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Advantage 1

Advantage One is Cybersecurity:


The threat is rising --- every cyber-attack increases the risk of extinction
Nolan 15 - Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, former Trial Attorney at the
United States Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from George Washington University

Andrew Nolan, 3/16/2015, CRS Report to Congress, Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal
Challenges and Solutions, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf, p. 1-3, 9/17/2015, #TheNextPKen

The high profile cyber attacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend: the
frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks are increasing,11 posing grave threats to the national interests
of the U nited S tates. Indeed, the attacks on Target, eBay, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Sony Pictures,
and Anthem were only a few of the many publicly disclosed cyberattacks perpetrated in 2014 and 2105.12 Experts
suggest that hundreds of thousands of other entities may have suffered similar incidents during the
same period,13 with one survey indicating that 43% of firms in the United States had experienced a data
breach in the past year.14 Moreover, just as the cyberattacks of 2013which included incidents involving
companies like the New York Times, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, and Microsoft15were eclipsed by those
that occurred in 2014,16 the consensus view is that 2015 and beyond will witness more frequent and
more sophisticated cyber incidents.17 To the extent that its expected rise outpaces any corresponding
rise in the ability to defend against such attacks, the result could be troubling news for countless
businesses that rely more and more on computers in all aspects of their operations, as the economic
losses resulting from a single cyberattack can be extremely costly .18 And the resulting effects of a
cyberattack can have effects beyond a single companys bottom line. As nations are becoming ever
more dependent on information and information technology,19 the threat posed by any one cyberattack
[end page 2] can have devastating collateral and cascading effects across a wide range of physical,

economic and social systems.20 With reports that foreign nationssuch as Russia, China, Iran, and
North Koreamay be using cyberspace as a new front to wage war,21 fears abound that a cyberattack
could be used to shut down the nations electrical grid,22 hijack a commercial airliner,23 or even launch
a nuclear weapon with a single keystroke .24 In short, the potential exists that the United States could
suffer a cyber Pearl Harbor, an attack that would cause physical destruction and loss of life25 and
exposein the words of one prominent cybersecurity expertvulnerabilities of staggering proportions.26

Cyber attacks cause grid collapse


Kakutani 10 - Pulitzer Prize winning book reviewer
*Citing Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-
terrorism for the United States

Michiko Kakutani, 4/27/2010, The New York Times, The Attack Coming From Bytes, Not Bombs,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/books/27book.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 9/17/2015,
#TheNextPKen

*We dont advocate/modified for ableist language


Blackouts hit New York, Los Angeles, Washington and more than 100 other American cities. Subways
crash. Trains derail. Airplanes fall from the sky. Gas pipelines explode. Chemical plants release
clouds of toxic chlorine. Banks lose all their data. Weather and communication satellites spin out of
their orbits. And the Pentagons classified networks grind to a halt, blinding the greatest military power
in the world. This might sound like a takeoff on the 2007 Bruce Willis Die Hard movie, in which a group of cyberterrorists attempts to
stage what it calls a fire sale: a systematic shutdown of the nations vital communication and utilities infrastructure. According to the
former counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke, however, its a scenario that could happen in real life and it could
all go down in 15 minutes . While the United States has a first-rate cyberoffense capacity, he says, its lack of a credible
defense system, combined with the countrys heavy reliance on technology, makes it highly susceptible to a devastating
cyberattack. The United States is currently far more vulnerable to cyberwar than Russia or China, he writes. The U.S. is more at risk
from cyberwar than are minor states like North Korea. We may even be at risk some day from nations or nonstate actors lacking cyberwar
capabilities, but who can hire teams of highly capable hackers. Lest this sound like the augury of an alarmist, the reader might recall that Mr.
Clarke, counterterrorism chief in both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, repeatedly warned his superiors about the need for
an aggressive plan to combat al Qaeda with only a pallid response before 9/11. He recounted this campaign in his controversial 2004 book,
Against All Enemies. Once again, there
is a lack of coordination between the various arms of the military and various committees
in Congress over how to handle a potential attack. Once again, government agencies and private companies in charge of civilian
infrastructure are ill prepared to handle a possible disaster. In these pages Mr. Clarke uses his insiders knowledge of national security policy to
create a harrowing and persuasive picture of the cyberthreat the United States faces today. Mr. Clarke is hardly a lone wolf on the
subject: Mike McConnell, the former director of national intelligence, told a Senate committee in February that if we were in a
cyberwar today, the United States would lose . And last November, Steven Chabinsky, deputy assistant director for the
Federal Bureau of Investigations cyber division, noted that the F.B.I. was looking into Qaeda sympathizers who want to develop their hacking
skills and appear to want to target the United States infrastructure. Mr. Clarke who wrote this book with Robert K. Knake, an international
affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations argues that because the United States military relies so heavily upon
databases and new technology, it is highly vulnerable to cyberattack. And while the newly established Cyber
Command, along with the Department of Homeland Security, is supposed to defend the federal government, he writes, the rest of us are on
our own: There is no federal agency that has the mission to defend the banking system, the
transportation networks or the power grid from cyberattack . In fact, The Wall Street Journal reported in April 2009
that the United States electrical grid had been penetrated by cyberspies (reportedly from China, Russia and other countries), who left behind
software that could be used to sabotage the system in the future.

Causes nuclear meltdownsextinction


Hodges 14 Professor at Glendale Community College, teaches Psychology, Statistics, Research
methodology, Personality theory, Abnormal psychology, Social Psychology, Death and Dying, Learning
and Cognition, and United States History; teaches online for Deer Valley Unified Schools, Grand Canyon
University and Rio Salado College; head college basketball coach at Glendale Community College (fun
fact)

*citing Judy Haar, who has a MS in Nuclear Chemistry from San Jose State University

Dave Hodges, 4/18/2014, The Liberty Beacon, Nuclear Power Plants Will Become America's Extinction
Level Event, http://www.thelibertybeacon.com/2014/04/18/nuclear-power-plants-will-become-
americas-extinction-level-event/, 9/17/2015, #TheNextPKen

Fukushima is often spoken of by many, as a possible extinction level event because of the radiation
threat. Fukushima continues to wreak havoc upon the world and in the United States as we are being
bathed in deadly radiation from this event. Because of Fukushima, fish are becoming inedible and the
ocean currents as well as the prevailing ocean winds are carrying deadly radiation. Undoubtedly, by this
time, the radioactivity has made its way into the transpiration cycle which means that crops are being
dowsed with deadly radiation. The radiation has undoubtedly made its way into the water table in many
areas and impacts every aspect of the food supply. The health costs to human beings is incalculable.
However, this article is not about the devastation at Fukushima, instead, this article focuses on the fact
that North America could have a total of 124 Fukushima events if the necessary conditions were
present. A Festering Problem Long before Fukushima, American regulators knew that a power failure
lasting for days involving the power grid connected to a nuclear plant, regardless of the cause, would
most likely lead to a dangerous radioactive leak in at least several nuclear power plants. A complete
loss of electrical power poses a major problem for nuclear power plants because the reactor core
must be kept cool as well as the back-up cooling systems, all of which require massive amounts of power
to work. Heretofore, all the NERC drills which test the readiness of a nuclear power plant are predicated
on the notion that a blackout will only last 24 hours or less. Amazingly, this is the sum total of a NERC
litmus test. Although we have the technology needed to harden and protect our grid from an EMP
event, whether natural or man-made, we have failed to do so. The cost for protecting the entire grid is
placed at about the cost for one B-1 Stealth Bomber. Yet, as a nation, we have done nothing. This is
inexplicable and inexcusable. Our collective inaction against protecting the grid prompted Congressman
Franks to write a scathing letter to the top officials of NERC. However, the good Congressman failed to
mention the most important aspect of this problem. The problem is entirely fixable and NERC and the
US government are leaving the American people and its infrastructure totally unprotected from a total
meltdown of nuclear power plants as a result of a prolonged power failure. Critical Analyses According
to Judy Haar, a recognized expert in nuclear plant failure analyses, when a nuclear power plant loses
access to off-grid electricity, the event is referred to as a station blackout. Haar states that all 104 US
nuclear power plants are built to withstand electrical outages without experiencing any core damage,
through the activation of an automatic start up of emergency generators powered by diesel. Further,
when emergency power kicks in, an automatic shutdown of the nuclear power plant commences. The
dangerous control rods are dropped into the core, while water is pumped by the diesel power
generators into the reactor to reduce the heat and thus, prevent a meltdown. Here is the catch in this
process, the spent fuel rods are encased in both a primary and secondary containment structure which
is designed to withstand a core meltdown. However, should the pumps stop because either the
generators fail or diesel fuel is not available, the fuel rods are subsequently uncovered and a Fukushima
type of core meltdown commences immediately. At this point, I took Judy Haars comments to a source
of mine at the Palo Verde Nuclear power plant. My source informed me that as per NERC policy, nuclear
power plants are required to have enough diesel fuel to run for a period of seven days. Some plants
have thirty days of diesel. This is the good news, but it is all downhill from here. The Unresolved Power
Blackout Problem A long-term loss of outside electrical power will most certainly interrupt the
circulation of cooling water to the pools. Another one of my Palo Verde nuclear power plant sources
informed me that there is no long term solution to a power blackout and that all bets are off if the
blackout is due to an EMP attack. A more detailed analysis reveals that the spent fuel pools carry
depleted fuel for the reactor. Normally, this spent fuel has had time to considerably decay and
therefore, reducing radioactivity and heat. However, the newer discharged fuel still produces heat and
needs cooling. Housed in high density storage racks, contained in buildings that vent directly into the
atmosphere, radiation containment is not accounted for with regard to the spent fuel racks. In other
words, there is no capture mechanism. In this scenario, accompanied by a lengthy electrical outage, and
with the emergency power waning due to either generator failure or a lack of diesel needed to power
the generators, the plant could lose the ability to provide cooling. The water will subsequently heat up,
boil away and uncover the spent fuel rods which required being covered in at least 25 feet of water to
remain benign from any deleterious effects. Ultimately, this would lead to fires as well and the release
of radioactivity into the atmosphere. This would be the beginning of another Fukushima event right here
on American soil. Both my source and Haar shared exactly the same scenario about how a meltdown
would occur. Subsequently, I spoke with Roger Landry who worked for Raytheon in various Department
of Defense projects for 28 years, many of them in this arena and Roger also confirmed this information
and that the above information is well known in the industry. When I examine Congressman Franks
letter to NERC and I read between the lines, it is clear that Franks knows of this risk as well, he just stops
short of specifically mentioning it in his letter. Placing Odds On a Failure Is a Fools Errand An analysis of
individual plant risks released in 2003 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shows that for 39 of the
104 nuclear reactors, the risk of core damage from a blackout was greater than 1 in 100,000. At 45 other
plants the risk is greater than 1 in 1 million, the threshold NRC is using to determine which severe
accidents should be evaluated in its latest analysis. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, in Pennsylvania has the greatest risk of experiencing a core
meltdown, 6.5 in 100,000, according to the analysis. These odds dont sound like much until you
consider that we have 124 nuclear power generating plants in the US and Canada and when we consider
each individual facility, the odds of failure climb. How many meltdowns would it take in this country
before our citizens would be condemned to the hellish nightmare, or worse, being experienced by the
Japanese? The Question Thats Not Being Asked None of the NERC, or the Nuclear Regulatory tests of
handling a prolonged blackout at a nuclear power plant has answered two critical questions, What
happens when these nuclear power plants run out of diesel fuel needed to run the generators, and
What happens when some of these generators fail? In the event of an EMP attack, can tanker trucks
with diesel fuel get to all of the nuclear power plants in the US in time to re-fuel them before they stop
running? Will tanker trucks even be running themselves in the aftermath of an EMP attack? And in the
event of an EMP attack, it is not likely that any plant which runs low on fuel, or has a generator
malfunctions, will ever get any help to mitigate the crisis prior to a plethora of meltdowns occurring.
Thus, every nuclear power plant in the country has the potential to cause a Chernobyl or Fukushima
type accident if our country is hit by an EMP attack. CAN YOU EVEN IMAGINE 124 FUKUSHIMA EVENTS
IN NORTH AMERICA HAPPENING AT THE SAME TIME? THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE THE ULTIMATE
DEPOPULATION EVENT. And There Is More The ramifications raised in the previous paragraphs are
significant. What if the blackout lasts longer than 24 hours? What if the reason for the blackout is an
EMP burst caused by a high altitude nuclear blast and transportation comes to a standstill? In this
instance, the cavalry is not coming. Adding fuel to the fire lies in the fact that the power transformers
presently take at least one year to replace. Today, there is a three year backlog on ordering because so
many have been ordered by China. This makes one wonder what the Chinese are preparing for with
these multiple orders for both transformers and generators. In short, our unpreparedness is a
prescription for disaster. As a byproduct of my investigation, I have discovered that most, if not all, of
the nuclear power plants are on known earthquake fault lines. All of Californias nuclear power plants
are located on an earthquake fault line. Can anyone tell me why would anyone in their right mind build a
nuclear power plant on a fault line? To see the depth of this threat you can visit an interactive, overlay
map at this site. Conclusion I have studied this issue for almost nine months and this is the most elusive
topic that I have ever investigated. The more facts I gather about the threat of a mass nuclear meltdown
in this country, the more questions I realize that are going unanswered. With regard to the nuclear
power industry we have the proverbial tiger by the tail. Last August, Big Sis stated that it is not matter
of if we have a mass power grid take down, but it is a matter of when. I would echo her concerns and
apply the not if, but when admonition to the possibility of a mass meltdown in this country. It is only
a matter of time until this scenario for disaster comes to fruition. Our collective negligence and high
level of extreme depraved indifference on the part of NERC is criminal because this is indeed an
Extinction Level Event. At the end of the day, can anyone tell me why would any country be so
negligent as to not provide its nuclear plants a fool proof method to cool the secondary processes of its
nuclear materials at all of its plants? Why would ANY nuclear power plant be built on an earthquake
fault line? Why are we even using nuclear energy under these circumstances? And why are we allowing
the Chinese to park right next door to so many nuclear power plants?

Cyber-attacks collapse missile defense


John Reed 13, a national security reporter for Foreign Policy, Here's How Foreign Spies Are Now
Getting U.S. Weapons Tech, 7-23-13, http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/23/h-
eres_how_foreign_spies_are_now_getting_us_missile_tech, DOA: 8-14-14, y2k

foreign spies want to


Forget the shady middlemen; never mind the students just a little too eager to find out the particulars of engines and warheads. Today, when

acquire America's latest weapons technology , they just hack into networks and steal the digital
designs . 2012 marked the the first time, overseas intelligence agencies used cyber espionage - rather than the
old-fashioned kind -- as their number one way to pilfer information on U.S. weapons . That's according to a new report by one of
Pentagon branches responsible for preventing such spying. Not coincidentally, perhaps, half of all successful incidents in 2012 of espionage against American defense contractors

cyber attacks are steadliy replacing --


originated in Asia, up from 43 percent the previous year. THis report higlights what plenty of us have come to grasp intuitively,

or at least complementing -- attempts to flat-out purchase U.S. defense technology or simply ask for more information about it as the top
MO of industrial intelligence operators. This shift from overt attempts at collecting information on U.S. weapons to cyber theft means that it may become more difficult to detect when a

According
rival is trying to gain access to America's defense secrets. It also shows why the Obama administration has been in such a tizzy of China's alleged industrial espionage.

to the report from the Defense Security Service, these spies were particularly interested in gathering information on U.S.
electronics; worldwide collection attempts in this sector spiked 94 percent from the year before. A "substantial"
number of those electronics were radiation-resistant electronics that can be used in nuclear weapons , ballistic
missiles , aerospace and space programs , according to the report. "Foreign entities, especially those linked to
countries with mature missile programs, increasingly focuses collection efforts on U.S. missile technology ,
usually aimed at particular missile subsystems," reads the report. Why are nations with mature missile programs trying to steal secrets about American

missile parts? To make their missiles even more deadly , of course. "After a country masters the chemistry and physics required to launch a missiles,

scientists and engineers can focus on accuracy and lethality, the desired characteristics of modern missiles," the report notes. Getting their hands on U.S. missile

parts will also help these countries defend against American weapons. "Reverse-engineering would probably
give East Asia and the Pacific scientists and engineers a better understanding of the capabilities of the targeted and
acquired technology to develop countermeasures to U.S. weapons systems," reads the document. Overall, foreign spies' top four American

targets were "information systems; electronics; lasers, optics and sensors; and aeronautic systems technologies," according to the report. All of these are crucial

parts of the weapons that have given the U.S. a clear advantage on battlefields for the last 20 years.
Information systems are how the US military passes massive amounts of intelligence and
communications data . Meanwhile optics, lasers and sensors are key technologies that help American drones
spy on enemies and that guide its smart weapons onto targets. Aeronautic systems technologies, as you know, are
the parts that make up the Pentagon's next-generation rockets, stealth drones and fighters -- exactly the types of

weapons that nations like China are trying to replicate. The report doesn't specifically call out China as the home of these spies. But let's
be honest, the vast majority of espionage attempts originating from Asia are likely coming from China. "DSS continues to take the politically correct route and hide China within the East
Asia and Pacific' category, disappointing," Richard Bejtlich, chief security officer of the cybersecurity firm Mandiant, told Killer Apps after reading the report. The Defense Security Service
document was published on July 17, two days before David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told Killer Apps that his agency is constantly finding new attempts
by foreign government to install spyware on U.S. weapon systems. (In 2011, a Senate investigation found that tons of counterfeit electronic parts made in China were making their way

Far East countries -- who accounted for 54


into U.S. weapons; these parts could hide spyware or back doors' allowing enemies to take over or disable the weapons.)

percent of the interest in American missile tech -- targeted everything from the Standard Missiles and Ground Based

Interceptors used for missile defense to TOW antitank missiles , Trident Submarine launched
nuclear missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot anti-aircraft missiles and Harpoon anti-
ship missiles. It's bad enough that U.S. intelligence officials are constantly discovering new plans to insert spyware and back doors into the Defense Department's supply
chain. But what may be worse is that American analysts are only discovering indirect evidence of this infiltration, according to a senior DOD intelligence official. The back doors

"Our adversaries are very active in trying to introduce material into the
themselves remain maddeningly hard to find.

supply chain in ways that threaten our security from the standpoint of their abilities to collect
[intelligence] and disrupt" U.S. military operations , said David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency during a
speech at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado on July 19. DIA is finding more and more plots to deliver these parts through front companies that are "the instrument of the hostile
service that's guiding and directing them," Shedd told Killer Apps during the forum. "My concern is that our adversaries -- and they're multiple in the supply chain context -- have been
very active for a very long time," David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told Killer Apps at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. "We're finding things, not in
the supply chain itself but plans and intentions through" front companies posing as legitimate DOD parts suppliers. This is hardly a new threat. (Yours truly has written about the
epidemic of counterfeit parts poisoning DOD supply chains since 2008.) A 2011 Senate investigation discovered an unbelievable amount of fake semiconductors in brand new DOD
weapons such as the Navy's P-8 Poseidon sub-killing plane and anti-ICBM missiles used by the Missile Defense Agency. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the parts were found

In addition to the obvious safety threat posed by say, fake aircraft bolts or wiring harnesses, one of the main dangers
to come from China.

to the supply chain is that spyware or back doors can be built into critical electronic circuits. Spyware and
backdoors could allow an enemy to easily monitor U.S. operations or even disable American weapons
systems . Israel is rumored to have used digital back doors planted in the software of Syrian air defenses to disable their radars during its 2007 air strike against the Dayr as-Zawr
nuclear facility. Just as scary as the fact that this kind of espionage has been going on for years, is the fact that the massive advantage the U.S. military has in hardware and manpower
doesn't exist in the digital world. "As we learn more about our own cyber requirements and needs, we have a better understanding that the world is a flatter world in terms of what our

adversaries can do in the supply chain," Shedd told Killer Apps. While DOD has poured counterintelligence resources at the problem, "I sense
a little bit that it's insufficient " said Shedd during his speech.

Missile defense makes nuclear war impossible and checks A2/AD capabilities and
solves North Korean adventurism
Richard Weitz 13, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the
Hudson Institute, The Geopolitics of Missile Defense: Many nations already have, or are acquiring,
short- and medium-range missiles. The United States is leading the efforts to negate such threats, 4-5-
13, http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/the-geopolitics-of-missile-defense/?allpages=yes, DOA: 8-14-14,
y2k

The U nited S tates finds itself at the heart of the international politics of missile defense. Its leading global role in
developing and deploying BMD technologies and its worldwide network of alliances both empower and oblige the
U nited S tates to defend much of the world from missile attack . These same alignments also provide the ties the Pentagon needs to construct a
globally linked network of BMD sensors and facilities. For this reason, Washington has lobbied its friends and allies to cooperate with U.S. regional BMD initiatives as a means to strengthen
mutual defense capabilities and to supplement traditional U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrence guarantees with missile defenses. The Obama administration has also used its strong
investments in missile defense to reassure countries concerned by the administrations desire to downplay the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. officials have persuaded most

allied governments that missile defenses complement deterrence by causing potential aggressors to doubt that
any attack could succeed as well as providing a hedge should deterrence fail. More than 30 countries
already have, or are acquiring, short- and medium-range missiles able to deliver conventional payloads at great
speed and distance . Some are trying to develop longer-range missiles that can carry warheads armed with various
w eapons of m ass d estruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological). The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) predicts that the
missile threats to the United States and its allies will grow in quantity and quality as antagonistic states
increase the size and capabilities of their ballistic missiles. With respect to the latter, ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile,
reliable, survivable, accurate, and able to fly longer and farther. In principle, U.S. BMD systems make several critical contributions to U.S.

security. They can: defend the American homeland, U.S. forces and citizens located overseas, and U.S. friends and allies deter
such attacks by enhancing both the capacity and the perceived will of the defender to thwart any aggression
dissuade potential aggressors from seeking to acquire and deploy ballistic missiles or nuclear warheads by
reducing their perceived value reassure U.S. friends and allies about the U.S. will and commitment to defend them, which contributes to other U.S. goals such as
dissuading them from obtaining nuclear or other destabilizing retaliatory weapons overcome anti-access/area-denial (A2AD ) and other asymmetric tactics

that use missiles to try to negate U.S. conventional advantages Under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, the
United States has employed a variety of tools to address these missile threats. U.S. officials have engaged in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in an effort to persuade North Korea and Iran
to end their nuclear weapons programs and refrain from the further testing of ballistic missiles. They have also used declaratory policy by repeatedly warning these countries against
developing, testing, or using these capabilities. Additionally, the United States has provided security assistance to help U.S. allies enhance their own defense capabilities. The Pentagon also
bases or deploys large numbers of U.S. troops in each region, with an impressive range of conventional and unconventional capabilities, reinforced by U.S.-based assets with global reach, such
as long-range strategic bombers. The United States has offered many of these countries diverse security guarantees, including implicit and sometimes explicit pledges to potentially employ

U.S. nuclear capabilities to protect them. Finally, the U nited S tates has been constructing missile defense architectures in each region as well
globally to counter Iranian and North Korean missile threats. These include short-range missile defense
as

systems such as PAC-3 batteries, theater defenses such as THAAD and Aegis-equipped naval vessels, and the
ground-based midcourse interceptors based in Alaska and California.

North Korean adventurism goes nuclear


Mark Schneider 14, a senior analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement
from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior
positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy, including principal director for forces
policy; principal director for strategic defense, space and verification policy; director for strategic arms
control policy; and representative of the secretary of defense to the Nuclear Arms Control
Implementation Commissions. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a member of the State
Department Policy Planning Staff. The North Korean Nuclear Threat to the U.S, Comparative Strategy,
Volume 33, Issue 2, 2014, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495933.2013.840203#.U-
w8FfldUtw, DOA: 8-14-14, y2k

A recent unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment stated: DIA assesses with moderate confidence the North
[Korea] currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles . This conclusion is highly
credible and not really new. North Korea was assessed to have nuclear weapons long before the actual (or at least detected) first test of these weapons in 2006. Building
a nuclear weapon small enough to be carried by the relatively large payloads of North Korea's ballistic missiles is not a very difficult
task today. In light of what is now known about the proliferation of a nuclear missile warhead from China to Pakistan
and from Pakistan to North Korea, the North Korea defector reports about nuclear weapons development and the North Korean nuclear tests,

the DIA conclusion may be an understatement . The North Korean nuclear stockpile may be significantly greater than what is usually assessed. This
is of concern because the North Korean regime is the most brutal Stalinist dictatorship in the world. Moreover, while North Korea
has long made occasional nuclear attack threats against the U.S. in the past, the scope, magnitude, and frequency of these
threats vastly increased in 2013. Current U.S. policy, which downgrades the importance of nuclear deterrence and cuts missile defense, is not well suited to handle
this threat.

2 internal links
1. Backdoors make cyberterrorism a ticking time bomb
Seneque 14 Gareth, ICT professional with a particular focus on UNIX Architecture & Design, holds a
degree in Philosophy/Politics from the University of Sydney, Alex Comninos, an independent researcher
focusing on information and communications technology and politics, a Doctoral Candidate at Justus-
Liebig University in Giessen, Germany at the Department of Geography, where he is conducting doctoral
research on the challenges and constraints of the use of user-generated geographic information systems
in Egypt, Libya, and North and Sudan in 2010 to 2011, "Cyber security, civil society and vulnerability in
an age of communications surveillance", 2014, Justus-Liebig University Giessen and Geist Consulting,
giswatch.org/en/communications-surveillance/cyber-security-civil-society-and-vulnerability-age-
communications-sur

The relevance of Snowdens disclosures to cyber security The scope and reach of the NSAs surveillance
is important. The NSAs surveillance posture is as has been repeated by General Keith Alexander, and
is reflected in the NSA slide in Figure 1 to "collect it all":32 from undersea cable taps, to Yahoo video
chats, to in-flight Wi-Fi, to virtual worlds and online multiplayer games like Second Life and World of
Warcraft. The NSA has at least three different programmes to get Yahoo and Google user data. This
shows that they try to get the same data from multiple mechanisms.33 With the GCHQ under the
MUSCULAR programme it hacked into the internal data links of Google and Yahoo34 for information
that it could mostly have gotten through the PRISM programme. In addition to highlighting the NSAs
massive institutional overreach and global privacy invasion, Snowdens disclosures also highlight the
many points at which our data is insecure, and the vast numbers of vulnerabilities to surveillance that
exist throughout our digital world. However, while the NSA is the largest threat in the surveillance
game, it is not the only threat. Governments all around the world are using the internet to surveil their
citizens. Considering the rate of technological change, it is not unforeseeable that the methods, tools
and vulnerabilities used by the NSA will be the tools of states, cyber criminals and low-skilled hackers
of the future. Regardless of who the perceived attacker or surveillance operative may be, and whether
it is the NSA or not, large-scale, mass surveillance is a growing cyber security threat. It has also been
disclosed that the NSA and GCHQ have actively worked to make internet and technology users around
the world less secure. The NSA has placed backdoors in routers running vital internet
infrastructures.35 The GCHQ has impersonated social networking websites like LinkedIn in order to
target system administrators of internet service providers.36 The NSA has been working with the GCHQ
to hack into Google and Yahoo data centres.37 The NSA also works to undermine encryption
technologies, by covertly influencing the use of weak algorithms and random number generators in
encryption products and standards.38 The NSA in its own words is working under the BULLRUN
programme to "insert vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT systems, networks, and
endpoint communications devices used by targets" and to influence policies, standards and
specifications for commercial [encryption] technologies.39 The NSA is also believed to hoard
knowledge about vulnerabilities rather than sharing them with developers, vendors and the general
public,40 as well as even maintaining a catalogue of these vulnerabilities for use in surveillance and
cyber attacks.41 None of these activities serve to make the internet more secure. In fact, they do the
very opposite. As US Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren commented: When any industry or organisation
builds a backdoor to assist with electronic surveillance into their product, they put all of our data
security at risk. If a backdoor is created for law enforcement purposes, its only a matter of time
before a hacker exploits it, in fact we have already seen it happen."42
2. NormsCurtailing surveillance is key to effective norms-buildingthat prevents
cyber-warfare
Farrell 2015, Henry Farrell, PhD in Government from Georgetown University, Associate Professor of
Political Science and International Affairs, April 2015, Promoting Norms for Cyberspace, Council on
Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-norms-cyberspace/p36358?cid=nlc-
press_release-press_note--link2-
20150406&sp_mid=48385113&sp_rid=YWtpbWVyeUBoc3RvZGF5LnVzS0

*build norms- soft power is necessary- SPURS COOPERATION

*no one is listening to us rn

*AT: Treaties- no one listens to them

U.S. policymakers argue that the United States and others need to build norms to mitigate cybersecurity
problems. Admiral Michael S. Rogers, head of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Command,
has argued that shared norms are a basic building block for cybersecurity. He has called on actors in
academia and civil society to help design them and to assist in their spread. It may seem strange that
Pentagon officials are arguing for soft tools rather than hard military options, but there are four good
reasons why norms are the best option available. First, the United States is vulnerable to cyberattacks
and this weakness is difficult to address using conventional tools of military statecraft. Second, it is
difficult to ensure that complex information systems are fully defended, since they may have subtle
technical weaknesses. Third, classical deterrence is not easy in a world where it is often challenging to
identify sophisticated attackers, or even to know when an attack has taken place. Lastly, treaties are
hard to enforce because it is so difficult to verify complianceparticularly in cyberspace, where
weapons are software, not missiles. Although norms are hazier than treaty rules, they may still have
important consequences. Norms against the use of nuclear weapons have taken hold since the 1950s,
making their use nearly unthinkable in ordinary circumstances. Robust cybersecurity norms might, over
time, rule out some kinds of attacks as normatively inappropriate. They might encourage other states to
see norm breaches as attacks on their security, too, spurring cooperation to prevent or stop attacks.
Finally, norms can provide shared understandings between states that allow them to work together
where they have shared interests and manage relations where their interests clash. Challenges to
Norm Promotion It is hard to spread norms, even in the best circumstances. Unfortunately, these are
far from the best circumstances for the United States. U.S. policymakers face three major problems.
First, it is easiest to promote norms when one can invoke common values to support them, yet the
world's cyber powers have differentand radically incompatiblevalues over how to protect
cyberspace. The clashing interests between democratic and authoritarian regimes on the value of an
open Internet and definitions of security make effective global treaties impossible. Second, the
potential adopters of norms are likely to be more receptive if they do not think the proponent of the
norms is acting in bad faith. To be sure, many states were happy to use the Snowden revelations as a
cover for opposition to any rules of behavior Washington might offer. But for others, efforts at
persuasion have been damaged by the exposed gap between U.S. rhetoric and actions. At the very
least, other states must be persuaded that following a norm is in their national interest. The disclosures,
however, reinforced the view of many states that the United States disproportionately benefits from an
open, global, and secure Internet, and is only committed to these values to the extent that they further
U.S. economic, political, and military objectives. In light of the Snowden disclosures, the United States
is poorly placed to persuade other actors of its good faith or its commitment to shared interests and
values. The extent of the damage to the U.S. reputation was revealed when the United States accused
North Korea of hacking into Sony's servers and announced its intention to retaliate against North Korea
through low-level sanctions. Building on previous indictments of Chinese soldiers for hacking into U.S.
firms, U.S. officials followed an approach of "naming and shaming" cyberattackers while pursuing
sanctions and possible criminal charges. These actions are highly unlikely to result in successful
prosecutions, but potentially serve a normative purpose by signaling to the world that some actions are
unacceptable. Although a few states criticized North Korea, many did not buy U.S. claims that
Pyongyang was responsible. Members of the business and technology communities also expressed
polite skepticism over the evidence supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Advantage 2
Advantage 2 is hegemony
The Snowden leaks have jeopardized the tech sector by ruining credibility and public
confidence tight restrictions on surveillance are critical to send a signal
Vijayan 14 (Jaikumar, writer for Computer World who specializes in privacy topics, formerly worked as
a contributor to the Economic Times, Tech groups press Congress to pass USA Freedom Act,
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2604630/tech-groups-press-congress-to-pass-usa-freedom-
act.html)

Concerns over the U.S. government's data collection activities have caused substantial problems for
U.S. technology companies over the past year. Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden's leaks about PRISM and other NSA
data collection programs have caused U.S. companies to lose customers and business in other
countries. Technology giants like IBM and Cisco have reported blowback from overseas customers as a result
of concerns stoked by Snowden's revelations. Some have predicted that U.S. cloud hosting companies could lose tens of
billions of dollars over the next few years as overseas customers take their business to foreign rivals. Many vendors, including
Google , Microsoft and others have asked the government for permission to disclose more details about
the the kind of customer data they have provided to the government in recent years in response to
requests under the Patriot Act and FISA. The companies have argued that such transparency is vital to regaining the
confidence of international customers. It is against this background that the tech groups are calling for quick passage of the USA Freedom Act. Reforms
contained in the bill "will send a clear signal to the international community and to the American people that government surveillance
programs are narrowly tailored, transparent, and subject to oversight," this week's letter to the senators noted. U.S.
technology companies have experienced losses in overseas markets as a result of the surveillance
programs revelations, the letter noted. Other countries are also mulling proposals that would limit free data flows between countries, the letter cautioned. The measures
in the USA Freedom Act would alleviate some of these concerns and would help restore faith in the U.S.

government and the U.S. technology sector, the letter said. Civil rights groups and the Electronic Freedom Foundation, which support the bill, called it a
good first step in reining in the NSA's domestic data collection practices. The bill addresses many concerns but still leaves some wiggle room for the NSA and other U.S. spy agencies to exploit it
to their advantage, the EFF said in blog post this week. Even so, it offers the best chance for some positive change, according to the EFF. "Congress can do the right thing by pushing forward
with the USA Freedom Act and passing much needed NSA reform," the EFF said.

That destroys US tech competitiveness the plan solves and the squo doesnt
Mindock 15 (Clark Mindock - Reporting Fellow at International Business Times Internally quoting
The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. ITIF is a non-partisan research and educational
institute a think tank whose mission is to formulate and promote public policies to advance
technological innovation and productivity internationally, in Washington, and in the states. NSA
Surveillance Could Cost Billions For US Internet Companies After Edward Snowden Revelations -
International Business Times - June 10 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-surveillance-could-cost-
billions-us-internet-companies-after-edward-snowden-1959737)

Failure to reform National Security Administration spying programs revealed by Edward Snowden could be more
economically taxing than previously thought, says a new study published by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
Tuesday. The study suggests the programs could be affecting the tech nology sector as a whole , not just the

cloud-computing sector , and that the costs could soar much higher than previously expected. Even
modest declines in cloud computing revenues from the revealed surveillance programs, according to a previous report, would cost
between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016. New estimates show that the toll will likely far exceed ITIFs initial $35 billion estimate. The U.S.
governments failure to reform many of the NSAs surveillance programs has damaged the competitiveness
of the U.S. tech sector and cost it a portion of the global market share, a summary of the report said. Revelations by
defense contractor Snowden in June 2013 exposed massive U.S. government surveillance capabilities and showed the NSA collected American phone records

in bulk, and without a warrant. The bulk phone-record revelations, and many others in the same vein, including the

required complacency of American telecom and Internet companies in providing the data, raised
questions about the transparency of American surveillance programs and prompted outrage from privacy
advocates. The study, published this week, argues that unless the American government can vigorously reform how NSA

surveillance is regulated and overseen, U.S. companies will lose contracts and, ultimately, their competitive
edge in a global market as consumers around the world choose cloud computing and technology options
that do not have potential ties to American surveillance programs. The report comes amid a debate in
Congress on what to do with the Patriot Act, the law that provides much of the authority for the surveillance programs. As of June 1,
authority to collect American phone data en masse expired, though questions remain as to whether letting that
authority expire is enough to protect privacy. Supporters of the programs argue that they provide the country with necessary capabilities to fight

terrorism abroad. A further reform made the phone records collection process illegal for the government, and

instead gave that responsibility to the telecom companies.

Thats key to hegemony


Segal 4
(Adam, director of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR), An expert on security issues, technology development, November/December 2004 Issue, Is
America Losing Its Edge, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-11-01/america-
losing-its-edge, BC)

The United States' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and
industries faster than anyone else. For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and
technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and military power.
It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the
Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead. Today, however, this technological edge-so
long taken for granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through
competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential
policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of
their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to
and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising.
Indian companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the
world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the
world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips
and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies
such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many
other types of manufacturing. Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the
globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system.
Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S.
technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The United States will never be able to prevent
rivals from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster
than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United
States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home.

And hegemony is sustainable - Tech competitiveness is key


Drezner 1 - (Daniel, State Structure, Technological Leadership and the Maintenance of Hegemony
Review of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 3-25, JSTOR,

Cambridge University Press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20079588.)

The importance of economic growth to state power is undisputed by international relations scholars.1
The importance of technological innovation to economic growth is similarly undisputed by economists.2
Logically, technological leadership is a lynch pin of great-power status in the world, a fact recognized by
long-cycle theorists.3 However, despite the obvious importance of innovation to power, and despite a
large literature on how the state should be organized to maximize the extraction of societal resources,
there has been very little written in international political economy on the state's role in fostering
technological leadership. The relationship between innovation and the nation-state has been
discussed in international relations, but the debates that touch on the subject mention it only in passing.
In the late seventies, there was a great deal of discussion about state 'strength' vis-?-vis society as a way
of determining foreign economic policies, including industrial policies.4 One of the implicit arguments in
this literature was that strong states would pursue more enlightened economic policies. However, the
strong state/weak state typology has been criticized as vague, and this literature has moved away from
the study of economic issues, focusing more on security policies.5 In this decade, proponents of
globalization argue that because information and capital are mobile, the location of innovation has been
rendered unimportant.6 While this notion has some popular appeal, the globalization thesis lacks
theoretical or empirical support. Theoretically, even in a world of perfect information and perfect capital
mobility, economists have shown that the location of technological innovation matters.7 Empirically, the
claims of globalization proponents have been far-fetched. Capital is not perfectly mobile, and increased
economic exchange does not lead to a seamless transfer of technology from one country to another.8
The location of innovation still matters. Long-cycle theorists have paid the most attention to the link
between techno logical innovation, economic growth, and the rise and fall of hegemons.9 They argue
that the past five hundred years of the global political economy can be explained by the waxing and
waning of hegemonic powers. Countries acquire hegemonic status because they are the first to develop
a cluster of technologies in leading sectors. These innovations generate spillover effects to the rest of
the lead economy, and then to the global economy. Over time, these 'technological hegemons' fail to
maintain the rate of innovations, leading to a period of strife until a new hegemon is found. While this
literature has done an excellent job at describing the link between innovation, economic growth, and
global stability, it cannot explain why techno logical hegemons lose their lead over time. This article
argues that the governance structure of the nation-state is crucial to determining the effectiveness of
national innovation policies, and that a decen tralized state structure is a necessary (but far from
sufficient) condition for a nation state to maintain technological leadership. For countries at the
technological fron tier, a centralized state structure will lead to policies that retard innovation.10 A
centralized state can play a positive role for technological late-comers as a way to accelerate economic
growth.11 However, centralized decision-making at the frontier increases the chances for technological
leaders to decline over time. If a unitary, central actor is responsible for public investments into
innovation, the decisions will be biased towards status quo interest groups. Furthermore, centralized
states face a greater handicap in the natural tendency of governments to stick with policies even as their
utility declines over time. Centralized states are more likely to maintain flawed policies rather than
engage in reform. This problem is endemic to all levels of government, but errors by centralized states
are felt across the entire country and difficult to reverse. Decentralized states are more likely to create
an environment that fosters experimentation and rewards innovation. Errors by one region are not
replicated across the country. It should be stressed at the outset that there are myriad factors
affecting the ability of nations to innovate. Market factors such as industrial organization, the absolute
size of the marketplace, entrepreneurial culture, and factor endowments matter. The role o? fortuna
should not be underestimated. A decentralized state structure is hardly a sufficient condition for
technological leadership. However, it is argued here that in the modern era it is a necessary condition.
Given that the relationship between the two has not been discussed in the international political
economy literature, this is not a minor point.12 If true, the relationship between state structure and
technological leadership has serious ramifications for theory and policy. It suggests that the United
States, a decentralized state, has the capability to maintain its technological and economic primacy for
the foreseeable future. This prediction stands in sharp contrast to the forecasts of American decline
made in the past two decades.13 It also suggests a tension that great powers face in managing the
international system. On the one hand, foreign policymakers need a robust economy in order to
advance their interests. On the other hand, in order to do this, governments must weaken their
autonomous decision-making power at the centre. In terms of policy, the argument presented here
suggests that the predicted rise of Asian economies to economic primacy is far from assured, and that
the role of the state in Asian economic development has a limited practicality. This article is divided
into five sections. The next section develops an explanation for why decentralized government
structures are a necessary condition for main taining a healthy pace of innovation at the technological
frontier. Centralized governments are more vulnerable to political pressures to distort innovation
policies, and centralized structures prevent other institutions from pursuing alternative policies. Section
3 provides a case study of Great Britain's loss of technological hegemony in the chemicals sector to
Germany in the late nineteenth century. The British state erred in not supplying enough public goods to
foster innovation; its centralized structure compounded the error. Section 4 sketches the recent rivalry
in information technologies between Japan and the United States. Japan's errors in its technology policy
are quite different from those of the United Kingdom in the last century, but the causes and effects of
the errant policies are quite similar, due to the likeness in state structures. The final section summarizes
and concludes.

ExtinctionPrimacy solves global escalation


Metz, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Director, 13
[Steven, 10/22/13, World Politics Review, A Receding Presence: The Military Implications of American
Retrenchment, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13312/a-receding-presence-the-military-
implications-of-american-retrenchment

So much for the regions of modest concern. The Middle East/North Africa region, by contrast, is a part
of the world where American retrenchment or narrowing U.S. military capabilities could have extensive
adverse effects. While the region has a number of nations with significant military capability, it does not
have a functioning method for preserving order without outside involvement. As U.S. power recedes, it
could turn out that American involvement was in fact a deterrent against Iran taking a more
adventurous regional posture, for instance. With the United States gone, Tehran could become more
aggressive, propelling the Middle East toward division into hostile Shiite and Sunni blocs and
encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. With fewer ties between regional armed forces and the
United States, there also could be a new round of military coups. States of the region could increase
pressure on Israel, possibly leading to pre-emptive military strikes by the Israelis, with a risk of another
major war. One of the al-Qaida affiliates might seize control of a state or exercise outright control of at
least part of a collapsed state. Or China might see American withdrawal as an opportunity to play a
greater role in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The United States has a number of security
objectives in the Middle East and North Africa: protecting world access to the region's petroleum,
limiting humanitarian disasters, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, limiting
the operating space for al-Qaida and its affiliates, sustaining America's commitment to long-standing
partners and assuring Israel's security. Arguments that the U.S. can disengage from the region and
recoup savings in defense expenditures assume that petroleum exports would continue even in the
event of domination of the region by a hostile power like Iran or a competitor like China, state collapse
or even the seizure of power by extremists. Whoever exercises power in the region would need to sell
oil. And the United States is moving toward petroleum self-sufficiency or, at least, away from
dependence on Middle Eastern oil. But even if the United States could get along with diminished
petroleum exports from the Middle East, many other nations couldn't. The economic damage would
cascade, inevitably affecting the United States. Clearly disengagement from the Middle East and North
Africa would entail significant risks for the United States. It would be a roll of the strategic dice. South
and Central Asia are a bit different, since large-scale U.S. involvement there is a relatively recent
phenomenon. This means that the regional security architecture there is less dependent on the United
States than that of some other regions. South and Central Asia also includes two vibrant, competitive
and nuclear-armed powersIndia and Chinaas well as one of the world's most fragile nuclear states,
Pakistan. Writers like Robert Kaplan argue that South Asia's importance will continue to grow, its future
shaped by the competition between China and India. This makes America's security partnership with
India crucial. The key issue is whether India can continue to modernize its military to balance China
while addressing its immense domestic problems with infrastructure, education, income inequality and
ethnic and religious tensions. If it cannot, the United States might have to decide between ceding
domination of the region to China or spending what it takes to sustain an American military presence in
the region. Central Asia is different. After a decade of U.S. military operations, the region remains a
cauldron of extremism and terrorism. America's future role there is in doubt, as it looks like the United
States will not be able to sustain a working security partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the
future. At some point one or both of these states could collapse, with extremist movements gaining
control. There is little chance of another large-scale U.S. military intervention to forestall state collapse,
but Washington might feel compelled to act to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons if Islamabad loses
control of them. The key decision for Washington might someday be whether to tolerate extremist-
dominated areas or states as long as they do not enable transnational terrorism. Could the United States
allow a Taliban state in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, if it did not provide training areas
and other support to al-Qaida? Most likely, the U.S. approach would be to launch raids and long-
distance attacks on discernible al-Qaida targets and hope that such a method best balanced costs and
risks. The Asia-Pacific region will remain the most important one to the United States even in a time of
receding American power. The United States retains deep economic interests in and massive trade with
Asia, and has been a central player in the region's security system for more than a century. While
instability or conflict there is less likely than in the Middle East and North Africa, if it happened it would
be much more dangerous because of the economic and military power of the states likely to be
involved. U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been described as a hub-and-spokes strategy "with the
United States as the hub, bilateral alliances as the spokes and multilateral institutions largely at the
margins." In particular, the bilateral "spokes" are U.S. security ties with key allies Australia, Japan and
South Korea and, in a way, Taiwan. The United States also has many other beneficial security
relationships in the region, including with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. America's
major security objectives in the Asia-Pacific in recent years have been to discourage Chinese provocation
or destabilization as China rises in political, economic and military power, and to prevent the world's
most bizarre and unpredictable nuclear powerNorth Koreafrom unleashing Armageddon through
some sort of miscalculation. Because the U.S. plays a more central role in the Asia-Pacific security
framework than in any other regional security arrangement, this is the region where disengagement or a
recession of American power would have the most far-reaching effect. Without an American
counterweight, China might become increasingly aggressive and provocative. This could lead the other
leading powers of the region close to Chinaparticularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwanto abandon
their historical antagonism toward one another and move toward some sort of de facto or even formal
alliance. If China pushed them too hard, all three have the technological capability to develop and
deploy nuclear weapons quickly. The middle powers of the region, particularly those embroiled in
disputes with China over the resources of the South China Sea, would have to decide between acceding
to Beijing's demands or aligning themselves with the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan bloc.

Vitality of the tech industry alone solves great power war


Taylor 4 (Mark, Professor of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Politics of
Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions, 4-1,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)

Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost
every aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nations technological capability has a significant
effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national
technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence
have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also
determine a nations trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will
base their production facilities. 3 Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus
capital,a nations technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power
over them. 4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications
for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that
nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in
their global stature and influence , such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany
during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. 5 Conversely, great powers which fail to

maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on
international scene. 6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that
shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on i nternational r elations,
and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to
international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable
in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For
example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At the very
least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military
doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination,
and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics . 8 Jervis tells us that
the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9 Walt
agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a states aggregate power, and thereby affect both
alliance formation and the international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with
technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational
Technology also lowers information & transactions costs
attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11
and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. 12 And in
fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohanes interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman
Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the
et als globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the third debate,
issue, from Katzensteins cultural norms which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; 15 to
Wendts stripped down technological determinism in which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world
state. 16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes
peoples identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting
international politics. 17 Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations
and the entire course of history, though they describe mankinds major fault lines as running between economic classes
rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation,
communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place

It escalates
Paone 9 (Chuck, 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force, 8-10-09, Technology
convergence could prevent war, futurist says, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)

The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" so


formidable that it could avert war , according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton , CEO and chairman of the Institute
for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently

listed among the world's leading speakers and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence,
Survelliance and Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other

government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. " The
superiority of convergent technologies will prevent war," Doctor Canton said, claiming their power would
present an overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries . While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and better than
other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said, referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a
nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor Canton said he believes

rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the futility of
nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system." "The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet
favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations, including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from

Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the one in which he's
engaging in disruptive and deadly acts. As a futurist,

personally most interested -- is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of strategic change on

the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. He focuses on six specific technology areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro,
quantum and robotics;" those he expects to converge in so powerful a way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor
Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the

warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be
helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user with
advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human
being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in healthcare?
more sophisticated artificial intelligence applications will
What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that

transform business, warfare and life in general. Many of these are already embedded in systems or products, he says, even if people don't know it.
Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially curtail the
National Security Agencys use of domestic backdoor surveillance encryption
programs.
Solvency
Closing backdoors strengthens digital securitythat doesnt trade off with law
enforcement priorities
Bankston 15
(Kevin Bankston is the Director of New Americas Open Technology Institute and Co-Director of New
Americas Cybersecurity Initiative, 7-7-15, Its Time to End the Debate on Encryption Backdoors,
http://justsecurity.org/24483/end-debate-encryption-backdoors/, BC)

Tech companies, privacy advocates, security experts, policy experts, all five members of President
Obamas handpicked Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, UN human rights
experts, and a majority of the House of Representatives all agree: Government-mandated backdoors
are a bad idea . There are countless reasons why this is true, including: They would unavoidably weaken the
security of our digital data, devices, and communications even as we are in the midst of a cybersecurity
crisis; they would cost the US tech industry billions as foreign customers including many of the criminals Comey
hopes to catch turn to more secure alternatives; and they would encourage oppressive regimes that abuse human
rights to demand backdoors of their own. Most of these arguments are not new or surprising. Indeed, it was for many of
the same reasons that the US government ultimately rejected the idea of encryption backdoors in the 90s, during
what are now called the Crypto Wars. We as a nation already had the debate that Comey is demanding we had it 20
years ago! and the arguments against backdoors have only become stronger and more numerous with
time. Most notably, the 21st century has turned out to be a Golden Age for Surveillance for the government.
Even with the proliferation of encryption, law enforcement has access to much more information than
ever before: access to cellphone location information about where we are and where weve been,
metadata about who we communicate with and when, and vast databases of emails and pictures and
more in the cloud. So, the purported law enforcement need is even less compelling than it was in the
90s . Meanwhile, the security implications of trying to mandate backdoors throughout the vast ecosystem of digital communications services
have only gotten more dire in the intervening years, as laid out in an exhaustive new report issued just this morning by over a dozen heavy-
hitting security experts. Yesterday, Comey conceded that after a meaningful debate, it may be that we as a people decide that the benefits of
widespread encryption outweigh the costs and that theres no sensible, technically feasible way to guarantee government access to encrypted
data. But the fact is that we had that debate 20 years ago, and weve been having it again for nearly a year. We are not talking past each other;
a wide range of advocates, industry stakeholders, policymakers, and experts has been speaking directly to Comeys arguments since last fall.
Hopefully he will soon start listening, rather than dooming us to repeat the mistakes of the past and dragging us into another round of Crypto
Wars. We have already had the debate that Comey says he wants. All thats left is for him to admit that
hes lost.