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SALUDO V AMEX
Facts:
Congressman SALUDO filed a complaint for damages against AMEX and
its officers Fish (VP and Country Manager), and Mascrinas (Head of
Operations) with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. SALUDO
alleges that he is a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. The
complaints cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of
petitioner Saludos AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to
his daughter. The 1st dishonor happened when petitioner Saludos
daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the
United States. The 2nd dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his
principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan
while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the
Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka. SALUDO says
the acts of dishonor were unjustified. He says that AMEX ET AL
unilaterally suspended his account for failure to pay its balance covering the
period of March 2000 when he did not received the corresponding statement
of account. Because of the great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and
professional standing as a result of AMEX ET ALs acts which were
committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner, he prays that AMEX ET AL be adjudged to pay him
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. AMEX ET AL,
in its answer, as affirmative defense says that the complaint should be
dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the
parties was a resident of Leyte, alleging that even SALUDO himself is not a
resident of Leyte. As proof: SALUDOs community tax certificate, which
was presented when he executed the complaints verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City Saludos
complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said
city RTC-MAASIN: Favors SALUDO. DENIED AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES OF AMEX ET AL. Says that venue was proper since a man
can have but one domicile, but he may have numerous places of residence.
Here RTC says that although SALUDO is domiciled in Leyte, he has
residence both in Pasay AND Leyte. Moreover, RTC says that as
congressman of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial
notice of. AMEX ET ALs MR DENIED. Hence, AMEX ET AL files
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with CA. CA: Reverses RTC. Favors
AMEX ET AL. VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID. Declared that petitioner
Saludo was not a resident of Leyte. CA referred to his community tax
certificate which was issued at Pasay City. CA says that under RA 7160, the
community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual. CA also pointed out that petitioner Saludos law office, which
was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. CA said it
was wrong for the RTC to take judicial notice of SALUDOs residence.
Issue:
WON venue was improperly laid in RTC because not one of the parties,
including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, was a resident of Southern Leyte at
the time of filing of the complaint.
Ruling:
VENUE IS PROPER. Petitioner Saludos complaint for damages is a
personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of ROC1. The
term residence as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed
with the courts of first instance means the place of abode whether
permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished
from domicile which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning. The definition of residence for
purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term
domicile; When analyzed, the term residence requires two elements
(1) intention to reside in the particular place, and (2) personal or physical
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of residence is
adopted; Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it ones domicile; Since a congressman, or the lone
representative of a particular district, has his residence (or domicile) therein
as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also
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deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing
personal actions. Following the definition of the term residence for
purposes of election law, a congressman for a particular locality not only
has the intention to reside therein but also the personal presence therein,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The fact that a partys
community tax certificate was issued in a place other than where he claims
to be a resident of is of no moment because the same does not preclude his
having a residence in another locality for purposes of venue. Courts are
allowed to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions; The concept of facts of
common knowledge in the context of judicial notice has been explained as
those facts that are so commonly known in the community as to make it
unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it
indisputable among reasonable men; The fact of a congressman being duly
elected could be properly taken judicial notice of by a trial court, the same
being a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits. A
congressmans residence in his province where he was elected could be
properly taken judicial notice of by the trial court.

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JALOSJOS V COMELEC
Facts:
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for mayor of Baliangao, MisamisOccidental for the 10 May 2010 elections.
She indicated therein her place of birth and residence as BarangayTugas,
Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition
to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which
they argued t hat she had falsely represented her place of birth and
residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had
not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence
in the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels
of land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs.
Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction of her
house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error in her place of birth
was committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in aCoC, an error in the
declaration of the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that
would lead to disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications
provided by law.
The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as
the duly elected municipal mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent
was DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor.
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and
affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due course to or
cancelling her CoC.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.
Held:
Petitioner failed to comply with theone-year residency requirement forlocal
elective officials.
Petitioner uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is
whether she was able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that she
had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior
to the May 2010 elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence
is synonymous with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v. Gurayheld as follows:
The term esidenceas so used, is synonymous with omicilewhich imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice.
First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention
to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as
held in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELECand subsequently in Dumpit-
Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
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actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal stayed in Brgy. PuntaMiray whenever she wanted to oversee the
residences at the same time. construction of the resort and the house.

Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive
proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date,
must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections
using the same standard of evidence.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and
positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one
year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III,
Villanueva, Duhaylungsod, Estrellada,Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol,
Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and
physical resident of Brgy. Tugassince 2008. However, they declared in the
same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her house was
being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true,
Fernandez v. COMELEChas established that the ownership of a house or
some other property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially
true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in
the locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before the elections.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a
voter only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency
requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from that for
acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public
office.
The Petition is DENIED.

Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and

Estrellada asserted that in December 2009, construction was still ongoing.
By their assertion, they were implying that six months before the 10 May
2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas.

Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited
Baliangao occasionally when they stated that "at times when she (petitioner)
was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of Lourdes Yap while her
residential house was being constructed."

These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that
petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most,
the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building
and developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only

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GAYO V VERCELES - Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her greencard holder
status when she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the
Facts: Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in
Verceles migrated to USA with family but she retained her Filipino Manila prior to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles
citizenship filed her certificate of candidacy, she was no longer disqualified to run as an
1993 returned to the Philippines for good elective official because of such waiver of permanent resident status in a
1995 registered herself as a voter of La Union and filed her income foreign country.
tax returns
Between 1993-1997, would travel to USA to visit her children 2. NO.
1997 effectively abandoned her status as lawful resident of USA - Sec 40(f) LGC 1991: Disqualified: Permanent residents in a
for the May 1998 elections foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad xxx
January 1998 surrendered her alien registration
- Sec 65 (e) OEC, BP 881 (1985) provides for an exception of the
May 1998 elections was elected mayor
disqualification xxx unless said person has waived his status as a
2001 ran for re-election and won
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country In accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws
Issue:
1. WON Vercenes was able to meet residency requirement for
- Both provisions are in pari materia they relate to the same subject
municipal mayor in the May 2001 elections
matter an thus should be construed together and each legislative intent is to
be interpreted
2. WON LGC impliedly repealed Sec 68 of the OEC by the fact that
LGC does not provide waiver for status as permanent residents
- OEC is a catchphrase or a conditional cause on how a permanent
abroad which is provided under Sec 68 of OEC
resident or immigrant of a foreign country could fall outside the coverage of
prohibition
Ruling:
1. YES.
- Legislature found the inclusion of how to fall outside the
- Sec. 39 of the LGC of 1991 require residence for at least one (1)
prohibition in OEC is unnecessary, hence the deletion.
year immediately preceding the day of the election for local elective
officials
- Thus the absence of that conditional clause in Sec. 40(f) of the
LGC 1991 may be supplied by Sec. 68 (e) of the OEC
- Abandoned status as permanent resident of USA; surrender of
green card; decision to relocate to the Philippines; elected mayor in 1998.
Thus, animus manendi (intent to remain) in the Philippines and animus non
revertendi (without intent to return) in USA prior 2001 elections were
established.

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MACALINTAL V COMELEC exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is
not qualified as an absentee voter.
Facts: 2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others: presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the
void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects
the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates
the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

Issue:
Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

Held:

No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required
to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required
for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws,
domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a
resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned).
The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to.
Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines
for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be

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MACQUILING V COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor. 5 On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states: On 30 November
2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections. 9 Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further
bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December
2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700
in entering and departing the Philippines. On 30 April 2010, the
COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
declare him in default and to present evidence exparte. Neither motion was
acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as
the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was
only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, THE
RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION: Instead of treating the
Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based
on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one
for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that
he is a Filipino citizen. 18The Court ruled that Arnados act of consistently
using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. Petitioner Casan
Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the
2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the
First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and
the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate
who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner. RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: ruled in favor of
arnado Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use
of a US passport, There are three questions posed by the parties before this
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge
on the result of the first.
Issues:
1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. 2.
whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made. 3. whether or
not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to
this case.
Ruling:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. 2. The use of foreign
passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
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PERSONS CASE DIGEST COMPILATION
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voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it
does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants
the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position. Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his
US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, Arnados
category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by
law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office. By the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified
to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local electiv . 3. The
rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is not a second-
placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates. Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-
placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This
doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to
address the ever-recurring issue that a secondplacer who loses to an
ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots."47 This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is
a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision
that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities
in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office." A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling
therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try
a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined
"to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally
elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in
that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or
not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal
president." The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible
candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner.
By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the
first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to
election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a
candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run
for public office. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person
seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity
to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied) It is imperative to safeguard the
expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken
through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and
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PERSONS CASE DIGEST COMPILATION
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only the electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado being barred
the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
in.1wphi1 With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
among the qualified candidates. We have ruled in the recent cases of disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the
Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already
cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the proclaimed the winner. Arnado's disqualification, although made long
ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
election. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have
in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who
expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected. under the Local Government Code will not apply.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when
the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidates
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the
rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a
prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified
one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is
actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates. That the
disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office
is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids
not only the COC but also the proclamation. The disqualifying
circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It
does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the
first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office. The disqualifying

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CONDON V COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant
to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved
and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn
issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to
be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the
2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during
the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She
obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7
and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba,
La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September
27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that
her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified
and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified
her proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was
dismissed y the second division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on
September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a
Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the
2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens
seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue:
W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to
renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A
9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
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candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public
office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra,
Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to
the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship
was invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer authorized to
administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission
on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).

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RP VS BATUGAS
Facts:
Ascuzeana Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. Ascuzena was born in Zamboanga del Sur on
September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents. Her primary, secondary, and
tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools She then practiced her
teaching profession in various schools situated in the Philippines. In 1968,
at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago),a natural-
born Filipino citizen. They have five children. After all the jurisdictional
requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA 473had been complied with, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
Issue:
WON the petition for naturalization should be granted? YES.
Held:
Foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through
either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization
under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to
alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA
473, which provides that:
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens
may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for
them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial
naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has
since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA
473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien
wife thru derivative naturalization.
PROPER PROCEDURE: As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for
an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino citizenship is as
follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure
followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must
file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and
that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husbands citizenship
pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon
the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the
joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order
or decision granting or denying the petition.( NOTE: in this case, Ascuzena
followed such procedure but it was denied [by ministry of justice] so she
filed the petition for naturalization)
In this case: However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial
naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied
by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition
and received evidence of her qualifications and absence of disqualifications
to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was
affirmed by the CA.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession
before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take
on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support
her family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five
children, provided them with education, and have all become professionals
and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of
both husband and wifes lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional
and can resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and
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this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the
only country she has known since birth.
judicial declaration of citizenship (not authorized) vs naturalization
proceeding
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In
the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to
declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the
petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to
acquire the privilege of be coming a Philippine citizen based on
requirements required under CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under
strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege,
and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly
Filipino family.

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