Risk Analysis by Means of a QRA Approach on a

LPG Cylinder Filling Installation

Ali Dormohammadi,a Esmaeil Zarei,b,c Mohammad Bagher Delkhosh,c and Ali Gholamib
a
Department of Occupational Health Eng, Faculty of Health, Hamadan University of Medical Sciences, Hamadan, Iran
b
Neyshabur Student Research Committee, Neyshabur University of Medical Sciences, Neyshabur, Iran;
smlzarei65@gmail.com (for correspondence)
c
Department of Occupational Health Eng., Faculty of Health, Neyshabur University of Medical Sciences, Neyshabur, Iran
Published online 2 September 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.11623

In recent years in the process industries much attention
has been paid to the quantitative risk analysis (QRA). This
study describes a QRA evaluating the risk from the operation
of an LPG installation. Both individual and societal risks to
the installation personnel, customers, and neighbors/passer-
bys are evaluated. The study showed that the largest effect is
caused by a jet fire and flash fires. Unacceptable individual
risk is being imposed on personnel, consumers, and third
parties. Societal risks are also unacceptable in comparison
with the Installations acceptable risk criteria. Risk reductive
measures proposed for the Installation include the applica-
tion of smaller pipes and fewer flanges in Compressor room,
the use of smaller vessels in Storage units and the use of
Emergency shutdown valve. V C 2013 American Institute of Chemi-
cal Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 7784, 2014
Keywords: quantitative risk assessment; individual risk;
societal risk; LPG installation
INTRODUCTION
LPG as a clean, environmentally suitable fuel which as a
multipurpose energy source has played an important role in
the world. Its consumption has been constantly increasing in
most countries of the world [1,2]. LPG has more than 1000
applications in industrial, chemical, residential/commercial,
refinery, and transportation [2,3]. Heating rural, residential/
commercial accommodations, and cooking are the important
applications for LPG in Iran [2,4]. Approximately, 75% con-
sumption of LPG in the world is related to residential/com-
mercial and chemical applications [3]. LPG is a flammable,
noncorrosive, nontoxic, odorless, and liquid [3,5].
The safety of LPG operations is an important concern pri-
vate companies and government in Iran [2]. LPG, being heav-
ier than air, having low boiling point and any leakage, will
quickly vaporizes and accumulates, increasing the risk of
explosion and fire [6]. Contact with LPG can cause the severe
burns on skin [6] and asphyxiation effects are possible [2].
Prominent major accident involving LPG include Mexico
Citys incident in 1984 where explosion of LPG storage tanks
adjacent to residential zones resulted in 650 death, more
than 6400 injuries and 31 million dollars financial losses
[4,7,8]. In Feyzin of French in 1996 around 30 deaths and 80
C 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
V 30 truck drivers per day.
injuries were due to fire of LPG leakage of spherical vessels
[5]. In Italy, 14 LPG tanks from train wreck resulted in
around 31 deaths, losses to nearby buildings [9]. In the last
decade, 41 incidents occurred in LPG installations in Korea
resulting in eight deaths and 138 injuries [1].
In Iran the safety of LPG cylinder filling installations is an
important issue. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) is method
able to evaluate both individual and societal risk (SR). Quali-
tative and semi quantitative risk assessments have been
applied to LPG filling stations and LPG transportation [1,4,8].
However, QRA is not often applied to such installations.
In risk assessment studies, there are generally three main
types of risk to be considered (1) Occupational risks to the
workforce of the plant; (2) Community risks to nearby peo-
ple and environment; (3) Economic risks-the loss of capital
assets, production, and compensation [10,11]. Since eco-
nomic risks are usually covered by insurance such risks are
not considered here. For LPG cylinder filling installation
occupational risks are defined as first party risks, risks to cus-
tomers and neighbors are defined as second and third party
risks.
Installation Description
The installation considered here is the biggest cylinder
filling installation in Iran. Figure 1 shows the LPG Cylinder
filling installation layout and nearby surroundings. LPG is
brought from refineries in tube trailers with 20 tons
capacity. A compressor draws LPG from the trailer to fill
the three Horizontal cylindrical storage vessels up to maxi-
mum pressure 150 psi, each with 60 tons capacity. The stor-
age vessels are filled to 85% of capacity at 75 psi. LPG is
drawn from storage vessels by three centrifuge pumps
through 20 m pipe work to the Cylinder Filling Platform. In
this draw path, pressure is increased to 150 psi. Upon fill-
ing the cylinders, LPG transmission will stop automatically.
Excess LPG is returned to a 1 ton Return horizontal cylin-
drical at 75 psi pressure and then to the Storage vessels
[12]. Filling of cylinders takes 45 s. Loading of cylinders
trucks takes15 min and every day 30 cylinder trucks are
loaded at this installation. Altogether, average gas consump-
tion is 40 tons (two tube trailers) per day, 4000 household
cylinders, and 200 industrial cylinders per day. This
exposes 200 persons for filling the household cylinders and

Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.1) March 2014 77

Figure 1. LPG Cylinder filling installation layout and nearby
surroundings. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 2. LPG Cylinder filling installation location and its
surroundings. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 2 shows the LPG Cylinder filling installation and its
surroundings. To the east side of LPG installation, there are
highway and industrial areas. To the west, there are indus-
trial residential areas. To the south, there are factory and
Gasoline stations. To the north side is a warehouse. Thus,
there are seven potential vulnerable targets outside the instal-
lation of concern: workers in Gasoline station and industrial
areas, passers on main highway, and people living in resi-
dential area. To calculate the risks, it is assumed that the LPG
filling cylinder installation personnel work 12 h per day and
six days per week. Thirty one operators and one manager
will be at the installation on workday. Also, 230 customers
(0.001 person/m2) and 100 people (0.00003 person/m2) are
assumed as second and third parties.
78 March 2014 Published on behalf of the AIChE
Figure 3. Flow diagram of the procedure used for QRA
[10,11]. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
MATERIAL AND METHOD
A systematic QRA procedure (Figure 3) was followed
[10,11].
Hazard Identification and Scenario Selection
First, we identified areas of vulnerability and specific haz-
ards. One of the first systematic methods of hazard identifica-
tion use in chemical industry is the HAZID technique [13].
All necessary information of LPG process was collected. This
includes geographical location and environmental informa-
tion of the location, plot plan, P&IDs (process instrumenta-
tion diagrams), PFDs (process flow diagrams), installation
layout, operation procedures, physical and chemical specifi-
cation of the material, etc. All possible scenarios were identi-
fied and tabulated. The most credible scenarios were
selected after screening the high frequency and high conse-
quence scenarios. A summary of scenarios are in Table 1.
The typical incidents include rupture, breakage of a pipeline
and creation of a hole in a vessel or in a pipe [10]. A total of
17 scenarios were modeled and their risks were quantita-
tively assessed.
Consequence Modeling
Consequence modeling is carried out in several steps.
Source models describe the discharge rate, continuous and
instantaneous, and the total volume discharged. A dispersion
model describes how the material is dispersed. Fire models
predict thermal radiation contours [10]. All emergency shut-
down valves of the installation were manual. The vessels
internal pressure was considered to be constant. The release
duration was taken as 1 h for all scenarios and the release
inventory was considered 106 kg in all scenarios (for
compressor, pump room, and cylinder filling platform units).
For horizontal cylindrical storage vessels and the return hori-
zontal cylindrical vessel inventory was considered 51 tons
(85% vessel capacity) and 1 ton, respectively. With the
assumption of a 1 h release, the influence of release inven-
tory is not significant [14]. The release elevation was consid-
ered to be constant at 1 m height (approximately, the lowest
DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.1)
Table 1. Credible scenarios and their estimated frequency rate in studied installation

Scenario Scenario Release Hole Frequency

Unit No Description Size (mm) (1/yr)
Compressor and S1 Leak of the pipe work 5 3.231022
Pump Room S2 Leak of the pipe work 30 231023
S3 Full bore rupture 100 2.531024
Horizontal Cylindrical S4 Leak of the pipe work 5 131022
Storage Vessels S5 Leak of the pipe work 30 131023
S6 Full bore rupture 75 1.131024
S7 Disc Rupture 600 2.431025
S8 Catastrophic rupture of vessel 231026
Cylinder Filling S9 Leak of the pipe work 5 1.131022
Platform S10 Leak of the pipe work 25 1.231023
S11 Full bore rupture 50 2.331024
S12 Catastrophic rupture of cylinder 2 31026
Return Horizontal S13 Leak of the pipe work 5 3.131023
Cylindrical Vessel S14 Leak of the pipe work 25 3.631024
S15 Full bore rupture 50 1.531024
S16 Disc Rupture 600 2.431025
S17 Catastrophic rupture of vessel 231026

Table 2. Consequence modeling input data Table 3. Atmospheric conditions corresponding to day (D5)
and night (F2).
Pressure
Unit Equipment (psi) Atmospheric Parameter Day Night
Compressor and Compressors (1), Pump 150 Wind velocity (m/s) 5 2
Pump Room (3) Flanges (48), Atmospheric stability class D F
Valves (33) Pipes Ambient temperature ( C) 28.23 21.31
(97 m), Instruments (5) Relative humidity (%) 15 81
Horizontal Vessels (3), Flanges (18), 75
Cylindrical Valves (24), Pipes
Storage Vessels (36 m),
Return Horizontal Vessels (1), Flanges (9), 75 tions comprise, average wind speed, atmospheric stability,
Cylindrical Vessel Valves (7) Pipes ambient temperature, and humidity. Two different atmos-
(16 m), pheric conditions were used corresponding to day (spring
Instruments (2) summer, D5) and night (fallwinter, F2), (Table 3)
Cylinder Filling Cylinders (4200), Flanges 150
Platform (4) Valves (60), Pipes Frequency Estimation
(55 m) The Frequency of incidents can be estimated either from
generic data or failure sequence models, such as Fault Tree
Analysis [10]. In this study, most initial failure frequencies are
taken from the OGP data directory [16], except for the fre-
quency of catastrophic rupture failure, which is taken from
[13] (Table 1). In QRA incident outcomes are calculated using
height that has the highest risk). Ignition probability (imme-
Event Tree Analysis. The frequency of an incident outcome
diately and delay) depends on discharge flow rate and differs
is defined as the product of the initial event frequency and
in each scenario. In this work, the probability of ignition was
all succeeding conditional event probabilities leading to that
estimated from [15] after collecting data of all ignition sour-
scenario outcome [10].
ces and discussing in the hazard identification meeting with
the appropriate expertise. For estimation ignition probability
in each scenario considering its discharge gas flow rate and Risk Estimation
opinions of the appropriate expertise. The values from both With QRA risk is evaluated as: (1) Individual Risk (IR)
[15] and opinion expertise were estimated but the higher and (2) SR [10]. The IR is defined as the probability of death
value of probability was considered for massive LPG release. at any particular location due to all undesired events. Thus,
The releases directions in all scenarios were assumed to the total IR at each point is equal to the sum of the IR of all
be horizontal. A probability of 60% was assigned to an scenario effects at that point Eq. (1).
explosion event, while a probability of 40% was considered
for a flash fire [14]. The consequence modeling input data Xn
shown in Table 2 were used for the risk calculations. IRx;y 5 IRx;y;i (1)
All scenarios were modeled using PHAST 6.5 software i51
package developed by DNV (Det Norske Veritas Co). The
software is widely used in industrial QRA. In general, conse- where, IR(x, y) is the total IR of fatality at geographical loca-
quence modeling requires the dispersion modeling in a tion (x, y) and IRi(x, y) is the IR of fatality at geographical
range of representative atmospheric conditions. These condi- location (x, y) from scenario i described as in Eq. (2).

Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.1) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs March 2014 79
Table 4. Lethality distance (m) of jet fire and flash fire whit vulnerability level (%)

Jet Fire Flash Fire

Day Night Day Night
Scenario No 100% 50% 1% 100% 50% 1% LFL 1=2 LFL LFL 1=2 LFL

S1 11 12 14 13 14 16 5 10 10 20
S2 56 62 73 65 72 83 62 86 78 95
S3 162 184 216 188 210 219 200 270 230 270
S4 10 11 13 11 12 14 5 8 8 17
S5 48 55 65 57 63 72 51 70 63 80
S6 110 125 145 127 142 163 124 160 140 166
S7 646 733 862 775 874 1022 680 930 857 960
S8 0 0 0 0 0 0 360 466 341 421
S9 10 12 14 13 14 16 5 9 10 20
S10 47 53 62 55 61 69 53 72 66 83
S11 88 99 116 102 114 129 103 140 123 150
S12 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 33 18 23
S13 10 11 13 11 12 14 6 8 8 16
S14 41 46 54 50 54 61 42 60 55 65
S15 77 87 100 90 99 113 84 114 95 116
S16 646 733 862 790 885 1040 166 195 170 202
S17 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 100 67 85

Table 5. Lethality distance (m) of pool fire and fire ball whit vulnerability level (%)

Pool Fire Fire Ball

Day Night Day Night
Scenario No 100% 50% 1% 100% 50% 1% 100% 50% 1% 100% 50% 1%
S1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S2 0 0 0 24 26 29 0 0 0 0 0 0
S3 135 165 200 166 222 290 0 0 0 0 0 0
S4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S5 0 0 0 20 22 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
S6 70 82 96 90 118 154 0 0 0 0 0 0
S7 203 300 400 210 305 430 85 130 220 85 130 220
S8 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 130 220 85 130 220
S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S11 36 40 43 63 80 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
S12 0 0 0 3 4 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
S13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S15 30 33 36 33 42 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
S16 0 0 0 91 103 120 22 0 0 22 0 0
S17 0 0 0 17 23 31 22 0 0 22 0 0

acceptable criteria is 1026 per year, ALARP is 1025 per year

IR x; y5Fi Pi x; y
SR is the relationship between the frequency and the
number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in
a given population.
(2) and unacceptable is 1024 per year. For third party risks
1026, 1027, and 1028 per year are the acceptable, ALARP
and unacceptable criteria, respectively.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Risk Acceptance Criteria Consequence Modeling Results

For this work, the following risk acceptance criteria are
adopted from EIHP2 document of Risk Acceptance Criteria
for Hydrogen Refueling Stations [15]. For first and second
party risks, the individual probability of fatality should not
exceed 1024 per year. Third party risks outside the LPG
installation shall be exposed to probability of fatality greater
than 1026 per year. For the first and second party risks, the
Modeling results showed that the jet fire, flash fire, pool
fire, and fire ball are main consequences of LPG installation,
respectively (Tables 4 and 5). The worst jet fire is by a Disc
rupture in the Return horizontal cylindrical vessel (S16). This
event is predicted to lead to fatality of all people (100%) up
to 790 m distance and fatality of 1% up to 1040 m at night
(Table 4, Figure 4). The longest harm effect distances by

80 March 2014 Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.1)
Figure 4. Lethality radii for jet fire from a disc rupture in return vessel (S16) at night. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 5. Flash fire envelopes of a disc rupture in storage vessels (S7) at night. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

flash fire are by seventh scenarios at 857 m at night. All peo-
ple within the plume are predicted to be killed.
The most dangerous pool fire scenario is S7 with the
100% and 1% fatality contours in daytime at 210 and 430 m,
respectively (Table 5). Modeling showed that the jet fire is
not only occurring in instantaneous releases; including sce-
narios of 8, 12, and 17 (Table 4). A fire ball also occurs with
the Disc rupture scenarios (S7, S16) and catastrophic rupture
(S8, S17) in storage and return vessels. All scenarios have
flash fire consequence (Table 5).
The lethality radius of the worst jet fire cases and the cor-
responding probability of death are plotted in Figure 4. This

Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.1) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs March 2014 81
Figure 6. Maximum concentration footprint of a disc rupture in storage vessels (S7) at night. [Color figure can be viewed in
the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 7. Maximum radiation versus distance for worst case jet fire (S16) with different atmospheric conditions. [Color figure
can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

radius for the Return vessel were highest (e.g., 790 m) in
autumn and winter seasons of the year (F 2 m/s). The results
showed that a jet fire set by a Disc rupture of the Return ves-
sel can affect the largest area (1,036,828 m2). The safe dis-
tance from this incident is 1040 m.
Modeling showed that the most dangerous flash fire will
occur in the case of a Disc rupture in a horizontal cylindrical
storage vessel. Figure 5 shows the fire envelope of this flash
fire with the 100% probability of death due to high heat radi-
ation is in the red circle with 850 m radius.
The flash fire envelope and cloud footprint of Horizontal
cylindrical storage vessels are also shown in Figures 5 and 6,
respectively. The concentration of the material released in the
yellow LFL area of Figure 6 is above 17,140 ppm and enough

82 March 2014 Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.1)
to kill all the people in the area. The Lower Flammability Level
(LFL) zone has a cross section of 772,283 m2. The blue part of
Figure 6 is the half-LFL zone with across sectional area of
1,171,050 m2. The concentration contour plotted is 8571 ppm.
The Figure 7 result shows that the maximum radiation
from a jet fire caused by a Disc rupture in a Return horizon-
tal cylindrical vessel may reach 400 kW/m2 (in spring &
summer) and 396 kW/m2 (in autumn & winter).
Risk Estimation Results
IR Results
The results showed that personnel and consumers are
subject to unacceptable risk (Figure 8). For third parties, the
IR of all 20 workers in the warehouse (northern side) and
part of both industrial region (west and east side) and peo-
ple passing from highways and byroads are within the 1026
contour and which has exceeds the risk acceptance criteria
for third parties (Figure 8).
SR Results
The SR of fatality from potential hazards was calculated in
three categories in Table 6. Results indicate that a full bore
rupture in compressor and pump room (S3) and catastrophic
rupture of a cylinder (S12) have the highest (3.4 3 1023)
and the least (1.1 3 10210) SR, respectively at the LPG
installation.
A further SR ranking analysis is given in Table 7. Results
revealed that first-person risk category, scenarios 2, 3, and
16, for second party risk scenarios 2, 3, and 7, and for third
party risk scenarios 3, 7, and 16 produces high SRs, all of
which are in the unacceptable region.
The safe distance of the LGP installation outside of the
1026 contour is equal to 225 m which can be seen in west
side of Figure 8.
The lack of specific databases of LPG incidents that are
usually used for events frequency calculation and specific
individual and social risks criteria for LPG process and other
process industries in Iran could be considered as the major
limitations of the our study. Development of risk criteria for
process industries is a key issue for future researches in Iran.

CONCLUSIONS
The accidental release of LPG from the Hamadan cylinder
filling installation and the subsequent consequences are

Table 7. Social risk evaluation ranking of unacceptable

scenarios

Scenario Number* Risk Party

S2, S3, S16 First Party
S2, S3, S7 Second Party
Figure 8. IR counters of LPG cylinder filling installation. S3, S7, S16 Third Party
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.] *The scenario numbers are taken from Table 1

Table 6. Social risk values of LPG installation for three party risks whit relevant probability of fatality

First Party Second Party Third Party

Scenario No 1 0.5 0.01 1 0.5 0.01 1 0.5 0.01
S1 7.731025 1.431024 2.331024 1.731025 3.131025 5.131025 5.331027 9.731027 1.631026
S2 6.131024 8.931024 1.531023 1.331024 1.831024 3.031024 3.931026 5.731026 9.231026
S3 3.431023 3.331023 3.331023 7.331024 7.331024 7.331024 3.531025 6.431025 1.531024
S4 1.231025 2.231025 3.131025 2.431026 4.431026 6.331026 7.631028 1.131028 1.131028
S5 1.231024 1.831024 2.731024 2.431025 3.731025 5.631025 7.531027 1.131026 1.731026
S6 1.431024 1.431024 1.531024 3.131025 3.031025 3.231025 1.231026 1.731026 2.731026
S7 8.831024 8.331024 8.831024 1.931024 1.831024 1.931024 3.331025 5.431025 1.531024
S8 4.131025 4.031025 4.031025 8.931026 8.831026 8.831026 9.431027 1.131027 6.131026
S9 1.831025 2.631025 4.331025 3.631026 5.431026 8.931026 1.131027 1.731027 2.831027
S10 1.631024 2.031024 2.631024 3.331025 4.031025 5.431025 1.131026 1.231026 1.731026
S11 1.231024 1.331024 1.631024 2.431025 2.931025 3.531025 7.531027 1.131026 1.731026
S12 1.631028 0 0 3.331029 0 0 1.1310210 0 0
S13 3.731026 6.831026 9.631026 7.631027 1.431026 2.031026 2.431028 4.331028 6.131028
S14 2.831025 4.331025 6.831025 5.831026 8.831026 1.431025 1.831027 2.731027 4.431027
S15 1.231024 1.831024 2.131024 2.531025 3.831025 4.631025 7.931027 1.231026 1.931026
S16 1.031024 3.131025 3.131025 2.131025 6.731026 6.731026 1.031025 1.431025 2.331025
S17 4.231027 0 0 8.631028 0 0 2.731029 0 0

Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.1) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs March 2014 83
evaluated here including, fireball, jet fire, flash fire, and pool
fire. Both individual and social risks of these consequences
for three party risks are calculated. The main conclusions are
summarized below.
1. Maximum harm effect distance and maximum radiation is
caused by a Jet fire by a Disc rupture in the Return hori-
zontal cylindrical vessel are predicted to be 1040 m,
400kW/m2, respectively.
2. Jet fires and pool fires of an LPG release have the highest
and lowest heat radiation, respectively. The radiation con-
tours of jet fire and pool fire are larger at night than in
day time, this is true also for flash fires from continuous
releases. The fire ball radiation contours are not sensitive
to atmospheric stability class.
3. The estimated IRs for personnel, customers, and third
party are unacceptable. The SRs are unacceptable for
Compressor and pump room, Return and Storage vessel
scenarios.
4. Safety distance of the LPG installation (from plant bound-
ary to 1026 risk contour) is 225 m which is out of the
LPG installation boundaries.
5. The safety of LPG installations is a major concern and in
this installation the three party risks are imposed consid-
erable risks. Thus, in the LPG installations, the installation
operational risk management must be the main issue.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This article was extracted from a safety research project.
The authors thank Neyshabur University of Medical Sciences
as well as Persi Iran Gas Hamadan Company for their sup-
port. The authors announce no conflicts of interest.
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