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Goldman innovation diffusion military discount

Checks Muslim advance into western Mediterranean, ends their domination of central and eastern Mediterranean, and signals end of golden age of
Ottoman power. With the artillery revolution, the English lost nearly all their European holdings. The advantage of the new artillery on siege warfare
was immediate. Much like the Mongol innovation, mobile war tended to centralize military influence. Blackwell, , p. Defensively disadvantaged
states are likely to devote more attention to efforts to improve their military technology and organization. Blitzkrieg, for example, relied on dive
bombers, high-velocity anti-tank guns, and tanks. We conclude with some preliminary observations about the relevance of our findings for
understanding the consequences that are likely to follow from the United States pursuing the information revolution in military affairs. German
victories at Lorraine and Mons tend to erroneously reinforce this perspective. Mongol methods diffused through Asia. Neo-realists argue that,
"States, like firms, emulate successful innovations of others out of fear of the disadvantages that arise from being less competitively organized and
equipped. By , technology had again provided the tools for a new type of war. Among the great powers, this had disastrous results. In sum, neo-
realism predicts that military best practices will diffuse quickly and uniformly among states. The theory considers industrialization to be history's
chief revolutionary technology because it dramatically increases the level of productivity that could be extracted from any given population. Macro-
social transformations, such as the merging of military enterprise into the market system, permitted nations who adopted market controls to operate
more effectively as great powers because it stabilized civil-military relations and provided a stable tax base to support larger more formidable
armed forces. Outside of Europe, most South America colonies adopted revolutionary nationalism and shrugged off imperial ties while Asian
colonies generally did not and remained bound to Europe. A necessary component, however, was almost certainly a nationalistic population and an
advanced industrial base. All along the Hapsburg and Valois frontiers -- Netherlands, Danube Valley, Germany and Northern Italy -- the influence
of smaller political units rose as they were able to assert their autonomy against vastly larger armies. Suffering from a hundred years of humiliation
by the English, constant internal rebellion and the after effects of Joan of Arc, Charles VII allowed himself to be persuaded to create first a standing
army and then a professional artillery organization. Artillery retained its importance for the attack and defense of fortifications, and in naval warfare,
while improvement in infantry small arms and tactics, particularly by the Spanish, became the decisive factor on the battlefield. Lacking the
resources available to England to purchase expensive chivalry, the smaller nations developed highly effective infantry tactics -- the Welsh
emphasizing the longbow, the Scottish using the pike. While centralized state governments and disciplined professional armies are still the rule, the
emergence of the levee en masse in the War of the Second Coalition allowed innovators to overcome non-innovators' defenses. In , the rest of
Europe had not yet learned the lesson of Austro-Prussia and Prussia was able to defeat France using the same methods. For power transitions
theory, the consequences of diffusion are a function of the speed of power transitions. On land, the logistical requirements of supplying mechanized
forces again required fantastic integration of land, sea and air forces. It is not clear, however, how nationalist or Napoleonic any of the states or
militaries actually were at the time of each war. War is a matter of Darwinian dominance or survival for states, and of life or death for individuals.
The Russians, in particular, learned much from Mongol cavalry doctrine and tactics, and also adopted Mongol "ferocity. While competition among
European great powers stimulated more rapid spread of innovations within Western Europe than between Europe and the rest of the world, even
within Europe diffusion has been far from the even process that neo-realism suggests it is. Indeed, the Franco-Prussian war can be read as a
contest between the French doctrine of set defense based on rifle tactics, and the Prussian doctrine of strategic offense and tactical defense which
integrated railroad and rifle. For feudal states, this meant changing the social basis of political power and was one of the major factors in the rise of
absolutism. Later, in the Pacific -- particularly at the Battle of Midway -- the United States demonstrated that naval power would hence forth
depend on air superiority. In Europe, England had almost certainly been the most powerful state, but artillery permitted the reemergence of France
as the region's great power and Castile to conquer the Iberian peninsula. In the preindustrial age, changes in the distribution of capabilities between
and among nations took a long time. At Rouen and Cherbourg and for instance, Henry V spent five and six months respectively in investment. Both
the professionalization of the late-Middle Ages and the nationalism of the nineteenth century had a profound impact on the ability of states to
generate and utilize human and material resources effectively. Free Press, , pp. First, the Mongol way of war required an unusual commitment to
training -- always beginning in early childhood and providing a nearly exclusive focus during the warrior's life. English longbow infantry tactics VI.
None of Napoleon's achievements was as significant for war as showing how to mobilize, train and supply such troops. The macro-social
foundations of success in the information age are not limited to industrialization and population. Infantry tactics tended to result in a rise in influence
among smaller innovators at the expense the great powers of Europe.

Systemic effects of military innovation and diffusion


The tactics associated with them, however, did not. Tanks were initially used in support of the infantry in World War I and aircraft were initially
confined to spotting and scouting roles in support of battleship fleets, each innovative technology being fit into established ways of war-fighting.
Mounted archer and shock troops combined with siege mechanics, extremely effective military doctrine, and superior command, control,
communication, and intelligence. On the contrary, technologies are related to the culture as a whole and the origin, diffusion, and influence of a
particular invention cannot be understood except in terms of the total culture which originated or utilizes it. Adoption of innovations depends on the
compatibility between the technology and the state's society, culture, and military organization. In the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, where galleys
played little role, the new broadside ships and tactics replaced slower roundship technology and boarding tactics. In , the rest of Europe had not
yet learned the lesson of Austro-Prussia and Prussia was able to defeat France using the same methods. Dupuy and Dupuy, p. This varies across
innovations. The siege-heavy character of medieval warfare meant that infantry were always present in large proportions. It would be difficult,
however, to say whether it increased or decreased strategic mobility. In , the British founded the Bank of England, a centralized source of credit
for financing war that allowed them to underwrite expansive naval efforts which the French, who lacked a comparable credit mechanism, were
never able to match. Conclusions The preceding analysis provides a first cut at understanding patterns of military diffusion and their international
effects. But historically, the organizational and macro-social dimensions have been more significant for explaining military performance. How does
the offense-defense balance affect the rate of military diffusion? Broadside technology and ship-of-the-line tactics are unique in that they affected
different regions in different ways. We are concerned, however, with adoption, rather than innovation, in order to understand the process and
consequences of diffusion. This outcome stemmed largely from the increased capability of steamships and the need for coaling depots. Advocates
of the RMA seem to believe that whatever the current situation, if the United States could somehow achieve this "new way of war," then current
apparent U. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to support one claim or the other since during the period of dominance of Napoleonic
methods -- approximately -- no wars were fought between states that had both adopted the methods. In Europe, England had almost certainly
been the most powerful state, but artillery permitted the reemergence of France as the region's great power and Castile to conquer the Iberian
peninsula. Quester makes the case that the mobility of offensive technology effectively imitates the geopolitical effects of open plains. In the
Mediterranean, galleons were significantly slower and more cumbersome than galleys. Moreover, the theory posits few obstacles to adoption of
innovations. As had been the case with a number of other innovations, these tools were first put to use by peripheral states, first by both the Union
and Confederacy in the American Civil War and later, to some extent, by Japan in the Russo-Japanese war. A necessary component, however,
was almost certainly a nationalistic population and an advanced industrial base. Professionalization of officers corps D. Leveraged by
improvements in military administration and key role of absolutist state. The Tofflers point out that the way a society makes war reflects how it
makes wealth. It does not address other macro-social transformations that have had significant military implications. One of the main problems with
the immense armies of the period was mobilization and supply. Mongol practices were used to great effect in the thirteenth century to subject to
military domination the largest area ever before or since, yet they failed to diffuse and impact contemporary warfare in Europe. Ernest Dupuy and
Trevor N.

Military/First Responder Discount Innovation Factory


By the time of the Thirty Years War, the worst of the combat had moved east into the regions of Europe where goldman innovation diffusion
military discount fortresses had not yet taken hold. After the industrial revolution, in fact, the correlation between industrial and military power
was very high. Seton-Watson, Briton in Europe: France, which pioneered and came to depend heavily on gunpowder artillery, was also slow to
adopt gunpowder small arms. Later, when technology and tactics had diffused more symmetrically, both sides were able diffueion bypass set
defenses to carry out both goldman innovation diffusion military discount and air assaults against the other. The assumptions goldman
innovation diffusion military discount predictions of neo-realism, power transitions theory, offense-defense theory and organization theory for
the scope and rate of diffusion, and its international consequences, are summarized in Table 1 below. For power transitions theory, the
consequences of diffusion are a function of the speed of power transitions. Not surprisingly, the only two great powers in Innvation to significantly
increase their international influence -- Spain and England militaryy were sea powers that obtained much of their wealth outside of Europe. After
the Congress, the number of goldman innovation diffusion military discount German principalities, for instance, declined from over three
hundred to less than forty. France's revolutionary use of artillery in the fifteenth century incorporated the English infantry tactics that preceded it,
and acquisition of nuclear mlitary did not result in the United States dispensing with the mobile armor tactics that Germany pioneered between the
wars. At the other extreme, organization diffusion theory hereafter referred to as organization theory predicts uneven diffusion and differential state
response. Innovatio some cases, like the revolution in drill, small states could easily adopt the innovations first but were soon overtaken goldman
innovation diffusion military discount wealthy nations that could more easily afford to develop the modern infrastructure necessary for
supporting a large army. Rational adaptation results from the values and needs of modern society. None of Napoleon's achievements was as
significant for war as showing how to mobilize, train and supply such troops. According to the research on the diffusion of innovations militart
organization theorists, technical efficiency is only one variable that influences rates of adoption and, hence, the scope and speed of diffusion. One of
the main problems with the immense armies of the period was mobilization and supply. Adopting a new military system based on common infantry
was far cheaper than purchasing expensive chivalry for Switzerland. Checks Muslim advance into western Mediterranean, ends their domination of
central and eastern Mediterranean, and signals divfusion of golden age of Ottoman power. See Figure 4 We note the date militayr the battle,
conquest, or event in which the innovation demonstrates its superiority decisively in a contest with a first class military power. The theory considers
the connection between politico-economic power and military strength to be so close that one could legitimately infer one from the other. In the
information era those idscount now appear to be in the free access to information. Chief among these were the internal combustion engine, radio
and aircraft. By identifying forces disccount addition to competition that drive diffusion, organization theory actually predicts the scope of diffusion
will be far broader, that even nations remote from the core of the innovation will have an incentive to adopt it once normative pressures set in.
Smaller states have a greater incentive to adopt defensive technologies while larger states have a greater incentive to adopt offensive technologies.
As Kaufman militwry Glaser emphasize, however, offense-defense innovafion assumes optimal state behavior, or high levels of military skill by all
states. When combined with ship-of-the-line tactics and ship killing guns, they had another effect. Culture and Environment Cambridge, MA: The
new ships allowed innovators to militarj cannon on a global basis and to control the world's oceans which contributed to their ability to project their
land forces where and when they pleased. On land, the logistical requirements of supplying mechanized forces goldman innovation diffusion
military discount required fantastic integration of land, sea and air forces. University Press of Kansas,goldman innovation diffusion military
discount. Each of the galleass used in the battle held around thirty guns broadside. Other principalities, particularly smaller states, appeared to
have less trouble implementing reforms and by the mid-fifteenth century, in the most active theaters, paid professional armies had displaced feudal
levies as far east as Hungary. Early in the sixteenth century, the sea powers of the Atlantic began to experiment with mounting cannon on the
broadsides of ocean going vessels. While the broader systemic consequences of offensive dominance are the subject of dispute, most analysts
agree that the system's more powerful states benefit when the offense has discoknt advantage and that the system's weaker states benefit when the
defense is ascendant. The artillery revolution, for example, permitted Europe's largest and wealthiest state, France, to assault the castle walls of its
smaller opponents voldman a fraction of the cost it would have taken to execute a prolonged siege. Emphasizing cultural constraints, Quincy
Wright argues that, "technologies are not superficial devices from which all cultures can benefit and innovatiln may originate anywhere and diffuse
easily and rapidly. The Spanish were quick to use the broadside technology, but goldman innovation diffusion military discount to emulate
English ship of the line tactics, and consequently suffered a major loss of influence in miliitary Atlantic to the English. See also Clifford J. Suffering
from a hundred years of humiliation by the English, constant internal rebellion and the after effects of Joan of Arc, Charles VII allowed himself to
be persuaded to create first a standing army and then a professional artillery organization. We identify a dramatic rise in military effectiveness as
being established when a set of inventions is combined in a unique and innovative way and is proven in battle against a goldman innovation
diffusion military discount class power. Unlike diffuxion, power transitions theory does militaary assume rapid and militart diffusion, diffuion it
does golfman increasingly rapid diffusion today. The most powerful state at the time the innovation came into use, Spain, was the last major
European power to adopt the techniques but the sound defeat of Spanish tercios by the French at Rocroi dislodged Spanish attachment to their
long-victorious tradition. Nationalization of armed forces vs privatization H. We conclude with some preliminary observations about the relevance
of our findings for understanding the consequences that are likely to follow from the United States pursuing the information revolution in military
affairs. In sum, diffusion is an uneven and irregular process. Later, they suffered a similar decline in fortunes in the Mediterranean to the Spanish.
English stake their claim to mastery of the seas. The Goldman innovation diffusion military discount of the West Cambridge: Leveraged by
improvements in military administration and key role of absolutist state. At minimum, implementation requires the ability to develop and build new
weapons systems and frequently requires fundamental changes in the current social order.