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There exists in anthropology a Law of Four Stages, which I call “Sahlins’s Law,” as a tribute
to Marshall Sahlins. Each stage represents a change in the relative balance between anthropology
and its subject matter. In the first stage, the cultures of the world were hardy and anthropology
weak or barely existing. In the second, as anthropology gathered momentum, gained chairs,
journals, endowments and field sites, its subject matter — traditional cultures [5] — weakened and
began to disappear. It was as if the ethnographer — an antithetical King Midas — had been cursed
with the gift of turning everything to dust. This was the turning point of Tristes Tropiques. By the
third stage, anthropology had reached the peak of its power, yet unable to bear the vision of this
field of ruins and gnawed by the guilt of shouldering “the White Man’s burden,” it began to
denigrate its own achievements and to deconstruct itself to death. In a symbolic sacrificial rite of
atonement, anthropology thus endured the very destruction it thought it had wrought upon its
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Methodology vs Content
But then we confront the second obstacle, that antiquated theory of science to which the
discipline clings even more vigorously than to its cherished guilt. Although there is considerable
discussion about the scientific method in introductory social science textbooks, methodology never
appears in the natural science textbooks of physics or chemistry. To be sure, epistemologists and
philosophers of science write a great deal about “the scientific method,” but natural scientists
sensibly enough do not bother to read them. It is only the social scientists who, insecure about their
own scientific status, take these discussions seriously.
Rigor in science is more a question of logistics than method, for objectivity, certainty and
control are required only when masses of data must be stored, transported, combined or modeled.
“Scientific” has two different meanings: logistics on the one hand, and content on the other.
Science is at its most productive when it defines new agencies that share their life with a scientific
community. It is, thus, only the social scientists who put the cart before the horse by discussing the
rigor and certainty of a fact, before having defined the new agencies under examination. Such
methodological rhetoric in anthropology carries no more meaning than the construction of a
highway, six lanes wide and several hundred meters long, located in the middle of nowhere. It
would be robust and “rigorous,” yet where would it lead? What kind of traffic is it designed to
carry? These are the questions that take precedence over the actual dimensions of the road.
Once we have rejected the useless dreams of methodological rigor, where does anthropology
stand if it tries to imitate not the purity of what it imagines in the natural sciences, but the real
productivity of those disciplines — embodied in the new agencies they mobilize? One would never
guess from the discussion thus far in the AN that anthropology has elicited, mobilized, stored,
documented, archived, compiled, theorized, assembled and modeled more new facts and agencies
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Even more absurd in this debate about over scientific anthropology, is the fact that no one
has acknowledged that anthropology is already one of the most advanced productive and scientific
of all the disciplines — natural or social. Ethnographers despair of reaching what they and their
forebears have already achieved: a bewildering redefinition of the humans who populate the world!
Imagine a world stripped of all anthropological discoveries. What a desert it would be without this
scientific discipline. Only physics matches anthropology’s ability to generate a multiplicity of
agencies and hybrids.
The guilt-ridden anthropologist will say, “Yes, maybe we have accumulated lots of factoids,
but they are not scientific enough. The are too controversial, immersed in narratives, dependent on
shaky protocols and highly idiosyncratic. We should be ashamed of not living up to the ideals of
epistemology.”
A careful reading of the ethnographies that describe natural science practices would soothe
the worries of our profession. What could be more local, idiosyncratic, fragile or collective than
the painstaking extraction of data from a nerve ending by neurobiologists described by Michael
Lynch in Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk in a
Research Laboratory (1985)? If you believe that only anthropologists are caught by the narrative
dilemma of their own reflexivity, read the extraordinary description of mathematical practice by
Bryan Rotman, Ad Infinitum: The Ghost in Turing Machine — Taking God out of Mathematics
and Putting the Body Back In (1994). Rotman describes how the textual mathematician sends the
semiotic slave Agent to perform automatic calculations that no one else has the time or the energy
to do. There is even a comparative ethnography of formalism in Helen Watson’s work on the
arithmetic of Aborigines and Australian white settlers. The more that the experimental sciences,
formalism and intellectual technologies are studied by anthropologists, the less intimidated and the
more optimistic anthropology as a science among the scientific disciplines should become.
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Scientific Anthropology
It is now possible to draw upon the subfield of the anthropology of science to define what a
scientific application of anthropology should be.
Positive Reflexion
Broader Integration
Political Promotion
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Through the new history and sociology of the sciences, anthropologists can learn the many
ways in which politics, instead of being deleterious to the sciences, is in fact beneficial. Contrary
to the claims of epistemologists who try to separate science from politics and facts from values, no
scientific discipline could have survived had this been the case. The slogan, “Science is politics
pursued by other means,” actually helps science because it insists on those other means necessary
to build a society. To reason in 1996 that science is a fortress that could survive only if it were
more insulated from the larger society — and that anthropology is tainted because of its
innumerable ties to the larger collective — is more than a sin, it is absurd. Such reasoning ignores
the history of the natural sciences, in which science does not occur as a foreign body within a
culture; it is part and parcel of the collective.
Modern Redefinition
Finally, the comparative basis offered by an anthropology of all the scientific disciplines,
affords a new perspective on the question of what it is to be a natural or social science. If
anthropology is the study of cultures, it covers only a tiny part of its program if. It leaves nature
outside its purview. This includes the unexamined extraterritoriality, extrasociality, extrapolitics
granted nature by the Occidental self in its understanding of its history. Ethno-sciences take a
completely different shape when they begin to include physics, chemistry, botany, high technology
and medicine. We no longer study belief systems, but also truth systems, where the very notion of
belief evaporates revealing a new field that I have called “symmetric anthropology.”
To be or not to be scientific is not the question. Rather than assuming this defensive posture,
I believe that it is much more productive to be offensive in all meanings of the word — and to
include both the natural and social sciences in the usual field sites of anthropology. It is here that
anthropology’s next discoveries lie, and here that we — according to Sahlins’s Law — can be
finally of use to our subject matter.
[Trained first as a philosopher and later as an anthropologist in the Ivory Coast, Bruno Latour has
turned to field studies of scientists, engineers, and innovators in general. He has recently published
We Have Never Been Modern (1993) on the notion of a symmetric anthropology that would
include science, and Aramis or the Love of Technology (1996), which details the life and demise of
an automatic subway system. The anthropology of science is part of a larger community called
“science studies” that includes historians, philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and economists
of science and technology. Latour refers interested readers to Sharon Traweek’s Beam Times and
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Life Times: The World of High Energy Physicists (1988) and A Pickering’s Science as Practice
and Culture (1992). Latour wishes to thank Monique Stark for kindly correcting his English in this
text.]