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AUGUST. 1917



Part One - The Reallatnc Attitude toward Ixper1ence.
Ohap. I. The Pr.-Athen1an Period. Physioal Real.:1sED.
Cbapt. II. The Athenian Period
8.) The Pl3.1tan10 Phase. Eplstomologdoal Real::ism
b) The Ar1~tote11an Phase. Methodolo 61oal Reea11sm.
; , r
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?alt 'f:-:o - The Tl.:.TI!:it;, Pe.ciGd.

Part Three - The Roman~lc Attitude tonard Exper1enoe.

Chap. I. The ROtDan-Chr1atlan Per1od.
Chap. II. The Early Soholastio Per10d

Ch:tp. I. The Ccr.:..:lao t 10 Pe r ied..

Ch3P. II. TI:e ~::::..t:'onu.liBtlc ?~ri(d.

Part Five - The l s-tic A:.t i tule t owar d Exper ience
Cha~. I. The ner~naliatic Period.
Chap. II. The Brit1~h Period.

~hap. Ill. The Peried

Chap. IV. The C~rent Attitudes.

i II

This work alma to iud1c~te the role of categori?s in eo~e

ph~se8 of the main ourrent of ph11osophio~1 development. It doas not

pretend to give exhaustive lists of ~ategorjes used in the iete~n1na

tion of experienoe. +t 19 in no senge ~ h1~tory of phi1ovophy. It

aims only to point out th~t the var t oue '::'3 tegor ie~ uaed ar e iet~I'mlna-

tiona of experienoe, and to indica.te in ~ome senqe h:')"i t'o chmges in

e~per1ence bri ng R.'b~ut serious mod.i f1ol:lt 1""8 in the "~tegor i 6fl cr
evalua.tione of th~.t expe:""i enee ,
This worle bei n.g baaed upon the hypot.haaiA t~~t the !~hU.OBOph

io"",l ~a.te50r1eA ar e f'.,.~jc111~r nl~g" of evaluatlnna of the tot~?l ex-

perienoe.Whether or not th~ phjlosophers ar e aware rf the fs.ct, it doee
not in all per:tod~ d1sCU9'1 !;lpeoiflc o.,.tegor~a but :iefera t c the maaa of
t.hem l\A t.hp. general attitude ~f the th~nle!' or period. !n <111 c~~

at terr.!it i B l"R.d.e tC'l deser1 be the l:1n1 of e "'perionce ':11: 1 cb on the ~hys1cal

side led ;,:0 the :tpr-racl'1ti"n th~t t h e ca.t egor t e s ar e c ons t t buen t factors
of expe !1enoe.
The arpended ana.).yt1c3.1 tab~eB of ccnt ent n are nc t inte~i'9d to
he 1r~Cace8 of the ma.ter~.a,l u.eej but rr.e!''91y running ,!uiieg to cos e of

th~ antsts.ncUng arguments.


Apalytical table of contents.

The futility ~d .arene1s of philosophy 16 o~ing to a f~11ure

t to &pprec1~te it~ ~im ~j puxpose.

I Ph1109ph~=9

categories they are using.

io not fu1~y ~ppreci~t~

the eignifloanoe of the
categcries are un1~rat~od ~8 eval~
j tions ~f expsrienoe, '.vhich is a. special case ;:;.f exper i ence , '~hfl prob-

le~~ of the thinker are kept i;f1nite.
.\rhe~ th~ natur e c t c3.tegories io t:\ttende:i to, t he hiflt~y ot
philosophy takea on a. new significanoe. I t c.mnot be 10!lger l:':'T... aidered

as a record of ~bstraot loglc~l Blat~~s. A survey of philoao~iliy indl-

ea.t ea th~ .r313.tion t "th~ a.bstr:tct !orrliulation to c cnc re t e e~J.::aiience

l'~e ext r sue va Lue of oateg:lry atuJ.i sa cca.e a out ilt U".:J C :':;~"l-

si1er::.t1 ~'n of r e cent philo50pi1ical attl tu:le"'. In r e cent tlltle~' ~i.:3

v~lue of :::oncrete e~~erienca h~3 b0a~m3 90 ~rcmlLent a factor in

aspects of experience to t ae neg:'ect of son.e :;..( ~h"J rnor e algn:l.:it:::.:.nt


o~ nci~nce ~~i religion.


Philosophy from the earliest times hap. had to defind i.tealf

f with great valor from its enemies. Philosophy, however, has suffered
1 far more from its friends than from its enemies. In the earliest
time Plato l found it neoessary to protest against the condemnation
of philosophy'and to explain Why it 1s attaoked. This state of affair
has persisted from that time to this and philosophy still ha9 to
struggle to ma.intain#tts plaoe a.s a legitimate disoipline. The ilf-
fiaulty with philosophy basbeen a laok of appredlation of its functions
and purpose. Thus we hsva today the st~tement of one of the most
oonscientious devotees of philosophy that philosophy baa claimed ~ore
and aohieved lesR than any othe~ scienoe. 2 This writer fails to afford
philosophy any oomfort because in oommon with those be oritizes, be
mistakes the method and purpose of philosophy. Mr. Russel aims to
reduoe philosophy to a series of abstract and contentless propositions
which have perhaps a remote if any oonmction with experienoe. The
history of Philosophy a.~pears to be a series of futile atteflpts to
solve the problem of knowledge and existenoe. In the earliest times
philosophy aimed at dlsoovering the ultimate faots of existence in
the form of the stuff of the world. Later. with the growth of the ideas
of man's importanoe. there developed the viewpoint tha.t the problem of
pbilo8o~hy was really a problem of knowledge. In still later t1me~ the
problem of philosophy was implioitely determined as an effort to ~x

plain the ~orld in terms of human experienoe. It 1s only in very reoent

times that philosophy is beginning to make explioit to itself its funo-
tion as an attitude toward aotual human experienoe. These various
---~--------~---------------- -------------------------------------
lTheaetttus 174. Republio VI,VII. Euthydemus 307
\ .
2Rusaell_ Our Knowledge of External World.
II p1111osophlOal. formula tiona mark the stages in the empirioal develcp-
ment of pbilosa,phy in its attempt to realize its purpose and the
means for at~aning it. In the oonsideration tbGt this development
t of philosophy is en~irely empirioal 1s implied the question as to
the fu~illty of the previous philosophioal formulations. To designate
as futile all earlier stages of philosophy would be an erro; since eaoh
individual philosophioal formulation is & definite function of the
experience of the time. In a8s~ng this attitude one preoludes ipso
facto the idea of oomplete error in previous systems. for that would
imply an eternal and statio standard. From the standpoint of a.ny
particul~r time it is possible to judge whether & philosophic ~~~itude

adequa,:.iel.y represents the period. As an example there is Buggestsd 'the

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extreme unauita:Dility ot an s,'baolute idealism 01' a. h\!man empiriuism

to incerfret curren~ experienoe. To formulat such attitude to ~~1
~ould ue ~o develop false and futile philosophy. We may expect a
philoaop~1oal pseiv10n vO be espeoially cognizant of the experience
to wllicfl it is a. iormulated a.ttitude. The futility of philosophy
.. is beat i~lu8tIa~ed by the situation in ~tioh thinkers bring baok into
relief ~ositione whlon were developed under other ciroumstanoes. It ie
qui is an erroneous n;.ethcd to interpret experience wi'th oa;tegoriea bor-
rowed t r c.n, quite other times and oondi tione. In O1U"rent thinking
new re~liem appears as an attitude whica attempts to interpret twentieth
century experience With a methcd borrowed from the seventeenth. In
every auch case the pressure of the ~reeent experienoe foroes a mod-
ification in the formulatei attitude, but the attempt to make living
experience fit into a dead Sh811 bespeaks a laok of awareness of the
philosophical function. The genuine fu1tllity of philosophy should be
carefully distinguished from the There are t~o. tntirely
opposed u1 tUE\tions here. The f~~)parent fut11i ty of philosophy 18
expla.inad by the fact th3.t the oritics of philosophy oons1der it a.s
an a.bsolutely :ig1d and permanent expl~lna.t1c;n of the worlcl and man.


The chaT!ge of fut111 ty made frcm this standpoint obviously has no
mel'it. Philosophy is an ;;l.ttltude
enOU&l it changes w:th that e~~erienQe.
tow~.r1. exper1euQe a.nd naturally
The g~nu1ne philoeophtoal
futility is found in the f3Ct that thlnker~ fail to realize that
Ij philoao~hy is a highly con9ci0ua evolution of experienoe.

Ii The :Jr vblerr. of ::hiloeophy 1e t make a systematlio and va.lid


I' . ... :.
evolutivn ofax~exl~nce. This evolution 1s a oonscious or1ent3tion
1 wi til ~ea.fJeot tic tl.e obj aots and non,ii t i on 'l.'hloh oonstl tute the exper-
lance of the individual ~i the race. Philosophy is a highly conscious
and delio~rate deterrelnation of the nature of experlsnoe. Philosphy
1s a oritic~l evolution cf e xpe r Lence ~!~ Leh streeees the es~ent19.1

signlficarlce cd eXf,:srience. Tbe n:ot1vea guiding the determination

o~ philoaophy ~11 relate to the ult1m~te purpoRe of brln1ng about the
defini ~e orientation 01 i;;:;'J thinker in hie v:orld. The evolutions of
PW,1060phy are c~incident 'IIi th the gel~el'A.l c1.eterminntion of experienoe.
Wh~~e t~e~5 is expe=ience the~~ i~ alwqye' this process of orientation.
In fa.ce cxpe r i ence in ~p:es..t ,P-=:.!'t iii nothing more than a. determination
of objedta and conda tl ens ";11io11 c/)n:~ti tuted. ait,erlence, for purposes
or act i on and t aough t , The enr i chmen t of experienoe 1s the furtI~9r
i or ldnt:l.tLm among the obJ ::::<~t:) and cond i t ions ietermi ned in ?revi cue

I expecianoe. In the !1;Ol~~ advanced and 8pecial1zed kind.s of experience

I t.L1i8 frocaa; is e f?m1116.l'. T;~e s c t e ncea all U lustrate this
i, pr ccas of ;ieternl1ni:l~ e7.?er19nCe for specific purposes. The orienta.-
! ti(J~ in the r orld. of a f.:aLticu~:l.r kind of phenomena. ha s i t e nature
in a o.or e cr less defini '.,e need. Up ~o the point where the sci euoes


merge with philosophy this crlen~~t1on for a specific purpose goes

on. The j1!ierenoe between this and philosophy l1ea in the differenoe
in motive. In method and material the work of philosophy is entirely
continuous ~1th that of all other d1eoiplinea whioh lormul~te the
meaning of experienoe and point the way to further exper1enoe. The
differenoe between philosophy and soienoe 1s a differenoe in degree of
cr1ti:iam in handling the materials, a differenoe ~hioh 1a en~irely

I plausible because of the contribut1ng

s1 tuations.
oond1t~ons in the respective
Between soienoe and what ma.y be oalled ordinary e:.;per-

1anoe we find alao a differenoe in d9gree.
may n~e the d1fferenae expertnesa.
In th9 latter oase we
The soientist deals with the same
I objects and oonditions that the ordinary experienoe deals With. but
tbere is present a vastly greater amo~g of exp~rtness in handling the

i objeots and condiulon8. To aum up,philo,ophy 19 an atti~ude tOa;~d

ii experience, an attitude that 1s rigorously anci ~ritio~lly fo~mul~ted.
Ph110soptly 1s an a.~tempt to oonstruot oategorlea whioh will j,etsrmine
~he nat~e ani the meaning of experienoe. This work of date~mining

I and conaitioning expe~1enoe 1s a oontinuous prooess With the i~ct of

l ex~er1enoe itseli. Experienoe is an ~ot or determination of soma kind
i or oth;:;r wlletuer tqe end of the experience or acme aot or
I ei t.aer as prepaxa.tion for an ao u or aome other eni. This ~ct of
I experience a13 determination ma.y go on in &erms which are not in any sense

I oogni~lve but a.s the ineraotio~

toe action makes an appreciaole differenoe.

of objects, to one of
In the

at least
witu ~hioh

this eXl;erlenoe beoomes complex there emarges a series of Jate.ri;,in9.tions

I or oacegories whioh give definition to and a sense of central

ove~ the

l The oategories of philosophy are more definite ~1 uaually more

permanent evaluations of experienoe than we find in most of the
disoiplines . This is owing to the fact that the motive which. guides
the formulation of the philosophic attitude 1s an interest in the more
permanent phasea of experienoe, and in the more permanent experienoes.
Cause as & philosophioal oategory has wider implioa.tions and a. t1lore
permanent signifioanoe than cause as & soientifio oategor,_ To insist
upon this point brings out the relationship between the various forms
of categories. The most damaging critioism that ~y be leveled at
present day philosophy is ~tailure to appre.1ate the "importanoe of
the oategories. To understand the n&~e of the catcgorlee is to
&Ppreoia.te the task of philo80phy better and to eX81"t by tha.t fact
a Wholesome influenoe upon the solution of the philosophical problema.
If the thinkers would aprreclate the faot th~t philosophy 1s an at'ltude
toward experienoe and that an attitude is a sublimation of experienoe,
then the value of the oat~gories whioh are the components of eXfer-
lence and the attitude alike, would be more appreciated. ~hi8 would
result ina greater agreement among philo90phers and in a greater
unity in philosophio thought. Tbe change of futility eoor~en laid
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at the deor of philosophy. tend~ to disappear. The historian of
ph11090phy would have the task of aocounting for the kind of experience
whioh influenoed a partioul~r formdation. The type of oategories
used to 'iesoribe experience would be traoed as far as pra1;icable in

I the experienoe of the period in which they are formulated.

The s1story of philosophy as usually written 1s a reoord of
system making. The histories desoribe the attitude whioh 1s taken
toward experienoe a.t partioular time a.s a logical forllllJ1.at1on. The
oonditions under whioh the partioul~r sy9tem is developed are not
brought out. There is a reoord of the oategoriee used?whether
, the

'r.... .

philsop~er himself formulates ~hem in a table o. not, but the

meadng of these oategories as evolutions ot experienoe 1s not di8-
, W1th the appreoiation of the value of the study of cate-
'J .
gores new l1ght 1s thrown upon the development of the hl.~Qry of
philosophy. .:The philosophioal exper i enoes now brought into con-
taot w1th the other k~nds of exper1enoe. The determination of the
ph1losophioal attitude are found to be of a pieoe with those of the
other 80ienoes and all other phases of experienoe. The study of
philosophy as a detaohed form of intelleotual manipulation will lose
its standing and justifioation among philosophere.
An adequate interest in .the nature of oategories must lead
to the investigation of what the experience is whilh yields a oertain
kind of categorization system. The ooncrete e~rienoe which forms
the baokground for any suoh system will be inquired. into, and this
will 8erve to throw muoh light upon philosophical pursuits. The his-
tory of philosophy indioates bow in different periods the whole of
experience is oategorized. in cognitive oategories, at other times
great stress is laid,upon affec~ve o~ volition oategories. T~e e..

t perience at the basis of these forms of philosophy will be examined

j and the cause for this apparent misinterpretation of experienoe will

I .- ~1
',:'" . t!. \
I be determined. Experienoe1 is sometimes entirely negleoted to
ethioal or mental or material oategories and here also the basis in
the actual experience of the time would be investigated. In fact
there would be an interest awakened in experience itself as well as
in the speoifio attitude toward that experienoe. The determination
or experienoe in terms of a minute part of it will be exposed as a
, serious fallaoy in philosophy. There will no doubt arise from this
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1 lIn the history of philosoph~. uS6'the term reality in plaoe of ex-
I perienoe; the t~nkere are ~mployed, of oourse, With reality.
,,": I

a.tendenoy to explain experienoe as far as pos~ible in terms of
itself rather than in some part of 1~~

A pragmatio acoount of the history of phI1osoph~ would in-

dicate a progres~ive growth in the appreciation of the value of

oategories as elements In the evolution of experience. Theimpor-

tanoe of the oategories follows the appreoia.tion of the importance
of experienoe in the determination of reality. We find thus in
Iant' u-l.attempt to formulate a dootrine of oategories whioh should.
exhibit the nature of experienoe. Kant. however, did not 8ucceed
In his enterprise beoause experienoe for him oarried too heavy a bur-
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den of wesent t s' mechanioa.l philosophy and Newton's soienoe. The
Kantian oategories do not bear any notioeable resemblanoe to oategor-
ies of genuine experienoe. From the standpoint of present day events
we may oriticize tbe Kantian attitude toward experience as entirely
misrepresenting experienoe but allowanoe MUet be made. for the fact
that in a genuine lense he lived under different conditioDS and bad
different experience. The type of oategorization doctrine tha.t is
formulated i8 sympatomio of the experienoe under which it 1s dev-
eloped. There is thus a rational explanation for the d1fferenoe be-
tween the Aristotelian and the Xantian tables. The tables of catego.
ies consoiously formulated are integral parts of the general attitude
toward experienoe and yield significant information as to the kind of
attltule a thinker develops. The objeotive attitude of Aristotle
toward experience iw illustrated by his table of oategoriss. It in-
dicates the faot that Aristotle bad not yet attained the conoeption
of experienoe as the basis of reality. The realization of the ex-
tremely olose conneotion between reality and experienoe was impossible
1n Aristotle's time. Philosphy for Aristotle was anything but an
attitude toward experienoe. Aristotle and his time were not aware of

-;-~~f~?F~ .

~helr own attitudes toward experience and only in proportion as a

period 1s consoious of its own attitude, 1s there an apprec1ation of
p~1108oph1 a8 an a.ttltud. toward experlenoe. Where the realization
of attitudes 1s at a minimum we find categories of an external kind.
This is~n8 oase in the early philosophy of Greece in which the world
Is stated as objective substance of Bome kind or other. In the modern
phil.8Qph~cal statemente the categories are In terms of experienoe
but~ ~8 was suggest~d in the case of Kant. experience 18 conoeived in
an artifioial meo4anietia way.
To oonsider the history of philosophy &8 a reoord of a~titude.

toward experience with refer'~noe to the experienoe which i8 being

attitudinized,tobviates the diffioulties attendent upon considering
~e hi8tory of ~8.8'a, as a reoord of abstrao~ logical systems.
This attitude toward the history pi philosophy oonsiders the suooessive
dootrines as produots of a process which attempts to evaluate human
experienoe in its generality. This would include the sooial, politioal,
economic, artistic, and re~~gious experienoee. The suooeeding for-
mulatlons have no logical development or evolution, they each represent
a more or le88 oritioal attitude toward new oond1ttons and ne" objects.
Philosophy as dootrine is the most exact interpretation of these
experiences. An investigation ot any formulated dootrine would indicate

then why a partioular phase or other of experienoe 1s ma~e basis and

dominant in a speoifio attitude. The oategories of experienoe for the
philosophers are abstraotions of the aotions, beliefs, and atti~udeB

of a cextain time and plaoe. The thoughts of the system are no~

born and oarried on as thought, but ideas fundamental in any sys~em

find their origin in the life oonditions of the time or plaoe in whioh
the sytem is formulated. The es~ential nature of any given exper~o8

find. liS expression in other attitudes than in philosophy. Philosophy

1s only one of many ways in wh1ch the life of a people may be 1nter-
preled. Philosophy is. however. the most deliberate and oonsoious of
all the attitudes. It is the attItude which exempliflea most what is
being experienced.
The categories of p,hilosophy no less than other c~tegor1e8

are funotional constituents of experienoe. The oategories are symbQls

ot the experienoes come to realization as visible reality. The,phil-
osophical oategories are funotional produots of the experience process.

They are not subs1stentlal entities whioh remain permantntly in time.
Secaus they are in a funct10nal senae symbols and sublimations of
1I experienoe. they arise develop and perish with experienoe. The
oategories of philosophy are derived from the ordinary experienoes
of the thinkers who handle these oategories. The most abstract cate-
goris of ph11os~phy are derived trom the oonflicts and the collisions
I of ordinary human relatlons.
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They are gleaned trom the sorrows and

I ~

joys,the buttes and droths of men and women. The evaluations of ex-
perienoe are elements in that experienoe and this faot accounts for
, the 09nrespondlng ohanges in the philosophloal doctrines ~d the ex-
I perienoe situations in which they are developed. P~losophy is rooted
deeply and 1nevltably in the politioal, sooial, eoonomic, and the other
I f
experiences of everyday life. Philosophy ls, however, not a Beoord
merely of what goes on. It is a genuine and integral part of this
experience. In faot, true philosophy is nothing apart from experienoe.
It is experience worked over and condensed by way of appreciating the
profound and intense significanoe of this experienoe. Philosophy thus
1s in its ea~ential nature a relatively permanent aspect of experienoe
I whioh transoends the other phases of experience beoause the meaning

of experienoe is 18S8 ephemeral than is tae immediate experience in
itself. There is something in the experienoe which persists and
~hioh 1s involved in the continuity of the experienoe prooeos.
Philosophy i8 concerned with the multiplioity in the unitary exper-
ienOR ~n~ the unitary in multiplioity, likewise in th: fLuid, in the
stable and the stable in ~he fluid. Philosophy aims to seize bold
of the parti~l views and hia1en ramifioations in experienoe. Philo-
sophy cannot be reduced to politics or eoonomic or any partioular
kind of experienceo whioh indioates the porld in a partial mamner
merely. The philosophioa.l attitude is funotionally different froll
the other attitudes toward experienoe and oannot be reduced ~ any
single one of them. From the earliest times it has been considered
the aim of philosophy to get at something more than the mere ~acte

dealthwith in the daily life, but what that i8 hasbeen dsterm1nei in

an unphilosophioal way. It hac bem thought of a.8 an ex:1atenoe
beyond a permanent and substantial entity beyond the
reach of the ordinary powers and capaoities of the finite thinker.
Philo8QPBm fr0m the earliest timeo h~ve struggled to oate~orize this
inner meaning of experience but they have m1~epres~nted. by calling
it 11sas whioh exist in eteraity and things in themselvea &n~ other
impotsible things. This has led also to tha. invention of a number
of ne~ and peouliar mental proceeD"with whioh to grasp this inner
sense of reality. Philsophera have tried to attain it by the art
ot_pure dialectics .by intuitions of various kinde and. even by Faith.
It is only in vary recent times th"~ tit is being a:ppreoi~"lteJ that the
1nnerslgn1floanoe of experienoe id found in experienoe itself. The
most oer La-in re:\li ty is to be found only m experienoe. Xt is. in a.
8ens~ the law of experienoe. the formula of experienoe While not

transcending in any sense e3perience. In current philosophy the em-
phasis upon the intimate relation between reality and exp~r1enoe baa
led to a denial of the plaoe of philosophy among the legitimate
occupations of th1nkers. Philosophy haa b~en made sUbject to science.
This has oome about by the emphasis of the obvious oondit:ons of everJ-
day life as rea.lities. an eIr.phaiUu' ~:h1ch 1s admira.ble as long a.s there
1s no denial of the existence of a significance in these experienoes.
In surveying the history of philosophic thought we find the
philoBOphio oategories functioning a.s evolutions of experience, ohang-
ing With that experienoe and beooming more and more of their
fuotions as the experienoes beoome::oof more importa.nce to the individual.
having the experienoe. Experience may be aaid to be conscious of it-
self when the individual who has the experienoe realizes the" importanoe
of this experienoe, In a pe~iod when exper13noe is unrelated to the
individual the oategories with which experience ia evaluated are objeo-
tive and external. The v~ious oategories used for the desoription
of experience are not differentiated. The oategortea may be inlitfer-
ently physical, moral, religious or economic. In faot, the en~3r-

priee of ca,egorization does not make any conscious appeal to ~ha

'J evaluator. There is being expressed 71h:t t might be termed the lIil1
to evaluate experienoe. At l~ter times the oaagor19s are d1fferan-
tlated, but there is too great a gap left be~~een them. The a.t'tew-pt
to evaluabe experienoe may come to be the atte~pt to find t~he ulti-
mate and absolute va.lue in which the world can be expressed. When the
experienoing individual is a.pparentlyset adrift from the strong
established conditions and institutions, experience may be oategorized
as values derived from the inner life of an individual or r-eople.
, ,ote" "t

There are other vcl:ltj.ons -in the n:anner in v.-h1ch exper1ence may be
categorized. The stress laid upon the place of the individual in


experienoe may lead to an evaluation of experienoe in categories of ~

an extremely subjeotive eor~. All of theBe and many others ~ij:

ocounsd in the history of philoeopby.
The earliest oategories of philosophy are developed under con-
d1tiOTlB ~Llioh make them external and objeotive. Just when this prooess

I of categorization begins must. of course. be obsoured in the haze of

human ex~erienoe at the time of the beginnings of reoorded history.
The purity of thoee categories 1s aleo a m~tter of exceeding doubt.
The philosophical a.ttitude waa hardly differentiated from the relig-
ious and &esthetio attitudes. Tbe sooial influences, that it. the

gross factors of immediate evente, we~. more marked than in later
I periods. The mythical e~d magical asvects of experience played their
effective part in shaping the attitude of these early thinkers. The
events tlhia!". occurred in Greece in the part of the fourth cen-

I i
tury and the early part of the fi:th brought out an attitude tc~ard

I experience which maae the c~tegorlzatlon process take ~ocount of the

J part whioh the experience. plays in the evaluation of experience.


Ao the ciroumatanoesof life in Greece change, ec doee the attitude

toward it change and. we :find with an attempt to evaluate ths world
I in such a. way tha.t reality is found in a. sphere beyond the v:orld of
j ordi~a.ry hultan activi ties. The eC'Dle':o:h<o.t dlt'ferent oondi tiona which
1! developed later induce an alteration in this vlewpcjnt such as
Aristotle described au an attempt to bring together the t\'TO sharply
sundred worlds. The philosophies of Pl~to and Ariatotle both aro
partial to the views thl3..t knowledge Ls an essential f.'?.otor in the
-t determin~tic.'D O~ .reali ty. 'I'he importance of "":,otuaJ. experienoe in their
I timeg is so slight that their oategoriee are fixed and eternally given
entities. The formulated oategories of Plato and Ariatotle which are

oharacteristio of their gener31 phllo80phloil attitudes are the
barest logio~l symbols of knowledge and existenoe.
With the radioal changes in human ehPerienoe whioh ~ook place
with the downfall of the Greek oivilization a more or less oonsoious
att1tud~ toward experience took place. The world began to be oate-
gor~z.d more and more in terms of the inner experienoes. Follow1ng
the crasade! an1 the rehabilitation of man in the soheme of human
events p the ~orld beoame oategorized in terms of experienoe. From the
days of the Renaissanoe tc the present philosophy has beoome frankly
ooncerned primarily with experience. The inoreased importanoe of ~e

individual and the growin 5 stability of the 800ial order ga origin

to the i~ortanoe which was attaobed
to the correaponding aeries of
oategories of thought and .l3xpras.Goft., and na.ture and spl:ri t. The
extreme mobility of the oivilization of the period finds its adequate
expression in the prominenoe ot the categories of ~t1on, force and
potentiality. As European o1vilization became more and more organized

and standardized, and. the secur i ty of t he indo! vid.ual eeemed to be
attained by the development of the individual n&tions,the evolution


of experience in terms of nature, law, and mechanios beoame a prom-

inent phase of rhiloe"phio thought. Each new cievelopment in the
sooial and politic".l cond t t i one brings with it 6 new kind of formu-
lation of those ccndlt1ons~ The important plaoe whjoh suoh oategories
as sUbstanoe, essenoe, oause. an1 attraation took in the determination
I ot reality in the early modern ~hilo80phy refleots a definite con-
1 dition of social experienoe. Tbe ohanges in tbe meanlngR of older

lI oategories take :l~ce in answer to the same gener~l oonditions.

faot of attempting to establish a formal dootrine of oategories in-

dlcates alao definite condlt.icna of the development ot social exper-
The work of Xant lJl/:attempting to set up in a. table the
fundamental oonditona of experience is symptomatic of a s1tuation
in whi~~ the 'reedom and value of the human 1njlvidual gains recogni-
tion. The Xantian oategorleo at once indioate an establisbed social
!.l ,-'
order, 8tron~ and independent; and a pietistio empbels of tee priva-
cy of the inner life of the individual. There io tBaa the phenomena
which re~resent all there 1s of reality ~o far as 1t can ~e exper1enoed
but there 18 still remaining the things in themselves whioh can never
be known. The philosophy of tho early nineteenth,. in Germany clearly
indicates how the etruggles and strains of a disrupted natiun to find
itself brings out a categorisation of the world Which stresseo voli-
tional and affeotive oategor1es. The world i8 so~eho~ determined ~s

depending upon the individual in the way of creation or appreci&tion.

In the same period the ohaotio national oonditions gave rise to a
category which has pl~yed a tremendous part in the philosophy of the
nineteenth oentry and later - the Absolute. In the latter half vf
the same oentury there oame a settling down a:ter the revolutions.
The v~ious nations of Europe became ~ore ~nd ~ore so11d and the world
took on a. more cert::l.ln a.spect han it ha.d pcaee eced tor come time.
In the .~orld of philosophy the atti tudes begz..n to reflect thia exper-
I ience by the formulation of positivistio and matorla11atlc vi~,points.

The categories with which the world waG evaluatad were ef a core

~ external nature than in ~1e previous period. M~tter became an important
cate 60r y in the ~v~!uaticn of experience. With the development of ex-
1 perience so01al and scientifio. the oategories became altere~ and

tr~sformed,ani ener~1 beo~~ a prom6nent oategory for the evalu~t1on


_._~':":'::-'=-=-"":'===;';.=-""''P'"'''''''' _
of experience. The mo'Ve:ll~nt whioh 1a bsln~ del1n~ated fln~.e a.
parallel 1eTelopment in the other att1t11des. The political. religious,
aest~etlo anj 8o~tlrl0 attitujel ~11
ch~ngtng and dev310plng in
~. 1;,4f_'~'! .. ~

a very similar pr~cess. In the petulus ~erlo1 under d130uaelon the~G

exists ~n exceedingly cloes oonnection between the c~tegor1es of the

several attl tudes tc~a.rd exrer1enoe. In fact, the ccnnect t cnc beoo:r.8S
so olose ~h'tt thel',~ is a marked tendency to eonfuee the v4.riouB oate-
At the preeent time in the predominanoe of meohanioal ao~leve

ment and ~be supreme euccaae of cCIurero1a.l and. industrial e:fficler.oy

there is a tendency to determine reali ty as es~ential1y l!.echar:lc'~.l

and external. The chanzea ~hioh have oOwe ~bcut through prc5ress in
scientifio appllcat ~ ens h::tV9 g1 yen i:rpetue to the inclin'tt l:-n to
evaluate ~ll ex~er1enoe in e~rr.a scientifio form or other. At the
beginning of this tendency there ~~r. current :h~ ittttude th~t a for-
mula ceul=. be dev1se:i 1A'l-.1ch \fculj ccmprellend :'.11 re:t11ty.l bolutton
as a ~romlnent cate60ry in such ~ formula at first see~ed to open the
way t~ the mo~t h11ien eecret9 of existence. With~e development of
this atti tuie as 3. ccnsecuence cf gre~ter 3.W9.renee3 of expe;r1ence, the
inadeq~acy of thie oategory aa a tot~l evaluation of e~~~rlenoe became
e~phae1zej. As a reaotion to this attitude of categorizing e~erlenoe

entirely frorr the st3~dpo1nt of eo-called science, tbere have arisen

~wp:lnts which b:?.ve a,tten;~ted tc t,~ke accovnt of the mere CC[;Tlext
experience ~hlch the meoh~nlc~l attitudes seemed to le~ve unaccounted
for. There have been ~era1etent references to those aspects of org~~c

phenomena a uch :i:: ~ ~ ah~,ke tllorcughly the beli e f j n any crude moob-
an1etic solut1cn of 1mfort~nt frcbla~s. V~r1o~~ forus of spiritualism
h~ve been developed to ta.~te the pl?oe of the crOBI;; rneohan1 etia do-:tr1nes.
1The Synthetic
philosophy ot $enoer 1s an illustration.
Evolution has been re1nterpreted and made oreative rather than
mechan1cal. So far baa th1s react ion to the mechanistic philesc>phy
gone that the authors have placed themselves dangerously on the side
of an unoritical philosophy.
The confl~ot of the cross natur&listio Viewpoint with the
att1~ude which 8tres~ee an ex~reme spiritualism bringe into sharp
relief the imp~rtance of the oategoriep which are used in ior~ating

an attitude toward experienoe. When the oategories used are eom-

eolously attended to the are brought out at once the demerits in the
polemios of those who take suoh opposed stands toward phenom~na a~

the vltalist- and the mechanists do. The bitter quarrels whioh oenter
about their Issuea C~ resolve themselves readily when the funo~ion

of the oategories as evaluations of experience are cle~rly held in

mind. In the world of physics the problems raised by the relativists
do not offer such insoluble situations. ~hen they are a;proaohed with
an attitUde whtoh oritically regards the function of the ca~egoriea

used in the determin~t1on of phenomena. When the categories ~re

seriously studied, the evaluation of the phenomena involved ~ill not

be taken as a descr1ption of absolute re~lity. The categories ~1ao

selvea will also not beoome far the thinker transformed from de~erffiina-

tion more and more approachin6 re~lity (because of the gre~ter c~aas1-

t10aticn of the immediate situation) to element,a of a fixed ani rigid

re~lity. In general the var1~us aspects of any problem. the ont~logic

a1 !~nd the experiental may be held apart and oons1dered with eBp~o1al

reference to the best solution of the problem at hand. The ot

the problem Which ar~ part1culady observational or interpretativ~ may
likewise be held apart, the oonfusing of issues Which ze eul, t from

oonfuund1ng the t~o aepects woul1 be cbti3.ted in :a. 'cJt.:ict etudy of

the oategories involved ~han a problem 1~ faced.
A critical ntu1y of the nature of o~tegories not onl, brings
clarity to the thinker in the of pJ:,obleIts. but in a. gel1::;~:a.l

''';-r'l.y enahlP,B him t:) def1n1 tely lo::ate hi 9 l:roclsfl":'. The <l'nnvl113ion of the

ph1losoph1oal i:titude ~lth the soientific and religiouB 13 3lso avolde4

There h:i9 been l'r.e.:n1f1e~t in r ecent thinking theten~lancy tc e)nsider
acme experimental vle'7point or ot~er 5'.9 the (mly scientifio one.
Philosophy wa.~ taken. to os oonsaerned w,. th some sort of spir1 t'JJ.l raal-
1 ty which la.y beyond the rea.1m of ac rence , ItB Tn:.1.t:?ri3.l could 110~ be
manipul~ted nor its findings verified. The confliot here arose from
the fact that the exper1mentgJ, scientist eeeme:.l to le~~ve untouched a.
vast ran~e of aetu~l experience which a)pe~rB important. Th13 exper-
lenoe can as.aily be lost sj. ght of in the extrer:.e empha.sis. that is
p1aoed. upon syrfa.::e ?_spects of harpentnga. Wi th the same, vigor tha.t the
philoso~hio experl~noe was denied reality its cha.mpio.ns,declrej it to
be the only genuine reality. Tlle ord.inary f ete of l1fe'" ~':eI' a considered
as fhe shadow9 or arpearanqes cf real i t y1. Th1a att1tuie cculd ~nl1
lead to tbe result th~t philosophy becc~;sg iL ec~e sense or ot~er

a. refuge for the ;.19S;,poi ~te1 horse ani unre:ilized. abi t ~ ens .01 a
hopelaef,' hum~.nlty. Life and re'11 ty beccxe d1a;9intedtnd. \i1a~,~~~a.te
, ,
'. ' ,~

to accoilod.ate thelt3elve- to euch a.a cannc t f:~ce the J.ctua.l facta uf

~ ; \.
ordin~.ry life. A mora critical at~ltu.1.e to.'1e.rd experlepce than either
. I ,

of the:~e views in1ic1.te would f5.nJ no such d.i3fu."lotio n ~n

' '. \
\ '

The proper 3.p~reciation of the (1atc~2:criea used ',1ould prevent the con-
'.' \

.j. .
. . . __._... --- .----------.-...----------.._--...' ----:'-'--i---
"- .".'

lnewey and ~ool'e in Cre~.tive Intell1gance. , .

The history of rl::.11oeo!.'hy iJ:uf!tJ'::.te" fori ~~ y:rf

t.t s r;'etho.~ ;:.r.1 r e sur t s ,

The Pre-Athenian Period.

The early Greek philosphy shows us a. in reflection in

which there is a prjection of attitudes that may be looked upon
as unoritically naive. This is, to be sure, a refleotive naivete
for whe:~'e we have philosophy we must posit a oonsidera.ble amount of

awareness in dealing with problems. Tbe activity oalled refleotion

begins when there is some unierstandlng of the existence of a. prob-
lem. The differentiation in this under-tanding comes through the
adebtness in handling the problem. The feature which most of all
distinguishes the stages in rafl_otion is that of expertness. The prob-
lem of. logician is such by natur- of the superior teohnique which he
brings to bear upon his problem. There 1s a differenoe in degree
between the work of the logician ani ordin~ry reflection. The early
phllosoph:Js of Greeoe took a naive atti tude tow'"rd the world. The-ra
was aa ye~ no clear recognition of the nature of the problem. Ther-
was an at telq:t to state wh t the '.vorld was, but the a;:prehenslon of the
nature of the processes by wtioh thtss determinations w~-made, did not
oome out as a problem until a later p~riod.

The experiences of these people, in a political and eoonomic~l

wa.y and their temperamental equipment both favore) this type of attitude.
The world as such 1s taken to be the objgct of investigation. In this
period there 1s no realization of man and hie needs. ~ulation is at
this period not the formulation of assumptions critically made with
reference to an intlm~te human problem. The result of suoh speculation
as the Pre-Atheni~ls indulge in ca.nnot be brought into close relation
to their aotual needs. It might be .ell to point out here that the state-
ment just made would have little force could one transport onestli en-

uzu:;: . tn.. JSUv,UiJ ....... at

!!! iAn ..
. 2 ...

ly into the Ionian milieu. Thetr experienoe was suoh as to make

ir philosophy .er1ously Deglect~ the es~entially human espects of
~~, pe~fectly plausible. ~o oonsider only the politioal experienoes
an was throughout the wh~le of the Hellenic pe~iod in complete
8ubordination to the State As in proportion the experienoea of the
Greeke ohange so as to giva man a more important plaoe in the general
experience so does his plaoe in the philosophioal expression of his
time beoome more i~portant. But even in Plato and Aristo~le the
genui. b:uma.nnesB of the individual fails to appeu. The mos't funda-
mental category of the ancient Greeks waethat of PhY8iQs.l The
problem that oame to the Anoient Greek was as to the determination
of nature. The que8tion they aAked related to the nature of the world.
Tai s na ture is ther:: fore &S sumed as So whole. Hature i8 taken to
be the whole of reality; it is an immediate oomplete experience.
The further development of this proc4ss of experience is a specifio
determin~t1on of what t~is nature is. Tha.les found his determination
in water. This was a aefinite o~tegory to account for the ultimate
nature of reality. This effort to state the underlying prinOiple of
nature 18 an advanced stage in intellectual development. There 1s
probably no stage in human development/whioh the act of attltQdtnlzat10D
does not take plaoe. We might indeed make this cr1ter1an of overt
att1tudir.iz~tion the line o~ demarkation between those who are and ~hvAe

who are net conso1ously aware of their experiences, The attltu1e9 that
go to maka up the oontent of Greek philosophl~formulation are very
definite attituiea though the Greeks had no defi:ite awareness of
them as attitudes. The awareness of attiludeA oomes only with the

------------...._-----_.-.-_----_-..--~------------ ..--------------------
lBurnet, Greek Philosophy,p. 27.

at. .. ,. , c~ .. s~ ... Ii .. @i :Z!Z?!GGJ UEoL


, .pproach to the problem of knowledge. When the problem of knowledge
beoomes & source of troubles to the refledtlve mind, there is an
appreciation of the presence and meaning of ones determination and
evolution of experienoe. Througbout the whole history of Greek
philosophy there is no true appreciation of the nature of experienoe.
The prooess of experience is never inquired into. Aristotle himself
never rises to a correot consideration of the nature of experienoe
nor even approaches it to the extent such as the Kantian philosophy
The determination of the nature of reality by Anaximander il-
lustrates the immediaoy of the attitude expressed. Reality for him
is the~7itlpov, the boundless something. There is an indetermination
determination. The experienoe there is evaluated but the valuation
18 vague and indefinite. It seems that a determination must be made,
an attitude must be expressed, although'it is hardly adequate enough
to be de8criptive~ In this formdation we aee the powerful effort to
give d.etermination to the world. There is aVlgorou8 attempt 'to g1ve
a value to experienoe. There ia an unmistakable effort to give

i the attitude towards the world, but tsere i8 no definite

attitude. There is an expression of the belief that there mus~ be a
source for all the materials of the world. If &n:of the visib1e mat-
er1ale of the world which are 1n opposition to eaoh otber were 1nfin1~,

the opposites would long have oeased to exist. And if none o them
is infinite then the ultima.te stuff of the ":orld is not known.
Another predicate applied to this boundless was God or the
divIne (~etio~. This predicate is probably the expression of the
most exalted quality of the material thus described. With the Greeks
at this period the moat preoious stuff was called dWlne. This is
weall brought out by Burnet in the passages quoted from H1ppokrates.

aI do not think that any disease 1s more divine or more saortd

than others I think that those who first called this disease
sacred were men such a8 there are still at the present day, magicians
and purifiers (t(c4.e~ r-ret' ) and oharlatons and imposters. They
make use of the godhead (1"d e f 10" ) to oloak and cover their own
incapacity.a --aThe sacred Divine. a
aNothing 1s more .ivine or more heroic than anything else, but
all things are alike, are all divine. a- aA1r, Water and Sites-.
,. i'
A third ph110spy ooming from the same city as the two mentioned,

was Anaxlmenes. He aooepted the idea of Anaxlmander that the real

was infinite. He made a definite determ1n:l.t1on of this infinite and
oalled it air. Anaximenes did not find it necessary to think of the
infinite as being different from the material which 1s aeparsted out of
...I .....
it, since diversi~e,must be due to a greater or lesser quantity of the
substance in a given spaoe. Ana.xlmenee drew an analogy between the
human prooesAes and the cosmio prooesses; this gave him sup~ort for
the partioular determination of the rsal. Just as aur soul~, being air,
holds us together, so do breath and air-enoompaas the world. We see
in this form of philosophy an expression of an attitude derived from a
more or less superfioial observation of some obVious experienoe.
The investlgstion of the probable influenoes whioh yielded the
kind o attitude the M1leslans express in their natural pnilosophy finds
Bome sug3estlcns in their general oonditione. A question of importanoe
in this ocnneotion is this: Why h~s the birth of what we call Greeks
philosophy taken place in Miletus. an Ionian oolony in Asia? The answer
to this question throws some light upon the fact that the Mileslans
expressed the partioular attitudes with which they are aceeedited.
Miletus beoame the favored place for the growth of philosophy beca~se

it was saved the fate of ths other Ionian oolonies when Alyatter and
Croesus SUbjugated those cities. Thus as long as the Lydian kingdom
~ing~o~ l~nte~ M1la~u9 .~~ a safe anQ settled oity where science
~ni co~~eroe oo~lc flonr-ish. The M11eslan t~~dition co~es to ~n

en,i Otl.::t'~,re an:: iestruot ien of the tOml b:- the Persia.n.e in
19? B.C., aftar t~e b~ttle of La~e. Th~ freedor'" an' the seou=l tj~
held by:~.e cu l t ured citizens or such a to"n wo';ld give oc:.a.ston
~ l......

and ';":'-', /." ","

~ ~.
I .~ A ...,
..,.,.; ~
v ...... '.. ~ l~ ~ ~
we ,-.,., " ""C'
".:. -:'''';':4'''~
.. ,. ""''''0+
\."',..,.,J..... \,I' nt irely ffl... 11 of expraE;'i1 en.
T ......
' -' ''." ' ..l.

be...... , -_\.'._-
i . , ~ :>.
. . ..... - ...
' ~\""
.. \.._J. .., .. :.. . .c Le ~~~-

+-,,-... :-1 6::;:Eli.'l e~:ce The

~ _.-....
" [t 1 .,;

Sot t:i. t, -.., '::e ~ in the .-' : ~-. ....

........... \i
l ,
1 state them in a scientific way. The Milesians &xe of importanoe
n the history of thought on that ac~unt. The Greek scientifio tr~
:i. t' ~ l~ .
dltion may becharaoterlzed not as an entirely aotual attitude but
rather as a serious one. The Uilesians were serious 1n their attempt
to formulate a deflniteilde& of the nature of reality.
To the critical student it must be obvious that the Kileeians
were not making entirely new determinations of reality. To suggest
that would be to posit & discontinuity in experienoe. This would be
a total misinterpretation of what actually took paloe. We must posit
that the Mileeians were as~lng a more critioal attitude toward
experience than was formerly the case. They gave up telling
Professor Burnet puts it. That the determinations were n?-ive indicates
the naive na.ture of their experienoe. The Greeks at this time were
living in a oomparatively simple world. their experienoee were not
fraught with the oomplexities of modern 11fe.
The simplicity of the Greek fcrmul~tione as to the nature of the
Rea.l is manifest also in the fact th'J.t the oonnections between the
determ1n:tjons of the real ~nd the experiences that bring them out are
so obvious. The.e oan be traced a oontinuity between the categorle~

the Greeks used in their soientifio determinations and the categories

of their mythical and religious periods. It i9 thus that a conneotion
ma.y be found, between the' water that Theles sl.tggested as the real and the
. : v" ~ ';' . '~
Ooeanus which the Homeric poems speak of an1 the Manos whioh the
Hesiodio poems mention. l The Anaxlmandrian Boundleos oan be plaoed
into correla.tion with the Hesiodl0 ."choa.s. The a.t terr:pts to state ex-
perience on the part of Homer and Hesiod must be taken as expressions
of the period and indicate the immediaoy of attitude towards experienoe.

lVon Hartmann -Geschichte deD Metaphyslk. s. a.
.ere is a continuity of attitude in the expression of the poets ~d

early philosophers. This brings out the close cvnnect10n between the
oategorie of the v~rlous experiences.
Ther~ is not ~s yet developed an attitude categorizing re .lity as
something beyond the lu~edlate eternal objects. Ther- is n:t yet
brought to cQnsciousness the idea of the real as resl1ing in a prin-
ciple not immediltely available ~o the perceptual ex~erienoes. The
BOUndless of Anaximander. while &o~etimes taken to Indloute the via~

that he struck upon a. metaphysio:.:..l doctrine. :l.oes not rea.lly ":arrant

such an i1. .er1'-'I etation. There seems to be a. genuine connection be tve en
the Boun.:!.leGs of Anaximander and the Ocianus of the Homerio poems.
It 1s not ~ far fe~ohed explanation to polnt out a oommsctlon between
such a determination of ty as Oceanus and '.... ater; and t~. e f:.:..ct
th~t the Gre3~a lived close by and derived much of their e2per1ence
from the sea.
This ovntinui ty oetween the .formul.:.tion of the philosophars and
the po:?;;,a indio tea th:1.t at this period. there 1;:ae no f'unda.!r..ent:.l
diiferenti tion be twe sn the philoaoph1c ..nd the lecs ori tical att1 tuieq.

There is no shs.rp differentiation bet'iTe-::n the v~.:rious expression of

the att1tuJ.e"l tow.U"d experience. The philosophers do l"10~ ~'Jk ~ny
and experienoe as 9. true philosophy i;yt.l~lt do.
pointed. q;;e st ~ na a,'. to the ~'.\ tur e 0: knowled.2;e,i The fact th::. t t as
entire Lence 18 being cat egor i se in air..p le, nvtur e cs.tegorie9
~s alao evilence of the immaturity cf the Ionian philosphy.
The his tory of Gree~ philosophy indic::ltea th t not until ths:?' u.

come shar~ cor-ilicta between the iiract detern:inat:ons of experienoe,

is thero ~leveleped a. cri tica.l ::ott 1tude to,':'.rd the preae"'?
",." o~
...,....or1 ence

A cr1 tical at ti tude is not ievelope.i until the c3.tegorieg ar e c':'~!131:i.ered

wi th '1 vis' to their adequacy , To accep t a c3.tegory from the tra:t1 tion
of mytholo~y or relglon is not critic~l ~ni is e~eential:y not ph11oeo-
It is not intended to draw an absolute line betvreen whnt is con-
sidered philosophical and what is mythical and religious. No suoh
absolute line exists. Even in the moet highly abstraot thinking there
are definitetraces of attitudes derived from other aspeots of ex-
perience. Experience is a united Whole and all sharp diVisions must
be considered as entirely arbitrary. At this period of Greek philoso-
phy the attitudes toward experience were eo direct and simple that all
the attitudes were intermingled. As a.n illustration may 'b,: t,au the
close parallelism among the Greeks of the doctrine9 as to the number
of Gods and number of worlds.
With the ohgnge in gen~r11 orientation in the world of experienoe
Greek philosophy takes on a slightly dltfer:nt oom,leBion. The att1t~lde

taken an"j expressed reflect" -the ne" hap:::enings. The philosophy of

Protagoras introduces the new motives and the hietory of philosophy
absorbs a series of new exper1enoes, ~nd cagegories ~h1o~ g1ve them
expression. With Pythagoras b~gins the tradition whlcb oategor1z3s
experienoe in them th~t are not entirely peroepted. The attitude
of Pytha30ras takes on a mathematical trend and the Pythagorman
f1nds the T2.al1ty of things in number. TLe Pytha;orean attitude
:ioe~ not reprenent 3. compl~te eh n,;e from the ear2ier trad,iti(,;na. 11;
is in tr""rth me"i'ely a tra.ditional attitude, for numbers do not m:':.r.
for Pytha30ras wh3,t they signify to a. modern mathematician. Aristotle
points out that the numbers of the Pytr..a.gorean constitute til: actu,:..1
content of ordinary objeots. 1 In Pytha.goras snd his scheol, then, ",~'e
find from the side of categorizing experience, the source oi a sli;htly
more independent attitude. The school of Pythagoras in adopting nUillbera

--~----~--------------~-~----~----~--~------------------- - - - -- - -- - -- -
lYetaph.A. 5.
as the essence of reality give more sta.nding to the act of determing
experience and inoidentally make ~ay for the problem of One and Mony.
The development of this problem is Influen~d by the oonoept of
harmony .. . hich the Pythagoreane fostered. This notion of harmony
~lth its peculiar connection with the number oonoept is derived
to a great extent from the Pythagorean reformation of the Orphic
religion. l There is no doubt a very olose conneotion between the
attitudes whioh look upon the world with the veiled eye of myetlelsm,
and with the implioit fa1th in the re~lity of unsoen things.
It is quite probable that the Pythagoreans, because of their be-
lief in the possibility of the ene evolving into the Many, stimulated
the orl tlclsm of XenophaJlee whe ',V~.8 per hape the flrnt to insi at
emphatlo~l:y upon the oneaess of Reality.
The problem of the One and }lQt1y means to the phlloso~hl0 oon-
sciousness a development of extreme importanoe. It stimulatea th~

disoussion of problems whioh advance ph1loaophic history by the pro-

jection of ne~ attitudes. The early loniana acce~ted ~lthout oriti-
cism the unity of the world seaking merely a ;reo1se determinati~n

of it. So li t ~,le this specul': tiOD seem rela..te~ to the conorete
exper19nc~s of their period. th~t no very sharp oonfliot was encountered
:rom the polytheistic mythology. When the Ionian civi~atlon or~ke

down and. different ex:;erienoes h:?.1 to 'be corral?ted, the issee t.ecace
loca.lized. The problem of One and Mony became a. live topio for
thinkers. The advanoe it brought into the philosophy of Greeoe 1~

symbolized by the fact th~t the problem stood for a genuine ~;preci~tion

of the experienoes of the peried.

The Pythagorean traditions above all st~nd9 for philosophical
------- ---------------- -- -- ------ - ------------ --------- - ------ _... _----
ler Cornford, "From Religion to Philosophy", p. 194 ff.
progress in tha.t the fundament::.l determ1nati ons of reality
it makes, sOH.ewhat more independent of the Unrefleotive cn.tegortes
of re1g1on and mythology. The need for harmonizing the var10ue ex-
per1enoen which became proble~ led to the projeotion of categories ~

which, liec:.:.use they are leG! direct are nor e adequa.te :).'" deterr:'lntions
of experienoe. So far ~~ formal dootrine is ooncerned Pytbagenal
probably harks baok to Ana.x1mander. For Pytbagoras there 'J73.G :1.180
a BoundlesG from which all thingR wera :ierived.~ but Pythagoras ocn-
ceivej t~is in a mere abBtr~c~ though more definite w~y. The li~-

it:: t1 ("d1 \)I the unlimited gl vee origin to things and thus Pythagcr'l.s
finds ty in 8. realism ort t tea.::'1 iatermined. Th9 9up,=ri 01'1ty
of pythagora.s and his '':011001 in 1his rnat.ance i9 th".:t they set up

in a. hi;hly consoious m~nngr & set of principles whiob give ~et9r

minaticn to reality. This m~ked a a:a~e 1n the 1evelopment Q! the

Greek ph110sphy which ended in the emph~sis of tne attitude t~~~td

erparienc9 whioh "'R3.f1 9t;\.ted in kno.'11edge terms by Plato Ari,' totle.
The Pytaagorean philosophy 1n a genuine sense is ':\. tl"3.!lsi tion r;ovement
~et~een th~ Ionio ani Athenian v1ewpoint3.
The Pythagorean a.tti tude t owar d experience is deriv.~:l fr-:;;:: B.

serieiJ of happenincB qui te in cont r :st t~') thO'18 of the previ 0'.1'3 k~eri c=.s.

On tr..<:: ;foli tic~.l s'.de VIe find Tonf.a brought under the cloud of t~:-s

Pars ian invasion. Thi ~ reHu1 t:.~ in a 991' i 39 ofm1grat1ons ,..:hioh brougnt
the Ioni!?ns into contaot wi th new at ti ttd,ga and nev e~:per1enceo. The
gro\t'ing pC'.'ler of the persians ;~.nd. the br e akdo-m of the Ionian oiv111
zat10n brought such r eac t Lcns ani int6r=.oti~~.9 into the o~ltu!.~ c! the
per i ::.01 ~. 9 til 'br ~ ng tc conscf ouaneea new problems and new me t ao .::::: of

aolutic::. On the socia.l side we fj.nd th~-t the Lncr 1ml::0rt';uoe
of the Orphio religion brought abou t new att1 'by fole.y of OOiL-

bating 1t~ polytheIsm. Xenophanee and his work stand as examples

of the protest tha.t was made a.gainst Ionian oulture in general and
their polytheism in part1cular. l
Whether Xenophanee ~ae the father of Eleatio1sm or not he
belonge~ to the general tradition whioh made the problem of th~ One
an important iactor in Greek philosophy at this per1od. At this
\i~e it beca~e a genuine problem and was estab11shed 1D3a oonsoious
way. As the herald of the tradition which placed r~ality 1n a
domain beyond the region of the senses Xenophanes t insistence upon
the oneness of the world is an 1mport'~.nt a,iva-noe beyond ht9 pra-
deess"ora. This 1s true in spite of his ()~n expEes910nit which gave
a theieUO, turn to his etatement. 2
.. In the oonflict of the Hel'&clel t sn and Parmenedlan vi s' p .:.;ints
we obsErve the advance of Greek thcught to the stage in which the
work of the thinker plays an incceasirgly import~nt role. Heraoleitu8
and Parmenides both place reliance in Rea90n as a means for the
disoovery of reaJ.1 ty although in neither philosopher O3.n we iin.i
a total dep9.1'ture from the na,ively objective a.ttitude of the Y119a1ans.
In bot;; of these philophers thera is an ',d.vanoe in atti tud.e both "ii tb

respect to the inter~ret~tlon of reality ina the assigning of the

value to the 1nterpretation of experienoe.
',"i th respeot to the problem of One and Many these th1nl':er~

have a~xived a~ ~ higher plane of explan~tion Which 1s worth ncti~~.

The vie....;oint of Hera-olei tUB ae ema v~ry aoph1at1c.lted when cot.;

to th't of the 1Iiles1an9. '.Thereas Anaximenea find.s it neCeg~1ry to
p03it rare:aotion and oondensation to overcsme Anaximandes' thacry
of injustioe as a oause of th~ monym~rs ~f the one. Herac1eit~e

-... ~------~---...~-~----- -------------------- ------.. ------- ---- -- _-

- ...

lSee Bury, History of Greece 1911, p. 319 fr., Dials fr. 11,15,16,17.
See Aristotle Met. A. 986 b 24.
~nsiders the charges as perfeotly norm~l oonditions of reality.
eracleitu8 h~s found himself able to profit by the dlsooveries of
the p,thagoreana. Their theory of harmony made it 1mpo8~ible to
aooept the too naive attitude of the early Ionians. BeraoleituB
despises also the mythioal and mystioal views of the Pyth&goreans.
This led him to oategorize reality as fire which took him not 100
far from observable phenomena. In fire Heraoleitus found & sub-

stanoe which could acoount rationally for the multiplicity in

unity ani still avoid a mythological dootrine. The oeasele98 flux
ofUltgs and the ~ement from cne to mony ~nd v1ce vers~ could all
be explained by the conoeption of fire. ft1he~e 1s a way upward and
a way downward, a oonstant movement of things fro~ fire and a return
of all things to fire." With th1s oonception Heraoleitus mainta*ned
a connection ,with aotual things and yet found rg~11ty 1n a realm
dep~ndent upon reason for ita discovery. Reality for Heraolaitus
is ultlm~te11 to be found in the h~rmony of opposites. This h~rwony

is a divine law, a right whioh rulea the entire world. All th~ng~

are governed and prevented fro~ overstepping their liml~s by ttl;

right (Dike). With this oonception Hsraoleitu9 aimed to overcc~e

the diff10ulties in the pr~blem of the One ~n1 Mony. The world c~n

be both one and mony. the unity of the world is not procluded by the
onenes n
nor the m~nynese. The oh~nges which t~ke ~laoe are merely
expressions by the one of the un~erlying h~rm0ny w~ich 1s tbe gen-
uina reality.
In Heraoleitus we find a orystalieation of the attitudes that
manifested themselvos in ~ Greek thought. There is found in Her-
acle1tuB a subt~e mixuWre of popul~r belief which i9 c~Jntrolled by

a desire to be soientific and above the level of mY8ti~1Bm. This all

resulta in bringing to consciousness attitu1es th~t make for a more
, .
obstruct sl~nlflcanoe of the categories as the determinations
d experienoe.
This orystallization of the ~etermin~tions of e~perienoe

oame as a resutt of the social in~eraotion of the time. The

determina.tion ~f experienoe 9.~ one or many hc.s in its unierlying
motives the quarrels of ~ reli~louB nature involving the crl~1c16m oih
of the approved polytheism. Xenophanes in hie cr1tlci9~ of tbe
polytheism of the pe~ioi 1eveloFe~ ~ ~cotrine of the unity ot
reality. The purpos: of this doc~rina ani tn3 supporting evl1ence
offers li vulnerable gr oudn for the ori tioal !3.cul ty oI Hers-olei t ua ,
The '\:orld is one but this need not be t axen a,s a. jenial of the
real! ty of the many. Cl:'?.n\;'~ 3.n:l mot Lon became components of ':: :i.11 ty.
To deny their 1"8'{li ty on 'the b!:A19 of aence peroeption is to sho~':

the e~tJ!me unreliability of tha a enne a as o~ptlble of giving knoslJdge.

Hera-olei tUB indice.te~ to us tho? bS~'1 nni"l\s of the more '..batract f01:-

mule.tic'-, of experienoe. The ,iirect connecticn of the ph11oso:;h1c::.l at-

titude of Heracleitus 'ritb the re11g10...ta 1~e~~ In,::.ic?wtes th~t ",';0

chave ~, yet only a b~g1n~1n~ :~ the re111y cr1tical att1t~~eo ~f

ll'itb Parmen1de9 ther~ b:,glT.9 9. cl~arer emphaei!:" upon tile
oreative a~p~ot of the philosophl,c ~ttlt~le. The attitude as attiCude

hiatorj. Th19 att1 tude is of cc.;r c : ;ut snt~_ly 1:1to terms of t3 :,;,Slon.
Tha t 19. Parmen1dep pr e s "as mor s and more the lie a thE'~t re~.ll ~~. i!!

to be'.':n only t hr ou rrh

' . re3.S0TI. As 3. ma t t er of PS\.1"meni-lea
argues that tho.ight and reg,,11 ty ar e :.~;. P carried. the
One and Many p-roblerr: to th~ st:~~e of logio3.l abs t rao t f on , P?rmeni ~es

goes f!lrt!lcr th!'\n any of his pre~e9sora in forl:1uli.ti11,~ a. non-oex-

cept1ble a~tegory of exr.erienoe. Parmeni1gn given origir. to th~
c&te~ory of Being whioh i8 made to fuse completely with the oategory
of the One. The One is here in a more oonsoious way offered as &
ontegory of reality. The One of Xenaphanes finds here its most
thorough going development. Parmeuides in a very dec1ded senee
presages the advent of the problem of knowle:lge a.s the Sophists
developed it.
The poem of ~armen1des indicates a definite argument in favor
of the particUlar determination of rea11ty that he makes. In spite
of wh~t the aenees tell us reality ls. and 18 not passing away,
nor has it oo~e to be. It 18 not many but one for otherwise 11
oould not be. This argument is based u~on the truth that it 1s
1nconattvable that we should think that whioh is is not. Par-
men1des holds it to be absolutly true that wh~t oannot be thought
cannot be. and wh~t 1s not cannot be thought. The entire Parmeniiean
argumenl 1!3 one of though,s.s a.;;t.1nst the report of the sanges. ?ar-
men1des goe a muoh fa.rther tha.n Hera.oleitus in giving power to the
reason in cogn1zing reality. Parmenides arr1ves at the abstract
thOugh1 not very soph1~tioated oonoeption of existenoe. For Par-

men1dea existenoe 19 st1ll external material, it 18 corpore~l, it 18

sprea~ out in spaoe. Wh~t Parmanides h~9 done h~s been to oonsider

ordinary senae material at 1ts lowest terms. The reality of senge

mate:1~, whioh 19 ~11 ~aterial. 11es not 1n the fleeting qualities

that our senses infor~ us of, but in the fact th~t it 1s, th~t it
ex1sts. Th1s is the ultimate determination of experienoed objeot~

for Parmen1des, for his oriterion 1s oonceivability. Noth1ng or

non-being can be an objeot for thought, for all thought must be
thought of something. Further, if re~lity must be someth1ng, it wast
also be o~e for otherwise it cannot be thought of as being. Oneness
is than a speoific determination of real1ty, 1t 1s one of 1ts ohar-
aoterlet1c features. The two fundam~ntal categories of reality are
Bei ng e.nd ene ,
Parmen1dea has reached a stage in the attt1butes of character
to re9.11ty \'thlch placzf' him rar and beyond his predeoessors. \
att1tudes toward experienoe ~hlch Par~enide9 expreeses b~s beoome
much more self-oonscious an:' asar e of 1toelf. Parmen1d,. brings to
bear such an argument for hig determln~tion ae to all but preoipitate
the proclem of determ3n~t!on itself. In all of his argument Parmenides
seems to be suggesting that he is making determinations of exper~enoe

on some c~eis th~t 1~ d1fferent from that of unrefleot1ve observation.

P~smen~deg h~B reaohed a higher type of determ1n~tlon from tb~ etand-
polr.t of Greek philosophy. Bia d8termin~t1on 1s not higher ~n the '
sense of more ~je~uately describing experience. On the conr~ary it
may well be sa1j th~t he totally denies the reality of all l~ed1~te

experience. The world of evsryiay experienoe is a delusion~for

Parmenides. PF'.rmanides' determin:.tlon of experienoe i8 hlgh'er in that

he sought in a. more ]7fiilite and determined way to disoover w~..:t.3ali.

is. The determination of reality by Parmenldes is more de11berate and

oautious than is that of his predes80rs even though he did Dot attain
to a truer oonoeption of reality. ~e may see in ,armen1des the
develo;ment in the h1story of thcu6ht of attitudes whioh though they
are 1mmedin~e tunotlona of tbe experienoe
, of the period still represe*t
more a,; that experienoe. It IlliCJ 'be readily agree1 th3.t Ps.rmen-
lies apprec1atea more profoundly the experience of his period although
from our present stan~point he h~s a meagre understanding of the
oourse of human h&?panlngs.
The philoBopby of Parmenides seems a fitting expression of tbe
exp er~enoe9 of the Greek \'forld Ln his time. The perlodi of the foreign
appresa10n served to bring a oompaotness and a unity wb1ch fore-
shadowed imperial Athens. From the side of the experienc$ of a

people the establishment of the One &8 a fundamental oategory of

reality beoomes easy to explain. The identifioation ot Being with this
oategory fir-ds its expl~natioD in the development of ~ more oritical
method ot determln~n8 the nature of reality.
The .olution of the problem of the One and the Many reaohed
& peculiar status witb P~menlde8. The ar~nt of Pazmenides,es-
peolally with the support of the disoiple leno~
. was
And yet 0.11 the following philosphers were PlurOlistR. The philo-
sopherswere not yet able to grasp the elgl1flcance of an attitude
which put reality so far from sense experience. The Greek mind at
this period was naively objective. Reality had to be external
so it oould be grasped by the senseB. For the Greek the fun~amaDtal
kind of knOWledge process was the the visual seneation. The knowledgel
~o far as they were problematio for the~eeks at this peried were
oonsidered from th~ standpoint of viRual data. The pluralists
who took up tbe phllosop~1cal ~roblems d1reoted almost entirely their
energie~ to explaining change ~nd permanence. The prOblem of the
Onenes. ot reality was not further developed.until with the oh~ of
social experienoe the techni.que of reasoning and knotledge was pre-
pared to further handle it.
Philosophy for a time sti11 remained oontent to explain
experienoe upon the basis of sense perception. The Greeks were not

yet ready to investigate ~ea11ty in a realm far removed fromtbelr

constant and ordinary activities. Even when these activities led
later to an emphasis of the knowledge prosess as against nature.
human experience did not go far In modifying the study. The Greek
th1nkers had not yet attained th~t personal independence whioh is
eeae~tial for a constructive attitude toward experience, In the
olroum$tances in whioh the thinkers found themselves they could
not have the independenoe of the 1mmedl~te sccial surroundln,~s

to oategorize reality in hum&nlstl0 terms.

A modification in the attitudes of the philopophery at this
point i9 m.~lfe8ted in the les~ened energy given to the aategorlz~tim

of the ultlnn.. te substa.nce of rea11 ty and granter effort d.irected. toward

an explanation of how it oper&tas. The impetus to this i~ found oer-
t~lnly in the oontroversy of H=racleitus and Parmenlde9 ~ith respect
to change ~nd ;ermanenoe even though the part1cular oontention 01
H,ra.oleltu9 tb~t r~allty is cb9.Dge did not etimul:l.te it. Tbe
philosophers of this period were interested in disoovering a msans
of reoonoiling the Parmenedian denia.l of generation :lni becomIng.
1!1 th tbe H'oracletl9.n err.r:haal B of these of experience. The
oategories re~resenting the ultlm~ta of experience fer these
philosophers refer to the oontrolling forces of the cha~ge9 1n ex-
perienoe. ~e b~ve the tove ~~d 8tr1fe of Erepedooles ~n1 tbe N~us

ci Anaxagoraa. Err.pedoclee the phyoiolan f1n1e the permanenoe of

thing~ in the four roots which the early lanians took to be the ul-
t1m":\te <-tourcea of rS3.lity. Changes in things Tere brought about
by the two r-rlpc1ples of Love and Hate. These are for the most part
just such !ll.CJ.terlal as the four rootB. They are not 1noorpo:zraal
force~_ the concept of io:ce ~a distinot from hai not been
derived from
arrl vea at as yet. The two oa.tegor ies Love and. Strite LCr::pedocles /
the Ob3erV3.tjonu of a phys1c~1 kind. which he ~a.s OfCCilTse in the
habi t of u,aking. Ther e are l!'.!!.."'ly points of Bim113.ri ty bet.. een the
Love and. ~tr1fe of Empedoclef! and. the rarefa.ction and ccndemaat t on
of Anax1nlsnee, but wi th Err,pejoolea these two principles hvve ve.~y

muoh olearer functions. ~1th Eu.ped~ole9 these h~ve beoo~e alffiOSt

guiding prinoiples aeparatod off from the material which t~ey


effect. With AnaTagorag the separat10n 1s more c~mp19te although

even the~'e the neue is not a. totally different k1nd of material
from the stuff of the world.
The determin~t1on of Nous as a funjamental category m~k8

a turning point in the ievelopment of ph1loBophy. Anaxagoras

points the way to a. new d1reoti:ln which th~ attitudes of the Greeks
took. From this time 0]1'. ',.,e shall see th3.t the att 1tudes toward
"experience take on ~ mor~ problematio aspeot. The pr008an of determi-
nation of experienoe r eacaea th:l.t stage of ecnecf ousnee- tb:\t 1m:.~e18

it to oonsider 1 ts OtID a ttl tude a The forMulation and. express6ng

of att1tudes beaornea ~ problem 1n itself. This intelleotual movement
parallels ~ growing interest in ~ne'~ own exper1ence. The Greeks
of th1s genarat10n ~e led to find an abosrb1ng interest in their
orrn ~~~sona11tles. The Greek begins to beoome aware of himself more

an1 more, o~ing to his contact w1th the Persian. It 16 in this

per1c~ that Aeschylus speaks of the Greeks as men who h~i "never been
called the subjects or the slavea of any, one. If This is the period
when Ind1v1dual1mbegan to be the keynote of Greek olv1lizat1on.
This 1e ths ba~inn1ng cf the period when Athens assumed the leader-
ship of the Gre~kB. The struggle of Athena with Sparta for the
leadershlps of Greece typ1fies the growth of indiv1dualism and the
SUpreI!"l~cy of the int.elleot. It wa.s no ooinoidenoe tha;t; the >l
should come to be a funjamental oategory ~f experienoe, forA~x~~ora8

is the firet philbAopher of Athens.

The Athenian Period
r ": _
ADalytioal Table of Oontents.

In the Athenian period the problem of One an~ Many becomes

~n es~ent1ally logical one. Thgre is bro~ght out the fact of
predlc~t1on r~th~r than th~t of existenoe.
T;'19 entire philosophioa.l att1 tu:ie ohanges fr:m a study of
extern~l n~ture to an inte~~3t in human c~nduot. Thi9 results
in bri!l.;ing out ~he 1nt~re3t in the eS3entially hum'loU problems.
With ~he change of ex~erienoe th~t is found in Athen9. th3 think-
ers a.rrive 9t an int9I'ast in the attit'.lie to'.13.l'd. experienoe 3.n..i
10 not e t r es s 3.G illl importa.nt th3 ausumed obJects of kno",.le:1ge.
The individualistio expe~ienoea of the fourth oent~ry 13~d

to a oh~n~e in the ph~louophical vie~pQint BO a3 to bring out the

emphasis upon kno~led~e.

Throu6U the sophistio tradition the problem at the validity

of kno~leige o~~e to the front. In making va11j ths kno~ledge pro-
cess Pl:>.to1evelops the deJotr ins of : ar t icips.t1on 'Jlhioh or 19inatea
v;1 th Py t aagor as 'J.ntil it bec oe.e s a hi~hly conact oua dootrine of
prej,i~tl0n. The c;3"tegoriea ':::':ich Plato for:nally nama') .lre , however
r a t Lcns.L; tic aba t r ac t I cns an.i not n:etb..:dolo 61o:.1 eV.l~t1ons. T:-.:.:
ger..c:.';:.l catee;cr 18S of Pl~to sr e on tolo;:1 c!ll en tit i~9 ..n:::. are

unmlst3,.ke:~tle"tion of Pl-.tela Vie".IJpoint to a fixeJ. cateph:,--

"'1 t h Aristotle t her e is an j;~dvancej, methodolog1ca.l vis1tpo1nt

developed. It a~p~~ra th~t Aristotle arrives ~t an a1rnjratle attj
w1 th respect to the reI ;-..t ion of and experience. AristoTI~
stresnes the neoessity for studying actual oond1tion9, and. f'act9 of
experienoe. He develope a logic to deal with those faots. Aristotle
is the first to set up a oonscious table of categories.
The apparent confidenoe and worth that Aristotle plaoed in
experience i8 vitiated by an entirely erroneous oonception of the
nature of experienoe. Aristotle no less than Plato oonslder3 the
world of experienoe aa a pseudo-reality it not actual illusion. For
Aristotle the two worlds exist in quite ae emphatio a manner as for
The oategories of Aristotle do not form elements in any aotual-
ly experienced prooess but are formal aspeots of a tr3n9cen1ent real-
ity. So far as they apply to actual phenomena they are element~ of
expression. grammatioal forms.
The Greek philosophy in general is an ex'remely externalistio
attitude toward experienoe, and even when it develops a highly metho-
dological technique it still remains far removed iron: aotnal ex-
periential conditions.
The Athenian Period.

Anaxagoras may be considered as representing a tran?ltlQn

point between the pre-Athenian philosophy ~nd the philosophy of
Athens proper. This p~riod represents a changing point for entire
att1tudee. 80 fer as attitude is ooncerned the pre-Atheni~ per-
iod is direoted toward natur e , to"'1-:.rl th3 objeot of the att1 tude.
Th~ e~erianoe 1a taken direot~and immediately. the investls~ti~ns

of experienoe are based u~on aa~um~t1on tqken over from an unre-

flect1ve standpoint. The th1nkers of the Athenl~n p~rlod ~re interested
in the attitudes themselves and qU~3tion the a9gu~pt1on;maie. The
underlyin: mot119 for this ch~nge in philosophical pe~9~ective i~ the
ob!!nf[.e th~-t is to be noted in the experienoe of th19 period. ~hlcll is
different fro":: tha.t of the preoedtng time. The development of in-
-dividuali9m ~nd the Intere~t in perDon~l experienoes forced a mo~e

critio~l eamin~tion of the attitudes toward experienoe. The ie-

termlnati~n of experienoe began to involve the proble~ o knowledge.
A question come~ up in this connedt1on as to the rel~tion be-
tween the e}~erience of a period and ths philosophic attl~udes of that
time. It ie ina.ppropr1':.t~ to sa.y t ha t the philosophlc3.1 a.ttitude 1s
a m~re refleotion of the 9~perlence of ~ ~eriod. It i~ just as true
that ex~erlenoe or the ord1n~ry aff~1r~ of rne~ are reflections of 90me
phl10so~~hical att1 tude. An instanoe of till a would be the aot tcns of
a judioial body with its interact1ng comrr.erci~l ~n1 In1ustr1al faots,
I-;hloh are dictated by aome part1.c5ular po11 tica.l or sooial philosophical
att 1tude. It i9 sa.fer to assume tha.t both the actL"us and the abatracA.-
attltu'ie are pbasea of experience, ~nd. llAualJy in ~ rat t c :vhlch -rive
, I

one or the other predominance. The philosophioal attitude itself

i8 a phase of human experienoe and under normal oonditions it
never transcends the partioular experience in whioh it is formulated.
Philosophy is ths experienoe whioh haa become oonscious.
The problem of One and Many takes on an almost entirely new
oomplexion in the Athenian period. The Sophists projected with em-
phasis the viewpoint that the determination of reality w~s dependent
upon the relative importanoe of peroeption oY thought in knowledge.
~fter the influenoe of the Sophists. it becomes with Plato a problem
of Dialeotio ani not one of immed1~te experience. On the fo~mal
si1e the problem eeeDfd to h'lve beoome exhausted in i te p013sibili ties,
in the Pre-Athenian period. The problem finally oame to be one of mo-
tion ,a.nd chl).n:e
. with respeot to the stuff of reality. Even with
P~menides and 7eno the standpoint of the knowledge proces1 as an
eS!lential faotor in the desoription of experienoe did not become es-
tablished. It is quite apparent th~t only under the conditions whioh
pl'sva,il'd in Athens cou:d the importanoe of kno','Fledge become re&li7.ed.
Th:re is thus much to sl:.pport the. vie.,.- of Zelle th=3.t ani not
7eno 1s the founder of Dialeotic. l From the beginning practica~ly of
the Athen1~ perio1 the determin~tion of experienoe will be made ~1th

~ f~irly oritical view to the va11d1ay of the oategories. After

paB~inz through the st~ges of inquiry as to the nature of kno~ledge

there is an attempt to determine & list of categories re~resent~ti~

of real\ty. From Socratls on may be traced a series of such de~er

mln:\ti una which resul t "f1Da.l+1 in the Ar1stote11::1.n ta.ble of oategon l

( ;,

ani which sjmbolizes the culmination of the Greek conce~tion of rtJ f

---------------------------~---------------------------- -- -- -

lZeller I Pl'" to e.nd the Phil. ,\oademy.

The experienoe of the Greeks of .the filth oentury brOll~ht out
a decidedly iifferent attitude than the ooe of tho previous perioi.
The interesta of the thinkers beoome cent ersd 1n more intimate human
experienoe than had previously been the o~ae. The problem of. human
b8h~vior against the beh~v1or of cosmic affaire took the important
plao~s in the attention of the thinkers. The problerr. of ty
or conduct beoame of greater lnter;:st t han t~le ultimate re1.1i ty of
tha stuff of the ~orld. This attitude ie IJluBtr~ted in the atatement
of Soorates implying that men, not nanur e , are hla1aachers. 1
The problem of oonduot and its orlter1an leads vary raai11y to
a. oonsilera.tion of the va.lidi ty of kno-dejge. Hem to determine the
criterion for moral oonduot beoomes a prominent que~tion ~hen mor~l

conjuct 1s & problem. The Athenian period in philosophy brings cut

not 0:11y the problem of kno'~ledge SoS a ba.!31a for tllS apeculaticna
coneernrng the rea11 ty of the world, but l.u.90 a. new se.dee of deter-
minations of ex~erience. These are the oategories of ~n eth1c~1

sort. The "good" beoo~es a.n expression for ao~e fundament~l types
of exparience. Without the ethical oategories no adequ~ta exprss3ion
for the 6~erlence Githe time C3.~1 De !T!::."le. There 1s in fa-at 9. close
oonneotion bet~een the ethioal ~nj reality oategoriea u; to the point
of 1~ent1ty. The good is thought of an .be ultimate exrrea~ion 0:
raa11 ty. The good i a rr.' the highest e~ ence vi re3.11 ty. 3. pr oceaa
which is poe~lble by the close xel~tlon in Greek thought of Ide~ ~d

Being. The:e seems to be good evidenoe for eelleving t~"!.t muc1: of

the difficulty and argument~tion in the Grask philosophy of P~ato'f

--- - - - - ---- -.

1Ph4!edra s , 230

.z: ..16m:" i ...... 3 .. " .'-'4 .Xi til Pi I :

.N:;O;::..... n:~"~ ,. : M:o:mo: $ ,ii,~,~~~, ... ,~ ~..,....\,,:Xi61;:.Jiiiemdi6: ,iA#...,,,,,,,,,1#. .: : '?ib$$X%iJo.o PC...... ~

'tJ,me wag due to a In.ok of reGognlti'JD of the true relatione bet;oreen
lihe t':'/ol. The temper of all Greek thought W3S to ereot into meta.-
physic~l being all iieaa ani prinolplae. The Pl~tonio ide~9 are
eloquent illus trat lone of the truth of thl e fac't. Tha fOJ.'(:;ul3.tion
of So sat of oategor iea of striotly logi ca.l oontent to rep.L'8eent
re~llty aa Plato ~id in the Theaetetus and Sophist indicates
aleo the oOlLplete'objeotiv1sm thst ac~u~ted the Gr~ek minl. Th~

categories that the Greek philosophers adopt to retrsaent re~llty

Beam to be very far removed fro~ aotual experienoe. Reali+'y for the
Greeks al~a,s seemed to ~e looatei beyond the everyda.y ~apveninga

and obJec~8. The dialectic of the Greek world W&3 i~ ire~t me~Bure

made 'po~131ble 'by this !:l.ot t.hat categories of reality had. eo 11t~:s

in o omr.on wi til experience. It waa this tend.enoy of the Greek mind

to be objeotive an~ metaphYGic~l th~t1sd to a tcrmul~tion of ~ series
of oategoriee at all. The 8ohe~e of categoriss 1s developed merely
because there 1s this im,Pulse to r educe real! ty to.fJtlll!r conven1 ::Hl",i
ultirr.9.te u:''l1ts. The 'beginnings of a. selIoonsoiouB :lttitu:le tc":sx:i
a doctr i!le of c2.tegor1es among the Greek; i9 loc~ ted in a dialec"t1oal

source. The crl~icisrn of this attltuie arises ire' the i~ct th~t the
Greeks al.."ays aimei to loca.te re3.1i tjO in ~ realm bt9yond. thail' c"on
experienoe or tended to d.eny it altogether. We will see t hu t until
we reaoh a stage in philosophical thinking in nhioh we h~ve an in-
tere~t in eX,ler1ence th~t the oategory dootrlne~' \'.'on't be in any '13.Y

represent~t1ve of experienoe. There will be e. hopeless 1naiequs,cy

of cat egor i es in the li9tf~ ..:l.ra.,~n up ~/i t11 r'39pect to quali t:f :?:.1J.

quantity. Tna comple~91~ functional c~tegories of th~~ experience


lSee Burnet, Greek Philosophy

-.( .. 6 _ . .5. A.1i E.i :;:;::;:z &2 &ii~ &_.M3U@j, ;s ~ .iiUULI .M .. .tttt....

.La I'!.-_ L ......... _ ~ ....... . , _ ..... ~

won't be found in the consoiously expressed tables, but muct b~ found
diBtribut~d in the complete philosophical viewpoint. Considering
Plato a? an example we will find that he has not in hie list the good
whioh r~~lly was the prime oategory of his experienoe. The Platonio
dootrine of categories had in oommon with other doctrines of oategpr1es,
whioh oonsciously &ttempt to rep~esent experienoe, the tendenoy to ad-
mit ~e categorioe only knowledge faotors. It is true then th~t ~hile

for Pl~to conduot i8 of extreme importance aa an element cf experience

yet it plays no part in the avowed o&tegorles. Of oourse, in th~

fundamenta~ philosophical oategories of Plato as viewed f~0m our

standpoint, the ethical categories find their deserved place.
The idea& of really cUlminate in the idea of the good. In trao-
ing out the complete develupment of the Platonio ideas we c~~ d1~cover

svn.ethin,t: of the true function of oa.tegories. Tliie is a. l'a.ot 111 though

..8 can fin.i in Plato only a. remote a.pproach to an eDum:;r3.t1on 0;' ca-
tegories OD a basis of an understanding of wh~t c~tegorles are.
In the entire"per1od of Greek philosophy as also in mo~ern

philosophy the categoriee are metaphysical and not me~hodological.

There 1s an at~empt made to determine what are the ultimate and

eteraal principles of reality. This attem~t is correlated with the
prevalent attitude that reality i8 a.n ult1m~te immutable 8$8en06.

In noder ri ph1,lospny when the attitude is more ep1stemolog1oa( than.

meta,hysioal the categoriee are taken to be the grouni prinoiples of
thought. 1 The categoriss, even when not metaphysical entities,are
really logic~l ultimates. The attempt to set up table? of o~tegorles

in the Greek ~er1od w~s an indication of ch~nge of ~ttitude in the

direc~on of knowledge process but this was no considerable oh~ge

a~ay froffi the e~ernal standpoint.

- - - - --
1. Kant's Categories tor example.
The Sophists represent the change in attitude from the oons1d-
erations of Dature to oonsiderations of oonduct. This ch~ge of
attitude grew out of the increasing Importan of the individual.
Thft 'Jge of Peri olee i9 the age of aohievement, of oonfidenoe. In. the
'o.. . ere of the individual. 'Rte a8.o".'ell~. man attained to rema.rk3.ble
heightn of mastery cf eelf and of n~tur8. This was th~ age in ~~ich

the penOtrating light of the intellect was brought away from playing
upon externsl nature and fooueed upon the indivIdual and upon man.
The entire history of Athens a~ this time 1s eloquent in ita testi-
mony of the new 1~portanoe of man. The entire sooial, politioal
and intellectual history be~r9 ~ltnes9 to the truth of this. The ora-
tions of Periole~ attest the value _hioh was set upon an Athenian
citieen. Indeed man beoame. the measure of all things. SOPhtoles
~ive8 expres~lon to ttie attitude in his BUgerb chorus in the
Antigone, n Muoh is ther~ paesing strange,
Nothing surpa8sing mankind. n
The suooess of Athens in the carryin: on oi he~ 1mp~r1al ~

bitiona ie a prime faotor in br1n~ng out this 1ntim&oy of the ex-

perience o! a ~eriod with the attitude taken toward it.
The ph11oBoph1cal problems of this period are n,ostly ethical
and political. The absorbing intereat in man ~d his conduot set
aside for the time the more remote epeoula;tions a.s to natur e , The
problem as to whether this more remote knowledge is avoidable b~com~8

itself a qtl.el3tion. The Sophists are sceptios with respect to the

rea11ty of the world. This must be taken to mean that a criticism
is of the attempt to reaoh out beyoni the direct and Immadio.'t8
experience. The Sophists may be coneldered 1n & w~y ~9 returning
to a dir~c't oontaot w11ih peroep'tual experienoe. The eta;tem-:int of
Gorgias IlS to non-existence of lihe world. may be ta.ken aa a.n ex-
.' 0 (!, t, I)\,~:.A
pression of th1R idea. The fa.c~ th~.t the Rophiata acquired therrlgelvea
more and ~ore with rhetorio is evidenoe of the prevalenoe of the
idea that in praotical pursuits oou11 be found more profitable em-
ployment. The unsettled sooial conditions whioh involved the Pelopanesisn
War were well prepared ground for the intellectual trend of events.
In the rapidly ohanging political fortunes of Athens may be sought
the lack offaith in the ultimates of e~rience. The complete in-
tere~ts were centered in the experience of the ~ay. Current problems
of soclal ani political importance demanded ani reoeived the atten-
tion of the thinkers of the period.
The soepticism of Greece at this period did not extend to
immediate experienoe but only to the reality beyond present exper-
ienoe. The Sophists who denied that realty oould be known spoke only
of metaphysioal reality. In conduot the insistenoe on the individualism
then current prompted the denial of un~t1mate st~ndarafbut those were
the standards of oustom. The soeptioism merely brought out the dis-
tinotion between custom and nature but did not attempt to deny the
standards of what was nature.
i .
The aohievement of Socrates l~y in the
direction of est3.blishing a. firm basis as criterion for moral con-
duot. Soorates me~nt to show that on the level of actual oonduot there
oould be developed ~~anG2T~~. The development of the category of nature
. f~'r- \
is the most SYmPtomatic/ or ~ae point being rrade here. The pre-Sophists
all thought of'nature as bei~g physis or the ultimate stuff of the
world. Here nature takes on a more anthropocorphio
aspect. It is a
category r~lated to human as aga1n8t cosmic behavior. l ~ocra t es ':'i th
the Sophists hal no f~ith or inter~st in ~ scienoe of natural things.
The task of Socrates came to be th~t of pointing out that vi%tue in-
volvln~ kno~ledge h~d an adquate oriterion. The amphasis that Socrates
-,.---... ---_...--_._--------- ------------- ------------------------ -- -------
lef. Pl-to, Republio, Lawsj 889 D.
places upon knowledge as a criterion for moral conduct points to a
fundamental char~cter18tio of the Greek made of thought. In tbe
Greek thought the objective attitude was always present. There oould
be no thought unless it had its external and objeotive correlation
in reality. The oorrel~tlon of thought anj being is a characteristic
and fundamental attitude of the Greek. This aocounts for the ration-
I r c: til' '"
ali~tio trend of the entlre Oreek civilization. This rredication for
knowledge showe itself as an inher~nt tralt of Greek char~oter.
is illustrated by the rise of traditional philosophlcal spedUlatoro
J~"d~;. r~
in Greece. In the time of Socrates we have the predication for know-
lejge coming to conclouunesa. This ~a9 fUlly carried out in the
doctrine of Ideas in Plato. We mURt note that there we atill h~ve the
objective and external attitude with reference to the nature of reality.
The ide~s are antological entities exiBtin~ eternally ~nj l~nutably.

In attem~tlng to injicate the basia of general experience for

the Greek attitude we muat take into accountnot only the te~perament

of the ~eople but aleo the speoific envbronmental oonjit~cns. There

are t'-o pointe to be clearly .distinguished here. In the fir~t plaoe
we helve to consider the genera.1 temperament of the Greeks and the
physioal environment in which they lived. These give character to
the general attitudes tow1rds experience whicn are illustrated by
the actione and thoughts of the pepple. In/second place there are
developments of a social and politioal kind which give origin to
les~ inclusive experiences and their expression.
The rationalistic and antologic~l attitude tow~rd experience
which characterized the speoul~tions of Greeoe may be indicated
as being influenoed so far ~s environment is conoerned, by the
comparatively narrow geographioal boundaries and other purely phys-
ioal conditions. Within this broad general type of attitude the
the ohanges in viewpoint toward experience maJ be traced to the
influenoe of sooial and politioal conditions.
The philosophy of Plato illustrates the fact that extreme
changes may be brought about in the attitude toward experienoe
without overooming the general tradition of whioh one forms a part.
Plato's ideas are orystallizations of the oonoepts whioh Soorates
develops in the realm of moral oonduot. In the pbilosoPJJ of Plato
we find the fact indicated th~t even when Greek philosophy attained
suo~ self-oon~clousnesB as to be absorbingly interested in the at-

titude toward experienoe. it still retained its antologioal and

external viewpoint.
Plato should be given oredit for attempting to set upa
series of categorle~ whioh should represent experienoe. This atte~pt

indicates an apprelo~tion of the problem of knowledge. That the

categories are abstraot antological enti~8 does not argue for the
lack of analytioal power on the part of Plato. The fact me~ns rather
that in hie period no thorough appreciation of knowledge and the
nature of the experienoe proce~s Was as yet possible. The Platonic
categoriee are essentially functions of the experience in whioh
they are formulated. The ~red~atlcn of the Gre~k peried means
endowing with existenoe. In the Athenian period the philosophical
attitudes were more eystemolo?loal than experiental. The greeks
had gotten over the absolute metophysioal attitude but ~ere far from
a genuine attitude of experienoe.
The ;ievelopment of the Platonic ~hilosophy \vas an outgrowth
of the problem of oonduot that Soorates faoed. Soorates was inter-
ested in ooming to some basie grouni in oonsidering the orit6rlon
of conduct. He argued that there was a definite me~nlng of virtue
If it is courage which 1s under disoussion the problem is the
exact na.ture of courage. If there is coura.geous aotion, if one
behaves courageously, ~hat is courage? The result of this kind of
investigation W~B the dev~lopment of the universal. The universal
is to be beet understocd aD ~ depeni~ble oriterion of moral oonduo~.

Aristotle tells us th~t Soorates ne6leote~ the ~orld of nature ~d

sought the unive~'sal in ethic:.l matters. 1

The universal has ito origin in the history of thought with
the Pythagoreans. Tha universal whioh Socrates sought for in the
et~ical roalm were tranaformations of the forms of the Pythagoreans.
We see in this transforrr.ation a ch~nge from the problem of existence
to tha.t of kno\'lledge. The universal of Socrates is not an ex!.stin.g
entity as are the numbers of the Pythagoreans. The numbers 01 the
Pythagcraans were not eep~r~ted froffi the sensible things in wbich
they inhered. The universals of Socrates were subsisting ent1ties
but ha~ no imme1i~te ~resenoe 1n sensible things. The interest in
ccnduct is ~lso a symptom of ~ new national experienoe and we find
that the peridd of Socrate~ waa ripe for a reworking of the previous
philosophical dootrines.
With the change in naticnal experience there is a ohange in
the philoooph1cal tendenoe~ ~hich refleot that experienoe and we
fini the doctrine of universality trt~sformed into the doctrine 'f
ide~a. The ~cotrine of iJeas is ~ metaphysio=l statement of ~he

prohle.., of universals. The general solidification of the universal.

ex~erlence mJ.kes a new dootrine lmperati ve. The thinker can no
longer be satisfied ~itb the arbitrary view of the in4ividual man.
The reoul t of this is thJ.t frclt tha kno'\vleige aspeot of Greek thinking

1s developed a strict metaphysics. The period of the Sophists was

the ohan~e in viewpoint from a strict metaphysics of a naive kind
to an arbitrary ph1lo8o~hy 9f knowledge. The whole Greek experience
was opposed to any such loose Weltansbh~uung and the result w~a the
metaphysical dootr1ne of Platonic ideas. The ideas of Plato 'are
Vantologlcal entities, immutable and ~nde~tructlble. It is l~portant

to note that with Plato philosophy leavea the realm.of conduct as

the exclusive domain such as the Sophist limited it to, and goes cn
to the broade~ fields of knowledge. This 1s the development of a
note struck by Socrates when he deolared that virtue is knowledge.
The certainty of knowledge 1s contested by, those who deny the
validity of the pred1aation prcceo~. Antiethenee doubts the pro-
priety of making jUdgmentss1ncs thoy O~~ not be valid. Plato makes
knowledge valid 1n giving antolcgical signlflc~noe to the i~eas. And
in maintaining the conneotion cetween coniuct ani kno~ledge the iiea
of the good 1s the higbeot idea.
The philosophy of Pl~to exhibits in a plausible manner the
way in which the striotly technical formulation of the philospher is
a crystallization of the experienoe of the time in which he lives.
The knowled;e problem beco~ea with him a :horougb met~physloal doctrLBe.
In order to guarantee the validity of tbe knowledge Froce~B Pl:to
makes the ideas entities of an i~r.ntable ani indestructible klni. The
setting up of a Itetaphy,'ioal cri terion of k;.oi'\'led?e 1s of course :ius
to an inadequate appreciation of the na t\ire of ex~erience an i ~f the
knowled~e process. The ideal of knowle1;e at this time ~as t~~t (f ~

strictly rational system. Plato belon~9 to the tradition which sees

'the truth and r e lity enacGnced in a harmcny of an objective l~ln~.

The ide ',8 of are :levelopmen.:.a of 'the nueber a of the Pytha.~cre:ul.8

through the one of Heracleitu8 and Parmen1des. The difficulty o~

partlcl~ati~n is a natur~l reGul~ of cOffcining the knowledge prooess

wi th the metaphysical L.e3.:1 of :he .;: revi (Jt:..B tr.inkera. The Pl,:,. t cni c
rhl10saphy iniloa;ea to un the sfeot~cle ~f the vivid s-ruggle w~loh

~as m~~e by the are~ko to ove:co~e the bonda or objeotivity. That

j s to oay frou. 01;.,' :;;rcant vantage ~oln t i t BeatTiS that they were

r.akini an uneucces :;ful fight to ov e r coae obj ecti vi ty As 11 n.a t t ~r

of truth the Greek philosophy 1s the eA:pre9:~ion of a partlcul :l,r

ex;erlen~e an-i cC'l.:li not been other"Nioe.
The Ire~t achieven.ent of Plate in in recognizlni th-.t e'!:;:e:-
lence ,\3.03 to ::8 fcuni in the explan'3.t1cn of kno'vleige. kno";-
ledge ~~, o0Lslderei to be t~e ccunterp~rt of ~el~6 ~ni ttu9 ~fan

tCt the cbjecti:ns '~hich lnvalldate:i r ::! dootrine., Tl:is inval-
i',~,ity "2.:; .iUB tc th3 ger.\eral experlence oGn-:3.itl~,n9 of Flltds time tt~;.n to .Sony lack on ~.1!: f'~rt. Pl:.t: da6~.rv6~ great ors.iit
for overco~ln6 the ilffloultiae of the Par~endlan ~n1 Heracle1t~n

confl1ct. At f1rot th,~ doc "rine cf 1 ie:::. ';;0.0 ::'f'~ ~~rentli' an en:ie1.vor
to me1.1:l.ts bet'~een uhe ee t:,o. The ccns t ant flux ,'as brc'-'gr..t into
oonnect1 n '0':'1 th tb~ eternal :lnj. p ezmanerrt , The 11fficul ty of
the ,:artloipation d.octrine then led Plate tv the r e .1izn.tIon tb:.:, the
iie~3 ~ar~ re~lly for~~ of ;rellcat1on. These ~crms of ~rei1c~tlon

ris-re a1;,;tr:lct 10~i.~3.l cn.tegcries, ~nj lnd.1cl.t9~ the tltr1ct CI",j1otive

vie~:I:clnt. It ,,,:".0 bj' ':l?-y of tl.ia a.t:atr2.ct fcrrrul:::ticn thCtt "Pl;.~c

reflectei the ex;erienoee of hiG ti~e~. In o~l~~ of It~ e~~e~~~lity

of vle.~c1~;, the Pla~cnio ~hl1oaphy in11c~teo 3 ~ra~~~g j3vell~p~ent

:' \.
of the att1tude tcv r ax~crlence w~lc~ ccnsijers more tha ~ttitula

Itaelf t~an ~li th~ ~ravloua hiloacphy.

Tila deve;opman~ of the r3cogn1tlan of ~be attit~de tow!rl
exper lenoe dl1 no t r es.c h :'he s t m dpc In t 0; 3. ::,::sycholo ~:ic:.l 6 .. :19 t-"'mology

a :~ h--
~ ..' ~~"n
1.. ;,.. ;: '-gortej
.; 0 . . , 1 Pl~tc iG a Greek ~nj ./~113 tt3 Greeks devJlcped
remarli,3.uly to the point of be~ ng gr e s tly interested 1n the knOWledge

l' Cf. Views of Natorp, Taylor, and Stewart

pr009S:'. they did net even entertain a subjeotive viewpoint. The
Greeks never came to a full realization of the nature of the e~per-

ience pr cce s v , AI;) h::..~ been sugge3ted. Plato r eacaed only the stage
of knovLedge but not the st:l,ge of exper Lence , For the Greeks
eXferieno~ ~~~ a pl~y of foroes and o~njitions which h~d their
pcwe r and fur~ose hi:iden i~eply a":ay frvm the eyes of the o!'din~:ry

;eraon. Ariototle is :l~ f:t.,r tx-: a. a.d~r901 tlng the true natur ; of
the knc~leile ~roce3z aa are the e~rller philosophers. Even fo~

Aristotle tha unive=3al represents a giien entity to which the objeots

of ex~erience must correspond. It was impossible for the Greek t~ to a subject! va vle~... point in epistemology. Tne shole Greek

cu! tt,re as an ex;;.reaolon of the experience of the fcrlc'i ','las dom-
in~ted by the objective ~n~ extern~l viewpoint. The Greeks of this
p~rl~i coulj not c=n~ijer the kno~lej6e trcee~ as an interacting com-
ponent vf ~ ohan&ing ani mod1f1~ble expe~1ence. The ~or1d for the
Greek '~,S he jetern~i ne i experienoei was a fixed and. permanent
world. Fer the Ore :'L~ the re:;,l ll. 7"hatever is must te eterna.l .nd
uno~angin~. The Greeko were acsolutists 1n the highest delree, and
~e find th~t their whole attitude, no m~tter how expreB~ed, whether
as a. n,etal:hysic:o.l vle'::point or as 9. dcctrine cr kno:vledge. indoiC'.::. tee
t Ll e , Syrr.ptolilatic of tl;ia char ~cteritl c of the Greeks net: f1 nj ~1:at

their pDychology 10 based upon a vioual a~i tactual plan. ~he t~o

ty~e~ c ; e xp er i ence giving a. ccncr e t e an:'. fixed 7-iorld. Trle 1- e tCl:;byel cal
dc.o t r ; e c of the Greeks ar e otrC'!~6l}' biaflj-ed by the mathematica.l view-
~oint. The tun!d string ~9 exprese~ng a ~u~2rlc~l r~tio~ for the
real i t 1 c r J.D ience is prcn:inen t in t. he l1let::l.!:by aic~l 81' ecu.latlons

of the Greeko. I~hen the doct:tine of kno . ,lelge r eacne e a cCI~,f1ider9.ble

develo~~ent as we find it in Plato, it 13 still influenced by the
extreme striotures of deductive logio. The rroces3 of kno~ledge for
Plato a.111;a at 3.lI extreUl$ determination of :lbstr:l.ct logioal c3.tegorles
auch tiS tile Same, Other, and Existenoe of the Tlmaeus, or Being, Like,
Sa:r.e, \.:.Ill ty, ani their opposi tee in the The~etetua.

The pr oceae of kr.o.vled;e for Pl-".to ans~er8 to the atti tu:ie

of his time. In the Theaetetus1he ind1catea the attitude that being
and know i n. ar e the aame , But bel~1Z fo:C' Fl\.to ae 1a evlden ~ fr::fl, a.ll
hie writings cannot. be anything but perll.;inent :3.n;1 fiJl:ed. Thlt rr.:lkes
1 t neceaaar r for ::is knoh'ledge ;rooee~ tc reiuoe to the t.areat ab-
stra.otion of elllBt~noe2. The categort of Plato cannot :).del.'~,.at:ny

of the nature of eXferlence. Ex::'erience for PItto h;'3 no fluij1ty

or develo~ment. TtAl'e is of oc~rae e~~erlence ~hi~t i9 dancr1ted
as b9con:'.ng, but this ia an absolute ,ie9c.:'i ..:,t1cT. o.nt it never is.
The re:-Ll~ never ha e be cce.e , it l::s ex1~ted. frcr. 9.11 tirr.e. T:-.e~le

two kin::d of teir.G ar e absolutel)' ee!:s.l'!lte and 1.intinct.:'

Tl'3 .iiffieul ty 7'h:ich Plato hat in nlakin; a conneo t i c.n let':i::en

these 1;\',0 kin1, of bein~ lntenqi i'i ad hi s ;4 ~ t i tU..1e of rn'.'tlr..~. l,no'~!J edge

an lLrcrt~nt ele~~nt in hie thinking. Tho wcrld of b~oc: ~n~ c~n 13

'JrOu~)lt jnto ocnnec t i cn with the wcrl'i of uein;; only if ,0 C<:\ ~d .~er

th:=..t iJeing; D.n:1 not tcir.13 are forp:A of the ~redioa.t1on l rOON"'-.

has ;i. I;vell mor e,i notion of than ?::.rmeni~e~)~had.

Fhen we 8"1.1 net be Lng 1~1 ';h:.1.~ we u.Ul'lt me an iA :hat it i3 o t her t nan

In thi s :,).tti tude of m:lkir..J,' cxi n Lencele~:en::l u~on knowl~d~e

ITheaetetus 188-189 2T1maeus 27.
h:..i dene.
of i ~~elf Ijth
....' :l"u'e
_"'. ... \t '..4 "U-'~-'
II .. ~,"""", c .."......
.a..., ... ... , of
,r.","'''''h'' 1~"'''''''~-no''"
u...l:''''"'- ",._ ~ in
th3 ia~eri;.ina.tlon of that eX}'erlenca. :"ha. s,tti uuae , r , i:l
ccnce rve.i in '~::J~:trlt oi' ex t r eme :tuth;nu.l1szr.. rner e is nc ;e:-,'...:.1r:13

ordinary auzaan l~ 1....~en1ngB ... n 1 events ,J,re nc t, ,:,.;; III ~PPl"~c1~tel. For

the l j vc :2 ce l'\'l','n
Q <I. ... ...... , . l-~;n','
~ ...... 0" are
_... ...o t even
..1,,; - _""1 W~
The Aristotelian Phase.

In Ariutotle e find a ocut i nued proe;resn of the kno~ledge

problem. The attl tude t osard ienc~e lec.:n,er-J so ccnac i oun ;1:3 to
develop in to a eye tertia.tic n:ethodobogy. Art '3totle fl'ep?.:'es the
first sy9teal1. tic treat 113C a on C:::;i,tegories an:l logic. Ari stotle
a t tenp t e in hie lOi;l:Jal tr~.t~31':J to ei3~.i.).b) :1L~h cert.l.lil rulas for t~e

ccnarder ed 0.9 an cr gam aed By;~t3m o~ r'_:.l~~ for the crg.';:.n of the
facta of expe r i s nce , Arl~totl5 ~~~'l Vi3:' close to tho: 9x;9r1cnc.,
prOC~Sl3 e mce he 1a much more of' "n empiricist th~n 19 Plate. It i~
i~ t~i~ r~ct tt~t wa flnl the r~lson dletre of Arlatotl~~ crlt3Tion
t I: I~. .....v
of the Platonio doctri~a of 1i819, Arlatotle'R criterion of Pl~to

closely enougn -che actua.l exp er i Ponce pr cc 39 '. r,rl ~totle 1 a a. :::r.y,ic1an
a.nd h~8 :i deciied empirioal vie,v~~cir~t,':hl1e the a ut t tu.te c! 71 :tc as a
mathea.:.l. t i clan 1 s n.or e cloaely cc nne o t e ~ .. ~, th t he ate;('n,~l and perma.nent
in e xp er i ence , Aris~o'lile in:;en.2.<J to :"inJ. :.1a i.mlve'.'s::l.l in the ; ....r-
tloul;i.:r"h1le ? h.e the dii'.;:;'ic'.llt:l of ::rjn~in.:.: ~he "tttic.:l ~.:C,' into
rel a. ti ern ':I i un t:1 e uni v;rs3.1
Jlhe scientific 19.oora and ','lritinJH of ~ria~.otla lniic,:tte t:l'3.t
he J iv~j in.a iifferent atag3 ':d ievelr.>p:nent of knOljlejie :h:m i i i

Pl.a t o , Aristotle 11v~1 in ;J. pe:'io.l !/hen the full fru1 ts of obaervat1on
and diece'/3!";" "lere being reaped. The men of ti11s time couf d

ta~e, 'ith more or le90 ~3Dur~nC3 of ~UC~elJ)to inv~sti~~te ~nl

catalo6ue the total a~~ of scientific !~ctB.

The l031c of AriAtotle 13 .ieveJc;:-1 :lB a n.sana of orgl.nizing
inite principles. The facta of experience ar e .. (',f o ourne , for
Aristotle cl09~1~r related to their det,errrlin':.t1on in ani CU9-
tom. Th:;\.t iA to eay, whan ";0 e~~Ij!3.k of latel'rcin,'.tion of experience
for Aristotle, ve '10 not mean that he leterm~ned 1 t <.l9io the lo~io1an8

of the n.o.ier n };erioj. Fot' Aristotle '9 conception of e xper i ence has
very little in common '~1th tho moJern!1~ of th':t.t term. Th:1t
expla.ln3 or-by Aristotle' a 102;10 a.tternpt~ to :letarmine the na tur s of
any n~-": .:..oject 711th 3tri:':t r ef'er ence L, an i,f.rrU:1t:\hle mc;..-le~. Tca

Aristotalia.n lOlic is eoaenti'~J~y :ie:1uctiv-9 'in n-i tu r e , an I crir:.:;'" an

'3.bsclute c'l/der into the ubjects or i ence , A v:ll1.i e x t i . te of
the 'fork of Aris'totle 'Noul1 ocna11e.r th'i1j in ..-~,llie Clf tr.<~ ~t d.:'lr.ents

concerned , Bet,", e en Ar i (\ to tl a ?..n:l ?l. t o there i a no ta.r t: 3:;'-;;:1. in:;

1if!3xenoe ~ith respect to the runda~~nt~l n~ture of ex~erience.

Yet Ari:3 totle has -levelope:i fl. t hor ogo I Ha; ~ecl\ r.1que for- the :l1.:'ldl:ing
of the otjecta of experience. 'rhie ie j i n :..1 1c ;\.t i c.n rf ~'\. more FIofound
appreciation of th~ nat.ur e of th~ expe r i.ence ~roceGf1l. Tl~e J (;,:;h; t

Aristotle iev09lope 10 of courie found in ihl 'bo3r::inr'i-ngn in 8onr-,l.tee

and, but Aristotle org~ni::es 1 t into a ';hole. -rhe in t e r 'n lj of
A:rietotlA in the developnD1'C of Logi,:: core a frC.~j t:le,i.l ~~7"jenoy

of hi;1 S-hou~ht. Eein:?; a. phyA1cian he oJ{ouLt n.a tur ":.;,',) n.o r e inter-

e s te 1 in tr.ele ta.ils of exj, er i ence .::.r.i t hun be 131 to an In ~e:"etlt

Arii3totle, ne muo t p061~ .fro!?: our o t andpo Lr.t , ':3.S C10-3S1 4

the ac:.u?.l e}tperientiu.l procc(1nln t!nt reality for 11im dl;j not Jl~
beyond the he avena , but in hh~ tiIr~ 1 t coul "lot be ccnoe i ve i ~il- t
genu1 ne reali ty :Jhould be f'oun l her e on earth. "~e see then t;n t
the ger.eral,. !; ti tude fe.r the Greek }.:h1loaophcrs iuclU..iinE; Aristotle
19 I! iIT.ilar T.. ar e, however , var t cus .iegress of develc'Iin,ent4
";1 thinthia c;;en.:>l.':.:..l ~tti rude , Aristotle repreaenli::l an a . .ve..n ee ever
Plate. frcrr. tl.i3 ntanCl~c1nt. Arlutotle ccrse o lLUC~ clcser to~:~e

iJea of a Rcie~ti6t, ~ha~ tbe ~o~e=n ~orlJ hol~J. ArlJtotle 1.

tra.di t :(.In:~. Be :~H~'3::.l.l'e tc :"e 9.. ph1lcao~h;;:l' of t~~ia s v.rlJ. a,ni saOlr.13

'to pLica hi;, reli;~ce in 1 reJen. ':: :.rL~ e x p e r i e n c e . Ju: 1 \ 1 tc ;le ,.!... ~~.:s'3.%'8

to rep~e~ent cCt~letely the ne' view~oinL perva1inj Creeoe lc th~

r.1J;lle o! t he fuUI'th censury , Ar i 9 to tle typi::'les ttie Greek u:~~i tu:ie

the Greek no t i o n r.i th 1 ta !lb,ce:l~nian inlf'ctus ' b r a n c h e d c u , c v e r t.,:~

three cont menbe , The at ti, tu:le of Ariatctle put:J :l. ;.:remiu.o'l:
kno\":lg:':':;'~ ani I,?kea it pool1i'tle fer him tc say tr:3.t II All rr;;en ty
nature .ie.1iL'e to know". Aristotle ir.. .iic:J.tcc in acme pl.:.l.c~s ~.1o

keen j,ie~le''';'AL~re '':1 th these.': .c l;f;Lrl:lt a. hcLil..iioh L'alucta.nce!l t c

cbj ec t to the ir.V'estig::.ticna of "c:eanly r~g2..r.ieJ. ~n1r.'".1
Aria~otler('! crl t i cf am of ? Z in.iic.~t:.:o th~t Ar1atotl~ '::~,~ at-

ten:;ti.jji:: tel ~et c l c acr to t.he~ct""3.1 level of experience. };lo: c":'lt-

LcLazi or PI: tv 1l.S1.y t:' t:?.l:en to t.~::..n t ha t Fl ~to h3.:i nc c..j,eq~te ex-

plJ.n~ti;:"ln cd ::.ctl.l'J..l l:,xfer1~n~e 2.0 i:. goe: on. In hie 1!',ete.~h~e3iC:';:'

Arls:totle ~.el a '.vh9..t tL: 1<..J:w.f; c cr; tr i [;',;; te tc ser.s1 cle thinga fer they
ne i ths~. caue e t. ovet.: n t or ch'J.l:be in thint;a. They :ic net even :i1..i.

2Met3.. 5. 11
p..I.rtiCU1J,l"11 "1 he calla tl'3t.:, t:nl"l 113 ':J.l1 ! lr.'d ~ 'Ol::\.to h 1.:1. Th'3\'S

10 .. 'lace in thin l:ind of cs'l ttc1'.; for oX';;eJrtt:~;" c!
a. r'.J~h Jl~ '..':car
reo\~gn1 t ~ on of ~t1 ni tur e c f.' t ::3 :-:notrle.:1ga .;:rocesa. T~,". ~ ,:n;.act '. t ion
~& :;..."';
113 i i , i i. .J,tad :d:~ ~ha el.\l;ot"".t~'l <;r :~ 'T'~tbcdolc.3Y ':1' scr enae ,
There 1i) '.La yat n> ref:; cr t1'.i1 i't1:.1:.e n~.t'}"e of t;~}":2''~~1ien08

1 '\1" :~l"
'te';.:~.- t l~U.;,;., '-rc\:rh-""
n.r -.. .."'Jl\.1 ~u":';~... l"
~J.;,;, ,; ,~....." .... uLI'nl
__ . . '" .l.h
o c :.../'<I.Jb
v........ .... o ... cr t e\~~,
.. 1"'"
,~'" he

In :n?.::in::;in~ the t,:"blo c,~ c~te2:;-Jl.iiHl :.::J ALltlt('~le f(:l"";;'~ ted

it ",''3 ,.
:.:a 'd,:relfJ.J"l
."1i~'!'l ti1:3 ~]ct t;'2~t t;hJ;' n c t any 010:11.' t,') the

,1ctU-ll 1':: l.:; rc : n '. in

iItF0.:t ,~:.r.ce c,~~ the :;tt3:l1C3.t1on ...: roccrn. .\d"l';c:tl~ ~'L1eCn tc f L-;~ ;';:H~
10 a1J:r.oat full awar eneue of tl1e ini~Gr;.anca of the a!frecL'i.tlcn CJf
tile ... t t i t 1;0 Ii ior,:lexl' er 1 enoe It e eec.a 1,,_ os 01 bl'to to ~ ony tho. 1;
with Aiototle ~e reach a ~olnt in the hiatcxy or ~hl1os0fhy phe~ the
~roblem cf kno~lalg~ etanda o~t ~ith shax~ outliLe in the attlt~ie cf
tr.inkers t c .:.:.rj ex~er1ence. ~ha A.evelo~~:ent li! thci.4ght a.fter At'ia-

natur 0 of ex,:.erience. l'he i"frc.. vcu.en ta tb;, t t:'-.inkcr:J 1n i;rO::.L:.~ed. in tile

na.turo t"I experience. Until such Jon in;;iEi,ht is a t t<.1in;;.:i. 1 t i ..: c.. ~Ciught

pbica.l ~.robler:.a. Kant ~hus d.ecl,:..reo t1.ii.ii t.-:. hieG':"ii:~ r.c h .. i cv o.. ;tlt
11 . 0 lIcan lLJ.~e in the logic oi J.riatotle. t(.:..r..t O~: cc ur r.e CVC1:~''''~Jk3

Ci.:tllP:':' e tal y


bu t ex~rea .h.. ne of 1.:. 6 cxi s ten toi;;.l aSJ,;3ct 3 of t.l~c ceJ c c t o of: ;;: '~& ar ienee ,
...... ,.. 1.V"n '''r'
'" r v ,-.... """"-'lot"

_ _ . .~ .. .... .. . _ .__ .a.

lTrana. Analy., C~a~t. 1, 8ec. 3.

an.. the ,'iork (If the kno;'.led~e lrt.'~eDe 16 ~o er~l"l!'e"'e't1 the Qua1itlea
:n::o. ccr;:iiticns of the object. Ttc cit c vcr t en are not c('nQt1tutjve
of t he lLject. Th:t0 IJ!d1c~teo ~ho '''ije ~~i".''):r6ence of t he .riE:,~.cte11an

cono a t , Lon c.'? t'=-

- .I ~ ~ "" '"" .:... _ " _n~turi' .-.("J. th'
....., 010 - ~ r"t"~"c"'1i"
_.. tJ .,."
." * ..~, of'r'-')'
.o. ...,. ~'l..,>
\it ~ \; n"T''':
\.f -~ ~4n(
.l- "..... l'
...... '.t
.. '.- e-

.f c roe t I, l r'..;. t I

; re.!i C:~'. cn t o Tho Influe.n:~n (f the pyth~e0ra~n~ ~DouflA

- p o o ...
~ v ;:-.
_' ' ,,'!-lo~
. eO c...
~ \I \. "I. '"" in :..n :l.L e :.r" nce her e
be- . t_"t':In- on t a
~ r" _ ~
......, ~ '.
...., ,>'
:. ~ ..
... .~
" ,_' ..: 1 _~ ,.1.. J:'- on ."\ - ' s t c t)
~ ... . ' . . ' : . ; : ~ r
, ,(\'\1.'
f .'.
v !I
'\ I",,'of L
. . J... '. -." . \r.'
" I
~ ....:,..
~1)'o--h)us n..a~ (. n 1'1 i 3 ~ :',;'" t ~.
~l . . t.;:;
':l f'
..... ..II ARu"'l""~
,. ~, I..J.&.t... v~~'--1nt
.' _ ";'.{"I . . . . .~.~
. :,., t h ';.'""

_ I,J~ <, .. '(er"''''~
~. JJIf;.J \.: '".:J ~
I' .. ...... ca t.egor Le n
-"'; .._',',i;' .-1.1 ~ r '.......J....,
J.J... 1-."\ ~~.lre
.,;,,-1 c 1., I r.n
vt r.T'
"_'_ th

. S
0.:.. t ;~, \'.,~lf~Q .

l'P .. .at A. J,:: Phyc , V, 1. ret. \",7, ti;\t iB .":3n9~\~1r.n, u ..... ltlon.
2Gesch. der Log1k, 206.
3 AT 1 t' t r t 1 .;; 1 " , ' 75
4 T"'h An n.1 Y '.. -I lCb.~P. 1, eec . III.
5 ~ at is ~.o ud1ng substanoe.
point to be maie here is that the categoriee do not indica.te
any intrinsio process f evalu~ting experienoe. The categories are
re~lly deoor1pt1ve termA funotlo~~ing 1n a cbaesifactory capaoity.
The lo~io of Aristotle deals with objeotive conditions. with pro-
pODitloDS ~nj not with the intim~te funotion1ng or the real exper-
1 " prooeSA.,
1fen\al Ari8to~le iA deall~~ with the expreAs10ns of attitude
toward experience, not with the elements of the attitude wbioh 18
experience. The iootr1ne of Aristotle 1s thus not an intimate ~ccount

of the 1~;;-':"proceS9 but the desoription of some phaRes of rssul ts

of the ex~erlence ~rocea~. While this position of Aristotle 1s an
advance uver his predeoe8sors in the reoognition of the importanoe
of attitude, tA1s attitude 1s not yet well understQbd.
Th~t the o~tegoriee of Aristotle do not represent an ade-
qU3. t~ intelpretf\.ti on of the ~x}:.erlence prooess seems ~lear this'
indic~tea further that Aristotle was not oonscious of the ~enulne

~rcoeo:eo of experienoe. The philosophy of Aristotle considered as

an attl tule tow9.Xi1 experienoe involves much mora than can poa:tibl~, be
compri 3;":' in these oategories. Thi a is all the more peoul iar ".'hen
we oOI:~;1Jer that Aristotle diel not think othenvise than that the

cat egor ion he anumeraliea at's f.lliffloi ent to oover the en t;ire ran:!:e of
e xper I enc e , Arlstotle seems una-rar e tha.t he haa 9. valu''.ble llBt of
other c'J.~a;.~orlen ".'1!11ch do not find a pl'loe in hia formulated one s ,
FXj::eci ,l:. J y needfUl for the repreeenta'tiOB of hi 8 \Vel tanshauungng
are nec e s er .~y a.nd. cont rngency , purpose and end, es -enee , substanoe.
being ~n.i ct.aer o , This indioates tha.t Aristotle was qUite unaware
of the plaoe th~t the oategories should take in his philosophioal
system. The 1ependence on the expreB~ion of the objects of experienoe
al'e too ~uch emphasized. The p~oceAR of predioation for Aristotle

ls a prooess of enumeratlng the qualities and oondltions of the
subjeot. The qualitles and dbndltions inhere in the subjeot. That
is,an objeot is desoribed. The predioation prooess for Arlsto~le is
not the determin-:tion of an experienoe. The experienoe is a determdn-
atlon alre~y made and presented. The predioation prooess if the en-
umeration of the elements of determin~tion. Having this attitude
twward experienoe the larger and more speoific determinations of the
experience do not apear in the ArIstotelian table of oategories. It
was this faot of the i~dequaoy of the Aristotelian table of oate-
goreis th~t led Platlnu8 to oritioize it as referring only to the
sensible world_ and not applying to the supersens1ble world at al1. 1
In general we may say it 1s true that the Aristotelian categories
do not adequately represent the Aritote11an ph1losophy. They do not
aim at the interpretation o~ the Arlstotelian attitude toward axper1-
en08. For an interpretation of the Aristotelian attitude of experienoe
we must take into account the oategorles not brought into stri~t for-
9Ulation. We must consider the plaoe in experienoe of the contingent
and the posslble. In attempting to interpret the Aristotelian ~hllo

sophy one must do more than &ttend to Arlstote l s definite assertion

wlth respeot to the categories.
In oonsidering the whole soheme of oategories that Aristotle
uses we meet with this faot that the attitude expressed in the ~or

mulatlcn of the oategories reflects the general viewpoint of Aristotle.

We should not .ay that the formulated cagegorie~ do not at all express
the attitude of Arlstotle toward experienoe; we should say rather that
they indiaate some defect in his appreoiation of the nature of ex-
perlenoe. Experienoe for Aristotle is a more or less objective oon-
tact With things. This oontaot 1s objeotive in that there is no

lpl~tin~s, Enneades VI.


oreation of things by the experienoe prooe9s. It is for this reason

that knowledge for Aristotlt is primarily a prooess of systematization
and olassifioation. For the same reason also knowledge for Aristotle
1s demonstrative and not primarily investigative. The objects ot
experienoe are not determinations ot the experienoe prooess but
olassifioations of an experienoe prooesl whioh 18 above all a eerIa-
zation prooess. The oategoriee of Aristotle are not oonstitutive
of the objeots of experienoe but merely desoriptive symbols.
The work of Aristotle indioates a olearer reoognition of the
attitude ,taking funotion ~f the logician and philosopher. but it is
neoessarily doomed to ~~ little advance over the previous thInkers
in that the attitude is dominated by a particular viewpoint. Aristotle
is still under the sway of the externalistio viewpoint Which is a charac-
teristio of the Greek philosophy. Aristotle is as much dominated by
the striot absolutistio viewpoint as is any thinker of the Greek period.
Aristotle should be iivan credit for attempting to break down the
distinotion between the sensible and intelligible worlds. The oate-
goriss of Aristotle indicate a protest against the exo1usive asorip-
tion of the real to the realm of ideas. The oategories of Aristotle
may be taken to be extension of the viewpoint developed by Plato in
the sophist. which makes of the ideas predioates of propositions.
That Aristotle bas notmade the most of the w~y he saw is evident sinoe
he has not given up tbe two world theoryl. Aristotle is a rationalist
in preoiselythe same sense as 1s Plato. True being for bim 1s just
as unoonneoted with ordinary experience as it is With Plato. The trend
of the entirer MetaphY810s lends support to this viewpoint. In the

--- - - -- -
lBurnet - Greek Philosphy. 345, holds Aristotle to be more at a
separatist than Plato.
_. /

twelfth book of the Metaphysios l Aristotle indicates &s sharp a

divill10n betwe"n the sensible and the supereensible, &sthe diohotomy
w~s then stated, as i8 found anywhere in Plato. One might insist
that Aristotle be oredited with the attitude that so far as his ac-
tual scientifia work 1s concerned he d1d harmonIze the two worlds,
ot the ideas and of sensible things. In reply it might be said that
this attitude represents a failure to work out completely his position.
The logic of Aristotle's attitude drove him by necessity to the
separation v1ewpoint. It ~as the absolutism of the Greek spirit that \
held its partakers captive. The predioation of the unmoved mover is
an essential conesquenoe of Aristotle's philosophy. The absolutistic
viewpOint is not laoking eTen in the attitude of Aristotle's method,
and indeed vitiates it.
Aristotle begins his improvement over Plato by making the
form a part of the thing. Be means to bring the forms out of the
world bey~n4 the Heavens and to give them a place in the world of
8ensible things. He car~ies this point so far that the Form beoomes
the only i~portant f~JS in the objects of experienoe. What a thing
is depends upon ite f~m, and the purpose influenoes entirely What

& thing is to beoome. 2 Although the material must always be present

it is not the important element. It 18 not even ot equal importance
with the form but in most oases it is present to the detainment of
the object. Sinoe the form is really wh~t a thing is, Why any objeot
is not what it ought to be is ~ :due to the baneful influenoe
of the material involved. The dootrine of development of Aristotle
~ ~ ~_~ 4_~~__ ~ ~ __ ~_~ ~

lUeta. 1073 A, 2
2Meta. V. 4. 1015 A Part An. t. 1. 640, B. 2a 641 A. 29, B. 29 sQq.
Ph7. II. 1191 A. aa - 194 A. 12 193 C. 8.

is a description ot the attempt tbe form makes to realize itself.
There is an internal neceseity in nature which oauses things to be
what they are. The world of experience oonsis. of objeots whioh are
attempting to realize their inner eseenoes. That ~hey donnot realize
their form8 or purposes is the fault of the material whiob 18 related
to the form. In matter Aristotle tind8 a hindranoe to form and it
is the oause of blind ohance and natural neoessity. It is matter which
1nterferes with the paupose of nature to rea11ze i~self. The Ar1stote-
lian philosophy ot nature calls for objects fully realized and exhib-
iting in the best way the purposes actuating tht1r presenoe and conA-
it1on. That objects are not fully realized with respect to form is
in all cases the fault of the resistanoe of matter. All irregular
natural phenomena are explained 1n this way. Ar1e~otle carries this
1dea so far as to consider it an abortion of nature when ohildren do
not resemble their parents and espeoially the father l Zeller2 points
out that the birth of a bad son to a good father or vioe versa, or
when the nature of the body does not oorrespond to that of the soul.
tbere 1s an abortiont of nature. There are other lnst&nces indicating
that the development of Aristotle is not a true development but merely
a devise for absolute classification. The dootrine of Aristotle implie8
a ssries of absolute forms to whioh the objects of experienoe mUst
correspond. The objeots of experienoe lack reality in just so much as
they fail to resemble the forms.
It is clear that experience for Aristotle is just as much
/ it is for Plato. The Forms still stanel out as the essen-
tially real and genuine aspects of experience. In so far as experience
is not form it is not real. The most real is that which has in it &
\ -------------------------~-~-------~---------------~-------------

1Gen. An IV, 3 767. B.6ff.

2D1e Philosoph1 der GrleoheD~ ~. Auf. 8. 429.
minimum of matter ani becouss pure torm. Aristotle is thus a
metaphys10ian and his scientific experienoe does not oontain much
r~a11ty. It ie only in intention that Aristotle goes beyond Plato.
Aristotle is not yet appreoiative of the nature ~f experienoe. He
should be given credit for stte~ting to give a systematic statemenf
of the categories. Ariitotle should be oredited with a keen insight
into the problsm of predication. His total oontribution. however. is
much minimized in that he was still domin~ted by the objective and
metaphysical sptrit which pervaded the Greek conoeption of exp8ri~oe.

The categorle~ of Aristotle are then parts of a scheme for the me~~O
dological o~~ering of tbe objeots of knowledge. Because theysre
developed tD connection with an attitude which ie not entirely consoious
of t~e nature of experienoe they oannot answ~r to a~ adequate. conoep-
tions of categories. They can represent to us a more conaiouB &ypre-
ciation than was ~reviously the case, that reality is given in exper-
ience, ~nd recognized by the knowledge procese. Belonging to a meta-
physical tradition experience 1s to a great extent divorced from
reality, and knowledge 1s & case of clasgification of the objeots oi
experience Which do in some measure approxim~\e reality.
It 1s necessary to consider that the discussion of Aristotle's
categories involvs two set.~ The first may be oonsidered to be the
series formulated in Topics and Metaphysios an~ other places. These
indicate a grOWing oonception on the part of Aristotle of the frecese
of knOWledge. In studying those categoriee we must grant Aristotle
credit for a better attitude toward experienoe than hie predec9saors
possessed. Aristotle seems to &~preoi~te the neoessity for giving a
stricter account of the ordin3rY and average experienoes,than did
, example. Arletot~e seems to reaohe:l a thorough going
soientific viewpoint. We must posit for Aristotle a better appreoia-
tion of the taot that for an understanding of the world there must be
a oloser sorutiny of the prooess of kno~ledge than was true of any
of his predeoessors, The empha.sis ontha better und~rsta.ndin6 of the
knlowledge prooess must be construed as a keener appreoiation of
the importanoe of the understandinc of experience. This is a much
oloser approximation to the ~ppreoiation of the' experienoe/prooess
Itself than we have seen advooa.ted by any of Aristotle's philosophioal
We have seen, that in spite of all this as was quite normal
the oategories of Aristotle were too 010s8 ~o the grammatioal espres-
slon and reflected too muoh the mere prooesses of predication to be
genuine representations of experience. They reflected the fact tbat
the attitude toward experience which Aristotle held to was influenced ~

a too rigid and static conoeption of experience. we were bound to

conclude that while we had in Aristotle a greater emphasis of the
attitude in the understanding of the world the whole Aristotelian
viewpoint was miad1reoted by the objective and rr~tapbY81cal traditions
whioh pervadej the Greek philosophy
The c~tego;ies of a mor$ general kind and whioh are not for-
mulated in a series 1ndic~:te qUi te oonolufll vely the striot! y met3.-

physical att1tude of A~istotle. They indioate the alight advanoe

that Aristotle made over Plato. Experienoe for Aristotle is a re~y

made, rigid type of being and has little in common with the plastic and
ohanging events of our ordinary existence. Our experienoe to be real
must answer to this beyond world of fixed oharaoter. Our experienoe
1s real only if it partakes of the real world whioh may be taken to be
the realm of the final purpose or end. The world of the here and now
is only a stage in the fulfillment of a purpose Which transoenis
the present both in time and spaoe. It 1a in this point that Hegel
finds himself so muoh in sympathy with Aristotle. All experienoe ot
the finite individuals Barks only a stage in the development of gen-
uine things. The objects of the present experienoe are attempts,more
or les8 9ucoeesful~to ata&in to genuine reality. This situation is
brough readily to mind in considering some of the oategories of Aris-
totle. Being for Aristotle reduoes to a bare and abstraot entity
totally devoid of all qualities such as they are known in ordinary
experienoe. Being for Aristotle 1s not a sUbstanoe, as the modern8
c~noe1ve it, it oannot be any tangible experienoe. It 1s one of the
most universal of and therefore cannot ba anything because

it is always a such and never & this. l Thie same oondition obtains
with reference to unlty,and oarrying out the principle whioh Aristotle
states in oonneotion with these t~o categories we find that the
wider categories of Aristotle are far from giving us genuine experience.
A olose examination of the Wider Aristotelian oategories in-
dicates qUite .qlear1y that for Aristotle eistence is the same as log-
ioal predpation. There appears in Aristo&le an atteffipt to go beyond
Plato on this point, but the attempt qUite obviously doee not suooeed.
Arietotle seeme to get olo8er to genuine experienoe but as we have
seen, his awareness of the nature of experienoe is such as to no~ lead
him to a oloser contact with experience than Plato achieved. In
oonsidering the oategories as Aristotle formulates and uses them, we
Bee hirr. holding an attitude toward experience which entirely subverts
the nature of reality and of experienoe. In spite of the faot th~t

Arl~totle nolds a more advanced attitude toward experience than did

1 Meta. Z 1038 b. 35 ff., 1040 b.l? ft., I 1053 b.l? ff.
hie predeoes60re. he is so little aware of the ~rue nature of exper-
ienoe that he doee not transoend the attitude of the Greeks but r&ther
culminates 1t. W1th Aristotle's formalation of a table of oategorie8
there is thrown into =e11ef the proilem of knowledge in a very pointed
way. We find that the Imprtanoe of predioation 1s braugh~ out. Ex-
perienoe ie oonsdiered to be a determination ~rocess. The fault in
thi8 philosophy is that the determintloDs are given in a netaphysioal
way. They are assumed and experience muat fallow the outlines of their
torms. The objeots of experience must fit certain previously given
forme. The categoriee of Ariatotle do nct oonstitute ex~erienoe. the
determinations are not characterizations of experience in the most
fruitful ~anner tb~t they can be thus jetermined. but they are given
prior to finite experienoe. The determin~tlons ot expertence for
Aristotle do not take the shape of
expe~ience. they 10 not (race the in-
timate exlctenoe of everyday facto, but warp and distort the oe~seles8

flow of experience toftt oert~in prejudged jetermin~tions of reality.

The ~etermjnat1on8 of experienoe are rr.ade before experience and are
in tru~h form~l~tsd in conneotion with some speculative tradition.
In the tin~e of Aristotle the soientist and philosopher h~d not developed
the oourag~ to look upon experienoe with a confidence in one's own
powers to detor~ine its n~ture. In fact the time bad not yet been
reached by the scientist in ~hich he could say th~t he CQuld not de-
termine the nature of experience. As ha:) been 90 otten repe~te~, the
time of Aristotle ia the time whan a correct awareness of oats at-
titu:!e toward ey-perlance w~s not yot developed. In this fact W3 find
, the reason for Aristotle's failure to appreciate t~e natt~e of dev-
elpment. It ia for this re~90n aloo th~t he could not give a s~tls-
I factory aocount of the relation of the universal ~d the part1oular.
I It is for this reason thet Aristotle oould not acoount satisfaotorily
I for tho eo-called abnormalities ofax~erience. For Aristotle the
I obj eot.8 of experienoe whioh failed to mea.Bure up to their ul tlma.'te
I forma were unreal ani oould net constitute experience. In Aristotle

I ~e do not find aa yet the attitude of experience. We have in full

I aeaeur e the metaphysic3-1 attitu:1e, the attitu:ie of objeotive ani

tranaoendent reality.
I The philosophy of Aristotle may be Gonaiiered as a definite
I representation of the gen:ral experience of the time in which it was
I formulated. There is so~ething in oommon with the several other
I aspeots uf experienoe whioh it~ a part and an expression. The
I Aristo~lan Weltanshauung may be looked at from tbe standpoint of the
I ohg,ngiJg poli tioal fortunes of the Greek people. We can see there
I 80medefinite oorrelations between the two. The general social
I ~
e1taut1on pervading Greeoe at this period finds i~ expression in the
I general philosophical attitude as exemplified in Aristotle's theory
I, of Xnowledge. EthicD and Politics. The differenoes bet~een Aristotle
and Plato represent genuine differenoe 1nthe general experience of the
I time.

I Aristotle is a stranger in Athens and is not entirely in sym-

I pathy with the completeness and solidity of the Athenian state. Per-

I haps also at this time the pasJ1ng of the whols Greek

was influencing h1a attitude. Aristotle 7.iS

in individualist and
I this ~ay be traced more clearly to the faot that the conception of the
I world was beooming more tolerant. The ~olitica.l ohanges taking place
I meant ~ greater freedom of those ~ho were not Greeks. Aristotle's
\ pupil Alexander was proposing to giv~ equal consideration to Greek

,,'; ,/

and Barba.r1a.n. The portR.1e o:f Greek oul tU.A:'e and 01 vl11za/" 1'~11l .l:&.Ea.8.
opening w'ide, the other peoples VIers entering and dnj OY~:lg iihe frui"te
of their develo~mtnt. The importanoe of th~ indi vidua.l 'laB ino:o:ea.sing
~ith the downfall of the autonomy of the Greek 6t~te. The IT;e~~ fao"t
of being a member of the Athenian sta.te for example. waG not suffioient
to give a. man his standing in the world. He II:U~t be eomet~11n6 on hi s
own a.ooount.
The development of soienoe at thia time was likwise a faotor
in the development of the importacce of ~he indiv1~ual. Tlli~ dev-
elepment of scienoe shoul~ not be considerej ~s the oaU8a of the
inoreas i l.g impor tanoe of tli!! ind.i'11dual. The faot th::.!; the inai liidua.l
,va.a beccr.i ng of mcr e iJ!.portanc n:ay jU3: a s we:ll be taken tc inlioate
a ver~' vi ~:ll stimulus t owc.zd scientific investig!':l.ti<.'n. E:l,ch s:~ould
te taken to be a. ;;;:ymptcll:i of onanlng
1\ which reauJ.teci in ex-
I=::aasloZls cf newer attitudeA to':i.~.r:i experience.
Aristotle's insistence on the imfiortanoe or the .individual
18 to ce traced to llitl reflect.ion of t he newer ex;;-,erlenoee of tr..e Greeks.

!:ia insi'.tence in hie poli tica.l fhiloaoI:h~" on the in.fortsnce of the

indi vidua.l and the 8eoonduy lm~orttU1ce Cif the communf ty n:.ay be tra.ced
to the absorbtion of the Greek states into the gro~ing Alexandxian
kingdom. His attitude ~ay be con9idered aleo as a d1Bat~Eov~1 of th~

sllbsumption of the independent states to tbe over'Yhelldn6 !teeter] of

a. s1ng1e state.
The Aristotelian philosophy hae other oc~eequences th~n those
Aristotle himself thought of. Aristotle 19 still a Greek and his
!att 1 tude r ~fl ae t s a develcpman t of the Graek t r ),di t i on , The oonque af
. of Alex'3.nder lnilc~te a br~noh1ng out of the Greek spirit. Tt.e Greek
attitude in an obje~t1ve one and as refleoted in AristO\fl~an forma-

l~ticn n~int?ln9 it9 objeotive an1 ~lxed oh~90t9ristlc8. As ~e have

s~en the phl1oA~phy or ATigtotle b~g1ns with a d!f!nte stress of the
individual in experienoe and ends with an 1nslRtenoe on the importance
of the Form whioh puts the tnilvi:iu~.l in an a.J.rroflt oomplete discord.
This dlecrpt:tncy CCC;l,:\ out in Aristotle'l\ enrcha. is of hie non-autocratio
1\ .. ."'"

vie,:; while holding that ttere born alaves. Aristotle. while
holding to the rre50mlnanoe of the Indi vl~.u3.l still believes that man
W -r f",
is ~boclutely 3. aoeial animal. Men would. degenergl ~nd. becce e 9. beast
~ere he to turn his back upon society and llva alone. ~ith re?pect
to Aristotle our conclueion mllBt be th~t hie phlJoRophy 10 1n an integ-
r~l way a forl?1l11~ion 0: the general outlook upon the experienoe of
hi s tll'.:e.
It hr..o.~ be en arparent throughout our bi'1ef resume of the Greek
philosophy th~t a )efjrite ~ttitude tow~rds experience is developed
?.ni !te.~.nt3.in8 i tgelf thl'C':ughout the entire hietor)' of Greek thought.
Greek phi lol=Jor;hy ia e g r:oent1 ~ lJ. Y obj ect1ve &,8 the whole a.tti tude
of t he (!.reek Ie object'.va. We find 3. developm<?nt from totally 19-
ncring the rro~po~ of e~:erlenoe to the pOint where it ccmes to be of
genuine trJpOl'tFnce. The eSBent1~1~.y sUbjeotive nature of the exper-
ienoe rl'vOCSf never become a a. genuine part of the Graek at ti tude.
The at~i tude of the Greek, lIr he t her in soienoe, art or politics 1s an
ir!:!i.ediace reaction t o exrerlenoe. The Greek had neve!' r-eached the po-
~~ t i cn th:.. t the :",'rI:er1ence iA d.!"Jpenrtent upon him for ita peculiar

In B~ianoe the Greek developed the ije~A ~hieh ~e=e derived

fr ..,,'m ~ pr ac t Lcal nep-rJ. 'l..1.I~t11 he re'ched a sy:?tems.t~c 9tructur~ of

t 0 acccr d ., if.h an e1 abor s.t hon cf ne3da. Gre~k soi ence is more
impersonal and unrelated to human needs than 1t nas eve r been sinoe.
Symbolic of this fact 1s the great prom1nence of mathemat1cs m the
hierarohy of Greek scienoe. The speoul~t1ons of the Greek thinkers
are very closely allied to the mathematioal disoiplines. Only the
last period in Greek oulture 1e obar~cter1zed by a thorough study of
empir1cal soience. Emptr1cal sciene. begin to flourish only when the
star of Greek ciVilization waB setting as a national prooess and
The Greeks never dev.loped their physioal scienoe beyon~ the
statio conoeption of experienoe. The general viewpoint of experienoe
among the GreeKe called for a type of soienoe whioh should consider
the faots of the world as fixed and unalterable. The fundamental
question in Greek soience is~~y does a oertain thing happen\ Bow
it happens is not a pressing question. In the biological soiences
the investigation of what aotually did oocur gave way to the pre-
supposition of wh~t shoul~ oooui in a fixed and stable world. This
indicates th~t the nature of the experienoe process Was not a subject
for investigation. An inquiry into the nature of experienoe would
always give the changing nature, ~uoh inqUiry would give the idea that
experienoe 1s not simple and uniform. It would indioate that experienoe
1s not a prooess independent of the person Who had the ~xperienoe.

The psyohology of Greece indicates also the objective attitude whioh

jominated the Greek s~ientist. The experienoes such ~s the psycholo-
gist deRoribed them were expressed in terms of vision. The objeo~ve

attitude was at the basis of all deBori~tions of mental phenomena.

The art of Greeoe indicates With othe~ cultural 1isc~plines

the objective view of the Greek mind. Greek art is eAsentially con-
oernted with the type, with the real beyond the accidental expressions
afforded by the ~art1culars. The architeottre of Greece 1s graced
;;i t:. t~l:: ~imj:lici ty of ~".\the~~tic9 and ',11 th the etr1king 9yrrJ're~ry

i:~~di.vLtun,l e xper Lence , cut t'ha e~:::e~tenoe of the Y7hole ~roup. E~oh

piace of :u-t seams t) have enahr t ne d w1.thin it the entire Greek

In Greek liter It"l.lra the confl i Ct9 9~er, to te cf vaJue, a'b-

et;"~ct ~-:l'i;1c1.~lc~,n~t teJj'''!e~n the 1n:11v1du'!.le. The experience~ '1e-'
l~1o~e:i "'lEof ent i r e gc oupe . Greek tr3.ged:' 19 for. the ~:~:H~t pa.::t
:', JK
cccupfe 1 :; i til :leacriptlonn of the ti tanto stru5~1 en e-r' eternal 11.7is

3nd not of ~~~ otrife of human beings.

In r;)11 ~i(':l the
~ ,
~''i t o! exter-,ali t'T. al!d detrtchment 1~ ~'911

e:cer:p11fie:L For the Greeks re11gi:-;n '.'f~.~ never a pe:"sonal ~ff~wir

il1:li 71 i1.1:1.2. ~o lone !J.~ J:ne observed the ri tag ;:re~ented .'by thn at'lte
~~~t ~n iniiv11u~1 be21eve1 ~~9h19 own ~riv:te concern. Religion in

inj17i~~~lt, li!e. Greek rali~1on ~a! ~ cold, 1ntelle~t~~1 affair.
It h';\i ~:lth~!'..'" in 1 t of th~ ~o\ll -::t irrln.; dep~n1ence of the 1.nii y1:lual
ucon ''.no:'rn tcr cea , ! ~ did. no t r epr eaent ~ atr i ving f,Jr an in1a-

The c~te~or'l~s of Aristotle no m~l'~ t han tho!3~ cf any Gre~k th:..t ccnt ac t "!l'i th exper i ence w:~icl1 iVO~.\J.:i mske of ita. -v~11d

e~~ment in genuine t hough t , The f"..1.ncttonal na t ur '? of th:3 categ:.riea

30 f~:r ::U @=sek thou,~ht 1s ccn cez-a ed , 1s 'brought out In t;H~ f;~c~ that
th:1 att~ t-:d~9 t he r : ~re in im::e1i~.te c:mtaot ,.,1 th tl:e ':'?oTt} Cc1~:'j.'" kind
e,f exper Lerice in tb::.t pl'lce 9.!11 tirie. The philoHo;here (1f Greece no
to very recent tl~es ~~~reci~ted the fDnctiJ~~l nature
of categories in their overt attitudes.
Hellenistio Period.

Analytical Ta.ble of Contenta.

With the dissipation of Athenian po~er the=e ends the char-

acteristic Greek philosophy. After Aristotle the ne~ human e~per

lences bring new Rttitudes to~~d thoe! e~perienoes.

The rationalistio phllBophy of Athens beco~e9 mojlf13~ in

esaential particul~8. there is a note of individualism brought in
whioh was not so ~rominent before.
The methodological viewpoint drops out and the Stoics bring
about such a ohange in the Aristotelian categoriee a9 to rrark a
break in the development of the philosophy Th1ch 1s highly ccnncious
of its own attitudes toward experienoe.
The functional nature of the categories they use is 1nd1c~ted

here aa 1n all the previous caees by the corres~onding chanZes 1n them.

and the lack in formulating them~and in the general experienoe ct the
In the Alexandrian-Roman period the o~tegories ~ith which ex-
perience io determined re!ledte very markedly the influence of tha
fusion of western and eastern ci v1l1zation. In a gene~'al way tha ex-

perience~ were beginning to be oategorized in a rom~tl0 B~irit. ~he

world was looked upon from the standpoint of the ~xtremaly hBlplea~

individual. The feel1ng of dependenoe upon an i need. cd Cc' :'.~~r"a i to

give char~cter to the attitudes of the p~riod.

The eSlsebt1ally Greek cdmoapttion of ilie and e7.perience'~oulm1'na-te.

in the Aria~Qte11a~ P~OBOPhYJ There is found in Aristotle the highest
point to which the GReek philosophy,g;1na. The essent1:=..11y ch,~l'aoteri8

tic Greek viewpoint 1s summed up in the stateMnt of 'riatotle. After th1','

philosophy we have a ohande in attitude of a decidedly tllndamental sort.
;he essentially Greek attitude gives way to a oonoept.on of e~?er1ence

and. of man. whioh 10 an .enr8lle one from thfl,t ote.nd;;oint. The extreme
objective attitude towar ~~/B't&ps s;eide, and. thr're comes u:;on tbe stago
efwes1iern pt1108oph-r a odlnception .~ of life a"nd ot IIS1ll whi ch 9/r'f,ha.isea-
the inner experienoe&. T~e 8bjec~1ve experienoe comes to the f~re and
dominates the culture oj, ~l !Den for a. oons1de.ra.ble pel'ic .:i ot ti rae. The:

empaae1a 1s' tran8'fpreed from oC'jeet1ve n~ture ",bich eontv tna th~ human

being as a. PBit'U to the human being 1 teelf In a. way wa r~,!'>.~J s"!y tha.t the

worll: of na.ture decr:;ases' 'lote proportions'. The 1ntereat i,.. external

nature beocmeo diminished and, the exps8t:enc1se of cbjectlve tJ:ifl~a a.:re to
a iegree lost. 1t m1ght be said that 1n thL? peri.:d tt. ',re oomee So

eeparation 'bet'.. . eell the aciences- of man ::md of na tur e au-h th;:a.t both the
subjeotive an" objectt1ve can 1:8 fostered'.
The post-Ar1s*oteliar period in philopo;hy rn~kks a series
of changes in huma.n experiences Whioh ~':ere ~. tremeniou9 1n,;~\Ht' for
the h1~tory of thought and action from that time to thi9. ThAr~ oame to
pass wi th the downf,9.11 of Greek inje! endence th3.t er.ttre helJ enizat10n

~n 1mpcrt~nce in this period such 3,8 it ne~~~ kne~ ~e:c=~. T~~ i~i1v1d.ual

beoame of extreme ~mportanoe in his experienoe and experienoe came to

be determined eith retrenoe to the individual. Te lnd1.1~ grew to
depend UpOD himself for the interpretat~on of hi. experieno8~. SoleDoe
gre. more humanistio 'and more j%&Otlcal. The 801entist~ of the time were
intere8ted more in probl~ affeoting buman individuals' than problema-
of serious oosmet import.
Thedevalopmeut of the knowledge troceas Whioh came
to ~ ~eau in Aristotle was' not ~utirely lost ~i~hl the StO~C9 and' Epic-
usens ~ut they mad~ ~ uiffer~n~ use of it. After Ar13totle the attlt~

'ie tcr,'~ard e.lC~erience became mo~e al)d Itore consolous of 1 ttelf and fina.-
lly re2.ul~ed in Ii. n.or e V.L' :i.ea~ ccxr.p16te scal... t1clem. In the Itret FISi08
thEu'e d~velo!/i.i cl. cri-~ica.l ex~ina'l"ioD of ex~erlence. Genuine sc:.~pt1clsm
lll~:4}e 9 it 1:1 a;::;:~a:canco fel the firs:; tir.:e ~a.nd. i$datc:l t es tt.. :;t t ld~l: sill

'l'l:.e e:;l'oaillg ~mpcrtar..oe of r:::-':":1 as ,;i. :L~ctcr in exp-

sutj;;:cti\;'~ c...U/itu:;,e. ThiEl rt!E.l.;,S tt }:o~eitl,; !'or tts Ep,iC'l.::ceaL:e t . deny

t.. t' IH;G;l' 1 n':tul';; cd: Iu~r. 5i.n::' ICJr ~r.f:: StOles to believe tt 'teoau:,.aof the
!-':1 t icil-5.tion pf the in:liv1.iual eo \:1.1 '.iIi tl~e wor Ld Ree..son. Tij.:; ."revs,lboe
(;f i,he 8toic ai.tituC-e incUoateci th:;.t "the aependence of r.::l.~ is not yet
C:U1'l(.: ~e. i~e;llJ.d t u-. t man t; ~jll con.f;iCi.~I.:a hir.~eelf e: ""f t::e "iprlC
ZtvLe ovor corae e ~.'1tL. veewpoint t ne d.i!.flculti~s t

The Hellenistio period also gave origin to the

conoapt of the B:-:lge. TIe "'198 man i t i9 who knows the ";sy ot! har~'5ness

in ge1te of JY1Y worlgy mlaf'ortune. Th';' fact thn.I: ';he ethi~:.l dc>ctrine of
the Hellenistio' pettod revolvgg about the otnce-:;ti on of ~;:-.p1ne;, 19 an
indlloatlon of the grol'!1ng 1rr:r:prtanoe of human ex.ser t ence , lI~n h9.d to

depeni upon h1mstlf end sinoe he could not cont'rr,l theextern:1.1 forces he
oons1iered ot h1R duty to conquer him~elf. Th*s hel?le9~n6a5 resulting
fr~m. the ex~:erienoe of t.he time eh'JTej. H,s' .ffect .,) ~.,:, in the 9~reptlclsm

-prevalent in the pert>od. There .~ro~e ~ueBti ~n8 ~s t the ::09811i111 t y of

knc..le1.!.9 ,aues ti ens ':t"hioh now s~emed to r;:~rry rr.uch force :.. nd oony1"tioD.

?yrr~,;o '\'\).0 911:!.nje 3.S a aym:::ol of ? stern eoe-;.t 10 n~ ~d. ndl~ be ooccidered
3.? a f1rgt of a sce c t Ic ;loctrine, It 10 ,)l1:':::r.~~te.d tn-=t ;':h':' lack
of 1n9i9tg:nc~ron 3. strict sxetptioiFlRl in the hiqt0t1y of t:'(hli~~:Ic~fo:ce

'PYll'ho 'ioes not mean that the wi Li to ie~" 'qe e'ntirel.~' }".C~:il:g. It

rr.'lke the oxer~tical atti t~a'9 of laa tin:; 11r.~:o'l"tane(. 't'h~ co:'~::J et~: exept-
i cal at ti tude oouJ.d notbbe !l true eYi/!;:'t61l of rfl".~}; tht)u~=, t

~A~eote.:i in '\ille Hellenistio per1o~. From th~ !lt~n:i~~oint o: .~ at'tot

c:nt1nu':.ion 0: the ~rs,1ition foun1 in Ar19totlp. th~r,~ i~ " b:. '1: .t'1th th

c,'tei t:jeolly of kno,:,>'1l1r;,ge ":e r.lq.y consider t h-i t '''1~: ~t'1atctJA co. ,:H as end

to give up the strict rells"ce ppon the ltnowledge pr co> 98. Thec.?tegories
for the stoios beoame more ontological than was the case since a seriee
of categories wa.s first formula.ted. The empbaslsof,tbe a.tt1 tude tow-
ared experIence i9 given up and experienoe 18 evaluated. 3.8 an 83ternal
fact. This result wo\ud be expected when ~e oonsider that the amtire
Stoic dootrine ls to become fuse1 with the World All. The ln~1v1dual

1'1 r:i~ : 1 ~ e"'e:'lce~n:i p:;:l."fect1':.n in beooming joined 'N1 th the world rea-
son ,
~1 tt. tl.!3 Stoics ther e is a. r etuzn to a mechanistic explanation
of nat ure T111 a is true a.l so of tne Epi cureans who i -deed held 't-o a
fr'Hlk ::i'3.terlali !jtio v ie.. pol nt , Emplla*",e 1a placed vpon externa.l nature
bu t 1 t 1s an or;iered nature flUah as oould oont~in in reJ.a.tlomah1p
to it. The j,'3t e ~mIn,l tion of th-J exper rence s ar e 3,11 infl uenaed 'by this
Blr,haais of the inii~!1'ju3.l in experienoe. The ata.rting point for all
phl10Bo~hlcal gYBte~o in t~ia period wae happIneo3. All 9pecula~ion

:tnl 311 r-r:l1oeophy<!3.? '; i'L,;':.-l:: to th~d uT"iver~ally desired and. 1'he co..
:.l0te r~unclatlon of all kno~Jed~e la po~s1ble in 1uah a time ~n~

~cept1oism flourished in the Hellenistio 2e~lo:i with Sto1cl~m an~

'E...:: ic~e~J.ni8m.

The chanz;e ln the doctrlne of o9.tegorlaR whioh the 9tdcs brought

about ll;~de theIr. into formal aDt~J czj c?l principle". They became modes
of nreiicstion of n~tur3l thln~G. Th~ formul~tte~ aeries ocntaina the
- to -
hi~heDt outogcrle9/~h~oh all the ~ther9 are by tegreea subordinate.
The Al'latotellan co.tegorle. ar s re~~uced to four, E~1n~ 19 the highest;
unie r th:!-FI l:~ qU~llty; under tInt '"lcci.:-lents.l quality; t.llen
cove : rr;'laticTl nn.r}~inJ the connec tLon of the o"tject t'Bln~ predicted
"ith o t he r ()bject~. The c lr.nge s ~';hic!: the 8to1ce Ln t r oduoe in th.e
of doctrine to ba traoel here. The development whioh can be traded
from Socratas to Ari atotle cannot be .foun.l cent inued ill the thinkers
of t:lio peL lod. The 8to1cs and Epicureans indicate a break 1 n the j,evel-
opment towaxds a oloser appreciation of the ph11oaophero' own attitude.
The Stolcs are expressing an external attiLuje wuict from the etand-
~~oi."l'~ '.f cUn!}Ch,ld, e vi a"tl tuJe. is very aim1lartc ths Pre-~~oph18tio8.

The emphasis of the individual 1a the Hellenistic per 1..:i nay be taken
to oontinue the tradition ~hion 18 conscious of ita own ~l~ce in the
for~ul~tlon of aLtitudes although the paried ~arks a bre~ 1n the dev-
elopment of Ath~nian philoaophy.
In t.he boll..::nlatic paried we fin:i the teteological vle~point

give up , There is ~ {jore meohanical v~ewpoint adopted. The te teolosc&

l.!.etls iaJll.e.i1.t~ly f-Ieceding tied the In:i1vidual up t';itb 'the :r.aas of
eX~~%1en~1 cbJectu and things. The meohanlo~l viewpoint of th~ Hel-
lenletic ;erlcl givea difiercntiatlo~ to the obj~cts of experienoe.
The experience ceccme s mor e ;,ord lnilv1ciuated ':l.n:l even if the empha.-
f!1~ on tha a.tt1tuJe itself 18 neglected it 1s cl!a.r th::..ta new attitude
13 Ior~ul~te~ ana leveloped. It W~3 in the Hellenistic ~er1ci that the
Stoics first forlliula~ei the ~rlnciplum individuation, No two things
C3.n ce enC1:ell and i n ill resftH;~U :llil~.1 Th1103 I:cint is ~.vell ~vorth ~
9:re3si~1g, that although tha ;hl1~oph'Jrs of tho Hellenistic ::e:ioi are

r:lofJer ccnne c t Lcn ::l:h ~,he a.ttl~u.le itfJel":. Thin i3 iL.uot.r:l~o:l by the

':ltoic e~ister.:~13ry ; the l::,;,,!cure -. en Ln e r a tance on har-;ineoG 1n their

~t 1~ic5. The 7',tclc cren:i of t nc tir~es i a t nen LO eV9.1uate exper lanoe

in nuch terms ac tc p , int unlUi staked-oly to t he 1~:lt1j ec e i on of the indl vid-

-- -- ---- ----- _.-_._--- -- -- -- ------- -- - ---- ------------------ ----- --------

lEicke - Stcics and E~icurcane.


ual into the determinat10ns of ex~erlence. The determination ot the world

as an evaluation of his experienoe 1s in the Bel~enistio period still
give in terms of this world. we find indeed an attempt made to give up
the formulation of experienoe in the oonoepualterms of the Greek philo-
sopher.. The evaluation of ex~erienoe is anthropocentrio, but atill
of tnis world. In the next period we find that the exper1enoes are
evaluated in the oategories of a transoendent existenoe. ,va may say tha

the Stoice,for example, come baok to an immediate ocntact with the world.
The attitude toward the world 1s not streR~ed aa much as th~ det.ermin-
ation of the world itaelf. The emphasis is different, however, from
that of the pre-Sophistio philosophers. The kind of ex~~rience that is
being expree'oed is entirely other than th:l.t of the pre-Sophist.. In
the Hellenistio period the world is of extreme importanoe not for its
own self but beoause it provides a home for the individual. The exper-
ience looked at from a viewpoint more or les8 external to the 1njlvid-
ual in the Hellenistic period beoame determined more and more from an
1njividual vis;7point. The f~ct that ~he 1088 of Greek independenoe made
the injiv1dual shrink into himself, did not carry any f~rther than to
1njividuallze ex~er~enoe. A SUbjective Viewpoint ~a8 not atcalned be-
for muoh later times.
:'he Alexa.nirla.n pario:l :;:;.:'r ..::J)n~ an '~"r'U1lJiun:..r1: ~~~-v~Jvp-

ment of t hought 3on.;' cur tur e , Tl.:; c:~t:3.)l"i.~.3i:'."l.tmt ()i" ;.:.e;.... t.;.:lz-l.\. .;;.. 3. oenter
ana. seat of l'j:l..l.Illn;~ b.'(>ugl'lt. forth :.u .l.'~~;itulo ~O/! ..r.; _~~._:)'=i.:r1:~-' :.h1ch
"a~ not c.nly n.::;! bui. even r evo';u..ti_ri' Al(.x<4.'"'.ll'i;l. ;L'E~~::~,};:mt.~ ? aeries

the. Th~:e a",': eel..:: a J;11:.a;ling 1.;1 elei,ient.: :.:..Bt ..n., :'e..,'y ll:;..e
at r e emed m t c eaoh Ct.llf:j, un; fu.~Hh'~ in 11es. and in ~l.cCitJn. ?he liffer-
ences 1n thou~{. c 't~er. over c... re jU~ ~ . a th:.1 .;iffe::e-:c':;"3 in \i:.'dcn-

al autonomy have been cver ccme , The ian ~e:.:;'c.: j;' :, I": e i for
the fusicr:. of OccLlent~.l an.l CLiaj~L~l t~Je and v i c. o (;~ ~ t~~ . .s ,

The Alex nul" ian !=-'.:r1c.:.:.l cr Ln :. L C' ? r;

rar;.t1vely n:.;.: L10ue elf ev; t. i~ e~.t-31'i3r~c::.

The 1r.iiV'1:uall~1;.~ ten:::'r;~l '1:::1c, tt.~ BelJ~'r:j;;tlc ~':1.j:,S

eh.o'.1ed 1u3 beccn:e AC' ij ;~enfle n.t-:l aci.t e t.:l;.t ;1 an not.: )y l;"'\.ike_ 'jt ex-

i:.;rience i"r,.i. his ovn ~:(llnt of vi~, Ltd; i.e n.,)e tll'," .~ -, i r.; of vi'Jl'l .~n

-axctrewaly P(Hdl~nal 01:8. Th~ i:ea:l. {or 3.-t',,:.cbncr.t t<.) .;,:.:- lefir:ita thing

'0\30(l',',e SCi aouve an to Lcccu e finally the ::.:..:tre:.e ne ceo .itj ::c L.:; Joul's
89.1viiticn. F:rcn: t.:i8 g:l:e,1 the ex .r en.a 3t..:~j:'ctive vie~i":".t :1.::ioh c~n

tr~st~i ~ith ~he objec~ive attitule ~h1oh i; :c;luae1 in t~e 2:~t~ry

cf wes t er n t nough t , I'h . Aleaandri:m r:ei:icid ;;1 0':;0 I.::: ',. r; ~-,/.~e c.:~ !3.'li-

ti t'llldej it becc'mes ira. kl'y l"elig,ious. 'rl'.e CI1::Lnge ~~C 111t; l'cl:.~i(ui3 aa-

r.ect is gradual and paRAeA thrC'.u~h i.. he e s entia12y ctL.1cal :....:;i;~ct of

the Hellen1otio }:;e!'1vd. In the A~axa.r,-:l"ii,),n }e.:1o:.i. the :lotrll.: na~n of
the world comes fro:: a religi"u~ aour ce , nl~ inHt;lrli.~I;)~ ne ed.s e;i Lhe
individua.l give the olue to the jet=:::u.1n~tion of expt,!:r19noe. '?bl1,o-
sophy in t h1 a peri:d turns 3,W1,Y rr c.. n 3. t'\.:l.' '3 , '1nd frort! mor!!!1 ty 3.nd
ta~,G.~ refuge in r~11g.ou8 ex;erience. Tbe 1.~t1tu1e of set"lc,j
gives U}: its frankly mateI'iallr;tio vle'~:f=,,1nt a.n;. !?tt!!.cr.e~ to :l~;lr-

1tUrl.l vle:;fcint of t ae '/forI:!. Tr.e:-3 1s :\ rem~rk' cl:':'I.n~e CCf'e over

Frc~ 1 C'c'tl r>.. ' ~t

thir'66 frvu, a raJ.li3~lc atar:i;'c: :-.t no t he r s 1e 9tre~ge.i the ew of a.

~J: iri tual ;,orlj.

Tho Alcxanjri~n ~~e.::1.c1 tl.::;,rl:E' ~ i od in tne history of tlhought
when tl'le i1lystical a.n1 r o... mt i c attituden tof'Z'.r,~. life bfOCme$ very

t:rOli,1nent. T,ei:,} aliti tuie l'r.'J.y be t.r vced to the o-riental influenoes
whioh r;,.re B'~rik~ r.g 3ymtorr.o of the ;\lexi~n lr1 In aul t ure , Tbla ",y~t:ica.l

or re11g1GuB atti tule 1;,.ai'3B 1toel": :31 t in t!:e forn1ul'?tiorn ~-f ex-
petlence au involving other-~crld ele~!nts. The iet~r~'n~tlon8 o~

a.U1~hasls of tho:: tirtFJ in rl7-,ced upor. the supergens\.'ous wtic' upon tthe
!~'lfli'?';' ::-iJ.e ep..erged .rren; the Plo.tcrid di v iAlon of the '''orld. ~ymp1to-

m~tlc of the.: '=1'1,:.-1 ar e auch cone.. it:(.,~:' s.~~ the at-e;~pt to spiritualIze
a.lj eA~er 1ance , 7r..c ccr:.f11 ct be t. ve cn bod;' '\nd. Aplr1 t for e11pren::\CY
r enu'l t .. 1:1 3 o:,~.,;l~t: suto::din':.ti'.:r: of rr,J!tte:r to ~p1rlt.l T~e rredom-

tilude:'i'l1ch ;1 ace o 1 t ~'; ccnfldence in ~. re ',1m ~'i?jr~nd. F~'er;En'\ t experienoe.

~!i;"n aeems ;0 base his c:nfld.enoe in his own a.bility. The ntrfm~1 sense ct
1ndividu~lity ~nj pJraon~l power ~hloh max&s the Greak m~ ~nd thftnker
ia laokln~ 1~ the inllvidu~l of tnis J1:icj. H19t~rI~n3 plao6 gre~t

--- ----------------- ...... ---_. --.- ----- ------------------------------------


lOi. WindEiban1 - Ge~.

d t"1
emphasis u;on the 1nd1vi~u~lity of tbe G~eek 36f.eci~ly of ta~ Athen-
i~ period. l There is a growing 10s8 of confidenoe in on~'e o~n per-
aon ~ith the fall of Athenian independence. In the Greek par10d the
strength of the social structure wae sufficient to give a sense of power
and authority to each individual. In ~be Alexandrian ~erioj ctis 1s
fraot1cally all diss1pated. There 1s a keen desire on the Pal"t of man
t c becce.e joined and fused with a sOtJ.ething beyoni the~selvea. Man is
no longer sufficient unto himself but seeks to transcenl himself ani to
be taken up into the whole. Z
There is no quest10n but that one of the o~usea for this ohange
in attitude involves the ohanges going on in the general eT.~erience of
t",",u. 80 far as political affairs are concerned we fini !tan aau prao-
tioaJly lost his holi upon hia loc~l grou~. Man h~s loot his immdiate
ani direct contact with a streng sustaining power. The indiviJual
has been forced back into himself ana upon himself. The all abscrt1ng
problelll for the individual now is to nave h1s soul. VIi tL the 100'3 of
niB temporal oonnections man cle~ves with all his strength to a hepe
in the beyond.
AS a conclous formul~tion of a dootr1Lo vI c~ta~orles we ~y

t~~e Plat~nus ~s an example, Pl~tinua a~and in this period aa an ex-

cellent 6&a&ple of one who faces the ~roblem of the nat~a of oate-
gorles and '~roceede to deal wi~h it directly. Platluus oriticizes the
Arlstotle1an categories beoause they are a~pliaable only to ooj~cts of
sense. Platinua is conoerned in estab1ishing a dootrine of categories
~hlcn will determ~ne the genuinely re~l objecce, those of supersensa
.';~ fin.L 1n Pl<?t1nus a t endency to atre9:.~ the 1nteJlie;iblt'? aorl;'i. for
there is found re~lity. rhe ~orld of orlln~y experience 18 uot real
for Pl:t1~us. ~eallty for Platlnua 1s found ir the tranecendent~l region
let. E. Meyer, K:leinere SObrif'~er":"
3For oontrasting political views of Greek and Oriental,of. Wheeler.
Alexander the Great.

beyond human experience. The realm of human experienoe 1s illusion

and the falsification of the real. It 1s ot the vilest
vile and the
inherent seat of all evil. The entire attitude of Platinus Ls a
representative of his period is to glorify the intelligible and ~e

mean the world of sense.

Platinus represents a transition stage between the older
external view and the modern sUbjeotive standpoint. Plat1nua indi-
.., }
cat ea an appreoiation of the inaUficient"J of th e Greek vie\'tpoint.
Plat1nus is reaohing ~~t after a n~wer and completer attitude toward
elperienoe. The scoial situation demands that another attitude toward
experience be embraced. The result is not, however, suoh that Platinu8
and his followere realize a better mode of evaluating experience.
They do not have any better a~frec1~t1on of the meaning of life and
reality. The Heo-Plataniets have net yet come to the realization of
experienoe as such. There i8 no oloser adherenoe to the attitude
itself than was the case With the Greek thinkers in the preoeding
periode. Their emphasis of the transcendent and spiritual indicates
olearly a grcwing sense of helplessness on the part of the individual.
This 1s not what we may term from the modern standpoint a hea~thy Bub-
jeotivity. The subjeotivity of the Alexandrian-Roman represents a
sickly dependence upon something not present. It is the projeotion of
the inne~ aelf 1n a romantic rather than 1n a naturalistio manner.
There 1s merely a turning away tro~ the ozder tradition to embraae
an opposite Viewpoint. We might traoe in this school the beginnings
of a. subjeotive sta.ndpoint whioh led ultim3.tely to the appreoia.tion
of experienoe as experienoe. In the Neo-Platonic sohool we have not
as yet a.ny aprreolatlon of the nature of the experienoe proaeaa.

Platinus and his sohool represent 1n the most apparent way the begin-
ning of an attitude toware experience whioh results flnally in an
appreoiation d experience as such. But this 1s only a beginning and
from the atandpoint of a ccmpleted aohievement this school is as tar
trom a consoious appreoiation of the nature of experience as is
Aristotle. In this period we ha ve the re11nquishment of the oold int el-
leotual attitude and the aoceptanoe of a warm internal contaot With the
world. This beginning may lead to either one of two oonsequenoes. Thil
cloe~ cOm.neroe With things of the world might lea.d to a careful and
CODs'atent evaluation of objeots. The relation of experience and
reality might be determined with exaotness. The v1ewpoint might lead
to a careful scientifio prooedure and investigation. The alternative
ocneequenoe is that ~n attitude of mystio relation of the individual
to the-world ~ll is developed. This latter condition ooours in the
Neo-Platonic world. There ie in this period no advanoement in the bet-
ter appreciation of the prooess of experienoe. The Neo-Platonists do
not even to a wholesome sUbjeotive position. The evalW!-t1on

of the: supereensuous world and the aocompa.ny1ng ccndi tiona A due to

& ruthless eUjectiviam.whloh .eize4 upon the men of this per1od. In
order that the subject1v3 viewpoint should be fruitful ~nd plausible
it i6 necessary to have a striot oonfidence 1n the e~erienaes of the
individual eo that a oonfident evaluation of the experiences i~ posa1ble
The categories of Platinua aim to indicate & wide brehDh bet~een
the sensible world and the world of intelligible things. The intell-
igible world ie ~or him, of course. the. real world; the other is not
rea.l but a ahadow or a;-:pearance of. the real wo rld. Tltis doctrine brings
out tha mystical element in Platinue. In order to bring out so~e sert
of order and attaohment 1a the world Platlnu8 makes use of the oon-
oeption of a One With which the entire world of objeots and persons
must enter. In so far as the world 18 real and good it 1s oomposed

of soul ma.t erial. ma t er1a.l ':rhicb ba-a ~:>e~n dar1 ved fr::::. -;ae Qne 3-..:.prOale I

prinoiple by em~natlon.

st~nda forth as an ever-reourrent th~me, ~nd th~t is the !~ph~JiJ on

the h1gh:r value~ th~t ~re atta~h9d to th~ bey~nd of ex~erience. Pla-
tlnuo -lo e e ~iot ~c os> .... $ c;a:plet ely to the t ranecendent vcrl.i e..o ~c

the lat er phllos,::phers. Pl~ t i"iue at iII rn.'\lnl;aine hla held 0:; t~ e
world of preae~t phenomena althoush he ~enie8 it h~~ a~nu1ne r~al1ty

aa ~r.c or it~ co~onents.

The Alex."l.ndr1an-Rc!:1.r.. pe rf cd 1 a a. ~:,ericd. of ext~t'e'?',e Indivi :1t1.1_

but an individualism of a peouliar sert. There is a eiokly turm1n~ in
of the person into his own self and a. fe~rful dapendenoe'..:rv:: one'a own
resc,urces. This type of individualism st3.nds 1n rr.arked ol)nt:r:~at to
the Greek Indlv1d~llam. The Greek 1~dlv1dual stood firm ~nd with whole
- hearted r~li;;nee upon himself as a. sturdy member of 3. solid 8001 sty.
Greek eoo i at y waa homogeneous and exelusi ve and as long -, " it held to-
gether it gave ita :nerolJera a. firm .hold upon theIDeelves and upon tbe ob-
j~cts of th.1r experience. The present period made of the indlvldua1
~ OO~ in a ;iant maohine. &&t1onallet1e li~es were broken down ~nd

from tae compact oity state there resulted 5. o08mopollt~ni8n: w~.l ch

swamped the individual completely. The~'e were gre.s.t political orga.n-
1zaticns d~velopec1 but the ordinary individual had n c l3..rge ahaz-e in
them. His i~tere8t8 were outside those of the grand organlzaticn to
$h1eh he was counted a nominal member.
A glanoe at the oulturel slt~..1ation of this p~rl~d indicat es the
weakening of the staunoh individualism oftbe Greek times. The Alexan-
drian pe -iod prcduoed svme results in the soientifio fields. but tjis
work was dec1dedly 0 f an empirioal and faotual eort. No ela.bqr~.te

principles :ver~ developed. The..:'e 1s to be s e sn here the oarryini' on of


the interest in e.~p1ric,:..1 ff.eta 'Nilic~~ Otlb'';':l, :'Il~b~ :":.ot d:..ya or the

1nneri t~noe .frc.~. the ~.::"i3t pha ae of A:.h3ni~.n thvu;ht. Th13 in'~ cr c at
in soielloe W!,;l,,a fostered in .:edio.~ne, geo:;':1.phy and 1n !:'l.ct ... ':'.:.t.he
ao-o~11ed hUffi~niat10 soiences. The ~dv~nc~o ~n :~tha~~~1cJ ~Ld

1y Ecm'.n :!..3peet cf this p e r ir d t h s a-:~r11er cr .r~J.exu.ndr~an ,:'1:riod p:,~p-

'.~r W!.ltl brillia.nt witt diaccve:--y :'::d ach1ev'9::,ent. Tli;te 1:1, -.v;!(~rer,


gators "'~B sn to employ thmmselve~~ ,"1th th'9 unue '.1'11

~,f1cl the bizarre, they dld net hesitate t~ 9t~,vf. to ;t'efl,'~ -",ook<a and
~~strol1omics.l The t':;,atee r i n t o Iryatlo~,l ani !I;:'iq;jc11 01. :3~S 'J!

.::.nd led t c a. -:lc1cua cccupa't lcr. with :l3.z10al pOA'ars,:\t..:-nea ~!10. pla,nte.
Even the sr~at a~trono~10al dl~oGver1e~ ner~ 111uted Tjth ~dtr~lo:lca1

~nd. other Bupexst i.t Lne. 2

In the ROJ!,an p'~Hicd we h~~'e a ~:r.~plete f~11re of '7.h~ fH,j,entlfl0
:aJcvenn~nt In Roma.n banda ac I enos 'oVSG c',;;u;.pl~tely di as ipat ed , 7~1P.

soientific ..cver.l-,nt whioh ~ae ac str'J~lz _. in Greece _.

~:radU!illv b'l::'::rr,e

extinot in the Roman period. Rcac W9.B c-ccupf ed '.rith the bUildln~ up
and the malnt enane e of a huge pollt 10al ayat em. --t ~
The in't e Li ec't cf
I" J e .,

Ro:r.e :i'd; c ccupa ed w1th the lnve{!~jO cf achemec by whioh tc hol,) to-
~et.her and control the encrracus terrltor1es and depenuer.c t e s 'iiliioh

she It!4de a part of her doma1ns. The experienoe of the P:.c'.. n r e r tod
is expreac.ed in an excellent, r;','-l,n-er in the La:r.B w!1icc.. were fCrJ:'.ulted
and administered. rt lncl1o!ltes the pl;>.ce of t'he in61,~Tiriual in t~li6

mighty ocean. The 1ndlv1dU!:t.l of the Roman per10ct fc'.:nd himself quite
Sueem1hl Geeohichte der Or1ech1ecben Literature in der Alemander1-
nerzei~ I. 1991, S. g35.
~Burokhardt - c/eohBaOh' S;Utur ~. 1902 8.621+.
L outside the pale of events. The ccnt3.ct of the individual with
things aotually going en was very limited. The Romans were SUbjects
and not oitizens in a concrete sense. The Roman politioal organiza-
tion 1'~U~ a. vaut end in itself and did not e~lst for the people. The
fina.l reductjen ot the Roman state testifies to the 1nherent weak-
n88888 of 1ta peouliar struoture.
It 18 in these oharaoteri*tio8 of Roman Society that one finds
the oaueee for the development of an attitude which stressed the values
of the other world. What was laoking in the present world W~8 sought
lnthe world beyond this. The spiritual world beoame a reality to the
peoples of this period. In the spiritu~l worl~ could be found solace
fer the sufferings and hardehips of this present life. The progres6
of the Christian doctrines has a rational explanation in this soc1al
situation. The religious attitude whoae essentIal oharacter!etio is
,.,. ~ A ~.,

brin~ng the human~1nto oanta.ot and under the proteotion of a permanent

'a.nd it,if10ient
. power must have developed in this soIl. A or! t 10al and
soieutlfl0 attitude was impossible at suoh a time for that attitude
impll~a t~t the 1ndIv14ual has a solid foundatirn for his work. In-
tore&t in the foroes and obje~t. of the wor~d must asaume that the
~~rlu is present and favorably disposed toward such interests. In
cth~r Nords, beiore man o~n devote himself ~o a whole hear\ed interest
in hie e-~perienoes, theae experienoes must have 80me fixity and per-
munenoe. Experienoe must be something in its own right. This was not
the ccndlt~on in the Roman world. There had not yet oome that higher
individualism Rhio~ could give a oonfidence in one's own experience.
, the older type of individuality whioh receiyed its support from a feel-
ing of cloee ~nd secure contaot with a strong soolal organization bad
disa~peared e~tlrely.W1th the downfall of Greek Independen~e there was
oeg\W. a.:1 era i{~ "'l. ich the stable individuality took a steady deoline.
In the 6.1exanclrian-Roman period there was no suestion as to the dev-
elopment of a satlsf';ctory tcy-~,rd experience. Thf: .:att,itude
tc',nrd experlenca did not raoe1 ve~rlY ::13..s~1rlc3.t1:n JL.i defl111 t ion In
this tilDe. The lr~ve:t1.g<!,ticna in the fu~ti;ne of ,!no~lej~e.'iel'e 1m-
pos21bl13 when men were ec prt:t:)ccu;;ied ',7ith ;;ittejr.~t~ to ~tt.l.~l1 :;:l~m

selves to their aurround~ngs.

The Roman-Ohristian Per1od~

The philosophy of the later days of Rome shows a deoided

tendency toward the unquali~ied assumption of tbe importsoe and
,neoessity to place onels all in God.
In this period philosOph7 maT
be said to have fallen upon evil days. Philosophy as a oritioal
attempt ,to evalua~ ~-experienoef has all but disappeared. The
, ',}l ( ."~-' ( '. .'\ r _..,\.
deolln~Jtrom'the attitude in whioh experienoe was investigated in &
fearless and energet~o way to the situation in whioh the whole of ex-
r: _", 1-:
perienoe was ~rle4?by the impenetrable oloak of a God. The deoline
passed through the stage. of the practioaland mildly religious attitude.
In the Hellenistio period philosophy beoame subject to the out1ook of a
practical life. The attitude toward experienoe of this period was dom-
inated by the accepted dogma of the exolusive ethical values. This
attitude still had room for some indepenjenoe of outlook. ~here was
still the influence of the philosopher visible in the desoript1onsand
determinations of experience. This independenoe was yielded gradua1ly
to an alrr:ost unoritioally acoeptej religious viewpoint. In the period
we are now disoussiDg philosophy in the seDse we speak of it above bad
well-nigh disappeared. Philosophy doe1 aotual1y disappear and is lost
entirely from the cultural history of the Middle Ages in Europe.
We shall find in this period no avowedly phlloe~ohioal position. The
worl in scienoe and in philosophy indioates the deoline of an emtire
sooial struoture. An entirely new social experience is in prooes~ of
development. It is becoming of more and more importance to give oneself
a plaoe in the world. There is not possible DOW the
. attitude 01 evaluat
lng experience with oalm and deliberate critl'~Qm'. The times cry for
I a fervent olinging to some solid rook. There can be no self-re11anoe

on the part of the ind1v1dual in giv1ng values to experienoe. The

strength of the individual haa bean entirely sapped and dissolved.
The individual of this period etanis helples~ before the stirring

~vente of life. ani for prese~vationls sake must throw himself unreserv-
edly into the arms of God. We should not expect then ~find a formula-
tion of a doctrine of oategories until such a time an the attitu1e tow-
~d experienoe becomes self-oonsoious. and fully aware to the thinker.
And so it ie. Not until we oome to Kant ~ill we find an original doo-
trine of categories but with Kant the whole attitude toward o~tegorle8

is different. It might be said with genuine propriety that the per-

iod we are new examining and the attitudes here 1eveloped are prepara-
tory ctageo for the v1c~pcint we will fir~ in Kant. The inherent con-
tinuity of the perlod8~hcwever. should not be too tar stressed.
As an expresoicn of the attituae of this period we have the
words of St. Augustine. For Augustine knowledge ani re~llty is in God

and of GO~. God for A~~~t;/~ is the Bole source of tr~tb and being just
as the New-Platonists ~~ught. and ~lth whom Augustine W~q acquainted.
We must bring out ~t once. however. that unlike the Nee-Platoninta Augus-
tine believed in a God who was an absolute personality. We find t~t

more and more the experience of absolute isolation and helple9~nes8 of

the in11vijual refledted in a vie7poir.t whic~ stresAes ~eEson&lity.

M~n munt caot hie lot r.ith Go1 ~8 the 901e and safe support
but th~t God ~uat not be an external wcrld scul iut a personal being
suffusing warmth and ten~ernesn to those who nest.J.e a.t l1js bosom. The
, ....

emanation pantheism of Ne~-Pla.ton1at: 1s sorel}r insufficient for this

period. Suoh an attitude woul~ not at all expreso the experience of
this time.
Ccneldering God as a personality Augustine made him the oenter
of ~ll experienoe. God 1s the all embraoing source of man and his
surroundings. There is only to be exoluded from God non-being and evil.
God iB the oreator of all thlbgs out of nothing. '" Augustine i8 oareful
to point out that God oreated things out of nothing, not out of his
own es~enoe. Thia obv1atp the pantheistio and consequent 109s of per-
sonality, conception whioh hai been the aocepted at~1tuie in pravlous
The extreme per90nall~tl0 attituie of Augustine comes out in
the startin; point ~hich he adopts for PhilosOPhlcJ know19dge. Augus-
tine m~le8 10ubt his starting point. Ha intrenohes himself strongly
in the position that to doubt is to at least be. To give up &11
bel ief in thin,~8 1s still to retain a. strong ho11 on t;~e real1 ty of
the conscious being. The viewpo1nt expressed in t~iis iootrlne lndio:.l teB
the great store that 19 p~ed 1n the individual. Tb3 philosophy of
Augustine revolves ~o~n~ia conneptlon of the importance of ~he in-
dividual. To make safe the existenoe of the ooneoioue being 19 to
guarant*e the reality of ~ha remembering, knowing and willing 1nilv1dual.
The act of douhting is intilll3.tely tiad up wi th these aepe o t e o:f the 1n-
dividual. ~hen one doubts ~ne must refer to the trutha anI lda~s con-
served in the memory. For Augustine the menta.l prOCB~fteB "'dt'S oonsti-
tutive of the totality of the parosonality. This indicates ~~ain the
avowed belief in an extr~me individuality.
Another conospt1on in Augustine whioh argue 1 for an in~1vid

u'i.listio a.ttitude is th3.t of the prima.or of the will. The ''1ll::l. 1s the
guidinG forae of all ac t Lcna , It is the diractin6 po\S~r of the :1 ntelleot
jUdging and reasonin~ as well as the simplest sense ~eroeptlona are con-
trolled by it. This standpoint of the ~1ll indioates ~nother fundamen-
t3.l a.t ti tude of Augustine. The pO',7er of \fill and alJ. 1 te ccnsequen-
oea are derived f~om the relationship of man to God. It 1~ from God

that man der'.ves his powers and capaoi ties. Augustine is an ladi v-
ldua.list but an lndividu::U.lnt who requires much sUl:~ort from acme
pO':1e: 'Rho' in:ised gr:mtB and re~int!!.1ns this indlvidualiflm. The Indlv-
Iduallom of this par1ed muot needa fina ao~e found~tion outside It-
Gel!. Ther~ ~aB too lit~le goldity in the genar~l and ~pecifio ex-
porienoe~ to give a self-suffioient inj17iduallty. The ~a~e con11t1oDB
~nic~ ~ade a man stake all upon himself made it i~~erative for the man
to hsvs SCi:i8 externa.l sup. ort for himaalf. 1~3.~ 1a free and capa.ble of
d.oing tha.t ':ihlol: he viills but ul tlmll,telr t1:is freedo~ ?Jd c?paci tY' 1s

11~ltel by the reetrlcticno of Gc~ upcr. the Inj1vliual. The lr.1ivid-

ua11ty ~urns out to be a turning ~ith1n =neeelf, an atte~pt tc find
oneself in onela o~n inne~ spirit, since the objective accial conditions
~o not yield a habitation ~nd a resting pl~ce for the ~~ary~a tormen-
ted iniiviaual. The lndl~iauality of Augustine io inoo~~le~e aince
ther~ 1e for everyone an absolute ne~d of redemption. Thlp ~b~olute

need of l'edemptlon indian-teD t ha.t of h10 own na t ure canno t posAlbly
act in ~uch ~ way ao to be jecer7:ng of ciXace. The freedrrr: of the
'::111, it turno out, ~.-aB ronse:l::ed. on] J C t r.e or1 g1nal man. ~i th the
fo.ll frC'm of Adam ~l: humane 't:orrl ':":'i th p.1n, nor C3,n t,hey Bave
the~zel ... en with gcocl. -:rorkB. To a~'a1n rcJe~,r.tjon n..!ld tb~ bC'O:l,lr:~ln

mi.: t r ecour ne direct:'..:.' to God. The ab90J ut e dO~,)"3n~.eT'! oe of man upon
God 10 'chan a.pparent aJid the frec.icm \'!h10h TO'a!! 'J".lgge1t!!d ~e the lot of
man nan louti ita potency. The ont i r e ioc':rine of man in A'Jgust',ne plaoes
!1irr, i:-. a. atr.lg~le ';:~,ich 1a ccnuta.~,; :l.n1 even un~vo.illnt~ to 'l~J.ain the
bleanelne3s of the spiritual lirs. The ne~d fer 9~17~tl~n ~~ich is the
, cf hie

;en~r~l poci~:on ~nj condltl~n.

The -jetermin'3.tions ':)f e~:pa:'1e:los fO: AUg".lstin~ have their aour ee

!J.nd. end in th~ un::rl~iG.':1.1 rel1:1im.1:1 :l.ttitud.e. Th~ exper t ence of the time

was suoh that it brought out expressions of attitudes toward experienoe

which indicate the unreserved aoceptanoe of an attitude i~posed by a
feeling of weakness and dependenoe. The period of which Augustine may
b6 taken as a reprseantative was one th~t had ita full quota of terrors
and defeats for the individual. It was a time when even the formal

artifioial sooial structure was being torn sunder. ~

The inroads of tbe
Barbarians augured for the speedy dissolution of the Roman order. So
inevitable was itl ~e8truotion as to make the attaoks by the Barbarians
a matter of oommon ooourence. We have in this period a peculiar aituatio]
On the one hand the contemplatl~n of Rome destroyed, struck teaor and
awe into the souls of both Roman and barbarian. It is said that Alaric
while bent upon the sack of Rome trembled at his own success. l When
the end of the jternal City was approaohing in aotuality, the oalamity
was considered inevitable. Augustine and hie christian oOffipeers be-
lieved it due to the inherent vioes of Pagan life and ~otions. The Romani
were oonvlneed that it was the damnable de~d of the Christians. This
attempt to place the blame for the calamity with all ~he condit1ons that
it involved iDdic~tes the severe poignancy with which Rome's destruction
WaR felt. This was no sent1menLal reg~d for RODle which wae e~reBsed.

It was the experience of a genUine 10SB whioh was echoed in the aespair
of Romans and Barbirian8, of Pagans and Christians. The fall of Rome
is a symptom of the Booial deoay whio1~ was characteristic of those times,
it was an indication of the bonds and burdens whioL the man of the per-
iOd was sufferei to endure. The condtions of man in tlle per1ed w~a an
entirely unen~ble one. The severe demands of such an organization as
the Roman one was, brought ~ hard eoononlic lot to the ma9~ of the people.

- ---- -- ---------
The people of the Empire wore literally besieged by an army of tax
gatherers. Every poe ible pretense was invoked by ~:~ns of which to
gather more and more money. There were direct taxes gathered from the
country people and from co~meroe and industry in the towns. 1 The
burden of taxatlon was an extrllmely sta.ggering one. The luxury and com-
fort of the ruling clas9 bro~ght hardship ~ni privation to the middle
clasR. The social cundition whioh may at . best be called very bad, ex-
tended to the moral and. re11.giou (l of the time's experience
The moral oonditions which beoame the province of the Church called for
~any very badly needed remedies. Conditions in the Church were afpal-
ing and oaused condemnatory expressions that were deep and far re~ohing.

The thinkers of the period were not heBit~nt in declaring the meed for
great improvement in the moral order.
The relaizetion of the misery and the deoay which was taking
its place 1n the social order i9 eloquently expreosed in the attempts
to flee the present temporal order and to find ;.:efua;e 1n the ci ty of
God. The great. emphasis that W'i.B pl'\.ced by this period upon the glor-
ies to be at~ained in the spiritual home to which everyone looked for-
ward was the result of a genuine need for a general ameli6%ation of the
900ial oonditions. As an example of this striving for salvation the
De Oivitas Dei of Augustine points out an extreme oondition of sooial
wrong and suffeziDg. The De Civitas, though written as a defence of the
Christiane fro~ the injiotm6nt as destroyers of Rome is of course an
attempt to picture what a spiritual commonwealth should be like. The
De Civitas brings out with all force the leanings toward another world.
The present world is unsatisfaotory'and unsound. In it .is vias, misery,
and despair. To the city of God the heart and soul of a pieus Christian
should be turned. It 1s there and only ther= that one may s~ek salva-
- - - - - - - - - - - - --~

lDuruy, History of Middle Ages, N.Y. 1891. Book I, Ohap. I.


tion with 80me assuranoe of suoceae. To tbe men of this peried there
wa.s one place to look for the bat~,er t hf nga tha.t one is absolutely

denied in this world. That plaoe was the heavenly city. It is of

ext%eme importanoe tc nete the special charaoteristio of this cIty.
For itiaal oommonweaths h"vG been devised before. and eaeb ha.s been
designed to remedy a pa~tioular iefeot. To see just what sort of 0111
this was to be 1s to a~preoiate what particular defeots the sooity
question seemed to sutfer from. The i~ea1 city is al~~ys an ex~r~9sIon

of the longing ot 9. pc:.rt1oular sooity.

The oonslder~tlon of the conditions existing in this period
g1ves us a very substantial basia for the examination of the attitudes
that the people of the period took to ."a.rd. their expezf ence , One ~'1ould

nto expect a strong IndlviJu~11am to be developed. This perloJ is es-

pe~1al11 ripe for ~he jevelopment of a mYAtic~l and subjective attitude.
The subjeotiviBm would be more my~tlc~l than 90lipoietio for the in-
dividuale at this ti~e l~ok th~t confidence in thema~lves whioh i9 neo-
essary for ti"ledevelopment of that a.ttl tude , The tendenoy in thia oon-
dition would be rather to plaoe onete faith in a pO?ler beyond oneself.
We finJ in the Roman-Christian period the development of the conoept of
an ind1vidual God w1th Whom om c?~ get into a olose personal relation.
Muoh of the thought of the periods is devoted to tte formulation of the
best statements of how it i~ posnible ;or man to get into a satisfactory
relationship with God. One of the Uioat ee:1ous probleu~ of the early
Christian period waD to show the rel~tionsh1p Gf the present Norlj to
God. This is all a qUite iefinlta attempt to evaluate the experienoes
in the best terms than available. God ~aa the centre of all hope and
of all relief. What misery this world could infliot was oontrolled and
direoted by God. This w~s the consolation of philosophy that whatever.
suffering this worli arferia 19 Inten~ed by Go~ for our ultimate goOd. 1
We find in Boethlu9 a very deoldei 1~dic~t1on of the transformat1ons
that are made in the philoBophles whioh co~ to this perioi from f~rm

er times. The Stole ~nd Neo-Pl~tonic vle~~ol~ts are remodole1 ani re-
vise::' to gi ve adequatc ex-press1:.n to the exparlenocs \7hich are pecu11ar
to the p e aent period. Vlh:..t3ver elecants of Greek theory are brought
into thls psrlod. are l'svlsed and remodele.ito cuit the changed oond.itions.
The entir-: re 'lom external to man wt.loh vas i::terfreted a.s ObjECt;lH~

nature now 1s maie to oonsist of the ~raatlon of God. The experlenos of

the tin:e calls out ne interpretatlo:!s of this expezLence , 1t is ilr.P08-
sible ~o conceive of i1fferent experiences influenoing thinkers to
adopt the game attltuieA tO~2Xd these experiences.

lat. Boethlue - De Consolations Philosop

'l'he ninth c env u.ry in Europe ie a per10d 01 chu.nge a.I~1i !l\ivel ty
Tnere are devel",ped oi' a. ~rvt=lloua na t ur e en a m;..bLi~i\;e i, t

eC:.l.le. fh~;r.1:; 1s Ln ~;'Jl,jrt c.O to J..ehab11it .... t e l.lie c:..i1~i~~;;1on

unut ac culture 01' anc l ent i10me. 'il:e pO.l.i;,ioa:L. history (J~ ':':': L,,'v,re in
the r:::.nth oent--::a."y rch;orUB ttl;;: alite.I.k- t to un! t. c;3 Europe i.-l ;;.:. a .... i:ile
elll]::iL; unc ez the lea.J.e cBhip ot L:il:.rleme;ne. ..'141.;. :J.ovel.ll=nt. jAiubt
be raken to ue thE l:.dt phase in~hll old order of things ';"';'1U tone tran-
e:;, ti~:n ~oi t cet,l:een t ae old all d the oe~'/ worlds. T~~e C:.!.rolingiao
ell:p1re and i.~~ ::i.t.t.b:".1=-teu. recovery ;.. 'ta,;: old ci,.-iliz;s.tiun n ... ;i :.\.\-ary
'or i~.f exit;t e!~CE;. Tl.e n ewe r r:..ot 1vee io the d.avelopmslJ.t cf Eur-..}-'e' do
h1btC.L'}" ,'/hicl1 1"1. l'olJ:::t:oent;;. ~~rE;1t.ted into t he p erI ...:], :;;,ica ::,;.I~:t the
l>e~ilu in~ c:.l~:~(; n.cde rr, wo r Ld , 1'ne ~.eter1ora.t1(jn uf tl~~ C~r<;lh.!Sia.n

r.:.;piJ'o :;.. YC or1f.'::. to' the nati-r. .:.l c.l';;,;.!:.izd.ti_rJ.~ of ;,l("dern tit;,ea.

7hc C... r(..lillgl~n Emp1.r.e !i:'ci. t-1':ly ~ brief CI.rael' .:_0.1 diB~4..;,

in o. ceut ury , It il' e fullcwed by an aLlvBt :_8 L.cpeletltJ Zl. ~~t.: fUuion
a c ;':'e<.:ed.ed it. The end c r tIle eqJi1'6 !'i.1.B the beg:i..nn n( ui' tflC feudal
;t:.cricd .,.. ;.ich l:.eI's1Bted 1~_ Fu rcp e lor centUl1es until the klngd:'hl6 -;;ere
fairly estJ.bliehed. Th,~.' f:' ",;;ej,'e c;th"::.l' ev ent.a 0: a. n:E..gnifioent ch~rao

t er in the p,,:rlod i\';;ich 'Ne Oc;;l~ tlH 1Jtl.rly ;-:oL",1a,8t rc , "e b~~C; the
s~ruf::.:le bet;.een the Ct~w.:cll :n:l the re"/i ve:l el1lpir~ in th~ tJle\"enth
cent ury , Uo n.o r e etlrl'ir.g tirJie...: can be 111lJ.gined nhe,n t i.oo e J: rcp e
oxper1enoed 1n this i;cr1ocl. In tr.e :;l;-;I.'lDt:"l c er.t uz y t:l:~ C~ H ~ee

befan, t aes e event e vihich ;.rc S;rt"ptc~.;i c .... t a re~tloaane3s l.nd a of the world uoh a.~ is uo~::..rcely to be fouo-i! 1n
h1Bt~ry. There seemed t~ be in Lurc~~ in th1s ti~e ~ seethl~g fermen-
ta.tion w't.1cn T.~S to resclt 1t:. scn.. n~, pl0d.UOt. This time of con-

fueion and of ohange wae a preparation ror a oivilization baaed upon

a more stable evaluat1or. of an individual human being than was ever
the in the previous hiatol"Y ~ the world. The speoula.tions of
thie period had ae their primary motive the attempt to arrive a~ a
definite attitude with respec;t to the e"1alua.ticns that enc uLd be given
the individual. As against the previoue periods we have diecuaaed
there is &n advanoe in that the determination of the value of an in-
dividual becomes a problem and is not aocepted as an uncritical
aoquiescence in a hopeless imposition.
The early Scholastio period is replete With a ohangin~e~riv1ng

human experienoe. This period 1l:.Qlu.~e8 the ninth to twelfth oentur-

ies inoluei ve. The eecon d half of this peried appears aa the reoord
of an awakening of man tc hie pow~re and surroundings. In a~ny w~y~

He might consider th~t this importance of the individua1 man

~as due to the purity of action from the nominals of traditions and
theory. The ccnsitution of sooiety in this period of the natural With their Vigor and freedom was a marked contrast to the
sooiety of deoadent Rome when the oenter of sooiety was a auperlm-
posed gcvernmental struot uz e , !~'i th the Gernlans there oame an orgaa-
iz&tion of society on a basia of personal relationship of m&n tc man.
The individuals were related by p~rscnal ties, and the centralization
of power nas brought about by a minute organizati:n of the hierarchy of
persons. T~e feudal syeteM i8 a symptom of the emphasis of indiVidual-
ity in the ages suoceeding the dismembermen~ of the Roman Empire.
This spirit of personal independence was the probable oauee of the
fleeting existenoe of Charlemagne's rehabilitation of the empire. rt
was this same spirit that kept alive the eQlpire as an ideal eonstime to
be attained. One might Whether it "r\as not this growth a.nd dev-
elopment of the idea.l empire whioh made it poseible for the sp1r1t~~
kingdom to be fostered by the popee until it c0mpeted lor and achieved
a decisive temperal power. The lueal empire gained and grew 1n p~er

when the ohanging feudal oonditions strongly as ed the indiv1dlJal

pcwer and hope. When the feudal oonditions mad~ the economlc~nd

social relations unbearable for those in the lower ranks of the

hierarchy, the people turned their eyes toward the spiritual realm.
In time it was the Church w~ioh represented that spiritual kingdcm
which beccme the guardian and control of the men of the middle ~g98.

And in time it WB.s the Chruoh that stood w1 th its great development
and 18&1 solidification aa the cor.~lete power and authority dominating
all m~n, their works, and their oond1tion.
In the eleventh century the importance ot individual existenoe
was maintained by the confused aocial condition. In thia century ~e

find the popes and partioularly Gregory VIr engaged in mort~l oombat
with-the Emperors of Germany for supremaoy ot temporal power. The
oontest resulted in a draw illustrating the power 1t was possible to
wield on the pretense of representing the spiritual world. The ~t-

t 1tilde of the poeple ot t ilis t i:"(:8 was suoh thti.t human experienoe wae
not a sato oriterivu for reality. The humiliation of an emperor and
the strength of the papal power ?ould not be a genuine situation where
the belle; in and fear of the beyond is not an overWhelming oharaoter-
istio of menls attitudes. The period under disoussion was one in whioh
fear of future result .. was not a. powerlll influenoe in men' & 11vee.
The developing and grOWing personality in Europe i8 ~~nlfeBt

in the Crusades. This 1s a phenomenon in which the surging componente

of indivldu~lity seek expression. The wonderful tr~nlfor~at1vn of
experienoes which was brought about by the crusades is a matter of
historio reoord. The crusades were followed by a civilization in the
twelfth oentury \,hl0h was a ma.rvellouB ohange and great 1n it sown
\ L/

r1 ght. There were breaths of new life infused into industry. OOlllDlerot
. .\ "splr1t of
and Ln ra.ct every human aotlvl't,Y. The soar1ng

the wonderful cathedrals their a.ppearance 1n the t .., elfth oentury.
The o~thedrals represent a hllP style of development of Eurpean oul+
ture and oi v111za.t ion. The universities too bt'lgan to mean 8omethi~

in the life ot the men of the pre-modern period. The universitiee

1ndioate the blossoming per10d of rapidly growing consoiousnes8.
The universit1es mark a peried of standardization in society. The
un1versities are symptoms of the growing control and system that is

coming to be a feature of,~o'ia.l
The experienoee of the perIod sbow some gradual tranBforma~iona
r, 7.hlch take place. The lnnate nee4 for some cor.nection With tne world
shows itself admi~ably in the experience of the period and the a.tti-
tudes taken toward this elperienoe. We have seen that after the
destruction of the Empire & serious confusion prevailed in European
society. The souls of the people th~n oried out for some attaohment.
This brought out the strength of the spiritual kingdom Wh~.Oh grew
and grew in pwoer and Influenoe. The oreed of Christ whioh was taken
as the gUiding star gave a gre~t inpetus to theChuroh. The doctrine
that eaoh one was entitled to a plaoe in the kingdomot grace appealed
to the people and grew out of the extreme need"for suo. a kingdom.
It was absolutely necessary to have some suoh oonoept developed to
give solace to the striving Boule of the period. The develo~~ent of
the Churoh w~e ineVitable then since it represented this kingdom on
earth. By the thirteenth oentury the org:".nizat1on of the Churoh was
oomplete and it h~d already reaped the full advantages of its being.
The strength and oonfidenoe which oame as a result of the organization
of the Churoh and the oonoomitant begfnning of national existenoe
made for a olearer appreciation of man ~nd Jed to a growing interest
in tis experience. This A~ ~ prepaxatl~n for the revolt tn~t ~~8

n~"",de:l::;, tae stell. )i.:thority (of th~ churcc , anJ flnQlly tu &.

develvpmerlt c:f science i.o.j a :ener~l full exp2eeaion of ...:\0 Ie newly

acquired 1ndl.1duallty.
The eX;'I'ea'~lcr~a ct attitude3 to'N:lrd experience. in t .i e ,per1od
is 11reotly lndl~at17e of the e~Ferlence of tbe ~~ri:d. T~~ ~e~elop
ini; attitu';e cf L1J.lv1Jt;:..11tj ~~si~.a to S~10'll itself 1n Erl:;g1m. The
Soct t~ke9 ever tc a 6re.~t ext ent ths philos"phy of A..l.~llatille )ut there
::.p~e3.ra ~lre~dy 3. ne-;: en;Fhsi~. The pr"oblem of eln~n..Lt~ on (~i,J:,: ~ugu8t1De
t cok over frClr. Nec-Pl~'''1;~Illa.n ~ pro~:i.em c r 't:1e ;;re~taJ." impor-

t anc e cf the uniYerae.l. The ~taolut~; pl..::ing of alJ. rs:..lity "-Ild.

pmoblern of re'~.l ism conea out ..

3.:c::..1r~. In 92'. er.o e the ~;rob~e:n r.-ny be

taken to be th,:;.t of inv!:lstl;;-::.tL.;; ~'r~ether ':Ir !:ot :::.o,ll~.ilc ha c some

ol5jeot i ve ex! at eno e or :'J': t '!'~le fW:::':l~t i ~n doct ri ne take3 tr_~ -:'orm with
Er1nG\(iil t ha t th~1 pp.rt1c:1~ro ~:.;r.t,n:tte fIC: .. t he '-1I.iver3~1. 'i'~..~ ~;nlTer-

a~l is prior. arid 19 productive Ol' ~he ~':~i.rt1::11:j.a.r. A raidd.l.e .Jt::v;e 18

to thp. morrt lmivo'sr\l. ~. -

I. ,:'
.: ,...
.L. _ to ha.ving
Beln~ 1~d1oates an e~~er 10~2in- of ~h~ ~en of t~1~ ;Gri~d tv
aometh1n~ et~ble and re-l in t~~ ~orld reJ,:
Jf1th Saint Anselm the desire to ll3.~~ scree exterr.:>l ,i.e,fend...'\.ble
object comes tt: the doot r1:'!~ th~.t t a e me r e tact th~.t cne can think
the h1"'_-heot
..... rellllty C"'\_... .-..nt
Q ... c es 1t~", exf at ence ,
A J. e
'1'\.. el b t e d on t C1 og1 oa. J

argument indicates a muoh oleser relat onehip be~een the individual

and reality than we have had in plilosophy. since the Grdeks. The
individual is beooming more and more important in experience. We aze
a differenoe between this period and the Roman-Christian period. In
the Christian period the effort *as entirely to state the world in
Theistic terms. The effort was to attain some immediate guarantee
for the human experienoes. Tha~ representej an attempt to plaoe man
in some immediate fixed relation. The time of Anselm, aims to show
...) i
the relation of God to man. Our Davies-Home tafleots the attitude
now. What particular rela.tion d08s God bear to man?
The problem of universals takes a more definite shape with
the sohoolmen in the next oentury. The twelfth century shows a
development of sohools and of doctrines whioh ind1ate the better
. I

organization of soc~ty in that period. The oenter for the discussions

are the sohools in Franoe and parti~ularly the University of Pari
The disoussion of in the twelfth oentury indioates a
strong degree of personality developing. The argumetns are symptom-
atio of a strong sense of seourity on the part ot individuals. There
is grea.ter freedom of interpretation and definition. There i8 much
store to be set upon the fact that the oentury indicates a great
interest in the problems of an intellectual kind. D1alectio is fost-
ered in the schools. Experienoe has taken on an entirely different
significanoe. The interest 1n intellectual problems gives us some
notion of the ohanged conditions. The twelfth oentury is one of
relative sscurity. The orusades resulted in an 1ncrease 1n oommeroe
and industry. Towns were estab11shed and the civilization seemed to
be fairly permanently estab11shed. In the twelfth century the sum-
, J

moa were beooming established as author1tative souroe books. The

problem of-universals seemed inplaoe then to attempt to specify ~he

preoise importance of the individual.

The problem of universals is really tbe problem of individuall.
The imPDrtance of the partioular was tbe topio of ohief interest in
this period. Tbe problem of universals took its particular form be-
cause of the impetus given luch study by the presenoe of tbe Aristotel-
ian De Categorie and De Interpretations in tae translations of Boethiu8.
An exoellent illustration of the type of philosophizing oonoerning
universal. is the handling of the problem by William of Cbampeaux.
Ra:soellinue and Abelard. William taught tha't the univsrsal i8 in
eaoh individual thing. that the individuals were acoidents of the
universal whioh is SUbstance. This extreme position whioh Abelard
attacked With the critioism that the substance would have mutually
oontradioting acoidents was given up and a milder realism adapted.
William modified his view 90 that the universal. identical 8ssenoe
is found in each particular in a particular SUbstantial form.
William was opposed by R080elliDUB Who taught that universals
could not at all be substances. The only real things are particulars
Universals are according to Rescellinus merely sounds which serve &S

spmbols of sUbstanoe or aooidents. They are not realities in them-

selves,no matter how real the things which they represent.
In Abelard 1s found the medi~tor and the oritio of both
Viewpoints. Abelard taught that both his previouA teaohers were
wrong. Universale oould not be things nor are they mere words. -The
universals he taught were predicates given to things by thought. The
universals are the indispensable forms of all knowledge because they
cont&tn in themselves the likenesses of things. No universals exist
in nature as a multiplicity with like qualitites_ The likeness be-

tween things i8 owing to the faot that they are oreated after an arche-
type 1n the mind of God. Abelard desoribed a threefold existence of
the universals. As coneeptus mentis they exist ante rem in the mind of
God. A. likenesses of the essential oharaoteristics of things they
exist in rem. In the human mind they exist as ooncepts and predioates
whioh arb ,oquired by oomparative thought.
The formal 400trines developed and the argumente to support
them are refleotionSof genuine attitudes whioh the men of the twelf~h

century ieveloped towar experience. The dootrines thus dev~loped in a

for~l way had their application in those theological discussions
which'formed the most congenial atmosphere of the Soholastic intelleot.
The Early Scholastio perioi is cns in which the grOWing worth of the
individual was beginning to be realized. The entire experienoe of man
was taktng
, on a ne~ signifioance. Tha emphasis previously placed upon
the inner oonsciousness was merely an attempt to indioate the attaoh-
ment to God. Now the value of the individual tor himself 1s receiving
determination. The ind1vidual looma up as an appreac1able faotatin
human experience. The moat important aspect of this is that it
presages an attitude whIch will plaoe a high degree of confileno4 1n
theexperiences of the individual such as 1t assumed in the modern
period. In the Early Scholastic period this attitude 1s still in
germ, and oomplete development is yet to be at~ained. In this period
the worth of the individual was still a function of his relation to
God. but this relation was assuming precision and s;stematic statement.
With Abelard the partioular 18 as important as the univ~rsal or at
least the universal ie no more clearly defined than the particular.
The un1vers~1 is not God from whom the part1culars derive their exist-
enoe, the universal is in its highest phase an idea or pattern in the
mind of God.
The full signifioanoe of Abelard and his position ~s tha~ he represents
a oritioal attitude whioh 1s direoted toward the teachinge of the
Ohurch Fathers. Abelard pointe towards the ideal of a free Investlgati
of what was then taken to be experienoe. Abelard is oombating the
orede ut intellig18 ot Augustine and Anselem. Abelard ie insisting
upon a right to deolde upon the basis or evidence and not to de01de
as authority dictates upon a preoonoeived basis.
The end of the twelfth oentury is oharacterized by a growing
attitude or humanism and of agrowing sense of toleranoe. There is
developing an interest in past literatures and thoughts .~loh indi-
oates an inoreasing lense of appreciation of human experience. We
find such name. in this oentury as John of Salisbury and Alan ot
Lille. both of these philosophers deprea*ed the submission to the

formalism of logio. They both advocated a stUdy of the Intlm~tely

human subjects. John was a. staunch defen4er of The Trivium from the
attaoks made upon it. He was in general an alert guard of oulture
and was interested in attaoking all those who attaoked 1~.

(Jr{a(.,{t~1;/[ A ~;'/
J . l .\orA.?.
..,1 ~.'. i, .
' "

The Batura-listie ~ \

AnalJ_tj.2~~Ja.b~~_ ss. P~!lt ept 8.

The Naturalistic period marks a stage in European history
1n wrrh10h the human individual aeaumea a growing importanoe, to the
point of a oomparative freedom of thought and aotion. This is traoe-
able to the more and more stable position that man attains to 10 a
sooial and political way.
In the Soholastio period there were many events whioh oomprised
the sooial experienoe which indioated a grOWing sense of importanoe of
the human individual. Thia fee11ng of the value of the human 1ndivid-
ual may be traoed to a developing sense of F:',.' ",';.', fJ_ of the sur':'
roundinge. The absolute so11dlity of the Churoh with the oomple't10n
of its power gave man a more seoure plaoe in the world although at onoe
his indiViduality made for a long standing protest against the restrio-
tion upon it. The oategories with whioh the experienoes are evaluated
show the oompletelne88 and rigidity whioh indicate great oonfidenoe in
the thinker and his interaotion with reality.
The Bationalistio period indicates a greater degree of confid-
enoe in the individual's experienoe by the individual. The general
800ial experienoe whioh brings about suoh a ohange 1s the 0~n1zat10n

of the various nations into stable autonomous groups in whioh the in-
dividuals appear Oo'mpaAtively free. The exper1enoes of the
seem to take en greater and greater value and reality a8 the experience
~ of these 1nd1viduals~1s oategorized.from the standpoint of human ao-
tioDa and reactions. There is a grOWing .rend in this period to revolt
from all sorta of superimposed authority and to beoome free.
The Iationallstl0 period 18 oh&raoterlzed. by suoh formal at-
t1tude. toward experienoe a8 to indioate a oomplete modifioatlon or
even re~eotlon of the more or les8 stat10 phl10sophyal the past per-

l 10d. Phil080phy takes on & more spiritua11stl0 aspect.

The view-
point s indioat~ an etlo1oST whloh involves the _ h\f\"Il:Vooneciouenees
of human ind1vi4ua18~& & fundamental prinOiPle)rather than objeotive
. .ture. \

The experienoe period develops an extreme relianoe upon exper-

1 ienoe as the baals of real 1t1. Experienoe 1&, however, construed &&
ob3ectlve happenlngs whioh are sUbjeot to absolute od univereal la
1 The ohange to an empb&als of oODorete experienoe a8 the baSi8 of real-

J ity is clearly _de out 1n 8pite of the In81stenoe of thlnkers upon

l metaphysioal prlnoiples &8 es eentlal to reallty. Every pha8e of exper-

lenoe, politlcal. moral and solent1fl0. ll1ustrates the magnified
Importanoe of lndividuals.
The evaluatlons of reality are stated in much olearer terme
of 1nvest1gatlon and experlmentation than in any prevlous modern per-
J iod. The phllosophloal attlt1lldes are muoh strengthened ln such a
1. sta~e of d~.efopment by the emphasis upon the soientif10 modea of
1 w.t~~~vi~Zer1eno.. There is found in this support of solenoe a
mean8 0' overooming the au tho rat 1ve presor1ptions as to the nature of
reallt7. Authority 18 plaoed in the report of aotual happenlngs rather
than in the offi018.1 dogmas ot the anoient writings wh10h some extra
soientifi0 &uthor1t1 imposes upon th1nkers.

, The Scholastic Period.

I The thineenth oentury ls one of the m08t fru1tful and dls-

I tinguished of all centw:t8e. It represents an era of rare aooomplish-

I DleDt and 1s brimful of promise. There i8 a. pl&U81b"1 view current

I, among historl~a
, that were It Dot for the destraotlve wars of the
next oentury, the Renaissanoe oould be sald to begIn from the thir-
teenth oentury. The development of civilization in this period was
I remarkable for many ol1arao1;er 1st lca In iahe flrst plaoe we be. VB a
I growing strength of organizations of the 800ial 11fe. There 18 8.

1 strengthenlng of the bonds tl1at hold men together. The 01t1e8 made
I great progre8s in this period; the organization of artisans make. for
I a greater apprecia.tion of the oonsciousnes8 of eelf. The growth of

I .
the individual and his value would 1Inow no restrioting bounds were it

DGia that the oonflict between the Ohuroh and the State brought out
the Impo;rtance of one or the other. The individual would, of course,
have to take a eUbsid~-Pos1tion in oompetition with such great
I In the wake of the Crusades there oame & growing appreoiation
of oational exi8tenoe, with a parallel solidification of the nations.
I Awa.y'!rom their own homes the men of the different nations forgot their
I ord1narr faotors of separation and rea.lize8 the faot of belonging to
the same groupf using & sim1lar language and haVing more or lees 'the

I same attitudes. Tbe coamon purpose aotuating all the individuals gave

I & growing sense of

on~ees whioh made Ohristians stand oyer against
This was the condition tha.t the Churoh its power. The
I oentra.llzation of lhe power of the Church reoei ved a great impetus from
\ the 6:rueadee. The ChurCh grew in pwoer and contral a.nd was afDbitioD8
to be master over both spir1tual and material realJla. Innooent the
Th1rd proolaimed the presenoe of two p. .ers, the Pontifical and the
Royal and ins18ted that the formerwa8 f1rst 1n 1mportanoe. Thie gave
the ChUroh the privilege of 1nterfering w1th po11t1cal affa1rs. In the
, oentury Bon1floe VIII proolaimed the oomplete aubm1es1on of
the Roral to tbe Pont1f1oa'1 power. He Dleant to Ine18t upon nothing
les8 tban & oomplete absorbtioD of one by the other. In faot, the
Churoh did attain to an extraord1nary power in the thirteenth oeB'tury.
As evidenoe of this may be oonsidered the tacte of the oondemns.t10n
and depos1't10n of Frederiok the aeoond~ tbe release of the Aragones8
/ I :") ~ ~
from their oath to """~ ~Y('~~t1\ and the t~Dsferenoe of lle8po11ta.n
k1ngdom from Manfred to Charles of Anjou. l
The resulte of the completer organ1zation of the aooiaL oon-
ditions made the indiViduals more oertain of themselvea. The Ind1T-
iduals beoume in general in oloser comtaot w1th their experienees.
They beoome more oonfident in their own powers. This gave an tmpetu.
to 1nvestigations of various kinds. The rise of the important lang-
uagee and their use by wr1ters W&8 evidenoe of a greater feeling of
a.t-bomene8s on the part of the iDd1 viduala. Jlan turned more and
. more away from the absolute dependenoe upon the other world and bega.n
to make use of his own pow ere
The domination ot the Christian world by the Churoh pla.oed
gre... t limits,110ns upon individual development. The 1nd1vidual was
maie to rely upon the a.uthority of the Churoh. The study of Aristotle
was at first atterlr oondemned because the Cbnrch at first failed to
realize the support 1t oould obta1n from h1e writings. When the spir1t
of oompleteness and finality. whioh 1e oonta1ned in Ar1sto~le, ~inally
1 VN.tJ . .
I Dewey - History of the Middle Ages, p.


:.: .
";;" .

made lts entry into the 'dmderstand1ng of the ohurchmen Aristotle became
the final and absolute authority. The full development of the lndlT-
idual and hie powera was not pOBtible until after the Churoh bad lost
its power. When the Churoh deolined it did not with it all th.e
oomfort that man.finds neoes&ary for the development of his individual-
ity. In faot, now individuality had beoome so highly developed tha:t

I the striot authority of the Churoh chafed men's soule, and they wiShed
to rid themselves of suoh a fetter as it forged for them.
In the trail of the Crusades oame an experienoe of the indlv-
I id~l and his powers suoh as was not 'wue s1noe the days when Athene
I was supreme. There was a flourishing oOl'd1t10n ot 1the industries.
( Those Who took the journeys to the ~Bt, brought baok with thea the
I arts whioh they established 1n Europe. From Damasous were brought
textiles, from Tyre glass whioh was made into mirrors. Windmi1ls,
flax, eilks, and many useful plants for oultivation were introduoe&
into Europe. Cotton fabrios beoame known in 1ih1a period, and 1inem
dIfor various pmrposes.
paper was beooming use? The oontact with the
Arabians resulted in the introduotion of many manusoripts 1nto learned
oircles of the European oivllization. There w~s derlved also ~rom the
Arab1&ns and Jews many kinds of s01ent1fio 1nformation. While the
Chr1sti_ns in Europe had lost praotically all learning and all oul~ure

the Mohammedans and Jews were devel~lng a bril11ant clvilisation in

the East. The Crusades made 1t possible for this oulture to De tra:.ns-
plait eel in Europe.
The thirteenth century stands 1n the history of human experienoe
as a period 1n whioh there was a bold reas8ert1~ of the ind1v1dua~.

Man aimed to" give expre8sion in the fUllest sense ~o hie being. This
expression naturally enough took on a group form since we have already
suggested that the Churoh as the centra.l element in the soolal structure

ma4e 1",.01f supreme in all things. Di8regarding, however, the surpres-


aion of the indlvdtAl in strict obedienoe to the Churoh there ~s muoh to

g1vo ev1denoe of a strong personal 1t7 developing. The tr1umph of
Reason in th1s period gives evidenoe of the first assertions of a new
personality. In this peried we have the beginnings of national litera-
tures, there are Bung in this period the ohlvalry and the plety of
I the lDen whoee actlcne merited chronicling. Godfrey of V111ehOrdOnl~
I wr1 t es a. hl story of the roUt~ Orusade; thia br 1ngs into promlnen"
something more than things of the other world. The Sire de Joinville,
I friend to St. LOUis, givee an aocount of the 8eventh Crusadel whioh

I sbows &; modem interest 1n things and an individual interest 1n suoh ev-

I ente. The thirteenth oentury is the oentury of the Romanoe of the Rose"
and of thc.t 11st of aingsre who gave expresel0~o the experienoes of
the time, among whom Day be mentioned Eaohenba~," Gottfried von
\ Strassburg, and Bot_on von der Aue. In the Gothic \'it1ioh wer
I developed in their utmost b~ut1 and magnifioenoe in thi s period we find
~ a ooncrete expression of the longinge and the needs of the people of the
J. ' time. The e~re8eion of an attitude means in every 0&88 & foxmulation

.~ in 80me sense of an evaluation of experienoe and an appreoiation of this

The more definite expression of the attitude of the Soholastio
period toward experienoe is reflected 1n the philosophioal oontribu-
l t10!s of the period. The Soholastio philosophy in its full bloom as
I we find it in the thirteenth century 1nd~oates the confidenoe in the
I intelleotual eqUipment of the philosophers. And yet the philosophical
) dootrines show a leaning upon authority and a completeness of dis-

I cussion which: suggest an unmistakea.ble limitation of the bounds

~ .. ----- .-.---- -- ----_........ -------~ ... _-~--
1' .f .... .... .
I ]iemotries
~ ~ t .. ..


experienoe. In many ways we may look upon the genera.l oondition in

Europe at thiS time as silti1lar to those of Athens in the last days
of ita supremacy. There 18 a oompleteneaa of power a.nd an adequa.tness
of experienoe that givea a finished touoh to the attitudes of the
thinkers of the time. We ~ay seek in this fact some causes for the
aooeptanoe of Aristotle in th1s oentury and for his profound influenoe
over all thought and oauduot. The faot of philosophising and h~v1ng

speoific and insistent attitudes tOWlrd eJperienoe means the assertion

of the individual ss the possessor or at leaat as a factor in exper-
ielloe. In the thirteenth oentury this assertion of the individual
is made to fall into a 80heme whioh involves the whole group, or
The thirteenth century represents the synthesis of the m1ddle
agee. There is a ooordination of the whole experienoe of the oenturies
to whioh we refer by that name. Someth1n~ seems to be reaulting from
- ~
the constant and numerous attempts of the v~r1cua s:ates ~ oome into
being. The Churoh whioh from the very year of the d1Bmemberment of
the Roman Empire aimed to suoceed it, ~c have aooomplished it e
purpose. This condition finds refleotion in the Summas, the most im-
portant of whioh are making their appearanoe in this period. All

knOWledge and all conduot can be desoriied and presoribed in a c)mpre-
henslve system. The proper exeroise of Reaaon brlnga about tbe aocom-
plt.hment of this purpose.
The philosophers of the thirteenth oentury aooepted the ~ttitude

of Aristotle ~ith
-great eagerness.
express the general temper of this period.
~as much in Aristotle to.
The deductive science of
Ar1stctle met the needs of a time 1n w~ioh the experienoes of an indiv-
idual were not allowed to prevail against oertain presoriged forms.

The accepted attitude in this time is that the indivldua1 experienoe

i8 an instanoe oonformable more or lese to a given type. The predom-
inant attitude in this per10d is a reali.tic one very si.ilar to that
of the Greek period. The novelty of the atti t'Ude is inoidental to the
devslopment of the Christian idea.s and ideals whioh have been supplying
the fullness of men's minds throupout the modern era .
As an example of the established attitude in the Soholastio
period we may take the Viewpoints of Albert and Thomas. Overlooking the
differenoes between these two thinkers we find that their determination
or experi~oe admirably refleots the actual oonditions preva1ling at
the time. With respect to the problem of universals both are realists
believing that the genera.l is the primary and important :f~ctor. Albert
argues tbst were not the un1ver~al the real~one oould no~ predicate
anything of a real objeot. And were not the universal eXistent in
reality, it could not be known. l The aniversal exists as form in three
olasses, that is, there are three types of existenoe in general. The
form exists belore the individual in the mind of God, a second form
is 1n the individual as the one that pervades the many. A third exists
In tH\ minds of human thinkers. For Albert the oauae of the difieren-
tlation between objects depends upon the material in so ~ar &s it
oarries tbe possibility of a certaIn form. The variation of objeots
may not be accounted for upon the basis of varioUB mater~als. but only
upon the basls of the varying forms inhering in the material. The
multiplicity of individuals thus may be aooounted for by the partition
lof the material. St. Thoma.s lJeliev8s that the universal 1s 1Jl rea.lity
t .',-.'\ \'.~v\.J..\ ,,-::t
minorent in the particular. and is abstraoted therefcDm by reason and
made autonomous in consoiousness. The,devIatlcn from Aristotle of
Albert and Thomas 1e eVident. These ~ \A~.tv0 bring out t he greater im-
---~~--.--------~--.-.---------------------~- ..---------....----..----


portanoe of the universal but make an enviable plaoe for th~ individual.
The universal in itself i8 an eternal luminous ray shining out of the
supreme intelligence. As the most pure form God is the highest univer-
I sal and whatever 1s not of hie essenoe i8 oreated by him. This view

I sumo up the ocmpletest attitude of the Scholastic period.

I The final subordination of the ind1vidual and his experienoe

I to a superior bQing 1s brought out by St. Thomas in his attitude toward

the stnte. The state is inferior to the Churoh s1noe it makes possible
I the attainment of only subord1nate goode. The Churoh as the represen-
I tatile of the kingdom of God 18 a far superior 1nBt1tution. There 1.
I great ato 1'8 laid by the ea.f'ety and ea.lvat1on of the soul. This is mo~e

I important than any of the tempora.l gocda that may be got through the
I agency of the temporal organiZ&tion. In the writings of Aquinas there

I decidedly unm1stakea.ble evidenoee to ind1cate the greater value that

La plaoed upon the exper1ences of the everyday world than was true 1n
the early 8oholastio or Christian period. The temporal world has not
I yet reaohed a ~lue in any way copparable with that of the spiritual
I .
world. The individual experiences JBUst not yet be conaidered as ab-
solutely to be relied upon. There 1s something above ordinary exper-
I lenoe whioh 1s reality. There 1s a rela~1onship between them but there
I ie no question that the experienoes of the ordinary world are merely
I the preparations for the partioipation in the events of the kingdom ot

I GoA.

I The a.ttitude "I the time as expres3ed 1n :~tC1Da.. a.s to the

I relative importanoe of hmD experienoe and the beyond, is seen in the

I fuotions attributed to the reason.

oompetent to oome into posaesaion or
The reason taught Aquinas 1s wholly
all knowledge 1n its domain. There
I 1s a perfect oonfidenoe plaoed 1n reas~n. St. Thomas believed the world
of ordinary experienoe was built upon and governed by unaltorable law8.
The oomplete or &dequate knowledge of anythin~ involves a knowledge of
its caue e , Rea.sun 1s entirely ooulpetent to disoover the cauaes of
things. In 8e far St. Th~mae grants reaso~ a very decidod influenoe
1n the investigation of truth. There is a limit,howevor, to the truth
whioh man oan attain. God fro~ whom all truth 18 derived, grants to
the human j:ea.son only one kiI.d of truth. The higher kind of truth is
not given to man by of his expe~:ienoe and ree.son, 'Dut it i&
revealed to him. Reason would not suffioe to obtain divine truth.
Di vir.le truth c.,n neither be domcnstrated nor comprehended by huma.n rea.s-
on. obt&ined only by f4ith. St. Thomas meane to 1nd1o~te

that there is not neoeeciarjly a contradiotion between those two means

of a.cquiring truth. Faith aIid reason should
... always be considered a.s
~,4<f -f

supplementing each other. Philosophy and Ii.. .r..0:;< \ not opposed
scianoes; they a=e rather two so1enoGs giving different views of the
aame truths. l From our vieiHpoint we ma.y interpl"et this as revealing
tho attitude of St. Thomas whioh indicates t~e values and the limita-
OD& whioh pl.3,ced upon the experienoes of the human 1ndividual
A oertain autonomy und power is ascribed them but in the final ana.lya18
they are restricted. In this puriod there does not exist a~ yet the
~bsoluay free and untr&Dm1eled development of the human personality.
There are many evidences of a develcpin germ whioh will some day
ccme to 'ths.t oondition of growth, 'but at this time it is atill a
germ. Thd dominant atti~u~e i~ atill that of the universal ohurch.
The world is still overshadowed by the hopes and fears centered about
the he~venly kingdom. The individual is import;~t in tha.t he is or
~~y be an ~oceptable c~nd1~ta for salv~tlon.but aalv~t1on is necaaaary

- ----
lOt. Turner - History of Philosophy, p. 347 ff.

and may not be avoided.

Salvat1cn in moat caeea 1s made to ocnsiat of some fom of
unity with God. Throughout the Christian era th1nk3re have sought to
11 bring m~n into relation with God. In the earlier periods it was acoom-
.pliehed by making the individual an eman~tion from God who rl~~lly re-
turns to God. In the Scholast1c period we find the mystioal unions
with God takin;. on anoth~r form. With Bonaventura, for e~mple, the
individual seeklng the highest ferm of salvation attains it by contem-
plative knowledge. This knowledge is different from the knOWledge of
reason. The m11n polnt is tbat through aome power of man he o~n reaoh
the final fus10n ~h the eterual llving God. Stress 1s not laid upon
the inherent oneness of God and Iran. but upon the fact th'3. t salntion
C'r \\111ty with God c ames through the cap3.o1tles and. the values of the
ind,lvidual. In Bonaventura. the indiv1d,ual ha.s advanoed over t he ~
torlnes aa 1n them he has advanoes over the previous myst1cs.
The gra~lng value of the individual and the incre3.s1ng l~ter-
... ~.- 11'.-....
eet in hi s experience 18 illuetrat ad by the j it":t \t tt. \' of experiental
'I, 1\
scienoe that is beg1nning to make its presenoe felt in this period.
The mcnks show an inoll~~t1cn to ~ke indivldual investigations lnto
the oauses of natural phenomena. The obvious 11mlt~tions of this in
vestlgaticn is apparent. It the bottoro of the ins1stence th~t to learn
one must i~quire of nat~e lies the aS3umption that reality 1s of things
l,' oocult. The inTestlg~tor8 of this period were not as must be only
erroneouely expedted. free inqu1ters into the ongoing of experienoe.
but alobem1sta and astrologers. Baoon is to be oredited with the un-
qualified e=phasis on experiments but this meant for him in the final
analyais de111ng with mysterious powers and secret lnsights. It would
be a serious error to think of Bacon as a modern scientist, he ~as far
from being that. He must be lookd upon a8 a representative of & period
in whioh man was &waktning to the conao1ousneaa of his own p~11oeophJ

and the significanoe of that as an element in the evaluation of ex- .

perlenoe. Albert and Aquinas were also men of soienoe a.e the term ie
applicable In this period and the differenoe between them ~nd Baoon is
only a. differenoe whloh one finds between different Ind1 vid.uals 1n the
e~me oentury. In all of these we f1nd suoh an ~ppreoiatloD and ev-
aluation of exper1enoe as will give man Bome reoognized plaoe in the
totality of this experienoe. The adoption of this attitude to the
degree in was possible in this period is an aohievement no~ in any way
to be underestimated. To adopt a more critical and substantial atti-
tude in this age is an impossibility. For the student of the period"
to expect a more oritical attitude is to expeot a distortion of the
ordinary trend of human development. The point to be insisted; upon
1s that there waB a development a.nd that a.t this partioular the
attitude toward experienoe brought ot.."t the value of the individual as
was indloated above. An important ~Oir.t t~ oonsider is that this
period as all the othera 1s not to be consdlered as a statio division
of human development of a homogeneous kind. This formula is a f~lsi-
fioation of the way human experienoe goes on. Any period should rather
be oonoeived of as a stage ot human growth presenti~~ certain definite
ohar~cter1st10 whioh may be aocounted for With respect to certain oon-
di tiona. Even in the latt er part of the thirteenth century the v1ew-
points are ohanging. There are henoe many protesta a~inst the dafini.
a.uthority Which caae to its oulmin:;.tion iB this oentury. As an example
we find William of Qboalll-\ ins13t Ing upon a great er au'tonomy of the
individual. Oocam oomba'te the realist io vie~o1nt which had beoome
quite strongly intrenched in the thinkiDg of the period. Ocoam Qelievea
that knowledge is attained b) the individual of ~ltings dire,otly without
the mediation of aome intermediate speoies~ For Oooam the unl~ersa18 are

I. _
merely terms.or signa for things; the th1n~a themeel~e3 ~rJ direGtly
oognized by the ir..j1 v1dun.l with tohe mental p r ocea ~ w!ll:h he c:.~led

intuition. The categories e~pre~s cur th~~~ht but ~ct neceaea7ily

-' .
anyth1n; real 'l.nd the objects of these c~te;orie:J are r:).'"Jns..l and
the.refore ccnt ent Leae , The ex;o:'1ence of the individual of more
importanoe than, since b~ cao knc~ re~11ty directly. This r~ises the
value and increases tee 1mpo%t~nce of the indivld~~l. In Oooa~ we find
a sym~tom of the great opposition to the ~~thorlty of the Churoh ~h1oh

h~; it$ inoeption at his t1me. William in f~ct aligned himself en t~e

side ~f the state ~nd declared that as f~r as tempor~l m~tters 10, the
at e t e is supreme in its a.u"thor1ty. -
He was in lea.gue r:ltb. P~illp the Fair
and Lewis of Bavaria in their attacks upon the papacy.
Oco~m represents the beg1n~lngB of the transition t~ the more
defi:lite Diclclern pet!iod. Th1sphiloE;Ophy. represents en the abaf;ra.ct
~ide the eumc.d ng up c r t be 6itrus~ le cf' the indi vldU'-l +. 0 3. t tain to self-
cu~sciousneas. It ~e the etruggle whioh the theolo~ian described as the
('I~i ,-t-
1:9.Y tel salv9.tic.n. It 1s the effort expended to ~';.e~t 'oneself in the
greEtt flow of experienoe, it 1s a.n c.ttempt to find til. pl~ce in the world
wh1ch oil1 g1~e identity and 6t~bl1iiy to the individ~l man. The at-
ta.inment of aeln-lcod 1n the domina-r.t att itude of thie pel'ir.;.j can come
enly when the Ld1vid ua.l passes thrcuh the var Lcua sta.ges of purifioa-
tion and Eite h1maelf to B.bSU1Ii6 a. ~lece in the he~.' venly kinsdcm ;;'6
D~' nt e pc et iea.lly exp re saee 11L The g'l'C'N 11",[;' 1mportano e of the ind1 vidual
and the i:. ct that sal-;:.ti:r. =.~ for the ind,1-vidual, is brought out by
the f~ct that 1n Danto the lo~est pl~ce in Hell 1s reserved fvr the
trr., ii, or of both the l":a.ln;B of aea ven and ea r t h , Jud~ e arid Brut.ue and
Cae:. -.1i.u~, tllQ cne til a betrayer of the fc..;:nder of the Church, the cthe re
tlic i\.under of :'he Empire, arc e..pporticnad t be gre~.teet misery.l Eaoh
".: \~. ~.~. L
~lorundn~ de~:Phl10eOPhle d. P. 1896. e.4}). (Erdmpuu)
:~L 1e gUll ty in destroying the rest illg pl~oe of the ind1 v1d"U!:1.1 Without

a home the indlvidu~l is nothing and he who does aught to deDtrcl this
home is gUilty of crimes enormous.

The Nationalistio Period.

The same oonditions of human experience Whioh made for a

striot oentr.ilization and authoritative oontrol cf the soaial sit-

~l uation under the leadersb1p of the Churoh unm~de th~t oiroumetanoe.

We find then that 1n the fourteenth oe~tury the Churoh Bufters a eeriel
I of reverses whioh result in its ultimate d1aaolution. From this time
I on the power of the Ohuroh 1a restrioted more and more and the tsmporal
1 power falls into the hands of the several nations whioh ~evelop ~nd

t grow in power ~nd oontinue their expanding tradition until the present

I day. A great ohange came over the in a very 'brief tiU'1e.
ifa.ce VIII was absolute m~ster of both spiritual a.nd tem~ora.l power and

marohed through Rome with the two swords preoedir~ him. Benedict the
I twelfth replied to the ambassadors of the esoQmmunioate Emperor t
I Louis of Bavaria that if he absolved him the king of France would de-
J pose him. The waning power of the Churoh ma.y he a.1so 838Il in the con-
1 trol of the Roman people in the eeledt10n of Urban the sixth as pope. l
t The three oentur$es after the thirteenth are mnrked with numeroua ineur

reotions and fundamental oritioisms of the Church.
secular powers gave men
the Churoh.
oour~ge to protest against
The gro7th of the

The efforts of the Churoh to compete r.ith the eectuar pow-

Bustained from

., ers for Bupre~Loy robbed it of its other-~orldly charaoter. Many of

the greatest overt material loesee osme to ~be Churoh beoause it was a
J faotor in the variouFI numerous atrugt;lee of ~.he developing eta.tea with
1 each other. There. had c~me into Europe t~e spirit of aelfhood t of per-
J ~~-~~-------------------~----~--~------------~-------------~

1 lnuruy - History of Middle Ages.

t ....
ao~al power and 1ndependenoe. An all embracing unity of ~ ~p1ritual

h.L'''e been the unsettled cc~.diti~n :.hi.oh p:eva,iled. 8trcn~ In,11~idua18

cent est ill&, for power the ;.:!Ots t of t he history ot 't.AeS8 cen'tw,"1sa.
The g61"'iinJ n.;.t iona Vlere at 111 dcvel~;I:. l:"J ; in the fernu, c:' plaat 10
naticnal boundaries whioh ~ere attao~ed ~nd unattached ae ~he personal
fQllowing of an ind17idual prinoe. As a result cf thie condition there
w~s brought abo~t ~ gro~ins e~ns~ cf the import;.nce of the in~~idual;

nne experiences 'A'8::-e 8'ni.luo.ted trClt th3 etandpcir.t ~f the ~r~di";'1c.ual

rathJr than frol!. the ot3.nd'p::.~.nt, of a superimpcaeci aut:J.or1 ty. This per-
iod ~as an a~aken1ng of man t~ ~n appreciation of his worth and exiet-
eucs. It ~a; a period ~ sel!-expressi~n as ocnt~~sted with the immed-
iately ~reoedln~ period of aelf-suppreaicn. In th~ fia~1cnalist10 period

t he rs was a. grC'~dual tre-neformation of the attitude to\,;~rd experience.

A positive a;,oertlen of the L .. div1dual 'Cas exprea"ed in var1~us 'liaya.
in invention, 111 leE.,.rninS, in axt e , Clnd 1n the expansion of commeroe
a.nd industry tD.~the point of voyages of discovery.
So 'far a~ the ocnditions of the Churoh are ccncerned there appear
rn tl,1li t)~J.iod such 1mport::.:..nt event e as the gr'Jat Echism ~,h.1ch teok plaoe
from 1578 on, and the bes1nningo cf tho Relormat1on. As eaxly ~6 1377
Wycliffe ad~ooated mea6urea which would l~ve deprived the r~er~rch1 of
the Church,of all power. nycliffe f,~ntej to fobid all tempor~l posses-
sion to the clergy and to makQ their epirltual power dependent ".!.pon
their good benu vior. Wycliffe went 6:: f;..I' &,s tlJ cri t1c:1ze 'the d.ogma.B
of the Ohurch, denying .traneuDbta.ntiation, neoesEity or o'Jnl'ilUt.'1.tion and ism~r.d. the: value cf a. re11gi(Jus ceremony i~ The English

r~~ ionali ty of Wyolifie mus,; be locked to for the enoouraging element in

~yu11ifala career since the treedor of the 1udividual w~s e~an a~ this

t1ni,; a mo r e o~rt;~:: qUR-IJt1tr in Engl~nd th~n :,n the oN:t1n~r.t. There
it ?;'~~ C".~rried out 1: cr-:;'cslt1cn t c ttl!' s~?tll'H' ,p'j,,:,'gr l.E ,-ell, .:nd the
1neufrect1cna ~$ tboee of' W~t Tyler, for exs.mp1e, J.3.Y be tn.oe;:1 to
thle e curc e , At:3. 3 !.r.~e.':~l&t l:;,t~r rerl::1 th,n~ O.... i71e t!'le l'e'.7clt ~t Huss

'?n:l Jeroc:e, bctb of w~crr. ,ent to ~h" ~t,~~, L 1415. Tbe Refol'u;j.tlon
r: r oper brinZI1J out the ne'i! c~d1 t ions 7101 oll c cnt r a st sh~r::,l j- w1 t'~ the

pO"ler of the Churoh ~no its uI.,d1eputed S<1::;'Y in t h s t'::lrte.ent1. o:;ntury.

The 7ihole e r s, ct Proteat':l.nt19t: -'!dch t.e3in~ :'It t'::1."3 tL:e, ie a n expres-
sion of the 11beratlc\n e,;t the lr:ci1vldu:~1 ani his att.9.1Jlllleat ~r ~ grea.t
degree of oonfidenoe !:> his cvn po,vera 'lnj experience.
Tho politto:l o:'lnd1t1'Jne i~di~'3.te the inoreased 111lpolt~~;ce of the
Ind.i vidu3.l. Gre:~.t er freed em of ~:t ten 'J-ncr ~ht;.u;:ht were obt3.ined by pet-
'.tien or .foroe s.nd 1r. ,geDeral th~ stI',i.1ned :H,j :f'pre; c;;.o:.ltiona
were relieved '~6 the oenturi~ go on. The l;~urpat1~";:f.. cf I-re.1ry IV in
Engla.nd 16 justified 'by th9 f1:tl th~t it 1a for t he p~b11c ';-:;:801. In
England the or~anlzsticn of pQrli~mc~t ~ia ~einS ~erfeoted ~$ the

a spirit of lr.di'11du.'1.11a;n ',';hloh dor.:in:l.te.l the ljclHi:'.l ~i;;!;a B.&d

order. The free'J,:n1 of tl:-e ci tt'?B el:~h as Florence~ Venice, Geao 1. and
P1ea indicate t h e g en e rc.L ~endency ct the tizlle to cb t at n an ~ to 'aln-
tg,1n aut oncny , Within th!:~e citi,!e: t h s atruizl.;s takin.g rl;Loe ':.;'e fur-
ther symptOlr:s of the eaa.e ger;,er;).l ccndf t lone. In :;'r~ I)'Je the ~..a.;,e
atruggle for the 210ertiea 'r.h1c~ ':e::e held neces "<lry '!I': 3 1ndttl~ed, tut
96 'faF. no t th~ C'; ae in En~-l::'.n~ the mcna rch ;:'e~~rne etrc:.z f..:.nd ~Q.'_,~l1ty

we-e the irrsste1' rp.:nlt rather t~"),n the rr:o:.~n .:ief~nit'~ li~:J'3rty. Iil th1e
period we f 1nd the begin:, ini!:'= of a f..~11oaopby of l~.o.t i thi a 1 a an effort
", ..:>
to establI8h wIth more or lean precision what are the basis and the
foundations of the right of individuale and states. There are,found
at work in th1eper10d suoh wrIters &s
M&oh~ve111, Thomas Morre,
Jean Bodln and others.
Bymptom~t1o of the 1noreasing 1~portanoe of the ir.d1vidual ex-
perienoes are the var10us Invsntions and improvements 1n con~eroe and
industry. Thi~ period marks the developmont of sun powde= and th~

printing press, two inventions vrhioh served to bring about the moet rad-
ioa.l ohanges in the 01vi11zat 1(,D of the world. The development or gan-
powder made the:'feuda.l knight an unneo.. . e~ary quantity 1n warfare and
thue raised the valus of the foot soldier. The result of this was tb&t
the king oould diSP~ wTrh the nobles and hhus strengthen the oent~l
power. 1 The development 0 f 1=rinting possible t he wide d~tr1bu
tion of books in the elsteenth pentury. Twenty-four thousand oopies
of one of Erasmus I books wer.::- etruek off bjJ one print ing }:rees in one
yea.r when previously So geed workrnan could produoe but two in the same
time. 2
The moat ohar~cter1stlc expression o! the modeln attitudes tow-
ard e;.;per1enoe is eumned up in the origin and rrrowth of i~ ~~knoWn
E! e hum.q,nism. Humanism which began with 'Detrarch steed for :J. t endenoy

t. whioh above all pointed to a grOWing self-appreoiat1on on the par~ of

the modern man. This was expressed in the genuine de1itht men teok 1n
their own experienoes; they beg&D to take plecsure in lite itself.
In a rrenu1ne way this w~e a return to the pa~n ideals of the JoY of
.. living, and a turning a 1r&.Y frem the ascetioism develcped dl.lr1ng the

-- -----
~Sohevi11 - History of ~odern Europe, 1998, p. 2.
2Hayea Politioal and Sooial History of Mo1ern Europe, p. 180.

,, ..

Christian pe~iod. Humanism in the technical senee meaDt a return to and

i a delight in the literature of antiquity. The Latin and Greek authors
were eagerly sought for and zealously studied. In the authors of the
past they found a re'reshing spring whioh g~ve issue to the l1ving
waters of human life. The writings of the anoients gave the humaniste
a satisfying oooupation. There was no longer prevalent the ideal of
suppression of ~ll human qualities. Humanism gave expression to the
deligb1i of the experienoes of this world, and seemed 1io oppose the
ideals of the Christians Which aimed to deepise the present life. Up
to the 8ixteenth oentury the humaniit10 movement flourished and advanoed
to all European cormtriea of culture, and had among its leading spirits
suoh men as Erasmus, Kore, eolet and many others.
The development of art in this period adds oonsiderable testimony
~o the expansion of the self-feelings in this period. There is every
indication that ma.n baa beoome fairly well established in his surround-
ings and sought to express his individuality and experienoe. At :this
time art atlll represents more a group expresslon, but the subjects be-
came individuali~tio as the period develops. The main them~ is that
of religion, the expre8sion oentering about the Churoh and its offer of
graoe and 88_1vat1oD. The commemoration of the deeds and worths of the
so01al leaders 1s also made tbe subjeot of oon8idera~.le art produotions.
t In the earlier part of the period the free cities of ~alY shone br11-
laintly with the masters of soulpture and painting. ~~b\rt1, Do~ellO,
della Robb1a and Miohelangelo gave expres8lonto the new'po~~r8 tha~
tv '; -,
men felt. In paiting da Vinci and Tit1a~ graoed the oider period while
. '1 I'
l, Rubens and Va.n Dyok ind1cate the spread qt this new
in t~,e latteJ
part of the present period. The devel0P,1Del1t of art~~,~, a progressive
f , ,"
movement away from a mere oopying of th-e anoient s, a\ t epdenoy with whioh

;\ t modem painting 'began. The work of the later .period shows an interest
in and aD effort to del.ibeate an individual subject. The production
of paintings of persoDs, of individuals. begins to oharaoterlze the
, : art ot the later Renaissance. The U'.reet in huma.n figures rather
than l&Dd.eoapes alao indioa1les the genenl teDdenoy that we are d.esori
ins. In philosophioa.l ciroles the new oond! t 10DS brough't out a gener-
al revolt against Ar18~otle andhhie dootr1nes. Aristotle oame to be
oonsidered as the center of the Schola.stic philosoph, whloh was being
more and more oPP08ed. The philosophers hoped to find 1n Plato a bet-

t er expression of the current Viewpoint and in Florenoe a zealoue stud:

of Plato wa.s undertaken. The Florentine aoademy was Dot a purely Plat-
onio 1netitutioD; the men who revived the study of Plato did not know
Plato 90S he real11 was but knew him rather in his pJ,2tl1lntan dres. and
even as 1n the O&S6 of ~he platonio Theology of hOino. Plato was eeen
through Proclue' eyea. Perhppe the, pure Platonio dootrines would have
been DO more aOCfptable to the ph1losophers of the Human1stic period
than that ot Ari8totle. These men Bought tor & doctrine which would
make men free and equaJ. members of a 8IJlgl,e ~n:1. Another Forent 1I1e
who W8.e a.llled to the Platon10 groUp, r10~ de~~o, 8. dBYOtlPd
etudent of the Rel!rew myeUoal .r1Un~, :the ~~bolA" a.ttelllPted to
f1nd a. synthes1s between theee 1i'1'1tlzag'$ and the revl"ed Pl.ato.
f. \

The humanist1. made especial111~1~ter attack. upon the 10g10

. . '\ -',
of Aristotle. Violent a.ttaoks were oent_red
;. : .
upon the. sJ11og1am. They
',.. .
deolared that it was incapa.ble of a.ddIng!'anyth1ng new :to ~owledge.
, .
Valla in partioular. took it upon himself to a.ttaok t~eAr1atotellan
10g10 whioh he 8e~med thorougly fami11arl~+th. The most. charaoteriet-
. I,
I ' . '
10 ark of the period 1e indioa.ted in tMs\type of attaok upon the log1
of Ari8totle~ Tbe period was one of noveltyJ of advino'ement.
'1' ,
10g10 of Arlstotle must have appeared rather 1;. to
them. Vlves and Hlzolius make very speoifl0 attaoks upon the Aristot-
elUn 10g10. Vives deolares tha.t the Ar1sto1l11al'l empb&si8 on unlversal
oonoeptions meant the medla.eval oonoeption of solenc8. 11zo11ue in-
aiet. that only individual t11ngs with their qualities constitute re-
a11ty.l In talla we find a thinker who i8 the highest sense eJPresse.
the longinge at the period for a ~ler and r10her life. It 1s iD
thia sp1rit tha.t valla proola1ms pleaaure to be the tille and 0111)'
g004. 2 ~here beginn1ng to a.ppear marked ohanges 1n the va.luea
wh10hare named a.s determina.tions of exper1enoe. The indiv1dual exper-
ienoea,are" a:"a.1n1ng !Ugher and higher values in the formal d81;e1'mlna.1I.on
of the phi18~her

The temper ot the Nationalistic period is shown aleo 1n the

soeptioal attitudes that are taken toward. exper1enoe. The soeptios of
the Raca1esanoe mean to inslst upon the necessity for studying nature
and the departure frem a dependenoe upon 'the word of authority. Their
world 18 not Tet brought into the fooua of solenoe and they are tht18
Without faith in the powere of human knowledge. The att1tude of the
so.,t10s 1s one of freedom &nd high valuat10n of the ind1v1~1. ~he

determinations of the world is yet despaired of as the tradition of

8olenoe 18 awaiting establishment. sanohez i8 mere the 8o~ptl0 on this
account for he ie a physioian and more in'terested in nature. The pupil
and fr1end of Montagne, CharOn, finds ~oW1edge suff10ient for the
etudy of the lnner life whioh 1s the ~81.\for morals. Knowle~e w1th

respeot to the ethioal oonduct. need not be doubted.

i i

lWlndelband-Tufte - Hietory of Ph110sophy, p. ;60. .

t. 'We,(;\'A~' ~ Geeoh1oh te der Ph1lleoph1 e. 2 B.. B.18; ~o 7 .J
Tbelatter part of the Iat1onalistio period shows man attain1Dg
to an Inoreased independenoe while the earl1er part of the period finda
him merely resiSlng theauthor1ty of the Soholastic tradition. Althoug
in the earlier period there were attempts to replaoe it with attitudes
of their own i' was not until the latter part of the period that the
; .~.
evaluations of experienoe are qUite free and Independent. The oon-
fidenoe that men of the stzteenth oentury put 1nte their own a.bility
and power was not paralleled in htory sinoe man plaoed himself over
~\~ Illl.ture. Ilot only lVae there here a oontempt of the paet but;
a.n 1nsuperable rel1anoe upon the exper1enoes.of the present. The awak-
ined human oOllsoiousness had tried out Ita Winge and finding them _t18"
. -
.. ;,
faotory.was attempting to soar higher and higher 1nto the 1mmensity ot
huma.n thought. There i8 now fermentIng a situation which will lead
soon into the very heart of nature, and there all the 80ientif10 values
of the past will be transva.lua.ted. The o'bj actions to the philosoJ)hioal
s~*enoewill result 1n a development of a new method and a new stImul~

to Investigation. The Belf-oonfidence dIspl&1ed 1n ~hemBelve8 by the

men of t bie period 18 illustrated by the :better with whioh Bl"lIlC &DnOumOE
the Vice Chanoellor of Oxford: UDootor of a more perfeot
of a purer and more blameless philosophy, recognized
and honored in the foremoet aoademies of England, nowhere a foreigner
. t14--\'~ 'to the barVar1an"is the vulga.r~nl

As a ohars.ot erist io of the new philosoph1 we may consider the

naturalistio attitude With whioh the world is vIewed. The oategory
of oause was assuming a greater prominenoe than we.a preViously the oase.
This 18 an advanoe even if th~ final oause 1s God as Doebae thought.
For Bruno God 1s too the formal J effioient and final cause, out th1e
does not detraot from the faot that the determination of the world was
taking on a na:turalie'tic 'bas1 s. Experienoe i8 depended upon to 11eld
Adamson - Development of Modern Ph11oaohv. Vol. I1_ n. 2~ f~
. '" 'ans~ers to the problema of nan, and the problems are questions not to
be found reoorded and answered in the books of the anc1ents. Te18s10
amuee th;lt tS.e re::t8on cannot yield up truth but tha.t it can come only
from the senees. When the senees are relied upon to g1 ve knowledge
there 1s oertainly a progress in the mode of evalU&ti~ experience.
This is an attitude whioh wuet lead direotly to investigation and di8aat
isfaotion with ~ure d~uoticn. ~ele810 a1med to repl~ce the form and
fl ~&,
matter of Aristotle by force and. er. The foroe whieb qU'O't"ed ~on

:} matter was either the principle of hot or oo~d. Telesio felt 4isaat-
,l iefied with an explanation of nature based on some dootrine of the ulti-
mate results. He meant to. give an explanation ira terme of the immediate
workings of nature.

l' The work of Copernicus seemed to bring a.bout a oomplete reversal

t of the old order of things 1~ the world. In effect he altered the entire
I' oourse of human thought with respect to the wo%kin~ of n~ture. To give

I so absolutely different an evalu~ticn to the world'. phenom~ argues

1 tor an independent attitude toward the experienoes whioh a study of

:j nature yields. In the preVious oentury Nioholas of Cuaa felt free

enough to believe in the relativity of all ideas. In many respeots he
may be oonsidered to be the preoursor of the soientific movement of the
Renaissanoe. The sprlt of the new age manifests itself in him in an
I unmiatakeable way. There is seen 1n Copernious a definite re11ance upon
1 the results y1elded by experienoe. The soientist t,fls free to give a
I. serious valuation to the discoveries that biB efforts 1181d. The In-
inqUiries are r~ther free in spite of the ultimate submission ~o a high-
; er authority. In the case of such men aa eopern~oU8 the submission is
owing to the oontinuation of a tradition in the times, as an individual
the emphsis is upon freedom of researoh. DBe who will investigate must


pOIses a .f;r~.e ,mind," was 'a motto that wall represented the 1ndiv1d-
\ULlity tendencies ot the ReDaissanoe. The work ot Copernious indioates
the 010s8nes8 to nsture and faith in its simplicity whioh argues tor
a striking oonf1dence 1n man's abi11ty to question itaad oomprehend 1t
The attitude taken toward the world Is stated In terms ot ezperienoe.
In a senae man Is a mea~aure of reality. The fact was not so clear to
the men of this per1od. They oould not yet use the cs:t egort of exper-
ience in this, they stlll epoke of nature and their reLatiom to 1t.
In Bruno there oomes ~gether. many of the mctiTe8 whioh find
their partioular IIlanifeatat10ns 1n the several att1tuies of Oopernious,
Taleeio and Cusanue. Bruno believes fIrmly in the rea~'1 ty of nature anc'
: ...i. believes firmly in the ll:fe~ that Is, 1n nature. Bature for Bruno was"
single living pusating thIng oontaining within it everything. Bruno
carri ed out the Copern)&D. system and made the great warJ.d-t:\ll
countleaB worlds. eaoh of whloh revolves a.bout a oentr:t~ sun. In this
th~. we find the acutest expression of individualism t~t ~he age
produoed. In his maturer thought :3runo pla.ces a syst8JD. of monads or
individual beings at the oenter of rea11ty. These monads a%e all 1nter-
related and form a whole but the measure of pertect10m is the ehara-otE
;.1' of individuality. The unifioat1on of a.ll the monads 1s the most perfeot
monad and this 1s God, single substanoe whioh moves 1m all things.
. ~ ,
We must observe in Bruno an emphasis upon the external world, upon
.. .

nature, that 1s, upon the underlying unity of the total experienoes.
'.:1;. The aspect of the Rena1ssanoe whioh stressed the individual

by emphas1aing the inner oonsoiousness fln~s express10n in a number

of r-hilsophers. Bruno and Companella oonneoted w1t~ this dootrine
in aome form or other. Companella refers to Augustine n 1n4ioating
that ultimately all truth and all knowledge must be derived trom one'a
own inner oonsoiousness. All knowledge of the world 1s roo'ted in man' 8
knowl~ge of himself. The objeots of nature are kno~vn only in eo far as
they influenoe and change the knowing individual. To kno~ oness1f one
need not undergo change. Knowledge of self would be immedia.t~ and
always but for the faet th~t thH neoessity of knowing external things
makes this self-knowledge pass into a state of subduation.
The national19tic period represents a revol~tion not only in
astronomy but in every dep['\.rtment of thought. The Copernican revolution
is only ,,~sYlllPtom of th~ "h..,.~e in attitude "hioh ha e hksn plaoe 1n
Europe. The signifioant faot is that men'a ~tt1tudes are beco~lmg

reoognized if only in ~n implioit way as their own. The attitudes

toward experienoe are taking human shape. The movement a~~y from God
is slow but as an absolutely dominant influenoe the divine oeingloeea
its ferce. The Nee-Platonism of this period rather maturallzes God
instead of making r e. l1ty all center in the divine and the beyond

.. 5 .mcs.L...... t 0= 6gO! ( .6.. ):._ ,g;;...:~ JW.~~ .. . ".%,&.1, " , iMU.6.St th &5&&;eJ ..
The E~~erience Perlod
------- -----

The results of Huma.nd am considered as a return to thp. lit a:r-

a t ur e and 13.ogu:l~e oi' tile Flst ~;s.s the 1t1or'"":.;.e1n~ i,~'r-ort;>.noe 01 the
iadividua.l. The Importance of the 1nd1viJ..l9.1 ~ve a hieher vSl.lue
to bis experiences. From ~he Humanistio period on there de~elopad

mo~e and mor: comple~e elements of the ~rldio terms of experienoe.

At Z1rst 'tae c~te~:orizata on ot the world takes pl:~ oe with onl y 9.IJ im-
plied indica.tion of the lmport';nce of expe r i enc e , Tr,iu a:ttltl:.':le dev-
elpa and b accme a aelf"-col,acious a.nd there ia t'in~lly tile :ce.:..11~ut ion

th.' r e:.. lit1 1a to 'be f o md only If: the experienoe of human i:.dl""

The history of modern philoElopby is a. recorci of the developing- realiza-

tion th.:;.t the human mind must needs realize th!1t it c.i nnot t rane oend
ita own exper1 ana e. In th e early At"! '::-el:1 t111. e d~!velopl!'1ent III ~!lnt. t!::tt

ai re,.11ty, t.nez-e '.1a.s P.ot s geod. conception d!'vel0:ged of I~b:~t e xc er Ie nc e

ie, Tllia .fi;.C'~ rel.J.~ted in an age lonr, e eo.r cb for re'_'lity. tk:.~ ';. .;.~ emp-
ty 01 i:L'uit:f'ul results. The heglrllling o r the faitll in b'.;m,:..n e xc e .... 1enoe
~~e deve~~pe~, Lcwcver, in tne Natj.~ali~tic p~r1cd. In the p~riod

:.:ollo,.dl:r: tt~is impllci 't f18,~"h in the eype!' lences cf :iTld1 vldlJ.:;.l ~ resUlted
ill the m:;.~~vol.i.oue adva.ncea iii eci ence ':' nd the Sort:; tr.!?- t chs r-sct c r i a e
t~e ceV'enteenth century.
At the Llaale of the nay; &pir1t of ac'ie!ICe "t!-::ich '::3.$ 1nau'~\lra.ted

in the seventeenth century by Gall11et. is the 1mp11o~ticn th~t t~e

rea.lities oftthe world ar e sUbject to 1nt T e a t 1 g , ; . t 1 o n and dis:;overy by the

iI.l.divi:1\.U.l ei .::Olte of indivio.t.3.1 men , It is t n i e faith in t~le L::'s'J. that; ty tra.y be given in t erma of human experienoe wn i c h 11 e s ,:lot i; b~ r oura-
dat ron of the experimental met hod in soience. There is faith :h:l.t 1n-
veetlgat:on will yield genuine facts ~nd their laws and that these
facts and lawa ~ay De ve~if1ed by t~e experiments of the individuals.
From this period Ou ther~ ie a fundamental attitude developed in the his-
tory of thought to the effect that only in experience c~n re~lity be
found. There is a oompleter turning away from the dogmatism of
Soholastio philosophy thZ4n was ever the case before. Even when the
world 1s finally determ~.ned 1:. tern:s of God and th~ other categcrlea of
th~ Scholastic per1ed it ~9 a det~rrr::nat1on that 1e presumably based
upon the results of thought and experienoe. The oharacterlBt~o ohange
1n attitude is t~t there ie more or less oritioism at the foundation
of any partlcul~r determination ef! e~er1enoe. Considering our hypoth-
Beie that philos~hy 1n all perl~~ is the critical determi~tion and

evaluationt of experience, we muet eay of the present period that the

attitudi~atlon function ia becc~ing self-conscious. We will find then
in this peried disoussicns of the problem of knowledge and descrip-
tione of the power and capacd t Lea of the human undeestanding.
The extreme va.lue that 1s pla.oe:! upon human experience 1s in-
dicated in the avidity with which Ilen took to the study ot natural
phenomena. This period 1s one of expreme aotivity and of exceptional
resulte in natural Bcience. In fact all kinds of phenomena was oeing
subjected to the rigid observation and interpretation of sclen~1st8.

The seventeenth oentury 1s a.n age ~f discovery in soience, it marks the

period of foundation of soience as it haa oome to us in its developmant.
The Bc1ence of this peried bofsta of such names as Kepler~ Ga1111e~,
HUyJr1f~, Newton, Harvey, e.nd sooree of others which have uade 1llustr10.
the various sciences.
The fundamental ohE'.roter1atica 0 f the e):peri enc e pe rlod 18 the

emphasis of e~er1ence in a way which . ShO~B a -

of experienoe. There oomes to be developed varicus methode of observing

and interpreting phenomen~. Th~r~ 1s gLe~t aotivity in the investiga-

tion of the h~an ULderet~nd1ng Qnd th~ methode of scienti!io research.
The n ~ed for n- VI methods and Mt;3.nS of 1nt erpret ir~g da.ta be c ome 01 prim-
ary importa.nce 1n t~1 a :eric:d. The strk1ng indi;idua.lism i.1.r,d iJelf-
I "(\I
c~l.denoe of the t~tink~ra ~ itb re:;peot to the forlllula.tlon of I!lethod
I, t s expressed bY' Ba.fn: nUeam~hl1e wh;l.t I h'J.V6 ofter. sa-lel I must here
t' emph&tica.lly repeat: th~.f. if a.ll the v:its orall the a.ges h:id met or

.' r:.....
shall meet .. ~a:ileeophy b:nci t"tre-aotenoee~pl -The thought of the

1: peried is extensively ccctp1ed with the organiza.tion and deter~ina.t1on

~; of attitudes on the experienoe baais. So far as a ;eneral or1e~tat10n

V of the 1a concerned man h;lS come tc the sta';'e in which no

f; aDeolute~homelesS~P0881ble. The aocept~tlcn c1 experlenoe ~a a basi


fi of reality praclades forever the pca:ib1l1ty of absolutely divoroing man

r frow reality.
of reality.
The proble~ now is fic~ to ccordin~ta

In sOp-!e aens e the philosophiO prOblems from now on '.vl11 be

and interpret thefiao

t the investigation of the n~ture of experienoe. AS was g~geeted this

1 oarrie. baok to the ~roblem as to the nat~re of the hur~n underatand~.
I The social and pollti:::a.l conditions 1n Europe fr.m this time on are
t auch ae to make sa.fe and aolld pl~>.oe torthe individual. Civilzation
f';~.' 3.

1n Europe has re~ohed a staSe of solidity ~nd permanenoe suoh as to

f. . ..'
...--..... -........
ke~Afore7er man from being a homeleas wanderer upon the faoe of the
J~.,. ..'
earth. Wh~t ~~n'a ~ttitud~ will be toward his experiences will depend
.~ .

upon more ~pooifio oonditions than w~a tha c~~e in the middle a~ee.

t In the a.~;e of experienoe the 1tudes will depf3nd upon tl16 o~ndl tiona

'I of the partioular nation fo= apao1fio formulation. The nation~ having

f ~.;.~
..... ......
the g1'eJ'wtest freedo:: and eta.bl11ty will be the homes
of the i1me. Frolil hhis time on philosophy in Europe \7111 represent
:J the thinkers

'J ~---------------------- ----------------------------------------------

I;,~ 10f. Works Speeding-Ellie, p. 354, Vol. VIII. Paraeceve.
. ',"
;:..; -'

.. , -
" '
att1tudea much more depender.t upon ns.t i cnal exper i eno e than W~J the case
aince the Gree~ feriod. In ao~crd3nce ~ith our viewpoint we f1~d this
is true of ;t1] activitiea s.nd expression of 2.ttitlJdes. The horae IOf Art
fer ~)".a.rq:le.. fir;d& itself to be th~ Netherlands :: ~ter the Italia.n per-
iod ~~ne3. After the ~at:~~ali~t1c p~r1od Philoscphy shifts to o~her

part S o.l Europe.

The \iev~lopDlent of philosophy in th~ Experience period t~.lces

pl?~ce ir. Fn.nce I the Neth171 La n-Ia , Fn~l:l.nd and later Ger~la.ny just as

the poll t.ic.~ 1 find scola.l h 1 at ory c.f Europe sbift s to these countries.
In the r.ext r"rl'~d Gerr'lsny t3.}c.~s h.~r pl~ce aacn.. g the important na:tlona
c0ntrH1ut to t he intall e ct ua.f history of Europe.
The f~ct 10 o! ~reater importance ~9 the n~tienal life develope
1:ith the evolution cf s'.atee. With the "1.evelopment of stability -s.mong
the v::..ricua at a 'v~9 ~ e -;.ti] 1 find the 3o.tt1 t udea expressed are more per-
g:mal t han in tne ea r l ! e r periods when the llhole group atti tu1e is
expr es sed III the later periods 3o.leo the socls.1 experiences beca.::ne
more oloaely rel~ted i~ the philosophical e~presE1cu than the p&l~tio&l.

The expe r Lencee 'oeccme mort'! 1nt ernal with reference to a pa.rticul~.:r group.
The experiences are the results cf the interrel~tions of individuals
rath~r than the in'erre13t1on of a ~roup with other groups such ~a the

middle ages h~ve shewn ue. With the development of philosophy the
Viewpoints arid attitudes expressed are mo r e spontaneously the ref1.eot10na
of the lndi v1d.ual though the st:btle :nfluenee cf current -;.,ct a and current
thc~ht is never lacking.
The experienoe peried shews a time 1~ Which are developed the
stable politic?l ccnditjene through the stages of absolutism. The
(' II .
nat~cns are mere and more becrming autoncu~e ~nd diveroed frem the a~thor1t} of the political ohurch. The experienoe period

" 1
\ .
is full Cit 1i1l~' warD f(.rtrd~ eata:olish:Dent of ir.ciepen:ient Protests.nt
k1ngdo~a. In the e~yoLteenth century the ~arB ~re atill waged by
CG.tholic k1ngclcl!16 ~~'c- inB~ Protestant kingdoms. Philip the Seoond
atl"i ves to ext 1rlJate t ne Prc.t eetant ism in England ir1 the fins.l years
c! the si.teenth centur7. An i~~crt~t point to be noted 1e th~t while
the bA~e ci religion still 13 the all powerf~l influenoe in politioal
&.flo.1re 1r~ EurcJ:.e, it is a t the &'a::.e t1r.~e ~1. atrictly national ma.tter.

peri (;0. a.ivance& t hc sti:'. . t e ::i.E.p-ect of the 31 tUl1t ion bec omes cf t;re,;. ter
and el'eatCI' ec:prUi.aie. The n3.tiona '.~ere be;i~ninl; the s~ruggles for
th~ right tc ex~nu an~ d~velcp fer themselves. Tbey felt the need for
and sought the :.aterit:l.l 1Ir.}:rovell.ent n..nd cult1vat1cn of their l!2.. I1,i~ and

t pec.ple~ ili 'cayc th':,t epok e

epil'it frem the iet l era c:f oxt ranee vs s.uthc ri t y

elc,;',~ently the i:-.del=endence ~f the human
The relig10ue ,'
t cf tl'.le pe r Lcd mark the cf indiiTidU3.1s to live their l1ves
t a.cco rd Ing to 'the1r 071n .ide::..s. They th:! best eXfrees1(.ns of the

I gro\ViLb ildi viduali ty of "whe I=eriod.

ine10ted upon the prev~le~ce of their
Both Cat'"olice a nd Prot esta.nts
1de~3 to the point of 1ntoler.anee.

[ ;!1th the Pea7e of \':estpha.lia. t he era c f tclerat ion :3et 3 in and

as religicn 6ces the vs.ricus reople3 le::-..rn to tolerate each other.
:30 f~1.r

r ae11g1cn is 3.ftsr t:lia used a s 3. pretext to settle dynaot1c .r';:l.rl'sls.

t tr.r~nl.3h t aeae ic qU:1rrela t In. t t:l e no. p ot Europe assumes
t It 1e \

, ,t

From the seventeenth century en the

Definite powers
turne ~p~n
~re ~ch1eved qy
the stare cf hiatory as governors and diotators

~he varioua
hlatory is one ct
n~tlons. The

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
, <~ ~I
r :.. I
Ii;1' lSobevill - History of Modern Europe, p.159-160.

.. .t
...... ~

.. "
of the destin~s of peoples. The expansion and development of the var-
ious human aotivities falloN the boun1~rie9 laid down by the n~tion&l

ascendancies. In one p e r Lod the Dut'J:1 are 1.:1 t ne 3.3CSi1d:LnJY~ the arts
and Bcienoes. cc~meroe and industry flourish ther~ and then so~e other
naticn exoela in all the ~cti~ltiea of the ti~~. The development ot
philosophy ~111 follow this Bocial and polit1c~1 deyelopme~t, ~ui the
oateGories with whioh experience is determined will be cha.nged a.nd
mod1fi~d aocording to the new oonditions.

The cat s20rlee used in the '\rarloue periods of philosophy sh~w

a modlficatll~n arid develcpm-nt which depend upon the gener:\.l experienoe

of the period. This is\bly illustra.ted by the expe r Lencd period.
In the phl1ospph1 of this perloi which ha s a decidedly na~u1' atral:

Il and tendency, God 1s repl~cetin ~art by the category of

ca.t egoL")' cf substanoe i6 ~ade to serve the f'.mct ion wh~ oh Ln th e p1'8V-
I~.e/vvtl,d ~'I(~ 'J~:+;ltS<.rz{__
ious periods wel'~' (ffl-a---n~-''fom-lro'- ~o.e.hrg--4~~-ed. n'lW
subet~noe. The

I for!!: is more in conforoity with the tendency of the tilte. The att1tuie
j brought out by the modification 1~ the c~te;ory is symptom~tic vf a
1. greater ~egree of control exeroised by ~an over Cod, and in gen~ral it

brings out the closer 1:el5.t iansh! p th9. t ex1 at ed b!tween
1n this period.
men cf thi til pe:d od ,
The attitudes 11::ply the expanding indiViduality of the
The immedi~ te ohang ee Which God ia

;l.'id God

t briug ut in the worl::l r.el'S referre1to the operation of natural law.
J The n'l.turC".1 fQrce& in the70rld T.~=e brought to the degree of determina.-

1 tion aa re tural caue es , The f1:111.1 ca ce es of the Ar1.stotelian and

I' Scbolastio aci~noes were replaoed by n~tur~l causas. Th~re nt~ral

C~Ugee were f~~ally determined 33 the uniformities in n~tu~e diacovered

by tha individual e~eriences of the eC1ent1fioiDvest1gat1~n. The wotld
of phenomena was reauced to ~ aeries of 0r1er17 happenings dictated by
th9 mechanf oa.L laws "..h ic h gO'lerned the universe. The pla.ce of God 1n

~:s .,.telll bee",,,,... pro;'lem anc ""u 110 lOliger the prlD1ll.ry and
!unda...ent ~l assuwpt len vf all attl tudes t o71ard exper Lenc e ,
The new experi encee 0 f the p~r1 0 d. b.:ct1ught a ocu; ne. m=1,YEl of

de~erminin~ and eval~att~theee experiences. The ~ettled cCfidltfons

of a nat i on bring a.bout gle':'.t er exp res e Lon 01: a.~~t i t udea to.:ard the con-

l1itlona and theee exp r ee e t ons wIll answer to the n ew ccndltiof1s. The
gradual mudifioa~ioa 1n the w~y of eT~l~~tin~ experience ia due to the
modifioation in experienoe. The fact th~t God r-radually comeS to be
tr:..l.nsformed into sUbsta.noe 1nd1o~tes eo ne,'I mode c f interl:JI"eting exper-
Lenee , The !it:rio::i now d1sC'.lseion 1s a. p8!r1od ot the i nc ree.eed

at~bi11ty of individual nations. men fin1 themselves we~l orieated in

the grolJps in wl"ich they are pla.ced. TrJe 'rlorld e eeme to t sk e on 6.

rirmnees and a solidity. In t.'1is period. then I!:e find the l'iOxld deter-
mined a~ a dai1nite working cf lunua~ent~l laws. The ~eLtod of these
J:!termiu.atluna in this pe ra cd become that Q'f ma.thematioe lnete'l.d of
dialectio. In tili a change 0 f method Vie i'Lnd an exp r eaa1'..en of the

g,re:.t ttr eWl-haai ~ that iil pl';\. ced. upon th e process of 9X,!J~l' lance. In the

dia.lect iQal u:et hod de duc t t ana a re rca-de i'rom a.i~r i sa uf premiti eo .'lilich
1a the ~'ll1al analya1a3.xe accepted upon autnority. 'I'h e lJ:et:lud. ci

"~thewatloe i8 an acivanoe on t. is in ao i~r ~~ th~ cri~1nal 9remiees

are fl'eiHuned to 'i)e derived fro;l'~ e cn e element Ln experl~n.ce. T.1e lath-
eaa. tica.l at:ltemeut ie preaumed tc yield a. l3.'R Nhicll expr eae e e the p.\rtio-

1.\i.a.1' cccur rences , In the n er aolidiflo'3.tic:n and p e reanenoy .;! n,.",tions

au.y be iOU!ld t he ca us e s or at cc ca e i ona for the ne.7 systematio
determination of the Torld. The gre~t philosophical systems or ~~iB period
are brougnt ~bo~t by the ayetem~t1z1ng of hwnan exp~r1ence ~n vue form
of cell'mon aiDie and common a c t I c na of uait Mtlons. T;-10 ::a.riations in
these syatems are due in a. definite \ltfay to the partlcul?.r turns -tha.t the
national experienoes bring a.bout.
110t 'ire tr.e cat.agorier.' of philosophy ar..d the specia.l scienoes
n1od1.f'1ed and v:1ried to meet the needs of the new expe rLeno ee bnt new oat-
egor1e9 co~e into U9~ to give evaluation to the phenomena of experience.
In the eeventeenth century the c~te:~:or1ea which made the meat elllpba.tio
sh~~1ng were those ~f nature ~nd of law. There 1a a characterization
of la" as n~itural; religion even wa" ohar:,;.oterized a s natnral a.s
revelation. All phenomena were red~oed to law, the reign of 1&~ became
the dominant oh3.1''?oted.st10 ot the J:eriod. The oatsgory of la.w wa.s the
Bupreme '! applied to the el ement s and 'J~ndit1c:1a e,f UXl.=-er1enoe. The
t ca.tetor1zat
.... ion of th~ world in tern,e of substanoe, e , :not1~,

law bring out the inoreu.eed. 1mpcrt6..noe which t~1's lJentury gj vas to the

experienoea cf the io.11 iT1dlN'1.1. ~hen the 1 :-:di vidual firJda himself fairly
enaojnsed i~ hie surroundjn~a he may begin to make definite determination
of those surroundings. The 8001ri.l and. politicnl ccnd1t1:):-.a of Europe
at this p.grl od V'1e~~e ripe for a. 8trong oonfidence 1:i one t a own exper-
1 1ence. The 7:orld is interpreted then in terms of experienoe a rad not in
~ terms of ,\ supe rmundcne Bxi!Jtencs der1 ved 'by a subject iva ae:'iroh vI
I the ;.r.cU.v1dual conecf cusneae ,
Tr.e na t ions cent ri but ing to the development of philosophy 1n
the seventeenth oentury were Fr;tnce, England and t:-Je Netherlande. In

, these ccuntr~ea ~~ffie degre~

In these countries the

of solidity nas
~dj'Uetment of the

in~i1..r1 dns.La
by the people.
to the SOClial group
f :-:'"l,S fi.1rly ;7ell eat~b11ahed. T:)e time ":Vaa ripe for SC~Tle eX'Presa1on of
the att1tuds& cf the thinkers to::ard exper i enc e , The peried nor under
d1ac~aalon is ~u~ in ~~lch the freedo~ of the ind17idu~1 has ~ecome so
tar a f~ot ~a to permit a deCin1te att!tude tQward experienoe. The faot
th3.t tl!E: L,d 171d.u~la were s3f'ely besto-aed ",-;1 thin. the group waa the

occasion for a n~turali~tio determinate philosophy r.hich was developed c

. f

To take Hobbs, DeeO:=.Ll't ee a nd Sp1Doz~~a ~x3,mpl '38 oi t nj nk era vi r-,aoh
:;)f t nes e l1~t:ons we find reflect\J tli~~ spirit of the -:tre with
a. mech:..nio?.l Vie?1~'oL:t conc e rrn n; na t ur e , J..... e.vch of thBae philosophers

we find the ;rr..dual re:ietermins. I , l o n of exp~rience w1th v:;luee different

frc~ those of the Soholastio ph11~eophy. The new attjtude tow~rd exper-
ien~~ ia pla1uly riaible !~ e~~~ ~i ~h~~$ pnj~o~0phAr&. In Ho1~9 we
find So eygtem b';.sed upon the l'unno.ment',l o~t'?e(1ry cf motion. For " Hob~s ~
the determinatior.. of exp er-Leno e ms.y :1egin x"1th th". t"'lte,:ory of motion.
D~!;3oa.1s taught th~t the clearest irle:~9 were thoBe of extension, ciiv-
iai011j ty and motli ty. In adding thought to these t'undamen tl.l 03.t eg-
ories we see hOlV Deo:"l.rtea i e a.tte!J;pt1'.~ to r econo i Le the n~-:I spirit of
eoienee and natu~e with the older Chr19ti~n tr~dtticn. The f~ct of the
Cartesian dual world 1e an el~quent w1tneaa to the atte~p~ to ovtroome
the older suoject17p jeteru.inat1on of expe~1encc by the ne"er T~luea

of rig1d meobani~al science. ~ith Spinoza theTe is aleo built up an

objective lL80hanical system with "the fund:lmentll c'l.tegcr1ee of s'~betanoe

~ttr1bute and ~de.

~n?liah ~r.11oaophy :-l3.ry ita ll"(j:j ~rn -,)ea-in.,ln;;:a un .ter 'the f~l".,or-

~ole 1nfluencea of th~ Tudor rUlers. The 3r~~in~ independenoe of the

English is f9.vor:lbly i~di'::l.ted '.1y "th~.t'reedc atL.(l~ned frol'lJ th.~ fetters
of t n e dOlt'l.n Cnurch. Under these mona rene E~!lan1 l;)~uJ:i3d ':-. aense of

streng~h 'lni unity of th2' kingdo1: which :r'l.l1e fnr ';1. da"elopm~nt 0: li~-

erty and power a.monz the peC\ple. By the t of 711za~":th'9 r31In
En31and 'lra.a oe:innin3 to et,'lnd '18 the J:roteotor of .PL"ot~et~nt19mj tias
t ae Ep1acop~1 and Pre~'byterl;ln cnurone s '?ei."e firn:ly eat\oliehed . T!l9
rraonir.9.t 1. one of Philip andl1i ~ ,\ rmada orvuzllt ab; t a sIJ1 ri ~ e i unlfica.-
tion cf national sentiment and doorre1 ths Catho11c1ew ~f En~land.l

--- - - - - - ---
... llHr1.. / i;' 'f.'
lSchev111, History of Modern England. p. 97.
, . )

... ,

art {; f. nd til e eci eno e s 1'10 1: 1 iell~u. ::.nd Lhe E;11z~oeLn:.dl per icd lLlf;j,y iJe
Tne E1J zabethan

, . Il~ scienoe this t:cri(".d {l;~do eQ:.. e rell':.S.rL~ble e.dvano e s , the "lork

of n?per in T.;c; t h ema t ica ~.ud Hs 1rey in Ut:! eli oine wLile pUbli er~ed. a.fter

i'l~. In e;ena:.:;:.l the pJrl(l.i .:i:;~il cr.e ci ~:al1d.ence if: the 11~,:!:~.f; i. l:.ii l dual

tile 1nne.c et\..;ellce 01'1.11 '''JC11erienoe. The method o f B.:toQJl '!H.~3 no f a ~an

um e induct iva k'let~l:id in t na t r e ','ia.B not lef.t room for a. lawil1l1ch
',';oul,- be an :: betrt.ot f:'crr!;i,;'la t t cn cf the v~.r1ous phenomena , In B300n I ~

c.et1:cd t c e 2.' v; ~f ~hoen~' ens 16 . . ot ~rr1ved 3.t by an experiment,.. l de-

tex1tlin.:.tior: c-! pc1.rticnl:.n" ~her-om':?na. Bt;.oo;~ Ulustratas trl1/'iire:otion
cf de"T(:~:i.cprr;f"nt I) f node rn 6 c1 enc e , There i9 no essent 1a.1 dep':~rt ur e
frer:. the Rei ent iile ;:r.~1; ,"lod cf Ar1 etotle, in f=:.ot one mi.5'ht l.ook upon
Baoon's soience ~e a reno?ation of Ari3totle'~
It scientifio method.
c' ,':" .J-; I '. " (l {I
IdE'ht ~e sa~.d th'?t B~c~)c ecr:::p~(~, ~m.y the ~c~lol!'H:t1c vaz.1.:.rt!3n fr'JI'! the

tct1e 1a ttl.:lt. 1iH~ fOrJ"l18r s'tres(\ed the type fro~:; the beg1n!:1ngo cf !'.11 1n-
vect if.,atio!: whiJ.e Baco n i'trea ~d th~ mcd e c,! r~ching it. The universal
or t}'pe for B~':,C':'11 \'1:;\:1' :uo t .... 6 1 i ttl eo 3, p roducf of e n ex:,er1ment:-!.1 pro-
cedur e ad it '!::'i'. r<:r .Arl~totla. 13~ccn'a im?<r1rt!lllllee lie:: muoh moc e in
hie iI~tnntion t.h!.\n in 1118 pr('lduct1on. He ";';9-9 cert~i:~ th':.t t n e 7~1'l.1es

l;iven expe r i eno e Ve:"i.i r.ut tn 1.3 v".lue::-., he felt the need for a compk et e
raint erpr~ta.tLon r.f the '.~orl~. uf eXl".o?r1enoe. Baccn , hO'Rever, W:1.a not

hi.r;eelf cf a.ppreo1~t1n' the fa.ct th:-.t 1:1 order 1;0 properly
e~rn.l u1.te e xp er Lenc e one ,'j.. l:;st r:underst.and th:1. t i t is ezper1ence I, ha.t must

'oe eV3.1U'~ted. It W.3,3 fi::r t'>1ia re~BO:"'. tha.t B:~ocn sought his fr:\rllla and
:.t 7W.~ f :.r t~.1a re',s:~' that B:).~.:n.i. der:reoate:3 the ~3.tegor19s us ed in
logic ~n1 Physio9 and usee ~orae ones hims~lf. ~ Quote~r1sma

X.1LJ.\u d .XVI '~~m- ~saAUm.ttl. .. While ind.ul:;ing in th13 'N~olesale

oan-ie:rnatio:l of ~hp. cat egc r i ee us ed by others Becon apeks of "a.ppetite'
and adesire' . .~f t hi I1gS, 0.( eppet it es whioh "a1m ata pr1 vat e g:>odlt and
ltap;-etlte:Jr;.,.l:h aim :.It e. e pt.'blio good," of"bodiea dell~htlng' in na-
ture of s~iritsn~hen he ;l.C" foroe. 2 B3.ccn's ph11os:-,p!ly indi:a.tes a.

ttovum 0 rEJ~num., 'I,~ t 0" .,,0_
....., j ."
' . .J \/".''J' "'.' r -';I-t!-,
!\'I\ I I I

2 Se t h - En;11sh Philosophy and Schools of Philosophy, 1912, p.47.


promise of a definite philosophical tradition, but which haa not yet

. ~, be en fUlly es~e.bl13hed. 3::.~o~ is ]lot ':4 syat. em.:'.t io :~hiloaopher" there

: 1::J n., oI"d!.rly !'~l"~:l':l1'~~i':~ 'oJf 1!'.:~teTln.l~ in his i-9ritings. This point
if:J e.~i;>l.l.),alaod i~-. hiJ 3'~:i1 ng t h" t h"!' tak sa~ll ~'lo':'Vledg'efor his p:.; 'iV-

He 3ta~i~ ~t ~he ~~~y ent~~nce to t~e ~odern per1ed and it

i~ i!:f,alai'Jle ta~t th~_~ ~houl.j b e yet a soientifio f~eld 11th defin-
itely :ld-r~ai b:::md'J.rle3. Ba.c~'l!'1 ~resa~es e. defillite type of philosophy
jUs:" ;;;'11 tt3 po11-:ic:.:.l o~m:i:.t:.U:1a of hie tin:p.i3 ~tbe form:Lt1ve psriod

The ~e::'1~:::l 01 the s event eent h oe:1.tury llJ:ay be taken to be tb~ i[~ h-..:.nar. :::t;v~lcpJr.e::t I:. '~1~ic~'j th,~ ' S'll'i='t was made to bEing a.bout

Et~nl~ :'~rmon1cus rel~ t! =,r~a!~lp betTeen the m

'Ta 1 'P.orld~ the -:vorld
exL:j't il~G ~ndependent ly of the ~ r.d1 vidual s and the indi vidu< There
t.; hd.ii ccc.e the ge::er':'tl r ec 11z~ tiGrJ th~t the wcr ld 1e Bomehow 1nt 1121 a tel y
cc t e. :-\'Ht buzr.:.:.n exp er i en ce , T~ia fE,ct 19 brc:,-ght out in tt.e Car-

f ~ian I cCei j t 0
anc e ci: ex i e t ence ,
~:ge s.~. The f:1,::t cf
Thousht is t h s e eccn d of
tholl~ht o~ rriea a t (nee an aSB11r-
t~o oba.ra,~ter1etlca, the
ether i,.oeir.~ e;;;tenalon) .ihi~h are eseent1~1 coaponent e of extl?rna,l things.

This e:.rlr J..r.d 1r.:i:I:l t ....r e e.t ;
en :.. .~ ..tur:;.lhlt10 b'lsie

t'j bring togetl::.el' man and the un1 vex-so

'bring9 out the etI"llg~le of the thinker

cI ~ha peri:1 t: overc~xe th~ attlt~de of :he past. Ged is till needed
t c au;::crt th~ rel,"1ticnsh1p ~ro~~ght out, b-..:t 'he is brou$ht 1n only when
11e is i!eeded a nd ne is ncr needed?. t every point. Hobbs brings out
~his bel~el'.\.l :.ttitu;]e ir. th.?t ioi: h1Jr. man is a. body an:ong others whioh
e.r e BUbjcot tc the e t e rnel laws cf motion. Tl".e cc nnect t on bet?ieen sa.n
and the u.f.iveloae fur Hobbs is i\:t"c,,ic\ed for by an absolute, mech3.nlsism.
Lver:rwllin~-; ,hI.: or. ~:~:i. st s n~blfjt btl ccrpor eaI or it is not. God ig ex-

cl~ded fr.<.' t~:.:::- system ae t!l~ onJy tilinE" ;vhicr. is not body and thus 1s
not an oDjeot ior ph11oaoph7.
With Spirloza 'he rela.til.illships 0. man a.nd na t ur e io Drought
out by 3.0 identitt whioh bring3 the triO t t;>get her The rel;:;.l. ien is that
ot a ~riole an~ part of a large w~chan1e~. ~n is ~ partio~Qr oomplex
cc~p6eed ot varicus Dodas of a single sUbstanoo, all of whioh is real-
ity. Tbe general cbar;oter1atio of all tilese at'titudes is that eaen
1s dowinated b7 the preT~lent nature of meohanis~. Th~ entire thought
oi this perivd 1& dcminated by a. meohanioal conc ept Lcn , 'ril1~ cCIloep-
tior. ci: a 'Rcrld whioh 1s pux'ely Ul.eobanioal a.lld governed by ~bsoiuta

n1tureal l~Rs r~led every scienoe and every dep~rt~ent of thougnt. The
ccnoept1cn ol meohaniam grew out ot the iffort= of ~an to aocount for
his exper1encea u~on ~n natuzali&tic basis. The 'ne gc~l th~t the
" amll1tiona of tbe time dictated 'ciait tha~ ci gettins; a.way fr<.om CCilltrol am
domin;i,t1on of external autbority. In :uature iit wa s brcught about that
God became transla.ted into n~tura.l law. In philoecphy (,i<';;C, ".;>~cal!,e con-

ce! veci oi' 3.0 eube tanc e , T !8 pe~'lcQ saw l.he birt
c i DeisLU1whioh re-

p~'e6ents t.he mechanical att,1tu6.e brclI.'.e;ut iuto 'n~eclo~y. ":;--CCll God. oould
not be brought in u.s So part of the preoast:. he at ocd ~\;.tsid.e and gave
dlr~oticn& to 'the gi~nt meohau1am ot a. llLl:L';arae. In th~ sc~l;;..l and
~"litical 'l:orld thaxe is l'C\uoj th~ a.tt1 t ...,J.",a of 1.11:' mecn~J1io;.:.J. ~vrt ran-
i t: est ed ~"S uae struggle 1'01' i:. baoluti&m. 'J'ne apeoiflc ':;(z;:..llS U i o-reroolt-
in~ ;he aut ncr it r ot: home and aUPi:.l.a.nt lIlt; line !eu.ul 13ya:; Ci., in. Zllrope~

f ,':",,8 by vne riee \.if an a.baolut e mouQ.rch Iiu.O Gould iS17e ione 1130: ion a.

f unity and an autonoItiy.

l'c~: irlJ~ lli';'i.Ul
When tills condition 1s cno e ach i eved uue struggle.
1i uext ies are oegun anj toe BtrC/aetna. t is ..:. t .til.'"t laid
in l.lenta minds upcn thd government. a.t; na t i cn 10 la.ter pUl; u'p,:m. c ne people
aliJ the ocn8~itueilta .of sooiety. ':!11erJ wen are l' united in u, group
'r.nich l~aa a.t-.:.ained auuonoa y 'tlllJ i~c, ot" inc .... usa or, or e xc n;s iou .t'.(om thi8

lAttr1buted to Herbert 11582-1648).

, I(

Thought bedomes involved in the free development of one's powers and

processes. Tae oor~espcnd1ng type~ of thou~ht to t~ese situations
r~nge$ from the reoognition of r~al1ty as a ~roduct or co~relate of
experienoe tc the cons ideration of the nature :l.nd ul t1;n3.te va.l~le of ex-
As was eU;o8sted previously there are develope1 in t~de period
several modiflcat1cns of this mechanioal o~no~tlon. The philosophy
of Deoarte3~ Hobbs ~nd Spinoz~ differ in their formu1~tion ot th1e
. ,~
meohanioal ocnoe?tion. In eX~~1n!lng a little oloser the ~peol:io en-
vironments in whioh these philosophica.l syat ema are forrnul:l ted, aome
su~gestiona.for th! 11fferenoes oome out. Bobbed phjlosophy is cerived
from a SOil i~ which the absolutistic struggle ia havin~ full away. The
wsr bet'Kesn the people and the monnroh W:lS a. ~at";er whio:': teoR e. La rge
p12.ce in the expert enoe of Hob:,es and his t 1me. Th e !~ot cf t hi a con-
fleet m~de a deep impression in En~land for there the ~overnm~nt had
beccu e Oilite st~ble undar t he T'.ld~rB and jn th e time of Hobbes the
strWtgle for individual 11 bert 1" and freedom waa beccrtr.. g acut e. In
Descarte we find an imperfeot formula.ti-:n of the ;T:ech~H.1o'1.1 .::hl1osophy.
De9C~trtee slww6 the 'Jleft that seems to divide hiD' in hie efforts to ut a oompl.Jt e mechanical sta.t ement DeSC3. rt ea 1 e an i nd1-ridual

wl~l wa.s an ccn et ant liucceesit"e conta.ct with eeveral tradlticr.FJ. As a.
Frenchr.'.3.n Descartes w(":'.:li s..t this tiC'le be mere closely ccnne ct et rith
the elder Scholastic tradition tht'_n elthe:: Hobbes or Spinoza.. Ti':e insle-
tence upon a mecharit ce.I l=hllos~phy of nat .U08 1s tr~~ceable to "\. ccnt s.ct
wi th' an invironment whioh.was ccmmcn to the other phlloso'Ph~rs '.\Ie con-
sider ... ith Deac~rtee. Deecaz-t e s did not then deny entire fr'3erlo'" of
will as did Hobbes and Sp1noza . The attltuie of Deecartee to God is
al Be a dif ferent one t.ho.n 1 s the ea ee w1th the other two think er.a
In the timeof Descartes Fr~noe was not yet the acsolute monarohy whioh
it beoame under Louis XIV. In this pe~1od the Netherlands Were great

f~etors 1n the o1vil1za~on of Europe. There the Protestant nation was

I a strong an flourishing unity. The pra~iling attitude was that of a

strict u,l! ty of all tae people in the single unified nation. 'rna lISOhal-

I leal viewpoint could find very fertile ground in the Netherlands. ~ith

f:- Sp1noza as was not the caae with Desoa.rtes it was possible to make a oom-
plete harmoniz~tion bet~een the inner and outer worlds. Experienoe was

~. ~ore oompletely subjeot to intorpretatlon and it was g~ve~ ita v~lues

The period now being disoussed was one 1n whioh the old cate-
r gories with which experienoe ~s evaluated bad to be revised ~nd they
f took on a new meaning. The present period 1s in a way a transition
period. It presa~ea the oo~ing of a time when the categories with whioh
~ the experienoe will be determined, will be reoognized as haVing been
! cd~"
I derived from experienoe. ~D iaepreeent there is a great emphasia upon
the determination of the world with oategories that very clearly derive
their otigin frem experienoe, but as yet the oonneotion between the
oate~ories and experienoe is not very explioit. The harmony th~t ls
oeing brought about between the world of nature and the inner f~otor8

of experienoe 1s not made olear to the thinker. It is for this reason

that the strictly meohanioal Viewpoints hold sway among the think ere
of the period. This stressing of the meohanical ocnceptlon shout; itself
in the determination of man as well a~ of nature. We thua find Hobbes,
and Splnoza a.ll atteli.pting to formulate r1gid laws for the

emotions of man.

.:,T.:::h::;8--:::H;=:um=an=1,:.s..:,t,:.1c.......P:..e:;;r iQ.5!~

This p~riod marks the begln~lr~s of the &scenianoy of the

hum~n experi encea a.s a. bJ..sls for the interpretation of re~411 ty.

In d.ct~.11 tM.a atti tude the form in v/hich philoG':Jpher9

stress the iurportance of the buman uniersta.n1ing in the kno'~leige

cf r e ':.11ty.
In the naturaliatlc ps .lod the satiaf~ctory crientaticns of
the thinkers in the ~orld of experienoe is lndio~tei by a ze~~ous

1 n,luatrJ. in the B tudy of natta"e. The a.otual experiences in t ne form

of ~o1entlfio d~ta are investigated ~d bro~~ht into determln~tlon.

With the greo:a...tsr develo-pmen't of the peracna11st1c a. ttl t ude tl"J.e prob-
lern of th~ ca)ac1ty o~ th~ human mind to kn(w re~11~y is brvU;ht
cut. Th~':' ~ 10 a ccnat arr; in the f'ac-:.cra invo::'ving :;j-.e

~w;arene!'1~ i)f ~:mels atti.tude tonarda exper i ence ,

Wi th Lecke -the consct ouene ss of making an eV3.1uaticn of ex-
pe:::ienc'3 co.sen out in the strict determin.ltion of I!Tr~t can and wha.t
oam.ct be tha ooj act of human inveet1;ati cn , Lccke at ;emf t,3 ~o

":V~,Li2~te reality frc,:: this at andpo m t , 'l'here is the a.p!'eci!:~t1on

that obj ec r s s,nj events mUl;lt be eva.lua:ted 30$ '::1 th!!". the I'e:..l!:~ f')f

rr~~tical ex?er1enoe.
Leibniz Rtres-es the r/..:lation of re~lity to the kno':iled;e process
in mak . ng obj ecta conei :.t o~ the cla::iflcation of 1:1e'1.8. 'l'ne im:t:lied
ide~ tha~ the experience of the injividual 1s important in ieterm1n-
inrr ref.q.i ty is found alBO in the eJtphaaia pl:lced up en the mini in
the aoqu1 ai tion of knowledge. The ex tr eme 1ndi vid.u.~1131:' (l: Leibniz I

position 1s illustrated by the monad1sm which 1s the ceatral theme of

his enttre thought.
Both Locke and Lelbnlz refleot a 8001al experlenoe in whioh
after the group entity is beoome more or less stable the individual
membsra begin to acquire s-::me importanoe. In each thinker the speo-
ifio facts of the env1roning experienoe induces a d1ffer9nt formula-
InJt1tlsh thought the 1ncre~s1ng value of the individual
finis expresslonln the idea that reality o~n be found only 1n the
ccnsc i oua at~~tes t f the ind1 vidual. There i. lD this type of attitude
the obv1oUB impllc~t1on th~t rGa11ty 1s very olosely oonneoted ~ith

experienoe although experienoe is entirely m1g1nterpreted. This

position is worked out by B~rkeiy. and Hume~ each in a w~y ~hioh brings
out definite 900ial ocn11tions and ohan~es.

Kant arriv4a at a self-conscious attitude toward experience.

t.I~'. He ia clea.r on the point that ty consiAte of determinations of
experienoe arrived at by the jUiging procsAses of a thinker. Kant
expr eaaae in an exoellent tOlay S. oon.:i1tion of 8001al exper t ence wh1ch
place~ grea.t atore by the freedom of ind,i viduals who are, bo~!ever.

strongly bound by
objeotions 'lio
the 'l'~ho13 of whioh each 1s a m9r.!ber.
In Kant thi3 exhi'bl te 1teel! in the turn hi a ph1losophy tal~ea bee'louse
of his anxiety to avoid a sllojective idealism.
The successors f)f Kant brought ,vhat tbey termed nn orgu1i.zation
into t~a dootrine of oategories. They made the oate~orles incluie
more th~n j1d Kant. They made their categoriao objective indicating tbB
1dentl ty be tween the th()ught or knowledge of objects and the objedt8
themselves. This attitude
S begins
,- the German idealistic tradition. On
the sl~e of the eventw ~hlch this attitude parallels we fin1 an extreme
need for a unifioation of the aocial group to bring about a des1red end.
The union of all events and peraona in one &baolute is an attitude
t: hich mirror,:) tile unification of alJ. 1t a ind1viiual members to re-
build ;:\n:1. regenerate :~he German empire.

Jot .~
The Persona~iatio Period

The development of pe~eona11ty ~nd indiv~u~l freedom ~re-

;res"ed in Europe in lr.:ite:'.l~te continuity with themes sr:~. dev-

ecpment of nation~1 autono~y. The Sta.tes of Eurc_oe o,,:me into being
(('l't. ,,hJ J..r,~.,,_
J , . . . , . ""~..

~th the olv11iz.a~ion of ~ower in the hands of the kin!s. 'rhe freedom
fro!!' the church came about by the etren!.th3.oqul:red by the gre9.t lead-
ers in their vwr. ccunt r f e s , The antonomy of En~la.nj and of the Ne~h-

erlatl~l? came ?c:,ut throug~ the :-8s1 wtanoe of the T'.\1.ora~n.l the
Pri~ce9 of Ora~ge, ag~in?t th~ Spanish Philip who wa~ alJied ~ith
the POr9 ani cC'!,p.i tllted the mill t!\n~ y:q,rt of the chur cn , T,
Fr3.noe eBtg.b11~hed
1\ i.t9 aecen tency
" under Louie XIV to the uttC3r des-
~~o1lati'!" of S;ain. The 9t~b11ity of the government ~stah11Bhej)the

ris~ 3111 1evelC'r.m~!1t of COn":!'eroe ~nj intmstry a.fJ~ured,tne b9~1n::::'nga

of in,ih'1dual liberty =ln1- :::regres o have their Lnce c t t on , The crm-

1itlcns become ripe for th~ ~~rreA~ion of ~tt\tudeR ~n1 fe31ings 1n
tt.g Arts a.nd the 3c1enoefl. - The expe-:..-1enceA beoome jnaor:~ors.tej in
ey}'reqaed fornmlat1cns of1 philoaopb1c3.1 n9.ture. Tbe history of .
'.: ph1109Cphy tT~i18 aa.c098 Europe in tr.e same paths a3 the sooial and
,- N-r~~l",l
r-olit1c~1 events. A reoi~l 'eitu~tion which g1vea freedom s~d eeour1ty
t o the i nil vidu.a.l i B paralleled by 'l. phi1.oaophy t"hlc;- is more nearly
the e xpr eae i on of the inrt1vldual'e experienoe than is the case ',o;ith

~. the l'hilosophy whioh par'!.11els !! p~r10d of aubor1in~tion of ~b'3 ;:eople.

f~ The atti tud.e~ to'~'ard

'~I t:t~~_t
exper t ence become more cri tioA.l -::1 th the st.l.~.1a.rd-

i~e.ticr. of th~ rielaT ccnd1tton3 Dnt11 finally the f~ct tt~t tha
l),tt1 tudee o r e f ....m ot 1-':'!'a of the 80c1 ~1 c~nji t lone oomes t.o ccnacious-
1.:.)_-. '

In the Pe-rs.onaJ1et10 pe1:'io1 we h3ve the oate~orie~ of philo-

sophy taking on a partioularly human oharaoter1stio.

The method of

dete.xtin1ng tne.'!orl':: indioa-tea ..he impor~ant pl'\ce of lina in-
ilvldual in experienoe. In the British tr~dit1ona we find the
S";1'e88 1 aid up en the human under s t andfng , The proble::. of tho r: .J.G:'

in the presenT. pt31'iod. reduces i teelf !bItS t he queation of i'1!u.t C3.!.:.

'"he h~n rr.ln.i a.~ t~i n tc in ths ',uy of kncwLedga , We ma.y oO:l=liier
Looke as an exampla of a. tl1irJter 'I'lr.o b:r1:l 5athe oategories back -;c
the in~er nature of ~an. Locke 16 mak1n~ an attempt to br1n& back the
~orli to t~s experienoes of the hUili~ individuals. Iu is 1~ ~~i3

str~i~ th~t Looke makes the keynota of hie philosophical a~tituie the
practical raaulto of his atudy. Looke 16 aald. to be t~s fi~at e~iete-

is well jUlJ';.1fi~ii i i -se t'lke i t t o

tl:~ t he r a i aes a knowLe dge pr o1::1em ":Jy"a.y of or. ingini; out '.. r.e I:l:::.ce
of theex1-erience1n,~ L",.:l1v1dtU.l in the ;iet'9rr;~inatior~ of the .orli.
J..Iock.a, it glust be un.rer auocd , does no t cl~~~rly recognize the fI'cblem
::13 is f;s.c1ng. Locke re~=9ae;:~? :3. ';:~n!31t1on peried, a turn1!l:: ,
in the tevelopmen: of p:~11oaop~1c~1 attit' Looke 16 :e:'gl' b-aginca
ning te,'l.te ,'l. line 0::' ;;hiloacr;hioj.l ~h:nTelopment. ~~re n.igh.;, S~J-

t~~t it is true of Locke ~B of ~~~ t~J philosoph~r5 of the ~eri0i

t.a~ t~:.eric rot make? 6:ivisfactorr a:'lalyai~ of :in :.. t ax{;arience is.
Locke t aen ex..: re,;ae 6 a ~~end.ency cr hi a age ";0 give ar. irl',pOl'tanca co
t ... s 1-
. :;it.~."1~,~_,.-.L.
'~- v ... _ _ I';';; ... ~-
t"! LOO":I'8''''
A'" ti-"
4:i~ -I,,~.~-
.. --
.Io~:;:.1 c r Oi,:e r'",,~:
:- .::.;1.,'; c,:;.r::-

s1ierei for th~ firs": tiro.e a.o~t:: 0: r.:ar:'s labor;:l in

of aoe1al phenoffiena. As aocial co~litions

in E::1:;.:'s.::ii change the expr e s ~ed attl tudes to':3..r exper i ence lik.e,:i Be
caange , I~ l:aFpens to be 3. f;~ ~ that i:~ E:le;lan:i ths:"'G io3 a pro~e8eive

develo~rr.ent of the:.pprecL~tion of the Y;;.lue of an iniividl.l.a.l ...,eins.

The freedc~ of throu~ht an~ ~ct1on gro7s ttrcush ~ sta6e of insistence
upon the right to the product of one's labor, to a st~e of importanoe
of the individual hum~n being. The development of philosophy in
England parallels this series of stages.
On the Continent the appreciation of the individual grew to
greatproportlons also, but there the absolute autonomy of the indiv-
idual was not insiated upon in such sweeping terms. The sooial condition
on the contlDent were developing in a somewhat different way than in
Britain. The rise of &bsolutlsm oame a little later on the 60ntinent.
When the divine right of kings was given up in Britain it was still
olung to on the continent and espeoially in France. The German nation
which had suffered its Catholio unity break into a hundred pieoee, had
not reached its protestant autonomy whioh came with the strength of
~ r." of suoh a aoclal experience we have
Prussia. As a representatibn
Leibnis,the German philosopher. He shows olearly a struggle betneen
two tendenoie8. On the one hand he holds firmly to the meohanio~l

viewpoint wh10h is prompted by absolutistio conditions, whl1k he

still olings to a spiritualis~Jindioating an extreme apprediation of
the worth of human individuality. Leibniz attempts a reconoiliation
of these two tendencies, and so he 1s at once the opponent of Newton
and of Looke. Leibniz believes firmly in the meohanical nature of
the universe. Nature for him is a gigantic meohanism but it is a
'\'! \. .
national mechanism. For Lelbniz God is direotly involved in the
workings of the laws of nature. Leibniz makes sport of Newton's God
Who is a poor meohanio and must needs put his finger to his machine
occasionally. The work of Leibniz both in ita form and content in-
dicates a vaoillation between two differing viewpoints. There i8 here
the implication that the expression of this type of attitude is direot-
ly in correspondenoe with a peculiar social situation. The philosophy
of Leibniz is above all an expression of an extreme individualism
which in some form er other i9 direotly continuous with a super-
structure whioh is an embraoing unity. The two traditions growing
out of the attitudes formulated by Looke and Leibniz oorrespond
to a social experienoe which marks the baginnings of an appreoiation
of the place man plays in t~e det9rmin~tton of his world. There is
a. drawing frou: the a tti tude which makes a ma.n merely a. part of
a large ~erld u.aohine. The ~ortt of man on his o~n ~ccount will be-
oome an explicit component of the oon50iou8nes~ of man. With Le1bniz
this is bet :r brought out 1n spite of his failure to give full ex-
presoicn tc this in hie writings. Leibnlz in many instanoes seem to
belong to an earlier age than does Looke. This is brought out 1n the
controversy between the two with re~eot to innate ideas. It is
clear thp_t Locke is strugglini to get away from the tr9.d1 tion \vhioh
makes man entirely dependent lIPon so~/oonditione outside himself.

He 1s attempting to make mants experienoe dependent only upon man

himself. The mechanioal world tradition h:ts its philosophio roots
in a rationalistio conoeption. Locke meant to break a~ay from th~t.

Looke's surroundings were muoh as to give the individual gre~t confi-

denoe in his own personality as ~n Import{nt factor in experience.
There came ~bout a diohotomy between the functions of experienoe. The
great inorease in manls powers referred to pr~otical oonduot and bore
no identity relation with ultimate truth. This dichotomy brings out
the problem of the plaoe man plays in the determination OI his wo=ld.
The oonstituent nature of experience in the structure of xe~11ty be-
gins to be first realized. l The faot that it is only beginning is a
confiru.atQry testimonial. It brings out the fact of the new departure.

- - - -- - - - - -
10f. Moore Fun. and Rep. in Looke's Essay.
1 It 'Nas a begin!;lng because Locke stll1. t hr ough t t her e was much lacking
in t~ie attitu1e for tee determination of experience. Locke still
1 lived close to the scholastic trajition anj shared in an in&~equat9

1 viewpoint concerning the genuine nat'xre of experience. ~ith Leibnlz

th~re is aleo brou~ht out the depenjence of . exper 1 ence upon tbe
individual who has the experience, but more than Locke, Leibniz c1ung
to the older traditions. Leibniz .as certainly more correct in his

\. contention of the spontaneous ~o~er of the human unierstanJin6 but

I his conception was evolved much more in sympathy ~ith the soholastic
tradition. Conditions on the 60ntinent were more nearly akin to former

l times. The free development of ind.i'lidilale was not allowed. to t ake place

I until long aft'3r it wa.s a fact in Eri

The time of Locke w~s one of ~reat change in Engl~nd. The
growin~ power of the people finda an expression in the formation of

political partiea. The Toriea and the Whigs in their conflict over
the principle of toleration show us the increasing imfortance
the inji 'Jldual is acqud r ing in Engli sh ;oli tical affairs.

Ano ~her
series of events wbic~ is of extreme i~portance for t~e consideration

'., of the social affairs of England begins wi~h the Revolution. This event
resultej in the estdblishment of the ~rinclple that an English king
ruled by the sUffrag~ of tbe pe~ple ani not by Divins Right. Passive
f obedience w~e aleo given up. No money could be obtained without
P::l.rlia.ment and no ar!LY coul d be maf rrt a t ned in time of peace. '!'here '.7as
reoognized t~e right of petit:on~ the right of freedom of iebste in
Parliament~ the necessity of frequent Parliamen:s and ~he right of free
, ;

choice of repreaentatiges. l The election of William and Mary to the

throne of Engl and t nda ca.t.ed the new ;ower9 exer o t se d by the people.
--_.-----------_ .. _---------------------~-------------
- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -

lAo Rossal in Social England


The Toleration Aot of 1689 gave voice to the ~ights of individuals

to free development. It was, at oourse, stmtd in terms of the right-
of Publio worshiP.l The developing nature of lbe individual's value
oomes out in the fact that neither Looke nor his time knew the meaD-
ing of toleranoe in ita oomplete aspeot. Looke granted toleranoeto
all but Atheists and Catholios and this reveals a prejudioe whioh 18
born of a strong attachment to a Bast tradticn. The immediate
I ocoasion for the view that Looke held was probably the tact that he
looked upon the Roman Ohurob as a politioal power iDimloal to the well
being of a Protestant state.
The attitude toward experienoe as formulated in the philosophy

of Looke adequately parallels the experienoe of the time. In ths case

of Looke he was admirably fitted to formulate an attitude towari
experienoe beoause he took so aotl~e a part in the experiences of the
time. Locke WaS in fact the official philosopheT o the Revolution
in England. His relations with Shafte.bury and with William III gave
him an exoellent o:portunity to stUdy oonditions as they actually
were. 2 In his philosoph, Looke indicates an unmistakeable ten1ency
to determine the world in terms of the ,experienoe ot the indivi~wal.

The sign1fioanoe of the oategories with whioh the experiences were

evaluated were to be derived direotly from the thoughts and aotivities
of the individual. The meaning given to the values of the world were
to be derived direotly from the thoughts and activit1es of the in-
t dividual. The me~ing ~en to the values of the world were to be
brought out of the experience of the individual. Locke makes an ad-
mirable beginning in this direotion but there is no oomplete carrying
out of this attitude. Locke is not ~ble to break so oomplately with

10. Sohev1ll. History of Modern Europe, I.
2 ft Fox Bourne, Life of'J. Looke, Harpers, 1816.
~1th the past &s to make the world and himself oonditions of the
funotioning of the experienoe prooe8s itself. Looke makes a.,p1101t
the attitude that as ooncerns God and himself there are certain
factors of experience which for him 11es outside t~~ process of exper-
1enoe. l God and himself are intuitive Object8,"t!~"~reoede and go
beyond all possible experience. The Oartss1on influenoe seems apparent
1n the disoussion of the self-existenoe ot the individual. The contSn-
Uity of the thought of thlR period w1th that of the Soholastio stage
1s _very apparent. The efforts to reaoh out for a viewpoint which
would have its ground in the im~edi~te oonditions of experienoe are like-
wise apparent.
The dlvidion of the fundamental oategories of experienoe into
primary and secondary indioates the attempt that is being made to
evaluate the world in terms of human eJq)erience and the partial fa.11ure
of the attempt. Looke in common with all thinkers of this period.
is struok wi~h the independenoe of some aspeots of the external world
of the injlviiusls who experience them. This is a viewpoint ~lioh shows
a great ~1v~noe over the attitude whioh makes the entire.experienoe an
affair external and independent of the human individuals_who have the \

experience. That W3.S the si tuat10n in the Greek ot; ~hrOlSht.
Sinoe a valid a.tt1 tude toward experienoe must consider ~t in Palt in-
dependent of the individual, we should rather find Looke~s ~all1nga
\ .
in that he did not have a oompletely satisf~ctory notion of w~at ex-
perience is. To bring into experienoe a diohotomy based u~on. t~e
r-. \ , \
relative contribuitons of tbe thing in itself, and of the e~er1enctng
\.. '.
indivijual is to entertain obviously false notions of the c~~~ct~
. .. ,"\
~----------- -- -----_-...------------- - _------......---------------\.-.-------

lEssay, Book IV, 9 and 10.


of experienoe. Experienoe beoomes partly something which is not ex-
p~1enoe and never oan become suoh; The most fatal consequences of
8uch a faulty oonception wa.s Buffered by Locke and his philosophy. It
was no les~ a ma.tter than being forced to the conolusio n that a. gen-
uine acianoe of nature 1s impossible. 1 The human ,understanding can
attain only to pr~otlcal advantag~8 and not to theoretical knowledge.
Locke cuts bie world into parts. one only of which 1s subject to the
sorutiny and undeBstand1ng of man. theremainder 11es beycni the cap-
a-c1t1e') and faolltlee of his und.ereta.nd1ng. Looke d1v1jea his world
into the demonstrable and the probable. the latter only can be oojeG~

of our experienoe. It is olear that Looke has only a very inadequate

conoeption of the nature of experienoe. Locke labore1 under the concep-
tion of &. world whioh must be absolute and independent. Knowledge o~

this world oan be instrumental mere1r to the practical needs of the

human 1nd1v1dual. The it:portanoe of human experience for Locke rosoJ.ved
itself i~to the funotions neoessary for the acquisition of ;he "advan-
tages of ease and health. and thereby inorease our stock of conven-
ienoes for t~is life. a These advant~gea oome fro~ the ocou~atlon of
knowledge with sensitive objects. that 1s, objeots actually present
to our senses. It 1s evident that Looke thinks of our experienoe
as'being the a.ppearance or faint 001=Y of a. rs"11ty which liee behind.
We may oredit him witt making the appearanoe a product of an experien~

tla1 process.
In Looke's Eeaay we find a v~y elaborate anaylysis of the
categories made use.. of 1n the determ1n'ltioD of experienoe. These are
all brought into a soholastic Bche~e of pregreaslve gradations from
___ -~-~- - _I._--~--------------~-----~------------------------~

1Essay IV. 3, 29 IV. 12, 10.

the SiD?l~ to the lD09t complex, and called ideas. The list gives at
onoe the imprao81on ot the abetraut and rationalistic charaoter of
Locke's thinking. The objeots of expe:ienoe are presumed to be built
up out of sln~le ~ualltiea and funotions called ideas. The whole
experienoe i9 oonstitued. by the oomplioa.t1on of these simple idea-a.
Tne oomplex idea.s are of three 1t1nds , modes, substances, and relation
The ~.ost import-lot ;oint oonosrning these soholastio ideas ana their
complication lies 1n the fact th~t the experience ~hich results from
them 19 presumed to be greatly influenoed by the mind of ~he inliv1dual.
The entire essay of Looke denies ita importanoe from the-fact that it
doee attem~t to fjnd re~llty in some sense in the ~man ~xper1ences,

Th~t it does not seem to appreoiate what human experience is really

like is the fo.ul t of the time in '1:h1ch 1t was written rather tha.n any
Lack in tho::- auuhor , As typlc'.l of Lockets attitude 'tilth respeot to the
c---tegorles ~'e might ocne1ier th;~t of subStanoe. Substance fa a. un1ver-
sal o~tegory for it must be included in any objeot whioh haa qpa~~tie8

and relations. Substance is a neoessary. element in experienoe for 1t Jt

lies at the ta.s1a of experience, all qualities and rel::.t1cns ~ot in-

here in substanoe. It woul~ appear now that Locke gets prett~ :oloee
to the experienoe process. but there is a break here, for substanoe,
although it 113 a supportsE of known auallties, is itself absolutely
unkno~ anj unknowable. The philosophy of Locke turns out to be not an
experienoe pallo8ophy expepting within very narrow limits. For Locke
as for all the tti~kers of the p~st, re~ty was somehow not the objects
and evente of the present world. Re~llty must be something beyond the~.

Looke co~ld n~t extend such im~1101t faita and confidence in ~be ex-
perienoes of human The \?ori of Locke, taken in its h1)8-

tor1e nexus, might be said to ~es~lt in_ the modest oonfession that
definl te 111:~1 t e are set and 'i'iill continue to th,-:::trt the ts.lentn of
human bein?s in their ~t ~empt to l'e~li ty. A mora fnui tful
ju~gment muat be ~~de conc~rnln~ the work of Locke a~ an ~tte~pt to
:v3.1~s.te e:{p~rience. It ..; oule. OS ovel."looki11g muon to not arrrecLtte
t~:~ t the E~l :~a.y 60ncerning Human Un:lorst.'7..:liin?' is an adv3..nce over the
The PhiJosophy of Leibnlz 1s an expression of the au~onc~y

of t~~e individual, an expreRsion of the ir-:portance of bun-m ex~:;er1ence.

'file a.ttitude of Leibn1z is ccnceived under very different ccn-Ut1cne

tt~n is that of Locke. ~ni we will find that the imp11c~t1cna of the
two att1 tudes vuy cona:id-::rably. Leibn1z 1e much clo'3e~' to tn.:? source
of the mech_ical ph11cscphy and acience than is Lccks , Th.e centre
iC'r mathematical pur sur tEl in En~l and 99,5 Ca.n~br1dge an'l not, oxror d ,
O~fcrd W~~ more 3 centre for the stuiy of ~edlcine. Th~ intere9to of
Leibn1z are clearly 1ndic3.ted 1r.. the fa.ct thz~t dur i.n> ~. -;e.ry brjef
reaiience in London in 1673 he became aoouaf nt ed wi tl': tte no"t"ble men
of science "':.0 11 ved 1n E'n~land, espeeially Peel and Boy) e.2 'rne
visit to London ~t thio time Guickened the 1ntereatR cf Le1bn1z 1u
mathematios and phyM1cs auj when he returned to Paris he bec~~e ~1

int1r':!ite ~si3oc1ate of H'l:~y~ena. T~1e philoaq.:hy of Leibni~ EH'O'-:-f'I ::'.'t.

1t~ 'basis the !:1ec!l?n1cal conceptionj. the mathematical anJ 1o,"1cal

~etboda pxed$m1nate in his thought. T~ia matterr.~t1dal o~r.ce:tion

i fI 9C Dodi :'1ed, :.owever, as to alJ. ow the gl"~~.te3t plee ~:{}:1Ri l.} e for
::'e 1ndividua.l. Lei bn1 z br1nga out the irc:portllnce af th~ j nl.H.!t inal

eX1;erie>1ce by al.:oiving a very close connedti on between the t~lO't1~ht

of the individ.ual and eytern?-l raaJity. The gre:,.teAt objectivtty

it'! o'!)'ing- to the dlstinctne9~ ani ce.rity of Lle?,R. Spaoe and t1me
( t'

for Le1bniz are ideal rather th~ real. suoh as a meohanist 11ae
Newton oonoeived them. l Substanoe itself is for Leibnlz of the
material of experienoe t for it 1s at botto~ foroe. and foree 18 not
In spite of the mechanical basis.of the Leibnizian ph1losophy,
Leibniz is the ~09t thOrough going of individualists. The world is at
botto~ oomposed only of mona4., units of the stuff of the world.
The mon~ds are'eaoh coextensIve ~ith the ~hole of the ~orli; the part
and whcle are Bubslstentially the same but ther3 1s a differenQe in
de7elopman~ or unfolding. The monade ~e absvlutely iniivislble
ani unreal ted, they must be siagle and exist for themselves. They
o~nnot contain each ether. The extremely injivl~ualistic viewpoint of
Lelbnlz resolves into the attitude that the stuff of the ~orld 1s not
~aterial as the mechanistic. conceives it. but eplrit~~. Everything
in the 'Rorld 1s alive and eonacf cue , Leibnlz's vis1hpolnt come s to be
a spiritualism. The spiritualistic and dyna~io viewpoint of LeibD1z
indioatee the depend.enoe of obj ects upon the lnli v'iiual'a exper1 ence ~ ::1
~lttough the whole experience 1s conoeived in metophyeical terms.
Lelbniz no less than Looke stanis as a philoscp.ber ~ho ~akes his
f7el tansohauung a fUllotlcn of the indi vld.ual experienoe. The t-,,,;o
viewpoints, ho~ever. reflect the different s0ils in which they are
oonoeived. Just as the sooial e~lrv~~ding3 of Lelbnlz ~r6 closer to
the oondit:oue of the older tr~dlt~on9J 90 dOBe the fhilo30phy of
Le1bniz shc a. oloser connec :.. 1. on wi th tho sohola13t10 taradi tion.
The ln~1vldualism of Leibniz'D philosophy 1s indicated in his
attl tude tow:.r:i inna.te ldeE\.s. Leibnlz inaiots th3.t the mind is not
~_ _------
.. ... ---------------------------_ .. --------------_. ---------
,-Letters to Clarke, 3rd. \'!indebland-i.Tllft Ei a cr v 0: 'Chi
a . - .
. .;,.... !1.22
t l:E1och,r 'C
hvv :.n~ ita fuot ion in ole:..:.: ir.,;; up i :e~o ccz.. ;. ':.i';,\e..i in 1 t 11'. z~'uaed statal ... ~_.'". r 0 ut::1

T ~ '" :." . '-'.
_..' 01"';)
..... ~To! .
J. a..l6
., ,

of brin~ing them into selt cGn301 UDn~C3, ~ ;rocso~ of ~PPGrc.~t1on.

!.ei'hniz Q~na::ier.1 the i,:;.6:-.9 to be 'tlrt~:;,11y inna.te an th:.; :..rnd , that

l:~t:!.:m o;~ r;e1bnlz is the 0: ~1. :":-:t..:litlon '\':hioh g:.ves t:.e

?,::~:.:l ~.:C. the jUj~::r.~ of . . h~ '::Qrt:-. an,~ c: :.::1 iiivn :;! n.~ttll"e. Leilmiz is


~a ?ope's

1 Cf. Latta, Lelbnlz, 1898, p. 198.
world. The direct influenoe of Lelbniz on Les~ing and Herder 1s
obvious. l
There is no possibility cf oV8l:lookir.,g the fact t~1at Lelbnlz
is ccnstantly aiming to bring out an extrem~ in~1v1dual1s~ as a funda-
~ental prInciple of experience. Lelbnlz is expre9D~ng run attitude
~hlch indioates the consciousness of the i~portanoe of human exper1enoe.
We in Leibniz another a.spect stressed than 'Ne firld in Looke.
Leibniz is a mechanist and as such accepts the implications of that
viewpoint. LeibnIz accepts the world as firmly fi3ed an:! definitely
given. A fundamental element in the Leibnizian throught 1s the
principle of contradiotion. Lelbniz faoes tbe prcblem of ho~ this
~orlj oan be an objeot for knowledge ani this foroe. h1m to aS3ume
great pwoer on the ~art of the knower. The resllt 1s the monadological
conoeptlo~. which he fOl':':ul:"lt88. The \7orld. is rea.lly an unfoliing, a
development of what La latent in the r.cnad , Lei tnlz ca.lrie8 this out
to 9uch a pcint th~t hja fundamental ~rlnciple COIDes to be that of
suffioient ~ea4on.lnatead of acceptil~ ~ith Looke an apparent ,t
a. I, ~,':'

eensuatism Le1cniz inclines tO~al'j his peculiar form cf R~tionali8m.

?:e ma.y ; both these views to be born of g, a1 tuation ~~hich has to

find ito TOl'ld ex~reese:: in tern.s of exper t ence , The Y'orld must be
eV3.1uated. in te!:ms of the human personality and 1ts power. Locke
makes his evaluation in~ far a9 it can ~e done in terms of simple
elements of ~ Immeil~tely expeT19Dce1 sort. Looke was of ooura.
no t entLrely a believer in the sensuous expla.nation and in hiB 11m-
itation of the powers of the individual he shaNa hi~8elf not entirely
a. believ'3r in tile experience attitude. Leibniz a.leo does uot entirely
-------.. _--... ---------_....._------ --------- -----------_.... _- _--------....-

lYerz, Le1bniz, 1884, p. lS5 ff.

, ,."

put hie philosoph7 in the =eutii of Qx:;.erianoe,'bu:t being ~,.,rn of

a. sat or dlffer::'nt C1rCUll'ieI' from th~t of Locke .. he eX!ireaea
a GOl>jel::ha.t diiferenL attit1.lje. L<;lln1z is much mere a ~et~p~ysloian

than ~a !.ocke an;': :."u!;,s Lie a.t::'1tuie more in s.uch terl':ls. Thin is a.
waJ expla1ns the f~ct that Labniz leans
, 00 he'vily upon God. ,
It 1s
a o-""laractcrlst1c of the L1etaphyaiem- to 18Voke the airl"cf the Deity
1n erder tc expl~in what he needs to
.'.' ~cco~nt fer. This faot is read-
11y unjer9tand since the autBtanjin~ char~ct~=1etic cf tte mata;hys1e1an
is to eXl:lla,in mor e th~.n in the nature of th~ eaae 1 t is pos~1(ll ~ for a.
~llilost)pher to 0.0. Quite na tUl,3.11y tr1&n. Sot aome ~o~i1t or other the
m8t~pbys101an f~lle baok upon God to help hie in hla difficultlen,
The r~ietc.ry of philosophy indic~,tes C';l,t:.1 t e cle~rly Lh ~t since the birth
of the ~lief in po~erful ~oda thei~g~e of meta;hyslcal t~int 1n a
ph1l:sopher can be meaaur ed by h1~ use of! God. \'l'h~:h:::.: ~:!r,,'li-=,i t cr

eXl=:licit :'.8 a. s'Il~:port for his th~ories. :'\ .~atl"ix '.'of the philonoph)'
of Leibniz I') ouJ,';;,1f11, cono~lve~ in hetor::>g~n'30'.lB i1e9.9. it in an
attitulc atras':ing'che e:Kp~L'lenoa 0f hU1U3.n ceings and st1:1 it 19 IlDt :t
unjustifiably termed a. ':'.'eb of abtltr :at 91;eculs'.tio~. Th~ att1 tu1e ~.

extreme ind.1 vidualistl w~:tioh rune th:t' ough '.;he L,~i bm z Lan eys tern brings
out :'111a fOi:>t. The individual1am of 'L~ibniz is o;l.r!'led to an
extremely meta.phyeio!1..1 outo , In ths !:1a.tt3r of a mechan1c~_1 v1e1r-
pc:nt ~l:o Leibnlz 983me to b~ua tis phi~090phy ~;C~ ~ Frlncfl~, ~hat
. , ' i ... r ,.( .~

physica must be carried out tv wetaftya!Oe1 snd BO ~eibniz reports

!.\9 he joe,. fX(;!!l i.hs menhl::l&~ of Descut'.:lQ. leibn1z iF! ai!i1ing a t a.
met hcd of mak t ng hin philEHlOpliY concrete. He .:'.~mu ~t an org:'.:n concep-
tion ~otl.ich s:::"'a.1J. i:J.clude the e::per1c71ces . 'hich ar e th~ oom])cneni..'3
0::' the '(o'~1'1':. The doc't r Lnc ')f con ':'used. :lord. cleo::..!" ~er(le::.;d~~ nnn Be

------- --- ------------....----------- --_... _-------------------_ .. _------

10i. Prinoiples of Nature and of Graoe, 1n Latta, Le1bn1z, 1898.
oonstituting the content of the world brtngs out this point. There
1s ole~ly apparent in the philosophy of Leibn1z an e~?reasion of
the inclusion of individual experiences in the make up of the world.
This 1s an attitude th~t has also been expressed 1n Spinoza. It
oomes out in the idea tha.t man is a yJa.rt of the stuff of the world.
Han is part of substanoe ~ God. Leibn1z expresses the same attitude

in his pre-esta.blished harmoD7. Man is not without his oonneotiOlL

with God, that 1s with the whole of the world.
The change in a~t~de toward experience comes ant in Le1bnlz
with remarkable clarity. The gradual change in the 8vdua.tioD. of the
world comes out in the different oategories that LeIbniz uses and 1n
tha different me~tnlng he a.tts.oh~s to the same oategorien. A study

of Le1bnl:r. shows olearly hO~ll suoh important categoriss as ~bstanoe,

Matter. P~SS1billtY. Cause, oMotion, Space and Time~ Atom,~~e~oeption,

and Foroe, were given a new determination to suit the new o:"lndl tiona.
TheBe categorIes are adapted to a viewpoint whioh regard~ the ~orld

a.P. meohanioal antj. yet oZg&Dlc. The organic and dynamio viewpOint of
Leibniz brought forth suoh new evaluatory terms as suffioient reason.
the oompoBslble and others. It is more a"parent in the case of Leibn1z
than in that of ~ther philosophers just how the experienoes of the time
beoome expre~Bed as a formulated attitude whioh gives system an!~rder
to the values tha.t theB. experienoes take on.
The philosophy of LeIbniz is born of a situation which 1s more
or le'"'!s uneJt9.ble and ohaotio. Lelbniz is a. German who wa.! born tvro

ye-rs before the Peace of Westphalia, and who wrote in Frenoh. The
Germany of Le1bniz at the oonolusion of the Thirty Years War W~B in
a.s pitiable a state of deva.station and misery as any nat t on In.A n1.tnesf81
in modern times. The suooessive overrunnings of the country by Swedes.
, t-

8pan1ard~, troats. and Frenoh loft the ocun~ty o&l'ren, roor ani de-
grr:.d.ed. When tho intellectual and socia.l :f'crc~s b,gan to renew'th**r
energies they gl~anad tr.G~r vigor fto~ the neighboring Frenoh.
In p~ll tioa.l ma.tte::l the a~601u1;i sm of t he french was tranaported to
Germany -:l.nd. there spring up sun kingFl to the number of. four hun:1red. l
Germany '~~;'9 not the Cioll from "oM. ch could spring a. ~urely meohs.n1st10
;:hl1onophy. Absolutiom \\"':'_9 j.nEleed fcun1 there cut it was an absolu-
t1s~ th~t ~~s the he1ght cf 1ndlv~dual1a~.2 The mechanical d~term1n&-

tion of exr.o~ience ~~a not borne cut by the evanta an1 occurrenoes In
(!ermeny. The Ireohanicc.l ir.fluanoe cO'..lld. have been acquirec. by the

th1rkere from ~ ccntaot ~ith Frano~ and Engl~nd. but if the philcsophy
lot c re~re8ent the exper ience of t he Gerr.-:a.ll people it could. not be an
~.tC'r:lc nechanrnm but So tlona.:il?tic ore. 3 For ";he ccrnpl.,t1c.n c.f the

cont ent of t~e L-.ner life. The ~c>11 of Oer!lany at ttiu ~eI'i oi repxes-
ente: in scrr.9 SG:lse t:c.~ s~'r.e GltL1~tion th=.t othe::l:' r;';:.rts CJf Europe ;res-
'9ute1. 1 n tr.e 'l:.ya be:~::>=e ;.c,l j t 1c,-l uni fi c"-. t ion. The:e "1(=.;, 6t ill very 01

The ~hilosophy of 1.e1bnlz indlc;1.tes ::I. pet.pIe lOBt in the mazs o of

':i'trthly e1:"1stence, seel:ng for i~r:elf::. :hcr::e ,::;:jch l=~'::s :it to

believe 1!! s:')f! in tto ~o~ole of the \7orld. 1 tself The ele'-l'ients
in Leibniz's philosophy whioh are G1ml1i= to ttc1a i~ the Soholastic
philooo;:hy in;i1c::..t~ an cnv i r onzcn t .'(:~c!':. in similar to tte 3001:1.1

.._- ..- . _-----...-...-...--_._---.- __._------- -------------------------------


lni~h~d, Hiato~y ~f Ger~~n C1v11iaa~ion, p. 282.

2Monodolngy 70 - is a re!laotic~ cf "tLls.

t,t. ;

3ro r Lei'bniz the!"~ ccut d r.c't ce"principle of na turc ~6roly, cut

aleo principle of graoe. :1

upon the spirt tu!!l nature of obj ec. S 9:1011 tl toe influence of the ex-
trema ~'.2bj eot 1v", f:,.otor ,vhich a.1'; ..:.ya ~h.:U'a.oterlzes So v1s\'{point mloh
10 :level oped unter 0 ,:'!l:li 1; ~ :;H') ')! ;Joci~l hopiJlassllesa and damora.:iLiza-
tion. To jUt:JA fr,:,r,~ 90.'9 ~f:';l~ cor raspon.Ience tiith Hassen - Reinfels

find in the fi:rflt :;l,?.C'e th~t !.:e1bnlz jOOil l.j; 8j;pl'eillJ ae nnich ae Looke
t he conBO::CUS 1nclu:~ion nf th~ exp cr Lcnce f:..ctor in his plliloaoph1oal

anr r ound le1'):\n17. !'e<Jl~l t in '" -1ifferent cc..cep t Lcn oi wllG.t -r.h6 ne.~ure

cf Ex~erienoe 1". te~.bniz r-Jt~elJ;e3 the cogm ti ve proc6:\Sea "i 'the 111-

the "!.ot1 ve po:t~:r.t' ("f t!~s min1 ir. e::;:~"ience. Ti4ild refJ~;,~ in a me:l.sure
Ln the t(l(' hef)V}' lo< ci the ~.::r.:.t2.1 fCiiOrEl vi the in;.iividual. The
'''ol''ld i~ 2'1 v~,., ever tr: tj~r. t ~~'~:;s c:..~ th.; Tile philosophy of

Leibniz i~ entirel:: tr:o metfl];.hycical for tt:e period in whioh 1 t is

developed. ~a ~~ve atte~rt;;: to iniic~te that the social experienoe c
of tbe na t i cn o"n L: l~.rle ;r:,g~ei.lI'e be :.l:a.'I.'n upon tv S,(:COt:Ilt for this fa:t.
WeT~ it n~t fOT th9 c~ntact th~t Lelbniz as ~ thinke nad ~ltL other

no sense hw e J. t t a i :n:l t:-~~ exce:l(;:loe '1h~ ca it has re~.ohed.a.n'i it ',..ould

not have been ty::icaJ. 0: tt:: ex~e:.'i3;'lCe p1111osophiee. Le1-oniz and.

Locke bo~h are e,Y:r-eri:nce philosoph'Jrs. Leibn1z doea not halt ~t the

gen ~~al AiE7nificanceB r.f er.:;;eri eno e , In id.a conacf ouo thinking he m3.kes
1 t refer to ccmr:or:pl'ce - ~,tt.r~, ti'.:Q. T::i.e :'..iv113ioa ~etwaen these phaaes
la m~dd easy for ~lm.

into his metaphysioal --


The British Per10d

~he hls~cl'i.ans of f1:iloecphy wh,-; w:rite in the t~3.a.it1onal

l.'train ~11 EJho'.v the javelc,pnlent of English philosophy fron. Lecka to

HuIlIe r.~ a n::tt1.;.ral Evoll1tion of certain d.dir.lte logloa1 grounda ,
Thf'l'e ia hpJ.ied the at! sump ti -:.n th~t ti.ere wac b0methiIl~ in t:.-::3
Lockean ~hilosophy which inevi t;;..bly le~~:1Dto HU1r.6. I t is ~.lRo 1ffiP11ed
s.n such wrl tlng ;~E.t Da.rl:el~ is a natural miJ.d.le link be twe en the
t'.70. A t:'\lch more acour r.t e vie\~pc5nt is tl!3.t the formuLte:.. a.ttitudes
'.'f t.r.ene tr.1nkers anave r to experiences '.ihien ar s intern:llly c:.,;nt1n-
u~ua but ~hlch stow ~re~t ~o11fic~tlon ani development. The t~n~ o~

j 11 H 'lill)cl.l sm e~~:pl.r lcism~':hic: ;.ervade:o tha phi1co(,phy eof

Bel:1:el:i, HUl:.e ~r:~ <111 theL~ p.t'.~':::.ce.::ac~e r':'f':ceoe~"t ~tti~u6..ea ... ~;ioh ex-
Dres~ the fundarrosil:al charaoter13tica ~f ~he Eritioh acoial exper1ence.

The philono~hy ~f: Barkel#y and H~;:a are ric t lo~1 c3.1 d.er1 vat1 ve~ of the
p~11oeor,hr of L:.cke, l"Jt i:he philoscphiue of :.::.11 three Bl.i.Ir. lLP in a.bstrao1

~nd lnte!leotu~l ferm a ~eri88 of cwnditicn3 ~hlch seemed tc h~xe a

~eci:edlJ crg~io atatua and development. The oonditions which they
oum up in .:.::nt ar s the g.c,:>wth and deve Lopmen t of democzatn c and in-
The r(dloso~hy of l:arkely and. Hwne reflect \'fell the
;;.n-:: tile pr=.c tical acnrcvemen te of a ne.tien which
.~"~vel~pe:l an empire ~1 th almoBt :'h!:e~ centuries of undis};utea. ewa1.
The philos~~h1eB of rerkcl~ and H\.lme cculi nc n.or e et;.sily IHioV.C oeen
ind1v1iu~listic ~~ smpiristlo, tb:n co~ld Engl~n~ be ~ashed~by the
ccns t ar t tta:?l>.~re cf the Atlan~ic emf. 'The Vi<hpo1ntaof f:.arkolYand
Burne wer c 'levelc;ed '.:nier oondi tl caa in "..hi ell t he signific.t:.noe of the
The ind:~A ~rial changes 1n rartlc\.ll?..r "':hi ch came :.b('ut in th3.t ::~r1od

trcught w1 th thati'; new at ti tuje~. 0:. ...':~rT_ln.:: ............

Tr.e ~nt1:'e vl~".'poin1J;

tc~cerned ~lth the specifio

ccnc i trons clf hun;an weli'f\.re. Tl':;..d.e l:i.:"',~, its IJUCCeA!;~::; brought 1't1th it
a reorganl~t10n of th~ ~voial stTuctura. Tho cl~ee~~ in Aociety took
on nev f,')l'T.:a rlon:l ata.nde.rds. 1 Tndustrr C'.nd. trn..::';.8 brought :-,ut 'the

indu3'~ry broi.~.dened the hQrh:o~ of n:an :1ni '~ e'.pprecl;.tlve of their
cvn exper Lenceu The:.1. t t i ~ ude;~ t c~:;2rd ";hs ei.~~e:'ler..cea SA they .':eveloped
in f:~rl'~cl r.:.a~iiook n.oce ,:;! t:.~ exp er i encee then '!)'!"ts ];',rev!cu.lly the
caue , ~7e find then that Barkely
t attm::;tf~ to l!l't':te experienoe in texas

1enoe into uuoh termA. His ~r:t~ne~ indio~te ~ho he~cic efforts to


:: .n.e signs (.f li,fa .L, B'Sxkely hdi~at~lJ t~:Jt he t~'3a not en'lre11
!:..icc'~GJi\l. Th(;l1e ar e utilI 02;::e O!l.t~;'):i:"ieo u=:e1 in Beriel~Y "'h1oh

~ clJneo1"".l.s one

u~.llr an.i .:lim to bec ce.c r e cc r d e ~:f ",h~ ongoing cf ex~~r1enoe.itself.

-- - ----- .. _- .. _.- - _.---.--_ .... .._--- -- .. _------------ ----_.-

.... - -------_ .... _._--------
l!ufte, The I1Hl.1v1:'u;:.1 c.rd tie Rel:'.tict: to Soc1et~{. tTr.iv. cf C!:ica.go
Contribution to Philosophy, 1904.
a.nd pril1ciples ples~ed. to underll& exper Lence , If -,-'(3
the Re!l9.1cs vaaee ~er ied to be the 'oeglnrlinga of thd fCl't:nlla t ion of
rltoiern at titu:iea to",ari e~perienoe~ \,3 n.a_~ c(,nai.ia:L' t:'a ~_-L'.;aa.nt:eriod

to be a transition 1:.0 t ne v ia-'i:Jvin:' 1"l.'lot fihilooophy 1a an aasent i~l

expre~oicu of exp9rienoe ltaeli.

~'e9'pec to to the nauur e vi expar ienoa. <v ve fin;,i a

In Be!'kol,

ci.!3 he o:.,lled. ~hGlil. Barke':y cai,e 0::'036 to \'1-,0 vie3pci l:t that bl;':- 'le:_~ge
, r
l I,

&: ~'.i:lg; Iji/ 1~1 tCl'Li~S

and philo:Jophy uu.r.. on:.i..y be of expor i ence , -!.Ju.t

... - ---.--..--.. ~ _--_ ----- .. - -.- ' - _-_ .._------_ _-_.~- ----- .. _------
10i. Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. I.
mechanios. The eva1uat ion of experienoe upon the basis of its own
rigbts and evaluation did not oome until later and at the present
time i8 only beginuing to be suffioiently understood.
The gener~il oondit ions of English experienoe in th e period
under discussion show symptoms of remarkable ohanges. England
during this period indioates the development of individual liberties,
and a oloser attitude of thinkers to human oonditions. The point
now under disoussion was one in which the signifioanoe of the in-
dividual as a member of the oivil order was ooming to the coneoious-
neSh of the people. The political and religious oontroversies and
disousaions Were about to beoome replaced by social and eoonomio
topios. The politioal oonditions were beooming mcre and more definit-
1y settled and the attitudes of the individuals were less to be shaped
ncw by the diotates of group orientation. TheP~blemsfor the thinkers
bec~me those whioh are influenoed-by oonditions within a group, and
b)Anon-exclUded conditione arising from inevitable relat10ns between
groupe. The influence of nations upon one another can never be
genuinely exoluded. The pI:Oblems whioh agitated the minds of think-
er in England ooncerned more the growing oiroumstanoes whioh resulted
. D
finally in making of England the workship of the world. England
during the ~ign of Anne won a leading position among the nations of
Europe l I~ p~itical destinies become fairly well settled. During
the same reign England beo&me united with Sootland in fact. The
apparent union beoome an aotual one when the ParliaJIients were united.
From th~t time England and Sootland were governed by the same la...
The ~owing demooratization of English soolal 11fe continued and is
-- - - - - - - -- - -
10f. Sohevill, History of MOdern Europe 1999~ p. 25
lllar~ed by tile be~in:,inga cf cabinet government in the :eign of

George I. In tLia tL,e ~l8o the be~innin5a of Ene:-landl;a indua- gr eat ne e s became aympto,;.6 cf the p r eva Lent social 0 rder.
The sccial conditions indic~ted by the facta mentioned are reflected
in the fhtlosop::.y of Berk~y:.. The philosophy of 3erke~y indicates
a growing tendency to rega.rd ::~a signific':nt the expe rLences of the
individual. The sooial demoncracy which i6 developing in England
is reflectai in Berkeley in his attempt to express re~lity as ulti~~t

ly the ooneci:u6 states of the individual. Just as. the beginn~~gs of

individual independence are reflected in Lockeia intereat in the
hW~an understanding, so is t~e development of this indepenJence
marked by BerkelY~8 a17ance ever Lecke. Looke cli:';s to the notion
of substance in 6o~e sen~e, indic~ting the lack of ocnfidence in t~e

capacitiee of the individual. Beri:aey allowa an advi:l.nce in 'this respect

and'::l.n;e of attitude t owar d substance ifidic':l.tes an mcr ee eed
reliance upon the experiences of the individual. Berke~ re~reaent6

in the nr s t o r y of philosophy the gr""7i:lE devel opment of the experience

p~ilcsophy. Tr.e aoci~l ccndi~icLa ~hich prevailed in Berke~la time
gave evidence to t ne spirit; of individual freedcm and even license
wilicr.. inJic~tea the reorganiza.ticn of the social at ruc t cr e , EngLand
wa s a ccun t ry full of t ae eoulliticrl of r eact Lcn a ga i ne t previous
social rigidities. The English sere beginning to sense the power
of nat t ona L expansion. Berke:ey as a. man of fine sensH:>ilities was sere
ciistresoed with the preva.l ent moral t c ne of society. Ber~e~ stands
as a heroic frote~t againat the egoism and the 6el~1ahne~~ of the
En2'lish society of 'the p er t od , Bt::rke]f;r p rc t es t s eupha.t I ca Ll y i ns t
the statement of eociety such as Mandeville Fre&enta it and his
Aleiphron is an eloquent arg~ment against it. He longed for a
sooiety in wmdoh his sooial ideals would meet with some realiaation1
In general this period was lawless more or lees oorrupt, and re-
markable for its speoulations and latteriee. There d~es not appear
to be the sooial stability that one would expect in an established
society. This period is the time of the South Sea and other bubbles
whioh flourished then and added to the general ohaotio oondit1ona. 2
Lawlessness prevailed in this period and individual license was rife
. BangiDgs were so frequent and so profuse that manylB..d. to b.

transport ed because there was no room fer them upon the ga.llows}.
Berkel, oonoeive~ of himself as a defender of theism against the great
mass of opinion whioh seemed to be atheistioally inolined. This faot
adds testimony to the oharaoterization of this period as one of free
and unintelleotual Jooial experienoe. Thw world &s an object of
philosophioal determination would be evaluated in terms of the in-
dividual experienoe. Experience itself' would enter more defir.1tely in~o

the determination of ~bjects and events. Attitudes toward experlenoe

are beooming more and more spontaneous formulations of the happenings
tbat,~ experienoed. Attitudes are becoming closer oonnected with the
experienoe which give origin to the attitudes. This 1s tantamount to
the statement that there i8 beooming to be realized that onets
experienoe is in great part a function 01 the individual who hasthe
experienoe. The theislI of Berkely rray be taken to be the expression on
the philospphioal side of a. need for a more stable care for the Booial

experienoes. With Berke1y there ie a definite change in the meanings

of the oategories imployed in deaoribing and evaluating experienoe.
------------- ..-.---...---------------- .. -.----------- -- ----------------
lFraaer - Berkely: in Blaokwocdta eeries, p. 117.
2S oc i a l England, V. 5
3Loo. oit. v. 5.

The fundamental category of Bubstance takes on a deoided change

from even the period of Looke. Substanoe becomes in the long
" age

of Berkely immaterial. Berkely means by this to deny that substanoe

has any existenoe outside of the minds whioh perceive the objects
having substanoe as th*lr oomponents. This attitude may be interpreted
to mean that Berke~ is unwilling to admit that the objec~s of ex-
perienoe are oomposed of anything but the aotual material of ex-
perience. In a peouliar wa1~( the plaoe of experienoe in the realiza-
tion .of the presenoe of objeots and evente is brought to oonsoiOU8-
ness. Berkely. as did Looke before him, ind1cates an advance 1n
terms of experienoe and not in terms of some assumed substanoe or
prinoiple whioh underlies and conditions our experiences. The atti-
tude of Berkely in so far as this represents his att 11l1ude, '1s com-
mendable but he was not able for laok of per.peotive to evalua~e his
attitude in this way.
Berkely so little understood wh~t hie own
position really meant as to believe that he Was at war with the
\. VV'
Newtonian philosophy. Bertely was of oourse deeply inbued with
the~logioal and re~lgious prejudioes and thus failed to understand
how the work of theftnatural~ philosophers of his ~erlod were expree-
II 11 ~
slng a etmilar ~tti~d,.l The disoussions in the ~efenoe of free-
thin:lng in d~(~~t~.(1nd10ate quite ole9.rly what attitude Berkel~
is attempting to set up and defend. Berkely seems to be reaohing out
for the pure faots of experienoe so far as soience goes. This is
true even though we may interpret him to be misoonstruing the essen-
tia.l nature of natural soienoe suoh a.s Newton and others stand for it.
The true sign1ficanoe of Berkely's position lay not in his supposed


lot. Seth - English Philosophy and Sohools of Philosophy, 1910.

opposition to the atheists and soeptios, but i~ his fur~herano.

of the philosophy of experienoe. The exoellenoe of Berkely's philosoph- / \ I

~ ,tV l b .
ioal expression talla away with his later work. The ~~~ic~ of
Berkely i8 in some sense & spoilation of the splendid a~titude in-
-:ff,<r-.. f: t ~,f t"/t \ c-:" .
dloated in the Prinoiples and 1n the Development8~ In this oonneotion
we see that it 1s not a strange irony of fate &s Seth sUlBeats that
Berkett should become regarded as of the 80eptual tradition while
e ,

attempt lng to refute tha.t att 1tude. Berkely' 8 philosophy ata.nda &8
an att1tude tOWJ.~ rd experitmoe whioh was developed under definlte
oonditions of experienoe, and his philosophy i8 a lInk 1n the ohain
of attltudes which developed parallel to the development of that

Berkely'a slgni,loanoe in furthering the philosophy of ex-

perienoe ~ames out in his diso~ssicn oL the other oategories suoh as
Spaoe, Time, Mot10n, Cause and Numbers , Berkel)' protests against
the prlnciple tbat there oan ex~st such a thing as an abstraot idea.
Bis point 1s that Spaoe and Time are derived from an actual sensation-
al situation, whioh 1s assumed the only genu1ne experienoe
situation. In this connection Berke{~ oomes out as explioity as
possible With the attitude that the oategoriee of exper1enoe are
derivations of experienoe itself. With respeot to abstraot ideas
Berkely believes himself to h~ve gone beyond Looke and trom our
stan4point he indicates a viewpoint very close to the actual exper-
ience situation. Berket) denies that there are abstraot ideas such
as color, for example, which presc1nds from the speoies or individuals
oomprehended under it. For Berkely the presenoe of euoh abstraot
ideas would be a distant removal from experience.
'. \ ' .. _ J
~ '1\./'"(..1;\ \/\-, ..."W

In seotion 116 of his Periods ().f KnoWledge Berkel)' baa a

splendid state~ient of hie position whioh brings out the plaoe of
eXFerienoe, in.the attitudes tow~rd experienoe}or philosophy. The
work of Berkely indio~teB in a splendid manner the reinterpret~tiom of
the categories under different general experiential oiroumstanoes.
It is ole~rly seen how the categoriee ohange their meanings and
what oonditions the namee seleoted for the oategories. The soolal
oonditions of BerkelY'a time represent the growing importanoe of the
individual and thus the categories gP.t their signifioanoe in terms
of individual experienoe. Berkely read the signe of his time to
indicate that men were drifting away from the higher things of life
and plunging into vioe and error. l He conoeives then hie determln&-
tion of e~erlenoe in spiritual terms, emphasizing the idealistic
elements in experienoe.
The emphasis that Berkel~ placed upon the fallacy of
dist ingulshing bet;een prilJ"Ary and seoondary qualities is a.n ex-
oellent indic~tl~n of ~is attitude toward reality. This position
marks the development of the attitude that in experienoe alone is
reality to be found. There is nothlngbeyond our experienoe. It haa
no sup~orts and no presuppositions. In much of hie writing Berkely
places great rela~npe upon oommon sense. Berkely 8eemB t~ be utterly
,t .\\\ L-. U.l ',,,.. 'J.", "fl,,", k,f.:.I
refutin~~and olinging to a dootrine of ordinary experience.Reality
i8 given in the senations or perctptions of the experienoing indiv-
iduals. Berke~ Bought to safeguard this positicn against obvioUB
oriticisms be deolaring th~t in the final analysis all things &re
peroeived by God. But Berkely does not Wish to be underetcod ~B

believing th~t God was the guarantee of the objeot of the experienoe.
Berkely was content to let the fact of an objeot's peroeption oon-

Alciphron 1732; Essay towards preve~ng Ruin of ~reat Britain
st1tute the existenoe of that objeot. If there was experience the
1 (i.
exper1enoed objects were real. In faat Berkely states that his proof
of the existenoe of God oomes from the faoe that things do exist
~d therefore must be peroeived. 2 The primary qualities are not
beyond peroeption, they do not exist of themselves. Nothing exists
but that whioh" is pero~~ed. There i8 here the unmistaka.ble attitude
of the experienoe philosophy. The world is ~T&luated in general in
terms of experienoe.
The attitude of Berkely takm as a general expression of a
definite soolal experlence partakes in grea.t mea.sure of that exper-
ience. There 1s expressly implied the oonv1otion that a view of the
world must be given only in terms of the events and objeots whioh
oonstttutel the aotual surroundings of human beings. The defeat
in suoh a philosophy as Berkely as indeed of allthe British ex-
perienoe philosophy is that a wrong oonoept1on of experienoe is
entertained. While the overt attitude 1s that the exper1enoes must
be deter.m1ned ln terms of experienoe ~hat experienoe is conoeived as
oonsisting of such objectionable elements as to vitate the attitude.
To take Berkely as an example he conoelves experienoe as oonsisting
ultimately ln te~s of Qualities of senee. 8A oherry, I say. 1s
nothing but a oongenles of sensible lmpressions or ideas peroeivsd
by various aenses. whloh ideas he limite4 into one thing by the miDd:
beoause they are observed to attend eaoh o~her. The ideas or
senaations as we should call them are just as objeotionable ab-
straotione from experienoe as any tbat Berkely exoludes in his
" '. ..
---~~--~-- _--._-----~-- ... -------------~--_-.-_ .._----..---_..----- -- -
lByi~s' -anci Dialogue
2Loo. Cit.


\. writings. Experier.ce is then net experience bUT really a ~ombina

I tien of entities which are p r eauppue ed and not found in experience.

I . 'rhe posit :on of Eerkelly ia then or.1y an exp erience philosophy in it B

I intention. In its corrp1etion it is still a

This is true a Lao cf Hume although HUlI,e mak ee scn.e advancea in the
metaphysic~l viewpoint.

I development of the experience philosophy.

! The attitude towarde ex~erience which we call the experience
I philsophy develope with the exp~r.6ion of the soci~l exper~ence in
which it first finds expression. The time of Hume t s
philo8cphy WSo.S ma rk ed by an extren.e emphae I s of th e human indi vid-
u~.l as a. fact er in experience. There hae been an . ad7ance from the
interest in tae hum~n understanding to human nature. The tendencies
of the t in:es mov e in t be direct i en of a closer int ims cy wi th the
numan individual. The ~la.l; ue of t h e human indi'ridt:a.l is cc mine: oui'
in the greater place he takes in ti:e industrial '~orld. 'Encrnloua

I Fowers a~e being manifested by the h~man in~ividual in the pro-

I ducticn of economic goode. The jrduetrial revolution which becaae

I, an enormC~6

factor in the devel~pment uf Britiah life bro~ght out

I the interde~endence cf industrial exp~n6ion and in~i~idual enter-

I priae. Tile :'mprovements in manufactt:re and tLe gre;:..t increase

in we~lth and fo~er brouht renarLable ch~nSe& into the lif~ of the
Eritish. Every attitude ~nd inst1t~tion wa~ affected ~nd a cvmp18tely
I new n~ticn was created. The incre~6ed impcrtance of the inJividual
I gained exp r ee s i cn in the dev el opment c f the "le..iasez faireR p r Lnc rp Lc
I whicL dominated British thought for an exceedingly lengthy period.

I In comruercial and industrial oenters entirely new ideas began to

prevail. The aceia1 Baiences date their origins frorr. this period.
I Poli tical eccncn.y in s cme of i t s p r es enf cna rac t e r i e t i cs 'be3'i~e in this

, t1me. The genGlral d1ffua1on of intelligenoe beoomes a developing
I 8YD1P1Jon of the period.
the adi vidual.
This indiof\tes an moreasing importanoe of
Eth10s takes on a. new faoe and begins to oon8ider
its problem from the standpoint of man's In_tinots and tee11nge.
, The emphasis 1s upon the nature of man rather than upon some
abstraot qualitIes given in oonntiction w1th ma.n. BUlle declares thea
I that reason oan never be 'the motive to any aotion but i_ always the
I slave of Passion. It beoame a period in which the moral criter1&
were sought for in the make up of the 1ndividuals and Dot in abstraot
prinoiples far removed from the sphere of human oonditions. There
was 10 general a revulsion against intelleotualism, there was the re&l-
I iza:tlon that man was more tha.n mind, and had tbe oamp.Bition of huma.n
t nature. Hume revolted against the intellectual ethios of Looke and
\ Cudworth, and his leaning ~oward a theory based upon human nature
, made him a stern or1tio of the mathematioally demonstrable morality

The utilitarian aspect whioh ethios took on at this time indicates

J also the fact that the attitudes whioh are formulated ocncsrning
'1 exper1enoe find many po1n~s of oontaot With experienoe. The geod
is stated in ter~s of the useful and thus comes oloser to the
wants and needs of individuals than do the abstraot prinoiple8.
r The direction in whioh the experienoe in England was tending
I is Vlell illustrated by Bome of the religious movements whioh flour-
\ ished ~t this time. The rise of Methodism at this ttae.brings aut
t the e~phaBis of the period upon the iLner nature of the individual.
t Methodism places a large premium upon the intimate experienoes of

J individuals. The Method1set movement 1s an attempt to express and

make prom1nent the inner feelings With whioh one 1s endowed. other
religious movements beginning about this time gave voioe to the
.I .:'J

growing dissent and freedom whioh marked the growth of individualia
I The viewpoint toward experience whioh Bume formulated 1ndioa~es

f a oorresponding change ~o the ohanged oonditions. The phi1eeophy

I of Hume is more c1_.e17 knit up With the aotual experienoe prooesses
t than is true of Berkely. There &re unmistakaable evidenoes in the

I writings of Hume to 1;' dioate that he intends his attitude toward ex-

I perience to be de%i1ed absolutely from e~erience. This is unmistake-

I ably expressed in his view that no idea'oan be derived except from
I the impressions, and the impressions are for him the very essentials
I of experienoe. Bume goes beyond Berke!\ in abandoniDg the inev1ta.bJ.e
I peroeiver Who gives the guarantee for the ex1stanoe of the perceived

t objeots. Hume reduoes all experienoe ult imate11 to the impressions

of sense. Bume does no t accept with Berkel) the given faot of self.
Bume reduces the self to a ftbundle or oollection of different per-
I oeptions whioh succeed each other with an inconceivable ~pidity.

I and are in a. perpetual flux and movement a.1 Hume :ccep'ts frankly the
1 farthest oonsequenoes of the empirical Viewpoint. The whole of ex-
~ 'per1enoe ie reduoed to this flux of 1mpressione. Hume ~e oarried ~be
f experienoe philosophy to 1ts ultimate oonolusion. The connection
I between experienoe and the attitudes toward experience are formed o~

I the very same material. The Weltansohauung of Hume 1s derived from

,. the ordinary experienoe of the ind! vidual whioh redu 08S i1 nally to '!the

t data. of.eense.
The def1cienaBs in the viewpoint of Hume toward experience
I comes out 1n the examination of his overt oategories and in the doo-
I trine of oategories he leans upon in his discussion. The categories f.r
I -~-----------------------------------------------------------------_._
l lTre&\Se I, IV, VI.
~r ~

Hume eo far as~bla own exposition 18 ooncerned are the eeven phl1-
oeop~1oal relations whioh oonSlt.te knowled~e and probability. Theee
may be taken to be the materials from which are formed his Weltan-
sohauung so far a~ it is overtly experienoed. One must, however, add
to these at onoe the oategory of Idea and ite immediate correlate,
the Impression. We see 1ndic~ted the faot that Hume's philosophy
leaves plaoe for levele of Material. There is first the level of
Ideas and Impressions. Theee are the stulf of experienoe. The8e
are the materials of which all experience 1s constituted. The im-
mediate meohaniem for the transformation of these impression. and
ideas 1s -the gentle foroe or attraotion. the exact causes of whioh
are unknown, and whioh i8 called assooiation. Hume does not hesitate to
deoalre that we oan never go beyond these impressions but leaves open
the problem of their exaot working. l That is. Hume does not attempt
to attaok the problem of the cauae s of the lmpres::lone ofeense.
The second level consists of the relatione whioh are built up from
the original ideas. The obvious point in this attitude is th~t the
oategoriee w1th whioh the world 1s evaluated are of the stuff of ex-
perienoe. There are no values or catego~1e8 oomposing the attitude
toward experienoe whioh are not of experienoe. ~his is an advanoe

over Looke and Berkel~. With Looke there still remained as ~n evalu-
ation of experience substanoe which had an eXistence beyond experienoe.
Berkely reduoed substance to states of consolousneaa but allowed.
however, the self to be an underived element of experienoe. Hume meane
to exolude absolutely everything but the 1mpree:ions and lde~s and
their derivations. Hume means to frankly evaluate experienoe in terms
of ite own self. The categoriee of Hume are categoriee of experienoe.

- ------ -
lTreatJe, Part II, seo. 6; Part IV, eeo. 5.
The ezperienoe of the individual has tinally come into ita cwn in an

I unrestrioted. manner.' The world is re4uaed to man and the objeots

and persons he deale With.
Up to t~1s peint we find Bume quite in line with more reoen~
\ tendenoies in philosophy. This attitude in philosophy is entirely
t wholesome and indicative of progree8. There is much to be said by

II way of dissatisfaotion with _he Humean attitude toward experience.

Bume regards experience as an artifioial. oompounding of given
elements. The world for Hume and knowledge of it are based ultimate-
ly upon such vague abstractions as the old metaphysios dealt with.
I Humels viewpoint
8.S Berkely'8, goes 1,0 fa.rther than its commenda.ble
So far as ita development and its actual value, it f~lls far
l, short of being a satisfactory position. Hume's period was one Which
stressed. experience but this was done in favor of a standpoint Which

I was iUlItedi~.tely oonoerned with rrathema.tioal rigidity.' The individuals

are not entirely men of flesh 'and bone but units of a given kind.

I,. The ideas whioh Hume deals with are ohemioal elements partloul&rly
useful for co~positlon purposes. The impressions and ideas of Humo

f are as far from experienoe as they could be. Experienoe is not oonsti-

I tuted of these permanent rigid entities. In the entire diecussion of

H.ume no adequate desorlpt1or. is g1ven of the workings ot experienoe
t or any of ita parts. The assooiation school of psychology doea no~

l.- touch in any sense the exact functioning of the knowledge prooesses
t when experienoe goes on. The disoussion of t~e Passions aa well as

t the Understanding takes on an artifioial aspeot. The experienoes of

an indivldual are handled as by a cabinet maker wboputs together
distinct parts. There 1s no handling of an orga~10 proess Which is
very finely interrelated and adjusted in its parts. The period of
, {j'

Hume oould not appreci~te the genuine worth of an individual. There

were just the beginnings of an interest 1n the human characteristios
cf This growing but very inadequate a.ttitude is illus-
trated by the eoonomic theories prevailing. Hume attempts to refute
the idea that the wealth of a. na.tion consists of its money He
decla.res that a~en and comu;odities are the real strength of any
oommunity." There is & general emphasis upon labor as being the
souroe of power and riohes. The vlewpo1r.t just miseea the importanoe
of man as a faotor 1n the eoonomio world. H~e 1n common with his
eOi1re period 1n making of man and bie labor the souroe of power and
wealthdegraded him to the level of a commodity. Man is no more, so
far as his labor goes, ,than a commodity. Tne importanoe and dignity of
human persona.lity is not made muoh of. It is lost in the intrioaoies
of ita commodity va,lue. Hume together with his time overlooked in
their final viewpoint the true inner life of man with ita warmth and
color derived frem oomplex paaeione and desires. Hume spoke of such
matter, but in the end made his individuals ccnaiat of oold 11fe-
lee8 e.toms put together by eternal laws. Hume 'Nas a, victim of the
meohanical attitude which persisted in ~ie jay. The experimental
method of reaeoning which he sought to introduce into mor&l SUbjects
was a too rigid and abstr~ ot method fer handling genuine human nature.
The oa.~egor1ea of Huma are based upcn given prinolplee or facts
and are not elementa of experience. The ph1loeophy whio!l 16 reared
upon auch structures must be something other than a philosophy of
experienoe. The experienoe philosophy of the English tr~d1t1onie an
experience philoaophy in intent only. In ita implioation and es&ent1al
nature it is baaed upon presupposed elementa whioh are accepted and not

at all derived from the experienoe procesBes themselves. The world

of phenomena and peraona ia not evaluated in terms of itself but

rather in aooepted terms whioh are artifically impoaed upon the

world of experienoe. The dategor1ee of Hume as the beat representa-
tive of the traditional experienoe philosophy are log1c~1 categories
and not meaning oategoriee which are genuinely eXistential oeo~uae

they preeerve a vital connection with the aotual oonditione of

experienoe. The faot that th1a ki:.d of cr1tioism can 08 made of
Hume indioates th~t he stands ~or an attitude toward experienoe whioh
1s ~ore in ~ooord With experienoe than ~1&S previcualy the case. Hume
doee intend to evaluate experienoe in experienoe ter~s but his inten-
tion ie not fulfilled. In spite of his failure to work out a sat la-
f~~tory experienoe philoscpby Hume has done a oreditable work in
adv&ncing the cause of the eaper1ence tradition. It is oommendable
to be a preoise repre6enta~1on of one's period of oulturel develop-

I ment.


_CW. . (, .ill K .( it! t!, ,....-.m~:4M:n,. ti!&litih ji.JiG 2, ........ .%lM . . ! ttt _.( :U";4 .. i, i,1 . ..!..UA4tm;c,..t(SlUAAA::tU.-. =4t btn.;!
The Xan~ian Tr~dition.

In'the ~odern pet10d of philosophy there was established the

irrevooa.ble a.tti tude that reality Wfi.a ill some way or other given in
experienoe. The partioular formulations of philosophio theory aimed
to state jUBtwhat the nature of thi8 exper1enoe was. This at~empt

to state the nature of experienoe wa' more explicit than ira the pre-
experienoe period, when the rel~tioD.h1p between reality and exper-
ieno~ w~s unreoognized. The oonaoiou8 at~empt to state the nature
of experience a.s a formulation of an attitude toward it ie no better
exemplified tban by the '''9~ of Kant. Kant has achieved an UDSur-

passable plaoe in ph1lusophy by offering a definite and de~1berate

,.,\ ..,.cA/ f
a~t1tude tOW'3.rd experienoe f t h e v: ," stand point 0 exper-
ienoe. Innumerable interpretations o~n be made and an indefinite
n~ber of interpr':~ations of 'the Kantian philosophy are made, but
no more fruitful attitude toward it oan be taken than to consider it
as an attempt to establish the taot that experienoe is explai~ble

only by experienoe. The Kantlan philosophy is best looked upon as

a oonscious endeavor to evaluate the world in terms of the evaluation
prooess. The evaluation process is the prooess of forming judgments,
jUdgments which have their souroe 1n the facta of experienoe. The
.1~t J entire britiqUe of ;ure ~eason may be taken as an exposition of the

r<'" validity and invalidity of oertain jUdgments. The sum of

valid jU'igmente would give a. definite struoture to the objeots of
~ll ~he

I our experienoe. The line diViding the valid from the invalid judg-
I ments would mare the pOint of transoendenoe of experienoe. Kant's
point in the oritique 1s that our transcendenoe of experienoe must
., ineVitably reDult 1n error and oonfused knowledge. Kant spoke in

terms of knowledge asking what were the oriteria tor the validity
of knowledge. In his development of the problem the point comes out
thai in order that anf philosophioal attitude be vall., it must not
over8tep,th~ limits of experienoe. Kant~ae we ought to expect,
",'" C I <"

brings ~~lou~ lim1taticDs to his investigation by assuming the

nature of experienoe and that of the judgment funotion. Kant departs
very little from the ourrent traditional viewa as to both these prob-
lems. Kant's great oon~ribution liea in ~n~ fao~ tba~ he mad8 a oon-
so1ou~ exoursion into the problem of the relation or reality and ex-
perienoe. Kant ha~ the advantage over Hume in this respeot that the
latter is anewering with lea8 the surrounding experience.
Kant indioates a more aotive part1oipation in the solution of his
problem. Kant 1s a professional philosopher and it appe~re he looks

at his proolem with a great~r turden of reJponoibility. Kant feels

keenly the neoessity tor establishing a oasis for the na~ural scienoea.
Hume 1s indeed influenoed by the 80jentific development of the time,
but the effect is unknown to him. Kant sees the 1mpli~at1ona of
soience with a olearer eye~ The differenoe between Hume and xant
might be atat~d as the difference between one Who sees that all
knowledge must be reduced to experience though it bring~ d~e oonsequeno.
and cne Who cannot aocept the oonsequences and thus examinee the na-
ture of experience. The way to this work i8 indic~ted oy the aooepted
convlqt1on that reality and experience are closely ~ited.l Kant
could not aocept any euoh result as Hume did, relative to the pre-
(\T' \ CJ
,~1ousness of knowledge and experienoe. Kant's philosophio attitude
1 B developed under ccndl'tjons of rigid an '1 .;, 'j ( ' - ' :. aooial experienoe.
The natural scienoe aepeot would natur~lly eno~gh then h~ve a more
I.. '
-------------------------------_._~---- ..._--
lot. Kant, d. r. v. 2nd edition, Berlin, l'O~, p. 105.
. /
weighty int ruence than wa.s the caue w~ th Burne. Tilis prinoiple account e
also for the faot tbat Kant labore consta.ntly \.,1 th probleEls of the ")J y
" prlori)e.nd logical finality. The aim 18 to attain to a settled and

lncluDlve attitude, an attitude fJhloh will be weighty and perrr.nent.


}\!t/TLi..8 enipha.Di~ee ~lroblem of tlle lirn51. ts of know-

therefore the Jc,.netant
I .

ledge and experience.

The problem of fcr~ul~tin an attitude to~.rd experienoe for
t. Kant involved a statement as tc,. the nature of ezperience. K~nt at-

I tempted t c account for experience and 1n zeneral we fin:1 f.t. his work
a. clef'.rer re-cognitloL of what the ph1losophical problen.8 are than was
I the ea ee in Hume. In g:clng from Hume to 'Kant we observe tihe cllange in
t attltuQe from a pas3ive aooeptance of tbe rel~t1cn between reality and
, experienoe, and a.n active a.ttempt to explain this relatiom. In aaking
the !undament~l Casis of his work the ~ture of jUdgment gant seems

I, to
ap~reoiate m~ch

~y come to the
better the task that devolves upon the philo80pher.
o~clus1on that Kant got no fartrer than H~e 1n
the 8olution of his problem and yet may not be able to deny th~t 1n the
j s , ..r
bett~r etatem~nt of the problem ~ 1s oonsiderably in advan~e in
~ vlewpo~nt. K~nt makes himself extremely vulnerable to the oritioism
1 that hie judgments are entirely toe ab6tr~ct and log1c~1 and th~t the

,1 material whioh they }.'.r~ . ',<. is too fixed and rigid. Irn spi .. e of
this he is re3.chin; out for;:. basis for a. viewpoint 1s e.clilewha.t

-1 more e.\t isf3.otory than we.D that of HUlDe. In making. the jUflgment the
prim~ry principle of knowled;s ~nd experience, Kant gives a po~arful
1mpetuato the in7e~tigation of knOWledge. We haY~ not even yet gone
beyond the att1tud8 th~.t our experienoe ts organized into knowJ.ect;e by
means of judg~ent8.

I In Kant we find the 'Just definite atte~pt to expresathe at-

I, titude towards the world of experienoe in terms of an evaliuat1~n prooess
The valuat10n ~roceaa is indeed sUbjeot to sericu& li~lt~tlone In
t ha t Kant is ia:bued with a very strong logical of .3, forlllal
kirid, but it is highly oO!!:.!Jlendsblc $;.6 3. pioneering Qlovement. The
undialnlahed fame of Kant ~ay be attributed to the fact th~t he was
of the firat to realize the fact tb.~t a. e~cceaatt.:.l at titu.:l8tCllJarde
experience must be closely ~lllaj to an adqu&te analy~1a of the experlEm
J:.1: OOeg3. Hume did not get the :full force of the 1n"portafice of exper-
ience from this standpoint. The progress ill philosophical thi~klog

ccneibto primanly in underatanjing whlt the r~laticn is bet.aen the

re~lity wf coj~ct~ a~j the experienoe of them. Hume affirmed the rel-
ation but did net penetr~te very ~eeply in ita explicatlvD. In tnls
re sp ec t one might sa.y oo,.aiderlng the barest philosophic".;.l de s elop-
ment t~at Hume Bet Kant's problem. Kant 1eaarves oxe~it for' a~preciat
lng the problem s.nd o.tte.mptir~g a Bolut1oa. The~'e must be oonstantly
kept in l:d:ld the fact th~~t tee work of Hume and Xar~t ia {h t a. develop-
ment ~;on llnea oj strict logical ad~anoement out ~h~t t~~ spacifl0
differenced in the h~ndllng of ~he problem are due to differences in
the aocial exper1enoe under the ~uspic~a ~f whioh the par~1cular

view ia tormul~ted.

The f"lot th:lt Kant 1-..:11y at; the :pr:.blem of r91~t1ng

rea.lity ::l.nd ex~~r1enoe 1s indiurdoted by lia I::>rr::u1.ating hid t::o.ble of

c;lteborie~. Tnie ti')ls is intended to 3xhiolt the e onc ept e under
\\'h1ch a.ll experience may be e'!-osumed. T~~ list of cate;oo!'ie:.l lnd1-
catee t~e liffilt of experienoe In t~t they.~=~ preeu~posi:iona of all
e.<perl ence , Thl! cat agor1 es a r e i n a ~vay oLaa ... e 3 under \'\'hich are
placed the vc.ricue exper i ence s by z eana of judgments. The jud~ments a.s
iun:3t t cns of th(~ unde :"et:inding synthet 10 iuno~ ~0n3 whi en ol"f)"8.D1ze
the nanilolds of een o e wilioh are in the last ana.lysis the ma t er La.L of
all T,llh~t Kan~ attewpto to do in the E~lULlytic i~ tc i n-
dlC'.F.:.te th~~ ~ltim~l-ta jUdgment" j'thich WCHILd organize the .xperience into

an adeql~te aohe~e of knolwedge. This is the work of the understand-

, ing "to or:'ng o.rde r a.nd system into the world of phenoieene, by l;1~:lns

of j~gmentll. Kar1t int ended t he judgment d to be the eaa ent ia.l syn-
ti!esia of aotilcl exp ext ence , The oategories are the aprior1 c on-
tl'ibuticns of the I!llnd tli the knowled~e of any phenomenal vbjt'ct.
We might sUoy tho. t up to this peint K~,mt' s rlorl mesrrt a ccnsiderable
t advano eerent in the devalopm~nt 0 f philosophy. But Kant could flot
withst~nd the possible stigme ot subjeoturaion.
I 'I ,<.. t\/ Kant wau at he~rt n
t mets,Fh J'scl3.n and oould r.o t
. " X3St ee.tiafied "'ith a final referenoe of

t reality to experience. T~is brought him to the unhappy div16lon of

-'. / .~'.-i r.. ', ""
1 the world into the normal and phencmenaL, Instead of making Lia
world the organized experience of a.n individual in experience, Kant

brc\jfllt rnt c hie Byat em the 1llnknow?bl e sources of the two end :t'~ctors

in ~he ~~per~ence proce~a, namely th~ thing in itself and the aynthe-
tic ~nlty of apperception. When we consi~er this element of the Kan-
t ian f'hiloeophy ',<:6 can well ~gre.:.: that he Cii d not pregrees beyond
j Hume in the solution of his problem. iiume put s re:.lity frankly into
t. the flow of experience. Tz,1e Kant COSI;; a160 a.nd 'beth f;i7e fa.ulty
, description a;; to the nature of exper Lence ,
tr';!lI=hl"sics e l ement s which lb'ike it eV1ier.t that
Both borrow frc"lfJ


1 liance upor. experience in each ~~6ei 1s much cvereat1rrdted.

Ka.nttbDotion of 11 oatexory ccmee to be then a. rl~1d and un
, changing mold lr~to ':l~: t ch a.z e thrown the aena a !;;.'\ter1al ..~hich 'lore to

0& e.YIltileei~ed into objecta. From tt1a there rieee all the -{:lnt1an
t difI1cult1ee of the connection between ~uch little related faotors
J of experience as the 6eose\ oata., and the ca.te3:0rlea.

't", ,J-

; '"
ma t erial for Kant acmes to be fixed element s which ocnst! t ut e a
flux of qualities. The categories are uny~eldlng molda of un en-
tirely other sort. The difficulties tb~t Kant kne~ ~ere oont~ined

in hie viewpoint are well exhibited in the ~nalytlc by hia long ~nd

laborious schemes of connection. There ie lacking in Kant that organ-

ic view of experience which seee in the categoriss elementa to org~nize

experjenoe Which were developed frcrn previous experience. In general

Rbat Kant Nae endeavoring' to explain was not the world of experienoe
but a ',forld wllich ia an especial kind of experienoe. elup- Kant .'l9.B

ting to explain the world of physics ~nd not our e7eryd&y world. l
It ie for this reason th~t Kant was 80 obsessed by the fe~r that
!lis world would not be objective. There W!lS not eo zuch difficulty
with univere~lity. Were Kant dealing ~ith the world ~nlch we ordin-
arily experienoe, its objectjv1tywou11 'been a m3.'tter c:f no oon-
ce.rn for a.s e xper Lenc e i t is as objeotive a a it is.
No one '",ho
really 1de!.ltiI'ies reality and axps::dence ne ed fear for the o'l)jootlvity
of reality, there never arises the ~eoe8s1ty to overexert oneself to
anchor it in ~ny way. Experienoe is of 1t3s1f objective just a~ it
is ;verything else ths.t on-, demand.e of one' 8 world. Beoa.uae Ku.nt need-
,\ .iessly st r ees ed this objectivity thet 1s the fixity and endUIUbility
ie~tur~s ot his Weltanschauung, he mado it loae its most ea~ent~~l

charaoteristics, thuB becoming. arltiflcal. The c~tegor1es of Kant

a r e t nen in the highe:st aenae ca:;e;:or::'ee c f :~n obat ract philosophy not
categories of experienoe. Kant himself denominates them a priori
e Lement B preoeding experienoe. From the standjjo1nt of act1,;.,l.l exper-
ience they ~re unrelated elements of an ilolated discipline, the realm
of pure thought and as such detaoherl fro~ everyday experienoe
Kant was infected with the meoha.nioal science of the time. He

;. f

was an ardentfollower of Newton in the attempt to establish a firm

basis for the objeo~8 of experience. This inclination toward the
Newtonian Boience he aOQuired in his student period and never oould
relinquish. The meohanical ideal persisted as a 8ubtle Inf1uenoe '
'f../ '~'J ,,,-J \
upon Kant's thinking throughout his life. The~"8\O\1A\.uanun- ./ '.
doubted influenoe of.this sort. It 18 for this reason that Kant had
to have absolute permanenoe andneoessity &8 oharaoteristios of exper-
ienoe. The Kantian philsophy deals with experienoe aocording to physiaa
and not with exprienoe in the broader way in Which it actua1ly doee go
on. It is no doubt in thi8 spirit that Kant made the note quoted by
DIoh beBohaftigte mich nicht mit der Evoluticnder Ee~irre

wle 1btens (den Handlungen, daduroh Begriffe erzeugt worden) nicht

mit dar Analysis wis Lambert~ sondern blos mit der objeotiven G~tig
keit dersslben,el whioh indicates an extreme emphasis upon ~he objec-
tive validity of concepts. The historians of philosophy insist that
Kant's formalism is due to his too close the formal logio
of traditional times. Indeed we have evidenoes of this in ~he name of
the prinoipal parts of the Oritique and still more in Kant's expeessed
belief of his affinity with Aristotle. The fact seems to be, however,
that Kant's adherenoe to Wolf as Riehl points out and his olinging
to the formal log10 are interrelated condi~1ons with his Remton1an
meohanical idea.s all of which are rooted in the peculiar gemeraL ex-
perience which Kant attitudinizes. That Kant appreciated his strong
mechanioal attitude is well indioated in h~apparent chagrim at ita
limitations for he saw olearly what its difficulties were. The almost
pitiful way in which 1n the third Crit1que Kant is for oed to aocept
the teleological prinoiples for the explanation of nature imdlcates
how strong a hold the meohanioal princ1ples had upon Kant. Kan~
-- - ---- - --- --
Philosoph1sches Kritoizmus.
~;" r~~lizes the g~p which separatea the Batural Hiatory of th~ Heavens

from 1:1a Cr1 tlque of Judgment. Kant cculi build a. world. but he ,;vaa
1nc~pable of putting into it a Dingle bl~je of grass. There could
be ~o rr.ore certain ev1dence of the inadequaoy of the Kant1~n vie~poiDt.
1 ".
TherJ is in this ceroumstance olearly disoernible the f~ct that the
Kanti?~ attitude tow~ri experience ~ith ita founiation in the c~te-

gor ie is an Lnadequat e vle'J!;;,oi:-. t. This is e. poin t at w;;ich Kant might

alll:ost have seen th3.t h1g scheme of knowledge W'.s una.ble t;j give deter-
mln~tl.:.'j tc experience. This :1efect in the v3.nti an forniul.;;.tion ~;.s of
course ohvl::'luFJ in h1~ a.tte:::J;t to deal ',71th the Iact3 of the mor~l 3.ud
re11 6 i ou 9 life, but th~:9 the d1:feTenoe in kin,i. of 6x-":"erlence .;.igbt
be adn.; t ~ei aa a ju~tif1able e;round. for In .ie:l.llr.~ .:1 th
the org3.nlc and inorganic there i a t ne cont Lnuoua f1ali of r.3.ture
:ie~l t ":1th ani still the rla:~.e ae t of C3. te~or ie:'! are 1.u:2.'01e tc cc: ...;r~-
hend t hem ,

Kant'Q ju~tific~ticn ~igtt .'ome in the f~ct th~t ~fter ~~l he

i s at '~e ..: t1 n 6 to eat :.bllsh a seCUllB bas La fOt: ~hya1 e a , In so far ;l.~

thg,t i.; true l:e 1 s cf cccr se ie: It-: g 'rl til a .: a.rt iC'.:l-:-~r aspe c t of ex-
tel' Lence J an .1 t ~1~.! t may '!ellbe fort-ul tel j, T. the for:::3.1

other. For ax;:.q::le, it n:1ght be argued th-:l t tirre and sk~ace sLot.:.J i be
t"lce""i i~ tte :1at of C's.t:3gor1e!'! itt. qu~11ty~ q'.le.ntit;; ",T: .. t::e ethers.

a jueti:ic:'ticl').?~ 10 lr.~r~tic.ned cannr.t ::::r.~titl..1te an '."ie=.u':.te 1aience

aftha K~nt~ln poo1ti:n. The un!erlyl~g ~otlv9 of the tr~noce~:J~-

Golve tte iroble~ of the rel~ti~n of r2~lity ani experience. If tt19

be the ng of the Kant1s.n philosophy it ir.eiit s a.ll the cr t ti ciem
of 1n~i~~uacy an1 aritificiality ~hlch is bro~ght against it. There

1s f'ou-'1d in !~'1nt t he bol1~Bt aevar -mce of 'lilG ;! '-:peri :3nC!3; -:clch

cur r en t en the cont t nerrt fx-:m the ti.J.e o! T'erH~artea tll:~t ~;'Jr..uind l,:el11ty

t.he h1er'1rchy of t he pl1'e G:Ji3n~39 ....


rel1.te.i ~.n~ e,::!.:;r'~hen.iei. '::y n:~~m.' (~:r ~';.t'.tnGlrl~:3 9, 1'.:1'::)1:1, t ne r c C.~ ',Ii
be no ce'~f;':ir_ty of -:e''..J.:lty. T},;IS cr:i:.el'l,in of r.l-jeot'!:ve va.1Lilt~ :.~

subjective, ~9 '1::3.9 l~oiT.ted cut. Kant'e ~"(Jrl: in th} laet;l!C :0-

frc~ expe~lence an1 J. rric.r1.

---- - ----_ ... ------------------------------------------------- ------_. ----- ~-

lOf. Arctlt~cton10 af Pure Reason.

/' l

exper ience as ret\li t y , are not flexi "ole ani runct i cns.L fact or A in the
organization of experience. The cate~oriea of Kan t ar e the n.os t ab-

atr~ct concepts unler which may be comprehenjed the kini of experience

~ which the science of physics treats of. It is ~ossi~le to conceive
~ll experience being aubaumei unle: those categories if af~ce ~nj time
,~ be 'added; but tben e xpar I enc e would be hard and, cold. No 1 i vi:15 pul-

a~tin6 being could recognize th~t experience as be1~6 what one lives
t~rough ~~d is affected by. The philosophy of Kant co~es to be an at-
r. titude toward experience which reduces it ~nj eeatr9Ys it, making it
unrecognizatle ani in a genuine senoe ur.real. The ca~egorieH of Kant
cannot 5. eal wi t~ the obj ect s and pe r sons that t rie numan thinker ac-
tu~~ly 1s concerned with. The vie~point of Kant 1s o~viously ponderous

of for~ulating experience. In the ievelopment an~ tr~nspiration of

experience the categories do not Flay ~ny ~art. They xay function in
the special discipline in Which cert~i~ as~ectsof experience 3Xe
strictly formulated. The imme:li9.tt3 succe seor a tjf Kant made lnci:~i'le

cri ticiems of Kant be cau ae of ~;he e x t r eu.e lirr.i t3.tior.s of the Kan t i an
position. While we c-mr.c t ayn::;ati7e tee much ':lith L1e tenor of tndir
COr! we may remark upon tie ext vulner9.oility of those cat e-
goriea to the charge th~t they cannot aiequately organize experience.
Cate~orie~ should give experience ac it ia ~n~ sho~ll r.ot te li~ited

The categories should be repreaent~-

tive of ~ll the ha~pening9 ani cor.jiticn8 which go to make up the life
of an in~ividual or a group.

The funct1onr~1 na.tur e of the 'K~ntl~ c'J.tegorle C1 lies not in

their repr~aentatlon of ex~er1ence ~o it 1~1 in its es~ent1~1 n~ture.

The foundation of philosophy had net r eached in hin time the 8.I:;:-recia-
tlon of Lt n oan a.ctivity and signlficg,nce. The funotic.'nal nature of
the oategories in Kant in illustratei by the ohan~e8 they have taken
on~ in order to portray faithfully the so01al baokgrouni which gAve
them their origin. The categor1?R of Ka.nt indicate only :\ slight be-
ginning in the ,:1evel(,pment tow:~rd the polnt at which they trill funo-
tion as e~aenti~~ eonponent s t'! experience. Thin 19 in:lic9.tej by the
fact t~h1..t th'3 Kantlan oategorlcHl n:.7I.Y t~ oona1del'e1 merely a.3 eSll~n

ti:3.le in the formulation of tIle rhysic::tl ieflcripticn of experience.

Ttey 7;il~ not ce:rry over to the rest of ex!'erienoe. the ccr,:!1 t; ens whioh
~: brought abcut ouch a ior~at1~n as Kant's were tha pecul1az ~oci'~

anj f~11t1cal eX~9rienoee of the GeIm~n ~eoplG 3t th~ time. The formal
. s ,
and ...; eighty at ti tude tOV/3.rd experience refldcts a. rigid. an:i OOll:P:i.Ot

st~~e. The K~ntian pbllosofhy W~8 i~velopa~ unier ~o11tical auspioes

Vihich ue v~ell oylt'tolized. b}' tile lenderohilJ of Fr:ier1ok the Gre.i.t.
The G~rn::ln nation ;).t tl:ia time 'Rae t ak Ln.r on 3. severe n st rc na), unity.
Tt:.e Ger!l:1.n people ~ere becr:.r.:in.; c:ira.eulousl, ei;ieient an.t or gant zed ,
.. . , -; ' . ~J .1 " J I,.' rJ /,
: '"I..t (,"". l'~~i, ~'. ~',.~ ., ~......: I .e-' ..A / lr,', .~ ..r- c~ r, . . \
The ::rellm1nu.r:; ateco in the es ta.bli :'Ihrn:~r.t (.,f a aecur e Gerroa.n; aut one-
~. moua an t conseqm~ntl~,l I:0"1er. The 'lttituie C.'I vigorouB anJi deflnlte
7~ su~st~ntiallty ~as a reflection of thl~ new political ocndit1on. The
~ 1

ca t egor Les of Kant f3.notionl~g as e a s en t La l cor::roncntr3 of 1,,1(3 attitude

a.r a explai ned 90 far as their }CrUianenoe 3.n1 eubat'!.r, ti>;lli ty are ccncezne
Th$ e:el1er3.1 a.t t1 tude of Ka.nt in placln.~ ilO g.r~'::,t a 1=art of his 9xperlerao
on the ald.e of the exper1eno1ng indi ~11 11.13.1 reflects thd eocial con-

dit1cna Of this perioJ ~l~lo~-1nclu1e religious literty ~nd fr~edo~ of
thought. Frederiok made the gre~test efforts to bring culture and
learning to hie regenerated kingdom. The greatest enoouragement was
given to science and indu~try. Under this king Ger~any ceca~e an In-
'.i.uetrial na.tion ~d the p'U,,~u1 i; of r-roduct1 ve occupat t one gave iSrea.'t

tur e , Th~ expar Lence e of the ,.;opla were g.cea~ly con t r i cu ce-r t c by
their own na t ur e s ~9 r a tL:m:~l iJeh'lgs. Th~ :~:e of. F r eae r 10k ';V::La :-:1. ~ic U,66 and the poiloaophy of the J:srioJ '.-:13 t1n5e.i ~ 3re:::.t
Ii :'e'llo;lth the Ralilona,11stia a.tti t ude , As in pr eva oue h1~'ltorY'l .Jolld

ani firm aocl~l org~nizaticn ~i~e3 ri3~ on tha ~hilonopLio~l 3f~e

to ~ stern intellac~uali~tlc vlew~oiI~t. Ttia ~a9 true in th3 C~Je

of Aquinuil and the st:Cl.L1Zly o:cganize'l aocial situation in ;:.13 . .... "
l .., .....

father3.n1, regul ~ted. The reaul t of cont ae t '",i til t i11~) sort cr '3 :)c1al
orzanlzatlon could o r..l y c e th'3 Jevelopro~nt of an ;J.tti tuje ",vhlc:i 'lhould
be ! and abstract sucn a.s the philoaot:.ny of K9.nt":ile. rfle :Jh1~o-

soph~' of Ka.nt ajlllirably reflects the aooia.l con H t r onu of (

I, It ae.rvaa 30190 a."' an excellent illu<J:r:lti,:m of ',iI.3 i:1Ct t'l1.t t ae valum

a9cribeJ in the datermination of experience ar, functl~n6 of ~h~; ex-

In t. e phll::sophy of Kant we observe two aape c t3 ',;hl ch in-
jlc~ta olearly the tranaition place wnicn Kant ocou~ie~ i!l ~ne nietory
of philosophy. The oonsciously formulJ.tei ca.eegory doctri!le poi'its
back to the nl.trual soience development of con t tnen tar thouJ"ht. The
c:,.~agory doc t r t ne whic'tl i~ impl1.ed in Kant' a philosophy re~t1{J\."ll for-
w~t'd a.nd forma the baais for German ph1l:oolJhy in the nineteenth cel!1b.ury,
In K~t there ia distinctly discernible the confliot bct~een the old

-nd new vle~po1nts. Kant was not a traveller but he was a oit1een
l .~'

of the ovor1i. !{~t '7~9 ~ t.1 11l'l.11ate1. bj' 'Flume :Ml.l Rou.seeuu .~' .,~ll ~a

for Kant t s philosophy refl eo:a well the t i (;l1A (If j. ttl fOl'ltlUll.\tion.

The Y.n.ntian Co.ts c:orici:1 1:.11 tho::. 1)1'.\.0113 of j-I~e a1.titu.J.e ~nJ. l'er:1.6ocnting

il~_'1r: been mor e in tte ;;at ~.:ern of the Hume ~.nd Rouace su influence , but

~BR a streng factor. The ostegories th~t K~~t unco~s~1:U91y uoeo

af1 6t"oun:! prinoipleo of h5. E\ ayElten: i n,li c ~te e. more human fc..rn:ulatlon
t han he is ere ~i tei w1 t h. Th:.... t e I. emen t of l(!.:.nt ';' :.:.3 :1e~;alofed

t "ne ,~~e~ i i .., Cf .t'na

-.... nn nz nineteenth century.
he 1c ec no t c~ll by t~.3. t nan.e -md \':t1 en e a qe~tj. '~1 for hie aye tam
re;:: e eent bet .er '.71:~t rcm t cigr.i fiee fer the hiB tory oJ! ~hilosc,phy"

thu.n h:b osn for~ula.ted ee t , Kant' a own oa.tegol: i e s anew lJ9 100011 con-
\i1 wiens 't~t r.o tall tba ir:fluencGa that Jli:s,.Je themu~lvc~ felt. Tnt!

fcxmul2.tej, Kant1:..n oate~or1eg iniic~te the e:ttreme ~oli tl~aJ. crien-

t a t Lcn but net .he ~Hecble s oc I a I con,:!1 tlcn3. Th3 unfol'rr.ul :l.t~l KiJ.n-
ti""n cil,':e;oriec of ~jh'3 Thir.i. Critique ~nJ otl-:r.:r "'Ii :'In.;a ar o bettel'

rel"~'r} '~ent~tivaa of the 1.,trlnsic sooial condt t Lona , The for::lulated

o~tajOrie8 do not 10 justice to the Kant who clal~ad to t~lng about
~ Copefnio~ii revolution. Tha fO.L'r'lulatal ~ateg'oriaB ac no t .i'evea.l th e
pr e s ence of the pie Lis tic eldi1i,~nIi in the Prusaf an ~ocii).l e cc.nomy ,

thd,Oi.'ld o r expel' Lenoe j. a 151 yen \l.r.J the jU1gments 0 t a thinker.

The 9xtretr.el/ close connection between rea.Ii ty ","8 e xper i enc s and. the

thinker who is aware of his experienoe, nas overlooked by Kant.

The suocessors of Kant developed their attitude toward ex-
: perianoe upon the basis of Kant. intentional and un~lftl1ed dootrine
rather than upon the dootrine as he formulated it. Kant may be reok-
oned as the stimulant to the 1evelopment of German Idealism but it could
not develop on the basis of his extreme naturalism. The followers
of Kant soon found grave objeotions to the oategory dootrine of Kant.
They came to consider philosophy more and more a8 a system of logic
and made more of the knowledge problem.although the categories them-

is reversed~ the citizen does not aoquire his standing by virtue of

membership in the state, but the state becomes important because of
the individuals who composs it. The disruption of Germany ~y the
Napoleonic activitiea in Europe made this attitude stand out. The

f individual stands out more and mors as the centre of experience.

I .
philosophy of Fickte may be considered as an atte~pt ~o derive all

j experience from the natuxe of the individual.
able as an attempt to interrel~te
The method is describ-
and unify the total experienoe of
an individual. The distincUon bet~een .he moral and the natural was Iieali.:ta lnten.ied to:; e11:;1rl~te. The .ilvleicn ;:e: een tC.'3 noum-

tee Jeve:i.opmen~ of the eye.

V'oJ -"'V~
b.L oJ "
_ ... .,."
Lv ...., +1'''r01'
"....... 'h~~'
..&_.l.j .lc ,i':l'.l ':"rm

to the ty;e of attitule ~ich Ficl t6r~~ forroul~tlng. :ne ;enerLl

tren:i Cof G rni<:l.n I 1e:.t.11sr:...: 6 tr~ ~:::i the lo,:-:-1~'1:z;in-:-
\'.' ~
of the attltu1e
'i.oj.ri e xr er rence , 'rhe 1!fl~:stuu tt,.t;~~, reoeiv.::;j in the at~it;lj.e Y':-'

~ 3et 0: c~~egorlc. In 2egel the ~hQ16 of exe:ience 1e cc.;caed of

:1. s e u of ca t~~cri e: ',r" j. Of'. ievel q; f:ro:. 0:".:> anoth:~r b; n.eans C~ <.... ilaleo-

11. it

.:_ -
U :.
- ,. - -
.. ~ ~ ., : 1 g'ht
1"' _~'.
........: .: . ....... -:-.
." - J> ""

.' lav-
~ ~~ .~
. i .:> t ,.. , .
& .... ~ ~ .., - t,,;;

re .:ie!; e r.9. t '3-1.

v,. -~, ....
........ 1 .. :,.

makir.~ . .l'"
ience it ael f ~.

..lJ. ,l

- r,.l. I ::l
.._t t: i -: =J :i
......-.1"" .....

":'~ an t tn !J.t tit u . :ie - .... "

'tl .:;.,. '':l:

'. '.... _

" : "r.-:,
' .,. .
" -;,- ~
.. __
... '';'', ~~ "-'.-
, .. : :: '2'

in :-::: ;. ;' - - ._...

,.- ...... ~., J

- ",..'"

1 c; 1J too i ! - - '-'",,...
v .i .. \...
.. ......
_~_.:. .. ,.

t c:.. .':::r j .1 .... ~..

. "';"'.

~_. ex e.~ ... ~.

~ -r
r.' ............
1s all cont~lnlng. There wae for Hegel no que~tion of otjective
validity of the oate~oriea, for they w~re all the obj~ctivity there
waa. The oategcr1ee ~ere for Hegel of the stuff of experienoe. Hegel l;r~ught to a. systematio and et.;l.ndardiz.e:i atti tude the riotow view-
pulnte current after the Kan~ian for~ulation. Hegel 1s reJuol~? to
a eyateh:atic organization the jUigments concenning experienoe. Coming
aftel' the Idealistio and. Romantic atti he :lake<":! no :liscrimi.nation
ag3.inst a.ny type of experience but make: thell', ~J,1 sU1::j e ot t c ).etermi-

n~tion by the oa~egorie8.

Tlle gravest cr1 tldiam thTt C3.n be made of He;el' 3 c::tte~orlee

1 S iihat i;hey are atil tel concep t s , .:1 ;:;s t r ac t and eq:.ty. 'rhe CJ. t egor Le s
of H3gel are inoapable of representing experience or of ~eing e~~erience

for they are fixei and .Ie a ti tute of 11 fe unt po-ver , 'L'\e alte?orlee of
Hegel ar: lO~'ic:al abstr3.ctior,a ani have nc ccnnect i :.n ith expel.'lenoe
except by expr e s ~ attribution. '.I'hey ar e r.ot in their levelopment
'lIh3. t Regel cla.imed for them, n:?:.mel it th:l t they are expez mce , 'rhe
cat egor Les In.Tle no ext e t ence in re-:..l1 ty and. exist (;nJ.y as cOLce,t.;td
in th.;; inti of a. ttl nk er , :\9 categories ueve i oprn; aCl,;oJ...:l1n~ t\) the
He~eli an formul~"'I.t1 on they are rr.e l.a.:t:hy3ic<1.. ent i ti >30 belon?ing tv an
abao Lu . e "':'lich 1~ a transcen1ence of 3.ny 1' -!l'i..J ne experience. Hegel
\"'3." ciifted wi th an unuaua.I l y keen inBi~ht into the Onc~Qii.g of eXfier-
ience. He cbne.... ve.j the f,:.ctthat t he dXferiel'lOe ~rcce:;r. guar an t e ed 1ts
C,H. obj '~0 I;i v e vd.lidi ty. He at nerved a160 th~t exj.e r Lenc e in ita
entireliy coula be 61 veri rn the for~. of jU.igmenta. The; orli of ex-
~erienc2 coull be given in terffi5 cf u aeries of valuse or ~eterminat1ona

w1:ich I.ere tt.a reoul "j3 of J udllLent pr oc e are e , Hegel's ui 0 t ake lies in
g i vi n g an a b u o . ut Lye p e rn.anen t exi atnce ani inf1ni ty tr ~;i n e x j . e r i e n c e ,

He erra 3.]0{1 lr: n;akinz experience an absclutely ~iven sy at en, or occur-

rences tending to~ard a goa.l fixed fr~rn all time. There is no freedom
r and no spontaneity in the experiende of Hegel. It leoka the very
BS "entials which are con81 tut1~ of genuine experience. Hegel's
forward zter is breaking down the artificial barriers of Kant's judg-
ment fuctions is vitiated by his eSgent1ally metaphysical att1tude.
The categor1ss of Hegel are not of experience but would seem to be
superimposed ~pon experience. They are ObViously logical determ1n~

tions to 7rhich aotual experience is made to oonform. thy are not de-
terminations of experienoe whioh are developed in an exper1ental in-
teraction of objeots and events. Hegel thinks of his categories as
being neces~ary elements of the prooess of experience. This can be
true only if experienoe comes to be a metaphysical movement of abstraot
entities. Hegel had a keen Bense for the n:ovement of experienoe. He
saw olearl)' the part plaled by the 1n11vidual in the ;'rty of forming
jUigmente. This difficulty came in aocribing such overwhelming val1d-
1ty to the objectiv1 ty of the jU:'t;n:en~~ th:i t the jUdgmen": 8 wer e merely
expressions of the re~lity of some phase of an Absolute. He~el's ex-
per1ence, instead ~being tae tDdet~T~inate result of ~ indefinite
aeries of preceding conditions became the ~bsolute unfolding of an
inevi table series of eventa the goal of '.':h1ch <a.s determ~.ned fruM the

beginning. Hegel did not then advance beyond. Kant. He 8~.W clearer
than did Kant that the entire experience must be sUbject to the jUig-
ment proces 'es of the experiencing individual. He ~as o~;osei to Kant's
separation of experience into appearance and reality.l Hegel saw,also
that experience must develop f r om othe::- exper Leno e e . ~ia dat?.ke ';':'3.8

in injecting an absolute necessi ty into tl.cse experiences and rr.a.k1r.g

lLoglc, p. 93.


them all tend to':"tu-d some detern-.ined. mat~.physloal go~. In S('l fru- as

K3.n t !"i;;r~11y :l~sori bed the prooes ~ of jUd~ment l!\f1 he B~\\'l i t ~n:i rl:;;. te
it an es'ential el~rnent in thought, he avoided any harmful implinatione.
In eo f3.r a9 he did not make these jUj~mentB and o~te30r1es exi.atential
Kant avolied the metaphyaic~l lm~11o\tion9 of Hegel. Both Kant and
Hegel 8.:3 rei:resentativeB of a OO!'tlpa.r~ltlvely reoent tendenoy in philo-
Bo;hy ccntribute muoh bhat is valuable to an unierst~niing of thp. 9Val-
uatlon t=:rocesses of expe r t ence , but betil 1v1nZ un:ier o:)n:i1t1.r~ns va'l"V

dlffer,.nt fror.. these prevailing now , have very unsa.tisfa.ctory 1ne:cpre-

tatlons of the genuine signifioanoe of human e~erlenoe.
Current Phllooovhlcal Att1tu1eB.

Analztical Tabl~ of Contents.

In C\~rent philosophy therz 1s an avo~ed ~ppreci~ti~n of the faot
that reality 1s to be sough: fer only in which cons19ts of the
I "..~:;.'
~ ;.~
actual conditions and events of everyday 11fe.

I~. ~'.
..' s'


.- .
Phllooor-hy 1~ the nineteenth ce~tury ani after became at various
times merely scientific or adcp t ed an ethic3.I or a.esthetic atti tude.
The lIe': that re',li ty wboul.i not be 9:)ught in a. domain. beyQT')d. the vr-
dlnary experience brought V"1 th it the a.dd.ttlonsl consequence th-;.t phl1-

e~ophy could te reduced tc a mechan1c~1 sc1ence.

A rCiltiQT' to tho na.ively
r.:ech~nic3.l in~er':")retat5 on oi ~y:;:~r-
'; ~ '..'L
. , lence came in the forr; of a :net:t.phynlc8 '::hich Bought rea:i ty ou : ";;1.1.8
the dOlUs, t n of sct ence , Tl!5 C',r:1inary knm':ledge proce!"-l'!'Jes which ',~ere

iuncti.cnal in pcience vrer e preoun:e,l to be Ina.deqt:.,".te for the lnvestlga.-

tion of r:>ality.
. ~,
There.a.l~e no':d:~velop1ng in philosophy t~7o !:-ronament .9.ttltud8S
"o':7Ud experience whm aim to ccrrec:t the prevlr:,u3 1nsu.ffiolencis1 of
'; philosophy. These t~o movem~ntg rnw be termed Neo-Reallam and Pragmatism.
liea-Rea.lism asaumes that re'l.l obj~ct:', ar e independen~ of the
evaluation pr ocesr and the ca t.e -cr I e s ar s ~lementfJ 1nber~nt in t'e1
things. This reeul ts in a oonception ~... h1'ch make a of the c::...ts30l'ies
" abstract ontologlc~l elements. The Nea-Rcaiotio po~ition beoomes a
silr.11a.r vi e ''.!Po1nt to the r.~t icnallatl c philonophy of the geventesnth
In Pragmatinm phl1090phy s.rrl ves l.t thethorougly baar o f;r1n-
c1ple th;:'l.t :1.11 reality mua t be oc,ught only in the dom9l.1n of ac:'ul.l ex-
perlance. Pra.graatians l'eoogn1ze th9.t the categories of philosophy are
eva.luations of the facts and conditione whioh aotua.lly ooour in human
experi~nce. This a~titude haH led ~o the situation that it is considered
tl"jat a.J 1 evaluations ~f experience lJ.1'e thoBe which the practical soienoes
pr oduce , Ther~ 19 in th1. a.t tl tude an obvious ornie'lion of a. grea.t par"
of experienoe. There is overlooked all of that experlen~e which falls

wlthcut the of the special Boianoes.
To a.1~preci~.te the f\lnctlc)1'~l na t ur e of the catee;orlee there

~;! rju~t be differenti:tted be tween the variouR moti-ves and. ot r cumetancee

\nhlch ea.ll fOl' the, funotioning of the eV8.luation !='rooe,qn. R'ach realm
'; .c_~,:~
of experienoe serves ito own evaluations for the rartieul~r purposes
~':hl ell the epe~l fie ei tuation required..
The oategories of philosophy in oorn'on with all other categor-
1~~, are flmctlor.~l valuc~ given to the f~ctB and nonditicns of ax per-
i ence in an effort to determine their moot general an.t profound. signif-

ioanoe. These categories de~l ~jth aotual oonilt1one of experienoe just

~a the oategories of ordinary experienoe and scienoe do. The differ-
ence s between thelia are funotiona.l, each type Bervin~7 ::,-9 an important
instrument in the life of a thinker.

~ ..

.J '~.


Current Philosophioal Attitudes.

In our -en t t~Qught l1e hwe the more ora leaa conac t oue reoog-

t~.ken to-:o:arj c'tperienoe. l'fa have r eacaed 3. !J t:I.~:3 1n p~11o~oph1cal

or acce~.t, o'vertly the ext ~tence of m;:'1t;l"phY91<:-s,1 rn~.11 ty 3..1 though a belief

in 1 t 1 a frequently the r~sul t of an a;-pA.X 'lnt1 l or1!. i~ 1.1 sta.rt 1ng point.
Current l)h11osophy the:l tA ~':,j.l'3tinguj.;lhed by the f".!oot ::hat it isa,wue' of
itoelf :;.~ an :tt::er..::t to forr:.ulata tL:": 131gnifiot:!..noe c! ~he events and
obj eot M "h1ch connt tl tue the exp~rj ental env1routrl-:!nt of :!:e thinker.
Ph11on.::r-hy rna.:,. be to 'te easenti "1Jly cvncerne:l '''1 th the explanation
of the cr~1ns.ry phenomena of avert~:.y l1fo, tOl.nd not i'lth cx1stenc:as ..,
~"7h1ch do r.o t , and canr o t make tllelllaal V8R fel t in or i'nfJ.u"nce the
tl-.Ct\lghts s.n:l ac:tlcns of irl::l-;ldu~~. Tt.1~ attltl.. ~r ma.y b ; taken
to t.e the ori tar1a.n of va1id. philooo;-t.. icgj. t~oug:.t f:.i.:l in c fu as
thinkero dev1ate t~o~ that ?&ttern they f1fl ~o c0~tllbute to the
Golutl~n of the philosophic problema of the pr~eent.

In ?~lJ this the the~is '115 ~:V; beenllP.mtatllng n9.mely, tt~.t the
a t e i tude t01.":tr1 e7perience mUGt 'b13 speciflc9.11y infJuencej cy that
expcr i ence , finis expeci~.l c~nf1r!'l:':tt.l::,"" in current thcu;:"t.
Current ph11oa0I:hy even r o the r r~AUI:'.ed. .r '" j ~C'tl':-n of it 'ldmir-
ably refleota present coniltiooa in th3 organi7.atl~n ant ~c~1vie3 of
pr e sen ~ ~~'J.)' !300 ~y. The ca ':egorleA ..,1 tb '7hlch exp e .1enc~ are eV9.1uated
injicate clearly the trend of $o~la1 co~ilt1~~9 aa they h~ve Jev3lopea
out of 'pr~vl~ .. ~ actl~ltla9
, 'Ul.-1" situationo. The98 cat~~oriea ' the

pro:\uots offj1ffe::-ent c7,ni1 t1 onn .1.- ~ 00 ar o d1 f ferent i:" their 11ent1 ty.
. I
1nj 1n their a1;nifio~ce. They either are different tDlues attaohed
to experience or they are 3im1lnr values with ad1e1 or ~ltered signit-
icance. The c~tegories ~bich oonstitute cer~ai~tormul~tlcns of attl-
tuiee tow~d experience ~e taken over dl~eotly frou. Gc1ence. In other
formul3.t1ons the categories take on connotat t one trorr. le:H~ 01'1 tical
2'.tti tudes to"'T1.1'd.experience. A special charoloter1otic p1'" I-:reoent-dA1
philosophy 1s that the:e Is a violent antipathy toward categorizing
the world of experience in intellectualistic ca.tegorlen. Th~re is
a general antipathy expreB~ed,ir.
the pub11shed vie~points
. \
to the
evaluation of .xparlenoe in terms of the oold abstraot categories of
the intelleot. This antipathy haa be~n oarried to the correlated
extreme of placing too great an empha,sis upon the praotical 1Uues
of experience. Ther, are ~eclied tendenoies to give experience a super-
abundent Yeight of aot1vi~y. The Voluntarletlc ~epects of experience
are stressed in on extreme way. M~n has been ola~sifIe~ a~ a 10ing
animal rather than a thinking animal Which, it is asserted, haa beeD
tra1itionally g1ven aft his/characteristic. l Reality has been eonsidered
&s entirely without the comprehend1n~ bounin of th~ intelleot. The
~orld h~s be~n ccnsiderei as p~irr~rl1y ~ oenter ~nd ~ OOUTee of ~ctlv-

ity. The intellectual functions ~:e subservient to an.:i ierived from

this Volunta.ristic baokground. Reality 1a taken to be thin eternal
~otlvity rather. than any prooeD~ cr series cf pTooeonec of intellectual
relationships. Experience 10 fT~q\1ently evaluated in aesthetic oategor-
ieee The world is taken to be 9. lIarvel1oLH~ 'J7'orl:~lof art I,":r:loh. i:! constan
1y being ore '?:t9d ?..nd reoreated. 2 The Volun tar! Atlc and ae s ehe ~lc move-
mente in philosophy reprcment nttituje~ of prot4st ag~lnat conceiving
the world entirely in terms of mental c~n9truotion. Thoae ~ove~ent8

- --- --- --- --- --
lBergaon - Cre~tive Evolution, p. 139.
4l0vertly' in the phIlosophy and imp1101 tly i.n o'ther systems
mean 'to empha.sise the other elemente which play prominent p~rta in
An 1netruc.~'ti ve char ar-tier i f'tio of practica.lly a.ll reoent tend-
enc i ee in lihe,tJ.ght. indicate an ~~pprec~.a.tion of ;'.ctna~. cxpol'ience as a.
bl1.H1a or CtY(lllt1 tuent of :"sal i -;'1. The a.VTarelnett7: of rerw,1 ty is 2.SSUDSd
to te 1=.oa~ihJe only by a, s";;udy of t~a r:1.C~9 of conorete exper t ence ,

T1::.16 a.t t1 tu:le ir:lplie::'\ ~~ part1c1.:,1~r
.' .
kind of exp er Ierioc 1iacke::oun.i, 1 t
'1:1 tl1 r e opec t to che longel! aspe c t a of : 1 fc a. 9t:'"t~ 0 noc1~1 or-
de r , The histo:ry of atti tU(le8 torard sxper i.ence 1 ndic"'.ton thi),~. when
o ond.t t ~ one hwe 'be,=l'l such as t o ti.!tke man feel tl-,oroughly j I~ trer.ehed in
tl!e11' p La.ce '11 the "orlcl. ~ more or leor-t oert3.1r. ;"tti 1ju 1e 1s ~~rtol1ted.

qtwh e.ttitu;lee a!?! t;he m',.t1.\t"',)1atio an.t positivistic dOTL1:'l?.te ths thought

()f the p<::,.:ioj. In the la~g ori t1cfl.l att1 tudes the f:lctn of ('xrerienoe
()rk ..
of~h.e tM.nker is to record. them
S.:>~oul~tl(Jn 1)eCc,r:.A9 an object 0:' ~uApeo1on and the atti t'..::.:i'J ig ~.U':etl
:. ~

tInt soience .Ls -entirely oompe t en t to .'le;~l ~l th al J tho f:'.ots cf cx-

~'~tr~ct physioal aalances.

The whole of experience is cla~~if1ed as
va.rla. u ,t ons of
J ,I,
mafl~ .~n:i na.-~~.
<: ~. \' . ':'be ::rorninA:'"lt ea.tegorlsa of such att1-
tu,~,e~ , f:.rce, energy, tir'e. ~n"1. ape-toe. l Un'19r other cc,!:ditiona there

,t may be a revolt ,iga1nat tnl") tYre of attitud.e an:1'1e~pe~1e]'lce rnr:ty be

char act ar Lzed entirely 'in terr"s (')f o onnc i on snenn , Thn ultimate c3.tegory
u.i3ht be sentience or spirit of Bcme acrt or OthST.2
The und:.-ratand.1n~ of t),e n"-l+t're cf exper t ence 10 /)orr'9t1-'e~

lOElt ir.. the zeal to ael!e hoI'! cf 1 t , Th19 :t1spoR1 t1nn to :"ltSl{6 ~very

thinl upon tte ~ropositlcn th~t r~~11ty 13 ~o be fou~d only in sxp.er1enae

--~- -- - -- -- - --- - - - -

lRecent Poal t1v1etic and phel'lon"en.-,1'r:-t1c movements.

sometimes results in serious error. There have be,:"D attitudes developed
whioh deny that all experienoe bas reality especially-the more reoondite
&~he less obvious aspeots of it. The result 1s that experienoe i8
to 80me aspeot or part and this is deolared to be the entire
realm of the knowable. What lies beyond this arb1tra.ry enolosure i8
oonsidered of no v,alue. The world is div1ded into the praotioal and
the speoulative and sinoe life is oonsidered a8 an eminently praotioal
thing Whatever seems not e:e1ly attainable 1s deemed not worth striving
: I; for. The adherents of suoh attitudes miss muoh of rea.lity beoause
they loae interest in eve~hing but that whioh is brought about by
qu10k methods. Thele attitudes are born of conditions whioh make for
self-satisfaotion and oompleteness. Here is the presence felt of a
power to d.ominate a.nd oent rol phenomena. Theee are preiods in human
experience in whioh praotioal affairs are exceedimgly sucoessful and
men seem to be wresting the innermost seorets and powe I'B from nature.
.' .~
Men seem to fairly wallow in tse heart of experience. When thinkers
under suoh oond1t ions do take oognizanoe of .,xperienoe whioh is not
bare and obvious they formulate dootrines whioh make of men faotors
in the dyn~mio foroes whioh aotuates the whole of experience. l There
is here as in other plaoes evidenoe that the values assigned. to exper-
ienoe are always f~notlons of the oonditions under whioh the evaluation
of experience takes plaoe. The sort of oategories used and the signifio-
anoe they oarry both depend upon the speoifio ocoasions of their dev-
eopment. A reoord of the cajegories With which reoent thinkers have
&ttempted to evaluate experienoe shows olearly what the experience whioh
'. 1s evaluated has been. In general the most recent formula.tions of

1 i
experienoe were developed under oiroumstanoes whioh gave great confld-
enoe in the oapaoity of men to oomprehend and define his world. The
categoriee used were than suoh as were derived from a suooessful
'lBergsonism, for example - The method of philosophy beoomes entirely
other than that of 80ien98.
handling of some specific kind or experienoe. Philosophy becomes in
general a part of the disoipline of soienoe. The re&l is taken to be
entirely oomprehended and oovered by the descriptions and definitions
of the soientifio disip11nea. l We have observed that this attitude
~y be oarried to the extreme in whioh the moat of experience and
perhaps the beet of experienoe 1s dissipated. The motive of philoso-
phy whioh is to give any adequate evalu~t1on to experienoe as 8uoh i8
lost. There i8 lost the extremely useful and valid distinotion be-
tween philosophy and scientifio oategories, or between ethical or
esthetio oategories. There is the still more disastrous fact in the
entire loae of the signifioanoe of the oategoriee. The categor1ds are
not oonsidered as elements in a thought prooess or an experienoe
prooess but as attributes of reality Whether existential or logical.
In more recent times there ~ve been renewed aotivities in the
way of making more definite the Vi ork of philosophy. There has 'been
developed a philosophioal attitude on a firmer basia than was the oase
sinoe the soientifio reaotion to philosophy. PhlbBophers bave beoome
interested in pointing out the meaning of experienoe without accept-
ing the dogmatio presuppositions of uncritical though~. There bas
oeen indicated alao the tendenoy to avoid the restrictions of a dog-
matic ~clentifio attitude. Reoent philosophioal disoussions are con-
cerned more with the method of ~nowledge than.was trve during the
reign of the dogmatic scientific attitude. The pIQblem of knowledge
1s reoeiving more attention than was formerly true. This may be con
sldered as a return to the Kantian attitude of investigating just wh&t
i8 involved in the axperlence process.

-... ........ -----------.. -------_-......_...-----------------------..--- _._-------- ---

f lSpenoerian Philoeophy.

Two general types of viewpoint are becoming prominent in phll-

osoph7 in answer to a demand for a oomplete faith in experienoe. TheB.
two are Realism whioh aims in so~e form or other to find rea11t7 in
,experienoe- a.lthough it is independent of the experieno1 tIg prooess.
Only 10 experienoe .~e objeots met With, but they may exist whether
they ~ver come into experienoe or not. The other whioh may be crudely
oalled Pregmatism finds reality in ex,perienoe because things are as
they experienoed. Objeots are dependent for their nature upon the
experienoing procesB. The Realist builda up hie Waltansh&uung as a 818-

t~m of events or faote or terms in relation. l The Realist aims to

eatablish the reality of the objeota of experience by oonsldering them
as not depending upon the fact of experienoe for their belng or being
as they ar8~ The experlenoe prooess for the Realist is a prooess ~f
finding or disoovering objeote. The objeots are not ohanged by enter-
ing the experienoe prooess With exoeption of taking on a new relation:
The prooess of oognition and experienoe are merely relations.A" ?The
method of knowledge for the Realists reduoes itself to a sort of logical
determ1nation of objeots and a mechanioal ordering of them into systems.
The Realist reduoes his world to an infinite system of simple and oom-
plex entities. The simple entities,are logioal oODstantssod sense
qua11tiee. For the realist the things of thought as well as those
of sense have ontologioal status.~ Both types of things have absolute
stabl11t) ~d ccnt1nu1ty in experienoe. In general the realisttenda
to reduoe so far
l' .
Holt - lew RUlee, p. ,66.
" .
BS it is possible the disinotion between
. . ,2.1~ ........
~he mental

roUgh-going realism must assert independenoe bQt only of thought

but ,1 an7. val'iety what.oever of experieno {'l"-II . . <~rC. (i \:'" ,J,. \ ')
3w~1i R~lis:n.
0 .~ 1 ift...,-. r.
" ., : " .. I
' '. .. i T " ; f ,

.~ I ~- .~
J cr-, .
:> , , -
and the physioal. In his attempt to preserve his world ap~rt from any
knowledge or experienoe of it, the res'list makes experienoe an -inter-
relat.on of logical terms. Russell ~efera to this as a priori knowledie. l
The realist olatma to put ~e&l~ty into universals somewhat after the


~., manner of Plato. 2

Despite tbe great importanoe of the oategories for any point of
view there is little or no overt disoussion of them by the Realists.
It is olear, however, what the realistio oategories are. For the

, . Realist the oategoriee are subsisting entities whioh enter into oom-
plexes suoh as the varioue objects and events of the world. For the
lealiat experience oonsists of these entities entering into particular
relations. Theee entities, as was said, are logioal reals and may

exist whether there is experienoe of them or not. The o&tegories for

the realiat are not oategories of experience for they exist of their
.. '. O'Nn rightand prior 'and beyond any experienoe. for the reali at the

highest categort is being; and Boing has no nece83~ry oonneotion with

existenoe. When an object cc~es into experienoe the implioation is that
it oombines With it another entity or att\ohes to itself another univ-
ersa~or again it enters a new relation. Realism makes a great deal
of its endeavor to esoape any sug~eBtion of anthropmorphiam. It wlehes
to get at ita world as it really is, without the disturbing intervention
of an experiencing indiVidual. The~e is ~uoh to be said in f~vor of
this attitude. The world should not in any sense be oonsidered as en-
joying nothing more tha.n a preoarious eXistenoe. The::.-e is a sound
instinot at the bas1a of an attitude which strives to release the world
----- - -
lprobiems of PhilQ80phy~ p. 135 ff.
ZRlWse11 - ProbleIfs cf. Philosophy. p. 142 ts .
N~~a., ,p. 35. ~; I\'~ (, II\.' V :-Jr.
~~ Mon~agUe - Essay Wm. James~ 11;-114.
Harvin - First Book of Metaphysios, pp. 108 ff.
'Bolt - Conoept of Consoiousnes8, p. 21.
from a degradinlbondage. This oommendable attitude loaes its V&lue and
importaDoe when it makes its world 80 independent and e8~ran~ed from
the experieno.~ who i8 80 vitally oonoerned witt it, that it loses all
meaning. The world that the Realist desoribes might ~8 oonoeived to be

, .
real but it oasnot be thought as having any meaning in our experienoes.
The experienoing individual oannot possibly find suoh a world a tit or
useful place for any purpose. The realist makes a m~t serious error in
failing to investig~te the nature of the oategories be employs to eval-
uate his world. It 1s ob11ous that the realist gives values to his worE
of experienoe. Giving it such values as he does takes ~way from 1t the
essential oharaoteristios that are actually found in it. The realists
follow muoh too 010B61y the ideals of mathematics and abstract physios,
It 18 extremely USef\ll for those disciplines to make use cf the ab-
stract logioal categories in determining their re~pectlv8 domains. The
speoial so1enoes have oertain definite funotions and thew8 funot1ons
are well carried out with suoh categories as they use. Philosophy has
a different fuaot1on and a d1fferent motive. It represents an autonom-
ous phase of human experienoe. Philosophy aims to state the me~ning
, ,;

and sign1floanoe of experience. The categoriee required to make tel.

evaluation muet naturally enough be derived frorr. experienoe. They
ahould be values that mean scmeth1ngfor experienoe, and should not be
superimposed upon experience as ultimate and substantial elements of
.ealitr. Philoeophy always aims to describe what comss to experienoe
and unless reality is e7.perienoed 1t cannot be the genuine domain of
philosophy. Even if we oannot prove that our experienoe 1s the only
reality and even if we believe that reality is always beyond ordinary
.~ paenomena there o&n be no advantage in using such categories ~s the real-
1st d08S. It must be evident th~t soienoe and philosophy are attempts
to formulate the s1gnificanoe of experienoe and no possible worth oan
be found in evaluat1ng experienoe &6 non-s1gnificant. This does not
mea.n at all tc fly to the oPPo91te and jUDt s.s '.r:ratir.nal and
make all reality antbropmorphio. Logical philosophy Hi-l.l._t~lve to
experienoe suoh oategories as will be suitable and ~hioh will 8ati8fY~
the aims and purposes of the oa_egorization process. If the purpose
is to give exper1enoe a system of abstract symbole as marks of rep-
resenta~1on, and this oan be aooomplished by means of o~tegor1es whioh
()J~t\.tV\.~a.nd unrelated
, .
are to experlenoe the work of the !'e9.11et is
'~ , justified. Some soientists alsume that this is Buffioient to mark the
work of sci eaee , The point is tc appreo1a te wha.t the oategor1 as Gf
ph11osophy are and are for. If the att1tude tomard philosophy i8 taken
to be that of adequately determining reality or desoribine:. ~xperienoe

as the writer would hold, then the arbitrary oonstr~otion of loZioa.1

elements wont do. These two att1tudes should represent two distinot
phases of philosophioal development.
lew-Rea11sm apparently bel::r:gs to
the former type of philosophioal theory, and finds ita p-:lrallel in the
past history of philosophy. In Ereneral the neVl-realiete seem to dis
regardtnhe fact that it is the first requisite of philosophy to be ~.wa..

of the nature of oatego1res that the philosopher employe. Th1s apparen.

11 is t~e reason that the neo-re~list fails to observe the interpreta-
~ '.~' tion of experience a s though'rea11ty ocns1sted of oertain t~insa in
themselves, or it might with equal propriety be said that experienoe 18
not interpreted at all. 1 Unoritioal rationalism represents a state of
experienoe 1n whioh the thinker finds blmselr more ar less oonditioned
by external faotore in experienoe. The thinker doeeDQ~ appear to reall.
the situation, however. In the 8eoo.d case whatever is st~ble and
pe:Bnent in experienoe is preserved and also appreciated. The thinker
lot. Russeil-sc1entlfic Me8hod 1n Philosophy, 1914.
, .

18 certa1n that objects oannot be produoed by the thinker but the fact
1s never forgotten that there 18 an attempt to evaluate them or that
~e value of the objeots 1s given as an attitude toward them. Not
i forgetting tbls there 1s more ingenuity and excersized in making
the attitude ~dequate. The degree in value of Tdrious philosophical
.: ! .-
attitudea lies in the fact that some are more oonsoious of being at-
. ~. titudes and thus have the possibility at least of being better atti-
Pragmatism developed as a reaotion to the absolutistio atti-
tude whiOh dominated the philosophical world after the deoline of the
narrow naturalism ~nd empirioism. P~gmat1sm is e8aent1~11y emp1ristio
but not 1n the sense that it takes the facts of experienoe as given.
It rather oonsiders the world of faots as developing and ~ra*ing. For
the pragmatist re~llty 1s not something ready made and fixed Which be-

comes known to the experiencer. Reality 1s a oondition of 80nst~nt be-

coming. The world of ~bjeots is going through a aeries of oonstant
~ ,. ohanges each making plaoe for the next ehange , Pragmatism mean 8 to
point out the absenoe of the stable ~Dd the eternal in h~n experience.
Pragmatism looks upon experienoe as 8ssential11 the happenings or human
beinga and this experience 1s inolusive of all the reality that the think-
er oan attain to.~ This attitude is well summa up in tee words of James
.t : .; it' ~ . ~ t
in ti6 Plua~1at1c Universe, "I find myself no good warr~nt for even

suspeoting th~ existenoe of any reallty or a h1ghe~ denomination thant

:J r

". ':_0
that di;.,;trlOt.:ted. and 8tr6ngt"l,.~ .\ '! and flowing sort. 01' rea.lity t~t finite
beings SWim in. n2 Correlated with this viewpoint the Pragm~tio logic
1s instrumental and forme a oonneotion between one experisnoe and anoth-

lCreatlve'Intelllgenoe, p. 55.
P. 212.

ti# ere It is not a. aelf-suos1atirAg activity indulged in for ita o..m sake.
Thinking is not merely formal aotivity, a sort of Belf-perpe~ual funo-
tion or aot ivity. Tr.ought ia purposive and rrakes for SJ1:.O and th,~t 18
desirable or necessary. The criteria.n for th~ t ruth or error of any
element of the thought prooesoes is the fulfillment of SOIDP. defi~1te (
! .: I
, . , "
I 1

(finite) aim or purpose. 1 In 63neral for the pra~matlc a.ttl~ude 4aere,r

are instruments of action.
The oategories for the pragmatio attitude ~re values attributed
to objeots in anaw=r to some definite need or purpose. In this attitude
-:> ' the nature of philosopby co~e$ to be adeq~~tely recognized. We ccme
" .

fhally to a stage of philosophioal development in Which the funotional

nature of the phi1osophica1 oategories ~:-preoiated. The ~ategoriee

become definite va.lues given to the f~ots of experEnoe in or~er to give

determi~ition to experienoe. We come to a period in phl1oBophloa1

development 111 r.hich ezper1en':Je is considered not as eOfne gi V'e, series

of objects and oonditions or as colleotions of orig1n~1 stufie whether
rationaliatio or sensationa.list 10. In so far expe rI eno e 1 s ta.ken
, . 308

to 'be the ,ctua1 objects, actions, thoughts and oonditione of human

beinga the instrumentalist h~8 achieved ~n ade~uate Viewpoint. Ph1l-
? oaophy upon such a basis must signify aomething in its method and
, "
The categories of philosophy Which the instrument~liet a110ws
OOffie to be narrow and restrioted in the1r funotions. The pragmatIst
tends to deny the full implioations of hie dootrine. This is owing
to the fa~t that this attitude a~111 is lnfluenoe~ seriously by the
... ~ l '
oondit il;ns whioh originally ha.8~' it. No~ instrumenta.lietio a.ttitude
rua,1!ita11Js its char:::cter a.s a negation of the absolute ides.11stic phil-
- --- - ----. -----
.. ~ ~'" . -.
lMoQre - "Soille Logioal AapeotB of Purpose" in Studieri of Logioal :,~."
1903. ~Also Pra.gmt~BDAmite Critioa, P. 14-15.
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 1916; Creati~e Intelligenoe. nry
cBopby. Tbe atl'aln cf denying tl'Hl.t the funotton of J:.hilo~ophy 1s to

be ~ D~ecul~tlve parmonlzat1cn cf n ~orld le~de the lnetrum-

ental1at tc ccmpr ee. it to the pcir..t of:l aever"practlo,;.bll1ty. The

lnatrumentaliet Bta~ds very strongly oomm1t,ad to a dootrine of .~ction

and this s..lac h~.s r es ul t ed in atraln1ng th~ pos1t1on. The i.netrument-

nl1at denounce, with '!.:l.mir:i ble lflc:".t ion the ide:, t h~t experi eno e
is a cognitive ~.ffair. but ~ermits hiCiself t:> be 0:; rrie-.l t.::; the opposite
and eq,ually f~.l~lt Y ext reme He tends t:;) .ieny the eFeoul~1 t i ve 11:. t erest
" " . . ....
;' (,.

its 1=.cotr"::~1lJ pl1ce v;1ue 1!'~ the ongolngof human experien::s. The
1natrU!l;en.t=,ll~t is a.t fa.ult, 1n failing to c~neldeJ; that no matter how
,f:lrot1os.1 tbecategorlzatlon funotion 190, t he r e 1.6 praotio3,b11it~ werved
in etr1vinJ for the so-o~llei theoretioal end. The tenienoy of In-
atru~entafi~~is to arbitr~rily lim1t its notion of pr~ot1~blli~y
to so~e 1efinite ccnduot. The lnstrument~11st overlooks the f~ot th~t

the theeretic~l l1fe ~nd ~ot1vlty are p~otlc~l ~lao, th~t ls, ae
legitjmate parts of experienoe. The Pragm~tlst never tir~9 of p01nting
out tb5.t the funct1:!ls of 9nlmt1on are c;.)!13t3.ntly being used for prao-
tio.l enda , T!l5.t la, the theoretic..l jUd.;:nents a r e for the moat p:lrti
f~nction1ng in practio~l situat1ons. The truth of ttle 1s olearly ob-
vioue but thi s tr'lth doee not a. tall obvls.t e the :f'3.ct of 0,
Value! of t r,e t:.eoretio3.: use :J fthe ev:.\lua.t ion fundltlon. It .Qlght be
truly aa1d that the development and usc of striotly p~11oaophic~1

os.te;crias ~5 raco6n1zed f~otors of experionce the lnstrumenta11at

overtly denies. The ~nstrumentallet hue the tenden=7 to deny the
validity of eo-called theoretio~l ~ttit~dea. This is not entirely true
in pr~ctioe for the Pr~gmatlst conside=s the stientiflc work to be not
ent lre:i.y ~ dlecipll!H~~ of pradt ice. In general it is true that 1; he

idea of ~r~otice or th~ practical takes en an extremely limited ~nd

reatr1ct1ve oonnotation. The instrumenta11st position in aoual1~y

Ii does not exol~de the worl! cf pu~e scienoe which has no immediate prac-
ticr_l ccr.e equencee , The instrument&list la.ya himself open t c ;luch crit-
icism rel2lpect1r,;- the extreme positivism of hts position. The '-"en-eral

attitude of the Pra;matlets 1s attacked as anthropomorphio. It 1s

charged iih~.t Pra.gmatism clings to r closely to the wh1ch
a.dopt e arbl t.r:..rily
, .
c r in at i!:cti vely the et'l.ndpoir.t or' pract leal belief
',-:h1eh is a. f~~~t1~n Oi<~~th;~PO!:lorphism.l 'he pOj.nt 1s th~t the

Pr3.gIl'~ti 0 a t t 1 tude 1s t:iken to revolve too c Lose Ly about the ir.di v1dual
expar ie nc ee , The uuman individua.l pla.ys to: prCJminent a l..i:-.rt in the
formulation c. tne attitude to~ard experlenoe. Thia nay he t~ken to be

t3.ker his attit-:de to oenter a.r o md hu-r.a.n a.ct1~r i e e s nd re';ot1ons to the

.~orld s bc uf hirr. it is a. very f3.7orable obe e raa t t cn , It iLdicate3 that

the 1nstrumer..t:.:.list 1s 1ealing with a:-:tu"l.l ha;~:en~n?a instead of l,i th
fermal syzrlbola of assumed events. For it is 1n fact true th~t 1n

Pragn:.ltl::;rr, tnere is r ea cned the etage in thc.:ght ir; whic r: tnere 1s the
mce t thorough coln;; re;t11zat ion of the pl1.-::e the exp e r renc In g L11i vid-
ual playa in exr er i ence , There i a not found in Pragm3. t,1am any t end-
enoy to ~~ka expe~ience for ~ranted) the ;17en in experi~nce 1a re-
ducad -:;0 an a.beolute minlmwr! '''hila,insisti:1g upon the position th:1t
re~11ty is found ~n experience. The critics of Praq:nl8,tAlsm
only if they shcwJthat the Pramat1st so strongly ins1ete upcn the plaoe
of the overt act Lons of the individual in experience that the other and
larger P!lrts cf experience are lest. Thi9 cr1tieieID l!;3.y be oe-
cauae of t h : e"<tre'l'ip. ine18t~nce upon the pr~ctic3.1 na uuae of t ne cats-
gor1zs.tlon functions (logics.l p rcceaaee , kr;,c~':ledge p rc cees ee ) , The
Pragr.::.tist,it 18 ~~.1d, overlooks the 3r3pects of exp~rience w::;.cr.

; not cle~rly pract1ual or 61ct~ted by ~Cllie pr~ct1cal purpose.

r ----------------~---~-------------------------------_._-
- - - - - - - - -- ----

r lperry - Philoe (,phi ca.l .', : p. 39.


Pragmatism has had the tendenoy to deny the value of suCh

determinations of experienoe as are .roperly oalled philsopb1oal.
I\ The anthropomorphloaand 8ubjeotivistio oritioilm against Pragmatl. .

were ineptred by protests against the restrioting tendenoies of

t~e movement. The
. ohange w~s ably answered by Moore,
whiob,however, still left the orltio~.m of ~nthropomorphiam.l
Professor Moore refutes the oharge of a p;'iv:3.te ocnsoiousnesa and the
more reoent literature satisfaotory elDludes any solipeito interpre-
tation, but the inolination to rest riot the attitude to partioular
types of experienoe remains.
The instrumentalist'- position does not deny Wh~lt is obvious
namely thLt human e~erienne oons1ets of muoh besides the pra~tlc~l ao-
tions. The instrumental attitude in its essential position should not
exclude suoh a disoipl1ne whio~ oocupies itself with th0ge er.perlenoea.
Muoh of the diffioulty with the problem of the soientifio and philoso-
phioal revolves ar~und the oonoeption of pure and praotical soienoe.
The instrumentalist mean* to insist that philosophy has no other sourc.
o! materials to work with than has soienoe. There 1s an extreme desire
to av~id any preoonoei~ed notions of rea~lty, any theological implica-
tions. In aiming to keep entirely within the field of aotual experienoe
the Pragmatist s.tands for an admire.ole position. There must be, however,
very olearly marked off the facta and interpretations within that field.
With the insiating upon the exclusion from the evaluation ot experienoe

of ~ unori~ioal or dogmatio oavegor1es, the aprreoiat1on of the ditter-

" between the types of oa~egories must be insiated upon also.
enos This
< .
must be eo because there are v~r1ous motives in lnterpretin~ experienoe.
The instrumentalist seems to oonfuse two different situation,. In saying
--- --

~, that a.ll int elligible .rJ.~~t 10ns a. ~,c Cf..usat L .. f. are w;\clly eei ant 1fio
he co nr e ::t).y :p;~:' nta out th;~.t it io: none en s e v0 cliao'..:.!s ul, tiL1". t e (il'igina

and lll'ti.:.te enda,{ ).:l"~ ;.'11.oh l'r0feaaor Dewey admirably name s

ars:_ti:;~.3.l awl eachQts.l~11'1.1 The 1mfli..~::..tLn i~ th~tt t : :"'scuas caus e

int slligent 1y cn e mue t 0.1 6CU3 53 obn::l1 t ions t hs.t occur in act uL.. exper-
i enc e , Thia excellent oos er va.t i ',r, 1)90' '!les trar~aformed in the tl1cught

or the i:lstru:;lcnta.liut until he C.. ';;fH: t c the ::iea that philQsophy a a

8 .1- i e nee "~e~l

I..L;:" eon ly '<Tl"'h
VI T'~'"
.) - - . : .,'.
. __ C'. ;._. b1
;t,) s
4_ .. : 'l""'~~-."
,-" t- .:.t: "::J
'" ~c_ !It t ""... a

i3 no e er i oue ob jert i on to th:; po::,j.t:l..::,l aL'loe it is taken to be a very

pr::i.otic9.~ fJJ!:,jp~.,.t:. . en to f01'muls.te an 3,tt1tu1etcl-':-'.rda e;~?~rienoe .n gen-

/ .. 1-

er:?l. No' (li.l~ ..' ic:ll ty C ::il.'ee wh en the pra;;Ill':' t i at ~:k~rare:-lt 1 y j, imi t s the
prac t iC;llt.:; sp eo '1 fio :;vert ~..:rt t cna

senes a different ;'I.lnation th~n do as the ca us e of soienoe. e "tie

mus t i;lt :...nd :.1,9 on 1; h e got" ound o.f act u; 1 e:cp ar i en 0 e ~. Yl 3.1.l. O'ln' at t 1 t ude 8
tIle d\f terenoe ~ r, ev~l ili.~ icn of I3xperi ence must r e (61' t: ':\' d1 ti erent
mot1?s or purpose. In the eoientifia investig~tionthe e~U3~ oi ~n

event or 0;:) :cd.1 t ion i B of v~.l ue in bringi n~ ~bQut.; SO..03 defi:!i t e :?1.'~O

tioal e.r.z=~t. T:)16 i 6 the d1eCliplir,e of over ;Lotion. The iUiuir1ng

1:1to the 09.i..lS:H: cf ev ent e and c ond i t t ona t"r::>:'l the ph110~()JJh~o~~1 :Jt9.nd-
pJint ita v'J.lue in tne motive .v~l:ioh men uav e Oi.' un -,iel~I..3.nd:
tllair expe r i enc es Vl1tl1Qut a v:l e to tM~ a oout SO s.6 ape,::1~l ~e
or while realizing that no 3uch s~ is possible. It is possijle th5t
ffien should be intereatej in E.nO~1ns th~t the8e are many even~~ ~nd

eondi tiona in e:perienees whi cn t ne y cannon mod ify or cnanc e r: any 'Ii'),1.

.. .
... ---~------------------------- ..--------_ ... _-- .. ~----- ------- --- -----
Dewey Jou.rnal of Philosophy, p. 337 If.
This i"'ltel.; t iQ :.,jt .:.n unc r i t Lo s L 'Ina, i,. 1s not ~ rel;1oua f:~itb

e,f the ;'L~bjt"ot ns t tcr ~'f :r.:t~';'j:hY3iou.l ln~!i..4iry ttk'\.t the litay l'l:-.:vent
r:,1aooIl..;ertj.~: :n t he ,:;tl:'~l'.l ;,eg.:..:..~~ead (~i' l;h'.,t one r,'Jj.Y believe ~:f the

icr..l f\:nct j CvS just

keep hie oate~crie8 diet:not. In ~~ct, ther~ is a g~o~ ba~ia f0I be-

3.t ~ll. '!'.le -n t Lr e trend ct the tlst~ pc at t I on is ec conceive

th:.~ :;.11 experience f:;r the purj cs e cf affect;ng \'

scC'e rr';.ot ic::d r e s ...1 t , Ao.Y....... s.~;;e~t e j ;.o~ve ttere o':l'..:ld be nc crt tic1J1Dl
-------------------------- - -------------------------- --- --------_.--- --_._---
1 ... -
Hournal of Philosophy.
(. ~.
of. this if the term pr:';i.ot1cal W35:',Ot re:atr1cted to 80,'$ 01'ert ':l.ot1on.
Tha 1!lstr'.unentalidt m;;Lkea the :Jt:l;telT.~n.t ::1.1ao th~t pr:J.i):~ .t i.c me a that

i n:.nking ia reierred ~o cJnae::tuenoea.l B-at the:e 1s 'v'Jry,t!~ ro:;m

l~rt; in liae k'ri:i.gwa.:, 10 11 t e ra t-uxe for auch a :1 on aequ eno e =..e '\.n 11 !'d~1'ly

not i cn ,.;i the aiTr.liflc:.1noe . .d ~ .

exo er i eno e in zen araL,
11ne~':: i:~ 1 i ~lile
J:~t le.ace v! LJ&.rt \if t.1l e pragun. tist 'si th the phi loa~phio~l~ J. lua.- oi e xpez Lec e , 7ne pru..;ld?-~19ttenda to rejeot t~')e "Ol'~: vf ~"Ivtruo

.t ing c.. ovnaoioud i tuue to'niora the rYhole of e~~Fer ieee. Ti1e ~- .ra.gmat1st

(arida to saeocl8,te tile I-'hiloa~;.>~ioa.J. .t'uncti0ninl!' of the cs,te;(iriz.:.:.ticn

:-,rooeeo ,viti;, ti::e old f:Jeta.phyaica .., hicLl :t.i!.Cied tc dlslJ.i. va a world ~r re&l-

~ti w~iOi~ .iay beyond the pl'esent '::orld of :l.Pf'eara:lCe. rh:?:-e il;i .:..160

':";j.4d ill F.LQ.6lf&~1aID the iJ1~.lic~ti~n that fhiloau1-'hy 1~ a. dia.phonous

I .

aha.dC~\' ,;h.i.,.;i! h~~~" UV61.' "~6 Ncrld. of aoto 10:1.. Ir~ apecut . t in~' '..\t_ on
t.n e Lao~i va lor 't,J.1e extreme inai:::itance upcn the practi~a.l or ~::.~c::uen-
q . .\.. .
ti~ " , -') \ .' , ' i'.. .r~l t ne evii.lll.~tic-r:~ cf ~j~perience t h er. i a 3u~:~agt ad

t ue ;,cs5iCil11tith.. t tjdb iuuic.:..te.; an ext a-eme aeslre :'0 m..k e an Immed-

i~tc ~.l.d t'lt4!i.l ~~etel&ina.tL.n t(J t:.. e faota an.icc.:!ditlona of exr.erienoe.2
The c::.tebC,;t.iea c..f i-hLi.oec}Jhy .:-r e evolut 1cn s giver.. t c, the 0'0 j eat e
cI expe zI enc e iII an ~ffc,l't t c i c:..watt; the I!&oat Eati8f~ctory ~ttltude

poe~lble tc~~r~ eAperienc~. The ~ctlve fer ~~kiL~ thia formulation 1s

to att~i~ t~ a vieu ci rea~1ty ~hicr. w1:~ make it mezt al~niflc~~t and
;:...~prcg,cha.ble. The dot t it uc e c.f philoEic.phy i e thecret1cal in it 8 function.
The ~Liy vr~cti~~l ~urfose is t~ er1ent the thinker with respect to his
aUXlct.l.ij t1~t:\. Tl.1a ;he:.:.cle o r e xpe r i enc e sc far a~ it can be ~ubji:'::t t c experiJtent:...l verii1cat1:.n. Tr.La.t i6, each. aSlj'jElct (.'f the
attitude must find o;;r.firmutic.ns. in ac t ua ; f .ct e ...nd cc n dd t Lcne , In fao't
t ae philooc-ph1o~1 Jot ~ i tu.:ie is c.ere:iy t ne ::i~t e~:m1I:~tiona ci th~ ~1~n1flc-

ano~ of t~eae fao~i 1nd c~Ldlticns.

--------.. ------------_._---- _._ ... - _.... - -------- -------------------_ ... .... -- ------ .I

~Dewey - E~~~7a in E~)erimental Logio, 1916, p. 330 ff.

A quiok result metaphysios in taot.
The '~'ilo"'o"ht
.1 & ;0> J;; . '.J:~
:":-.' '''i.s
_ .. ~_ ,;; ...... 1n"'-
--." ..... ~.~ W" t'-"
.i.. _ "'ol""'l"'i~l'''''
g J. " " . " .~ OJ 1'''''6
\ \.J '.,

t.h~~ o' h':l,(eni''j'::, :;, 0,. ~jrti.~"11"1' ~-L':le. T,..1'"; ha: b osn t!.F; .1E1'.:cry of

.h:ch fJ,..J.]u ilr.:e-cliatel:-- intr:- oro.-:-'r !Crti~'..:l~!'arher~ of :~ct~~n.

r;rQblem reppe~t1n:; the cl!?lri ty o.f the o3.~eg;oriee. i s l?e..1. .1ot
';;nly tc r.i1ati::':.lieh the philcl30phlc c't-ezor1ea lr'.:j t ne 6"Jj e r.t 1.'io
- ... ----- ------ ------_._---- ---------- ------------,------------ -- - _.. ---_._-

lCre.~tive Intelligenoe, p. 67.

but 'ileo to oor:relatethem with the c3.te~orlea of o th ez at!;ittldei:.
Experienoe to be OC[Jr~;.c:e, e , or adequat ely det ermimed. mus (; be eva.lw.t ed
in ether '1j~ya than in the ec i ene i fie s nd !";hilo&ophlc mann er e. If re3.l-
ity .1,3 ;:.ctllal.~y given in axpe r Ienoe it 10 evident tent iT. 19 e7~1'U~tec1

Q~ :thsr t~~n tn~ eci~~tific an' phllos~p~io at~1tuie~. In :~Ci, if

t.:.;; acier!tlIic ::'L:..\ philosophic a,li ~ltuiea s r e to posses::' J.r:y l..l. .... i.i1ty

T(~.:.. ~..:"H;:;~l..ieti ,I i:hileac.phy soience a r e merely mo r e crit i::u.l,

:..l 3el,;~t17e CI' crefl.ti:l~al valuea 2.6orib~d t o the f..~Ll vi e.\pal'lenoe.

11 :.1:.41

'rt. :: cr "_ "

" c J.J,.
~ ~ cn "' ~
'-t.:. t, - r :....,,~
_ " ' _ :.. ..... ! .. 1. . .c-.,.
~.... ........
. . . i>~w:.... ,,~'.:>
~.L ~.- ~tlng
__ '1 ...... ..L._.'"

ce j. :. J t:lis

values. PragmatIsm haa apt-arently t~ken the attitude that the &ole
, ,

mc.t1ve for the crIt1cl1'an1 C:il6C1~us formulation of an a.ttitude toW'-

~r~ exper1ence 1e thepract1cal one. This ~ttitude reEulta In the
construction of a methcdology for tha prnotical Bo1enees. The pr~otloal

e c reuces eV3.1w.te experience ,for acme d.ei 1nite practical end '.vhi cu 18
lluj;edlately desir~ble and atta.inable Ph11oa'Jphy which is the mere
ttleoret lcal scienoe de:l.le wi th ends whlcl1 a re not desired by everyone
~nd i'hicb reqL11re a mo r e ;'I.betra-c; and removed att1tude fer ita Fur-
aui t VIhile 1t 1 e certainly t~~~~"tha.t we muat h~ ve int elllgenoe to
liberate and liberalize act1on, this does not preclude the necesa1ty for
an intelllgenoe whioh '.fll1 be .",ble t 0 appreola.t~ the mean i ng of these
act i cr., and. to relate them 1J'il th otherc:aot ione and ocndlt1cns. It i . a.
ccmn.endab l e insight w;-licl1 dlff~['entla.te;3 th~ v:\.rlous aspects e r exper-
ience but freC":t:.ently a s we. 9 the cae e \'11 th Bergson tIll s resul'; e. in
;oinf over to a. ,position s1mil'ir to the traditiona.l meta-9hysloe. There t.~o p1tfalls to be ~Ulo1ded. In the .first plaoe it muat ce .ceoos;-
nized th;~:t there is genuine reality worthy of 1nv=ati~t1on and rleter-
iliin..~ t Len cut side 1ihe rea-lUi of th~ l:'l'a"n j 0,;1.1 s c lanoes. In the a soc-ad.
pl~oe it rAuQt be always kept 1n mind tilJ.t thia field. f:l.lthough outside
t1lC dcma.~.n of ~racti(;al

ia flu ":.Jre'J.K in the oc'nt1:juity

soienoe is c:nt tnuoue with it.
()f exper t enc e ,
Tha.t is, there
Correlatad i'.ith thia fa.ot
is the l:.ct t!l'.i.t the en t Lr e dO!D~i{l of expez Lenc e 18 by the

aa&e funotl~a~l ~rocesB which 1a differen; in ita 6peclflc activities

only b~oaaae of tn! varia.tion of ~he olrou~at~noea and Ule mot1v6 o~

th6 th1nk=rll. TheL'~ 1v no k(.owle,~e ;.rooeaa but t ne ea ne crerJ.ti.n~ oa.te-


gcr1zatlon Cuncti,:;r. '.'ihioh deve Lcps 'l.n.i aacert~lBS tile ei;nirle-
ance c1" tha and ocnd1 t Lone of huaan bell1 'J s . R~'1.11 ty :nnn.ot
ta'3:l~ it lClj,,:.t be ~u~;'jeoted to the ~rooeese3 ":if th\~ ev~l~tioZl

functicn if t~ is to be reaoted to, kno~, or dealt ~ith in ~ny way

A 'brief survey of its history indio~te~ that philosophy has now
entered UpOI\ an era. j,n(?tlioh it :-ea11zes ita own funotion. P:tliloBOphy
recognizes tbat it is an ~ttitude tC"lard experience. It is c.l es r in
i. te f.. wa rene es th&. t it is a ~roceae of or1 t 108.1 and ccnec i oue eVH.lue.t ion
of exper t eno e for the purpcse of orionting the thinker it: Lie ~.. (.:rld.
Ph:'loaophy a.ppreoiates now the fact th~~t the world of experience in
w~,"ct. . the thinker :finds himself ,1e depenc ent upon the thinkx cnly with
respect to cert~in definite cond1ticns. Philoscphy aD never before.
enters upon a ccur se of. serviC1e and validity. Xt h~.s r.n Ly to ['u::.rd aga.inst

cO{lfuslon a.nd misinterpretation of the ca.tegoriee whiob it eJr.plcys 1n

ite: work. Philoeosby aa r tmee the.t its domain 1 entirely distj,[ict from
t ha t ciogm.::!.t io mis lnt erp!'etation' cf exper1 enee v:hether called theolog1 ca.l
or/Which seeks rellity beyond the confines of ~ctual experience. Phil-
oacphy, to be valid, must evcid the dan~ers incident to miscalling all
o~ rea11 t y th~.t which is ,::r:ly a !=art ~ '!'hether the. t part be th e iurfao e
mf thinEe or the p.ntire fact oz a rart10ular kind. Philosophy h~e a
'distinct domain of its own whioh, \'?bl1e absolutely o cn t tnuous With the
rest of aotual expex1ence, is still an autonomous rart of it. ?nilo8ophy,
while never transoending actual experienoe, 1s the freest ~t1ve funa-
I tion cf all the 8ateg~rization prooesses. It creates ~ perspective wh1bh
guides experience in it e o.eve I cpmen ~ l'! 10n e Ili rect icn of freedom, a.ppre-
ciativli a.nd useful aocomplishment.

" ,
T!1e Functional l;atUI'e 01' the i:hi1osophici:i.1 ~(;:.t.6oI'it:;s.

~bstract of a Die~ertation

Subrr.1tted to the Faculty of the

Gre.lhl~t6 School or Arts l;l.nt,i Litex"", tun;
In C~n'i~~cv
" tor tte Lerree
.. of
Doctor of Phi10sort.y
In the Depc..:r tlf:ent of Philosophy


Jaoob Robart :r:Et.ntor



The Nature of Philo~Vhy. In this ni~~ertation the asm0ption 1s made

that philosophy constitutes an intellectual enterprise which ~ay be described
as an at~empt to arrive ~t a valie ~n~ systematic eVlluation of experience.
I This evaluation constitutes a deliberate, theoretical)and practical crintatic
with respect to the objects, conditions, and events comprisinr the experiencef
o~ the individual and his [roup, insofar of course, as the l~tter can he

hi storically traced out or infen'ed rrom o cs er-veb Le Gc.;ta. Al thou[h thi s

philoso~hical orientation is a critical evaluation of the ectual hu~an surroun
I ng s and c i zcums t ance s 01 t r-e thinker, t ne t eva l ue t ion ha s as i t s c: i t e rf on cf

cri t i cism the 61ni 1 Lc unc e of things ra t h e r than t he i r bare exi fit e nce , uct
only doeR the philosopher not ueal tl~nsexperiental thin[~, but also when
1le orients himself to exi~t.inf thins, he ev"luates them in their own terms;
do that he do es not s ol v e the problem ,~S to wr-a t tbin[s exi st a no whc.t their
significance is prior to an actual Lnve s t Lgut Lon ana c es cr-Lpt i on of those
things. Furthermortl, Listea,' o r eva l.ue t t nr thinrr: on the r.,~is o rvt he I r super
ficial appeaBances or their r~lation to hiD and his ic~c~iate interests, the
philosopher ~eeks a more lr~tinE 2nd sinilic:ant s~o.ndpoint. Tn plainer ~ords

philosphy from tr.i s ,\ncle is pre c Ls e L; the pt r-e sort 01' en t e iort s e 8,~ natural
What then c t I t u t es the .: if"ference t.e t we en !,hilosO~hy e no science?

Our answer is that the orientations of the phjlosopher eI~ ~OI~ critic:~l,

more concrete, and mor e [l-;n:ral. Mort: critical t science, in the sense
that the natural 9cien~ist is intbI~st6d in the fVLluctinn 01' so~e s~Ecific

;,ract j so tha t~he s o l u t ion of any i mme dh" te pro b 1Ir. is se... ti ste c t ory to him even
; hough he rr:a:;' have mud e as sumpt I on s wnt cb \'iill not b e su i t ab l e or' satisfactory

rom the s t ario oc Ln t 01' sor-e other s pe c Lf i c problem.

More concrete is th~ philosophical evaluetion in the senSe that no part
lof a fact is neglected in orr.e r to solve a specific prob Lem, For e xarap Le ,
the pbys lci st ne cas sar t Ly and pi cpe rI y nee'l ec ts '1.uf41i ta ti ve Ie a tur es of a

~echan1cal event for e~ample, in or6er to fst an abEtract &~6 rathem~tical

statement" which from his specific s t anc po Irrt an d the s t an-po i.nt or his part Lcu-
lar problem is an actual descr'iption of the event. In doing FO he is of course

entirel~ justified. From a philosophical st~ncpoint it very frequently happens,

but not always, that the qualitative features of the event are exceedingly

lm~ortant for orlentatio~al purfoses Since obviously our actual human

phenomena are c on t t nuou s , naturally t.he s e two tn t e re s ts rus e at sorr:e points
and becor.e ioentical. -Especially is this fact c1 ear When Vie c on r t c er- that

;phllosophy is merely theoreticcl Fcience.

Eore eeneral is the pht Lo s l eva Luat ion, since it repre s errt e a
free, orientational end~avour and conEequently is not limited to tre confines
or .
~articular ,mo t l ens , Frobebl y dihe mai n funct i on of ~h1los ;1phy i s the er-a t-
licism, of conceptions, the atte~pt to limit solutions, to analyze situ~~ions,
/ai1d to ::;oin~ out tte 1imitation~ of scientilic Lnv e s t i ge t t ona ..
i ~ot only is ~h11osophy continuous With science but it also may ~e con-
,sidered alon~ With ncie~ce as ~n extension of outuel hu~an contacts with

! su r roundf ng ttli ng s and even t s , scme t 1me ~ in t r.e c ours e or suc n contacts
, '

scientific ~otle~s arise resultin in the r~1inements an~ srecifications of

the o rc i nar-y contact with t ht nrs , Jn f"(',neral, tl:is ~cj,tnti1ic e c t i vi t y rr.ay' be

t hougnt of [~S a r.or-e e:':::crt rrrt e r-cou re e wi t h surr-ounc mr thin[~ ann events.

o r-d ent a t i ona I b e he vt or toward t ne i r nurc cundf ng e , and t r is Vie cal] '1hilosophical

act Lvt ty ,

The i~e.tule of CateeoI'i~s. The n ee ns l;S wh t cr, thefle Ln t e Lf ec t.ue I errt er--
p rLs es ,ue c- r r'Le d out we may na e;e ce.tei.:.oTie~ A c e t eg or-y we c one I ce r to be
an intellectual tool, con s i s t i ng, for the 1'l0 ~t p ar t of e n e ve l.uu ti onal r unc t t cn

.anc d1tt'erin With the u s es to wh i cn it is put. Ac:cordinfly, catecaries or

philosophy c i r re.r from c e t es.o r-Le s 01" science
_ 0;,;
i r om those of ev er y o ay think-
1n~. Af5 much as t he s e c:at'olies dfL er from each other I however I the~7 are e.l:

. common in the sense that they e.r e ob jec t i ve i n e t r-umerrt s or ev&lluation and not

the sUbjective reactions (ideas, conceptions) of specific individuals, althoug:

in ever~' Eine1 e instance they e re (I Lrec t Ly and immediately dEJri ved from 'Such

specific/ human act1vi ties.

Develop~ent of Thesis.

obvi ou s l y, si nee human exp sri e nc as e.r-e very (1 fr er ent r rcr- indi vi ou a l
to inrlividu~l, from a Apecific (roup c~ society to other ppecif1c rroups end

societies, and rr on one perLo d or hiptcl"'~7 to ano t r e r, we tl"tJre1'oI'e find t!:e

records of :,hilosophica!_ t houg ht filled with v ar yf nr ort e.vt e t i cm.. l s t a tement s ,

of e xperi ence . Each s t a t emen t fr:.rlo:e (Hff:l'ent sets of catE'tOI Le s , VI! e t.hcr

named the ~arne 01' not. Furthermore I in e ac h per i o c and 7'hilosophicEtl ~~'steUl
t he s e c a t ego rLe s c arzy different !"ienUic:~nces and functions e s Llstrunents

for the c arryf ng on of thfi intellectual o r-Lerrt e t t o ne I e nt erpr i se , Accon1inely

the development of the thesis consists of an a t t et- p t to s how how in di1fer'ent

philosop1:ical systems the c&tegories have vHried on the b~siS of cifferent

,cateorb at Lon conceptions. Unc e r' the !0110v-rin[ rubr t cs t re ou t e t andf nr p'r-
io"s of phi losophical history !J1E.~7 be mc i ce t e c wi to the char.. cteri stlc

attitu~es they rev~&l to us concerninr tt~ ~roce~p and tte ~roble~s of cate-

. go rd z at f on ,

(1) Attributive categorization.! In the earliest recorded ~hilosophica:

rThesf;s actual t erms do not appear t'n the orieinal c i s s er t at i on ; they are
emDl~yed here for c:onveni ence in eummer-Lz i ng th~ !:eo ttl ial;. _

j).e.riods the categorization pBDdess. c0118i s t e d rlainl:,' of' t he attribution by

philoso~h~rf' of governinE pririci~16P or basic con~ition~ fOI the ~ource and

dev e Lo onen t or !"lhcnoJTJl1C-i. consti tu t i ng the wo rI.c or ie c t s . Ann So we 1 inc:

here cate[orization s~sternA of limit~d ranee. One 00 ~ fbW c~tfories sUlfice

r etl ec t Lon conc erni ng tnt; na t u i e of t."t worl c at J~:['e. Here WE; rE<.VE- t he

Wat er (ThaI e8), Air (Anaxt mi n es j , en tr.tJ i:;.ouncl eSB U:Jlaxi~C;.nclf;r) cat eg o r t e s ,

Whethlr we ria ve the e l abo ra ti on of sorne pI:: rc e i VE::Cl ffii:.t Eridl in to <:. cosml c pr tn-

T Cipl e , or some na the;t mat ~cal ra "':.los qpythaoreans) rr.ade t~_e [round of all thin{
e1th~r ca~e some na~e o( a substance becomes for thes~ early thinkers the
ole cat.ego ry ,
So rar we Ji".a~; say there is no ce tI nf t e appr-ec i at rcn of the nat ure of

he cat ego rf ze t t on pr-ocl em , Thinkers do not exhibit any e e l r consciousness

lth respect to the evalu&tion of ex~~ribnce. The atte~pt is w~de ~erely to

hSolate and define t1'e rum.ament aj. princples of the wor-ld a e t~e thinkers
nderstood jt. In the world of Heracleitus and Par~enides, in which insistence
\ S Made that perce i ved y:'henorr.e:la cannot b e relied upon to ("ive reelity, we
irind the beeinninrs of an interest, ~lthoufh very pri~itivE and crude, in the
;Icateeorization prob l em , 'Nith the orie-in of t1".e catEio!'~' of BeinE, the One 'and
)Iany, as rhilosophioa~ ev e Lue t i on s , the pr-o c Lem of ca t ego rf ze t f on may be oon-
isidered to have 1t~ birth.
(2) Predioativt'l Cate,ori~ation. In this ;Jerioo the pr-oc e e s of cete-
! gor'Lza t i on be c omes fai l'l~1 spe oil' ie ~he c a t Eforiefl c ons t I tu te pal't Lcul arI zed
evaluations or prec t cc t i ons of t hf ngs , As a na t t er or ru at o r-Lca I fact this
t ~l!)e 01 ca t eg or-t ze t Lon !)I'OCeSs has its roots in :-'I'otlr~ which are to e. ce rt e i n
extent transferrec. irom t he Lrt e r-e st in cosmic pt enon.ena , to prc tLe r-s i nvo I v-

~lnf hunan 1Hiivit;ualfl b~.( t.h e Lr r e Le t Lon to the ~ocit:t~ in wnt cr. the~ live.

the r'liRcnssion of the Sophists c onc erru ng men t s cut i e s anri r-e s pons t bLl t t i es

ether men en~ Rociety arose th~ necessity to Pb~S spe~i.ic jUden:ents upon
,:hines and events. The need thus ap~Ears to identify and t::~:ablish t~E chHract~

of ~hin[s and institutions. Typlfy1nr t~i~ ~rodedure i!= the Soclatic

! det erm i na t ion of the n e t.u r e at vt rtue an, otter inve st j [ ct ions 01' more l

phenomena. AF a con s equ enc e we have (\i sco very and 1'0 st e r i ng 01' um ver e l s ,

to 'be ~l 8(lictions, instruments, which when e:.ppl1cable to 8Ct~ e nc

~conditionp, may he 'aid to conetitute their re a Li t y , In the thin1dnr of Plato
he universals tuke on ~Ol'e ptable cheradteristics ~n6 jn t~e forn of ideas
ead to ~t::rrnanent ev~lu~tions in w~ict Cbn te ~u~rntid u~ not onl~ t~~ tot&lity
f hunan experience: but its cosmic gncunc s and c onc i t I cns , With Flato the
yt hag or-ean ro rr;s , wh i ch Soc r-a t e s he.d nec.e into oe s cr-i p t i ve functions/1:ecome

redicates ot reality.
'Nhen we reach the work of ;:pn.stotle, who for the first time o r.r ars a

full flede6c establish~ent of th~ caterQriration ~roblem, we find a very de11b-

era t s development of t 1:e"':oct rI n s of ?x edi O~ t i on , For .Aris tot 1 e 't h e c a: eeories

become def~init e wor'kab l e instruments r or the ident ifi ce t I on enc oITanin,ti on

of all o b j e c t s and conditions met with in the ex?~ri~nce to w~ich the p~ilosophi

at t empt s to o r i ent hil"'sel f The l\r t~ to tel ian c e teol'h, e, 1"0, f- vel', are unf' 01: tum

ly developed ~ith too close a rsure to lenuace function~. Hencs, they turn

out to be c':esel'l rti ve eler:snt~ e c co r-c Lng to trc..m~ati(;al r'o ins , Tt',at J~ristotle

.d 1d. not l'e:::.! 12,8 the s pe c i1,i c na t ure '1 his ce t bfCI"' Laa t ion:Tobl err is c Ie at"

some of the ~oEt iM}Ortant valu~tio~s thLt he bmp1o~s jn ~is phi1oro phical

thin:dn( , ami, in the sec one . ? I f . c , his ce t eg crt e s ar-e !'J!. e su r.ed to b e [ > l ' e d e t e r m -

,'.1ne n and ~ b so Lu t e syrtbo I S or tJ"1 e ',';oi'Li of real i ty an d not j n st rur-errt al :.~ es-

cr-t ~t ions of e vr.I ue, t i v el emsn t s ,

Looke d 1190n a s l: vp.r:~ e1 at orat e C' ev e L o p v e n t of (:[: tero r i z a ti o n , but . o n t,j',e w h o L e

the at tt t ude t s o t e acnc-' an,' 1,crmal Fron t r.t f t r-o ur-ht is e xc Iu c e rt cri t i ce I

ob e ervab l e ,

t he ie euc t i on 01' t r-e G1 ef:K at a t e s to th.:: .ev e Lopc (;;::.t or r-o c e i n r:<.~t ion~,: e

no t i ce i~:I"'!~c:1jc::tl:' r: fl'p., ueI ce pcr t u re irom tre r t rcn; r s ti r-n.Li r t i c :r.ilos9ph~'

of .\thenc: v-Lt.h I t s f'l"phc-;:?is U'10n stri,e:t j objt:c1.iVt :.,cn:. .!.Lj onr , ~.".td', COiEB

u e . L t s t r c c . c t I v i t i c s , I n t r . e i.elJerH~-ci<.: ~;,rio~ tl',('; ~toics, 10r e vr r.p L e , a l L c w

the pred1uative functionR to lLpf~ 11Jrn tte ~'~iti0n ~f inptrurents condifently

Sed hy th6 tr.inkEr in eval~~tin~ thinrs. J:r:-te~,., ~.:-.iv ~;;:.tq=Olid~ <fain r ecore
o smi c ev z.Lue.t Lo ns , rl1 t ,1 i 11'ar : 1?re-Socrl\tHI'A in tt:at the c o s mo a is
looked upon ftF a l~I'fer ho~~ for the infivi(ua! than i~ ~OS~PF8d by a stable

politicul ~oc1et~.

t n v i v; .. . u a I !h.GS L n f,'":l-. tOH (:1 a :":'~~i~ L n t e i r i e t ct L o n ~~f +r.inL.". ~hjs vt ev

d e t L.rr
.. tru.t
.. \". \, tJ. on
..... or
_ +
II J."~ "
v r,..' in
~ tt. e r rs..; J.. ."'.
r.~' . __ "n' t:"" . 1 .1 l_J'. 5
1 ' ,.......
t .. ..L ~ .- ) _ u.

a rowln~' stability,

In tte Renai3S~nC& .~L:'io~J ~~ . fin~

that thra"rh the c e ve I o pnent 01 ro c i a l c;nt~ poli tical conc i tions ::-\t;'" Lnt er es t

... }
ill \.
cons t J.t tu t"".j:.l..
c s the :1"t'l
"" L. .. t: ot
'~... '0"
'_ ..t:' ... ...
. Ii"'"
~ O:-.:.~ '" ~f

L1tO:O!;scious sub s .... a~1(;t;J t nourr t , or fl'inc':J '~liPi(:l"'. is co ir-e Let e i... ~~~(;t..ltcf')
01' nac e r c erit j, c e.I wi t r. (Spinoz /;;.) concrete ia c t e J l'ui 1 t u~ into r-t;ch;;;.nic&..l
sy~tems of rb~eri~listic (Hobbes) or Spil'itUbli~tlc (Jpinozb, thin[s. Dbfinite:

developeo e i t: cc.,tecorib~ ttt.t ,1E: ~:esinect t o ['i ve c e e cr i pt Ive ::;icnUicance

" ct
F,' u c.,~1 ""renor'-'
:'. . >'C1. "'n
.1. "O""'''L... t t'a~cJ
...: lv~. _.. -\-, '"
~.'J,'" l' ::~ t r" ( ~,crl'
'--~'~,' -"l ..! '. ct, l or v a;::-

illustr<::tec by the wor k 01 bc.:.con a nr' :;e"'calt6s.

\ of the cate[orization rro(,lem ".nc. f:OW it if to hf ',iO I ' !{E:; ( I out. In SL1Ch r
~ ip .nd t f a t e d the :;efinitE: 01 r ent e.t i on c;<.;";.i?!it.y 01 the ~hi1osophel" :'L rLl!elinE

can fl'asp or be i0entlc~1 ~lth cos~iu sub~tance or t~e wOl1t w~cle

(5) Bv~lu~tlve C8te[orization. Fhilo!ophie~l tho'[ht in the 17th bnd
18th c en tur Le s ht:c;ame l"I01'e distln(;t~:' 1".lIr:cmi~ti(; en: persoriu Li s t l c t ne,n rc:-.d

hjtherto been the (;u~e. "of"

~ ..

upon the Inivit'lh..l In 't,r.t' r bcit:vc:.l ;'t;liOt:. FCll: ,.t. t re.t t i r.e t r, Ln c.Lvi ,.:..:.t:.1

bmlJ!'uc:.":=i was decldeCtl~- a, f"llinl l: ... c.: 0:1 tfe in(.ii.. i~.l"c...l:'8 4. Lss t l~1"U[t l~_

in 't.:-.e c ... Rt: 01 !,eihnitz Cc-otf;[011:n.. t Lon inv ..Lv e s r:::ir:<::l-.~l~" ... t. {;r..rt;.fs u on r

b e s I s of <... conc i ete i nv e s t i j . t i on of rc t ua L r ac t s , }.s OVE:l' q C;;.i~st t_ttc

e ar Lt e r- t h I mce.r s of t h e ev a Iua t Lvr cc::teccll7.c.tion ?t-,i icc: t r.e .L-,~c;.ntla.n po si tion

1s t~sed u~on e~~ct 0escription of ~et~il~d/f8i~ntlfiC f~cts &8 the nf tural

ec1entist elicits the~. It is in this s.'"' tha 'T. nt ~
~' i rLt ' ..... t

i.a 1
~,Vc_ODS a "..l .. t.",i'--'I
I w~rk1ne; out or a set or cate~ories wru ch 5,.0 pre suneo to be the e c t u.l tools
of cri t i c aj scientific ane" ?htlosophical thinkin[. AS it hap~ens, howLver,

the c a o, Le s ~l"e wo rke d out in an exceedin[l~' fOl:Ji:tl r.ann er bEd~:ed upon pure-
I~ ly me chan i ca l acience. In c ons e.juen c c, t!"e {~a~tie.n c;;"terories e r e not ~~mer-

ally serviceable in the (ie~-':l i t i on of' an~ r c i en t i tLc pl'

(6) Instru'ental Cateeori;-t.t.lon. In cur i ent philoS:;,::h~r t h e work of

the 1hi.loso :::her i a i:eflni tely n:c.J.ized as an e ve Iuat t on 01' ca t er or'Laa t f on of

ac tuat !'uc:tS. Eere we he v e i:1 c Lear ~-"n(": c:or::lete ao ce p t ance or ttc ielea t he t

phi1?ROphicc.l WOI'~-{ is .'ri!"lcril~' an e.t t e rp t to c eve l o p e n e t t i tuue w:,'crd the

a ct ual wo rl c. in wr fch the tt.L1ker n n- s r i mse Lt, ':'0 b e ru re , .~hiloso!1hbrs

aisaeree as to the li~its af this wOllG. 'mH::rec.s s oc:e 1 e l d eve t hu t OU!' con-

cre t e worLo of j ... ct is Lt n.Lt e c by t b e c on i Lne s of t .. c ne.tur a l <c t ent Le t , ,'thel's

problEI',s wi t h i n thf. [cnE::l'c-.l r.ov er.e nt , Two (istinc:t et t i t uce s r.'a~ be in(:i<.:~,teC:

i st i c manner.

not r.. c.rt , hov.eve i , .hc.t t.h e s e Ln t ere s t s e n c de~i..ces ~r,oull; Influence t r.e e.c tu a I

cat ego rf zr.t i on ~lO(;eSSes, but tt:Lt the work o t C:Elts['oriHttion 1:c:~ i t s Hrits

set and i t s r.e vel :Jpr;~ent in(.i~c4ted by t r e i:~vesti[t.tive thinker.

;" .
, " r: ;-,