PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle

This Paper is Issue #3 in a Series of Studies Based on the World Oil Forecasting Program ( A PDF Version of this paper is available at http://www.dieoff.com/page133.pdf )

THE WORLD PETROLEUM LIFE-CYCLE
Richard C. Duncan[1] and Walter Youngquist[2] Presented at the PTTC Workshop "OPEC Oil Pricing and Independent Oil Producers" Petroleum Technology Transfer Council Petroleum Engineering Program University of Southern California Los Angeles, California October 22, 1998 Abstract The world oil production peak, we assume, will be a turning point in human history. Our goal is to predict the world peak. To accomplish this goal, we have developed (to our knowledge) a unique new procedure based on oil production data, data analysis, conventional formulas, and heuristic knowledge. It comprises (1) a program, and (2) a method. The program uses the historic oil production data and predicts by statistical and heuristic techniques future production for the world's 42 top oil-producing nations (each modeled separately), grouped into 7 regions, and the world. The method is to build up a series of forecasts which, taken together, will inevitably converge on the peak. This paper presents the third in this series of forecasts -- designated 'Issue #3.' The peak production year and the expected ultimate recovery for each nation, seven regions, and the world are given in Table 1. Figure 1 graphs the world oil production life-cycle with the peak in 2006. Table 2 gives similar information for each region. Figures 2-8 graph the life-cycle for each region with peaks from 1985 for North America to 2011 for the Middle East. Middle East & non-Middle East and OPEC & non-OPEC categories are compared in Table 3. Figure 9 graphs the Middle East & non-Middle East. Figure 10 graphs OPEC & non-OPEC. Figures 11 and 12 depict by simulation whether or not new oil discoveries can delay the world peak. If so, by how much? Figure 13 is a 'phase diagram' that maps, as it were, our crooked route to the world oil summit. All tables and figures are discussed in the text. We believe that a 'base-camp' and a series of higher camps must be established before finally ascending to the summit. 'Encircling' we call it, as illustrated by the three forecasts we've made so far. Specifically, the 1996 Issue #1 put the peak in 2005; Issue #2 put it in 2007; Issue #3 (this paper) put the peak in 2006. Of course the peak could occur before 2005 or after 2007. Perhaps 10 camps will be required. Maybe more. En route to the summit, four predictions that we have made have since proved consistent with trends and events: Asian economic crisis, non-OPEC peak year, world peak inertia, and Caspian dry holes. All the models are available free on the Internet at http://www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/ Looking ahead: The new forecasting method, we believe, can successfully predict the production life-cycle of any of the fossil fuels, including oil, gas, and coal.
[1] [2]

Institute on Energy and Man; Seattle, Washington, duncanrc@halcyon.com Consulting Geologist; P. O. Box 5501, Eugene, Oregon, 97405

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PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle

THE WORLD PETROLEUM LIFE-CYCLE
Richard C. Duncan and Walter Youngquist Presented at the PTTC Workshop "OPEC Oil Pricing and Independent Oil Producers" Petroleum Technology Transfer Council Petroleum Engineering Program University of Southern California Los Angeles, California October 22, 1998 1. Introduction The world oil production peak, we assume, will be a turning point in human history. Our major goal is to forecast the all-time world oil peak, not by one heroic effort, but rather by a series of smaller efforts -- much like an experienced team of mountaineers would climb the world's tallest peak. The main goals of this paper are sevenfold: (1) Introduce a unique new 'tool' to forecast petroleum production, so-named the 'World Oil Forecasting Program' ('Program') and demonstrate its predicting power, versatility, and utility. (2) Use it to predict the peak year for each of the world's top 42 oil-nations. (3) Use it to predict the peak year for each of the world's seven regions. (4) Use it to predict the peak year for world oil production. (5) Use it to predict the production peaks and cross-over points of (a) the Middle East and non-Middle East, and (b) OPEC and non-OPEC. (6) Use it to answer the questions: Can we delay the world oil peak? If so, by how much? What is the relationship between new production and peak delay? (7) Describe how the 'World Oil Forecasting Method' ('Method') uses the Program to produce a series of forecasts which, taken together, will inevitably converge on the world peak. Show how a 'phase-diagram' ensures the consistency and convergence of our Method. Some definitions will be useful. 'Petroleum' and 'oil' are used synonymously to include crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and natural gas liquids (NGLs). EUR means expected ultimate recovery. 'Qi' means cumulative production to year i. 'RR' means remaining reserves. 'G' means billion (109). 'b' means barrels. 2. This Study Presently the world's favorable petroleum geology is unequally divided up among some 182 nations, of which the top 42 produce more than 98% of the world's oil; the next 70 nations less than 2%; the remaining 70, none. The top 42 producers are detailed in Table 1. The historic production data is from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (1961-1998). The forecasts were generated by the World Oil Forecasting Program, described later. The numbers in Table 1 are the bedrock of our study.

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3% 29.62 2.8 232.3% 5.2 2.5 -75% 1.00 26.1 56.2 -62% 40.1% 22.07 0.79 11 Denmark 2002 0.4 2.41 2 Mexico 2001 1.03 0.1 3.8% 5.92 3.8 82.0 18.2 8.5 6.4 -82% 11.6 -70% 131.1 28.1 -63% 43.05 5 Brazil 2007 0.8% 18.0 28.4% 18.9 129.4 267.46 38 India 2003 0.83 0.1% 50.0 10.05 0.0% Table 1.6% 3.6% 0.10 0.11 0.0 3.04 0. and 'b' means barrels.6 0. Petroleum Production Summary: Nations and World.05 0.15 0.7 6.0% 853.7 2.2 -90% 70.4 16.6 -78% 1.6 3.99 0.4 -65% 66.28 0.1 7.4 3.4 0.1% 15.01 15 UK 1995 1.5 -83% 14.33 0.5 14.9 11.6 3.0 100.04 24 UAE* 2017 1.0 14.09 0.6 -92% 30.07 0.02 9 Trinidad 1977 0.0 1996.2 1.6 6.4 -86% 32.6 60.5 109.6 17.3 5.62 0. Columns.11 0. and forecast 2040 rate Cumulative production through 1997.5 0.9 103.6% 1.05 0.2 42.7 -81% 9.14 0. and expected ultimate recovery (EUR).06 31 Gabon 2000 0.4 2.18 14 Romania 1976 0.11 7 Ecuador 2002 0. Remaining reserves.01 29 Congo 2003 0.93 0.12 3.4 56.6 0.4 64.5% 26.27 0.96 0.5 0.3% 2.9 -67% 4.6 4.4 47.3 2.5 -44% 73.6 48.0 271.6 -62% 81.5 -83% 8.3% of the world's future oil supply.3 115.8 44.6 1.00 11.5 66.7% 0.7 2.5 10.3 0.5 5.27 33 Nigeria* 2004 0.1% 3.1% 23.2 85.7 0.4 248.2 0.33 0.6 15.0 48.42 4 Argentina 2001 0.9 6.25 0.2 11.06 36 Brunei 1979 0. Saudi Arabia alone controls 16.2 -82% 5.0 12. some firmly established.02 12 Italy 2003 0.5 15.07 0.4 41. for 42 nations representing more than 98% of total world oil production.01 42 Vietnam 2005 0.30 0.2 -77% 28.1 38. Notes: SI units are used in this study where 'G' means billion (109).21 1. Far right column: The telling ratio of the remaining reserves of each nation to the remaining reserves of all 42 nations.0 -45% 85.07 0.3% 47.0 1.14 6 Colombia 2009 0.71 0.6 14.21 0.6 0.7% 0.2% 7.0 6.10 27 Angola 2003 0.9 95.1 264.2 -64% 13.8% 4.42 2.85 18 Iraq* 2010 1.57 0.31 0.03 32 Libya* 1970 1.0 -63% 1160.4 0.02 37 China 2002 1.4 14.0 4.17 0.6 5.0 2.14 0.1 -71% 5.2 -48% 189.01 0.08 0.0 -80% 0.54 0.32 0.4% 2.05 0.36 0.3 6.06 41 P N Guinea 1993 0.38 0.2% 4.08 39 Indonesia* 1977 0.58 0.1 6.31 0.1 1.5 1.05 26 Algeria* 2002 0.5 4.04 0.01 30 Egypt 1993 0.7 -78% 2.27 1.0 -86% 1.3 -91% 1.9 2.3% 20.6 3.7 3.0 -78% 7.N/ 1997 2040 EUR Pk Yr Gb RR.24 0. Peak production rate. Percent fall from peak to 2040.0 -63% 1183.50 11.0 4.7 17.39 0.0 0.9 2. '+' Indicates that relevant figures are increased by 2% top account for nations omitted from this list.17 0.27 0.09 0.1% 10.0 -80% 1.5% 18.2 12.27 0.1 42.4 0.07 22 Saudi Arabia* 2011 3.14 0.1% 5.2 0.8 6.1 -71% 20.40 17 Iran* 1974 2.29 0.6% 200.70 1.6 106.8% 5.2 -80% 2.05 8 Peru 1982 0.09 0.8 -69% 30. '*' Designates OPEC member. 2 .04 0.11 3 USA 1970 4. Production peak years.05 28 Cameroon 1985 0.2% 836.02 10 Venezuela* 2005 1. forecast cumulative production through 2040.8 7.8 -85% 7.06 0.7% 4.1 3.42N 23.9 2.23 0.0% 83. others forecast.7 1.0 2.08 0.0 2036. 1-to-r: Nation's number and name.4% 133.5 0.0 1902.47 1.22 0.3 46.70 A B Nation G H I J K L Cumulative Gb 2040 vs Remain RR.1 -46% 64.6 -91% 2.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle C D E F Peak Oil Prod Gb/yr Year Peak 1997 2040 1 Canada 2008 1.30 34 Tunisia 2008 0. 1997 rate.6 -83% 7.5 0.7 1.4 0.2 14.02 35 Australia 2002 0.4 -79% 7.2% 0.07 21 Qatar* 2009 0.6 0.2 -78% 27.24 0.50 WORLD 2006 31.0 1.6 -74% 8.7 8.98 0.2 0.32 1.53 0.23 0.4 15.7 -50% 1.9 91.5 62.1 0.95 20 Oman 2002 0.3 13.3 0.01 0.76 0.0 273.1% 7.1 2.31 0.60 26.4% 14.8 38.04 23 Syria 1995 0.8 10.01 13 Norway 2000 1.8 0.77 0.03 0.7% 3.25 0.23 1.5 -62% 11.08 19 Kuwait* 2018 1.95 0.1% 1.9 13.7% 2.14 0.1% 0.6 -79% 3.0 1865.5 -71% 1.1 17.8 0.36 0.29 0.05 0.35 0.6% 0.21 0.18 40 Malaysia 2001 0.8 116.44 1.5 5.02 42 Nations 2006 31.3% 3.23 16 FSU 1987 4.62 25 Yemen 2004 0.0 100.0% 2.

1% (= 70.g. UAE 2017. and it was also first to peak in 1970 (tied with Libya). Column L. But by 2040 all nations will be in steep decline. Note too that 28 of the 42 nations (67%) have not yet reached their peaks. In some cases. the USA's ratio is 6. In contrast." For example. Motto: "The faster you pump. far right. But caution is needed. Column C gives each nation's peak year.3% rank first in the world.6/1160). gives the revealing ratio of each nation's remaining reserves to the 42 nation's remaining reserves. Libya. Papua New Guinea is running dry with a scant 0. some are well established. In contrast. Saudi Arabia is may soon exceed the USA for second place. FSU. and Kuwait 2018. others forecast.8/1160). Column F forecasts the national production rates for 2040. USA. However. However. Column K forecasts the remaining reserves (RR) for each nation (RR = EUR – Q1997)Saudi Arabia owns the lion's share of reserves at 189. and Papua New Guinea) managed only a meager 0. Fourteen of the 42 nations (33%) have passed their peaks.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle Table I Discussion: Columns A and B give each nation's number and name. Kuwait has vast surplus oil for export but null military power. Example: In column L. Column I forecasts each nation's expected ultimate recovery (EUR). the USA in 1997 led cumulative production with 200. Columns J through L provide an overview of future trends. Most notable are the USA in 1970 and the FSU in 1987. and Iran) produced over 40% of the world's oil.3% (= 73.04 Gb/year. for instance. Column D gives each nation's peak production rate. At the other extreme. e. Italy. Column G records each nation's cumulative production through 1997 (Q1997). the minimum decline is Kuwait's 44%. Saudi Arabia 2011. Tunisia.8 Gb.4 Gb. the downward slide is likely permanent for several nations. examples are the UK and Syria. 3 . Note that in 1997 the top four nations together (Saudi Arabia. we now transform some of the numbers into an eye-friendly overview in Figure 1 following. Column H forecasts the cumulative production through year 2040 (Q2040).05%. These ratios are useful indicators of each nation's importance to the future oil supply. Increasingly it appears that the FSU will retain the all-time production record at 4. With the data and forecasts of the world's top 42 oil producers handy in Table 1. Note that the maximum decline is Mexico's 92%. the sooner you peak. Column E lists the 1997 production rate for each nation. direct comparison of the ratios is complex because.62 Gb/year. The bold horizontal lines divide the nations into 7 regions (discussed later). the bottom four nations (Peru. No doubt the last nations to peak will be in the Middle East. the ratios in column L are telling. the USA has null surplus oil for export but vast military power. examples are the USA. future production may rise to surpass the old peaks. And it is no surprise that Saudi Arabia's oil reserves at 16. Column J predicts the percent decline in production for each nation from its peak to year 2040. Tunisia is forecast to peak at 0. Nonetheless. close to that of the USA. Iraq 2010. Just the opposite. Kuwait ratio is 6. However. less than 1% of the FSU's towering peak. of course.4 Gb. and Romania.

Historic production data is plotted from 1960 through 1997. World production peaks in 2006. 4 Former Soviet Union. We have grouped the world's oil-producing nations into seven oil-producing regions. and 7 Asia Pacific. and key indicators for each region are summarized in Table 2. World. production forecasts. Curve 1 shows that production of the 42 top nations was 26. The cross-over point when OPEC production exceeds non-OPEC production is 2007 (discussed later in Section 4 and detailed in Figure 10). 6 Africa. more general picture of the world oil situation. 3.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle World Peak 2006 1997 Production Gb/Yr uc ti on 32 Oi Wo rld 16 Non E -OP C OPEC/non-OPEC crossover point 2007 lP r od EC OP OP EC do mi n a nt 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 1. The regions are: 1 North America. 4 . Years 1960-1997 are historic data. and forecast values from 1998 through 2040. 3 Europe. They will be discussed in a later section. a fall of 63% in 43 years. key to this study (curve 1. Figure 1 shows three oil production curves ranging from 1960 to 2040. and non-OPEC Oil Production Life Cycles. OPEC and nonOPEC production are shown (curves 2 and 3) for comparison to the world curve. Years 1998-2040 are forecast by use of the World Oil Forecasting Program. Oil production curves for years 1960-2040 are graphed.5 Gb/year in 2040. 2 South & Central America. OPEC. The historic production data.0 Gb/year. thereafter decreasing to 11. 5 Middle East. a k a the 'base-line' curve). Seven Oil Regions The top 42 oil-producing nations are grouped into seven geographical regions to get a better.0 Gb/year in 1997 and it is forecast to peak in 2006 at 31. OPEC and non-OPEC oil production (curves 2 and 3) are also shown for comparison to world production.

9 Asia Pacific 2002 2. (The bold horizontal lines in Table 1 identify the nations in each of the 7 regions. Column C gives the region's peak year (some historic. forecast cumulative production through 2040 (Q2040).0 26. potentially available for future international export. followed by the FSU in 1987.9 So. At the start of 1998 the Middle East had a hefty 528 Gb remaining. NB: The Middle East now controls 46% of the world's future oil supply. and peak rate. 5 .3 2. Europe a slim 65 Gb.4 384 392 -84% 142 12% 74. wherein the Middle East ranks first at 7.4 161 165 -73% 97 8% 58.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle B C D E Peak Oil Prod Gb/yr Year Peak 1997 2040 North America 1985 5.6 2. with over 50% of the world's production.5 A Region F G H I J K Cumulative Gb 2040 vs Remain RR. The average is 63%. 1-to-r: Region number and name. Europe a lean 98 Gb. The Middle East has a fat 747 Gb.7 95 98 -83% 65 6% 133.4 0.7 664 747 -52% 528 46% 68. Cumulative production through 1997 (Q1997). Column D gives the magnitude of each region's oil peak.9 Gb/year. Africa 2004.2 Europe 2000 2.2 167 178 -56% 104 9% 32. Column E records the 1997 oil production rates. others forecast).0 11. Seven Oil Regions. Column L gives the telling ratio of the remaining reserves for each region to the remaining reserves for all 7 regions. Production decline from peak to 2040. is likely to be the world's only oil-exporting region. Column H forecasts cumulative production through 2040 (Q2040) when the Middle East will have exploited 664 Gb of its original endowment. and expected ultimate recovery (EUR).0 1865 1996 -63% 1160 100% Table 2.9 5. Column K gives each region's remaining reserves (RR). And with only 4% of the world's population.2 0.6 5. Columns J through L give an overview of future oil trends. Columns. America 2005 2. At present the Middle East has 46% of the world's remaining reserves.4 Former Soviet Union 1987 4.9 42 Nations 2006 31. North America was first to peak in 1985. & Cent. and South & Central America 2005.4 2. or nearly twice that of 'second place' North America.7 2. compared to Europe's modest 2. Column G records each region's cumulative production through 1997 (Q1997). the Middle East has even a much larger percentage of the world's remaining oil surplus (e.g. North America is still leading.42N 250. The world's seven oil-producing regions are graphed in Figures 2-8 following.4 Gb/year.g/ 1997 2040 EUR Pk Yr Gb RR.3 1. The Middle East 52%.7 0.9 2. Column J forecasts each region's decline in production from its peak to year 2040.7 1. Production in 1997. The Middle East towers at 12.1 7. Column F forecasts the 2040 production rate for each region.4 Middle East 2011 12.1 Gb/year. Column I forecasts the expected ultimate recovery (EUR) for each region. The Middle East by 2040. Peak year (data or forecast).4 145 150 -69% 92 8% 836. North America falls 84%. Then four regions peak in quick succession: Europe 2000. but the Middle East is closing in fast.4 248 265 -70% 131 11% 218.8 0. forecast in 2040. perhaps 70-80%). Asia Pacific 2002. Far right column: The revealing ratio of the remaining reserves for each region to the remaining reserves for all 42 nations.8 Africa 2004 3.) Table 2 Discussion: Columns A and B give each region's number and name. Remaining reserves (RR). Last to peak is (you guessed it!) the oil colossus Middle East in 2011.

dominated by the United States. and reach its production peak. but maintained now only by increasing oil imports.8 1997 Production Gb/Yr Central and South America Peak 2005 1. and more aggressive development programs in Venezuela. This includes Canada. This region.4 0. 2.0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 3. United States.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 6 1997 Production Gb/Yr North America Peak 1985 3 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 2. We forecast that the recent growth trend will continue to the all-time peak in 2005. due to recent successes and developments along the eastern margin of the Andean fold belt. the privatization and increased activity in the Argentine oil industry. and Mexico. North America Oil Production. reached its peak the earliest of the seven regions. The United States was the first nation to substantially exploit its oil resources. This includes all countries south of Mexico. but the later development of the offshore Mexican fields along with Canadian exploration successes moved the regional peak to 1985. South and Central America Oil Production. 6 . This early exploited abundant and cheap oil helped to rapidly propel the United States to its high 'oil standard' of living enjoyed today. United States passed its peak in 1970. which country now accounts for over 53% (Table 1) of this region's production.

may move the 2000 peak to slightly later. Other European oil production is minor. the now independent republics are not coordinated in their efforts to secure needed financing and technology for oil development. this region now has diverse political and economic agendas. and will not achieve a unified peak production time.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 2.4 0.0 Production Gb/Yr Secondary Peak 2009 Former Soviet Union Peak 1987 1997 2.5 0. 5. Europe Oil Production. Further. The curve reflects a steady. The previous production peak reached by the unified USSR in 1987 seems unlikely to be surpassed. but it will be much lower that the earlier 1987 USSR peak. Decision by the Norwegian Government to limit production in order to flatten and lengthen their production peak. This region's production is now chiefly from the North Sea. 7 . orderly growth. The Russian oil fields are in an aging phase. We do project a secondary peak in the year 2009. Since the break-up of the USSR. with the regional peak at 2000. United Kingdom production declined during 1996 and 1997.0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 4. Former Soviet Union (FSU) Oil Production.0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 5.8 1997 Production Gb/Yr Europe Peak 2000 1. Countering this move however. and then a decline. where Norway and United Kingdom (Great Britain) are dominant.

PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 13. the curve is already well established. Libya. suggest that future production will continue to approach the classic bell-shaped curve of a finite resource. this region will have the bulk of the world's remaining oil reserves -. Algeria. and Angola.7 0. such as the United Nation's oil sale curtailment imposed on Iraq. Therefore. Egypt. However. It is clear this region will be the last to reach peak production. Even allowing for some intermittent production distortions. our forecast is 2011. combined with the rapidly growing population.4 1997 Production Gb/Yr Africa Peak 2004 1. With the peak year forecast at 2004. when oil prices are likely to be much higher relative to today's prices. the curve seems established long enough to be projected with some confidence to 2040.0 Production Gb/Yr 1997 6. the practical political necessity for these governments to continue to finance their variety of social programs. Africa Oil Production. production here is the most difficult of the seven regions to forecast.5 Middle East Peak 2011 0. 3. 8 . Because of political and religious considerations.0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 7. This rank of importance is not likely to change. And by the year 2020. the production curve data controls already in place probable will not be significantly altered. This region holds the bulk (46%. and the production quota system which is met with intermittent and uneven success.a large international economic and political advantage. Other production is minor. Middle East Oil Production. except that Angola could move up ahead of Egypt.0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 6. Order of importance in this region is Nigeria. Table 2) of the world's remaining oil reserves.

1 5. forecast peak rate. Australia.0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 8. This vast capacity for oil export represents more than just chemical energy. If Asian nations become more motorized. have been widely discussed since the so-called 'Arab oil embargo' in 1973.6 10. Forecast peak year.7 2a OPEC > 2007 2009 15. C D E F G Dominance Peak Oil Prod Gb/yr Year Peak 1997 2040 1a Mideast > 2025 2011 12. This region includes China. forecast cumulative production in 2040 (Q2040).C)/(RR. Geographic and Organizational Comparisons. it has been endowed with only 8% of the world's remaining oil reserves (Table 2). oil production in the Gulf of Mexico. and expected ultimate recovery (EUR).5 A B Region H I J K L M Cumulative Gb 2040 vs Remain RR. Cross-over year when categories la and 2a begin production dominance.1 4. i. forecast in 2040.e.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 3.C/ 1997 2040 EUR Pk Yr Gb RR. Worth note is that virtually all 'swing producers' are in the Middle East and OPEC (i. Remaining reserves (RR). Far right column: The important ratio of the remaining reserves for each category to the remaining reserves for all 42 nations [(RR. China is seeking joint ventures with Caspian Sea area oil operations. it is potential international political and economic power.8 1b Non-MidEast < 2025 2003 19. Indonesia. Swing producers have production capacity to spare beyond their domestic needs. Geographic and Organizational Comparisons The world's oil-producing nations can be categorized in several ways. It produces about 10% of present world oil supplies (Table 2).2 42 Nations 2006 31.6 0. Table 3 gives details.0 11. oil available for international export. Production in 1997.42N 219 664 747 -52% 46% 617 1201 1249 -71% 632 54% 332 902 998 -53% 666 57% 504 963 998 -74% 494 43% 836 1865 1996 -63% 1160 100% Table 3. India. Production decline from peak to 2040. Columns. But with some 60% of the world's population.5 18. 9 .e.0 26.1 7. and (2) organizational: OPEC and non-OPEC. categories la and 2a). as is their plan. 1-to-r: Category number and name. Asia Pacific Oil Production. and their potential importance. S. and has already bought into some U.2 1997 Production Gb/Yr Asia Peak 2002 1. Here we choose two: (1) geographic: Middle East and non-Middle East. 4. These categories.42N)].9 5.9 15.9 7.3 2b Non-OPEC < 2007 2003 15. and Malaysia as the principal oil producers. Cumulative production in 1997 (Q1997). their oil demands will add significant strain to the world's production capacity.

own only 54% divided unevenly among them (Table 3.8%.3% of the world total. Kuwait. by 2025 both Middle East and non-Middle East oil production will be in steep decline. export sanctions against Iraq. Non-Middle East production peaks in 2003 (curve 2). Saudi Arabia. 10 .PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 20 Non-Middle East peak 2003 Middle East cross-over 2025 Production Gb/Yr Ea st Middle East peak 2011 10 No nMi dd le Middle East domination M d id E le t as 1997 non-Middle East gap 1985 non-Middle East gap 1980 2000 2020 2040 0 1960 Year Figure 9. In fact. In contrast. and United Arab Emirates which together own 94% of the Middle East's oil reserves. The Earth is well explored so this geographical disparity is not likely to change. Middle East production peaks in 2011 (curve 1). Middle East and non-Middle East Comparison. Of that total. When will this happen again? Response 3: It's forecast to occur again in 1999 (Figure 9). Thereafter the Middle East dominates world oil production. with 96% of the world's population. Europe 20. Middle East exports averaged 43. Question 2: So who imports the Middle East's oil? Response 2: The Middle East exported 6. own 46% of the world's oil reserves (Table 3.2%. with only 4% of the world's population. the USA imported 9. other Asia Pacific nations 32. Table 1). Moreover. the Middle East production itself is dominated by the 'Big Five': Iran. the Middle East nations. but it could be significant indeed. Next OPEC and non-OPEC comparisons are shown in Figure 10 following. and Asia Pacific total (including Japan) 57.8%. (BP. Question 1: How about the Middle East's oil exports? Response 1: The Middle East's oil production could soon be overshadowed by its oil exports because most of the world's 'swing producers' are located there. far right column). And despite OPEC production 'quotas' and U. Iraq.6%. 1998) Question 3: The Middle East in 1971 reached 32% of the world's oil production. Moreover. the Middle East cross-over point). their installed plant has surplus capacity to immediately increase their exports far above 50% of the world total. In the global context. Japan 24. the non-Middle East nations.0%. The Middle East includes nine Persian Gulf nations (#17-25.e.4% of the world's export trade from 1982 through 1997. far right column). Thus it is hard to predict what the global impact of the Middle East's oil reserves might be. by 1997 Middle East exports had increased to 45. Middle East production exceeds non-Middle East production in 2025 (i.6 billion barrels (Gb) in 1997. N. However.

African nations 11%.4 Gb (i.. .PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 18 OPEC cross-over #2 Non-OPEC peak 2003 2009 OPEC peak Production Gb/Yr OPEC 1973 crossover #1 1971 9 Non-OPEC 1997 non-OPEC gap 1985 non-OPEC max. but its potential influence on future world oil prices is significant. gap 2020 2040 Year Figure 10. Table 1). OPEC could soon become a wider. OPEC itself could disintegrate and dissolve. 1998) In this section we use the World Oil Forecasting Program to answer the questions: Can we delay the world oil peak? If so. OPEC and non-OPEC Comparison. Venezuela 10%. . Middle East nations now control 76% of OPEC's remaining reserves.e. postpone it) by 1 year. 5. Figure 1). Gap 0 1960 1980 2000 O PE OPEC C do m in an t 2027 OPEC max. believe that new oil discoveries and enhanced recovery from old fields will delay the world peak beyond 2040. to say the least. Some nations may drop out of OPEC when their domestic demand exceeds production. mostly economists. The optimists. By 2007 almost all OPEC production will be in the Persian Gulf area. This uncertainty makes it hard to predict OPEC's future. OPEC production exceeds non-OPEC production in 2007 (the OPEC cross-over point) and thereafter OPEC dominates world production. Can We Delay the World Oil Peak? Optimists see at least several decades more of unfettered world oil production--but a growing number of realists conclude that world oil production is nearing its all-time peak. mostly geologists. argue otherwise. Next we test the possibility of delaying the world oil peak... The opposition. perhaps within 10 years.. Eleven nations are OPEC members: six in the Middle East. On the other hand.. Table 1). more effective organization by adding new members such as Mexico and Norway. each test builds on the 'base-line' world oil production profile (e. The increments of new production consist of so-called 'Norway Equivalents' (abbreviated 'NE').e. Non-OPEC production peaks in 2003 (curve 2).. one each in South America and Asia Pacific (asterisks. see Norway's EUR. with no surplus to export. and Indonesia a scant 3%. Figures 1 & 10). three in Africa. 2 years. 11 . curve 1. Question 4: OPEC in 1971 reached 50% of the world's oil production. When will this happen again? Response 4: It's forecast to occur again in 2007 (the OPEC cross-over point. Each NE is defined as a symmetrical production curve with EUR = 42.g. Then discrete increments of new production are added to the baseline production curve to delay the world peak (i. by how much? This is done by two simulation tests. (Kerr. n years. OPEC production peaks in 2009 (curve 1).

from 2006 to 2007.7 days delay per Gb. Curve 3: Similarly.5 NE peak 2007 3 World + 7. 12 .1 days delay per Gb. Curve 4 gives 3.e. from 2006 to 2007. Summary: Curves 2 and 3 each give a peak delay of 2. from 2006 to 2008.2 NE delays the peak by 3 years.4 Gb = 150 Gb) of new production were required to delay the peak by 1 year. Curve 2 shows that an increment of 3. Peak markers 34 World data all curves 1960-1997 All new production tests begin Jan 1998 curves 2-5 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Production Gb/Yr 2 17 1 World curve peak 2006 2 World + 3. Curve 5 gives 15. i. Summary: Test Series #1.5 days per Gb of new production. Curve 5: Now the big surprise! It took 8.5 days per Gb of new production. The results of Test Series #1 are graphed in Figure 11. Curve 4 gives 3.8 NE to delay the peak by 16 years. curves 2 and 3 each give a peak delay of 2. 7. 3. from 2006 to 2008.5 NE (i. Given the base-line world oil production profile from 1960 to 2040. Now a shock! Curve 5 shows that 8. Curve 2: By cut-and-try.e. This (again) gives 2. from 2006 to 2009. or 'NE'. 8. Curve 4 shows that 8. 3. A quantum leap.7 days per Gb. Relative to the 2006 base-line peak. New production is measured in 'Norway Equivalents'.5 days delay per Gb. The increments come on-stream on 1 January 1998. but this relatively small increase delayed the world base-line peak by 15. Note that the on-stream date is exactly 8 years before the base-line world oil peak in 2006.8 NE delays the peak by 16 years.8 NE peak 2022 1 World base-line forecast 1998-2040 “NE” means “Norway Equivalent” (see caption below) 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 11.5 NE delays the world peak by 1 year. i.1 days delay per Gb.e.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle PEAK DELAY SIMULATION: TEST SERIES #1. from 2006 to 2022. Clearly the peak delay is a highly nonlinear function of new production. Curve 1: This is the base-line world oil production curve with peak in 2006. from 2006 to 2022. by simulation we bring four discrete increments of new production onstream on 1 January 1998. Curves 2-5 are peak delay tests which add increments of new production to the base-line curve. Note well that no intermediate peak occurred between the peak of curve 4 (2009) and the peak of curve 5 (2022). Curve 5 gives 15. Four discrete increments of new production are then added to the base-line curve. This gives to 2.6 Gb more new production than did curve 4. so to speak. This gives 3.0 NE of new production were required to delay the peak by 2 years.7 days delay per Gb. Curve 3 shows that 7. 8 years before the 2006 base-line peak. i.2 NE peak 2009 5 World + 8.0 NE delays the peak by 2 years. i. Test Series #1 (above) demonstrates that the peak delay is a highly nonlinear function of new production.5*42.e.0 NE peak 2008 4 World + 8. defined as a symmetrical production curve with EUR = 42.e. Peak Delay Simulation: Test Series #1: The 'base-line' world oil curve is our reference (curve 1. In other words. from 2006 to 2009.4 Gb (Table 1). curve 5 required only 0.1 days delay per Gb. peak 2006).2 NE of new production were required to delay the peak by 3 years.5 days delay per Gb of new production. Curve 4: Continuing the tests.

PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle PEAK DELAY SIMULATION: TEST SERIES #2: Starting again with the world base-line curve. The results of Test Series #2 are graphed in Figure 12. Summary: Even if large amounts of new oil production are brought on-stream after the 2006 base-line world oil peak. to say nothing of creating a later and higher peak. even the huge increment of 370 Gb of new production (curve 5 above) does not stop the overall fall in world oil production. As seen in Figure 12 above. the total new EUR. 34 1997 World data all curves 1960-1997 All new production tests begin Jan 2015 curves 2-5 17 1 World curve peak 2006 2 World + 3.5 NE The new production slows 3 World + 7. 8 years after the world baseline peak in 2006. (3) the area under the new production curve. except here in Test Series #2 the increments come on-stream on 1 January 2015.e. The average delay for Test Series #1 and #2 combined is 3.) 4 2 1 World base-line forecast 1998-2040 5 3 World peak 2006 Production Gb/Yr } “NE” means “Norway Equivalent” (see caption below) 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 Year Figure 12. SUMMARY: PEAK DELAY TESTS #1 AND #2. 8 years after the base-line world peak in 2006. too late' to compensate for the rapidly falling base-line world oil production. The average for Test Series #2 is 0.0 NE the rate of decline but the 4 World + 8. the four heroic amounts of new production are simply 'too little. The average delay for Test Series #1 is 6. 8 years after the baseline world peak in 2006. except this time they come on-stream on 1 January 2015. 13 . Curves 2-5 result from the same four increments of new production used in Test Series #1.0 days per Gb of new production brought on-stream 8 years before the base-line peak. Clearly seen in Figure 12.2 NE World peak remains at 5 World + 8. Curves 2-5: We add the same four increments of new production as in Test Series #1. Rather it is a highly nonlinear function of four factors: (1) shape of the base-line production curve. For instance. peak 2006). Summary: Test Series #2. unchallenged by any of the four increments of new production (curves 2-5). None of the four increments of new production (ranging from 150 to 370 Gb) brought on-stream 8 years after the base-line peak cause any delay whatsoever in the 2006 base-line world oil peak. (2) the shape of the added new production curve. none of the four increments of new production cause any delay whatsoever to the base-line world oil peak in 2006 because the amounts of new production are 'too little. i. and (4) the date the new production is brought on-stream. the base-line world oil peak in 2006 remains the alltime world oil peak.8 NE 2006 (“Too little too late”. too late' to compensate for the rapidly falling base-line production. Peak Delay Simulation: Test Series #2: The base-line world oil curve is again our reference (curve 1. except that here in Test Series #2 the new increments are brought on-stream on 1 January 2015.0 days per Gb of new production. we add the same increments of new production as previously.0 (zero!) days per Gb increment brought on-stream 8 years after the base-line peak. In other words. Curve 1: The base-line world oil production curve with peak in 2006. The world oil peak delay time per Gb increment of new production is neither constant nor linear. they are not likely to reverse the downward trend in production.

(Both the LB. definite steps to produce 42 national oil forecasts. i. The H-forecast always (1) is constrained by (i. and the OPEC and non-OPEC life-cycles (Figure 10). "a way of doing anything. procedure. new production brought on-stream well before the 2006 base-line peak can delay it. 1996) Second the heuristic (H) part: Heuristic means. Although we can't precisely predict when the peak will occur. the estimates vary widely) together with a computer tool called a 'graphical input device' to construct an upper boundary forecast. ('UB-forecast') for each nation'. (Duncan. constructed to lie between) the LB-forecast and the UB-forecast. but inevitably it gets the right answer. etc. process. We next use our heuristic knowledge and the LB. and (2) extends each nation's most recent production trend for at least a few years into the future. and a world forecast. is constrained to occur within approximately the next 10 years. mode. 14 . 'N-H' for short. each nation is modeled separately by a 'numeric-heuristic' model. These steps are repeated until the world oil peak is identified and verified. "Yes. Step 1: This step constrains (restricts) each nation's future oil production between a minimum curve and a maximum curve. "a method of solving a problem for which no algorithm exists. "Yes.e.and UB-forecasts to construct the heuristic forecast ('H-forecast') for each nation. we are assured that it is not a 'moving target'. First the numeric (N) part: Each nation's oil production data is analyzed by a special numeric technique to establish a lower boundary forecast ('LB -forecast') for its future oil production. a regular. It involves trial and error.e. investigating. So the question arises anew each year. the Middle East and non-Middle East life-cycles (Figure 9). but not by much. orderly. It may take ten years or longer." From a search of the petroleum literature. Thus the oil production data are seamlessly joined with the H-forecast to give the oil production lifecycle for each nation from 1960 to 2040. Thus the world oil peak. we use the maximum estimated ultimate recovery (EUR. even large increments of new production brought on-stream after the peak are not likely to have any effect whatsoever on delaying the base-line world oil peak. 7 regional forecasts. some new fields are still being discovered and oil technology advances. the seven regional life-cycles (Figures 2-8). However. "Can new oil discoveries and enhanced oil recovery from old fields delay the world peak?" Our response is. definite procedure or way of teaching.and the UB-forecasts are then discarded. In fact the world peak is probably fixed by the most recent production trends of the top 42 oil-producing nations included in this study (Table 1). especially. orderly. lower and upper bounds. but only by a few days per Gb of new production." as was demonstrated in the previous section. we believe. "Can we delay the world peak?" Our response is. (Duncan 1997.) Finally the 42 national life-cycle curves are summed (as needed) to get the world oil production life-cycle (Figure 1).PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle CONCLUSION: The headline of this section asked. Each new forecast starts with the latest oil production data and then goes through three regular. Duncan & Youngquist 1998) Step 2: Although the world's oil discovery peak occurred in the 1960's. To accomplish this. as in iteration. The World Oil Forecasting Method Webster's dictionary defines method as." Our Method amounts to an ongoing series of 'squeeze plays' that constrains our forecasts and increases their certainty." 6.

'Encircling' we call it. The 'phase diagram' depicts on the x-axis the range of likely peak years. to verify the 2006 peak. The y-axis depicts the range of likely peak rates. assume that the actual peak will be in 2006 and that three years of falling production will be necessary to verify the peak. 2004 through 2008. So expect that the actual phase diagram. Just follow the arrows closely in Figure 13 and you'll see how it works. when completed several years hence. START WOFP Issue #1. Issue #11.6 Gb/Yr (This paper. Of course encircling does not mean an exact Euclidean circle. 2006 Issue #12. Figure 13. 1996 Peak Year Forecast 2005 Peak Rate Forecast 29 Gb/Yr 28 2004 2006 2008 Year Figure 13. Encircling the World Petroleum Peak. For our example. The studies continue from Issue #5 through Issue #11. 15 . The Issue #3 study (topmost point.e. 2000 . this paper) was done in 1998 and predicted the peak in 2006 at 31. our route to the world oil production peak may be subject to some irregularities along the way.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle Step 3: We check to see that our series of forecasts (each produced with the simulation Program) are consistent and are also converging on a specific peak year. The Issue #2 study (rightmost point) was done in 1997 and predicted the peak in 2007 at 30. 1997 Peak Year = 2007 Peak Rate = 30. START at the first point in the lower left corner of the diagram: Issue #1 of the World Oil Forecasting Program.0 Gb/year..6 Gb/year. a phase diagram is very useful to ensure the consistency and convergence of the forecasts. Like mountaineering. 2007 etc. 1998 Peak Year = 2006 Peak Rate = 31. but with different rates of production.. all predict the world peak in 2006. Thus after three downward years. 28 to 32 Gb per year. Note that (in this hypothetical example) it took 14 forecasts. As was mentioned. STOP. however. 14 years to finish the job. 'WOFP'. will look somewhat more complex than the example given above. 14 issues. To facilitate our climb we 'map' our route anew each year by a 'phase diagram'.8 Gb/year. Issue #4 was done in 1999 and predicted the peak in 2005 at 29. see Figure 1) 00 20 30 Issue #4. Of course the example is over-simplified. during Issues #12-14). but it does mean that we can map our route by a series points (forecasts) connected by lines (arrows) depicting our progress towards the world peak. Then the actual production rates fall from 2007 through 2009 (i. 32 Peak Rate Forecast Issue #3.6 Gb/year. we review our progress during the past three years. even though we don't yet know what that year will be. 1999 ue Iss . Following. the production data verifies that the world oil peak occurred in 2006.6 Gb/Yr Issue #5. #5 Issue #2. That study was done in 1996 and predicted the peak in 2005 at a rate of 29.

their oil demands will add significant strain to the world's production capacity. Prediction 3 -. Our conclusion: "Asian Tigers? In terms of oil resources. The Wall Street Journal. p. created one scenario in which.Non-OPEC Peak: Issue #1 of the Program predicted the non-OPEC peak in 2003. p.such as China. p. and India now with some 60% of the world population are getting motorized wheels. and has already bought into some U. p. but only by a few days per billion barrels (Gb) of new production. "Yes. It warned that the Asia Pacific region had 60% of the world's population. new production brought on-stream well before the 2006 baseline peak can delay it." (Duncan 1997. and Malaysia as the principal oil producers. oil production in the Gulf of Mexico." (Knott 1998) We are in full agreement with the CGES about the nearing non-OPEC peak. China alone would account for approximately 14 million barrels a day more than the present entire world oil production. 9-10) "A recent analysis by the Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES). 270) Issue #2 predicted it in 2001. Prediction 2 -. However. Progress En Route Here we extend the analogue of oil forecasting and mountain climbing to include verification along the way that our predictions seem to be leading toward the world oil peak. However. 22b) Issue # 3 predicted it (also) in 2003. China. We concluded. If China used oil on a per capita basis as does the United States. but less than 8% of the world's oil reserves. even large increments of new production 16 . Section 5 entitled "Can We Delay the World Oil Peak?" further investigated this contentious issue by a series of eight peak delay tests. These predictions are now verified or at least consistent with recent trends and supported by published data. 9) Now daily issues of The New York Times. But with some 60% of the world's population. "Asia Pacific includes China. "Compounding world energy demands will be the increasingly industrialized nations (particularly SE Asia. Southeast Asia. 5) This caveat was again repeated in Issue #3. using a technique called logistic curve analysis. India. (Duncan 1997. 268) Our warning about Asia Pacific's lack of resources was repeated in Issue #2. or The London Times verify the Asian economic crisis. If Asian nations become more motorized." (this paper. China is seeking joint ventures with Caspian Sea area oil operations. (Duncan & Youngquist. Prediction 1 -. it has been endowed with only 8% of the world's remaining oil reserves (Table 2). Indonesia. (this paper. as is their plan. It produces about 10% of present world oil supplies (Table 2). and India) wanting more energy per capita. non-OPEC production would peak in about 2002 at 50 million barrels per day and decline more rapidly than under conventional analysis.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 7. India and Indonesia w are just pussy-cats in disguise. even if non-OPEC countries discovered a further 500 billion barrels of oil. Issue #3.'' (Duncan & Youngquist 1998. the so-called 'Asian Tigers' -. p. China. a full 6 months before the Asian economy began to melt. Australia.Asian Economic Crisis: Issue #1 of the Program was presented at Princeton University on 9 May 1997. p. We consider four predictions that were made in Issues #1 and #2 of the World Oil Forecasting Program and continued in Issue #3. London. S.World Peak Delay: Issues #1 through #3 of the Program predicted the world peak in the tight range of 2005 to 2007.

14) CGES also investigated the possibility of delaying (i. (Duncan & Youngquist 1998. (this paper. government estimates . "A growing number of wells are coming up dry in the Caspian Sea. major oil companies have spent billions of dollars drilling for oil." (Cooper & Pope 1998) 17 .S.. at between 15 billion and 31 billion barrels of crude. Although we can't precisely predict when the peak will occur. . By contrast. In the six years since this chunk of the former Soviet frontier opened to outside investment. postponing) the world oil peak. . p. That would be a good strike. one of us (Youngquist) cautioned that the conventional Caspian oil forecasts were probably much exaggerated.. the Middle East holds about 60% of the world's known reserves. In fact the world peak is probably fixed by the most recent production trends of the top 42 oil-producing nations included in this study (Table 1).Caspian "Bonanza" Modest: Although in our Program the Caspian Sea republics are included in the Former Soviet Union (FSU).. State Department estimated that the Caspian region's possible oil reserves could reach 178 billion barrels. but that has been successively pushed back into the first decade of the next century. we are assured that it's not a 'moving target'..e.. and haven't yet hit a new discovery significant enough to repay the investment . "CGES starts its review with the comforting thought that oil production was once expected to peak in the late 1980s.... Specifically: Issue #1 predicted the FSU expected ultimate recovery (EUR) at 305 billion barrels (Gb). 268-269) However in 1997.. Prediction 4 -. their contribution to future FSU oil production is still clearly marked. the Caspian would contribute about 3% of the world's oil supply.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle brought on-stream after the peak are not likely to have any effect whatsoever on delaying the base-line world oil peak... 5) A recent Wall Street Journal article (October 12. However. but even at the high end of that range. p. CGES concludes that the peak may not be pushed back much further. raising questions about the reserves in a region that some have promoted as a potential Middle East of the next millennium . (Duncan 1997. p. 1998) updated the oil prospects in the Caspian area. In a report last year.S.. the U. p. 22a) In Issue #3 it is 265 Gb.. [But] several independent consulting firms now place total probable reserves in the Caspian region at about one-tenth the original U." (Knott 1998) We are in full agreement with the CGES about the inertia of the world oil peak. so in Issue #2 we reduced the FSU forecast EUR to 264 Gb." (this paper.

The arrows map our crooked and tedious. Figure 9 shows that the non-Middle East peaks in 2003." Not to be missed are Figures 11 & 12. Figure 1 graphs the world oil production life-cycle from 1960 to 2040 with the peak in 2006. route from Issue #1 to the world oil summit. seven regions. and the OPEC & non-OPEC oil production. Although we can't precisely predict when the peak will occur. or simply 'Issue #3. the inertia of the world oil peak. "Can new oil production delay the world oil peak?" Our answer is. the Middle East peaks in 2011. Figure 13 is a 'phase diagram' that assures the consistency and convergence of our ongoing forecasts. and Middle East 2011. En route to the summit. Figures 2 . 18 . Specifically. taken together. conventional formulas. the nearing nonOPEC peak. percent of the world's remaining reserves. This is our Method. Summary and Conclusions The main goal of this paper is to predict the world oil production peak. data analysis. Issue #3 (this paper) put it in 2006. but inevitably successful. and arrows connect successive points. The Program analyzes the historic oil production data and predicts by statistical and heuristic techniques future production from 1998 to 2040 for the world's 42 top oil-producing nations.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle 8. To accomplish this goal we use a unique new procedure based on oil production data. expected ultimate recovery. and the six-year string of dry holes in the Caspian Sea. Issue #2 put it in 2007.' Table 1 gives the peak production year. will inevitably converge on the peak. and heuristic knowledge. decline from the peak to 2040. and (2) the World Oil Forecasting Method. Each forecast (Issue) is shown as a point. "Yes. Former Soviet Union 1987. and then after 2025 the Middle East dominates world oil production. Europe 2000. remaining reserves. It comprises (1) the World Oil Forecasting Program. South & Central America 2005. even large increments of new production brought on-stream after the peak are not likely to have any effect whatsoever on delaying the base-line world oil peak. Issue #1 put the peak in 2005. Asia Pacific 2002. new production brought on-stream well before the 2006 base-line peak can delay it. The Method is to build up a series of forecasts which. but soon OPEC itself peaks in 2009. then OPEC dominates world production after 2007. but only by a few days per billion barrels of new production. four of our predictions have since been verified or at least they have proved consistent with recent trends and events: the Asian economic crisis. for each nation and for the world. Simulation is used to answer the contentious and important question. We hope this simulation technique will be a useful addition to oil forecasting. we are assured that it is not a 'moving target'. Table 2 gives similar information for each of the seven regions. However. A base-camp and a series of higher camps will be necessary before finally ascending to the summit. 'Encircling' we call it. In fact we believe the world oil peak is fixed by the most recent production trends of the top 42 oil-producing nations included in this study. and the world. This paper presents the third in this series of forecasts. Figure 10 shows that non-OPEC peaks in 2003. Table 3 compares the Middle East & non-Middle East oil production. as illustrated by the three forecasts we've made so far.8 graph the oil life-cycle and peak year for each region: North America 1985. et cetera. Africa 2004.

Washington. Youngquist. A. Duncan. 24-27. p. Sept. v. #98/4. W. (An on-going annual series) Campbell. pp. 345 p. 28. C. R. England. Walter (1997) GeoDestinies. A. and Youngquist. H. C. R. (1998) Encircling the Peak of World Oil Production: Institute on Energy and Man. Campbell. 12. Duncan. p. 1. (1991) The Golden Century of Oil 1950-2050: Kluwer Academic Publishers. and Pope. (1998) Oil Wells in Caspian Sea Still Come Up Dry: Wall Stree Journal.PTT/World Petroleum Life Cycle BIBLIOGRAPHY British Petroleum (1968-1998) Statistical Review of World Energy: British Petroleum Company. pp. Walter (1998a) Spending Our Great Inheritance -. Hubbert Center Newsletter. Oregon. 7. Space Studies Institute. Portland. pp.Then What?: Geotimes.. Oct. NJ. 5380.and Perhaps Close: Scientific American. 267-274. C. The Inevitable Control of Earth Resources over Nations and Individuals: National Book Company. Walter (1998b) Shale Oil -. System Dynamics Society. Princeton. J. (1997) The Coming Oil Crisis: Multi-Science Publishing Company & Petroconsultants S. R. 1128-1131. Duncan. Youngquist. D. (1998) The Next Oil Crisis Looms Large -.The Elusive Energy: Colorado School of Mines. Massachusetts. 42. 19 . C. 210 p. Cooper. London. (1996) The Mexican Petroleum 'Play' in Two 'Acts:' Taking Hold of Oil Production Data: Proceedings of the 1996 System Dynamics Conference. 281. pp. (1998) Non-OPEC Peak Looms: Oil & Gas Journal. Cambridge. (1997) The World Petroleum Life-cycle: Encircling the Production Peak: Proceedings of the Thirteenth SSI/Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing. J. 1-7. C. C. Youngquist. 43. 141-144. Al3. 500 p. Seattle. Essex. Vol. Kerr. Dordrecht/Boston/London. R. 32 p. Vol. pp. Knott.

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