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G.R. No.

L-6120 June 30, 1953

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, vs. FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Judge-at-large presiding over

Branch C of the Court of First Instance of Manila and EUGENIO ANGELES, as City
Fiscal of Manila, representing the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.


Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory
offenses, namely, (1) that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien
without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) that he failed to submit to the
Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel
"Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to
the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.

Before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be
appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as
authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of
the City of Manila.

The motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of the Philippines.

The court denied the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules of
Court by the Supreme Court, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly
repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power,
expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said
Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409
on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.

Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of
discretion to the respondent Judge.

Respondents contend that the right to trial with the aid of assessors, with all its concomitant
provisions, cannot now be invoked because, being procedural in nature, the same must be
deemed to have been impliedly eliminated.


Whether or not the right of the petitioner for the aid of assessor is a substantive right which
cannot be impaired by the court in the exercise of its rule-making power.

Yes the right to ask for the aid of an assessor is a substantive right which cannot be

The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must created and defined
by express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain
redress therefor. "Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A
substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or
property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public
affairs, whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which
substantive rights may be enforced in courts of justice." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. I, 1952 ed., p.4.)

In Bustos vs. Lucero,* (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448), this Court cited with
approval the following definitions of substantive law:

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
(60 C.J. 980.)

Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions (36 C.J. 27; 52 C.J.S. 1026).
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,

ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.


Petitioner is an accused in a criminal case. He filed a motion with the CFI after he had been
bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the
justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony.

The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108 (denies to the
defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation), and the
objection was sustained. Petitioner filed a case against Judge Lucero with the SC.

In a decision dated October 20, 1948 Justice Tuason denied the petition. He pointed out
that the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him
does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be
an infringement of his right to confront witness

On a motion for reconsideration, it is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. It is said that the rule in question
deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 11 of Rule 108 is a substantive law


No. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective
law and not a substantive law or substantive right.

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to
be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.)
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C.
J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
(22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first
step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition.
The difference is somewhat a question of degree. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular
case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching
upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by
general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.)
G.R. No. L-23614 February 27, 1970

PEDRO M. BERMEJO & JOVITA CAMORIN, petitioner-appellant,

ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-23615 February 27, 1970

JOVITA CARMORIN, petitioner-appellant,

ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.


Petitioners were charged of the crime of falsification of public or official document. They
made it appear in an amended petition for habeas corpus that the same was signed and
sworn to by Julia Carmorin as one of the petitioners. However, it was in fact the
accused Julia "Doe"/Jovita Camorin who signed and swore to that petition as Julia

Relying on the certification of the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been
conducted a warrant of arrest was issued and a case was filed against the petitioners.

Petitoners filed a motion to quash alleging among others that the prosecutor did not
conduct preliminary investigation in their presence.

Respondent judge denied the motion to quash

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before CFI of Capiz

It appears that petitioners requested for the re-scheduling of the preliminary

investigation on a certain date. However, the petitioners did not appear on the said date.

CFI dismissed the petitions

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled of the right to preliminary investigation


Even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify petitioners, but had conducted the
preliminary investigations ex parte, their rights to due process could not have been
violated for they are not entitled as of right to preliminary investigation. The numerous
authorities 12 supporting this view are not rendered obsolete, as claimed by petitioners,
because Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court invoked by them has no
application in their cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court took effect on
January 1, 1964 while the preliminary investigations conducted by the city fiscal were
conducted in 1963. 13 The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they cannot be
given retroactive effect. 14
G.R. No. 150274 August 4, 2006


DATUMANONG in the latters capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, Petitioner,


Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, District Engineer of Mountain Province, DPWH Cordillera

Administrative Region was charged and found guilty on the administrative complaint for
dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial by the Adjudication Bureau
of the Office of the Ombudsman

On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision.

Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court. While appeal was pending Secretary
Datumanong issued a Memorandum Order declaring petitioner DROPPED/DISMISSED
from the service.

Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court.

While the petition against Sec. Datumanong was pending, the Court affirmed the decision of
CA finding petitioner guilty of the case charged. Furthermore, Administrative Order No. 17
was passed amending Sec 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The new rule provides that an appeal of the decision of the Ombudsman shall
not stop the decision being executor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 17 can be applied in the instant case.



Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws
cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to
nor arise therefrom. 19

In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly
procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal. There is no such thing as a vested interest in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office. 20
G.R. No. 136368 January 16, 2002

JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C.

Tan, petitioner,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and


The heirs of Tan (represented by petitione, Tan Jr) filed a suit against the Magdangals for
reformation of instrument alleging that the intention of the Sps Magdangals and his
deceased father was to conclude an equitable mortgage and not an absolute sale.

Barely hours after the complaint was stamped 'received,' the Magdangals were able to have
Tan's title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470.

RTC declared that the agreement was an equitable mortgaged. It ordered the plaintiff,
petitioners herein, to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of the decision
P59200 plus interest at 12% per annum.

CA Third division affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. On March 13, 1996, the
Clerk of Court entered that the Decision has on October 21, 1995 become final and

On March 21, 1996 Magdangals fled a writ of possession noting that the redemption period
up to October 20, 1995 has already expired without Tan Jr exercising his option to redeem
the property.

Tan Jr countered that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the Court of Appeals
and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this case
cannot be considered final and executory.

Tan Jr. then filed a motion for execution with the with the CA directing the Court a quo to
issue corresponding the writ of execution.

The court then issued the challenged order stating that the 120 days period should be
reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgement which was March 13, 1996. Tan Jr
made a deposit on Apil 17, 1996 well within the 120-day period.

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of
judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of
judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution."

ISSUE: Whether or not the new rule should be applied to the case at bar.



There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule,
however, has well-delineated exceptions.

The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary
implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation,

or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.

Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of

procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work

Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would

involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts."

We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be
given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive
right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this
Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the
subject lot.
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005




Petitioners filed an annulment of judgement and titles of land against the Bureau of
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo.

Petitioners then filed a motion to declare respondent in default

The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later,
on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal 4 and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3,

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal should be given due course.



In previous cases, We have since required strict observance of the reglementary period
of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, 22 and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
However, we also declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and
the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. Our judicial system and the courts
have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the
just and proper disposition of his cause.25

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the
sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules
42,27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15
days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. 30

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration).
G.R. No. 159593 October 12, 2006


INC.), respondent.


MPC filed an application for tax credit or refund of its unutilized VAT paid on capital
goods before the BIR.

Without waiting for an answer from the [BIR Commissioner], [MPC] filed the instant
petition for review on July 10, 1998, in order to toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive period for claiming a refund under the law.

The CTA ruled in favor of MPC.

Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review
raising grounds that were totally new and were never raised before the CTA, to wit





The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR Commissioner's Petition, it held, among
others, that the BIR Commissioner cannot validly change his theory of the case on

CIR filed a petition before the SC. He argues that the observance of procedural rules
may be relaxed considering that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to
protect and promote the substantive rights of the parties;

ISSUE: Whether or not procedural rules may be relaxed in the case at bar



The general rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal.

The BIR Commissioner pleads with this Court not to apply the foregoing rule to the
instant case, for a rule on technicality should not defeat substantive justice. The BIR
Commissioner apparently forgets that there are specific reasons why technical or
procedural rules are imposed upon the courts, and that compliance with these rules,
should still be the general course of action.

The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural

rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so
warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good
and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is
discretionary upon the courts.17

In his Petition and Memorandum before this Court, the BIR Commissioner made no
attempt to provide reasonable explanation for his failure to raise before the CTA the
issue of MPC being a public utility subject to franchise tax rather than VAT. There is no
sufficient cause to warrant the relaxation of technical or procedural rules in the instant
case. The general rules of procedure still apply and the BIR Commissioner cannot be
allowed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
G.R. No. 164195 December 4, 2009


PHILIPPINES, Respondents.


AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the lands subject of this case pursuant to CARL.
LBP fixed the compensantion. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts in cash from the
accounts, but afterwards they filed separate complaints for determination of just

DARAB did not act on their complaints. RTC determined the just compensation plus the
payment of attorneys fees

On a petition for certiorari the CA granted the petition and nullified the assailed orders of
the RTC.

Petitioners went to SC. The Third Division in its first decision reversed the decision of
the CA.

In a MR the Third Division deleted the award of 12% interest and attorneys fees.

Issue: Whether or not the denial of the award of legal interest and attorneys fees is



The second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal
interest and attorney's fees) is denied, because, firstly, to grant it is to jettison the
immutability of a final decision a matter of public policy and public interest, as well as
a time-honored principle of procedural law.

The doctrine is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public
policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law.

Although the immutability doctrine admits several exceptions, like: (1) the correction of
clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable,22 none of the exceptions
applies herein, simply because the matters involved herein are plainly different from
those involved in the exceptional cases.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself had already declared to be final. (Emphases ours.) (CITED

Indeed, the Court reserves the power to suspend procedural rules and technicalities
when they tend to defeat, rather than serve, the interest of substantial justice.

The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice have always been, as they
in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As
applied to instant case, in the language of Justice Makalintal, technicalities "should give
way to the realities of the situation."

AFC and HPI are entitled to interest in the payment of just compensation.
G.R. No. 146611 February 6, 2007




Petitioner filed an action for partition against his half-brother, private respondent herein.

The trial court confined the partition to only the property actually pertaining to the estate
of the parties deceased father and co-owned by them, namely, the parcel of land at

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal before the trial court which was given due course. CA
directed petitioner to file his appellants brief.

There being no appellants brief filed within the extended period, the CA issued a
resolution5considering the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the same.

Eight (8) months after the CA issued the above resolution, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. CA denied the MR.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief 8 bearing date December 27, 1999, anchored on
Section 2,9 Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.CA denied the aforementioned
Petition for Relief

Petitoner comes to SC to relax the application of procedural rules or suspend them favor of petitioners substantial rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Relief should be granted.



The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Courts,
therefore, not only have the power but the duty to construe and apply technical rules
liberally in favor of substantive law and substantial justice. Furthermore, this Court,
unlike courts below, has the power not only to liberally construe the rules, but also to
suspend them, in favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently
belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-making power by no less than
It is equally settled, however, that this Courts power to liberally construe and even to
suspend the rules, presupposes the existence of substantial rights in favor of which, the
strict application of technical rules must concede.

The present case will have to be decided in accordance with existing rules of procedure.
We apply the settled principle that petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other
available or adequate remedy.14 Hence, a petition for relief may not be availed of where
a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new
trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not prevented
from filing such motion or taking the appeal.
G.R. No. 169942 January 24, 2011


LEGASPI, Petitioner,
COLINA, Respondents.


Respondents filed a Affidavit-Complaint charging the respondents with Falsification and Use
of Falsified Documents. Petitioner alleged that respondents falsified and used the Barangay
Clearance and Official Receipt purportedly issued in the name of CPC by the Office of the
Barangay Captain of Dasmarias Village, Makati City of which Lepaspi was Barangay

The Office of Prosecutor dismissed the case for failure to establish probable cause

DOJ affirmed the decision of the prosecutors.

Before petitioner was able to file its petition for review before the CA, it first sought for an
extension of time11 of 15 days within which to file the same due to counsels heavy
workload. The CA granted the extension.

Subsequently, petitioner asked for another extension14 of five days. CA denied the second

Petitioner harps on the policy of liberal construction embodied in Section 6, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action.


Whether or not the second motion for extension of time should be granted.



Sec 4 Rule 43 of the ROC provides that the court may only grant a further extension when
presented with the most compelling reason but same is limited only to a period of 15
days. Thus, when the CA denied petitioners Second Motion for Extension of five days, it
was merely following the abovementioned provision of the rules after it found the reason for
the second extension as not compelling..
As to petitioners invocation of liberal application of the rules, we cannot heed the same. "It
is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should
not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that
the Rules of Court may be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that procedural rules should
not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons."25

Utter disregard of the rules of procedure cannot justly be rationalized by harking on policy of
liberal construction.
G.R. No. 105294 February 26, 1997

PACITA DAVID-CHAN, petitioner,



Petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of
access to the highway.

Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. Petitioner had another access to the
National Highway which, however, she closed during the pendency of the case at the trial
court when she extended the construction of her fence.5

Petitioner failed to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts. Petitioner who claims
to be an "ordinary housewife (with) . . . meager resources" pleads that "those who have less
in life should have more in law" and that the Court should apply the Filipino values of
pakikisama and pakikipag-kapwa-tao in resolving the case.


Whether or not the petition should be granted by way of "pakikisama" and "pakikipagkapwa-



The appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. 21 As found by respondent Court, petitioner is not
legally entitled to a right of way on the property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable
arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.

There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before
they may be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly
complied with because easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such
inconvenience may be imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve
judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by
their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the
consequences of such choice.
G.R. No. 170404 September 28, 2011

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 117, Pasay City, Respondent.

Petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order void and that Judge Gingoyon
abused his discretion in citing him in contempt, as well as in denying his motion to fix the
amount of bond.


Petitioner filed a case of abatement of nuisance against her neighbor Mina. In the said
case, petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the "basketball goal"
which was permanently attached to the second floor of Minas residence but protrudes to
the alley which serves as the publics only right of way.

After petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte, Judge Gingoyon, declared the basketball
goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked "locus
standi." Citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for
abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a
private individual like the petitioner.

In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in. x x x Their
place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to
spare for recreation, to laze around or doing their daily household chores.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his MR he stated:

The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-
parte and where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from
the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the
record, given that the latter has already been in default. 9(Emphasis supplied.)

Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing and directed him to substantiate his serious
charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for
contempt.13 Petitioner, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon issued an Order19 finding
petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS
of imprisonment and to pay a fine of 2,000.00.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-
Parte Motion)22 with the respondent court

The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion based on petitioners failure to attach the
alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain.


Whether abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte


Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is
no abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, "[w]here the issuance of an

extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented."44 In
consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no
allegation of any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court.
However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.

We find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. "A 1wphi 1

becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the
[RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of
the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition."40 For the guidance of the petitioner, "[t]his Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction)
is not exclusive."41 Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper
cases.42 "However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any
of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice.
This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition."43 Unwarranted
demands upon this Courts attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for
pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006


HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK
BANSALES, Respondents.


Bansales a minor, was charged and found guilty with the murder of his high school teacher
Yvonne Declarador.

However, the court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to
the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.

The RTC set a preliminary conference considering that the accused would turn 18.

Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial courts
decision suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation


Whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with the



The rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 10

A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. 11

However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that considering the nature and importance
of the issues raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the
Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover, this
Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the interests of justice so require.

In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and
the application of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
G.R. No. 123050 January 20, 1999


SUICO, petitioners,


Suico obtain a loan from respondent bank secured by a mortgaged of two real estate
properties. For failure to pay the balance of the loan respondent PDCP Bank caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. It was adjudged as the highest bidder
and a Certificate of Sale in its favor. Petitioner failed to redeem the said properties.

Respondent PDCP Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch
28 an "Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession" 1 which was granted.

However, the writ could not be enforced because petitioners filed a "Complaint for Specific
Performance, Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56 seeking
to enjoin respondent PDCP Bank from selling the mortgaged properties and from taking
physical possession over the same during the pendency of the case. RTC Branch 56 issued
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction with the Court of Appeals that the writ of preliminary injunction be set
aside, declared void and without any further force and effect.

Court of Appeals ruled that RTC Branch 56 exceed its jurisdiction when issued the writ of
injunction against the enforcement of the writ of possession granted by RTC Branch 28.


Whether or not RTC Branch, 56 can enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession issued
by RTC Branch 28.



The statute books are replete with jurisprudence to the effect that trial courts have no power
to interfere by injunction with the orders or judgments issued by another court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction. 29 In this regard, RTC Branch 56 therefore has no power nor
authority to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch
G.R. No. 127371 April 25, 2002


AUTHORITY, petitioners,


Pursuant to such Cabinet Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co.
(CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise3 to distribute electric power to the
municipalities of Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of
the province of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition
which sought the "discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National
Power Corporation (NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area."4

ERB granted the petition. The case reached the Supreme Court and It affirmed the decision
of the ERB.

To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction
against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-186. They alleged, inter alia, that there exists no legal basis
to cut-off PSC's power supply with NAPOCOR and substitute the latter with CEPALCO .

The trial court rendered judgment12 in favor of PSC and PIA

CA reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the ERB.



Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a review of
its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court.24 Settled is the rule that where the
law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial
Courts in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.25Hence,
the trial court, being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It
bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal
administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice
whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or
vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.26
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

HERBERT CANG, petitioner,

CLAVANO, respondents.


The Spouses Clavano being childless seek to adopt the three children of Anna Marie
Clavano (sister of respondent Ronald) and petitioner. Ana Marie signed an affidavit of
consent. The eldest child of Ana also signed an affidavit of consent.

Petitioner, the father of the children opposed the petition for adoption.

Respondent countered that petitioner abandoned his children.

RTC granted the petition

CA affirmed the decree of adoption.

Petitioner is now before the Supreme Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was
fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by
Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article
188 (2) of the Family Code.


Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the petition considering that petitioner did not
give his consent



Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As
such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the
applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family
Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

Under Art 188 of the FC it is evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.

Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural

However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination.

The Court found that by law and under the facts of the case at bar, petitioner has not
abandoned his three children.

Petition was granted. The decree of adoption was cancelled.