tantuico Jr.  Private Acts Labor Laws (a) Villavert vs. Habeas Corpus rules (a) Enrile vs. 2. Tabalba. 120 SCRA 8 23. 31 SCRA 520 . Domingo. 11. 55 SCRA 533 Nilo vs. 8 SCRA 343 (b) Fielmens Insurance vs. Vda de Songco. Republic 108 Phil 265 18.  III. 193 SCRA 190 Corporation Laws (a) Home Insurance Co. Republic 108 Phil 234 (b) Co. vs.Commisioner vs. Payawal. 16 SCRA 601 19.Serfino vs. Espiritu vs. Salazar. 110 SCRA 233 (b) Abella vs. 301 SCRA 152. 227 SCRA 444 9 . Domingo. Statutes Offering Rewards (a) Penid vs. Eastern Shipping Lines. Insurance Laws (a) Del Rosario vs. 12. 9. Bautista. ECC. 13. Commissioner. Virata. 165 SCRA 327 . 3. vs. CA. 230 SCRA 205 (b) Loong vs. Equitable Insurance. vs. COMELEC. 121 SCRA 166 20. Election Laws (a) Pahilan vs. Jr. 25 SCRA 70 15. General Prospective construction 1. Administrative Laws (a) Solid Homes Inc. Retirement and pension Laws (a) Re: application for retirement ± Britanico. 123 SCRA 14. 10.Effectivity and Prospectivity or Retroactively of Statutes A. Special or Local Laws (a) Llanto vs. 4.Republic Flour Mills vs. 154 SCRA 19 . vs. Naturalization Laws (a) Velasco vs. 173 SCRA 421 (b) Board of Administrators. NLRC. CA. CA. Cipriano. 177 SCRA 72 16. CA. Paño. 152 SCRA 140 Social Security Laws (a) Vicente vs. Effectivity of statutes B. 186 SCRA 217 21. 424 Statute imposing liabilities Revenue Laws (a) Application of general rules (b) Construction in favor of taxpayer in general (c) Strict of liberal construction in general (d) Particular tax statutes or provisions (e) Cases . vs. CA. 305 SCRA 832. Statutes prescribing formalities in wills (a) In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy 107 SCRA 100 22. Vs.8.People vs.
Application to Pending Actions and Proceedings . Curative Statutes .Palomo Building Tenants Association. Santos. vs. 93 SCRA 696 10 . 133 SCRA 168 3. Intermediate Appellate Court.C.MRCA. David.Laceste vs.Municipality of San Isidro Cases for Stat con Endencia vs. Presumption 2. vs. Inc. Statutes relating to offenses and prosecutions . 56 Phil 472 4. Retroactive Operation 1. Remedial Statutes . Inc. Court of Appeals 5.
defendant-appellant. 85 Phil. We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs.: This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No.1950 to October 19. and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2. Woodrought 307 U.1950. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO. Judge Higinio B. that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. 9. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. we are reproducing section 9. 1127 which became Republic Act No. and so ordered the refund of said taxes. representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1. in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. 1953 PASTOR M. supra. 590. No. and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. until they reach the age of seventy years. as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines. was not received favorably by Congress. MONTEMAYOR.744. Because of the similarity of the two cases. without special pronouncement as to costs. S.. vs. 1950 to December 31. L-6355-56 August 31. They shall receive such 11 . involving as they do the same question of law. 590. and from October 20. supra. as Collector of Internal Revenue. J. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue. Alejandro for appellant. Meer. 1950. In that case. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior.45. Meer. they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court.R.46. SATURNINO DAVID. Endencia the sum of P1. brought up and presented here. Congress enacted Republic Act No. or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. SEC.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Macadaeg presiding. Manuel O. we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs.345.. particularly section 13. 590. which are raised. the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. For purposes of reference. representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. To bring home his point. 590 unconstitutional. 277. 552. Chan for appellees. Article VIII of our Constitution:. because immediately after its promulgation. can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers. Meer. as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. plaintiffs-appellees.
not a decrease of his salary. whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law. if not to counteract the ruling in that decision. the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. specifically prohibited by the Constitution. says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax. (Bandy vs. 590. As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department.compensation as may be fixed by law. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not. then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. 2nd 341. it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. W. at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. according to the Solicitor General. we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing. because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries. 342. and each Associate Justice. Thereafter. but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two. because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case. the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws." and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Under our system of constitutional government. because if there is. fifteen thousand pesos.. because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13. 44N. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this question. payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official. Article VIII.. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. So we have this situation.) When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution. we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers. it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law. particularly section 9. specially a judicial officer. Mickelson et al. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise. has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries. a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be 12 . Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. 590: SEC 13. Republic Act No. the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. and. Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590. as Chief Justice Marshall said.
so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. the amount 13 . the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term." found in section 9. principles of our constitutional system of government. Jur. (11 Am. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision. (11 Am. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do. validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts. Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. (11 Am. In the present case. twice a month. That would be neither wise nor desirable. ² fifteenth and end of month. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter.. particularly those governing the separation of powers.000 a month or P500 every payday. upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision. the Constitution. 714-715. 590. So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act.. Jur. a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. he should receive P1. the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions.) Under the American system of constitutional government. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. 905. otherwise. 914. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income.). referring to the salaries of judicial officers. emphasis supplied) We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws. Under such a system. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source. By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13. his salary is fixed at p12. Jur. or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage. we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. emphasis supplied) The legislature cannot. this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday. by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. but not to interpret them. or what a specific portion of the Constitution means. because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday. which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. that is to say. Considering the practical side thereof. 919.000 a year. said official actually does not receive his salary in full. was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. as a closely connected power. besides being clearly violative of the fundamental. Republic Act NO. (11 Am. Article VIII of the Constitution. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere. that is to say..taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and. Jur. If the Legislature may declare what a law means.
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace. instead of receiving P500 every payday. which became Republic Act No. and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. and instead of receiving P12. like the clause in respect of tenure. out of patriotism and love for their country. the members of the Commission on Elections. which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. but based on public interest. could not be large or substantial. he would be receiving but P10. The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers. that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant.45? Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. It is already attached to his office. 1127. and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145. 590. his salary is actually decreased by P72. not primarily for his benefit.55.685 and every year is decreased by P1. the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. but. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore. not as a private grant.37 a month.31 only. the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.000 a year. as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court. Such being its purpose. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts.. it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens. not restrictively. Gore (253 U. Compares to the number of all these officials. many of them receiving as low as P200 a month. he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary. provided and secured by the fundamental law. S. as a privilege . he would be actually receiving P427. 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary. in other words.000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent. it should not affect. but was grounded on public policy. limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals. Is it not therefor clear that every payday.744. Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption. So.collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1.255. about 107 Judges of First Instance. such as P3. like the President of the Republic. not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts. supra. were if not for the constitutional exemption. the Auditor General.744. 245): The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges. but as a limitation imposed in the public interest. they should pay income tax on their salaries.45 for one year. much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers. but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.685. to 14 . In the same case of Evans vs. including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals. to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties. commissioners of the Public Service Commission. When a judicial officer assumed office. But even if it were otherwise. it is to be construed.
and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech. (Republic Act No. allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945. And as to tax exemption. Persons. Tuason. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations. natural and juridical. Sec. specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. (Republic Act No. buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes. for reasons of public policy and public interest. 210). Meer. naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. inclusive. Considering exemption in the abstract. a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. In the views of the foregoing considerations. Pablo. thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary. Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. oral or written. discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. In other words. Bengzon. there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. and due to the high standards of experience. 566). there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it. are exempted from income tax. even if they derive income therefrom. substantial and onerous. Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption. 360). We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department. VI. JJ. and being required to retire at seventy. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. 35). the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation. they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real.secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. during their attendance in the session of the Legislature. and Labrador. supra. thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute. They are relatively more numerous. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court. tending to cause the dishonor. Padilla. on the aver-age. practice and training required. the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest. concur.. with no pronouncement as to costs. the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition. members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason. eleven. 22 . (Republic Act No. assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier. one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life.) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime. Reyes. Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States. as long as it is based on public policy or public interest. around his sixtieth year. 29 (b) . and that in enacting a law. are exempt from taxes on their lands. 15 . remark or statement. (Art. and because of the meager salary they receive. this excemption to them is relatively of short duration.
it being a transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers. 96700 November 19. J. (2) annul the auction sale of. in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General. petitioner. J. 85 Phil. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. PANGARUNGAN and LANAO DEL SUR PROVINCIAL TREASURER HADJI MACMOD L. PANGANIBAN. I wish however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13. 1984 to December 31. 590. No. DALIDIG. concurring: Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. respondents. in which I concurred. in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law". constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. Meer. 552. C.. and (3) cancel the registration of the certificate of sale involving the aforesaid real properties of the petitioner. Republic Act No. I am of the opinion that said section is null and void. The Facts 16 . The Lawphil Project . No. Meer. 1989 amounting to more than P154 million? To compel payment of petitioner's alleged delinquency in its realty taxes. In this sense. PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR.. G. concurring and dissenting: I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr.R.Arellano Law Foundation G. LANAO DEL SUR GOVERNOR SAIDAMEN B.Separate Opinions BAUTISTA ANGELO..J. 1996 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION. PARAS. did respondents act correctly in selling at publication petitioner's real properties on which is situated its hydroelectric power plant complex? Petitioner filed the instant special civil action for prohibition to (1) perpetually prohibit and enjoin respondents from disposing and selling. vs. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.: Is petitioner National Power Corporation liable for real property taxes for the period June 14. L-2314. R.
1989. this Court issued a temporary restraining order 5 enjoining respondents from proceeding with and conducting the auction sale of the subject properties. The auction sale was however held as scheduled with the Province of Lanao del Sur as the sole bidder. On January 21. a second demand letter 2 from respondent provincial treasurer was sent to petitioner with a warning that unless the obligation was settled. imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing fees. 1991 at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer in Marawi City.M. Anent the tax exempt status of petitioner for the period up to December 31. The auction sale was scheduled to be held at 10:00 A. On January 18. more particularly described in Tax Declarations Nos. 1990. 1990. On August 7.854. 1993.m. in any court or administrative proceedings "to enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations. 6 At 2:30 and 3:00 p. 1984 to December 31.114. On August 21. supersedeas bonds. Rejoinder was submitted on October 25. It was also published in the December 17 and 24. fees. Petitioner was assessed real estate taxes on said properties in the amount of one hundred fifty four million one hundred fourteen thousand eight hundred fifty four pesos and eighty two centavos (P154. of the same day. 1990 to January 17. 8 Section 13 thereof exempted it from the payment of all forms of taxes.Petitioner National Power Corporation is the owner of certain real properties situated in Saguiaran. Said properties comprise petitioner's Agus II Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex.m. D-804-A. D-806 and D-807 issued by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lanao del Sur. 1989. respondents provincial governor and provincial treasurer respectively 7 received telegraphic notices of this Court's restraining order. 1990. D-803-A. appeal bonds. Lanao del Sur. created the petitioner as a non-profit public corporation wholly owned by the government of the Republic of the Philippines tacked to undertake the development of hydraulic power and the production of power from other sources. 1990 and January 5. which became effective on November 3. a Notice of Auction (Sale) covering the subject properties was served on petitioner.82) covering the period from June 14. 1991. duties. 1991 to which petitioner filed its reply on April 29. 1991 4 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the December 17 and 24. A certificate of sale was immediately issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of the province at 1:30 p. 120. 1 allegedly because petitioner's exemption from realty taxes had been withdrawn. 1936. of the same day. petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. 1991. D-805-A. of January 22." 17 . 1991. 3 A copy of said notice was posted for one month from December 17. 1991 at the main entrance of the provincial capitol building in Marawi City and at the plant site in Saguiaran. this Court gave due course to the petition and the parties thus filed their respective memoranda. a demand letter was sent by respondent provincial treasurer to the petitioner for the payment of real property taxes due on the abovementioned properties. On December 14. Thereafter. Lanao del Sur. the following are the relevant laws and resolutions: (1) Commonwealth Act No. D802-A. Respondents submitted their comment on February 14. 1990 issues of the Lake Lanao Times. legal remedies would be resorted to by the respondent province.
petitioner was granted exemption from the payment of all forms of taxes. and (d) From all taxes. (c) From all import duties. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National Government. among others. the exemption of petitioner from taxes. cities. and sale of electric power. geothermal and other sources. Section 13 of RA 6395 provides in detail such exemptions. (b) From all income taxes. fees. (4) On January 22. its provinces. 1974. imposts and other charges by the government and its instrumentalities. for expansion. charges and restrictions of the Republic of the Philippines. 358. duties. as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. 40. (5) On June 1. restrictions and duties to the Republic of the Philippines. and all other charges imposed by the Republic of the Philippines. 1974. its provinces. municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities on all petroleum products used by the Corporation in the generation. Fees. which took effect on June 4. 464. duties. duties. Imposts and Other Charges by Government and Governmental Instrumentalities. Non-profit Character of the Corporation. imposts. utilization. transmission. Presidential Decree No. ² The exemption shall be as follows: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions and any government-owned corporation so exempt by its charter. 380 amended Section 13. and wharfage fees on import of foreign goods required for its operations' and projects. imposts. charges. imposts and other charges imposed. fees. . "directly or indirectly". its provinces. paragraphs (a) and (d). was enacted into law. To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section One of this Act. as well as excess revenues from its operation. costs and service fees in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be a party. (3) Republic Act No. ² The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investments. Exemption from All Taxes. the Corporation is hereby declared exempt: (a) From the payment of all taxes.(2) Section 2 of Republic Act No. which took effect on September 10. also known as the Real Property Tax Code. duties. revised the charter of the petitioner. 1971. Section 40(a) thereof provides: Sec. of RA 6395 by specifying. To quote the Solicitor General: Congress declared as a national policy the total electrification of the Philippines through the development of power from all sources to meet the needs of industrial development and rural electrification. fees. 18 . its provinces. municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities. on all petroleum products used by petitioner in its operations. . compensating taxes and advanced sales tax. municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities. And having been declared by legislative fiat as a non-profit public corporation with a responsibility of devoting all its returns from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation for expansion. 6395. 1949. cities. imposts. fees. duties. Thus. exempted petitioner "from all taxes. . Duties. to wit: Sec. specifically to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of electricity from nuclear. The corporate existence of NAPOCOR was extended to carry out this policy. fees. cities. cities and municipalities" in order to facilitate payment of its indebtedness. 13. Presidential Decree No. (emphasis supplied).
1-86 10 extended the said tax and duty exemption privileges of petitioner from July 1. revoked or suspended. revocation or suspension of the enforceability of any of the above-cited statutory subsidies or tax exemption grants." etc. 1984 up to June 30. subsequently. To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section One of this Act. Exemption from All Taxes. Non-profit Character of the Corporation. 1987 (the effectivity date of E. the Corporation. FIRB Resolution No. Duties. the FIRB issued Resolution No. including its subsidiaries. . in any court or administrative proceedings. duties. . The Board shall meet once a month. modification. further amended the aforestated provisions of Section 13 of RA 6395 by integrating the various tax exemptions therein into a general exemption from "all forms of taxes." (11) On June 24. dated May 27. 2 of PD 1931. which shall be composed of the following officials: Chairman ² Secretary of Finance Members ² Secretary of Industry ² Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority ² Commissioner of Internal Revenue ² Commissioner of Customs The Board may recommend to the President of the Philippines and for reasons of compatibility with the declared economic policy. 1975. 1985. Presidential Decree No. A Fiscal Incentives Review Board is hereby created for the purpose of determining what subsidies and tax exemptions should be modified.(6) On August 24. the exemptions withdrawn by Section 1 . 776 was promulgated. 93 effective March 10. creating the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB). partially or totally. . supersedeas bonds. is hereby empowered to restore. imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing fees. 19 . duties. (Emphasis supplied). the FIRB issued Resolution No. in its Section 2 withdrew all tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled corporations. 10-85 9 restoring petitioner's tax and duty exemption privileges enjoyed by it under CA 120 as amended. 13. the Board may require the assistance of any appropriate government agency or entity. Among other things. except those granted by the Constitution. 1985. 1985 onwards indefinitely. ² The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation for expansion. (9) Pursuant to Sec. Fees. Imposts and Other Charges by the Government and Government Instrumentalities. 17-87 11 once again restoring petitioner's tax and duty exemption privileges. 1986. once again withdrawing all tax and duty incentives of government and private entities. the Board was tasked as follows: Sec. making said on Section 13 read as follows: Sec. 2. (7) Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1931. 8 On June 11.O. Presidential Decree No. fees. effective as of March 10. However. And. 1984. But Section 2 thereof gave FIRB the authority to "restore tax and/or duty exemptions withdrawn hereunder. 93). To attain its objectives. the withdrawal. 1987. upon the recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) . under one paragraph. is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all forms of taxes. on February 7. Section 2 thereof provided: The President of the Philippines and/or the Minister of Finance. 1987. effective from June 11. 1976. . (10) On December 17. 938. President Corazon Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. withdrawn. or oftener at the call of the Secretary of Finance. appeal bonds.
then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo Pio de Roda. and constitute an undue delegation of taxing power. under Sec. Jr. On the other hand. which under the Constitution. simply put. The Court's Ruling Preliminary Issue: Valid Restoration of Tax Exemptions Although Section 1 of PD 1931 withdrew all tax exemptions presumably including those of petitioner. 1989. 2 of PD 776 (promulgated August 24.(12) Finally. respectively). 1989 against. confirmed and approved. in its Section 2. and is devoid of authority to impose taxes or revoke existing ones. the FIRB to inter alia restore tax and/or duty exemptions withdrawn under Section 1 thereof. Jr. Neither could it validly prescribe exemptions nor restore taxability by itself. 1984 up to December 31. respondents' position is that the petitioner's exemption from payment of realty taxes had been withdrawn or revoked by virtue of PD 1931. and in line with Sec. Hence. including its exemption from payment of real property taxes. insofar as it authorizes. and had never been validly restored by the FIRB Resolutions aforementioned. there was only one signatory thereof (viz. the FIRB is given or granted only a recommendatory power. in his concurrent capacities as Acting Minister of Finance and as Acting Chairman of FIRB. emphasizing that the FIRB is not a one-man body. such that at no time did it lose its tax-exempt status. Respondents argue that FIRB Resolutions No. In order to reinstate the petitioner's tax exemptions. 10-85 and 1-86 were issued in excess of authority. 2 of PD 1931. were just as quickly restored. Relying on National Power Corporation vs. and therefore. by authority of the President. because in each case. signed 20 . Sec. then Acting Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig. Province of Albay. Section 2 thereof authorized and empowered the President and/or the Minister of Finance to restore the same to deserving entities. as amended. The preliminary but pivotal issue however is whether or not petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges. only the legislature may do. and RA 6395. Thus. although temporarily withdrawn. the subject properties of petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes. 1984 to December 31. and thereafter sell at public auction. and which. in a Memorandum dated October 5. 12 which they claim is based on analogous facts. is that it has never been effectively deprived of its tax and duty exemption privileges granted under CA 120. because two separate and distinct acts were required ² a recommendation and an approval ² which could not be combined and performed by a single person acting both as head of the FIRB and as minister of finance. Petitioner's position. Hon. firstly. FIRB... nor by the memorandum of Exec. 1987 addressed to the Chairman. De Roda. and given the same rationale EO 93. and secondly. 1975) which created the FIRB. the subject properties were wrongfully levied upon and sold at auction. Respondents also assail the said FIRB resolutions as invalid and ineffective. as amended. never did it become liable for realty taxes.. thereby rendering petitioner liable for realty taxes for the period June 14. and then Minister of Finance Cesar E. Jr. Macaraig. 17-87. FIRB Resolution No. Virata. Jr.A. they are constitutionally defective and therefore null and void. is similarly void and of no force and effect. respondents contend that. The Issues The main issue in this petition is whether or not respondent province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess real property taxes for the period June 14.
FIRB Resolution No. 10-85 which was made effective as of June 11, 1984, the promulgation date of PD 1931, until June 30, 1985. On the other hand, by virtue of FIRB Resolution No. 1-86, Hon. Virata fully restored the tax exemption as of July 1, 1985, to continue for an indefinite period. He also signed the same in his dual capacities as Minister of Finance and as Chairman of the FIRB. The resolution specifically provided that:
2. The NPC as a government corporation is exempt from the real property tax on land and improvements owned by it . . . pursuant to the provisions of Section 40 (a) of the Real Property Tax Code, as amended.
While EO 93 again withdrew the tax exemption of petitioner, through its Section 1, as follows:
Sec. 1. The provisions of any general or special law to the contrary notwithstanding, all tax and duty incentives granted to government and private entities are hereby withdrawn, except: xxx xxx xxx f) those approved by the President upon the recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board.
nevertheless, it also stated:
Sec. 2. The Fiscal Incentives Review Board created under PD 776, as amended, is hereby authorized to: (a) restore tax and/or duty exemptions withdrawn hereunder in whole or in part; (b) revise the scope and coverage of tax and/or duty exemption that may be restored; (c) impose conditions for the restoration of tax and/or duty exemption; (d) prescribe the date or period of effectivity of the restoration of tax and/or duty exemption; (e) formulate and submit to the President for approval, a complete system for the grant of subsidies to deserving beneficiaries, in lieu of or in combination with the restoration of tax and duty exemptions or preferential treatment in taxation, indicating the source of funding therefor, eligible beneficiaries and the terms and conditions for the grant thereof, taking into consideration the international commitments of the Philippines and the necessary precautions such that the grant of subsidies does not become the basis for countervailing action. (emphasis supplied)
Pursuant thereto, FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 restored the tax exemption privileges of the petitioner effective March 10, 1987. Again, the resolution was signed by De Roda, Jr. in his dual capacities as Acting Secretary of Finance and as Chairman, FIRB. This resolution was confirmed and approved by then Acting Executive Secretary Macaraig, by the authority of the President. Considering the entire chain of events, it is clear that petitioner's tax exemptions for the period in question (1984-1989) had effectively been preserved intact by virtue of their restoration through FIRB resolutions. Respondents however vigorously argue that the FIRB, through the above-mentioned resolutions, arrogated unto itself the power to restore tax exemptions which it never possessed under PD 776 and EO 93. Respondents insist that FIRB effectively exercised not merely the power to recommend exemptions but the very authority to grant the same, which was lodged in the Minister of Finance and the President. As
proof of this, it did not secure any recommendation from any other body or office. Instead, one and the same individual recommended ² in his capacity as FIRB chairman ² and then approved ² in his capacity as Minister of Finance ² the grant of the exemption. For this reason, FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 were held by this Court in the Albay case to be null and void:
. . . , the FIRB, under its charter, Presidential Decree No. 776, had been empowered merely to "recommend" tax exemptions. By itself, it could not have validly prescribed exemptions or restore taxability. Hence, as of June 11, 1984 (promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1931), NAPOCOR had ceased to enjoy tax exemption privileges. 13
Such arguments are no longer tenable. Albay has since been modified and superseded by Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., 14 where this Court En Banc expressly ruled that FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 are valid:
. . . FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 . . . were issued in compliance with the requirement of Section 2, P.D. No. 1931, whereby the FIRB should make the recommendation subject to the approval of "the President of the Philippines and/or the Minister of Finance." While said Resolutions do not appear to have been approved by the President, they were nevertheless approved by the Minister of Finance who is also duly authorized to approve the same. In fact it was the Minister of Finance who signed and promulgated said resolutions. The observation of Mr. Justice Sarmiento in the dissenting opinion that FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 which were promulgated by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda, Jr. and Minister of Finance Cesar E. A. Virata, as Chairman of FIRB, respectively, should be separately approved by said Minister of Finance as required by P.D. 1931 is, a superfluity. An examination of the said resolutions . . . show that the said officials signed said resolutions in the dual capacity of Chairman of FIRB and Minister of Finance. Mr. Justice Sarmiento also makes reference to the case National Power Corporation vs. Province of Albay, wherein the Court observed that under P.D. No. 776 the power of the FIRB was only recommendatory and requires the approval of the President to be valid. Thus, in said case the Court held that FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10-85 and 186 not having been approved by the President were not valid and effective while the validity of FIRB (Resolution No.) 17-87 was upheld as it was duly approved by the Office of the President on October 5, 1987. However, under Section 2 of P.D. No. 1931 of June 11, 1984, hereinabove reproduced, which amended P.D. No. 776, it is clearly provided for that such FIRB resolution, may be approved by the "President of the Philippines and/or the Minister of Finance." To repeat, as FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 were duly approved by the Minister of Finance, hence they are valid and effective. To this extent, this decision modifies or supersedes the Court's earlier decision in Albay afore-referred to. (emphasis supplied)
There can thus be no question that petitioner's tax exemptions withdrawn by PD 1931 were validly restored by FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10-85 and 1-86. Again withdrawn by EO 93, they were once more restored by FIRB Resolution No. 17-87, effective as of March 10, 1987. Moreover, this Court, in the same case of Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., reaffirmed the determination in Albay that EO 93 along with PDs 776 and were 1931 were all valid, and that FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 and the tax exemptions restored thereunder were "valid and effective." 15 The Court in Maceda also held ²
True it is that the then Secretary of Justice in Opinion No. 77, dated August 6, 1977 was of the view that the powers conferred upon the FIRB by Sections 2(a), (b), (c) and (d) of Executive Order No. 93 constitute undue delegation of legislative power and is therefore unconstitutional. However, he was overruled by the respondent Executive Secretary in a letter to the Secretary of Finance dated March 30, 1989. The
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the construction of a statute given by a department secretary.
and laid emphasis on the fact that EO 93 constituted a valid delegation of legislative power to the FIRB, thus: 16
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
The inescapable conclusion is that the tax exemption privileges of petitioner had been validly restored and preserved by said FIRB resolutions. In passing, since we have delved into Maceda (which happens to involve indirect taxes), we also make mention of the fact that one of the key issues raised in the dissenting opinions (in Maceda) was the fact that the ultimate beneficiaries of that ponencia's affirmance of the tax-exempt status of the National Power Corporation would have been the oil companies, to which the NPC would assign whatever tax refund or credit it became entitled to as a result of such ponencia, and not the NPC itself, nor the government or the public. In fact, it was even anticipated by Mr. Justice Sarmiento in his dissent that the majority ruling in Maceda would set a precedent not only for the oil companies but also for the NPC's other suppliers, importers and contractors. In contrast, the instant case involves direct ² taxes ² real property taxes ² and any tax exemption with respect thereto will obviously not be transmissible nor beneficial to any other entity but only to petitioner NPC and, rightfully, the electricity-consuming public. Respondents further contend that PD 1177, which was issued for the formulation and implementation of a national budget, repealed the tax exemption privilege granted the petitioner under RA 6395, by virtue of the PD's general repealing clause, worded as follows: 17
(A)ll laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Decree are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.
This argument is likewise bereft of merit. It will be noted from the foregoing chronological presentation that Section 10 of PD 938 amended Section 13 of RA 6395, the petitioner's charter, by converting the various tax exemptions therein into a general exemption from all forms of taxes, direct and indirect. This state of exemption from taxes subsisted even with the enactment of PD 1931 in 1984. It cannot then be successfully argued that petitioner's tax-exempt status was revoked in 1977 by PD 1177. Besides, this Court has consistently held that "(r)epeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed.
7160. every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if. The properties in question comprise the site of the entire Agus II Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex. as amended. petitioner has always been exempted from taxes. PD 380 and PD 938. Section 40 (a) of the Real Property Tax Code. Consequently. 938 and Section 40 (a) of the Real Property Tax Code. expressly exempts them from such tax. Said section provides: Exemptions from Real Property Tax. Title Four of Book IV. that this exemption shall not apply to real property of the abovenamed entities the beneficial use of which has been granted. though repealed by the Local Government Code in its paragraph (c). however. It can be noted.D. in this Decision. to a taxable person. Section 534. 24 . but also logically unassailable. 19 On account thereof. PD 464. and that petitioner is mandated to devote all its returns from capital investment and excess revenues from operations to its expansion. These are government properties. rule upon the effect (if any) of Republic Act No. 20 was still good law during the period the exemption was being claimed in the instant case. and to enable petitioner to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance of the state policy on electrification and power generation. the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. wholly owned by petitioner and devoted directly and solely for public service and utilized in the implementation of the state policy of bringing about the total electrification of the country at the least cost to the public. which generates and supplies relatively cheap electricity to the island of Mindanao. 1-86 and 17-87 are void. the assessment and levy on (as well as the sale of) the properties of petitioner by respondents were null and void for having been in made in violation of Section 10 of P. ² The exemption shall be as follows: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions and any government-owned corporation so exempt by its charter. xxx xxx xxx The exemption is not only legally defensible. At this juncture. for consideration or otherwise." 18 Main Issue: Subject Properties Exempt From Realty Taxes Aside from the FIRB Resolutions above discussed. we merely make mention of the fact that the exemption claimed by petitioner is partly based on PD 464 which. 21 Nullity of the Auction Sale of Petitioner's Properties Inasmuch as the realty tax assessment levied against and auction sale of petitioner's properties had been premised on respondents' erroneous belief that FIRB Resolutions Nos. by any reasonable construction.Hence. 10-85. through the development of power from all sources to meet the needs of industrial development and rural electrification. they can be reconciled. from RA 6395. that petitioner's non-profit character has been maintained throughout its existence. 1984 to December 31. Provided. there is yet another cogent reason why the properties in question are not subject to realty tax. we hasten to point out that the foregoing ruling is solely with respect to the purported realty tax liabilities of petitioner for the period from June 14. We shall not. upon petitioner's tax-exempt status. 1989. the judicial declaration of the validity of said resolutions ipso jure renders such assessment and sale void. otherwise) known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Re: Mr. and shall state . in favor of respondent province. The properties in this case being exempt from payment of realty taxes. . Section 73 of the Real Property Tax Code. Davide. . and that thereafter the full title to the property will be and remain with the purchaser. to satisfy. As clearly spelled out above. . vs. and by respondent provincial treasurer at 3:00 p. Notice of delinquency in the payment of the real property tax. he is reiterating Mr. there were never any taxes. Justice Hilario G. 65. is suggesting in his Dissenting Opinion that we reexamine Maceda vs. Justice Davide's Dissent Mr. it is more than patent that such precipitate action was prompted not in the least by respondents' anticipation that this Court was about to act on petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. . respectively. Such notice shall specify the date upon which the tax became delinquent. or the tax shall have been judicially set aside. 22 of January 22. and cannot vest title over the said real properties nor the hydroelectric power plant complex built upon them. This is borne out by Section 65 of the Real Property Tax Code. ² Upon the real property tax or any installment thereof becoming delinquent. . after the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds of the province. Further. Section 73 provides in part: Sec. As these arguments were 25 . The respondents' all-too-obvious attempt at rendering nugatory and inutile any injunctive relief this Court may grant is useless and brings them only rebuke and condemnation. as amended. In short. the provincial or city treasurer shall immediately cause notice of the fact to be posted . is of no moment. except real property mentioned in subsection (a) of Section forty hereof . or an hour and an hour and a half.The assessment of realty tax being void. Ordinarily. Clearly. The fact that the telegraphic temporary restraining order issued by this Court was received by the respondent governor of Lanao del Sur at 2:30 p. by virtue of which respondent Provincial Treasurer was authorized to sell real property at auction: Sec.m. and several hours after the close of the auction sale. delinquent or otherwise. subject only to the right of the delinquent taxpayer or any other person in his behalf to redeem the sold property within one year from the date of sale. the entire delinquent real property will be sold at public auction. Macaraig 23 and revert back to the old doctrine in National Power Corp. . Jr. Albay. 73. . the province or city treasurer shall advertise the sale at public auction of the entire delinquent real property. petitioner never became delinquent in the payment of said taxes to respondent province. excludes properties of the petitioner from advertisement of real properties to be sold at public auction. Justice Sarmiento's own dissent in Maceda that Resolutions 10-85 and 1-86 were not valid acts of the FIRB and thus could not confer any tax exemption on NPC. Advertisement of sale of real property at public auction. 1991. ² After the expiration of the year for which the tax is due. the power to sell at public auction is premised on the real property tax or any portion thereof first becoming delinquent. and the latter never acquired any right to sell nor to purchase the said properties at auction. this Court would have been overjoyed to hear about said Register of Deeds (or any government functionary for that matter) moving with blinding speed. no such delinquency was possible to begin with. to satisfy all the taxes and penalties due and the costs of sale.m. legally and equitably rooted in and proceeding from the foregoing discussion is the ineludible conclusion that the auction sale and registration of subject properties are totally bereft of any legal basis and therefore null and void. except that in this case. 24 Basically. that unless the tax and penalties be paid before the expiration of the year for which the tax is due.
86) pursuant to Sec. such as the economic crisis triggered by the loss of confidence in the Philippine government as a result of the Aquino assassination. 4. Justice Emilio A. for any reason. 6. Romero. 5. particularly those affecting its tax exemption privileges. When EO 93 (series of 1986) was issued by President Aquino. Auditor General (15 SCRA 569 ). 1977. there was no violation of the rule under the 1973 Constitution that "no law granting a tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Batasang Pambansa". 2 of PD 1931 issued on June 11. Marcos was compelled to issue PD 1931 using his Amendment 6 powers. Gancayco in his ponencia therein. it was she delegating her power to the FIRB. and effectively affirmed the earlier Decision promulgated on May 31. inasmuch as PD 1931 was not passed by the said legislative body but by then President Marcos under his Amendment 6 powers. The FIRB did not create NPC's tax exemption status but merely restored it. which led to the moratorium on and rescheduling of foreign debt payments. it denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Maceda for lack of merit. the Interim Batasang Pambansa failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter which required immediate action. 1984. she was exercising both executive and legislative powers. the same were effectively restored by the Minister of Finance upon recommendation of the FIRB (via Resolutions Nos. This was so since NPC was not asking to be granted tax exemption privileges for the first time. Among the most significant holdings in the said Resolution are the following: 1." This was the Resolution 26 penned by Mr. 26 . 25 In any event. there was no power delegated to her. which for purposes of EO 93 is a delegate of the legislature. In brief. but merely to have its previous tax exemptions restored. but also when there existed a grave emergency or a threat thereof. Under Amendment No. former President Marcos could issue decrees not only when. Moreover. Justice Rodolfo A. Bidin. Justice Gancayco's 7-5-2 ponencia was strengthened two years later by what could be termed as "Maceda ² Part II. there was no problem of former President Aquino sub-delegating her power. an indebtedness which mushroomed to P12 billion in total domestic indebtedness and US$4 billion in total foreign loans as of the time of the issuance of PD 938. 10-85 and 186 were both legally and validly issued by the FIRB pursuant to PD 1931. Mr. Promulgated on June 8. A chronological review of the relevant NPC laws. Such exemption was deemed necessary to enable it to pay its indebtedness. will demonstrate that it has been the lawmaker's intention all throughout that the NPC be made completely tax exempt from all forms of taxes ² direct and indirect. 10-85 and 1. then. FIRB Resolutions Nos. 1991. It is clear that NPC had been granted tax exemption privileges for both direct and indirect taxes under PD 938. In the context of the serious debtrescheduling emergency.1 billion in foreign debt as a result of the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Thus. 3. for one. NPC. EO 93 as a delegating law was complete in itself and met the standards set in Pelaez vs. Clearly then. PD 1931 was validly and properly issued. 1993. Regalado. Indubitably. Thus the same person acting in a dual capacity recommending and approving said tax exemption restorations cannot be deemed to violate procedural due process. There is no problem of "violation of due process" when FIRB Resolutions Nos. Nocon and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa and Justices Feliciano. had US$2. rather. While the NPC lost its duty and tax exemptions as a result of the enactment of PD 1177 on July 30. 6. 1085 and 1-86 were approved by the Minister of Finance after the same were recommended by him in his capacity as Chairman of FIRB. Bellosillo and Melo. 2.extensively passed upon by this Court and sufficiently rebutted by Mr. we shall no longer answer them point by point here.
Padilla and Quiason) took no part. Co. Additionally. Undoubtedly. No. as sought by respondents. 455 (1944) (supra note 123. with two abstaining.7. respondent province has already auctioned off. We do not have a situation here comparable to Mahnich vs. or even criticisms of. 88 Law.S. It should be good for more than one day only. Sarmiento in his original dissent. (Screws vs. 561. should the FIRB resolutions be deemed void. this Court to wishes to emphasize ² as a matter of judicial policy ² the necessity of upholding the authoritativeness and stability of its pronouncements. 11) formulated a rule of law which has become the basis of federal enforcement in this important field. We take this occasion to remind the Commission to be more judicious in its actions and decisions and avoid imprudent volte face moves that the undermine the public's faith and confidence in it. it would seriously impair the capacity of the National Power Corporation to fulfill its statutory mandate to carry out the "total electrification of the Philippines through the development of power from all sources to meet the needs of industrial development and rural electrification. we ruled the subject FIRB Resolutions to be null and void. thus: . United States. No. 325 U. our pronouncements. Epilogue Quite apart from resolving the legal merits of this case. 1984 up to the present. The rule adopted in that case was formulated after mature consideration. While in Albay. Cruz maintained his original dissent.S. the said Decision.. "Maceda Part II". We add only to the instability and uncertainty of the law if we revise the meaning of Section 20 to meet the exigencies of each case coming before us. would not only be legally untenable and subversive of doctrinal stability but would also lead to disastrous practical consequences. Griño-Aquino and Davide. Comelec. 96. purchased and caused to be registered in its name the subject real properties of petitioner on which the Agus II Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex is built. while J. This is certainly stronger than the seven-five-two vote in the original Maceda decision. as mentioned earlier. joined J. ed. Two justices (JJ. 28 where we chided the public respondent. . Definitely. Ct. 19) where we overuled a decision demonstrated to be a sport in the law and inconsistent with what preceded and what followed.. Thus it would be apropos to quote Mr. 321 U. After all has been said and done.) 27 Consistent with the above. as affirmed by the aforementioned Resolution. we deem it more important to stress that the decisions of this Court are reached after due deliberation upon and consideration of all relevant issues. A denial of the tax-exempt status of NPC. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court: But beyond that is the problem of stare decisis. can no longer be considered to "carry no persuasive weight". it is clear that the NPC had its tax exemption privileges restored from June 11. S. Southern S. Thus. The far-reaching consequence of such eventuality would not be difficult to imagine. four against. 112.. The construction given Section 20 (of the Criminal Code) in the Classic Case (supra note 128. . While we are not necessarily averse to arguments against. That makes eight in favor. The Classic case was not the product of hasty action or inadvertence. other local government entities might even be induced to covet and grab other properties of the NPC in the guise of collecting local taxes.. It should be noted that in this case. was passed by a majority of eight justices." In the end. then the ownership of the auctioned properties including the hydro-electric plant would be legally vested in respondent province. Jr. we reversed ourselves in Maceda I and fortified such reversal through Maceda II. and JJ.. the Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from 27 . we frowned upon needless flipflops in Cabagnot vs. 64 Sup.
Separate Opinions DAVIDE. Narvasa (now C. ponente. where I unqualifiedly joined Mr. with the concurrence of Fernan. Albay (186 SCRA 198 ) declaring void FIRB Resolutions Nos. dissenting: I regret I cannot join in the majority opinion. with the latter only in the result) without any dissent (although Gancayco and Griño-Aquino.. Justice Abraham Sarmiento in his dissent. 93. Padilla. with Narvasa (now C.. A reexamination of Maceda vs. Five (Gutierrez.J. Bidin.. J. 28 . C.. Jr. Bellosillo. SO ORDERED. Macaraig (197 SCRA 771 ). and Davide. and Regalado.. J. concurring) voted to sustain the validity of the resolutions. Macaraig. and Feliciano. J. were on leave. Feliciano.. MelencioHerrera. 29 WHEREFORE. Romero. Judgment is hereby rendered: a) ENJOINING respondents and their agents from selling and disposing of the subject properties of petitioner. the Court was sharply divided in Maceda vs..J. C. Cortes.. vs. concur. Kapunan. c) ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Lanao del Sur to CANCEL the registration of the auction sale in favor of respondent province.. It may be stated that the decision in National Power Corp. Regalado and Mendoza. and Torres. (Sarmiento. Cruz. Paras. 10-85 and No. 1991 and the registration of the same as NULL AND VOID.) Melencio-Herrera. Narvasa. JR. Francisco.). has not a convinced me that FIRB Resolutions Nos. Paras. Melo. took no part).J. Sarmiento. ponente. concur in the result. Medialdea. the petition is hereby GRANTED. Upon the other hand. 10-85 and 1-86 was by an overwhelming vote of eleven. Hermosisima. JJ. 17-87 did not validly restore the tax exemption privileges of the NPC which were withdrawn by Executive Order No. and d) HOLDING that said properties including the hydroelectric power plant complex thereat remain in petitioner's ownership and control as if the assessment and auction sale never took place.J. Jr. The lapse of more than five (5) years since Maceda vs. 1-86 validly restored be withdrawn tax exemption privileges of the National Power Corporation (NPC). Cruz. Puno. Bidin. Gutierrez.. JJ. Medialdea.. and Regalado.the improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless upheavals in such interpretations and applications. JJ. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium. I also submit that FIRB Resolution No. b) DECLARING the auction sale conducted on January 22. Seven (Gancayco. Macaraig is hereby respectfully suggested. J... JJ. JJ.
composition. Mr. in his concurrent capacities as Acting Minister (Secretary) of Finance and Acting Chairman of the FIRB. or oftener at the call of the Secretary of Finance. Thus. orders or ordinances giving rise thereto. No. Constitutional provisions 2. An amplification thereon is in order.. International comity or treaty 3.. decrees.) took no part for the reasons stated therein. Local Tax Code as of its amendment by PD 426 6. Albay (Fernan. 776 provides for the creation.Jr. J. Any and all tax exemption benefits and privileges validly acquired. Two of those who concurred with Justice Sarmiento in National Power Corporation vs. associations. revocation or suspension of the enforceability of any of the abovecited statutory subsidies or tax exemption grants. Section 2 of P. considering that the former was signed only by Alfredo Pio de Roda. I In his dissent in Maceda. Jr. which shall be composed of the following officials: Chairman ² Secretary of Finance Members ² Secretary of Industry Director of the National Economic and Development Authority Commissioner of Internal Revenue Commissioner of Customs The Board may recommend to the President of the Philippines and for reasons of compatibility with the declared economic policy. The Board shall meet once a month. except those granted by the Constitution.D. National Internal Revenue Code as of its amendment by PD 34 4. exercised and granted to individuals. A Fiscal Incentives Review Board is hereby created for the purpose of determining what subsidies and tax exemptions should be modified. withdrawn. revoked or suspended.A.) dissented. 2. Multi-national corporations 29 . Virata in his concurrent capacities as Minister (Secretary) of Finance and Chairman of the FIRB.J. Statutory prescriptions bearing on ² a. the latter case carries no persuasive weight. the Board may require the assistance of any appropriate government agency or entity. Section 1 thereof grants the FIRB the power to modify any and all tax exemption benefits and privileges except those enumerated therein. corporations and entities. BOI Registered industries c. Tariff and Customs Code as of its amendment by PD 426 5.. and functions of the FIRB. and all laws. may now be modified by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board except those embraced and expressly provided hereunder. thus: Sec. and Padilla. Export Processing Zone Authority b. to wit: 1. It reads: Sec. C. while the latter was signed only by Cesar E. Justice Sarmiento held the view that FIRB Resolutions Nos. modification. 10-85 and 1086 are null and void because they were not valid acts of the FIRB. JJ. 1. To attain its objectives. the withdrawal.
e. three). partially or totally. even if seriously. 2. Jr. Any restoration of the tax exemption privilege would. No.D. Resolution No. upon recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board created under Presidential Decree No. the grant to the Minister (Secretary) of Finance of the authority or power to restore tax exemption under the same Section 2 of P. Also. can validly transact business only at a meeting attended by the required quorum (which is presumed to be the majority of the members. to be the FIRB.D.. i. However. he could. Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. 10-85 and 1-86 were presumably enacted pursuant to FIRB's authority under Section 2 of P. Service contracts on oil explorations From these provisions. The power to grant tax exemption. Resolutions Nos. .d. being merely corollary to the legislature's inherent power to tax. It is said: 30 . which is composed of five members. Paragraph 4 of Section 17. cannot be delegated except to those to whom the power to tax has been granted or delegated. since the chairmanship of the FIRB is vested in a specific person ² the Secretary of Finance ² and the decree provides for no alternate for him. No. The President of the Philippines and/or the Minister of Finance.D. considering that it is not a board resolution. 10-85 is null and void for having been signed only by Alfredo Pio de Roda. with the Secretary of Finance as the Chairman. The authority granted to the President in Section 2 of P. 776. Virata could pretend. Clearly. or otherwise revise the scope of coverage of any applicable tax and duty . 1-86 attained no better status. The aforequoted paragraph 4 of Section 17. I agree. in his concurrent capacities as merely Acting Minister (Secretary) of Finance and Acting Chairman of the FIRB. . De Roda nor Mr. then no one else other than the duly appointed Secretary of Finance can sit and act as Chairman of the FIRB. in effect. Resolution No.e. 1931 is an invalid delegation of a legislative power. Justice Cruz in his dissent in Maceda vs. and not by the board itself . since the earlier withdrawal thereof was by virtue of a complete law of withdrawal and not merely by one suspending the effects of the prior exemption. 1931 was enacted. It requires an absolute majority of ALL the Members of the Batasang Pambansa to grant tax exemption. Because then President Marcos exercised legislative power.. reproduced in paragraph 4 of Section 28 of Article VI of the present Constitution.. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 1931 to restore the tax exemption privilege is unnecessary or a surplusage. the exemptions withdrawn by Section 1 above. Neither Mr. although signed by the duly appointed Minister (Secretary) of Finance. it is obvious that the FIRB must act as a board in the exercise of its powers or in the performance of its functions. i. any one acting as such. . act as the Batasang Pambansa and grant anew tax exemptions. with the thesis of Mr. in this connection. 1931. which provides: Sec. then President Marcos could exercise legislative power under the unlamented Amendment No. Macaraig. No. At the time P. be a new grant of the privilege.D. and a vote of the majority of those constituting the quorum would be necessary for the validity of any and all board acts or resolutions. as he did several times. Article VIII of said Constitution provided as follows: (4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa. leaves no room for doubt that it is mandatory in character. The board. is hereby empowered to restore.
as amended. 93 of President Corazon C. The Fiscal Incentives Review Board created under Presidential Decree No. Under EO No. Isagani. The provisions of any general or special law to the contrary notwithstanding. and charges levied by the local government units shall accrue exclusively to them. Section 2 thereof should be read together with the preceding Section 1(f). It has thus been said that. where the Constitution does not forbid. except: xxx xxx xxx (f) those approved by the President upon the recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board. 93 the FIRB cannot. A. Under Section 5. vol. Section 5. II . . Section 192 of the Local Government Code of 1991 specifically empowers local government units to grant. 1398). tax exemptions. it may now also be exercised by the local legislative bodies. 2. No one dares argue that the Minister (Secretary) of Finance was ever constituted as a local government unit or given the powers. incentives. all tax and duty incentives granted to government and private entities are hereby withdrawn. 17-87. and ascendancy of a local government unit to be able to exercise the power to tax or the corollary power to grant tax exemptions. through ordinances duly approved. 1. . only local government units were granted the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes. the legislature. restore tax exemptions. Aquino dated 17 December 1986. 776. p. 31 . xxx xxx xxx Then Secretary Macaraig approved on 5 October 1987 FIRB Resolution No. The said withdrawal took effect on 10 March 1987. which purports to restore the tax exemption privileges of NPC that were withdrawn by Executive Order No. 17-87 was issued on 24 June 1987 under FIRB's authority conferred by Section 2 of EO No. Article X of the present Constitution strengthens further the power of local government units to tax by mandating that the guidelines and limitations which Congress may impose must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy and that the taxes. II I shall now turn to FIRB No. prestige. or reliefs under such terms and conditions as they may deem necessary. 84). which reads: Sec. of the Constitution. by itself.. Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. The Law on Taxation. 93.The power to exempt may be delegated by the legislature to the same extent it may itself exercise the power to exempt. no longer by virtue of a valid delegation as before but pursuant to a direct authority conferred by Article X. Section 5. The power of taxation is inherent in the State. but subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 17-87. Constitutional Law . is hereby authorized to: (a) Restore tax and/or duty exemptions withdrawn hereunder in whole or in part. which pertinently provides as follows: Sec. (CRUZ. Thus. Primarily vested in the national legislature. has authority to delegate to municipalities the power to exempt property from taxation to the same extent the legislature has power to exempt (COOLEY. fees. FIRB Resolution No. Section 669.
regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress convened.D. 17-87 was confirmed and approved by the President through Acting Executive Secretary Macaraig.R. executive orders. all exemptions from the payment of duties. The tax exemption privilege granted by the said Code was among those withdrawn by P. concur. administrative orders. taxes. amended or modified accordingly. another ground relied upon in the ponencia why the properties in question are not subject to real property tax. 17-87 was made before the convening of the first Congress. petitioner. III Resort to Section 40(a) of Real Property Tax Code (P. paragraph 5. decrees. 1. 1931. It was precisely for this reason that FIRB Res. No. 464). No. FIRB Res. No.D. Taken together. 15. rules. was the Presidential approval valid? I respectfully submit that it was not. G. Article XVIII).The last paragraph of Section 2 of P.D. 32 . 1177 as well as all other laws. vs. Constitution) following the first election under the constitution of the Members of Congress (Sec. respondent. because. 776 earlier quoted should also be considered. provides no relief to petitioner. It was convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987 Sec. 6. President Aquino could still exercise legislative powers pursuant to Section 6 Article XVIII of the Constitution. No. more correctly. 17-87 was approved. the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution was already convened and in session. No. Article VI. fees. Article VI of the Constitution. JJ. 1960 ELISEO SILVA. No. Its repealing clause. as a new grant of tax exemptions. It is the Presidential approval which could give life then to the Resolution as a restoration of tax exemption privilege or. I vote then to DENY the instant petition. are hereby withdrawn. provides as follows: The provisions of President Decree No. which provides: Sec. imposts and other charges heretofore granted in favor of government-owned or controlled corporations including their subsidiaries.. Padilla and Vitug. Only Congress then could have validly restored tax exemption privileges pursuant to Section 28 (4). No. Section 1 of the latter expressly provides: The provisions of special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding. by then. At the time FIRB Res. L-12446 May 20. It would have been entirely different if the Presidential approval of FIRB Res. the FIRB can only recommend. Without the approval. No. 17-87 would be absolutely ineffective. BELEN CABRERA. But.
1951. province of Batangas. 1951 granting the same was. Batangas. who had been delegated therefor by Public Service Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo. annulled by the Supreme Court (in G. Meanwhile. Aspillera violated the decision of said Court in case G. Cabrera applied for a provisional permit to continue operating her ice plant. dated January 31. whereupon Antonio Zaragosa withdrew his aforementioned opposition. L-3629.R. and thereafter. L-3629). 1951. 1951. Alitagtag. No. Tomas. or on April 11. 1951. with authority to sell his ice therein and in the municipalities of Rosario. the order of July 26.1 which ordered a rehearing before either the Commission en banc or one of the Public Service Commissioners delegated therefor by the Commission. Subsequently a trial de novo. L-3629. Tanauan. Cabrera had further excluded from her application the municipalities of Tanauan and Sto. No. 1951. upon the ground that. Opulencia and Leonor Lat. as amended on June 5. Subsequently. at which both parties introduced their respective evidence. Atty. On July 14. affirmed.R. A reconsideration of this order having been denied. No. in effect. and (3) Leoncio S. L-5162)2 for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having another rehearing and of annulling said order of July 26. 1952. Alitagtag and Ibaan. (2) Antonio Zaragosa. authorized to operate a 5ton ice plant in Tanauan. 1950. Tomas.R. this decision was. who operates a 5ton ice plant in the City of Lipa. on March 19. therefore. but had not infringed any law in considering said evidence for the resolution of the petition for a provisional permit. Commissioner Ocampo granted Cabrera's petition for a provisional permit. Batangas. province of Batangas. province of Quezon. Silva applied from the Supreme Court (G. On May 31. J. After the rendition of said decision of the Supreme court. for the reason that the Commission had not adhered thereto in admitting said evidence for the determination on the merits of the case. Cabrera had installed her 10-ton ice plant and started operation on March 15. over the objection of Silva. likewise. on October 17. with authority to sell his ice therein and in the municipalities of Malvar. upon the ground that the admission of the evidence already introduced before Atty. subject to cancellation or revocation at any time and without prejudice to such decision as may eventually be rendered on the merits of the case. for a period of fifteen (15) years from January 7. No. to which Silva objected. province of Batangas. Cabrera and the remaining oppositors presented their evidence before the Chief. Cabrera excluded the municipalities of San Juan de Bolbok and Rosario from her application. a decision was rendered authorizing Cabrera to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City. 1949. Antonio Aspillera. Thus. On appeal taken by Silva. Tanuaan. Commissioner Ocampo allowed Cabrera. Rosario. In the meantime. Legal Division. and to sell her ice in said City. Batangas. Medina for petitioner. granting respondent Belen Cabrera a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a 5-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa. 1949.Rodolfo M. Opulencia and 33 .: Petitioner Eliseo Silva seeks the review of a decision of the Public Service Commission. or on January 7. Oppositions were filed by: (1) Eliseo Silva. to re-submit the evidence formerly introduced before Atty. By a decision. filed on June 1. San Juan de Bolbok and Ibaan. in line with our decision in case G. CONCEPCION. 1950. Cuenca. under the Public Service Act then in force. Cabrera's application. and in the municipalities of Cuenca. Public Service Commission. 1950. such function could not be otherwise delegated. 1951. 1957. Aspillera. On July 26. was a for a 15-ton ice plant and covered the municipalities of Sto. we denied said petition for certiorari and ordered a trial de novo. or during the pendency of the appeal.R. dated September 20. Arsenio M. Tomas. to which the opposition of Leoncio S. Batangas. 1956. was held. who are. as well as of securing a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Cabrera from operating her ice plant. who operates a 10-ton ice plant in San Juan de Bolbok. Cabrera for respondent. and Candelaria. and was. null and void. Talisay and Sto. at the hearing of this incident and rehearing of the case.
on the other hand. 1956 "in the sense that applicant Belen Cabrera shall produce in her ice plant in Lipa City not more than 5 tons of ice daily instead of the 10 tons there authorized". On September 20. the decision appealed from says: Applicant's evidence is to the effect that Lipa is a growing and well populated city with new commercial establishments which every day a considerable supply of ice have to be consumed. there is no way of obtaining this very necessary commodity. is to the effect that there is no such demand for ice in Lipa and the other towns as testified to by applicant's witnesses but even before the war and up to the present time oppositor has never been able to sell the total output of his 5-ton plant. that applicant has operated her plant continuously and the production of her plant has been availed of totally except on occasions when the plant due too breakdown was not able to operate. Alitagtag and Ibaan. that in Tanauan 34 . that the people of Lipa have to get their ice from ice dealers and the latter have to go to other towns to buy their ice and this results not only in a higher price paid by Lipa people for the ice which they need but also in an irregular and undependable service. that there are really no businesses in Lipa which require the use of ice. The evidence of the oppositor. In this connection. which is entitled to reasonable protection against ruinous competition. who maintains that: The Public Service Commission erred in granting the certificate of public convenience to the respondent since there is no evidence to reasonably support the decision and the order of June 5. the meager evidence adduced by the respondent as against the overwhelming evidence of the petitioner showing the lack of necessity for the installation of an additional plant of any capacity in Lipa City in addition to the newly discovered evidence of the petitioner which the Public Service Commission ignored. by an order of June 5. that applicant has continued to invest large amounts in the repair and improvement of her ice plant in order to be able to operate the same to provide the public with the ice that it needs and that her actual investment on the plant is over P100. that the demand for ice in Lipa and the other towns can easily reach up to 20 or 25 tons so that the present production of 5 tons is grossly inadequate. 1957. In fact. 5-6. pp. that not only the people of Lipa but also those of the towns which are proposed to be served have a great demand for ice because these towns are close to Lipa and ice service from Lipa is easy if there were enough supply of ice in the City of Lipa. that the ice plant of the oppositor which has produced only five tons since it was installed is inadequate for the requirements of the public. but modified its decision of September 20. 1956. The case is now before us for the third time on appeal taken by Silva. the Commission rendered a decision granting Cabrera a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa and to sell her ice in that city and in the municipalities of Cuenca. 1957. (Petitioner's brief. that applicant's plant itself frequently stops operation due to the fact that there is no demand for ice is so little that there is no need for authorizing a new plant in Lipa to supply the requirements of these other towns. On motion for reconsideration and new trial filed by Silva on or about October 26. the Commission. that there is no ice plant either in Sto. that daily but more particularly on special occasions when there is an extraordinary demand for ice.) The issue thus raised by Silva is one of fact. 1956. Cuenca or Alitagtag notwithstanding the big demand for ice in these towns. denied the new trial prayed for. province of Batangas. constitutes an abuse of discretion to the prejudice and detriment of petitioner's business. and that public interests and convenience will be promoted by the grant of a regular certificate to her to operate the ice plant in Lipa. 1950.000. for a period of fifteen (15) years from January 7.Leonor Lat referred. or personal reasons and they too add to the number of people who must be provided with ice. when construed by the Public Service Commission as justifying the grant of a certificate of Public Convenience to the respondent. which hinges on the credibility and weight of the evidence introduced at the trial de novo. that many people likewise go to Lipa every day for business. Tomas.
1947. 44 Phil... vs. without counting the population of Tanauan which is now served by an ice plant in that town. Cuenca..L. It is well settled. it appears that in April. Batangas Trans. vs. 7. 85 Phil. Malvar. vs. 24971) was dismissed on October 24... We are convinced that a 5-ton production in Lipa can not be sufficient for the ice needs of the public considering the population of over 50. Public Utility Commissioner. 1947. Our records show that there is now a 10-ton plant in Tanauan operated by Opulencia and Lat and this operator is authorized. 106 Phil. we are inclined to believe the evidence of the applicant that the service of ice dealers results in higher price paid by the consumers and at the same time is not reliable and regular because these dealers do not have the obligation of bringing ice regularly. Tomas and Talisay. Tanauan. Tomas and Tanauan.000 people in the other towns of Alitagtag. May 26. among other towns. Sto. Tomas and Lipa.  4433. however. 3646) A. Co.000 people of the City. Tomas and Talisay. 53 Phil. on account 35 . upon the allegation that an increased production was demanded by the "rapid rehabilitation and advancement of the fishing industry in and around Taal Lake. Lopez vs. 328. and the evidence on record. Oppositor's authorized territory would concur with that proposed by the applicant in the towns of Lipa. the issue in this appeal boils down to whether the needs of the public in the area covered by the decision appealed from are sufficiently met by the ice plant operators therein. 539. are sufficient to bear out the conclusions of fact made in the decision appealed from. It appears from the evidence that Lipa City and the towns of Tanauan. it is urged that the proof to the contrary introduced by appellant Silva is more weighty than that of appellee Cabrera." This application (Case No.000 people. We believe. as long as there is evidence reasonably supporting such findings (Javellana vs. 56 Off. Ammen Trans. Halili et al. Public Utility Commissioner. 105 Phil. We have gone over the evidence presented by both parties at the rehearing very carefully and are of the opinion that the preponderance thereof establishes the need for permitting the applicant to operate a 10-ton plant in Lipa. Ynchausti Steamship Co vs. that applicant should only be authorized a 10-ton plant and that the town of Tanauan should not be included in her territory inasmuch as there is already in Tanauan a 10-ton ice plant. La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. Gaz. Sto. Phil.. Lapi. Apart from the facts adverted in the appealed decision. that the findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive upon this Court. Sto. Soriano. et al. brought to Lipa City" as the "province's commercial center. There is also the population of over 60. Gaz. 1950.now there is a 10-ton plant operated by Opulencia and Lat and this plant together with that of the oppositor provides all the ice that the public of Lipa and the other towns so that there is no necessity for the operation of applicant's plant. While it is true that ice is brought to Lipa by ice dealers... 118. Indeed. Valero. and we do not believe that with a 10-ton ice plant. Ibaan and Cuenca. L-2458 and L-2476. it would be necessary for the applicant to send her ice to that town. 649." as well as by "the big increase of population in said municipality and in the municipalities of Malvar. Guico. Bachrach Motor Co. 1959. from five (5) tons to ten (10) tons daily.. L-12350. Gaz. 362. plus the increased volume of agricultural products harvested in the province of Batangas and . Undoubtedly an additional plant in Lipa to serve the proven needs of the public will be more beneficial and convenient to the people of Lipa than to make them rely on service of ice dealers. 3110. Without denying the existence of evidence on the facts thus found by the Commission. 43 Phil. to our mind. Sto. Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Phil. Isip.. to sell in Tanauan. San Miguel Brewery vs. et al. 57 Off. Alitagtag and Ibaan have a total population of over 125. Co. We are convinced that the operation of applicant's 10-ton plant in Lipa will undoubtedly result in promoting public interests and convenience because thereby the ice requirements of the public which can not be met by the present plant will be adequately served. vs. 37 Off. Ship-owners' Association vs.. Silva had applied for authority to increase the capacity of his ice plant. Oppositor Silva has a 5-ton plant and is authorized to sell in Lipa.. in Tanauan. January 28. Lipa alone has a population of over 50.000. Tanauan. however.
Silva filed another application (Case No. G. without serial number. Wherefore. the Commission had more than the average opportunity and time to ascertain and elucidate the facts pertinent thereto. Bautista Angelo. in view of the number of years this case had been pending and of the incidents decided in relation thereto. defendant-appellant. 1967 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Paras. We hold that it does not. or on June 13. Labrador. with costs against petitioner. which is the subject matter of his appeal.. However. vs. also. R. and disclosed in his motion for reconsideration and new trial. Bengzon. 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code.. Cal. the Commission modified said decision by reducing to one-half (1/2) the amount of ice therein authorized to be produced by appellee Belen Cabrera. Barrera. the very appellant had urged the Public Service Commission to believe that the ice plant operators in the City of Lipa and in the municipalities mentioned in the decision appealed from can not sufficiently supply the needs of the public therein. It may not be amiss to note. in the City of Manila. as amended by Commonwealth Act No. that. Rosete and Solicitor O. plaintiff-appellee. and Gutierrez David. Philippines. 1962. after the rendition of the decision of September 20. Cabigao for defendant-appellant. Assistant Solicitor General F. That it actually gave due consideration to the opposition filed by appellant Silva and the evidence introduce by him is attested by the circumstance that in the light of the new evidence he discovered. Montemayor. In short. 22. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.: The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. 24971. C. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. Francisco P. Padilla.R. Contrary to law. soon after Cabrera had docketed her application. with six (6) rounds of ammunition. concur. No. the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik). 1949. without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14. L-22301 August 30." 36 . Alafriz. Eliseo Silva. on grounds substantially identical to those set forth in his application in Case No. FERNANDO.of Silva's failure to appear on the date set for the hearing thereof. It so ordered. C. J. 1956. the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August. 50513) for authority to increase the capacity of his ice plant from five (5) to fifteen (15) tons. therefore. J. JJ. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG. 4.
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm." Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits." Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government." The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6 The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
G.R. Nos. 24116-17
August 22, 1968
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. FERNANDO, J.:
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In two separate actions, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the validity of the distraint and thereafter the sale at public auction by the principal defendantappellee, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, of 100,000 bags of cement for the purpose of satisfying its alleged deficiency in the payment of the municipal license tax for 1960, municipal license tax for 1961 as well as the penalty, all in the total sum of P204,300.00. The lower court rendered a joint decision sustaining the validity of the action taken by defendantappellee Municipality of Naga. The case is now before us on appeal. We affirm.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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According to the appealed decision: "From all the evidence, mostly documentary, adduced during the hearing the following facts have been established. The efforts of the defendant Treasurer to collect from the plaintiff the municipal license tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Series of 1959 on cement factories located within the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, have met with rebuff time and again. The demands made on the taxpayer ... have not been entirely successful. Finally, the defendant Treasurer decided on June 26, 1961 to avail of the Civil remedies provided for under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period of ten days from receipt thereof within which to settle the account, computed as follows ...: Deficiency Municipal License Tax for 1960 P80,250.00; Municipal License Tax for 1961 - P90,000.00; and 20% Penalty - P34,050.00, stating in exasperation, "This is our last recourse as we had exhausted all efforts for an amicable solution of our problem." "1
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It was further shown: "On July 6, 1961, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the plaintiff that he was "distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of your delinquency in municipal license taxes in the total amount of P204,300.00" ... This notice was received by the acting officer in charge of the plaintiff's plant, Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his own admission. At first, he was not in accord
with the said letter, asking the defendant Treasurer for time to study the same, but in the afternoon he [acknowledged the] distraint ..." 2
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As was noted in the decision, the defendant Treasurer in turn "signed the receipt for goods, articles or effects seized under authority of Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code, certifying that he has constructively distrained on July 6, 1961 from the Cebu Portland Cement Company at its plant at Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, 100,000 bags of Apo cement in tanks, and that "the said articles or goods will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, and the proceeds thereof will be utilized in part satisfaction of the account of the said company in municipal licenses and penalties in the total amount of P204,300.00 due the Municipality of Naga Province of Cebu" ..."3
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The lower court likewise found as a fact that on the same day, July 6, 1961, the municipal treasurer posted the notice of sale to the effect that pursuant to the provisions of Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code, he would sell at public auction for cash to the highest bidder at the main entrance of the municipal building of the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines on the 27th day of July, 1961, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the property seized and distrained or levied upon from the Cebu Portland Cement Company in satisfaction of the municipal license taxes and penalties in the amount of P204,300.00, specifying that what was to be sold was 100,000 bags of Apo cement.4 No sale, as thus announced, was held on July 27, 1961. It was likewise stated in the appealed decision that there was stipulation by the parties to this effect: "1. The auction sale took place on January 30, 1962, ..."5
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In this appeal from the above joint decision, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company upholds the view that the distraint of the 100,000 bags of cement as well as the sale at public auction thereafter made ran counter to the law. As earlier noted, we do not see it that way.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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1. On the validity of the distraint - In the first two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant submits as illegal the distraint of 100,000 bags of cement made on July 6, 1961. Its contention is premised on the fact that in the letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26, 1961, requiring plaintiff-appellant to settle its account of P204,300.00, it was given a period of 10 days from receipt within which it could pay, failure to do so being the occasion for the distraint of its property. It is now alleged that the 10-day period of grace was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language of the law. According to the Revised Administrative Code: "The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon the failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint."6
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The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize and distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the time required ..." There was such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision therefore came into play.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or amend the law it has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower court did. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. That was what occurred in this case.7
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1962. with the representatives of the Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer present. 1962 is challenged in the next two errors assigned as allegedly committed by the lower court. 1962 pursuant to the distraint was null and void for being contrary to law because not more than twenty days have elapsed from the date of notice. the defendant-treasurer informed the plaintiff that an award was given to the winning bidder. and the publication or posting of such notice. certainly. On the validity of the auction sale . 1964. the sale . 1962. Ultimately. From the time that the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6." 11 chanrobles virtual law library This being a direct appeal to us. G. it is believed that the defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code... 1969 40 . but only on January 30. 1961. he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the court below.. the bidding was conducted on that day. If the sale did not take place. Under the circumstances. it was due to the requests for deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly delayed the proceedings for collection of the tax. 1962 that it was notified that the public auction sale was to take place on January 29. 1962.. as advertised. L-26712-16 December 27.000 bags of Apo cement which were under constructive distraint . 12 chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE.. It is the established rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court. According to plaintiff-appellant: "On this score alone. but on the next day..M. 1962." chanrobles virtual law li brary Why such a contention could not prosper is explained clearly by the lower court in the appealed decision. After the bidding. . at 10:00 A. Plaintiff-appellant's argument is predicated on the fact that it was not until January 16. Only two bidders submitted sealed bids. was illegal as it was not made on the time stated in the notice.. which fixed January 30." 10 chanrobles virtual law library There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of the lower court is otherwise.. the decision of the lower court dated 23."9 The reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court cannot be disputed.. is affirmed in toto. 1962. the said defendant issued the corresponding notice of sale. With costs against plaintiff-appellant. January 30. 1962. posting the said notice in public places and delivering copies thereof to the interested parties in the previous notice. It is its view that under the Revised Administrative Code8 the sale of the distrained property cannot take place "less than twenty days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property [distrained] . as stated in the notice of sale. Thus: "On January 16.2.R. . only questions of law being brought to us for review. and the said taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain that the required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the tax collector was already wellpublicized for many months. No.The validity of the auction sale held on January 30. January 30...chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The point is further made that the auction sale took place not on January 29. more than twenty days have elapsed. plaintiff-appellant must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive what the lower court found as established by the evidence. the allegation that there was no observance of the twenty-day period hardly carries conviction. 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30. 1962. On January 19. 1962. 1962. Thus: "With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on January 30. the defendant Treasurer informed Garaygay that he would cause the readvertisement for sale at public auction of the 100.. as the date of sale. on July 27.
In support of their request for condonation. 1966. BOARD OF MISSION OF THE EVANGELICAL UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH. TEEHANKEE. after which the motion would be deemed submitted for decision. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. 1964 separate petitions with respondent Commission. Sedfrey A.42 for the period from September. They further claimed that the penalties assessed against them appear to be inequitable. respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that "the Social Security Commission has no power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance.80. manifesting that they had adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities in its program of social amelioration. 1958 to September. J. On May 25. with which they are in complete accord. Ordoñez for petitioners. petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument. COMMISSION OF ECUMENICAL MISSION ON RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.446. Rosete and Solicitor Buenaventura J. Barredo. and respondent System filed its memorandum on August 4. 1963. 1966. but upon advice by certain Social Security System officials. respondent filed its reply thereto of June 22. On September 22. UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTERS. they were not subject to coverage under the Philippine Social Security System. They instead filed their consolidated amended petition dated May 7. 1958 to September. 1963. citing several resolutions of respondent Commission which in the past allegedly permitted condonation of such penalties. BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA. 1966. Respondent Commission set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing and oral argument on July 20. as follows: 41 . on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act1 vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties. vs. Petitioners stood on their original memorandum.UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY. contesting the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious missionary work in the Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners. and in turn. the Commission gave the parties a further period of fifteen days to submit their Memorandum consolidating their arguments. respondents. Guerrero for respondents. 1963. petitioners commendably desisted from further contesting said coverage. they paid to the System in October. representing their back premiums for the period from September. 1966.341. petitioners. Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. it has no legal authority to condone. The five petitioners originally filed on November 20. After several hearings. we uphold the Commission's Order dismissing the petition before it. 1966. the total amount of P81. 1966.: In this appeal from an order of the Social Security Commission. 1966. praying for condonation of assessed penalties against them for delayed social security premium remittances in the aggregate amount of P69. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. Upon petition of the System's Counsel. to which petitioners filed their opposition of June 15. waive or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the Social Security Act. respondent Commission issued its Order dismissing the petition. however. At the hearing. petitioners alleged that they had labored under the impression that as international organizations.
" WHEREFORE. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out petitioners' posture that the respondent Commission should assume. 1966. he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid . 1. that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties.75 33.42 Upon failure of the petitioners to comply with this Order within the period specified herein. has been reiterated in Commission Resolution No.253.928.2 No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement of the law's mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the 42 . the amount of P69. cited by the parties. . waiving or relinquishing such penalty.42 representing the penalties payable by them. the petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the respondent System. The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security Act peremptorily provides that: SEC 22. the discretionary authority of condoning.353. We find no error in the Commission's action.04 P 69. as against the mandatory imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances. broken down as follows: United Christian Missionary Society Board of Mission of the Evangelical United Brothers Church United Church Board for World Ministers Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations Board of Foreign Mission of the Reformed Church in America TOTAL P5.Considering all of the foregoing.446.891.53 7. "Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contribution shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the system. This Court is thus confronted on appeal with this question of first impression as to whether or not respondent Commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premium remittances. it cannot legally do so. in their respective pleadings. a warrant shall be issued to the Sheriff of the Province of Rizal to levy and sell so much of the property of the petitioners as may be necessary to satisfy the aforestated liability of the petitioners to the System. within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order. as herein prescribed. 536.019. series of 1964. this Commission finds.446. dated August 18. . 878.36 10. and so holds.74 12. ² (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding sections shall be remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Remittance of premiums. The policy enunciated in Commission Resolution No. wherein the Commission adopting the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation of the Social Security Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone. waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act.
including condonation of penalties. 1966 makes of record that since its Resolution No. the Commission. 4. in that they are non-profit religious organizations who minister to the spiritual needs of the Filipino people. and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature. the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium payments by force of law. Nevertheless." 43 . respondent Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same. which it reiterated in another resolution dated August 18. since the law makes no distinction between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. 1966. sickness. and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such condonations would be of no avail. provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republic's declared policy "to develop. pursuant to the recommendation of its Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation. waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act. however. good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant."4 Being a mere trustee of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members. They charge the Commission with grave abuse of discretion in not having uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting condonation of penalties. that would diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an express or specific authority therefor. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted condonation of penalties on delayed premium payments. Section 4 of the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the Commission. for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's reading into the law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein. whereby it is empowered to "perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the proper enforcement of this Act. there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute. Nowhere from said powers of the Commission may it be shown that the Commission is granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Act. series of 1964. The prescribed penalty is evidently of a punitive character. and that their delay in the payment of their premiums was not of a contumacious or deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a well-founded belief that the Social Security Act did not apply to their missionaries. without a review of the pertinent records of said cases. before the Court. it "has no power to condone. in its appealed Order of September 22. From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed. The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not. The Court is therefore bound to uphold respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of social security premiums. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the respondent Commission's power of direction and control over the system."3 In this concept. establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers against the hazards of disability. as provided in Section 3 of the Act. Moreover. old age and death. it does have the authority to condone the penalty for late payment under Section 4 (1). assuming such conclusion to be correct. it had definitely taken the legal stand. 5. They invoke more compelling considerations of equity in their cases. 3. that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties. 536.premiums to the System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. 2." The law does not bear out this contention. the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us to be "funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government.
The mere fact that there was a pending appeal in the Court of Appeals from an identical ruling of the Commission in an earlier case as to its lack of authority to condone penalties does not mean. Esperanza Valenzoga for respondents-appellees.7 The Commission's action has thus paved the way for a final ruling of the Court on the matter.. JJ.:. therefore."5 Petitioners' lack of intent to deliberately violate the law may be conceded. Acosta for petitioners-appellant.J. Dizon and Barredo.. 1966 of their original petitions in November. as in fact they filed their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum. the Court had already ruled in effect against their contest three years earlier. Alaric P. ACCORDINGLY. by the Commission in issuing its Order dismissing the petition for condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums. 7. 2519. when it held in Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. JJ. as petitioners contend. concur. Makalintal. the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. and was borne out by their later withdrawal in May. G. J. Reyes. Zaldivar Sanchez. however. J. The point. Social Security Commission6 that the legislature had clearly intended to include charitable and religious institutions and other non-profit institutions. that the Commission was thereby shorn of its authority and discretion to dismiss their petition on the same legal ground.6.B.R. Castro and Fernando. as claimed by petitioners in their second and last error assigned. Concepcion. BARREDO. This would have been the prudent course. petitioners-appellants. No. The proper procedure would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their liability therefor. J. without pronouncement as to costs. C. THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL.. the Court has held time and again that "it is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents. considering that the Act provides in Section 22 (b) thereof that the premiums which the employer refuses or neglects to pay may be collected by the System in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code. vs. QUIJANO. The Commission cannot be faulted for this correct legal position. and that at the time they instituted their petitions in 1964 contesting their coverage.. 1964 contesting their social security coverage.L. thereby preventing the penalty from attaching. Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in its Special Civil Case No. within the scope and coverage of the Social Security Act. took no part. respondents-appellees. 1970 GEDEON G. such as petitioners. in that they failed for five years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and thus incurred the 3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late payment. No grave abuse of discretion was committed. dismissing the petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of 44 . Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission and were given due opportunity to adduce all their arguments. L-26419 October 16. Granting that it had erred in the past in granting condonation of penalties without legal authority. is that they followed the wrong procedure in questioning the applicability of the Social Security Act to them. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T.
"(b) the presentation of a duly approved building permit. which shall be secured by the mortgagee. receipts of all materials used and that there are no unpaid labor or unpaid materials.00 shall be released only after:. to wit: I. The said appealed decision was based on the following: STIPULATION OF FACTS. to the following conditions:. when completed. shall not be less than P18.preliminary injunction filed therein by the herein petitioners-appellants Gedeon G. That the mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent-bank on March 23. (2) That the subsequent releases shall not be more than 100% of the value of the construction completed in excess of P6. thru counsels. 45 . IV. hereby submit the foregoing stipulation of facts. III. That the said loan of P19. That the petitioners' urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board Resolution No.. and to restrain the herein respondent-appellee ex-oficio sheriff of the province of Misamis Occidental from proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale of the real properties the above-named appellant spouses had mortgaged with the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure the loan aforementioned.00. "(a) the execution and registration of the mortgage contract. Quijano to compel the herein respondent-appellee Development Bank of the Philippines to accept said petitioners-appellants' back pay certificate payment of their loan from the said appellee Bank. II.00. "(c) the construction has been started and the value of the work done amounted to P6. series of 1947. 2533 on April 30.500.000. (4) That the amount of insurance of the building.200. Quijano and Eugenio T.00.500. "(1) That the amount of P4. The undersigned parties.500. (5) That the construction and painting of the building shall be completed within 120 days from the date of the mortgage contract. 1953. in the amount of P19.00.00 was to be received by the petitioners in several releases. 1954. predecessor-in-interest of the herein respondent-bank. "(d) the submission of the certificate of title covering Psu-136173. in accordance with its Board Resolution No. that all releases shall be made against the payroll of workers engaged in the project. subject among others.500. 3395. (3) That a sufficient amount may be withheld until the building is completed and painted and found in accordance with the plans and specifications submitted. That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC). free form any encumbrance and "(e) the submission of evidence showing full payment of current estate taxes.
"VII.1 read as follows:. "VI. out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to Republic Act No.(6) That the release of this loan is subject to the availability of funds. 1965. 2. That the respondent-bank. "VIII. 1953. acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right to the Salaries and wages as provided in section one hereof and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant. 1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved. provided that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at 46 . 897 was enacted on June 20. the trial court dismissed the petition. 897. the original back pay law. 1953 to Republic Act 304. 1966. as holder of Acknowledgment No. and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter. without the necessity of republication of the notice of sale. SEC. 897 on June 20. after advising petitioner Gedeon Quijano of the application for foreclosure filed by the respondent-bank. and directed respondent sheriff to proceed and continue with the public auction sale of the property mortgaged in accordance with the foreclosure application of respondent Development Bank of the Philippines after due notice to petitioners. That the first release of P4. thru his deputies. "IX. That on July 27. 1954 with the Register of Deeds of Misamis Occidental at Oroquieta. 1965. thru its Ozamis City Branch. thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the non-acceptance of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20. and that acting on the application of the respondent-bank. petitioners' sole assignment of error is that: "The trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the petitioners-appellants was not subsisting when Republic Act No." The appeal has no merit. 10181. otherwise. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall. 897. 1954.000. That as of July 31. In their appeal.59. the Amendatory Act of Julie 20. including interests. That the parties herein agree to transfer the auction sale scheduled for January 16. 1966 to February 18. 1966. petitioner Gedeon Quijano." Upon these facts and the submission of the parties that the only issue is whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. The pertinent portions of the controlling provisions of the aforementioned Back Pay Law. 1953. the Provincial Sheriff. scheduled the public auction sale for January 18. (7) That the lien appearing on the face of the title shall be cancelled. Luciana Jimenez shall sign as co-mortgagor. as amended by Republic Act No. That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries and wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized. 1965. was P13. That the respondent-bank. wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of P14. "X. the outstanding obligation of the petitioners with the respondent-bank. an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners. as already stated.00 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank. and under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance. "V. upon application of all persons specified in section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Amendatory Act. that this mortgage contract was registered on March 23. and certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance without interests: Provided. filed on October 14.200 was made on April 29.983.
or the corporations owned or controlled by the Government. however.00 representing the portion of the loan released before the passage of Republic Act No. the amounts released in July. that:..000... In that case.00 ² balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him later than June.têñ. The defendant may be compelled to accept a back pay certificate in payment of obligations subsisting when the Amendatory Act was approved (Sec. This action was dismissed by the trial court and upon appeal to this Court. The releases of the balance of the agreed loan were made dependent on certain conditions (see additional conditions mentioned in paragraph 4 of the stipulation of facts. 1953.000. Republic Act 897). while the subsequent releases covering the P9. and furthermore. It is indeed settled that under the above provisions. So. supra) among which is the availability of funds.00 on May 27. Later. it limited its acceptance only to the amount of P5. 897. It appears. 1953. Pursuant to said agreement.00 remained unpaid. Rodriguez received the first release in the sum of P5. 1953. 1954. ". Our ruling in the case of Rodriguez vs. The Bank refused at first to accept the said tender of payment in certificate.500.00 from the date of the agreement. or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. they executed the mortgage contract only on March 23. Rodriguez obtained a loan from the said Development Bank of the Philippines to be received by him in several releases and to be paid later in installments. that the release of the amount of the said loan of P19. legally be compelled to accept the certificates. Under these circumstances. 897. and when it accepted the same later. as did the trial court. the Government or any of its agencies does not have any discretion in the acceptance of back pay certificates.000.000. will not entitle the bank to hold the appellant liable for the unreleased amounts. 2. that appellants did not avail of it until much later. Rodriguez paid the installments as they fell due. in other words.00 was to be made in installments and subject to compliance with certain conditions by said appellants. or to any citizen of the Philippines. Rodriguez instituted an action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Davao to compel the Bank to accept his back pay certificate in payment of his whole outstanding obligation or. under the terms and conditions specified in the loan agreement. however. . hence when. When a balance of about P10. as in the instant case.£îhqwâ£ Republic Act 897 was approved on 47 . although the amount of the back pay certificate offered by Rodriguez was more than sufficient to cover the total unpaid balance of the loan. 2 when they are used by the applicants or original holders themselves for the settlement of any of the obligations or liabilities specifically enumerated in the law. the dismissal was affirmed upon the following rationale:. which corporation may not. 1953. Non-compliance with any of these conditions will not entitle the appellant to the release of the balance of the agreed loan and conversely. even for the portions of the loan corresponding to the releases made after June 20. as in fact.3 It is equally clear. such back pay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of an obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said amendatory Act on June 20. Development Bank of the Philippines 4 is controlling. It can not be said that appellant became indebted to the Bank for the total amount of P14. who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement. that the same provisions expressly require that the obligations ² for which certificates of indebtedness may be accepted as payments of ² must be subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. we hold. 1953 and thereafter cannot be considered as obligations subsisting in June.000. 1953.the time of the approval of this Amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities. Rodriguez offered to pay the said outstanding balance of the loan with his back pay certificate. It is true that appellants' application for an urban real estate loan was approved by appellee bank on April 80.. Consequently. 1953.
appellants did not thereby incur any obligation to pay the same. notwithstanding the approval by the appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (RFC) of appellants' loan application on April 30. however. or their wives and orphans. because that Act. 961963). RFC (G. No. limited any such application to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act".5 No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to here a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. 98 Phil. Herein appellants' situation is even worse than that of Rodriguez.6 Thus. PNB. 1948. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. appears to have subsisted prior to the approval of Republic Act No. whereas the obligation of appellants to pay the same could not have arisen until after the amount of the loan has been actually released to them. to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans. to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war. Undoubtedly. 30. on June 18. among the avowed purposes of the said law are: "First. 1953. Sept. Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would enable "many crippled or disabled veterans. but it should be noted that under such agreement the only enforceable obligation that was created was that of the Bank to grant the loan applied for. 1953. like crippled or disabled veterans. 959. or those who had in one way or another unselfishly sacrificed or contributed to the cause of the last war" to take advantage of their back pay certificates. The defendant may not be compelled to accept plaintiff's back pay certificate in payment of the amounts released after June 20. an agreement was perfected between them and said Bank.. only after the corresponding amounts were released to appellants after March 23. page 74." this Court has ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18. 48 . 2nd Congress. be said that the said loan was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. therefore. 1953.June 20. No costs. and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the last war. interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. in terms. vs. and said release was even subject to their compliance with certain conditions specified in the mortgage contract executed after the approval already of Republic Act 897. they could not validly seek to discharge it by application of their back pay certificate under Republic Act 304. 1958) relied upon by appellant is irrelevant. 1953. 1948. (Sec." The case of Sabelino v. and it cannot.têñ. 1953. as the mortgage indebtedness sought to be paid with appellee's back pay certificate therein." (Congressional Record No. 897.R. 1954. 2)7 WHEREFORE. as quoted in Florentino. as contended by appellants. We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the abovequoted provision of law. even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law.£îhqwâ£ On the other hand. . 1953. does deserve sympathy. It may be truly said. that when their application for the loan was approved by the appellee Bank on April 30. 1954 did such obligation attach. the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Here appellants actually availed of their approved loan only about nine (9) months after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the corresponding releases thereof were received by appellants only after the execution of the mortgage contract on March 23. This Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms.. no discretion is left to the judiciary. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms. Since the debt of appellants was contracted on November 24. L-11790. and to their wives and orphans. Secondly. May 6. 897 on June 20. when said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act. 4th Regular Session. et al. for indeed. 61. 1948 cannot come within its purview.
The facts are not in dispute. NARVASA.. Dizon. JR. the limits of its applicability. 9010941. No. TRAMPE. Manila. AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL. Makalintal. 1990 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. 1990 SPS. AURELIO C.. Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. J. the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103. 1990. even among laymen. G. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue. Jr. G.J. in Criminal Case No. petitioners. No.Reyes. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C..L. C. 1990. Quezon City. in his capacity as Presiding Judge. certainly. 92164 June 5. AND EULOGIO C. J. he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to 49 . Act. SALAZAR.B. none. People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine. REBECCO E. ABESAMIS. Teehankee. without bail. 92163 June 5. The following morning..R. charging Senator Enrile. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. Fernando.R. NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM. and HON. if not the validity of its doctrine. MANANQUIL. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON. JAIME W. and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10.. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE. it would Beem. Villamor and Makasiar. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil. Trampe. vs. Branch 103. petitioner vs. concur. To be sure. 103]. GEN. BRIG. Zaldivar. In the afternoon of February 27. ABESAMIS. none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.: Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence. JUAN PONCE ENRILE. which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question. February 28. PANLILIO. PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. Regional Trial Court. FFRDINAND R. the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio. where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate. JJ. Castro. respondents. respondents. 1990.
hence was denied due process. and (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph. with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which. through counsel. which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48. 1990. (c) denied his right to bail. of rebellion. Edgardo Dula Torres. or having been: (a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books. after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing. on March 6. respectively. 3 On the same date of February 28. No. the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another. whereas the information against Sen. 1990. therefore. Enrile et al. 5 On March 5. 1990. Revised Penal Code. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's coaccused. but not in furtherance. The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition.R. G.000. The parties were heard in oral argument. cash or surety bonds of P100. returnable March 5. 92163. The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options: (a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion. 50 . the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G. the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio. as scheduled. Gen.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200.000. Senator Enrile. and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses. Stated otherwise. and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling. 1990). and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios. 4 The Court issued the writ prayed for. No. alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being. 1990.00 (for the Panlilios). filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2. (b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. within 24 hours from notice. 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6. and raised similar questions. so-called. Brig.R. this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings. it should not apply.the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District.
The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition. as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case: There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. of rebellion. if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution. the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48. its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant. p. the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is. (c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course.000 and prision mayor. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro: La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932). Presidential Decree No. esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo. 10-A In the view of the majority. under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him. but not in furtherance. namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion. or should be. exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason. acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed. in other words. the incumbent President. 2168. depending upon the modifying circumstances present. reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. thereof. in the absence of aggravating circumstances.) 51 . or on the occasion. and (2) for the crime of murder. said provision. the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. However. If murder were not complexed with rebellion. On the first option. eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. On the second option. in the corresponding period.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana. absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing. saw fit to repeal. the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender. the ruling remains good law. which includes rebellion). but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character. depending upon the modifying circumstances present. even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Upon the other hand. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago. and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done). of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3. among others. or as a necessary means for the commission. would be unfavorable to the movant. Thus."' 11 In thus acting. but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor. a fine not exceeding P20. the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion.(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance.
Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into. se sancionaran los delitos por separado. hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse. o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be. there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. This. as amended in 1908 and then in 1932. the Court said: In conclusion. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act. the murders. much less adjudged. in such case. however. Vol. said defendant may be allowed bail. penando separadamente los delitos. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a 13 similar punishment. as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion. The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one. reading: Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos. if one act constitutes two or more offenses. under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. 52 . that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. p. on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. if imposed separately. Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite. arsons and robberies. which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof.HHH. Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo. (Rodriguez Navarro. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. simple rebellion. 2163) and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment. II. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other. and that. Hernandez. in Hernandez. Thus. Indeed. 12 The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court. to our mind. En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. therefore. we hold that. that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H. that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is. does not write finis to the case. arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants. affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder. imposed in its maximum period. restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not. Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense.We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48).
the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 15 This Court has already ruled. and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion. not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books. contrarily. and even then. would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis. Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. 18 There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose. claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. the information charges a non-existent crime or. the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. or could not have. and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors. that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. whether these went into the substance of what is 53 . 2. so complied. that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. of the Constitution. III. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge. it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked. nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case. which is bailable before conviction. sec. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint. while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. culminating in the filing of the questioned information. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise. Read in the context of Hernandez. that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination. theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling. gives no reason to assume that he had not. however. if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty. which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. in violation of Art.
is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through. the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and. 90-10941. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court. this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail. that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1. by the Court of Appeals on review. It may be that in the light of contemporary events. 1990. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. from deciding them. though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation. Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition. none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court. were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court. all apparently taking their cue from it. except this Court. in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.R. that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing. pleas like the present. bombings. and if it erred in that matter. but will give short shrift to. the Court now decides the same on the merits. they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings. that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G. Parenthentically. But in so doing. incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him. denied an opportunity to correct its error. 19 It is. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance. the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law. No. none. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth.charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him. kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the 54 . in a proper case. not even the sanctity of human life. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail. in any event. There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts.
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail. that proposition could have been plausible. remains good law and. Gancayco and Regalado. SO ORDERED. the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. despite periodic challenges to it that. are on leave. No. the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion. No. a crime which does not exist 55 . Cortes and Griño-Aquino.. for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time.. Hernandez. as a matter of right. thus. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character. an ongoing rebellion.. however. should remain undisturbed. and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder. J. I take exception to the view. JJ. Hopefully. 92163. before final conviction. either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby. Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter. JJ. the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only. J. the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. which is properly within its province. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion.R. but by and large attributable to.news these days. 92164 but took no part in G.R. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners. ironically. WHEREFORE. The Court has no power to effect such change. It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.. No pronouncement as to costs. so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. Cruz. as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military. concur. have only served to strengthen its pronouncements. Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA. which has been with us for the past three decades. concurring: I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine. Medialdea. or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of. concurs in G.
ascend the steps of the judicial ladder. In this case.in our statute books. habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code. No. The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion. which followed in the wake of this Petition. The Court. People. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Even if it had authority to act at the outset." Having been so 56 . 187 on 5 June 1987. to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. Quilen. for being "repressive. The proliferation of cases in this Court." by EO No. under the present state of the law. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. however. therefore. it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right. along with P. any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court. it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua). But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence. would oust it of jurisdiction. must have jurisdiction to issue the process. 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied]. petitioner could have continued to languish in detention. Director of Bureau of Prisons. 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis]. It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court. 942. 42 Phil. Besides. The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 805). is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law. indeed.D. if shown to exist. 24 SCRA 663). the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy. While litigants should. the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. Thus. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees. were repealed. nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues. Court of Appeals. In such a case. which is less effective. as a rule. the remedy lies in legislation. judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. may be availed of (Chavez vs. It may still be invoked though if the process. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court. was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner. Habeas corpus is thus available. If. Under the attendant circumstances.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated. JR. according to the repeal order. They had to come to us.repealed. but not a necessary means for. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. Hernandez.. The prosecution. is violative of human rights. Third. any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. a "creature unknown in law". She thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. Under the special circumstances of this case. Thus. and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose. J. President Aquino using her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of. And fifth. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder. issued Pres.. the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion. questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree. however. 99 Phil. concurring: I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. Decree 942. That function is exclusively for Congress. Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. the petitioners had no other recourse. GUTIERREZ. 57 . our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself. I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases. this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. a decree which. President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers. Second. in effect. Fourth. First. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder. Order 187. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine.the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. However. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder. the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion. thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law.
they do not belong to the prosecution service. the laying waste of civilian economies.be-enacted legislation. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses. Or. the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion. 1970. if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. order. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians. Worse. the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. July 31. 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to. The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. therefore. its duty was to obey. and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and. However. the blowing up of passenger airplanes. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. This argument is puerile. if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood. All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. or resolution. the massacre of innocent people. and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court. it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a wellknown Supreme Court ruling. It is as simple as that. at the very least and where possible. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-existent crime. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. Barrera. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. (L-31589. an 58 . make it conform to the law.However. any order he prescribes. In this particular case. The principle bears repeating: Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. any judgment he renders. It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of reexamination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a nonexistent crime. A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. This Tribunal having spoken.
the answer was that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court. It does so with finality. it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food. Clearly. 118 SCRA 241. VI). any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. expense and anxiety of a public trial. without reason. any probable cause to commit the non. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. from the trouble. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away. much stronger showing of probable cause must be shown. then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb had. (Trocio v. through the highest judicial organ. 125 SCRA 577 ) I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. a much. binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. logically and rightly. and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime. Under the records of these petitions. The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters. by tradition and in our system of judicial administration. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys. appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with the Senator and other guests. eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity. (Tugade v. 1968. 134 SCRA 438 (1985). They have to defer and to submit. Vera. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. Court of Appeals. sometime earlier. not in the records of the case. Boncan. The Court in Salonga stressed: The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty. et al. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v.' (Ibid. play basketball with barrio youths. join weddings.executive order. The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. 71 Phil. Manta. Cruz Paño. citing Hashimn v. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. Inc. Justice J. a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. In fact. The right to a preliminary investigation 59 . malicious and oppressive prosecution. In the case of the Panlilios.existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative. in answer to my query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 23 SCRA 948. The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J. even more inexplicable. 56  was cited). Court of First Instance. and other parties. 107.L. NLRC. to go on a vacation. this Court. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. L26364.B. 65 Phil. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court. I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. 216). and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. 23 SCRA 948  and VirJen Shipping and Marine Services. (Ibid. See also Albert v. it has to speak with one voice. has the last word on what the law is. fiestas. 85 SCRA 226 . v. May 29. In Salonga v.L. Here. it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.B. attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. 961.
Fernandez. It is. it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which. under our rulings. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"). A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion.R. an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. This case did not arise from innocent error. therefore. there is a deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The judge or fiscal. it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. therefore. Oandasa. does not exist. The Court is not. the remedy is with Congress. J. v. Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which. "for the purpose of (i... pp. and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. as an abstract question of law. preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. I. however. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.A.e. to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. More important. 92164. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that.. So it has been before. the Judge may rightly read it as charging homicide. such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste. would constitute the offense of rebellion.. the overt acts comprising rebellion). In these cases. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide. And in G. FELICIANO. (See People v. should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. Cruz Patio. 461. imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be. when put together. (supra) has been violated. in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder. It should continue to be so. therefore. 129 SCRA 391). could stand reexamination or clarification.is a statutory grant. the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said 60 .e. in any way. (id. Thus. S.462) Because of the foregoing. vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-existent crime. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. not the courts. concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court. No. those informations should be treated as null and void. et al. 25 SCRA 277) However.
destroying property or committing serious violence. 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and. Civil Code. the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between. City of Columbia. 18 SCRA 247 ). as a matter of law. Ed. Ed. Marks v. on the other hand. second clause. 378 US 347. Licera. on the one hand. And assuming the Hernandez 61 . open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated. In time. People v. while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. as far as I can see. 37 SCRA 420 ). result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4. 55 SCRA 607 . 866 F. Devine v. which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. of their powers or prerogatives. I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ]. naval or other armed forces. maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion.. New Mexico Department of Corrections. Thus. judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted. Palomar. the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature. Revised Penal Code. The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion. both in relation to Article 8. is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection. would. or particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly. 43 US 188. 2d 894 . wholly or partially. U. The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 2d 260 . while in legal theory. in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here. 65 SCRA 270 . the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. 2d 339 ). Jabinal.government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof. Gumabon v.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the Government. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar. however.12 L. or any body of land. It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48. Director of Prisons. It is. Moreover. Civil Code).S." At the same time. may be characterized as separate or discrete offenses which. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense. Article 22. differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection. But. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. 51 L. of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof.
The doctrine was good law then. second clause. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the allembracing applicability of the doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and jurisprudence. The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. Rodriguez. should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion. 90 . Geronimo. FERNAN. or in furtherance of. especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.g. C. 100 Phil. Finally. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e. With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court. To that extent. I believe that the Court. I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion. in the instant case. and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the 62 . 9. it appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48. 659 ). The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification. Decision). the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion. or in connection with. Put in slightly different terms. Thus. People v. would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion. rebellion are absorbed by the latter. concurring and dissenting: I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court.could be so characterized.J.. To my mind. 107 Phil. 99 Phil. I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. People v.. there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932. on the one hand. the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. Hernandez. To formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer.
commission of rebellion. albeit impliedly. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. strictly construed. it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. concurring and dissenting: 63 . The majority of the Court is correct in adopting. Theoretically. etc. brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. J. and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations. and may. has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply. As in the case of Hernandez. kidnapping.. the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion. failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense. not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. etc. may be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter. but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof. but a crime that is merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter. robbery. a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter. therefore. In the latter case. In extreme cases where murder. more particularly. of which this Court should take judicial notice. a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another. as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. The relevance of the distinction is significant. but. A coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder. The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. robbery. the Court. if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today. To illustrate. on the other. BIDIN. arson. and other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people. resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder. as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly constituted government. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof. With that distinction. arson. although done in the furtherance of the rebellion. arson. I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine. however. which is an element of the latter. but not indispensable. the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners. Generally. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. should not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary. common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof. robbery. and if and when actually committed.
Thereafter. I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion.000. the cash bond in the amount of P 100. Section 2. rebellion includes murder. Rule 102). the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed. collection of taxes and contributions. to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail. without necessity of a remand for further proceedings. It is indubitable that before conviction. the crime of rebellion is left fully described. a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. since an amendment will not alter its substance. if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other offense. conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case. before Us. 64 . Accordingly. damage to property. the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6. Constitution. it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine. SARMIENTO. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information. restraint of liberty. Consequently.. habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion. of rebellion. I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. of as a necessary means for the commission. devolves upon us. Constitution and Section 3. .I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner. More than three decades after which it was penned. is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly. because in any case. or in the course. As Hernandez put it. Rule 114). Article VIII. Rule 102). requisition of property and services. mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage. Hernandez 1 should abide. among others. J. rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government. on a petition for habeas corpus praying." 2 which implies "resort to arms. and the hunger. physical injuries and loss of life. accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III.. to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable.. among other possible crimes. for his provisional release on bail. 4 At any rate. illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. Petitioner is. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail. In view thereof. it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1). an offense which is bailable. the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14." 3 whether committed in furtherance. concurring and dissenting: I agree that People v. 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge. in this case murder. admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant.
arson and robbery. notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing. "is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Furthermore. Its head should not be allowed to surface.. while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder.00. In the present cases. granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100. at best. on the other hand. arson. 99 Phil. gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder. And yet. 187 of President Corazon C.I dissent. 13.e. not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law)." The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect.e. Rules of Court). because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. i. I venture to say that the information is fatally defective. And. on the other hand. I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and. and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court. from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question. J. robbery. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. 65 . because bail means provisional liberty. fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. however. arson and robbery does not exist. PADILLA. this Court was confronted with an appealed case. in the Hernandez case. the Supreme Court. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information. since the entire question of the information's validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases. Hernandez.. was "ground-breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. i. for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of the courts. 1990. we granted him bail. of no moment. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder. Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. even under procedural law. where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. As a nullity in substantive law. and the lower court has persisted in hearing. in our Resolution of March 6. I take it that when we. Rule 110. pending appeal. it charges nothing. dissenting: I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs.. the Court is confronted with an original case. In the Hernandez case. The fact that we gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view. but Executive Order No. the prosecution and the lower court.000. In the present cases. an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. however. it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. and multiple frustrated murder does not exist. etc." I dissent. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
which has been with us for the past three decades. may be availed of (Chavez vs. Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion. which is less effective. Besides. the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy. a crime which does not exist in our statute books. concurs. Habeas corpus is thus available. 90-10941. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder.ACCORDINGLY. Under the attendant circumstances. concurring: I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine. Paras. Thus. Consequently. Court of Appeals. J. must have jurisdiction to issue the process. therefore. habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. The Court. 24 SCRA 663). that proposition could have been plausible. have only served to strengthen its pronouncements. QUASH the warrants of arrest. and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. despite periodic challenges to it that. DISMISSED. Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA. Even if it had authority to act at the outset. should remain undisturbed.. it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right. ironically. In this case. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court.. But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence. J. RTC of Quezon City. 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis]. if shown to exist. I take exception to the view. petitioner could have continued to languish in detention. The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. remains good law and. People. I vote to GRANT the petitions. the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. In such a case. The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court. judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. 66 . no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court. It may still be invoked though if the process. to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. thus. the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled. however. the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. however. would oust it of jurisdiction. that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder.. however. which followed in the wake of this Petition. along with P. was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner. the petitioners had no other recourse." by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. ascend the steps of the judicial ladder. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v.. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees. I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases. Director of Bureau of Prisons. and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple. Quilen. If. were repealed. is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law. JR. under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. a "creature unknown in law". While litigants should. that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder. the remedy lies in legislation. Under the special circumstances of this case. They had to come to us. the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. under the present state of the law. GUTIERREZ. nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code. as a rule. 99 Phil. especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated. concurring: I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. Hernandez. any procedural flaw notwithstanding. 942.The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion.the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder." Having been so repealed. this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence. 805). the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. No. 42 Phil. The proliferation of cases in this Court. 67 . First. it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua).D. J. That function is exclusively for Congress. the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied]. indeed. for being "repressive. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose. I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail.
therefore. according to the repeal order. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. And fifth. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The prosecution. thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers. the laying waste of civilian economies. the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and. This argument is puerile. if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion. President Aquino using her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. the massacre of innocent people. it 68 . issued Pres. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court. Fourth. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. but not a necessary means for. under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder. in effect. Worse. However. Order 187. Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to. The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President. our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself. questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree. the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians. if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood. the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.Second. However. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Decree 942. the blowing up of passenger airplanes. a decree which. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. Thus. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.be-enacted legislation. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. Third. is violative of human rights.
VI). Prosecutors Fernando de Leon. 23 SCRA 948. See also Albert v. 69 . a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It does so with finality. they do not belong to the prosecution service. I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. make it conform to the law.L. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-existent crime. 1968. has the last word on what the law is. Court of First Instance. Vera. 65 Phil. Court of Appeals. It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of reexamination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a nonexistent crime. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. However. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. 125 SCRA 577 ) I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. They have to defer and to submit. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system. 23 SCRA 948  and VirJen Shipping and Marine Services. Justice J. L26364. 85 SCRA 226 . and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. (Tugade v. in answer to my query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest. its duty was to obey. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. at the very least and where possible. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. any probable cause to commit the non.B. this Court. 56  was cited). order. (Ibid. In fact. Barrera. it has to speak with one voice. 107. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. July 31. any order he prescribes. et al. logically and rightly. A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. the answer was that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court. 1970. not in the records of the case. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court.L. The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J. 961. through the highest judicial organ. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative. it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. (L-31589. any judgment he renders.issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a wellknown Supreme Court ruling. even more inexplicable.B. The principle bears repeating: Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It is as simple as that. In this particular case. 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision. Or. v. NLRC. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. This Tribunal having spoken. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion. In the case of the Panlilios. or resolution. an executive order. by tradition and in our system of judicial administration. binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision. May 29. it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court.existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors. Inc. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br.' (Ibid.
Oandasa. to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. Boncan. fiestas. 118 SCRA 241. It is. v. 134 SCRA 438 (1985). eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. More important. imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be. The Court in Salonga stressed: The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty. there is a deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. therefore. should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. under our rulings. without reason. play basketball with barrio youths. and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. So it has been before. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. from the trouble. therefore. it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. 71 Phil. I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. citing Hashimn v. expense and anxiety of a public trial. (Trocio v. It should continue to be so. sometime earlier.. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which. Here. does not exist.R. The judge or fiscal. an 70 . A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. to go on a vacation. Under the records of these petitions. the Judge may rightly read it as charging homicide. it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food. S. The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys. 25 SCRA 277) However. however. (See People v. In these cases. in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. 216). Manta. appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with the Senator and other guests. join weddings. it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. 461. attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters. malicious and oppressive prosecution. In Salonga v. and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime. 92164. such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste. those informations should be treated as null and void. This case did not arise from innocent error. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away.462) Because of the foregoing. No. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide. Clearly.A. 129 SCRA 391). Fernandez. then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb had. And in G. pp. any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. a much.The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Cruz Paño. (id. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. much stronger showing of probable cause must be shown. and other parties. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights.
preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder. I. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code. not the courts. Revised Penal Code. FELICIANO. or particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly. or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature. Thus. differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection. vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-existent crime. (supra) has been violated. The Court is not. would constitute the offense of rebellion. Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i. J. the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and.. when put together. exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated. Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection. maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"). Article 22. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system.." At the same time.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the Government. Civil Code). therefore. I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that. Cruz Patio." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ]. The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion. 71 . et al. destroying property or committing serious violence. naval or other armed forces. of their powers or prerogatives. on the one hand. wholly or partially. would. the overt acts comprising rebellion). can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. in any way. could stand reexamination or clarification. the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof.e.extra effort should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. on the other hand. or any body of land. concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court. as a matter of law. result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4. which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between.e. both in relation to Article 8. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar. it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which. "for the purpose of (i. may be characterized as separate or discrete offenses which. as far as I can see. the remedy is with Congress.. Civil Code. as an abstract question of law.
People v. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof. the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. second clause. 37 SCRA 420 ). 866 F. open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. But. In time.J. 107 Phil. And assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized. It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48.g. there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932. Jabinal. People v. it appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48. Director of Prisons. Finally. Moreover. It is. would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion. U. the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. Marks v. People v. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense. judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted. Geronimo.12 L. Licera. especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today. 2d 894 . while in legal theory. Palomar... 2d 339 ). Ed. second clause.The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here. the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. 65 SCRA 270 .. Thus. 51 L. Ed. I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced. Devine v. Thus. concurring and dissenting: 72 . 90 . New Mexico Department of Corrections. 100 Phil. Rodriguez. To formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer. Put in slightly different terms. however. subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e. statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. 43 US 188. I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion. 378 US 347. is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. 2d 260 . 55 SCRA 607 . FERNAN.S. 659 ). City of Columbia. 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Gumabon v. C. 18 SCRA 247 ).
but a crime that is merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the allembracing applicability of the doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. robbery. not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. arson. Theoretically. and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations. brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof. and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion. but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof. albeit impliedly. Decision). etc. I believe that the Court. and if and when actually committed. the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion. The majority of the Court is correct in adopting. common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof. With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court. or in furtherance of. resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder. the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another. if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today. or in connection with. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and jurisprudence. To my mind. The relevance of the distinction is significant. but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification. on the one hand. The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. the Court. which is an element of the latter. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. 9. Hernandez. more particularly. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. The doctrine was good law then. in the instant case. on the other. should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent 73 . a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter. 99 Phil. therefore. To that extent. however. the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. To illustrate. the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion. failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense. may be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter. With that distinction. As in the case of Hernandez.I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. rebellion are absorbed by the latter. and may.
J. 74 .civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people. concurring and dissenting: I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner. it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. In the latter case. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail. The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers. Petitioner is. habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion. In view thereof. the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners. a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. strictly construed. A coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder. Section 2. Rule 102). Rule 102). the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14. It is indubitable that before conviction. the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed. robbery. etc. Generally. as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly constituted government.. admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant. Constitution. to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. robbery. although done in the furtherance of the rebellion. devolves upon us. Consequently. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. arson. kidnapping. Constitution and Section 3. should not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary. In extreme cases where murder. among others. on a petition for habeas corpus praying. if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings. has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. for his provisional release on bail. it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1). a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III. before Us. but not indispensable. an offense which is bailable. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply. BIDIN. Rule 114). to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail. Article VIII. arson. of which this Court should take judicial notice. Thereafter. but. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine. I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion. and other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat.
" 2 which implies "resort to arms. illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. the crime of rebellion is left fully described. requisition of property and services. while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. restraint of liberty. . Hernandez. conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case. because in any case. is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly. because bail means provisional liberty. mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage. I dissent. "is to be read as charging simple rebellion.. this Court was confronted with an appealed case.000. collection of taxes and contributions. the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction. physical injuries and loss of life. among other possible crimes. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine. rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government. of no moment.. More than three decades after which it was penned. SARMIENTO. granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100. concurring and dissenting: I agree that People v. 99 Phil.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6. J. or in the course. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other offense. however. dissenting: I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs.000. in our Resolution of March 6. in this case murder.00. J. The fact that we gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view.. As Hernandez put it.. since an amendment will not alter its substance." 3 whether committed in furtherance. from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question. of as a necessary means for the commission. Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex 75 . 1990. however. Hernandez 1 should abide." The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. damage to property. I take it that when we." I dissent. we granted him bail. rebellion includes murder. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. without necessity of a remand for further proceedings. the cash bond in the amount of P 100.e. and the hunger. of rebellion. In the Hernandez case. 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge.Accordingly. 4 At any rate. i. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom. PADILLA..
R. ACCORDINGLY. was "ground-breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder. and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court. Its head should not be allowed to surface. ESTELA. where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto. And. 13. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information. at best. FLORESCA. arson and robbery does not exist.. 187 of President Corazon C. I vote to GRANT the petitions. RTC of Quezon City. ANTONIO JEAN and ELY. Consequently. LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. it has given rise to nothing. concurs. all surnamed Martinez.. Rules of Court). ROMEO. in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. And yet. on the other hand. on the other hand. 1985 PERFECTO S. etc. notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. As a nullity in substantive law. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA. I venture to say that the information is fatally defective. FLORESCA. but Executive Order No. 90-10941. JULITA SALUD and DANILO. CELSO S. fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. DE OBRA. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. i. FLORESCA. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. the Court is confronted with an original case. and the lower court has persisted in hearing. arson and robbery. J. the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled. and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ. arson.e. DISMISSED. for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of the courts. In the present cases. 76 . since the entire question of the information's validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases.. it charges nothing. even under procedural law. PEDRO S. Paras. Furthermore. MELBA S. in the Hernandez case. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and. No. pending appeal. and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder. FLORESCA. L-30642 April 30.crime of rebellion with murder. not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law). an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. robbery. JR. all surnamed OBRA. and multiple frustrated murder does not exist. Rule 110. In the present cases. SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. G. QUASH the warrants of arrest. FLORESCA. and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder. because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. the Supreme Court. the prosecution and the lower court. FLORESCA. JUDITH S.
ELIZABETH. DE ISLA. MARIA. a great many of them were still alive. negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. mud and water. respondents. including those named in the next preceding paragraph. MAKASIAR. five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust. DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA.. 77 . dated December 16. JR. allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. all surnamed LANUZA. Tito M. on the said date. Rodolfo C. NESTOR and AURELIO. died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. GEORGE and LARRY III. 1967. the underground workings. LORENZO. JESUS P. ripped timber supports and carried off materials. who. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA. Benguet on June 28. RAYMUNDO.: This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises. Specifically. notwithstanding the fact that up to then. blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in. J. 22 were rescued within the next 7 days. DIVINA. Villaluna for respondents. DE VILLAR. 21 in number. That for sometime prior and up to June 28. but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date. and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto. the defendant PHILEX. with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure. were left mercilessly to their fate. column of broken ore and rock below it. JR. while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba.LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. Portion of the complaint reads: xxx xxx xxx 9. with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time. MORFE. at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. represented by the plaintiffs herein.1967. Court of First Instance of Manila. Pacampara for petitioners. thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. Branch XIII. approximately 500. in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes. machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit. entombed in the tunnels of the mine. DE LANUZA. and the rest.000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks. all surnamed ISLA. with the result that. petitioners. 10. Presiding Judge of Branch XIII. accompanied by surface boulders. vs. VENUS and FELIX. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA. Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex). the complaint alleges that Philex. in violation of government rules and regulations. all surnamed VILLAR. EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to. including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove.
) A motion to dismiss dated May 14. Art.103.00.794. is obliged to pay for the damage done. and with aggregate assets totalling P 45. On December 16. of the time and of the place. respondent Judge. 42-44. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.117. Such fault or negligence. if there is no pre. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to. When negligence shows bad faith. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.394. 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual. bad faith. x x x x x x x x x In case of fraud. 2176. paragraph 2 shall apply. irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent. 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428. After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed. pages 7-13. a total operating income of P 38. during the year 1966 alone. respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27.existing contractual relation between the parties. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners. it having made. 1966. Art. malice or wanton attitude.00.254. respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence. in their Report of investigation. reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27. adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries. on September 23. 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.220. (b) Art. 2231. moral and exemplary damages. 2201. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. In quasi-delicts. as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasidelict. xxx xxx xxx (pp. Annex 'B' hereof. the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201. there being fault or negligence. particularly: Art. after taxes of P19. 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources.00 as of December 31. 1968. 2178. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27. or net earnings. the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees.xxx xxx xxx 13. 1173²The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. 1966. Art. rec. the employer 78 . 1968.
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury . petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages. subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. Exclusive right to compensation. petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury.²The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. 46. In their brief. 855 ) where it was held that "all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident 79 . In the second assignment of error. and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 5. Jurisdiction. the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted. disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease. pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act. particularly Articles 2176. which read: SEC. refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.. A In the first assignment of error. 1173. Petitioners thus filed the present petition.PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. SEC. Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 2201 and 2231.. .² The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court.shall. his personal representatives.. On the other hand. 2178. Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo. without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26.suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission." subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. is: Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive. It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual. Angara believes otherwise. appeared as amici curiae and thereafter. selective or cumulative. formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan. Edgardo Angara. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. On August 3. may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. exemplary 80 . moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions. then Atty. 1978. 1978. Justice Manuel Lazaro. 1976. submitted their respective memoranda. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners. WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected. except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code. while Atty. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker. Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent. In fact.e. In the resolution of September 7. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter.. and vice versa. or the heirs in case of his death. In the hearing of this case. now President of the University of the Philippines. i. Atty. does not remove the case from the exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act. they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act. and Commissioner on Elections. WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case. that is to say. collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department. Atty. There are divergent opinions in this case. because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo. it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case. petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex.
. bad faith. read: Art. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act.S. Lopez Sugar Mill. and the employer has the burden to prove 81 . 452). In the present case. oppressive or malevolent manner. the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income. 36).J. malice or wanton attitude. there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated. On the other hand. damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. Co. 100). Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code. 689). 53). 66 Phil. Hence. as long as the death. 2232. reckless.. the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. property or relative rights. The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. Inc. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith. In cases of fraud. Mendoza.000. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.. Articles 2216 et seq. Furthermore.J.J. payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C. In contracts and quasi-contracts. constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. In contracts and quasi-contracts. as assessed by the court. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton.and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825.S. The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. allow the payment of all kinds of damages. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C. 97 Phil. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. fraudulent. under the compensation acts.S. In other words. In fact. Art. 2201. Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family.00) pesos. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated. an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages. Civil Code. even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person. through the act or default of another (25 C.
otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228). The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission. Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379). WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In Pacaña WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employertortfeasor. Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs. With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.). WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. B Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of
the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. II). Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied). The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.²The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code. The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis supplied).
772 on June 20. 5. Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. 772). 442.. and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement. Exclusive right to compensation.. " More specifically. Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee. including its implementing rules and regulations. 1974. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. Article 4 of the New Labor Code. Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs. Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. Exclusive right to compensation. was amended by Commonwealth Act No. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer. Labor Code).Unless otherwise provided. his personal representatives. 1952. it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. Exclusiveness of liability. 1952." Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No.In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. promulgated on May 1. Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred 85 . both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees. "In case of doubt. because said Article 173 provides: Art. Thus. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty. 772 on June 20. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided: Sec. shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code. because of said injury (emphasis supplied).. thus: Sec. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. his personal representatives. as amended. because of said injury.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. as amended. Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws. 5.six. should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code. 2. as amended. but which took effect six months thereafter. 3428. 173.
1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs.A. No.A. and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death.ten. and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS). through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. 8. Palomer. as amended. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Justice Teehankee. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code. Castro. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages. 186. Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even remotely.A. Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted. 763). As above-quoted. decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. and conversely (emphasis supplied). Said Pacana case penned by Mr. that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence. Dizon. 772 on June 20. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724. No. June 30. Licera ruled: Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. R. but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Makalintal. WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 1161. in People vs. Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides: Art.B. much less expressly.L. C. as amended. as amended. Reyes. Zaldivar. 1952. No. is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. 167 [c]. therefore. 582). 610. as amended. 272-273 ). 4864. ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. constitute evidence of what the laws mean. 124 Phil. which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted. before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 18 SCRA 247. It is patent. under Article 8 of the New Civil Code. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270. The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. R. These decisions. 86 . The Court. although in themselves not laws. applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act. reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs.B. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J. Reyes. Fernando and Villamor. Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four. as amended.L. No. R. limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased. both penned by Justice J. Furthermore. [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code). as amended.A. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Fowler (3 MN 1. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana. to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did. vis-avis Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Consequently. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. is not legislating in the instant case. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining. especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life. 21. is not an exercise of the power of law-making. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive. nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution. each one of us is our brother's keeper. is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. to repeat. The Court. because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia. such attitude is unChristian. The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of 87 . It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution. limb and health of his worker. as amended. p. but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned. the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws. as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code. Even from the moral viewpoint alone.Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a restatement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. limb and health. No man is an island. It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision. 1964). which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to life. neither expressly nor impliedly. 93. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. and does not even refer.150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent. 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution. The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. In this our civilization. and now Sections 6. Vol.
Madison I Cranch 127 1803). "the letter of the law killeth." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864. In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself. into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books. 1937 ed. 1 Dissenting Opinion. "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U. even the legislator himself." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations. Modern Library. Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view.S. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him. recognizes that in certain instances. through Article 9 of the New Civil Code. which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. 1949 335 US 538). " Hence. which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence. 79). Butler 297 U.L. because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer. WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley. vs. He legislates only between gaps. because the mind of the legislator. Stone.America. feeble or strong. vs. To stress this affront to human dignity. "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law. pp. 1937). which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter. But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code. its spirit giveth life. the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes. Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist. He fills the open spaces in the law. 1907. American Sash Company. like all human beings." 88 . the court." C It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate. Only ruthless. in the language of Justice Holmes. Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A. 113).S. "the courts breathe life. p.F. 'Thus. unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process. "Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. p.). The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare. That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code. 503-511. quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9. This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower.
It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work.. To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail. Jensen. who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law. True. there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on. Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted. x x x. Under either Section 5 or Article 173. 244 US 204 1917). But said Justices. have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare. Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. Justice Harlan. Ronald Dworkin. 387). limb and health of the workers.It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88. and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Justice Cardozo. even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee. Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. Rolf Sartorious. without any fault on the part of the employers. Justice David Brewer. Government (277 US 188. Finally." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman. Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. which I am far from believing that it is. The Nature of the Judicial Process 100).. as amended. particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. jurists or legal commentators. does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life. Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound. They include Blackstone. . but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. xxx xxx xxx It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments. ailment or injury is work-connected. And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman. 845.ed. 89 . 210-212. the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death. Justice Black. Jeremy Bentham.853). Justice Holmes pronounced: The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. 72 L. Justice Roberts. 852. Cardozo. or that the Constitution requires. were it ever so desirable to do so. or decry the exercise of such power. or Article 173 of the New Labor Code. although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate. but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate.
76. Madison. Parish (300 US 377-79. Among other examples. 937. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors. 277 US 210-212. The case of People vs. in the case of Lochner vs. Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. 851-853). ed.On the other hand. 260. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20. The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. In both provisions. not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Again. Arizona (384 US 436 1964). The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. and maternity leave for women employees. De-segregation. capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294). Illinois (378 US 478). Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. ed. Springer vs. Pomar is no longer the rule. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. 72 L. As early as 1904. Tarok. which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. 1385. 440) by a conservative. the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. 852. 81 L. 261-268). Miller. Ylagan (58 Phil. holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense. Government. New York (198 US 45. Pomar (46 Phil. Only the peaceand-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 73 Phil. is now the governing principle. 49 L. 307 US 433. supra Coleman vs. Wainright (372 US 335). which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. Gideon vs. Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial decisions. Escubedo vs. ed. 83 L. 949). the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. 853). 90 . as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. not segregation. working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities. ed.
drew six crossed Manager's check (Exhibits "A" to "F". THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. GANCAYCO.. April. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION. Fernando. Teehankee. NO COSTS. . Respondents. is on leave. J. ARBICOM Case No. vs. 1986 in Civil Case No. and herein referred to as Checks) having an aggregate amount of 91 . plaintiff through its Visa Card Department. De la Fuente. both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act. 84033. No. J.. concur. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS. Plana.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City promulgated on March 24. Escolin.. Petitioner. May and August 1983. took no part. AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY. WHEREFORE.. PHILIPPINE CLEARING HOUSE CORPORATION. 1988 BANCO DE ORO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK. Q-46517 entitled Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank versus Equitable Banking Corporation and the Philippine Clearing House Corporation after a review of the Decision of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) in the case of Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC) vs. Concepcion. affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.It is noteworthy that Justice Black. Miller. Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage (BCO).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary The undisputed facts are as follows: It appears that some time in March. supra.J. Cuevas and Alampay JJ. SO ORDERED. JJ. 74917 January 20. penned a separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs.. Abad Santos and Relova. Jr.R. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American precedents. Unlike the American Constitution. BRANCH XCII (92). C. who seems to be against judicial legislation.
Thus. Branch XCII.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary The petition is focused on the following issues: chanrobles virtual law li brary 92 . wherein in due course a decision was rendered affirming in toto the decision of the PCHC. 1 In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. Subsequently.000.982. and to credit the clearing account of the plaintiff of the amount of P45. and after stamping at the back of the Checks the usual endorsements.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In its Complaint.23) Pesos with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date of the complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry In accordance with Section 38 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Pursuant to the PCHC Clearing Rules and Regulations. a certain Aida Trencio. the Board of Directors of the PCHC affirmed the decision of the said Arbiter in this wise: In view of all the foregoing.Forty Five Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty Two & 23/100 (P45.982.982. plaintiff presented the Checks directly to the defendant for the purpose of claiming reimbursement from the latter.23) Pesos and payable to certain member establishments of Visa Card. this case. No pronouncement as to cost was made. the decision of the Arbiter is confirmed. and the Attorney's fee in the amount of Five Thousand (P5. a petition for review was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.000.000. plaintiff prays for judgment to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P45. defendant refused to accept such direct presentation and to reimburse the plaintiff for the value of the Checks.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry Following normal procedures. its clearing account was debited for the value of the Checks and defendant's clearing account was credited for the same amount. the dispute was presented for Arbitration. All prior and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed the defendant sent the checks for clearing through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). Ceasar Querubin was designated as the Arbitrator. and Atty.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary After an exhaustive investigation and hearing the Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the PCHC to debit the clearing account of the defendant. chanrobles virtual law library Thereafter.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library Hence this petition.00) Pesos.00. plaintiff paid the Checks. the Checks were deposited with the defendant to the credit of its depositor. However. plaintiff discovered that the endorsements appearing at the back of the Checks and purporting to be that of the payees were forged and/or unauthorized or otherwise belong to persons other than the payees. and the Philippine Clearing House Corporation is hereby ordered to debit the clearing account of the defendant and credit the clearing account of plaintiff the amount of Forty Five Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Two & 23/100 (P45.23 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the complaint plus attorney's fees in the amount of P10.982. hence. Accordingly.00 as well as the cost of the suit.23 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date of the complaint and Attorney's fee in the amount of P5.
A. The Court. Were the subject checks non-negotiable and if not. Petitioner argues that by law and common sense. and Section 107 of R.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Reyes vs. No. The pertinent provisions quoted in petitioners memorandum simply refer to check(s). the term check should be interpreted as one that fits the articles of incorporation of the PCHC. 1962) the Appellate Court categorically stated that there are four kinds of checks in this jurisdiction. Is the Negotiable Instrument Law.1. in accordance with the provisions of Section 1000 shall serve as a basis for the clearing of checks. 2031 applicable in deciding controversies of this nature by the PCHC? chanrobles virtual law libra ry 4. .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law lib rary The Regional Trial Court took exception to this stand and conclusion put forth by the herein petitioner as it held: Petitioner's theory cannot be maintained. Where the law does not distinguish. does it fall under the ambit of the power of the PCHC? chanrobles virtual law lib rary 3. the cashier's check. 265. memoranda. further elucidated..R. 265 which provides: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library The deposit reserves maintained by the banks in the Central Bank. we shall not distinguish. efficient. As will be noted. What law should govern in resolving controversies of this nature? chanrobles virtual law libra ry 5. Petitioner alleges that with the cancellation of the printed words "or bearer from the face of the check. Chuanico (CA-G.. which states: To provide. 84033? chanrobles virtual law library 2. that while the Negotiable Instruments Law does not contain any provision on crossed checks. 5. Was the petitioner bank negligent and thus responsible for any undue payment? chanrobles vi rtual law library Petitioner maintains that the PCHC is not clothed with jurisdiction because the Clearing House Rules and Regulations of PCHC cover and apply only to checks that are genuinely negotiable. 20813 R. convenient. and the settlement of interbank balances . circular letters. it is coon practice in commercial and banking operations to issue checks of this 93 . the Central Bank and the Clearing House Rules stating that it is a negotiable instrument citing the definition of a "check" as basically a "bill of exchange" under Section 185 of the NIL and that it should be payable to "order" or to "bearer" under Section 126 of game law. economical and relevant exchange and facilitate service limited to check processing and sorting by way of assisting member banks.A. rules and regulations and policies in pursuance to the provisions of Section 107 of R. and the crossed check.. the PCHC makes no distinction as to the character or nature of the checks subject of its jurisdiction. Did the PCHC have any jurisdiction to give due course to and adjudicate Arbicom Case No.. Act No. it becomes non-negotiable so the PCHC has no jurisdiction over the case. maintain and render an effective. Emphasis is laid on the primary purpose of the PCHC in the Articles of Incorporation. entities in clearing checks and other clearing items as defined in existing and in future Central Bank of the Philippines circulars. Feb. the traveller's check. the regular check.
(Pp.character." 2 It was enunciated in Loc Cham v. Attention is likewise called to Section 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: Sec.A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary The principle of estoppel. the defendant made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements. there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. In other words. Consequently. 3 chanrobles virtual law libra ry 94 . out such warranty." No doubt transactions on non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of its jurisdiction. but to checks as is generally known in use in commercial or business transactions. obviously in accordance with Article 541 of the Code of Commerce." Thus. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. pp.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As provided in the aforecited articles of incorporation of PCHC its operation extend to "clearing checks and other clearing items. relying upon an action or declaration of the defendant. 185. Check defined. Ocampo. 4344. paid on the Checks. founded on logic is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation. stamped at the back of the checks are the defendant's clear warranty. this Court had occasion to rule: "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In a previous case. it appears that the use of the term "check" in the Articles of Incorporation of PCHC is to be perceived as not limited to negotiable checks only. 636 (1946): The rule. 77 Phil. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate. The same principle of estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying the existence of the Checks. effectively prevents the defendant from denying liability for any damage sustained by the plaintiff which.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant's warranty. this court is in full accord with the ruling of the PCHC Board of Directors that: In presenting the Checks for clearing and for payment. plaintiff would not have paid on the checks. Except as herein otherwise provided. .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry Anent Petitioner's liability on said instruments. the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check and the provisions of Section 61 (supra) that the drawer may insert in the instrument an express stipulation negating or limiting his own liability to the holder. ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. 1011 Decision. Rollo) We agree. With.
Such submission or contract shall be valid and irrevocable. . otherwise known as the Arbitration Law. petitioner and private respondent. MICR clearing operations by the mere fact of their participation. and are designed to facilitate banking operations." chanrobles virtual law l ibrary Sec 36.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library 95 . petitioner is estopped from raising the defense of non-negotiability of the checks in question.The fact that a bank participates in the clearing operations of the PCHC shall be deemed its written and subscribed consent to the binding effect of this arbitration agreement as if it had done so in accordance with section 4 of the Republic Act No. 21 of the same rules. in the clearing operations of PCHC is a manifestation of their submission to its jurisdiction.6. . (Emphasis supplied) Viewing these provisions the conclusion is clear that the PCHC Rules and Regulations should not be interpreted to be applicable only to checks which are negotiable instruments but also to non-negotiable instruments and that the PCHC has jurisdiction over this case even as the checks subject of this litigation are admittedly non-negotiable.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary Such submission or contract may include question arising out of valuations. Further Section 2 of the Arbitration Law mandates: Two or more persons or parties may submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing between them at the time of the submission and which may be the subject of an action. appraisals or other controversies which may be collateral. It cannot be conceived to be limited to negotiable checks only. It is of the essence to be payable on demand. Sec. institution or entity sending the same. 876.The term check as used in the said Articles of Incorporation of PCHC can only connote checks in general use in commercial and business activities. 4 chanrobles virtual law libra ry The participation of the two banks. AGREEMENT TO THESE RULES. (ARBITRATION) .. because the contract between the banker and the customer is that the money is needed on demand.It is the general agreement and understanding that any participant in the Philippine Clearing House Corporation. incidental.. It stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks and subsequently presented these checks for clearing and it was on the basis of these endorsements by the petitioner that the proceeds were credited in its clearing account. or the parties of any contract may in such contract agree to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them.6 of the PCHC-CHRR clearing rules and regulations provide: SEC.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary Moreover. 3 and 36. thereby manifests its agreement to these Rules and Regulations and its subsequent amendments.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry Checks are used between banks and bankers and their customers. save upon grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any contract. says: Items which have been the subject of material alteration or items bearing forged endorsement when such endorsement is necessary for negotiation shall be returned by direct presentation or demand to the Presenting Bank and not through the regular clearing house facilities within the period prescribed by law for the filing of a legal action by the returning bank/branch. Sec. precedent or subsequent to any issue between the parties. 3.
the bank is estopped to deny the genuineness of the drawers signature and his capacity to issue the instrument. 6 In another case.The petitioner by its own acts and representation can not now deny liability because it assumed the liabilities of an endorser by stamping its guarantee at the back of the checks. 7 chanrobles virtual law library A truism stated by this Court is that . it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. fair dealing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library The payment of a check does not include or imply its acceptance in the sense that this word is used in Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 9 chanrobles virtual law library 96 .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petitioner having stamped its guarantee of "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements" (Exh. it can not recover from a holder who did not participate in the forgery and did not have actual notice thereof. Court of Appeals 5 a point relevant to the issue when it stated the doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy. National City Bank. A-2 to F-2) is now estopped from claiming that the checks under consideration are not negotiable instruments. Whenever any bank treats the signature at the back of the checks as endorsements and thus logically guarantees the same as such there can be no doubt said bank has considered the checks as negotiable. The National City Bank of NY & Motor Service Co. By such deliberate and positive attitude of the petitioner it has for all legal intents and purposes treated the said cheeks as negotiable instruments and accordingly assumed the warranty of the endorser when it stamped its guarantee of prior endorsements at the back of the checks.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary A commercial bank cannot escape the liability of an endorser of a check and which may turn out to be a forged endorsement. this Court has succinctly emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. Petitioner is now barred from taking an opposite posture by claiming that the disputed checks are not negotiable instrument. that: Where a check is accepted or certified by the bank on which it is drawn. this court held that if the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library If a drawee bank pays a forged check which was previously accepted or certified by the said bank."The doctrine of estoppel precludes a party from repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed after having accepted benefits therefrom. good faith and justice and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary This Court enunciated in Philippine National Bank vs. in order that it can clear the said checks with the respondent bank. The checks were accepted for deposit by the petitioner stamping thereon its guarantee. 8 chanrobles virtual law library We made clear in Our decision in Philippine National Bank vs. To countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity and put premium on fraud or misrepresentation". This is laid down in the case of PNB vs. It led the said respondent to believe that it was acting as endorser of the checks and on the strength of this guarantee said respondent cleared the checks in question and credited the account of the petitioner.
National Exchange Bank. the right to enforce that cause of action was not destroyed by the circumstance that another cause of action for the recovery of the amounts paid on the checks would have accrued in favor of the appellee against another or to others than the bank if when the checks were paid they have been indorsed by the payee. L.Y. 204 N. Nassau Bank.E. and the drawer thus is neither a necessary nor a proper party to an action by the drawee bank against such bank. (b) that he has good title to it. 101 N. 302. United States (E. Bank of America (supra) and it follows that negligence on the part of the drawer cannot create any liability from it to the collecting bank. Thus We hold that while the drawer generally owes no duty of diligence to the collecting bank.S.C. and to inform the drawee thereof. (United States vs. Cas. (c) that all prior parties have capacity to contract. 74. United States Mortgage and Trust Col. and (d) that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting. 53 L.) 64 F 703) Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments ordains that: Every indorser who indorsee without qualification. warrants to all subsequent holders in due course' (a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be. and negligence in the performance of that obligation may relieve that bank of liability for the repayment of amounts paid out on forged checks. Ed 1006. the law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity. 54) and no act of the collecting bank is induced by any act or representation or admission of the drawer (Seaboard National Bank vs. which but for such negligence it would be bound to repay. Yorkville Bank 12 that: "the drawer owes no duty of diligence to the collecting bank (one who had accepted an altered check and had paid over the proceeds to the depositor) except of seasonably discovering the alteration by a comparison of its returned checks and check stubs or other equivalent record. Twelfth Ward Bank. 462.Y.S. 871 Amn. 1914D. A leading case on that subject is Morgan vs.A. 11 chanrobles virtual law library It has been enunciated in an American case particularly in American Exchange National Bank vs.R. The collecting bank being primarily engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the law holds it to a high standard of conduct. 11 84.The point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery. 80) and the drawer owe to that bank no duty of vigilance (New York Produce Exchange Bank vs. 214 US.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 97 . Cas. 204 N. 1915D. 208 N. Onondaga County Savings Bank vs. 218. Very akin to the case at bar is one which involves a suit filed by the drawer of checks against the collecting bank and this came about in Farmers State Bank 10 where it was held: A cause of action against the (collecting bank) in favor of the appellee (the drawer) accrued as a result of the bank breaching its implied warranty of the genuineness of the indorsements of the name of the payee by bringing about the presentation of the checks (to the drawee bank) and collecting the amounts thereof. 29 S CT665." In this case it was further held that: The real and underlying reasons why negligence of the drawer constitutes no defense to the collecting bank are that there is no privity between the drawer and the collecting bank (Corn Exchange Bank vs.A. It is quite true that depositors in banks are under the obligation of examining their passbooks and returned vouchers as a protection against the payment by the depository bank against forged checks. 16 Am.Y.
Having Violated Its Warranty On Validity Of All Endorsements. Payments To Persons Other Than The Payees Are Not Valid chanrobles virtual law l ibrary And Give Rise To An Obligation To Return Amounts Received chanrobles virt ual law libra ry Nothing is more clear than that neither the defendant's depositor nor the defendant is entitled to receive payment payable for the Checks.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary III. As the checks are not payable to defendant's depositor. who is neither the payee nor the person authorized by the payee. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted. payments to persons other than payees named therein. If something is received when there is no right to demand it. Article 1240. Section 2154 of the New Civil Code mandates that: Article 2154. the obligation to return it arises.And although the subject checks are non-negotiable the responsibility of petitioner as indorser thereof remains. " Considering that neither the defendant's depositor nor the defendant is entitled to receive payments for the Checks. should be compelled to surrender the proceeds of the Checks received by it. It is contended that plaintiff should be held responsible for issuing the Checks notwithstanding that the underlying transactions were fictitious This contention has no basis in our jurisprudence. If a failure of consideration is sufficient to warrant a finding that a payee is not entitled to payment or must return payment already made. Collecting Bank Cannot Deny chanrobles virtual law libra ry chanrobles virtual law library 98 . New Civil Code of the Philippines unequivocably provides that: "Art. their successor-in-interest or any person authorized to receive payment are not valid. and it was unduly delivered through mistake. but in fact strengthens. 1240.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry The nullity of the underlying transactions does not diminish. or any person authorized to receive it. payments to any of them give rise to an obligation to return the amounts received. plaintiffs right to recover from the defendant.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law lib rary The court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the PCHC in its decision II. Such nullity clearly emphasizes the obligation of the payees to return the proceeds of the Checks. neither can it claim any derivative title to them. with more reason the defendant. or his successo-in-interest. Defendant does not have any title to the Checks.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library To countenance a repudiation by the petitioner of its obligation would be contrary to equity and would deal a negative blow to the whole banking system of this country.
her address and her history. plaintiff would not have paid on the checks. the risk of wrongful payment has to be assumed by the defendant. SO ORDERED. The defendant knows the depositor. Depositor is defendant's client. 99 .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Having accepted the crossed checks from persons other than the payees. It has taken a risk on its depositor when it allowed her to collect on the crossedchecks. the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.liability To Those Who Relied On Its Warranty chanrobles virtual law library In presenting the Checks for clearing and for payment. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate. The defendant has falsely warranted in favor of plaintiff the validity of all endorsements and the genuineness of the cheeks in all respects what they purport to be.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry The principle of estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying liability for any damages sustained by the plaintiff which.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Whether the Checks have been issued for valuable considerations or not is of no serious moment to this case. and the defendant cannot now refuse liability for breach of warranty as a consequence of such forged endorsements. These Checks have been made the subject of contracts of endorsement wherein the defendant made expressed warranties to induce payment by the drawer of the Checks. The defendant's failure to reimburse the plaintiff has constrained the plaintiff to regular the services of counsel in order to protect its interest notwithstanding that plaintiffs claim is plainly valid just and demandable. the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation. WHEREFORE.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant's warranty. paid on the Checks. the defendant is guilty of negligence. the defendant made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements. In addition." Thus. Without such warranty.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The damage that will result if judgment is not rendered for the plaintiff is irreparable. relying upon an action or declaration of the defendant. The same principle of estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying the existence of the Checks. The decision of the respondent court of 24 March 1986 and its order of 3 June 1986 are hereby declared to be immediately executory. The collecting bank has privity with the depositor who is the principal culprit in this case. the Board of Directors finds no reason to reverse the decision of the Arbiter. defendant's clear obligation is to reimburse plaintiff upon direct presentation of the checks.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary On the matter of the award of the interest and attorney's fees. stamped at the bank of the checks are the defendant's clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. and it is undenied that up to this time the defendant has failed to make such reimbursement.
vs. G... vs.... TAN.. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). MITCHELL JOHN L... LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON.. SORIANO.. DE CASTRO... Respondent...-x A.. UBANO. Petitioner. Petitioner.J. x ..... PETER IRVING CORVERA. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER.... Petitioner.. x . ARAULLO. BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)...-x G. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO.. Petitioner. JJ. No. LIM. vs.. PERALTA. CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY. MARLOU B. 191057 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA). vs.-x G. COLLEGE EDITORS 100 .. MENDOZA.. Narvasa.. C.R.-x G.. 191002 April 20. No. concur.. ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS...... REYES.... TORREON.. ATTY.R.... Respondent.. represented by its Immediate Past President.......... Respondents.. 10-2-5-SC IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15. Cruz and Paras. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO. 191149 JOHN G... x ... ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY... JR. 2010 ARTURO M. TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS. CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.M.... JR.... ESTELITO P...... ISRAELITO P. NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE¶S LAWYERS.. BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M.. RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE...Teehankee.. NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES. No. No. x . Petitioner. No... and the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR. BOISER. ALFONSO V..... 191032 JAIME N. Respondent. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)..... CAROLINA P.R.R..
Intervenors. and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. INTING (IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas). 2010. holding: WHEREFORE. vs. and ATTY. x . and 3..R. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.. J. MARILYN STA. x .. accordingly. represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA.. 191420 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION... 10-2-5-SC and.. the Court: 1. PIMENTEL. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.. 191342 ATTY. BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP. INC.. 191032 and G. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA.. RESOLUTION BERSAMIN.... JR. Grants the petition in A. ROLAND B. Petitioner. AQUILINO Q.. Respondent.. Puno by May 17. (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon).. (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17.. Respondents.GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA. No. 191002 and G. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC).R. MA.... No. TOLENTINO.. and GUINEVERE DE LEON. 2010. and the petition for mandamus in G... ROSALES.R. Petitioners... 2.. 101 .. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.: On March 17..R. 191342 for lack of merit.-x G.. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA... AMADOR Z. vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO. No. LEONILA DE JESUS.-x G.. No.R...R.. the Court promulgated its decision. ROMANA. JR.. (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice. No.. directs the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. WALDEN F. No..... 191149. WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES.. No.. 191057 for being premature. and (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision..R. TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN.. No. 2010.M.
R.R.SO ORDERED. 7. Tolentino and Roland B. filed their respective motions for reconsideration. et al. have the clear legal standing to question the illegal composition of the JBC. 191032). 3. the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions when none exists. as taxpayers and lawyers. 5. in the aforegiven order: Soriano 1. Bello and Loretta Ann P. et al.. Marlou B. The petitioners. 2. 191420). Jr. 6. Thereby. as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban. power. not in Article VIII. Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.). Soriano (G. not a judicial. Valenzuela should not be reversed. Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN.). Tan. We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration. No. and Walden F. 3. the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP). No. Mitchell John L.R. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc. 191342).). Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous. Alfonso V. Amador Z. Peter Irving Corvera. Inting (G. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII. because it limits an executive. A plain reading of Section 15. 4. Philippine Bar Association 102 . All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. Christian Robert S. 2.. Rosales (Bello. Motions for Reconsideration Petitioners Jaime N. et al. whose belated intervention was allowed. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. and is powerless to vary the terms of the clear prohibition. The mere fact that the Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to participate as a Member of the Court. and Philippine Bar Association (G. Pimentel. Ubano. Tolentino and Inting 1. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Boiser. Jr. Lim. the Court has raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed. because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and did not involve a justiciable controversy. No.
The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title. IBP-Davao del Sur.the prohibition against midnight appointments. especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC.1. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and distinction. 5. the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do. et al. 103 . The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:. Considering that Section 15. how to do it. 2010. 9. 11. 6. the only duty of the Court is to apply it. 13. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the Constitution. 3. 7. chapter or section headings. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the outgoing President¶s powers by means of proxies. or when to do it. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight appointments. 2. The Court¶s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17. hence. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office. the Court¶s directing the JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election offense. Thus. not as the Court likes them to be. 8. and the creation of the JBC. Article VII is clear and straightforward. 12. 4. 10. the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the other. for the Court¶s duty is to apply the safeguards as they are. The Constitution grants the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect. despite precedents on statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations. and the only exception is that on temporary appointments to executive positions. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by the Court en banc. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments.
The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII against midnight appointments in the Judiciary. Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the Judiciary. 3. a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the Constitution. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and Judicial Departments. 4. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in all cases. Lim 1. 1. Thus. Its phrase "other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Article VII. the intent behind the provision. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. 3. Section 16. 3.M. The Court¶s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution. because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. No. BAYAN. 2.1. If there is any ambiguity in Section 15. Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to other appointments to the Judiciary. Section 15. 10-2-5-SC. The Court erred in granting the petition in A. which is to prevent political partisanship in all branches of the Government. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court¶s exercise of judicial review. The election ban under Section 15. 104 . Corvera 1. should have controlled. Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and physical arrangement. Section 14. no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution. Hence. Its language being unambiguous. especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of the Government. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication. considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the President. 5. 2. 2. et al. Section 15.
Thus. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17. and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the candidates. because the Court sits en banc. Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. because the law itself makes no distinction. even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election. Section 15. 44 days) within which to scrutinize and study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. because it granted a relief not prayed for. The clash of legal rights and interests in the present case are merely anticipated. 1. Even if it is anticipated with certainty. the Court should not distinguish. The form and structure of the Constitution¶s titles. the Court has violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole. The provision admits only one exception. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado. 2. the 90-day period under Section 4(1). temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1). 3.1avvphi1 5. The ruling that Section 15. 2010. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice. The clear and plain language of Section 15. Article VII precludes interpretation. Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1). Article VIII. 4.2. WTLOP 1. chapters. Thus. Article VIII is suspended. 3.. such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). the JBC has more than enough opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.e. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to the President on or before May 17. 2010. Article VIII. returns and qualifications of the President and Vice-President. 2010. The next President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i. When the constitutional ban is in place. giving more weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted. or a month and a half after the end of the ban. Tan. imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law or the 105 . There is no conflict between the provisions. sections. Hence. 4. The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. The 90day mandate to fill any vacancy lasts until August 15. and draftsmanship carry little weight in statutory construction. no actual vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred. 7. Jr. they complement each other. In ruling that Section 15. 6. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy.
The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17. Article VII and the pertinent records of the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous. and compromises the independence of the Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential. The language of Section 15. exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC. 4. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules. and that we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish. Boiser 1. 3. being clear and unequivocal. 2010 at the latest. 2. In interpreting Section 15. 2. Bello. the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous. Section 15. 1. because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the vacancy has occurred. Under Section 15. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive. because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. The Court¶s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare decisis. Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is prohibited from making within the prescribed period. because Section 15. 3. and lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela. considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The Court erred in granting the petition in A. 2.Constitution. not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its provisions.M. Article VII. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety. Pimentel 106 . Plain textual reading and the records of the Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial appointments. 3. the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary appointment to an executive position. No. 3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice. Article VII. et al. Article VII. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant. needs no interpretation 2. 10-2-5-SC. Ubano 1.
The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. 3. and conformable to the general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection of the rights of the people. He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. 3. Article VIII. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable. 2. His comment asserts: 1. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to republican constitutional democracy. as distinguished from the Court¶s adjudicatory power under Section 1. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court. The statement undermines the independence of the JBC. and because the JBC. 4. the interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to its representatives. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice. has not submitted a short list to the President. Section 15. Comments The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments. Thus. rational. Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary. in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution. Mendoza (A. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related matters. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court¶s power of supervision over the JBC as provided by Section 8(1). Article VIII of the Constitution.1. 2. but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its implementing rules and regulations.M.1awph!1 5. because the JBC has not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice. No. and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without proper authority. having yet to interview the candidates. thus: OSG 1. 2. JBC 1. 2. In 107 . The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief Justice. petitioner Estelito P. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight appointments. For his part. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate opinion.
or reversed. or abandoned. Ruling We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. 108 . but to Section 13. 2 Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and. to the extent that they are applicable. 2010. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.the former. not being new. and that its wisdom should guide. the criteria that must control the actuations. the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis. judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. Article VII (on nepotism). Article VII or Section 4(1).e.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom. until authoritatively abandoned. i. if not control. but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. especially with a new membership. Article VIII is to amend the Constitution. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere. Thus. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority. as the highest court of the land. The one highest court does not bind itself.4 The Court. unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts. therefore. to call for a rectification. but also of those dutybound to enforce obedience to them. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed. is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines. the requisites for judicial review are not required. To apply Section 15. have all been resolved by the decision of March 17. to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. hence.6 But ours is not a common-law system. for all the matters being thereby raised and argued. Article VIII. Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9. and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. 3. as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15. because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority. 4. not only of those called upon to abide by them. Nonetheless. controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales. it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours. after re-examination. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant.. where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.1 The contention has no basis. the Court. which was why Valenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. the Court in this case is. First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling. may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. necessarily become.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.devoid of rationality and foundation. construction cannot supply the omission. despite the silence of said provisions thereon. a provision on nepotism. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15. or as Secretaries. Commissioner Davide. Yet. either with or without the omitted word or words. and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction. but only Section 13. however. insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. disregarding the absence from Section 15. and no words can be interpolated in them. Jr. For one. even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible."8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13. Article VII or Section 4(1). Jr. they could have explicitly done so. Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. or the Office of the Ombudsman. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13. the express applicability of the ban under Section 15. Article VII. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15. the movants. Davide. the decision of March 17. because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law itself. 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division. In the end. Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary.10 Thus. Article VII as being equally 109 . had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. Rather. interpolation is improper. chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices. xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions. to wit: Section 13. Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication. Undersecretaries. given that their meaning is clear and explicit. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. The movants gravely err in their posture. In other words. including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15. both of Article VIII. Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court.7 Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15. Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are. Another instance is the movants¶ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9. Article VII during the period provided therein. the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. Article VII. And. Article VIII. That is self-contradiction at its worst.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary. because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary.
and within the jurisdiction of this 110 . J. for their retirements were mandatory.applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself. 27.: I. On March 10 Judge Jose C. directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. recites: That on or about May 1969 to December 5. a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President¶s or Acting President¶s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. most likely in Section 4 (1). 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. G. Yet. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with. L-32613-14 December 27. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba. Branch I). None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure. vs. Nos. Province of Tarlac. she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. HON. Article VIII. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy. The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob. Final Word It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President. Petitioner. Statement of the Case Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library On March 5. No. in the Municipality of Capas. ACCORDINGLY. SO ORDERED." and NILO S. We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter. docketed as Criminal Case No. 1972 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. finding a prima facie case against Co. SIMEON. The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair. the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and." and punishes any person who "knowingly. 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations.R." Respondents. becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. Philippines. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The twice-amended information. Her official duty she must comply with. CASTRO. 1969.
an information was filed. instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the government. the training school of recruits of the New People's Army. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. and elsewhere in the Philippines.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library That in the commission of the above offense. another criminal complaint was filed with the same court. willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts. of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN. joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders. the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines. by inciting. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law. that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY. RENATO (REY) CASIPE. deceit. in the Province of Tarlac. willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army. deceit. and that all the above-named accused. an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force. reads: The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac. feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines. above entitled case. did then and there knowingly. whose identities are still unknown. as amended. chanrobles virtual law library (b) That the crime was committed by a band. the above-named accused knowingly. knowingly.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. alias Romy Reyes alias TABA. ABELARDO GARCIA. to wit: chanrobles virtual law library (a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities. sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. Tayag. violence. BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES. and afford impunity. MANUEL ALAVADO. the abovenamed accused. subversion. violence. as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations. by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University. conspiring. the following aggravating circumstances are present. willfully and by overt acts organized.Honorable Court. 1970. Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following: chanrobles virtual law library 111 . confederating and mutually helping one another. ARTHUR GARCIA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Meanwhile. 1700. committed as follows: chanrobles virtual law libra ry That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter. for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. pursuant to the Order dated June 5. and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force. in addition thereto. After preliminary investigation was had. hereby accuse Nilo S. a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines. on May 25. or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power. 1700. which.
the said accused organized. suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country. or disguise was employed. the trial court said. violence. and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist regime.'" By means of the Act. Congress usurped "the powers of the judge. deceit. the trial court. subversion and/or other illegal means.1. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. deceit. and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government. and a legislative intent.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary 2. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry Resolving the constitutional issues raised. declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard. 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class. and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws. by force. and toward this end." Finally. subversion and/or other illegal means. the law is still a bill of attainder because it has 112 . its existence. impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder. 7 History in perspective. bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities. II. together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others. present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines. On July 21. La Paz. and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution. in its resolution of September 15. (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof. 9 chanrobles virtual law lib rary In the case at bar. and (b) craft. and dismissed the informations against the two accused. Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA. the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite. the imposition of a burden on it. (2) it is vague. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari. pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army. a 'clear. 1970 Tayag moved to quash. 1970." 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. according to the trial court. conspiracies. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac. section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted. rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. fraud. subversive and/or seditious propaganda. "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member. The Government appealed. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder? Article III." and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity. among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico.
Federal LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which. Instead. manager." chanrobles virtual law library 1. without more. against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. 781 et seq. 367 US 1. and imposes disability and penalties on its members.. trustee. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition. in Congress' view. member of any executive board or similar governing body.. This statute specified the Communist Party. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out: Under the line of cases just outlined..expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow. ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization.. Brown. 81 S CT 1357. Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. In section 504. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which. in U. however.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party.000 or imprisoned for not more than one year. vs. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows: (a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party . The 113 . organizer. or both. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors.. stated in section 4.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library Communist Party v. 6 L ed 2d 625. and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. business agent. 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. 50 USC sec. lend a support to our conclusion. 64 Stat 987. Subversive Activities Control Board. Membership in the Party." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. (1958 ed). That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action organization.S. sec.members of the Communist Party." under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office. it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability . shall serve chanrobles virt ual law libra ry (1) as an officer. or other employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder.S.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law lib rary (b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10. director. it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. 10 chanrobles virtual law libra ry This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.
e. to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit. must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly. that the Act specifies individuals and not activities. and that they joined the Party. while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives. this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. willfully and by overt acts. that the Communist Party. at 87.. suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy. 7." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party.. i.definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. after it is once registered pursuant to sec. was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership. with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. the Act provides adequate means of relief. as the law alone. reasoning that sec.) chanrobles virtual law library A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder. Even assuming.. 16 Similarly.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry 2. dominated. 6 L ed 2d at 683) Indeed. 17 chanrobles virtual law libra ry 114 . but instead sets forth a general definition. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly. willfully and by overt acts. or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title. were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization. 782 (1958 ed. and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion. a statute requiring every secret. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed. and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof. which (i)is substantially directed. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or active. which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these activities. (367 US. 50 USC sec. has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. by virtud of the activities in which it now engages. knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective. 64 Stat 989. to be unlawful. would suffice to secure their punishment. however." the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it: chanrobles virtual law li brary In this proceeding the Board had found. it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. comes within the terms of the Act. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities.. without more. oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register. 3 of the Act: chanrobles virtual law l ibrary [A]ny organization in the United States . A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy. and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power..
the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night. 22 or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities. in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus. and. Bryant vs. and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. Zimmerman. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable." chanrobles virtual law l ibrary 115 . the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan." and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others." and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known." the legislature may apply its own rules. while not immune from hostile criticism. 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder. it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder." was upheld by this Court." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years. 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union.In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act." meaning in that state. 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies. oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register. The Court said: The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of associations shown by experience. and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. 19 chanrobles virtual law libra ry Indeed.said: "Benevolent orders. have on the whole justified their existence. its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people. many of them having been in existence for many years." and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. . after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies. But the legislation is not confined to this society. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office. and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination." The third court. 25 chanrobles virtual law libra ry In New York ex rel. 21 or from exercising their profession. and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare.
S. advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised. in Lansang vs. 27 chanrobles virtual law library In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court.' . purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan..putting aside controverted evidence . no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices. become a member of or affiliated with any group. before a committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation." and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth. orders of other periods. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided: . This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chan robles virtual law library 3. But if it is not an ex post facto law. the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder.We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available including the published report of a hearing. after this section becomes effective." that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics. state and national affairs. gentile. association. 32 the U. in any office or department thereof. advocated. Therefore. in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy.. protestant whites. 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. and Negroes. either elective or appointive. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China.. or who may. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause . doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California. Board of Public Works. After meticulously reviewing the evidence.'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. P.that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. therefore." 29 More recently. advocated. "frequently a bill of attainder was . As Justice Frankfurter observed. Garcia. A.. that its memberships was limited to native-born. we said: "We entertain. organization or party which advises. If so it was advised .. that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States. society. or taught. that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local. if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised. and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes. Jews.. 116 . [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles." 31 chanrobles virtual law library Thus in Gardner vs. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association.
can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present activities.willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with. the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. by its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct.. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process 1. thus: . The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. in probability. 33 chanrobles virtual law library This statement. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950: Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that. viewed against the legislative background. the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein... Under these circumstances. may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Indeed. 1957.become or remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20. bethey many or few. if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy. or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so.S. Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed. weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party.whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. As already stated. are punished. the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable. subsequently to its adoption in 1941.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary . advise. them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. III. there can be no complaintof an attainder.In upholding the statute. As the U. the statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U. 35 Accordingly. advocate. Rather. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. mutatis mutandis." Only those who "knowingly. few organizationswill come within the statutory terms.S. any limitation 117 . Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date.
[T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party. present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines. i. [I]n the face of the organized.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law lib rary With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing them. [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear. the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact.on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil.. is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit.. chanrobles vi rtual law library . Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"). whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. subversionand other illegal means.those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chan robles virtual law library A conventional formulation is that legislative facts . instead of making these findings in enactingthe statute. 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose. thus: . Congress omitted to do so.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of legislativefact. Supreme Court said: 118 .. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble. chanrobles virtual law libra ry . and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact.are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia.posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities. new York.. and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. while adjudicativefacts . thus: . morals.will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that they exist." The recital of legislative findings implements this test. whether this standard has a reasonable relationto public health. the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if. In truth..S. A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.S.... national in scope but international in direction.e. and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.those facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy. systematice and persistentsubversion.there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.the U. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction. 36 chanrobles virtual law libra ry The test formulated in Nebbia vs. the requirements of due process are satisfied.. for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control.e.. i.
" Indeed. And if we accept them. must be acquired "knowingly. willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means.They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over morethan a decade and a half. carried to its logical conclusion..S. 530. the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means." 42 The requirement of knowing membership. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration. the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines. Nebbia v. may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act. as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States. misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly.no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require elaboration.. Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial. . 516. 2. 39 chanrobles virtual law library This statement. the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44 chanrobles virtual law library 3. "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack. 291 U.must lead to anarchy.. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof). the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit.that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors. as has been stated: Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings.It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject them. and when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose. . 43 For. We rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution. Cf.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act.." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission. . No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence. New York. subversion and other illegalmeans..502. mutatis mutandis. the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly 119 .. which principle. willfully and by overt acts.. but to the United States as asovereign. It surpasses and transcendes every other value. United States: 41 Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change.. independent Nation. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments.as distinguished from nominal membership..chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Moreover.we must recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is extensive. to be unlawful. hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society.
Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.. knowingthe purpose thereof chanrobles virtual law li brary Shall be fined not more than $20. the "Court said in Scales vs. any such society." 45 IV. where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative findings stated inthe U. and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. or both. advocate. violence orother illegal means."namely.and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law. United States: 47 It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected speech. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary]. "whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak. or assembly of persons who teach. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power.. group or assembly of persons. whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy.the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould. orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby force or violence. is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country. The former provides: Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety. an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries. for the five years next following his conviction.. 46 chanrobles virtual law library In sustaining the validity of this provision. 48 For in truth.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry The membership clause of the U. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines. The Act and its Title 120 .000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years. Moreover. The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. as was held in another case. should receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence. in the first instance.S. the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force. We can discern no reason why membership. is not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment." 49 V. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression As already pointed out.delineated objective of the "overthrow. legislation. is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual freedom. is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language. or affiliatedwith. and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or agencythereof. or becomes or is a member of. have chosen other methods. group. and itwas further established that a combination to promote suchadvocacy. albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty.S.
We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.The Government.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents. and forOther Purposes"). we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the Act. (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power. we cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement.The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under 121 . even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime. subversion or illegal means. in reality. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided. in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature. and need not recite the details of the Act.and (c) that he did so knowingly. Japan. but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local governmentby illegal means. finally. Accordingly. or the government of any of its political subdivisionsby force. even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act. violence." 50 chanrobles virtual law library What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads: And provided. Penalizing Membership Therein. in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations. Conclusion and Guidelines In conclusion. but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain. Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia. That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines."Together with the main title. operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief.. willfully and byovert acts." chanrobles virtual law library The Act. (b) that the accused joined such organization. must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association: chanrobles virtual law library (1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines. evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist power. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act. has a short title. and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. the short title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies. It is argued that the said proviso. scope. deceit. punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations. burt a democratic regime. VI. and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.for the purpose of placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any lien power. and chanrobles virtual law library (2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
JJ.1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790. respondent.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library ACCORDINGLY. Langkong. known as Republic Act 4790. and that Bayanga. vs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Makasiar and Antonio. knowingly and byovert acts. Bayanga. Sec. took no part. in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan. Barrios Togaig. concurs in the result. are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton. the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247. Bakikis.thecontrol of a foreign power. reproduced in haec verba. Barrios and Fule for respondent. Tiongko.. 1967 BARA LIDASAN. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig. It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon. SANCHEZ. C. petitioner. 1. Kapatagan. Suntay for petitioner. JJ. Colodan. Sec. Zaldivar. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. The first mayor. Aipang. reads: Sec. Losain.. Magabo. Bongabong.. and (c) that he did so willfully. and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.J. concur. No. which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur". Kat-bo. 3. Dagowan. Bungabung. Kabamakawan. Province of Cotabato.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Concepcion. Matimos and Magolatung. now in dispute. Province of Lanao del Sur. Barredo and Esguerra. On June 18.: The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections. the questioned resolution of September15. vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials. Madalum. but which includes barrios located in another province ² Cotabato ² to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Tabangao. 1966. chanrobles virtual law libra ry chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law libra ry G. Kat122 . 1970 is set aside. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 2. Costs de oficio.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to future determination. Langkong. J.R. Province of Lanao del Sur. The body of the statute. Teehankee. (b) that the accused joined theCPP. Sarakan. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition. Digakapan. L-28089 October 25. Sarakan. Makalintal.
" Comelec. stood by its own interpretation. the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790.bo. in the case of House Bill 1247. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional. a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang. given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. also of Cotabato. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration. Tiongko. registration of voters and for other election purposes. right at the outset. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15.5 Of course. the persons interested in the subject of the bill. Cotabato. Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan. only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill. Prompted by the coming elections. Tabangao. the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment. originated. Losain. Sarakan. Digakapan. 123 . and the public. Tiongko. Bakikis. the barrios of Bayanga. Cotabato. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated. Digakapan. being of local application. 1967. First. Magabo. under one statute. 1."2 It may be well to state. fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. 1967 and September 20. that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. 1967. recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."3 Compliance is imperative. the new municipality of Dianaton. And this. 1967. Bongabong. Aipang. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command. Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang. as the statute stands. through the Assistant Executive Secretary. also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. the pertinent portions of which are: For purposes of establishment of precincts. In fact. Of relevance here is the second directive. Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality. scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes." This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan. of heterogeneous subjects. Apprised of this development. of the nature. Lanao del Sur. Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15. language of such precision as to mirror. declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. the Office of the President. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Dagowan. Doubtless. Bungabung. twelve barrios ² in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato ² are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. the municipality of Parang. that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. be nullified. by resolution of September 20. which became Republic Act 4790. on September 7. Kat-bo. Matimos. Langkong. the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon. Second. Tabangao. Magabo.
we believe. And yet. it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill." This posture ² we must say ² but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill." read without subtlety or contortion. Mountain Province. the following. of giving notice to all persons interested. an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" ² which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation. which technical accuracy is not essential. For. and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth. L-16511. a province different from Lanao del Sur. The title ² "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton. the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan. Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that. therefore. may be taken as guidelines: The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading. study and discuss the same. 1966. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. both in the province of Lanao del Sur. the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet. and. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. Ifugao. The Felwa case is not in focus. as 124 . Salas. 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created.to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill. were not set forth in the title of the bill. deceptive. surely.6 In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement. xxx xxx xxx In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered. population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. and Kalinga-Apayao. a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents. and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area. thus. and. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for. October 29. For there. is bad." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. makes the title misleading. it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur. take appropriate action thereon. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law. or which is misleading. or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act. the title did not reflect this fact. in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 ² projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton.7 With the foregoing principles at hand. Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. and the purpose of the constitutional requirement. reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law. either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act. we take a hard look at the disputed statute. prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. should be kept in mind by the court. as controlling here.
39 A. our attention is drawn to Hume vs. may well apply to this case: It may be that words. if 125 . were likewise declared unconstitutional. The act goes beyond the restriction. 200 NW 262. Woody. . in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact.set forth in its title. as conditions. . that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid. but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may."9 Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions. As was said in Schmalz vs. considerations." The statute. Wooly. which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object. supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree." Savings Bank vs. Under the guise of discarding surplusage. be disregarded as surplusage. Village of Fruitport. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20. . or compensations for each other. with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. which shall be expressed in its title. The following. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur. There.J. Black. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan. As we canvass the authorities on this point. 539. "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. Schmalz vs."10 We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void. and the constitutional portion upheld." would have been a sufficient title. and that if all could not be carried into effect. . as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole. 219 NW 648." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff. in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control. to wit: . 316. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa. 56 N. however. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport. thus: . 228 Mich. by the name of the Village of Fruitport. 2. the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport. however. . including taxing his lands. Eq. then. buttressed on reason and of long standing. State of Michigan. and that the words. the parts will be separated. The title here is restrictive. for it is misleading. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur. for that reason. said in Hume. inducements. . A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its provisions. the legislature would not pass the residue independently. and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate. 649. Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution. We are not unmindful of the rule. which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title. in the County of Muskegon. a resident of Ottawa county. . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected. a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. be. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. 649. gives the exception to this rule.
if enacted into law. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions. thus: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void.13 Consequently. conditional. Secondly. which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. and valid statute. and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part. all the provisions which are thus dependent. large aggregate population and sufficient income. Firstly. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative. the aggregate population is large. That this is so. . thus: Could the observations as to progressive community. now Republic Act 4790. Municipal corporations perform twin functions. territory. large aggregate population. sanitation. what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever.some parts are unconstitutional.11 In substantially similar language. since the court has no power to legislate. . to remain deaf to these problems. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community. while another part is valid. and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. the totality of the twenty-one barrios ² not nine barrios ² was in the mind of the proponent thereof. is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself. the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete. as repugnant to the Organic Law. And yet. unquestionably. But in order to do this. we are afraid. When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress. is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. . . the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court. if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang. This bill. which carries out the legislative intent. . will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy. and income. still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality. the explanatory note to House Bill 1247. or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability. and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. states that the seat of the government is in Togaig. must fall with them. collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. . It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. may stand and be enforced.12 Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended. the valid portion if separable from the invalid. . we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine ² of the 126 . . thereafter enacted into law. several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. . reads: The territory is now a progressive community. by the Act. to create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton. or connected. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Amongst these are population. intelligible.
namely. The right of every citizen. He may not want. and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. not of this Court. is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Stated differently. to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new town.P. 4790 deals with one subject matter.. J.16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected. respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest. Separate Opinions FERNANDO. Hence these few words to express my stand. and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes. with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. amongst others. indeed.. Reyes. Republic Act No. Cotabato. Dizon.. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. Really. So ordered. we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void.14 3. he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them. For. if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all. Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible. Bengzon. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction. Makalintal. For the reasons given. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent. it is the function of Congress. Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. To do so.B. J. that petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found in two 127 .original twenty-one ² barrios. C. of the community affected thereby.. the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. Concepcion. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers. as is the case here. JJ. J. and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein.15 Petitioner is a qualified voter. I find myself unable to give my assent. Zaldivar. dissenting: With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court. we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. He may not even know the candidates of the new town. concur. he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.J. No costs allowed. therefore. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit. to spell out that congressional will. he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony. Castro and Angeles. he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted. this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point..L. Capacity to sue.
1 This provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American States. and against surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization. the paragraph in Republic Act No. the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios. To provide retirement benefits. It is true of course that in Philconsa v.6 the opinion coming from Justice Concepcion. Cotabato. located not in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan. after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Government v. the present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos. the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation. of the so-called omnibus bills. the members of the legislature as well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. The construction must be reasonable and not technical. the previous organic act. At the most. and not the strict test as desired by the majority headed by Justice Laurel." As we noted. a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. and log-rolling legislation. The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Lanao del Sur. Salas.7 one of the grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No.4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. for these officials. in 1938. construing a provision of this nature.2 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter. 4007. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against three. the Reorganization Law. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts 128 . Mere details need not be set forth. would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. In other words. this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. therefore. While the case of Government vs. Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation. a 1966 decision. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Commission on Elections.3 The first decision of this Court. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. however." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality.other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. 186. It is aimed against the evils. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members. AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision.5 up to and including Felwa vs. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find expression in its title. Justice Laurel. but in Parang and Baldon. providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c). It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. vigorously dissented. Gimenez. SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System.
9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution. That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional question considering the broad. as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted. What justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton. In Radiowealth v. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying precedents." The above principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our constitutional history. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. Stone.to construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act. That was embodied in the title. Agregado. it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority. This construction assures precisely that." In Sanchez v. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions. The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. I find the citation from Corpus Juris Secundum. Thus in a 1913 decision. which if not precisely controlling.8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law. As thus interpreted. Richmond 129 . '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality'."11 From the pen of the articulate jurist. In doing so. This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law. It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court. have a persuasive ring. we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute. I do not deem controlling. having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by another. In re Guariña:10 "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress. Lanao del Sur. The then Justice. with all due respect. The State decisions cited." American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to [their] validity. the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it. unnecessary and far from persuasive." It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. What was created was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries. that." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly. Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat. later Chief Justice. liberally. several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. some of the opinions coming from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition. Chief Justice Taft. Lyon Construction.
ed. the statute entitled "An act to amend Secs. United States. 58 Phil. 40. Burr. Congressional Record. and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision. Chief Justice Hughes. 194. 48 S. As phrased by Mr. Section 18. 21(1). 238 P 585. 4318 and 4327 of the Codes of Montana relating to changing the boundaries of Fergus and Judith Basin countries" was rendered void because the body of the act included the boundaries of Petroleum county. No. Article VI of the Constitution. I. 370. 111-112. . and private bills."15 Republic Act No. 7 8 9 6 82 C. in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such peril. All appropriation. 108. .Screw Anchor Co." but the body of the act affected another county other than Gratiot. 285. State vs. 72 L. Vol. Article VI. bills of local application. 296. 1188-1190. Benson.J. Emphasis ours. 101 Phil. p. Footnotes 1 2 3 4 5 Hereinafter referred to as Comelec. shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. bills authorizing increase of the public debt. 320. No. 1155. . Emphasis supplied. Vol. Schiardien. 598. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity. 303. So I would view the matter. 76 L. Hernandez. 31 NW 609. "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised.13 is that courts "have consistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation. I. 365. with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly brought to light in the opinion of the Court. revenue or tariff bills. 317. 8. 275 US 331. Ct. it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas. . 10 130 . 198."14 It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure. 40 SW 2d 315. pp. Sec. Ichong vs. Examples: Wilcox vs. pp. Philippine Constitution. Paddock. 18." Vidal de Roces vs. provides: "Sec. 346. Posadas. 40-41. the judiciary favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality. .' Crowell v.S. ed. v. but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. emphasis supplied. 50. where the statute entitled "An act making an appropriation of state swamp lands to aid the county of Gratiot in improving the channel of Maple river . Stiglitz vs.
dissenting: 131 . The reading of the former would give no clear suggestion that the latter would follow and be made the subject of the act. Section 4 thereof "requires the creation of a municipality on petition of a majority of voters or 500 voters. 48 P 583. To remove only Section 4 would be like taking the motor of an automobile which leaves the machine of no use. 1961. capable of being executed. Nelson. where the title gave notice that the entire village of Fairview is annexed to Detroit when the body affected only a portion. Hydorn. The court. City of Detroit. Jackson. The Commission on Elections. Barrameda vs. 370. 715. In the case of Fuqua vs. where the title of the act purported to attach Kearney county to Finney county the body of the act attached it to Hamilton county. This statute was declared void in toto. since they deal with the classification of cities to be created. L-18684. 113 NW 368. FERNANDO. City of Mobile. 259. 25 Phil. Brooks vs. Springer (50 Phil. using the test whether or not after the objectionable feature is stricken off there would still remain an act complete in itself. 98 So. State vs. cited. pp.. the statute involved was entitled "An Act relating to cities". Clerk vs. Fairview vs. While some of the provisions of the act are germane to the title. emphasis supplied). it was asserted that the portion of the statute excluding a territory from Mobile which was not express in the title "An act to alter and rearrange the boundary lines of the city of Mobile in the state of Alabama" should be the only portion invalidated. quoted in Government vs. 11 12 Black. hence. 113 NW 368. 44. Kearney County. Moir. 121 So. Simpson. 696. they seem merely to harmonize other sections of the statute which they amend with a new creation of cities other than sixth class towns.. Interpretation of Laws. sensible. the title of the act purporting to alter or rearrange the boundaries of Decatur city and the body of the act which actually diminished the boundary lines of the city were considered by the court as dealing with incongruous matters. City of Detroit. Bonnie. 292. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled as follows: "The judgment declared only Section 4 [relative to the creation of a municipality on petition of the voters] to be void and the remainder valid. In the case of Engle vs. they too must fall. City of Ensley vs. 116. p. September 14. 47-48. 13 14 McQuillin.. 204 SW 2d 963. We are quite sure that these provisions would not have been enacted without Section 4. ruled that there can be no segregation of that portion dealing with the excluded territory from that dealing with additional territory because these two matters are all embraced and intermingled in one section dealing with the corporate limits of the city." But some of the provisions were germane to the title of the law. ed. 2d. Municipal Corporations. 3d ed. 61. 92 So." 15 16 Macias vs. 481. 52 So. 1123-1124.Atchison vs. Sherrod. 456-464. 42 NW 1122. Fairview vs. J.
v. 78 Phil. 78 Phil.1 2 3 4 5 6 Art. 220. 535. 32. 40 Sup. 45. 527: United States v. (1950). 483. Rep. 1966. if this can be done without extravagance. ed. for this purpose. 37.. (1942) 228. 139. 43. 345 US 41. 429 (1950). 21. 42 Sup. Atty. 43 Sup. 258 US 204. 64 L. Panama R. 572. July 30.R. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank (1938). 7 8 9 L-23326. Government v. 663. ed. National Dairy Product Corp. 754. 114. Nuval v. 299-300. 849. 85 Phil. 66 Phil. 101 Phil. 229. 155491. Delaware & H. citing United States ex rel. Sec. Gen. 264 US 375. Rep. Johnson. 748. 260 US 110. 373 US 29. 53 L. 92 Phil. Texas v. Ct. INC. ed. 66 L. that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality. L-26511. Standard Brewery. 1155. RODRIGO 132 . People vs. or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions. ed. Inc. 408. 157. 301 US 358. 29 Sup. Alexander (1928). de la Fuente (1953). THE CITY OF DAVAO. Ichong v. 2008] SMART COMMUNICATIONS. 86 Phil. PETITIONER. 66 Phil. L-18349. Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. United States (1937). VS. Constitution. Carlos (1947). Ct. Oct. 251 US 210. 309 (1950). 1. December 18. 1074. 1962. v. 73 Phil. Chandler. Ct." Lucas v. 836. 281. If there is doubt. Cabatuando. 323 US 283. Rep. but will rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force and effect. 390. City of Manila v. Hernandez (1951). Eastern Texas R. Ct. 535. Shell Company. to disregard the more usual or apparent impact of the language employed. The other cases that may be cited follows People v. 24 Phil. Bratton v. REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS MAYOR HON. 87 Phil. Rep. Co. No. 407. L-14542. 376. Ex parte Endo (1944). par. even though it may be necessary. 68 L. Carlos (1947). 213 US 366. THIRD DIVISION [G. 235. Justice Carson who penned the opinion cited Black on Interpretation of Laws to this effect: "Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the constitution. Cordero v. September 16. 279 US 573. Ct. 1960. or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature. Chippewa Indians v. 848. 577-578. Co. United States v. if the words or provisions of the statute are obscure. Co. October 29. 566. Arellano Law Colleges. 44 Sup. 1965. 161. 483. VI. ed. 31. Cf . Rumely (1953). Rep. 67 L. 391. 12 13 14 15 11 10 United States v. 217.
They invoked the power granted by the Constitution to local government units to create their own sources of revenue. 7160. DUTERTE. (c) the power of the City of Davao to impose a franchise tax is subject to statutory limitations such as the "in lieu of all taxes" clause found in Section 9 of R. particularly Section 1. the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.A. 28. Hon. a pre-trial conference was held. 2002. the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. Civil Case No. On May 17. RESPONDENTS.R. No. Rodrigo R. Article 10 thereof. there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. 7294. On July 19. 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and its Order dated September 26. 7294. AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DAVAO CITY.976-2002. and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City.A. No. 7160 can only apply to exemptions already existing at the time of its effectivity and not to future exemptions. for the ascertainment of its rights and obligations under the Tax Code of the City of Davao. thereafter. respondents filed their Answer in which they contested the tax exemption claimed by Smart. 2002. must be resolved against the taxpayer. (Smart) against the City of Davao. Smart filed a special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ratiocinated that tax exemptions are construed 133 . Smart contends that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to the City. 7160 shows the clear legislative intent to exempt it from the provisions of R. The Facts On February 18. Inasmuch as only legal issues were involved in the case.A. and (d) the imposition of franchise tax by the City of Davao would amount to a violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts. (b) Section 137 of R. 2002 in Sp. The trial court noted that the ambiguity of the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in R. the RTC issued an order requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and. represented by its Mayor.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Smart Communications. No. DECISION NACHURA. Duterte. 2002. on whether it covers both national and local taxes. 7294 subsequent to R. on the following grounds: (a) the issuance of its franchise under Republic Act (R.A. the pertinent portion of which reads: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law. J. at a rate of seventyfive percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the income or receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City.) No. 2002.A. On March 2. Inc. to annul the Decision dated July 19. No.A.
] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SECTION 137 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. IN RELATION TO SECTION 151 THEREOF. the trial court cited Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. 7294).] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S FRANCHISE IS A GENERAL LAW AND DID NOT REPEAL RELEVANT PROVISIONS REGARDING FRANCHISE TAX OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. thus.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S FRANCHISE (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 134 . WHICH CONTAINS THE "IN LIEU OF ALL TAXES" CLAUSE. Thus. On the issue of violation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority and. ALLOWS RESPONDENT CITY TO IMPOSE THE FRANCHISE TAX. [b. WHICH PROVIDES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF TAX EXEMPTION PRIVILEGES.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT UNDER PETITIONER'S FRANCHISE (REPUBLIC ACT NO. AND SECTION 193 OF THE CODE. ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. Smart filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated September 26. Marcos. NO FRANCHISE TAX MAY BE IMPOSED ON PETITIONER BY RESPONDENT CITY. Smart assigns the following errors: [a. It added that while such power may be subject to restrictions or conditions imposed by Congress. the instant case. [c. any such legislated limitation must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. WHICH. AND WHICH IS A SPECIAL LAW ENACTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. [d. [f.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SECTIONS 137 AND 193 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE REFER ONLY TO EXEMPTIONS ALREADY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT BUT NOT TO FUTURE EXEMPTIONS. and declared that the city's power to tax is based not merely on a valid delegation of legislative power but on the direct authority granted to it by the fundamental law. 7294) HAS BEEN AMENDED AND EXPANDED BY SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. WHICH ACCORDING TO THE COURT IS A SPECIAL LAW. [e. those who assert a tax exemption must justify it with words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical not to be misinterpreted. 2002.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT TAX EXEMPTIONS ARE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE TAXPAYER.
its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate buildings and personal property. I.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE IMPOSITION OF THE LOCAL FRANCHISE TAX ON PETITIONER WOULD VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS. Section 9 thereof. (GLOBE) (REPUBLIC ACT NO. quoted hereunder. the pivotal issue in this case is whether Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the City of Davao. 7229). THROUGH ITS BUREAU OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE. The Issue In sum. Smart's legislative franchise (R. The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due thereon to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative in 135 . its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 7294) took effect. its successors or assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof: Provided.7925.The grantee. in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto. Prospective Effect of R. INC. No. 7160 On March 27. its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business transacted under this franchise by the grantee. No. [i. THAT PETITIONER IS EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF THE FRANCHISE TAX IMPOSABLE BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.A. -. THEREBY PROVIDING AN ADDITIONAL GROUND WHY NO FRANCHISE TAX MAY BE IMPOSED ON PETITIONER BY RESPONDENT CITY. "THE PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT. Tax provisions. as other persons or corporations which are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. [g. WHICH ARE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND WERE ENACTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.A." TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FRANCHISE OF GLOBE TELECOM. The Ruling of the Court We rule in the affirmative. In addition thereto.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE. That the grantee.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION BELOW. 72 unless the latter enactment is amended or repealed. is at the heart of the present controversy: Section 9. the grantee. 1992. exclusive of' this franchise. [h.
within its territorial jurisdiction.Unless otherwise provided in this Code. The intention of the legislature to remove all tax exemptions or incentives granted prior to the said law is evident in the language of Section 193 of R. 7160. No. non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions.: Section 137. 6938. as provided herein. the city may levy the taxes. No. No 136 .A.Except as otherwise provided in this Code. two months ahead of Smart's franchise. except local water districts. regardless of when the business started to operate. Franchise Tax. 7160) took effect. including governmentowned or controlled corporations. income tax. viz. On January 1. (Emphasis supplied. (Emphasis supplied. cooperatives duly registered under RA No. No. In the case of a newly started business. while Section 193 thereof provided for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted prior to the issuance of R. or presently enjoyed by all persons. the tax shall not exceed one-twentieth (1/20) of one percent (1%) of the capital investment.Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law. In the succeeding calendar year. whether natural or juridical. however. Scope of Taxing Powers. -. That the taxes. 7160. The withdrawal of tax exemptions or incentives provided in R. tax exemptions or incentives granted to. We agree with Smart's contention on this matter.A. The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes. No. in relation to Section 151 of R. the tax shall be based on the gross receipts for the preceding calendar year. and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided. Section 137. or any fraction thereon. are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. fees. the Local Government Code (R. -. the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code. in relation to Section 151 of R. because its franchise was granted after the effectivity of the said law.A. allowed the imposition of franchise tax by the local government units.accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall be subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. No.A. 7160. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. 1992. except the national franchise tax (now VAT).A. and real property tax.) Smart argues that it is not covered by Section 137.) Smart alleges that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Section 9 of its franchise exempts it from all taxes. 7160 except for those expressly mentioned therein. 7160 can only affect those franchises granted prior to the effectivity of the law. Section 151. -. Section 193.A. both local and national. at the rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt. No. or realized.
 They can only be given force when the grant is clear and categorical. Tax exemptions are never presumed and are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.A.A. It is not clear whether the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in the franchise of Smart would include exemption from local or national taxation. No. However. The uncertainty in the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in R. In order to ascertain its meaning. but from a general view of the act as a whole. No 7294 does not expressly provide what kind of taxes Smart is exempted from.A. If the intention of the legislature is open to doubt. consistent with fundamentals of statutory construction. No. 7294 The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise is put in issue before the Court. But whether the franchise tax exemption would include exemption from exactions by both the local and the national government is not unequivocal.interpretation is necessary.A. 7294 is not to be interpreted from a consideration of a single portion or of isolated words or clauses. Smart is of the view that the only taxes it may be made to bear under its franchise are the national franchise tax (now VAT). The surrender of the power to tax. Section 9 of R. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not to local taxes. II. 7294 is not definite in granting exemption to Smart from local taxation. In this case. What is clear is that Smart shall pay franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business transacted under its franchise. Congress intended it to be exempt from all kinds of franchise taxes . Smart has the burden of proving that.A. when claimed. The "in lieu of all taxes" Clause in R. 7294 on whether Smart is exempted from both local and national franchise tax must be construed strictly against Smart which claims the exemption.A. 7294 imposes on Smart a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business transacted under the franchise and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on the franchise or earnings thereof. then the intention of the legislature must be resolved in favor of the State. Smart failed in this regard. the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Davao. aside from the imposed 3% franchise tax. Every part of the statute must be construed with reference to the context. No. The grant of tax exemption by R. all the words in the statute must be considered. It claims exemption from the local franchise tax because the "in lieu of taxes" clause in its franchise does not distinguish between national and local taxes. No. and real property tax.whether local or national. As appropriately pointed out in the separate opinion of Justice 137 . must be clearly shown by a language that will admit of no reasonable construction consistent with the reservation of the power. No. We pay heed that R. income tax. R.
8241). the "in lieu of all taxes" clause does not apply to income tax. a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services. Congress could have used the language in Section 9(b) of Clavecilla's old franchise.There shall be levied assessed and collected. It should be noted that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in R. under the rule on strict construction of tax exemptions. Currently. 7294 has become functus officio with the abolition of the franchise tax on telecommunications companies. other than income tax. nature or description levied. x x x. from which the grantee is hereby expressly exempted." Also. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause does not apply to local taxes. No.A. If Congress intended the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise to also apply to local taxes." Nothing is mentioned in Section 9 about local taxes. -.(a) Rate and base of tax. The only interpretation. omunicipal. Congress would have expressly mentioned the exemption from municipal and provincial taxes. However. the pertinent portion of which is hereunder quoted." Moreover. 7716. Even with respect to national internal revenue taxes. is that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise refers only to national and not to local taxes. (Emphasis supplied).A. Congress did not expressly exempt Smart from local taxes.A. established or collected by any authority whatsoever. The VAT on sale of services of telephone franchise grantees is equivalent to 10% of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services. provincial or national. amended Section 9 of R. The clear intent is for the "in lieu of all taxes" clause to apply only to taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code and not to local taxes. the same paragraph declares that the tax returns "shall be subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. including the use or lease of properties. R. Smart along with other telecommunications companies pays the uniform 10% value-added tax. As admitted by Smart in its pleadings. as follows: x x x in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind. Carpio in a similar case involving a demand for exemption from local franchise taxes: [T]he "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise refers only to taxes. No.A. Value-added tax on sale of services and use or lease of properties. The proviso in the first paragraph of Section 9 of Smart's franchise states that the grantee shall "continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code. it is no longer paying the 3% franchise tax mandated in its franchise. the second paragraph of Section 9 speaks of tax returns filed and taxes paid to the "Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code. 102. -.Antonio T. imposed under the National Internal Revenue Code. as amended by the Expanded Value Added Tax Law (R. The phrase "sale or exchange of services" means the performance of all 138 . Congress used the "in lieu of all taxes" clause only in reference to national internal revenue taxes. No. No. 7294: SEC.
1998. cafes and other eating places. non-bank financial intermediaries and finance companies. the findings of the BLGF are not conclusive on the courts: [T]he BLGF opined that Â§23 of R. resorts. No. indemnity and bonding companies. including clubs and caterers.A. The authorities 139 . pension houses. or parts thereof which are inconsistent with it. In effect. dated August 13. regarding the franchises of Smart and Globe. lessors of property. It also repealed. specifically Section 20 thereof. No. respectively. or modified all other laws. and similar services regardless of whether or not the performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties. the BLGF is not an administrative agency whose findings on questions of fact are given weight and deference in the courts. through the BLGF. Petitioner contends that courts should not set aside conclusions reached by the BLGF because its function is precisely the study of local tax problems and it has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. persons engaged in milling. manufacturing or repacking goods for others. the franchise tax that the City of Davao may impose must comply with Sections 137 and 151 of R. real estate.kinds of services in the Philippines for others for a fee.A.A. Smart presents the same arguments as the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company in the previous cases already decided by this Court. dealers in securities. processing. inns. III. customs and immigration brokers. 7160. Smart submits the opinion of the Department of Finance. rest houses. including those performed or rendered by construction and service contractors. To be sure. Thus. amended. R. 7294 was rendered ineffective by the advent of the VAT Law. No. No. air. operators or keepers of hotels. warehousing services. transportation contractors on their transport of goods or cargoes.A. and non-life insurance companies (except their crop insurances) including surety. Opinion of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) In support of its argument that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause is to be construed as an exemption from local franchise taxes. remuneration or consideration. the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in R. whether personal or real. orders. motels. fidelity. proprietors. radio and television broadcasting and all other franchise grantees except those under Section 117 of this Code. stock. x x x. 1998 and February 24. expressly repealed the provisions of all special laws relative to the rate of franchise taxes. rules and regulations. proprietors or operators of restaurants. lending investors. services of banks. services of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph. commercial. lessors or distributors of cinematographic films. 7716. refreshment parlors. issuances. and water relative to their transport of goods or cargoes. However. 7925 amended the franchise of petitioner and in effect restored its exemptions from local taxes. including persons who transport goods or cargoes for hire and other domestic common carriers by land. As previously held by the Court. the local franchise tax that may be imposed by the City must not exceed 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the income on receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao.
but the correctness of its interpretation of a provision of law. However.A. or may hereafter be granted.cited by petitioner pertain to the Court of Tax Appeals. exemption. An exemption is an immunity or a privilege. Petitioner likewise argues that the BLGF enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of its duty. therefore. among others. no basis for claiming expertise for the BLGF that administrative agencies are said to possess in their respective fields. the "in lieu of all taxes" clause partakes of the nature of a tax exclusion and not a tax exemption. It does enjoy this presumption. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry.) 140 . 7294 in order to avoid the payment of local franchise tax. In contrast. income tax. No.. V. No. exclusions from gross income and allowable deductions. 7925 To further its claim.A. on the other hand. and real property tax. however. Smart pays VAT. or the type of service authorized by the franchise. No. 7925. e. There is. Tax Exclusion/Tax Exemption Smart gives another perspective of the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Section 9 of R. Smart invokes Section 23 of the Public Telecommunications Policy Act (R. -Any advantage. a highly specialized court which performs judicial functions as it was created for the review of tax cases. Section 23 of R. but this has nothing to do with the question in this case.g. 7925): SECTION 23. the interpretation of Â§23 of R. it is the freedom from a charge or burden to which others are subjected. That the foregoing shall neither apply to nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning territory covered by the franchise. This case does not concern the regularity of performance of the BLGF in the exercise of its duties. what it enjoys is more accurately a tax exclusion. privilege. viewed from another angle. IV. or immunity granted under existing franchises.A. is the removal of otherwise taxable items from the reach of taxation. Consequently.A. Thus. An exclusion is. also an immunity or privilege which frees a taxpayer from a charge to which others are subjected. there is no essential difference between a tax exemption and a tax exclusion. shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchise and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises: Provided. thus. to wit. and other related matters. A tax exemption means that the taxpayer does not pay any tax at all. The question raised by petitioner is a legal question. An exclusion. both in their nature and effect. (Emphasis supplied. as previously held by the Court. the life span of the franchise. It says that. the BLGF was created merely to provide consultative services and technical assistance to local governments and the general public on local taxation. favor. No. real property assessment. the rule that a tax exemption should be applied in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the government applies equally to tax exclusions.
 which was enacted on March 19. no other franchise tax may be collected from Globe regardless of who the taxing power is." the provision in the franchise of Globe exempting it from local taxes is automatically incorporated in the franchise of Smart. Congress. No such provision is found in the franchise of Smart. Smart posits that. provincial. municipal. provincial. this provision should also benefit Smart by virtue of Section 23 of R. established or collected by any authority whatsoever. since the franchise of Globe contains a provision exempting it from municipal or local franchise tax. 1992. or collected by any authority whatsoever. The provision in Globe's franchise invoked by Smart reads: (b) The grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines each year after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in this Act. the kind of tax from which it is exempted is not clearly specified. from which the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.A. 7229. or national is clear and categorical . The term "exemption" in Section 23 of R. The grant of exemption from municipal.that aside from the franchise tax collected by virtue of R.A.A. from which the grantee is hereby expressly exempted. As previously explained by the Court. As aptly explained in the en banc decision of this Court in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. 7925. No. v. (Digitel) v. and recently in Digital Telecommunications Philippines. Allegedly. in the franchise of Globe (R.A. 7227). No. 7925. No. in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind. No.A. No. in approving Section 23 of R. Province of Pangasinan . The term refers to exemption from certain regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission. No. 7229). otherwise known as the "most favored treatment clause" or the "equality clause. 7160.A. 141 .A. Smart wants us to interpret anew Section 23 of R. did not intend it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. provincial or national. effective from the date of the approval of Republic Act Numbered Sixteen hundred eighteen. or description levied. 7925 does not mean tax exemption. No. 7925. No. or national. We find no reason to disturb the previous pronouncements of this Court regarding the interpretation of Section 23 of R. No. nature or description levied. the stance of Smart would lead to absurd consequences. including those whose exemptions had been withdrawn by R. the legislature incontrovertibly stated that it will be liable for one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts from business transacted under the franchise.A. 7925.A. No. in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind. City of Davao. 7925 and the proceedings of both Houses of Congress are bereft of anything that would signify the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities.A. by virtue of Section 23 of R. 7925. Furthermore. municipal. established. one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts from business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee in the Philippines. The language of Section 23 of R. nature.A. No. Inc. Inc. in connection with the franchise of Globe (R.In sum.
privilege. Costs against petitioner. Petitioner's theory will leave the Government with the burden of having to keep track of all granted telecommunications franchises. later. 7294 leaves much room for interpretation. Absent the express provision on such exemption under the franchise. one percent (1%) franchise tax. we are constrained to rule against it. the doubt must be resolved against the grant of tax exemption. Petitioner's theory would require that. x x x. any "advantage. fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. 142 . is in the nature of a contract between the government and Smart. WHEREFORE. Congress again grants a franchise to another telecommunications company imposing. Act 7925. favor. Moreover. then all other telecommunications franchises will have to be adjusted to "level the playing field" so to speak. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties.The acceptance of petitioner's theory would result in absurd consequences. Secretary of Finance:  It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot. favor. VI. exemption. exemption. Non-impairment Clause of the Constitution Another argument of Smart is that the imposition of the local franchise tax by the City of Davao would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. including Smart. It is different if Congress enacts a law specifically granting uniform advantages. or immunity to all telecommunications entities. Due to this ambiguity in the law. say. In truth. As held in Tolentino v. This could not have been the intent of Congress in enacting Â§23 of Rep. or repeal. we find that there is no violation of Article III. No. privilege. The franchise. the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. To illustrate: In its franchise. through the exercise of prophetic discernment. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Section 9 of R. Section 10 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. As previously discussed. the franchise of Smart does not expressly provide for exemption from local taxes. according to petitioner. If. Globe is required to pay a franchise tax of only one and one-half percentum (1Â½%) of all gross receipts from its transactions while Smart is required to pay a tax of three percent (3%) on all gross receipts from business transacted. However.A. the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Smart's franchise was granted with the express condition that it is subject to amendment. but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. alteration. to level the playing field. lest some companies be treated unequally. or immunity" granted to Globe must be extended to all telecommunications companies.
SO ORDERED. 143 .
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