Islam and Arab Political Change

Arab world pro-democracy movements raise questions about how much Islam will figure into
the political calculus in emerging governments in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as new ones that
might arise elsewhere, says religion expert Ebrahim Moosa.

Interview by Ebrahim Moosa

Toni Johnson

July 18, 2011

Pro-democracy protests in the Middle East have raised questions about what role political Islam
will play in new governments in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as others that might emerge from the
continued unrest. Ebrahim Moosa, professor of religion and Islamic studies at Duke University,
says that while Islam will likely be a factor in emergent governments, people will be cautious
about allowing too much of a blurring between political and religious boundaries. "People are
chastened and sobered by experiences elsewhere," Moosa says, noting what he calls the failures
of the Islamic states of Iran and Sudan. Moosa says that while Turkeys government under the
AKP (Justice Party) is being seen as a model, it is unclear how that will translate into specific
national contexts. He also says that the United States is still operating under a credibility deficit
in the region and has not used its vast knowledge resources on Islam effectively.

One question that has come out of the Middle East protests is whether political Islam is
waxing or waning. What are your thoughts?

We dont know. The early indicators are that political Islam is a factor, but is not dominating the
scene. Political Islam groups, like the Renaissance Party in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, are by all accounts possibly the most prepared. They have been the most repressed, they
have strong networks and organizations, and they have ideological cohesion.

All the other groups might be less cohesive and less ideologically organized, hence they might
not be as ready for elections as the Brotherhood. [These] groups also are taking the temperature
and the pulse of the region, and theyve recognized that the [earlier versions of] political Islam is
not going to work: It hasnt worked well in Iran; there were experiments in Jordan; [it has been
an] absolute failure in Sudan.

Theres talk in these countries about looking to the Turkish model, or at least the ruling
AKPs version. Is Turkey becoming more Islamist under AKP, and how can Turkey be a
model for Arab countries if its itself in flux as far as the relationship between religion and
the state?

[Turkeys] AKP has basically turned itself into a political party that espouses Islamic values in
its political persona. ... Religion will come into the public space, but with a number of filters.

The Turkish experiment of the Justice Party, the AKP party, is a work in progress. And we dont
know where that ship is going to stop. What [the party] has to work under are the constraints of a
Turkish constitution that has all kinds of precautions against the public exhibition of religion.
AKP has basically turned itself into a political party that espouses Islamic values in its political
persona. So its not advocating theocracy, but it has internalized Islamic ethics. To that extent, it
is a model that is synchronistic with a certain model of secular governance. Religion will come
into the public space, but with a number of filters.
Of course, many people in the Arab Middle East are impressed by the Turkish model and saying,
"Wow, why dont we go that way?" The reason they are looking at [Turkey] is because they are
seeing a large Muslim country having Islamic values and prosperity. There is no theocracy;
theres maybe a soft kind of public religion in Turkey. Rashid Ghannouchi of the Renaissance
Party in Tunisia basically says that hes modeling himself on Turkey. The Muslim Brotherhood
has also named their party the Justice Party. So Turkey is the flavor of the month.

[But] we should not overestimate Turkish influence, because Tunisia and Egypt are very
different places. For instance, Turkey does not have Article 2, as the Egyptian constitution has,
which says sharia is a source of the law. So its very unclear how the Islamic model is going to
play out in the Egyptian context.

What support will there be for keeping Islam in the social, rather than the public, arena?

It is an interesting argument, religion being in the social sphere rather than the political sphere.
In other words, people dont feel obliged to have a religious mandate on which legislation will be
built. So that legislation would be on the basis of transaction, negotiation, agreement, what is in
the best interest of Egypt, or Tunisia, or whatever country. This doctrine of best interest is a very
important element in moral philosophy. What we are going to see is moral vocabulary that is
going to be increasingly Islamized in places like Egypt and so on. There will hotheads and
moderates. They will have to duke this one out.

In countries such as Bahrain, theres a large divide between Sunni and Shia sects. Some are
worried about an "Iraq Syndrome," where you have this sort of power flip between the
sects. How much trouble could this bring?

The Bahraini government has lost a golden opportunity to work with the momentum of freedom.
They have prosperity in Bahrain; Bahrain is small, manageable. If they wanted, they could have
had a constitutional monarchy with freedoms, giving the majority Shiites, who have been
excluded from many sectors of the economy and from power, a greater role.

I was in Saudi Arabia talking to members of Saudi Arabias business and professional elite as
well as its governing elite in January, and the only thing people could talk about is the Shia
threat, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is also Shia. And I asked them, "How long are you
going to play this card of sectarian division?" Because people outside the region can say, "These
Arabs cant get their act together." Unfortunately, some of the more puritan activists and puritan
tendencies in Saudi Arabia have spilled over into Bahrain and have created this war between
Sunni and Shiite, and blood has been shed. How thats going to resolve is not clear. And of
course, each one is now evoking Saudi Arabia as a defender of Sunnism, and Iran as the defender
of Shiism.

From what Ive seen of young people in the region, theyre not going to see too much value in
playing out these ancient hatreds [when] they know that there are other, bigger threats against
their way of life, their values, the way that they can be stable and prosper. Instead of
sectarianism, these kinds of theological differences should be celebrated as theological
pluralism--which becomes the foundation for political pluralism and political diversity.

What space do you think there is for smaller religious minorities, like Jews, Christians, and
Copts?

It depends where were talking about. In much more complex, bigger countries--such as Egypt,
Iraq, Syria, Yemen--there have been established patterns of minorities being tolerated. Of course,
many of the Jews have left, or were forced out from places like Iraq and Yemen. There are a few
Jews in places like Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt.

The more nouveau-riche Gulf states dont have very complex histories of diversity. In those
statelets, there is very little space for tolerance. They cant even get the Sunni-Shiite thing right.
Any kind of concessions to Christians, Ahmadiyya [a sect of Islam considered to be
blasphemous by some Muslims], or Buddhists will be very hard-earned and can only happen
through some kind of political compact, or companies or immigrants in that area insisting that
they must have some space, [or] from outside countries putting on pressure for the recognition of
diversity.

The absence of religious diversity is bad for Islam. Its bad for Muslims if they dont know who
other people are in the world. If they dont have Jewish and Christian and Buddhist neighbors,
there is a predisposition for Muslims to become cocky and believe that they have the only truth.
And they become absolutist, and dangerous.

In what way does the debate over the role of religion help and hurt these political
movements?

Instead of sectarianism, differences should be celebrated as theological pluralism--which

becomes the foundation for political pluralism and political diversity.

In Latin Americas history--or where I come from, South Africas history--Christianity was a
tool for liberation, something called liberation theology. A Catholic theology combined with
certain kinds of Marxism became a narrative for why people need to overthrow tyrannies,
dictatorships, and racist governments. People in the Middle East have the religiosity of Islam, but
not everyone is theocratically or dogmatically religious enough to make it into a political system.
Theyve seen Irans terrible experience, where you have a religious dictatorship that has sucked
the air out of Irans aspirations of being a free country. People are chastened and sobered by
experiences elsewhere; Sudan was a colossal failure in terms of being an Islamic state, at great
damage to its own national integrity.

People are going to be cautious with religion--[but] there are people who are going to throw
religious fire bombs into the public square. One hopes that people are not intimidated by that and
will talk back to people who throw these [rhetorical] incendiary devices precisely to silence any
kind of contestation. Thats one of the dangers of bringing religion into the public space--you
have dogma and belief instead of arguing over the nature of moral truth. [It would be good] if
religious groups in the democracy movement in Egypt can harness the transformative power of
religion without making a tool out of religion.

What is so magical about this uprising was that it didnt turn into violence. The violence came
from the tyrants. This is an amazing moment in the history of the Arabs that they have taken up
non-violence with such a passion. This is unprecedented in a culture where people felt that their
defense was to cry jihad, and jihad means "resist with a fist."

What should policymakers do to improve the U.S. image in the region and bridge the gap
with Muslims?

In the last ten years and in the previous administration, America squandered its moral standing to
the extent that anything that is remotely connected to the United States government is
immediately seen as suspicious. For instance, even the U.S. civil society is immediately seen as
suspicious. So from evangelicals to churches or NGOs, its always tainted by the American
credibility deficit. And people dont make a distinction between government and people. Theres
a lot of work to be done.

Just as every policymaker needs to know the ABCs of diplomacy, they need to understand the
ABCs of culture. And a deep knowledge of the culture is the knowledge of religion. Lacking
that, there can be all kinds of faux pas. Important military divisions and wings of our government
[have shown] that there is a tremendous knowledge deficit.

Its not as if our country does not have resources to educate. There are very few countries in the
world that have the knowledge about Islam that the United States has. Yet that knowledge [has
not been used to educate] the American public, and most egregiously, this knowledge does not
translate into the apparatus of the governance in our country. Therefore we are making the most
ill-informed decisions both domestically and internationally.

URL: https://www.cfr.org/interview/islam-and-arab-political-
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