Protcction ol Pcrsonncl in Pcacc Òpcrations

International Humanitarian Iaw Series
voiu:v .6
Editors-in-Chief
Prolcssor Christophcr Grccnwood
Prolcssor Timothy L.H. McCormack
Editorial Advisory Board
Prolcssor Gcorgcs AbiSaab
H.¡. ]udgc Gcorgc H. Aldrich
Madamc ]usticc Louisc Arbour
Prolcssor Òvc 8ring
Prolcssor Antonio Casscsc
Prolcssor ]ohn Ðugard
Prolcssor Ðr. Horst Fischcr
Ðr. HansPctcr Gasscr
Prolcssor Lcslic C. Grccn
H.¡. ]udgc Gcza Hcrczcgh
Prolcssor Frits Kalshovcn
Prolcssor Ruth Lapidoth
Prolcssor Gabricllc Kirk McÐonald
H.¡. ]udgc Tcodor Mcron
Captain ]. Ashlcy Roach
Prolcssor Michacl Schmitt
Prolcssor ]iri Toman
Tc !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law Scrics is a scrics ol monographs and cditcd
volumcs which aims to promotc scholarly analysis and discussion ol both thc thcory
and practicc ol thc intcrnational lcgal rcgulation ol armcd conflict.
Tc scrics cxplorcs substantivc issucs ol !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law includ
ing,
– protcction lor victims ol armcd conflict and rcgulation ol thc mcans and mcth
ods ol warlarc
– qucstions ol application ol thc various lcgal rcgimcs lor thc conduct ol armcd
conflict
– issucs rclating to thc implcmcntation ol !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law obli
gations
– national and intcrnational approachcs to thc cnlorccmcnt ol thc law and
– thc intcractions bctwccn !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law and othcr rclatcd
arcas ol intcrnational law such as Human Rights, Rclugcc Law, Arms Control
and Ðisarmamcnt Law, and !ntcrnational Criminal Law.
Te titles in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
Protcction ol Pcrsonncl in
Pcacc Òpcrations:
Tc Rolc ol thc ‘Salcty Convcntion’ against thc
8ackground ol Gcncral !ntcrnational Law
by
Òla ¡ngdahl
L¡!СN • 8ÒSTÒN
2007
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Table of Contents
Ioreword ix
Acknowledgements xiii
Abbreviations xv
Chapter + Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Iegal
Invironment +
+.+ Mcthod and Matcrial ¡
+.: Ðclimitations and Tcrminology o
+.: Proccdural Mcchanisms :+
+.:.+ Ðiplomatic Protcction ::
+.:.: Functional Protcction :6
Chapter : !urisdiction and Immunity :o
:.+ Principlcs ol ]urisdiction :o
:.: Multilatcral Trcatics Providing ]urisdiction ±o
:.: Ad Hoc Tribunals and Criminal Courts ±¡
:.± Multilatcral Trcatics on !mmunity ¡o
:.¡ StatusolForccs Agrccmcnts ¡+
:.6 Conclusions ¡¡
Chapter ¡ General Protection ¡;
:.+ !ntcrnational Minimum Standard ¡8
:.+.+ Tc Standard in Practicc 6±
:.+.: Conclusions ·±
:.: Human Rights Law ·¡
:.:.+ Scopc ol Application ··
:.:.: Ðutics ol thc Host Nation 88
:.:.: Conclusions o+
:.: !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law o:
:.:.+ Scopc ol Application o¡
:.:.: Standards ol Protcction +o:
:.:.: Conclusions ++·
vi Table of Contents
Chapter ± Special Protection ++o
±.+ Ðiplomatic Privilcgcs and !mmunitics +:o
±.+.+ 8ackground +:+
±.+.: Ðiplomatic Agcnts +:±
±.+.: Conclusions +:o
±.: !ntcrnational Privilcgcs and !mmunitics Providcd by
Multilatcral Trcatics +:o
±.:.+ Scopc ol Application +:¡
±.:.: Customary Law +±·
±.:.: Conclusions +±o
±.: !ntcrnational Privilcgcs and !mmunitics Providcd by
SÒFAs +¡o
±.:.+ Scopc ol Application +6o
±.:.: Status ol thc Òpcration and Pcrsonncl +68
±.:.: Powcrs ol Arrcst and ]urisdiction +··
±.:.± SÒFA Norms as Customary !ntcrnational Law +o:
±.:.¡ Conclusions :o+
Chapter ¡ Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel :o¡
¡.+ !ntroduction :o¡
¡.: Proccss Lcading to thc Adoption ol thc Salcty
Convcntion :o¡
¡.: Analysis ol thc Salcty Convcntion :+:
¡.:.+ Scopc ol Application :+±
¡.:.+.+ “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” :+¡
¡.:.+.: “Associatcd pcrsonncl” :+8
¡.:.+.: “Unitcd Nations opcration” ::¡
¡.:.+.± Rclationship to intcrnational
humanitarian law :::
¡.:.+.¡ Proposcd mcasurcs to cxpand thc
scopc ol thc Convcntion and thc ncw
Òptional Protocol :±+
¡.:.+.6 Asscssmcnt :¡6
¡.:.: Provisions on thc Lcgal Status ol Pcrsonncl :6+
¡.:.: Ðuty to Providc Protcction :6o
¡.:.:.+ Ðuty to rclcasc or rcturn pcrsonncl
capturcd or dctaincd :·+
¡.:.:.: Articlc 8 and SÒFAs :·±
¡.:.± !ndividual Criminal Rcsponsibility :8+
¡.:.¡ Misccllancous :88
¡.± Conclusions :o:
vii Table of Contents
Chapter 6 An Imerging Iegal Regime against Impunity :o¡
6.+ Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl :o¡
6.: Ðralt Codc ol Crimcs against Pcacc and Sccurity ol
Mankind :o6
6.: !ntcrnational Criminal Court :oo
6.± !ndictmcnts undcr thc Ad Hoc Tribunals and thc
Spccialiscd Court lor Sicrra Lconc :o:
6.¡ Conclusions :o¡
Chapter ; Summary and Suggestions for the Iuture ¡oo
·.+ Summary :oo
·.+.+ Tc Salcty Convcntion in !ntcrnational Law :oo
·.+.: Tc Systcm ol Protcction :+:
·.: Suggcstions lor thc Futurc :+8
·.:.+ A 8roadcncd Scopc ol Application ol thc
Salcty Convcntion :+o
·.:.: Conlormity ol SÒFA norms :+o
·.:.: Rcsponsibility and Accountability ::o
·.:.± Combating !mpunity ¡ffcctivcly ::+
·.:.¡ Tc Salcty Convcntion and !ntcrnational
Humanitarian Law :::
Treaties and Agreements ¡:¡
Table of Cases ¡:;
Official Ðocuments ¡¡+
Miscellaneous ¡±:
Bibliography ¡±¡
Index ¡¡¡
Ioreword
Òvcr thc coursc ol timc, pcacc opcrations havc bccomc onc ol thc main instru
mcnts lor achicving thc goals sct out in thc Unitcd Nations Chartcr. Ðcspitc
thc lact that such cntcrpriscs wcrc not in thc minds ol thosc who draltcd thc
Chartcr, pcacc opcrations havc ncvcrthclcss cvolvcd into onc ol thc most rcmark
ablc achicvcmcnts ol thc UN.
Tc conccpt was crcatcd in .o·6 by thc thcn UN SccrctaryGcncral Ðag
Hammarskjold and thc Canadian Ministcr ol Forcign Affairs Lcstcr 8. Pcarson
in rcsponsc to thc Sucz crisis. Tcrcaltcr, thc conccpt has bccn dcvclopcd and
adaptcd to addrcss contcmporary conflicts. Currcnt opcrations arc no longcr lim
itcd to obscrvation, monitoring and rcporting. Tc ambitious naturc ol prcscnt
day mandatcs is cvidcnccd by thc incrcasing significancc ol pcacc opcrations.
Tc lact that most conflicts today arc intrastatc has rcsultcd in a morc vola
tilc cnvironmcnt lor pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations. !n thc cnd, thc suc
ccsscs ol thcsc opcrations dcpcnd upon thc willingncss ol mcn and womcn to
cngagc in such opcrations in thc various arcnas ol unrcst and conflict that occur
rcgularly around thc globc. !n so doing, thcy cxposc thcmsclvcs to grcat risks. !n
somc instanccs thcy cvcn risk thcir livcs.
Ultimatcly, thc adcquatc protcction ol such pcrsonncl is crucial to thc suc
ccss ol pcacc opcrations. !n cffcct, attacks upon this pcrsonncl constitutc crimcs
committcd against thc intcrnational community.
! am writing this lorcword, against thc background ol my cxpcricncc as
UndcrSccrctaryGcncral lor Lcgal Affairs and Lcgal Counscl ol thc Unitcd
Nations lrom March .oo¡ to March acc¡. Tc salcty and sccurity ol pcrsonncl
involvcd in pcacc opcrations lormcd part ol thc rcgular dutics ol us who scrvcd
in thc Sccrctariat. A dctcriorating rcspcct lor thc bluc hclmcts and thc UN flag
bccamc onc ol thc most poignant issucs lor thc SccrctaryGcncral.
Tc invariably volatilc situation laccd by pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations has
bccn addrcsscd in various documcnts. Tc findings ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, in
his Agenda for Peace, wcrc that thc salcty and sccurity ol such pcrsonncl must bc
strcngthcncd.
Tc .oo¡ Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl is lurthcr cvidcncc ol thc continucd work rcquircd to cnhancc thcir
protcction. Unlortunatcly, thc acc· Òptional Protocol to that convcntion clcarly
x Hans Corell
illustratcs that this issuc continucs to bc a topic dcmanding significant attcn
tion.
Tc nccd to cradicatc what onc may dcscribc as an cmcrging ‘culturc ol
impunity’ in rclation to violcnt onslaughts upon pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcr
ations is a major challcngc. Tc succcss ol all luturc pcacc opcrations dcpcnds on
how wcll this pcrsonncl can bc protcctcd. Acts ol aggrcssion and violcncc against
UN pcrsonncl must simply ncvcr bc tolcratcd.
Tc nccd to confirm thc indcpcndcncc ol thc Unitcd Nations and uphold
thc immunity ol thc organisation and its pcrsonncl continucs to havc high prior
ity. ¡qually, it is ncccssary lor thc SccrctaryGcncral to bc prcparcd to waivc thc
immunity ol pcrsonncl in cascs whcrc, to do othcrwisc, would impcdc thc coursc
ol justicc.
Tc rcccntly rcportcd cascs ol scxual cxploitation by UN pcacckccpcrs arc
particularly troublcsomc, sincc rcspcct lor thc protcctcd status ol this pcrsonncl is
gravcly compromiscd by such criminal acts. Tc rcsponsibilitics ol UN pcrsonncl
and rcspcct lor thcir protcctcd status arc mutual.
!t is a lact that ccrtain armcd groups, criminal gangs and suchlikc arc wan
tonly sct on attacking pcacc opcrations pcrsonncl lor thc sakc ol it, irrcspcctivc
ol thc conduct ol such staff. Tough pcrsonncl sccurity might involvc situations
whcrc a widc varicty ol practical mcasurcs havc bccn takcn, an cffcctivc systcm ol
lcgal protcction is ncvcrthclcss rcquircd.
!n thc final analysis, individual host statcs in coopcration with othcr statcs
must cngagc this ‘culturc ol impunity’. Vhcrc thc cvidcncc cxists, thcy must
arrcst, chargc and put on trial thosc suspcctcd ol committing crimcs against UN
pcrsonncl. Sadly, it rcmains a lact that thcrc arc lcw cascs ol anyonc bcing pros
ccutcd lor attacks madc against pcrsonncl involvcd in pcacc opcrations.
Vc must rcalisc that il wc arc to succccd in “saving luturc gcncrations lrom
thc scourgc ol war” wc arc dcpcndcnt upon mcn and womcn prcparcd to partici
patc in pcacc opcrations. Accordingly, thc intcrnational community as a wholc
has an obligation to afford thcm thc bcst protcction possiblc. !n this way, thc suc
ccss ol any pcacc opcration will bc cnhanccd, and so too will thc noblc objcctivcs
ol thc UN Chartcr.
!n this work, Ðr Òla ¡ngdahl providcs an indcpth account ol thc protcc
tion affordcd undcr intcrnational law lor pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations,
and ol thc difficultics involvcd in arriving at cffcctivc univcrsal protcction.
Ðr ¡ngdahl prcscnts a systcm dividcd into a gcncral and spccial protcction
and an cmcrging lcgal rcgimc against impunity lor crimcs committcd against
pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl plays a promincnt rolc in this work, as it is thc only
multilatcral instrumcnt to dcal cxclusivcly with thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in
pcacc opcrations. Hc finds ccrtain lacunas in thc prcscnt systcm, but thc main
dcficicncics arc to bc lound in rclation to a lack ol rcspcct lor cxisting rulcs lor
thc protcction ol such pcrsonncl.
xi Foreword
Ðr ¡ngdahl’s work is a most valuablc contribution to thc study ol this
important topic and should providc an instructivc introduction to thosc who
would likc to dccpcn thcir undcrstanding ol thc subjcct.
Hans Corcll
Ambassador
Formcr UndcrSccrctaryGcncral lor
Lcgal Affairs and thc Lcgal Counscl
ol thc Unitcd Nations
Acknowledgements
Vithout thc grcat hclp and support ol collcagucs, lricnds and lamily, this work
would ncvcr havc bccn complctcd.
! cxtcnd my dccpcst gratitudc to my supcrvisor, Òvc 8ring, Prolcssor at
Stockholm Univcrsity and at thc Swcdish National Ðclcncc Collcgc. !t was
through him that ! first bccamc intcrcstcd in intcrnational law, and whcn !
cmbarkcd upon this thcsis ! bcncfitcd throughout lrom his guidancc and cncour
agcmcnt. ! am also much indcbtcd to Prolcssor Said Mahmoudi ol Stockholm
Univcrsity lor rcading and appraising thc manuscript. His commcnts and suggcs
tions havc bccn incstimablc. Ambassador Hans Corcll’s invaluablc contribution
as a lormal opponcnt to this thcsis whcn it was publicly dclcndcd, addcd much
to thc clarity and quality ol this work.
My thanks go out to Gustal Lind who provcd to bc an invaluablc lricnd
and companion throughout thc cntirc work. And to Ðr. Magnus Sandbu, lcgal
adviscr at thc Swcdish Armcd Forccs, who cxprcsscd a sinccrc intcrcst in my
rcscarch and was always availablc lor intcrcsting and stimulating discussions,
my thanks also. Hc “scnt” mc to work as a Lcgal Adviscr in thc SFÒR opcra
tion in 8osniaHcrzcgovina. Tc cxpcricncc gaincd in that position was ol grcat
hclp in thc prcparation and progrcss ol this work. ! impart my spccial thanks to
8rigadicrGcncral Håkan ¡spmark, a commanding officcr wcll tuncd to thc dil
ficult rolc ol intcrnational law in rclation to pcacc opcrations.
Ðuring my rcscarch ! was cmploycd by thc Swcdish National Ðclcncc
Collcgc, and in that rcspcct ! am cspccially indcbtcd to Christina Vcglcrt lor
hcr hclp and support at thc vcry start, and throughout this work. Among my col
lcagucs at thc !ntcrnational Law Ccntrc at thc Collcgc, ! much cnjoycd my livcly
discussions and good companionship with Pcr 8rostrom, Anna Korlol, Cccilia
Hcllman, Frcdrik Holst and Ðanicl Nord. ¡lsc8ritt Fjallstrom providcd impor
tant and unlailing administrativc support.
! much apprcciatc thc lact that collcagucs at thc Univcrsity ol Örcbro will
ingly gavc up thcir timc to discuss scctions ol thc tcxt with mc. To Richard
Sanncrholm, Marta ]ohanson and Maria ¡riksson ! cxtcnd my warmcst thanks.
To law studcnt Anna Forbcrg, who did a thorough job chccking lootnotcs, thank
you also. ! am particularly indcbtcd to thc Ministry ol Forcign Affairs lor granting
mc thc opportunity ol participating in thc mcctings ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc
on thc Salcty Convcntion. Hilding Lundkvist, Tcrcsc Hydén and ¡lin Millcr all
xiv
took part in thosc mcctings and providcd mc with invaluablc insights and lood
lor thought on thc Salcty Convcntion. My sinccrc and dccp apprcciation gocs to
8rian Moorc. Not only did hc cdit thc tcxt (without complaints), but hc was also
a grcat moral support in thc final stagc ol this work. Tc solc rcsponsibility lor thc
vicws cxprcsscd hcrcin, and lor any mistakcs, is minc alonc.
Tis work would not havc bccn possiblc without thc financial support ol
ÖC8, thc Ministry ol Ðclcncc and thc Swcdish National Ðclcncc Collcgc, lor
which ! shall always bc gratclul. Tc Collcgc also financcd visits to thc Unitcd
Nations Hcadquartcrs in Ncw York and to thc TMC Asscr !nstitutc in Tc
Haguc.
Abovc all, vcry spccial thanks to my lamily, Cathcrinc, Arvid and Lisa, who
not only cncouragcd mc but showcd paticncc and undcrstanding in what was a
long, and somctimcs daunting, task.

Tis book is an updatcd vcrsion ol my doctoral thcsis writtcn at Stockholm
Univcrsity and complctcd in acc·.
Örcbro
Òla ¡ngdahl
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
A]!L Amcrican ]ournal ol !ntcrnational Law
ACHR Amcrican Convcntion on Human Rights
8Y!L 8ritish Ycarbook ol !ntcrnational Law
¡CCAS ¡conomic Community ol Ccntral Alrican Statcs
¡CHR ¡uropcan Convcntion on Human Rights
¡]!L ¡uropcan ]ournal ol !ntcrnational Law
¡TS ¡uropcan Trcaty Scrics
¡U ¡uropcan Union
¡UF ¡uropcan Union Forcc
¡UFÒR ¡uropcan Union Forcc in 8osniaHcrzcgovina
FÒMAC Ccntral Alrican Multinational Forcc
GAÒR Gcncral Asscmbly Òfficial Rccords
!ACHR !ntcrAmcrican Commission on Human Rights
!CC !ntcrnational Criminal Court
!CCPR !ntcrnational Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights
!C] !ntcrnational Court ol ]usticc
!CLÒ !ntcrnational Comparativc Law Òuartcrly
!CRC !ntcrnational Committcc ol thc Rcd Cross
!CTR !ntcrnational Criminal Tribunal lor Rwanda
!CTY !ntcrnational Criminal Tribunal lor thc lormcr Yugoslavia
!ÐRL !ntcrnational Ðisastcr Rcsponsc Law
!FRC !ntcrnational Fcdcration ol thc Rcd Cross
!FÒR !mplcmcntation Forcc
!GÒ !ntcrnational Govcrnmcntal Òrganisation
!HL !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law
!LC !ntcrnational Law Commission
!LM !ntcrnational Lcgal Matcrials
!LR !ntcrnational Law Rcports
!NT¡RF¡T !ntcrnational Forcc lor ¡ast Timor
!RRC !ntcrnational Rcvicw ol thc Rcd Cross
!SAF !ntcrnational Sccurity Assistancc Forcc
KFÒR Kosovo Forcc
L]!L Lcidcn ]ournal ol !ntcrnational Law
M!NUC! Unitcd Nations Mission in Côtc d’!voirc
xvi
M!NUSTAH Unitcd Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MFÒ Multinational Forcc and Òbscrvcrs
MNF Multinational Forcc
MÒNUC Unitcd Nations Òrganization Mission in thc Ðcmocratic
Rcpublic ol thc Congo
MÒSS Minimum Òpcrating Sccurity Standards
NATÒ North Atlantic Trcaty Òrganisation
NGÒ NonGovcrnmcntal Òrganisation
ÒAU Òrganisation ol Alrican Union
ÒNUC Unitcd Nations Òpcration in thc Congo
ÒNUC! Unitcd Nations Òpcration in Côtc d’!voirc
ÒNUMÒZ Unitcd Nations Òpcration in Mozambiquc
Ò] Òfficial ]ournal ol thc ¡uropcan Union
RdC Rcccuil dcs Cours dc l’Académic dc Ðroit !ntcrnational
SCÒR Sccurity Council Òfficial Rccords
SFÒR Stabilisation Forcc
SÒFA StatusolForccs Agrccmcnt
SÒMA StatusolMission Agrccmcnt
UN Unitcd Nations
UNAMA Unitcd Nations Assistancc Mission in Alghanistan
UNAM!R Unitcd Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNAMS!L Unitcd Nations Mission in Sicrra Lconc
UNA\¡M Unitcd Nations Angola \crification Mission
UNCRÒ Unitcd Nations Confidcncc Rcstoration Òpcration in Croatia
UNÐP Unitcd Nations Ðcvclopmcnt Programmc
UN¡F Unitcd Nations ¡mcrgcncy Forcc
UNF!CYP Unitcd Nations Pcacckccping Forcc in Cyprus
UNHCR Unitcd Nations High Commissioncr lor Rclugccs
UN!C¡F Unitcd Nations Childrcn’s Fund
UN!F!L Unitcd Nations !ntcrim Forcc in Lcbanon
UNM¡¡ Unitcd Nations Mission in ¡thiopia and ¡ritrca
UNM!8H Unitcd Nations Mission in 8osniaHcrzcgovina
UNM!H Unitcd Nations Mission in Haiti
UNM!K Unitcd Nations !ntcrim Administration in Kosovo
UNM!L Unitcd Nations Mission in Libcria
UNM!S¡T Unitcd Nations Mission ol Support in ¡ast Timor
UNÒ8 Unitcd Nations Òpcration in 8urundi
UNÒSÒM Unitcd Nations Òpcration in Somalia
UNPRÒFÒR Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc
UNS¡CÒÒRÐ Unitcd Nations Sccurity Coordinator
UNTAC Unitcd Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTS Unitcd Nations Trcaty Scrics
UNTSÒ Unitcd Nations Trucc Supcrvision Òrganization
Abbreviations
Chapter 1
!ntroduction: Tc Salcty Convcntion and its
Lcgal ¡nvironmcnt
Pcrsonncl involvcd in pcacc opcrations arc lrcqucntly rcquircd to pcrlorm thcir
dutics within inhcrcntly risky cnvironmcnts. Tc attack on thc Unitcd Nations
hcadquartcrs in 8aghdad in August, acc., killing aa pcoplc, is clcar cvidcncc ol
this. Tc rcsponsc by thc UN Sccurity Council illustratcs thc scriousncss ol thc
commitmcnt ol thc intcrnational community to improving thc lcvcls ol protcc
tion availablc to such pcrsonncl opcrating in thcsc dangcrous situations. !n rcso
lution .·ca thc Sccurity Council
·. Expresses its determination to takc appropriatc stcps in ordcr to cnsurc thc
salcty and sccurity ol humanitarian pcrsonncl and Unitcd Nations and its
associatcd pcrsonncl, including, intcr alia, by:
(a) Requesting thc SccrctaryGcncral to scck thc inclusion ol, and
that host countrics includc, kcy provisions ol thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, among
othcrs, thosc rcgarding thc prcvcntion ol attacks against mcmbcrs
ol Unitcd Nations opcrations, thc cstablishmcnt ol such attacks
as crimcs punishablc by law and thc prosccution or cxtradition ol
offcndcrs, in luturc as wcll as, il ncccssary, in cxisting statusol
lorccs, statusolmissions and host country agrccmcnts ncgotiatcd
bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thosc countrics, mindlul ol thc
importancc ol thc timcly conclusion ol such agrccmcnts,
+
Tc uncquivocal willingncss ol thosc pcrsonncl, cithcr on missions ol statc or
rcprcscnting intcrgovcrnmcntal organisations or nongovcrnmcntal organisa
tions, is instrumcntal to rcalising thc twin aims ol pcacc and sccurity. ¡fforts
to protcct such pcoplc arc not ncw, but it now appcars to bc a dctcrmincd and
gcnuinc intcrcst on thc part ol thc intcrnational community to cnlorcc, as wcll as
cnhancc, thcir protcction undcr intcrnational law.
Tc purposc ol this study is to cxaminc thc contribution madc by thc .oo¡
Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl (hcrcin
altcr rclcrrcd to as thc Salcty Convcntion) to thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc
. SC Rcs. .·ca, UN SCÒR ¡··o
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·ca (acc.).
a Chapter 1
opcrations.
:
!n a largcr pcrspcctivc this study aims to systcmatisc thc protcction
ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations undcr intcrnational law and to idcntily strcngths
and wcakncsscs with thc prcscnt systcm as wcll as somc trcnds and dcvclopmcnts
in this arca ol law. Tc idcntilying and systcmatising ol such norms may contrib
utc to clarilying thc lcgal protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations and thcrcby,
it is hopcd, contributcs to thc rcalisation ol such protcction in thc ficld.
Tc Salcty Convcntion is first and lorcmost a criminal law instrumcnt and
should bc vicwcd against thc background ol thc incrcasingly volatilc cnviron
mcnt in which pcacc opcration pcrsonncl wcrc rcquircd to opcratc at thc bcgin
ning ol thc .oocs.
:
!n rclation to othcr instrumcnts protccting pcrsonncl in pcacc
opcrations, it is mainly onc ol cnlorccmcnt. !ts purposc is to prcvcnt and punish
dclibcratc attacks on protcctcd pcrsonncl. Statc partics arc undcr a duty to cnsurc
thc salcty and sccurity ol UN and associatcd pcrsonncl. Tc Salcty Convcntion
dcfincs a numbcr ol criminal acts and obligatcs partics to thc convcntion to crim
inalisc such acts in thcir national lcgislation. Furthcrmorc, it statcs that thc pcr
sonncl conccrncd shall not bc thc objcct “ol any action that prcvcnts thcm lrom
discharging thcir mandatc.”
±
!t is clcarly a duty imposcd upon statcs partics not
to intcrlcrc, and to prcvcnt othcrs lrom intcrlcring, with pcrsonncl in thc cxccu
tion ol thcir official dutics.
Howcvcr, thc draltcrs ol thc Salcty Convcntion also aimcd at othcr objcc
tivcs. !t thcrclorc includcs rclcrcnccs to othcr lcgal arcas conccrncd with thc lcgal
status ol such pcrsonncl. Tc Salcty Convcntion, howcvcr, has rcccivcd criticism
and was thc subjcct ol a rcvicw lor thc purposc ol strcngthcning and cnhancing its
protcctivc rcgimc, and its dcvclopmcnt in this rcspcct is ol particular intcrcst.
¡
!n
a Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, o Ðcc. .oo¡,
ac·. UNTS .6. (·c partics acc6c¡c. according to thc UN Trcaty Scction http://
untrcaty.un.org/¡nglish/trcaty.asp).
. Scc, lor cxamplc, UN SccrctaryGcncral, Supplcmcnt to An Agcnda lor Pcacc, posi
tion papcr ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc occasion ol thc Filticth Annivcrsary ol
thc Unitcd Nations, paras. .·.6, UN Ðoc. A/·c/6cS/.oo·/., (.oo·).
¡ Salcty Convcntion, Articlc ·(.).
· Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc
Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR
··th Scss., Supp. No. ·a, UN Ðoc. A/··/·a (acca), Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc
on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd
Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ··th Scss., Supp. No. ·a, UN Ðoc.
A/··/·a (acc.), Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
UN GAÒR ·oth Scss., Supp. No. ·a, UN Ðoc. A/·o/·a (acc¡), and UN Gcncral
Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
UN GAÒR 6cth Scss., Supp. No. ·a, UN Ðoc. A/6c/·a (Supp) (acc·).
. Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
acc·, an Òptional Protocol was adoptcd which cxtcnds thc Salcty Convcntion’s
scopc ol application.
6
A catcgorisation in this work has bccn madc bctwccn gcncral and spccial
protcction. A general protcction cncompasscs all pcrsonncl, irrcspcctivc ol posi
tions in thc opcration, and is providcd, lor cxamplc, by human rights law and
intcrnational humanitarian law. 8y rcprcscnting statcs and/or intcrnational gov
crnmcntal organisations pcrsonncl may also cnjoy a special protcction. Such pro
tcction gocs bcyond a gcncral protcction and is affordcd somc pcrsonncl bascd
upon thcir position in thc opcration conccrncd. Ðiplomatic and intcrnational
privilcgcs and immunitics arc arcas ol intcrnational law that will bc studicd undcr
that hcading. Tc practicc ol concluding bilatcral agrccmcnts with a statc hosting
a pcacc opcration is ol particular importancc in this rcspcct. A StatusolForccs
Agrccmcnt (SÒFA) is a bilatcral agrccmcnt concludcd bctwccn thc cntity (intcr
national organisation or statc) lcading thc opcration and thc host statc. A UN
Modcl SÒFA was issucd in .ooc to lunction as thc modcl lor luturc agrccmcnts.
A SÒFA is ol principal importancc to mcmbcrs ol military contingcnts who arc
gcncrally not covcrcd by multilatcral trcatics providing privilcgcs and immunitics
to pcrsonncl rcprcscnting intcrnational organisations. Tc lcgal norms stipulatcd
in SÒFAs draw primarily on thc law on visiting lorccs and intcrnational privi
lcgcs and immunitics, as wcll as on diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics.
Tc cmcrging legal regime against impunity in rclation to thc commission ol
crimcs against pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations has in this work bccn rclcrrcd to as
a third catcgory ol protcction. Tc Salcty Convcntion has bccn an important tool
in thc dcvclopmcnt ol this rcgimc. !t is modcllcd upon socallcd “tcrroristcon
vcntions” and includcs a prosccutcorcxtraditc mcchanism (aut dedere aut judi-
care). Crimcs committcd against UN and associatcd pcrsonncl wcrc, lor cxamplc,
includcd, as onc out ol fivc catcgorics ol crimc, in thc Ðralt Codc ol Crimcs
against Pcacc and Sccurity ol Mankind.
·
Attacks on pcrsonncl in pcacckccping
opcrations and humanitarian assistancc cntcrpriscs arc, morcovcr, listcd as a par
ticular war crimc undcr thc statutc ol thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court (!CC).
8

Tis catcgory ol protcction is onc ol cnlorccmcnt and must bc vicwcd against
othcr instrumcnts providing pcrsonncl with a ccrtain lcgal status. !l gcncral and
6 GA Rcs. 6c/¡a, Òptional Protocol to thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd
Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR, 6cth Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/6c/¡a
(acc·).
· Ðralt Codc ol Crimcs against Pcacc and Sccurity ol Mankind, Rcport ol thc
!ntcrnational Law Commission on thc work ol its lortycighth scssion, UN GAÒR,
·.
st
Scss., Supp. No. .c, paras. ¡· and ·c, UN Ðoc. A/·./.c (.oo6).
· Statutc ol thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court, UN Ðoc. A/CÒNF..·./o, .· ]uly .oo·,
.· !LM ooo.
¡ Chapter 1
spccial protcctions arc to bc rcgardcd as shiclds lor protcctcd pcrsonncl, thcn thc
symbol lor this rcgimc against impunity is thc sword.
o
Against thc background ol how thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcra
tions is systcmatiscd in this work, dctailcd analysis ol thc Salcty Convcntion
will lollow altcr thc chaptcrs on gcncral and spccial protcction. Rclcrcnccs will
bc madc in thosc chaptcrs to thc Salcty Convcntion, cspccially in rclation to
thc duty ol statcs partics to cstablish thcir jurisdictions ovcr crimcs stipulatcd
undcr thc convcntion.
+o
Criminal acts undcr thc Salcty Convcntion arc “murdcr,
kidnapping or othcr attack upon thc pcrson or libcrty ol any Unitcd Nations or
associatcd pcrsonncl” and “violcnt attack upon thc official prcmiscs, thc privatc
accommodation or thc mcans ol transportation ol any Unitcd Nations or associ
atcd pcrsonncl likcly to cndangcr his or hcr pcrson or libcrty”.
++
Tc obligation to
prosccutc or cxtraditc allcgcd pcrpctrators ol such crimcs is ol particular impor
tancc in this rcspcct.
+:

Tc Salcty Convcntion is thc first multilatcral instrumcnt dcaling spccifi
cally with thc lcgal protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations and in a work ol
this charactcr it mcrits spccial attcntion. Tc ncgotiations in .oo. and .oo¡, lcad
ing up to thc Salcty Convcntion, arc cxamincd in somc dctail. Tc purposc is that
it givcs account lor thc idcas on how dclcgations at thc timc vicwcd important
issucs rclating to “immunity”, “jurisdiction”, pcacckccping and pcacc cnlorcc
mcnt opcrations, intcrnational humanitarian law, and thc cmcrging importancc
ol intcrnational criminal law. Tc dcbatcs within thc mcctings ol thc Ad Hoc
Committcc, bctwccn acca and acc·, which ultimatcly lcd to thc crcation ol thc
Òptional Protocol to thc Salcty Convcntion arc also ol intcrcst sincc thcy pro
vidc an insight into how statcs vicwcd thcsc important issucs at that point in
timc.
For cxamplc, thc rcluctancc shown by scvcral dclcgations, not at thc timc
partics to thc Salcty Convcntion, to cxtcnd its scopc ol application through an
additional protocol, is intcrcsting in vicw ol thc lact that thcrc sccms to bc an
ovcrall conccrn cxprcsscd lor thc salcty ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. For
o 8assiouni statcs that sincc intcrnational criminal law (!CL) incorporatcs human
rights law protcction, “it can bc said that whcrc human rights law is thc shicld,
!CL is thc sword”. M. Chcril 8assiouni, Tc Sourccs and Contcnt ol !ntcrnational
Criminal Law: A Tcorctical Framcwork, in International Criminal Law \ol. !,
Crimes, ., ¡6 (M. Chcril 8assiouni, cd., a
nd
cd., .ooo).
.c Scc Articlcs o, .c and .¡ ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
.. Articlc o includcs, inter alia, thrcats and attcmpts to commit such crimcs.
.a Scc Articlc .¡, which statcs: “Tc Statc Party in whosc tcrritory thc allcgcd offcndcr
is prcscnt shall, il it docs not cxtraditc that pcrson, submit, without cxccption what
socvcr and without unduc dclay, thc casc to its compctcnt authoritics lor thc purposc
ol prosccution, through procccdings in accordancc with thc law ol that Statc. Tosc
authoritics shall takc thcir dccision in thc samc manncr as in thc casc ol an ordinary
offcncc ol a gravc naturc undcr thc law ol that Statc.”
· Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
thcsc purposcs thc analysis ol thc Salcty Convcntion will includc diffcrcnt prop
ositions prcscntcd during discussions both bctwccn .oo. and .oo¡ and acca to
acc·.
1.1 Method and Material
!n ordcr to discovcr thc contcnt ol intcrnational law it is ncccssary to rcsort to
its sourccs.
+:
Tc most authoritativc statcmcnt rcgarding thc sourccs ol intcrna
tional law is to bc lound in Articlc .·(.) ol thc statutc ol thc !ntcrnational Court
ol ]usticc (!C]). According to thc statutc, thc primary sourccs ol intcrnational law
arc intcrnational convcntions,

intcrnational customary law

and gcncral princi
plcs ol law.
+6
Lcgal doctrinc and judicial dccisions arc commonly rcgardcd as sub
sidiary sourccs.

Although this work has rclicd upon a traditional vicw on sourccs
.. A lormal sourcc ol law may bc dcscribcd as “thc sourcc which thc lcgal rulc dcrivcs
its lcgal validity”. ]cnnings, Sir Robcrt and Vatts Sir Arthur (cds.), Oppenheim’s
International Law, \ol. !, a. (o
th
cd., .ooa). Òn thc difficulty ol distinguishing bctwccn
lormal and matcrial sourccs in intcrnational law, scc !an 8rownlic, Principles of Public
International Law, .¡ (6
th
cd., acc.).
.¡ A trcaty docs not crcatc rights or obligations lor statcs not partics to it without thcir
conscnt. According to thc \icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol Trcatics: “A trcaty
docs not crcatc cithcr obligations or rights lor a third Statc without its conscnt”.
\icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol Trcatics, a. May .o6o, ..·· UNTS ..., Articlc
.¡. Tc \icnna Convcntion is a trcaty itscll and its provisions arc only applicablc
as trcatylaw to thc statcs that havc ratificd it. Scc Hugh Tirlway, Tc Sourccs ol
!ntcrnational Law, in International Law .aa (Malcolm Ð. ¡vans, cd. acc.).
.· Customary intcrnational law consists ol two parts: an cstablishcd practicc, usus, and
a conviction that this practicc is lcgally binding, opinio juris. Rcin Mullcrson, Tc
!ntcrplay ol Òbjcctivc and Subjcctivc ¡lcmcnts, Customary Law, in International
Law: Teory and Practice. Essays in Honour of Eric Suy, .6. (Karcl Vcllcns cd., .oo·).
Tc !C], in thc North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, analyscd thc crcation ol customary
intcrnational law: “Not only must thc acts conccrncd amount to a scttlcd practicc,
but thcy must also bc such, or bc carricd out in such a way, as to bc cvidcncc ol a
bclicl that this practicc is rcndcrcd obligatory by thc cxistcncc ol a rulc rcquiring it.
Tc nccd lor such bclicl, i.c., thc cxistcncc ol a subjcctivc clcmcnt, is implicit in thc
vcry notion ol thc opinio juris sive necessitates”. North Sca Contincntal Shcll (Fcdcral
Rcpublic ol Gcrmany v Ðcnmark, Fcdcral Rcpublic ol Gcrmany v Ncthcrlands)
]udgcmcnt, .o6o !C] Rcp ., para. ··. A trcaty may mirror customary intcrnational
law or dcvclop thc law by stipulating ncw norms undcr intcrnational law. Trcaty
norms may also ovcr timc dcvclop into norms ol customary intcrnational law, such
as largc parts ol thc UN Chartcr.
.6 Such principlcs arc oltcn rclcrrcd to as thosc which appcar to bc sharcd by a majority
ol domcstic lcgal systcms. Tirlway, .... 8rownlic asscrts that “intcrnational tribu
nals havc cmploycd clcmcnts ol lcgal rcasoning” bascd upon domcstic lcgal ordcrs.
8rownlic, .6.
.· Although lcgal doctrinc is a sourcc ol subsidiary charactcr it plays an important rolc
in intcrprcting and systcmatising intcrnational law. ]udicial dccisions arc gcncrally
rclcrrcd to as authoritativc statcmcnts ol thc contcnt ol intcrnational law as it stands
6 Chapter 1
ol intcrnational law, it is truc that cvidcncc ol customary law may bc sought not
only lrom thc intcraction bctwccn statcs but also lrom thcir opinions in intcr
national loras, judicial dccisions, national lcgislation and so on.
+8
Ðocumcnts ol
a socallcd “solt law” charactcr havc also bccn studicd, although mindlul ol thcir
lcgal status in rclation to traditional sourccs ol intcrnational law.
+o
Actors othcr
than statcs arc, morcovcr, growing in importancc in thc crcation ol intcrnational
law.
:o
8ascd upon thcsc considcrations, this work has sought to find out thc law
as it currcntly stands (lex lata) and to idcntily ncw dcvclopmcnts that might
bc in thc proccss ol bccoming law (lex ferenda). Tc lattcr pcrspcctivc includcs
an asscssmcnt, lor cxamplc, ol thc work ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc ultimatcly
lcading an Òptional Protocol to thc Salcty Convcntion and thc customary law
aspccts ol SÒFAnorms. Tc lex ferenda pcrspcctivc also includcs suggcstions on
how thc protcction ol pcrsonncl should bc strcngthcncd.
Tc analysis ol thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations has bccn
somcwhat affcctcd by limitations on availablc sourccs ol both primary and sub
sidiary charactcr. Tc Salcty Convcntion camc into lorcc in .ooo and thc practicc
rclating to it is limitcd, il any cxists at all. Ònly a small numbcr ol articlcs havc
dcalt in particular with thc implications ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
:+
Tc lol
lowing analysis ol thc Salcty Convcntion has thcrclorc partly bccn bascd upon
thc UN documcnts issucd during its prcparation and thc currcnt ncgotiations
on thc possibility ol cnhancing its protcctivc rcgimc. According to thc \icnna
Convcntion on thc Law ol Trcatics, prcparatory work ol a trcaty, such as docu
mcnts issucd during a diplomatic conlcrcncc, may only bc rcsortcd to as a supplc
mcntary mcans ol intcrprctation in cascs whcrc othcr mcans ol intcrprctation “(a)
Lcavcs thc mcaning ambiguous or, or (b) Lcads to a rcsult which is manilcstly
absurd or unrcasonablc.”
::
Tc analysis ol thc Salcty Convcntion may thcrclorc
bc criticiscd lor rclying too much on its prcparatory work. Howcvcr, thc lack ol
subscqucnt practicc and thc modcst amount ol litcraturc havc madc cxamination
today (lex lata). Tis is cspccially so with rcgard to practicc ol such institutions as thc
!C] and othcr intcrnational courts and tribunals. Scc, lor cxamplc, 8rownlic, ·.
.· Oppenheim’s International Law, a6.
.o G. ]. H. van Hool, Re-thinking the Sources of International Law, .··.·o (.o·.), Prospcr
Vcil, Towards Rclativc Normativity in !ntcrnational Law, ·· AJIL ¡.., ¡.¡ (.o·.).
ac 8runo Simma and Andrcas L. Paulus, Tc Rcsponsibility ol !ndividuals lor Human
Rights Abuscs in !ntcrnal Conflicts: A Positivist \icw, o. AJIL, .ca, .c6 (.ooo).
a. Scc, lor cxamplc, Stcvcn ]. Lcppcr, Tc Lcgal Status ol Military Pcrsonncl in
Unitcd Nations Pcacc Òpcrations: Ònc Ðclcgatc’s Analysis, .· Houston Journal
of International Law, .·o (.oo6), ¡van T. 8loom, Protccting pcacckccpcrs: Tc
Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ·o AJIL,
6a. (.oo·), M.Christianc 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ¡¡ ICLQ, ·6c (.oo·).
aa Articlc .a, \icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol Trcatics a. May .o6o ..·· UNTS ...
· Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
ol thc prcparatory work ncccssary. Tc status ol thc prcparatory work as a sub
sidiary sourcc ol intcrprctation nccds, howcvcr, to bc kcpt in mind.
Tc cmcrgcncc ol customary law norms is rclcvant to this work in scvcral
aspccts. Rcgarding thc Salcty Convcntion, it is hcrc hcld that it in somc rcspccts
codifics norms ol customary law. Tc Salcty Convcntion has also madc a valu
ablc contribution to thc cmcrgcncc ol an intcrnational lcgal rcgimc lor punishing
crimcs committcd against pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. Customary intcrna
tional law, morcovcr, comcs into play in situations whcrc pcrsonncl arc prcscnt
within thc tcrritory ol a statc hosting a pcacc opcration bclorc particular agrcc
mcnts on thcir lcgal status havc bccn concludcd. Not all host statcs may bc party
to major trcatics on human rights and intcrnational humanitarian law and thcir
customary law status is thcrclorc ol importancc. Tc almost filtyycar practicc
ol SÒFAs has bccn asscsscd lrom a customary law pcrspcctivc. !s it possiblc to
rcly on thc cstablishcd practicc ol past opcrations in luturc opcrations whcrc no
SÒFA has bccn concludcd: Tc problcms ol idcntilying whcn an cstablishcd
practicc has bccomc a rulc ol intcrnational law arc wcll known.
::
!n this rcgard it
is intcrcsting to notc thc position ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission (!LC)
which statcs that “rccords ol thc cumulativc practicc ol intcrnational organisa
tions may bc rcgardcd as cvidcncc ol customary intcrnational law with rclcrcnccs
to statcs’ rclations to thc organisation”.

!n situations whcrc no agrccmcnt has
bccn concludcd bctwccn thc partics, thc analysis ol applicablc norms has also
rclicd upon thc principlc ol conscnt. Vhcn a statc conscnts to host a pcacc opcr
ation it may gcncrally bc intcrprctcd as constituting conscnt to includc cstab
lishcd norms rclating to thc protcction ol thc pcrsonncl in qucstion, as part and
parccl ol thc ovcrall conccpt ol pcacc opcrations.


Tc analysis ol SÒFAs has bccn rcstrictcd by limitcd acccss to matcrial on
thc ncgotiations ol thcsc agrccmcnts and a lack ol documcntcd practicc lollow
ing thcir conclusions. Tc study ol SÒFAs has thcrclorc, in contrast to thc analy
sis ol thc Salcty Convcntion, bccn almost cxclusivcly bascd upon primary sourccs
ol law, such as thc tcxt ol particular agrccmcnts. Tc UN Modcl SÒFA has, how
cvcr, provcd vcry usclul in this rcspcct. Tcrc is a surprisingly modcst amount ol
litcraturc dcdicatcd to thc SÒFAs applicablc to pcacc opcrations, cspccially whcn
a. Ðc \isschcr comparcs thc lormation ol customary intcrnational law to a gradual
crcation ol a road across vacant land. !nitially “thc tracks arc many and unccrtain,
scarccly visiblc on thc ground. Tcn most uscrs, lor somc rcason ol common util
ity, lollow thc samc linc, a singlc path bccomcs clcar, which in turn givcs placc to a
road hcncclorth rccognizcd as thc only rcgular way, though it is impossiblc to say at
what momcnt thc lattcr changc took placc”. Charlcs Ðc \isschcr, Teory and Reality
in Public International Law, .·¡.·· (.o6·). Scc also Mark ¡. \illigcr, Customary
International Law and Treaties, ao.a, (.o··).
a¡ Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission covcring its sccond scssion, · ]unc – ao
]uly .o·c, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, !!, .6¡, .6·.·a (.o·c).
a· Scc Chaptcr ¡...¡.
· Chapter 1
onc considcrs thc vast amount writtcn on thc practicc ol SÒFAs in rclation to
visiting lorccs, such as thc NATÒ SÒFA (.o·.). Lazarcff
:6
has writtcn thc stand
ard work on thc law ol visiting lorccs and a comprchcnsivc study on thc currcnt
status ol visiting lorccs has bccn cditcd by Flcck,

which also dcals with somc
aspccts ol SÒFAs in pcacc opcrations.
Numcrous books and articlcs havc bccn writtcn on thc topic ol pcacc opcra
tions. Tcrc arc, howcvcr, comparativcly lcw that addrcss thc lcgal aspccts ol such
opcrations. Somc ol thc classical works arc by Higgins,
:8
8owctt
:o
and Scycrstcd.
:o

Òthcrs, who havc dcvotcd thcmsclvcs to a spccific intcrcst in thc lcgal protcc
tion ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations, arc Sickmann,
:+
Sharp,
::
and McCoubrcy
and Vhitc.
::
Among othcrs, usclul documcntations on pcacc opcrations includc
Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-keeping Forces (Sickmann),


UN Peacekeeping. A Documentary Introduction (8othc/Ðorschcl)

and Te Blue
Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (Unitcd Nations).
:6

Any study ol thcsc lcgal instrumcnts is thcrclorc partly dcpcndcnt upon
an analysis ol othcr arcas ol intcrnational law. Such arcas includc, lor cxamplc,
human rights law and intcrnational humanitarian law, intcrnational institutional
law and intcrnational criminal law. Tc dcpcndcncy ol availablc matcrial has thus
ncccssitatcd an apparcnt inconsistcncy in thc application ol lcgal sourccs whcn
diffcrcnt chaptcrs arc comparcd. A particular intcrnational organisation’s intcrnal
rcgulations may bc ol importancc lor clarilying thc lcgal status ol ccrtain catcgo
rics ol pcrsonncl within that organisation. As such thcy may also carry cvidcntiary
wcight whcn thc status ol thc pcrsonncl undcr intcrnational law is qucstioncd.
a6 Scrgc Lazarcff, Status of Military Forces under Current International Law, (.o·.).
a· Ðictcr Flcck ct al (cds.) Te Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, (acc.).
a· Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946 – 1967 Documents and Commentary
\ol. !!\, (.o6o – .o·.).
ao Ðcrck V. 8owctt, United Nations Forces. A Legal Study of United Nations Practice,
(.o6¡).
.c Finn Scycrstcd, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War, (.o66).
.. Robcrt C. R. Sickmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-keeping Forces,
(.oo.).
.a Valtcr Gary Sharp, Sr., Jus Paciarii. Emergent Legal Paradigms for U.N. Peace
Operations in the 21
st
Century, (.ooo).
.. Hilairc McCoubrcy and Nigcl Ð. Vhitc, Te Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United
Nations Military Operations (1996) and Nigcl Ð. Vhitc, Keeping the Peace, (a
nd
cd.,
.oo·).
.¡ Robcrt C. R. Sickmann, Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-keeping
Forces, (a
nd
cd., .o·o).
.· Michacl 8othc and Tomas Ðorschcl (cds.) UN Peacekeeping. A Documentary
Introduction, (.ooo).
.6 Unitcd Nations Ðcpartmcnt ol Public !nlormation, Te Blue Helmets. A Review of
United Nations Peace-keeping, (.
rd
cd., .oo6).
o Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
Howcvcr, this work docs not claim to takc lull account ol all such rcgulations.
Rathcr this study asscsscs thc thcorctical undcrpinning ol thc norms providing
protcction to pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. Tc proccss ol improving sccurity lor
pcrsonncl in such opcrations, howcvcr, includcs both lcgal and practical mcasurcs
that cannot bc complctcly scparatcd in a work ol this naturc. Much has bccn
achicvcd within thc UN to advancc thc sccurity ol pcrsonncl in tcrms ol practical
and institutional improvcmcnts.

Tc cstablishmcnt ol thc Ðcpartmcnt ol Salcty
and Sccurity constitutcs a major stcp in that dcvclopmcnt.
:8
Tc implcmcntation
ol Minimum Òpcrating Sccurity Standards (MÒSS) at all UN duty stations is
anothcr.
:o
Tc Lcssons Lcarncd and Altcr Action Rcports lrom thc bombing ol
thc UN hcadquartcrs in 8aghdad arc primarily locuscd upon improving ol prac
tical mcasurcs.
±o
Such improvcmcnts arc ol thc utmost importancc lor thc rcali
sation ol thc propcr protcction ol pcrsonncl.
1.2 Ðelimitations and Terminology
Tc dclimitations ol this study arc closcly rclatcd to thc tcrminology uscd. Tc
dcfinitions ol thc tcrms “protcction”, “pcrsonncl” and “pcacc opcration” vcry much
sct thc dclimitations, and will thus bc trcatcd undcr thc samc hcading.
8ccausc this work sccks to analysc thc lcvcl ol protcction providcd, inter
alia, by thc Salcty Convcntion, thc tcrminology ol that convcntion will bc uscd
as a point ol dcparturc lor thc dcfinitions ol tcrminology that arc uscd hcrc. Tc
prcscnt study is not limitcd to UNlcd opcrations but also cmbraccs opcrations
bascd upon a UNmandatc, but lcd by anothcr organisation or statc. Sincc this
study also includcs instrumcnts providing pcrsonncl with a spccial status, thc dcl
inition ol protcction in this work is somcwhat broadcr than thc notion ol “salcty”
in thc Salcty Convcntion. Pcrsonncl in thc prcscnt study arc catcgoriscd bascd
upon thcir lcgal status but, as in thc Salcty Convcntion, this includcs all pcrson
ncl with a lormal conncction to a pcacc opcration. Finally, as with thc Salcty
.· Scc, lor cxamplc, Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, !ntcrorganizational sccurity
mcasurcs: implcmcntation ol scction !! ol Gcncral Asscmbly rcsolution ··/a.· ol
a. Ðcccmbcr accc cntitlcd “Salcty and sccurity ol Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl”,
UN Ðoc. A/·6/¡6o (acc.). Also Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional
Peacekeeping Operations, Chaptcr X!: Sccurity and Salcty ol Pcrsonncl, (Ðcpartmcnt
ol Pcacckccping Òpcrations acc.).
.· Scc Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Strcngthcncd and unificd sccurity managc
mcnt systcm lor thc Unitcd Nations, UN Ðoc. A/6c¡a¡ (acc·).
.o Scc Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Salcty and sccurity ol humanitarian pcrson
ncl and protcction ol Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl, paras. a6a·, UN Ðoc. A/·o/..a
(acc¡).
¡c Report for the Steering Group on Iraq. Lessons Learned Report and Implementation Plan,
Te United Nations Headquarters crisis Response to Treat to the 19 August 2003 Attack
on the United Nations Office in Baghdad, \ol.., After Action Report and Appendices,
\ol.a (acc¡).
.c Chapter 1
Convcntion, thc prcscnt study stops short ol war. Situations whcrc pcrsonncl in
pcacc opcrations arc involvcd as partics to an armcd conflict havc not bccn ana
lyscd. Howcvcr, thc critcria uscd to dcfinc whcn such a situation occurs arc ol
grcat intcrcst to cxaminc, sincc such a situation changcs thc status ol thc pcrson
ncl conccrncd in many rcspccts.
Sincc this work is limitcd to pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations it docs
not analysc purcly humanitarian assistancc missions,
±+
with no lormal conncc
tion to a pcacc opcration, or thc lcgal lramcwork known as intcrnational disastcr
rcsponsc law (!ÐRL).
±:
!t docs not lollow lrom this, howcvcr, that thc analysis ol
thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations is ol littlc or no intcrcst lor such
cfforts. Òn thc contrary, many ol thc conclusions on thc protcction ol thc pcrson
ncl hcrc analyscd arc also ol importancc lor pcrsonncl on intcrnational assign
mcnts in a broadcr pcrspcctivc.
Protection
!t is a wcllcstablishcd principlc ol intcrnational law that a statc has thc rcsponsi
bility ol cnsuring thc protcction ol individuals within its jurisdiction. According
to thc SccrctaryGcncral, thc host govcrnmcnt assumcs thc primary rcsponsi
bility lor UN and rclatcd pcrsonncl, and “this rcsponsibility flows lrom cvcry
Govcrnmcnt’s normal and inhcrcnt lunctioning ol maintaining ordcr and pro
tccting pcrsons and propcrty within its jurisdiction.”
±:
A host statc is thus placcd
undcr an obligation to sccurc thc gcncral protcction ol all mcmbcrs ol a pcacc
opcration, irrcspcctivc ol any diffcrcnccs in lcgal status. As human bcings thcy arc
cntitlcd to bc trcatcd in accordancc with applicablc human rights law or intcr
national humanitarian law. Trough bilatcral or multilatcral agrccmcnts with thc
host statc in qucstion, pcrsonncl rcprcscnting statcs or intcrnational organisa
tions may cnjoy a highcr lcgal status than othcrwisc, and bc accordcd ccrtain
¡. Scc, lor instancc, thc Unitcd Nations Òfficc lor thc Coordination ol Humanitarian
Affairs, www.un.org. For thc tcrminology with rcgard to such cfforts, scc Monika
SandvikNylund, Caught in Conflicts. Civilian Victims, Humanitarian Assistance and
International Law, ¡· (a
nd
rcv. cd., acc.). Shc offcrs thc lollowing dcfinition ol
humanitarian assistancc: “assistance of an exclusively humanitarian character, provided
by the international community, to meet the immediate needs of victims of emergency situ-
ations”. !bid. 6·.
¡a Scc, lor cxamplc, World Disasters Report, Chaptcr ·, (!ntcrnational Fcdcration ol Rcd
Cross 2000), International disaster response laws, rules and principles, (!ntcrnational
Fcdcration ol Rcd Cross acc.), www.ilrc.org. Pctcr MacalistcrSmith, International
Humanitarian Assistance. Disaster Relief Actions in International Law and Organization,
.·c.6. (.o··). Yvcs 8cigbcdcr, Te Role and Status of International Humanitarian
Volunteers and Organizations. Te Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance, .....6
(.oo.).
¡. UN SccrctaryGcncral, Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations opcrations, para. ¡, UN Ðoc.
A/¡·/.¡o – S/a6.·· (.oo.).
.. Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
privilcgcs and immunitics within thc tcrritory ol thc host statc. Towards thcsc
individuals, thc host statc conccrncd is obligatcd to cnsurc a spccial protcction.
Tc naturc ol thc gcncral and spccial protcction may vary dcpcnding upon
thc intcrnational agrccmcnts to which that host statc is a party. Protcction undcr
intcrnational humanitarian law, lor cxamplc, dcnotcs a positivc duty to “ward off
dangcrs and prcvcnt harm” to protcctcd pcrsons.
±±
Tc tcrm “spccial protcction”,
rclcrrcd to in thc Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs
against !ntcrnationally Protcctcd Pcrsons including Ðiplomatic Agcnts (!PP),
±¡

has bccn dcscribcd as onc ol inviolability, implying a duty upon thc host statc “to
takc all appropriatc stcps to prcvcnt any attack upon thc pcrson, lrccdom, or dig
nity ol thosc cntitlcd to it”.
±6
Host statcs arc undcr an obligation to prcvcnt wronglul acts against indi
viduals and to punish thosc lound guilty ol committing thcm. Although this is
an obligation that lorms part ol thc rcsponsibility ol all statcs, thc duty to prc
vcnt and punish is also cxprcsscd in a numbcr ol trcatics, including thc Salcty
Convcntion. Tc obligation ol statcs to prcvcnt and punish wronglul acts against
individuals is ol particular importancc in cascs whcrc thc host statc is not party to
thc Salcty Convcntion or lor pcrsonncl not protcctcd by this rcgimc.
Tc tcrm “protcction” can bc dividcd into two parts. Tcsc arc proccdural
and substantivc rulcs. !n this study thc lormcr conccrns thc right ol statcs and
organisations to protcct thcir intcrcsts whcn onc ol its citizcns or agcnts has bccn
maltrcatcd, whilc thc lattcr rclcrs to rulcs that pcrtain to thc lcgal status ol thc
individual and thc rcsponsibilitics ol statcs (and bclligcrcnt groups) to cnsurc thc
protcction ol that status. Tc right ol statcs to prcscrvc thcir own intcrcsts whcn
onc ol thcir nationals has bccn harmcd in anothcr statc is commonly rclcrrcd
to as diplomatic protcction and could bc dcscribcd as proccdural rulcs.
±·
!t is
now bcyond doubt that thc UN posscsscs thc right to bring an intcrnational
claim against a statc lound to bc rcsponsiblc lor injurics suffcrcd by onc ol its
agcnts.
±8
Prcsumably this right also cxists lor othcr intcrgovcrnmcntal organisa
tions cnjoying intcrnational capacity.
¡¡ Frits Kalshovcn, Constraints on the Waging of War, ¡a (a
nd
cd., .oo.).
¡· Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs against !ntcrnationally
Protcctcd Pcrsons, including Ðiplomatic Agcnts, ol .¡ Ðcccmbcr .o·., .c.· UNTS
.6·.
¡6 Louis M. 8loomficld and Gcrald F. FitzGcrald, Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons: Prevention and Punishment. An Analysis of the UN Convention, ·a
(.o··).
¡· Scc bclow ..¡...
¡· Rcparation lor injurics suffcrcd in thc scrvicc ol thc Unitcd Nations (Advisory
Òpinion) !C] Rcp ·¡ (.o¡o). Cl. Applicability ol Articlc \!, Scction aa, ol thc
Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations (Advisory
Òpinion).o·o, !C]. Rcp .o¡ and Ðiffcrcncc Rclating to !mmunity lrom Lcgal
Proccss ol a Spccial Rapportcur ol thc Commission on Human Rights (Advisory
.a Chapter 1
Tc right ol a statc and/or organisation to claim rcparation lor an intcrna
tionally wronglul act is not spccific to thc topic cxamincd in this work. Although
an intcgral part ol cnsuring rcspcct lor thc lcgal status ol pcrsonncl, thc locus
ol this study will not bc on proccdural aspccts conditioning thc right to claim
rcparation. Nor will such aspccts, lor cxamplc, bc dcalt with in rclation to human
rights loras. Tc prcscnt work will instcad dcal primarily with thc substantivc
rulcs. !n this rcspcct thc tcrm protcction, lor thc purposc ol this analysis, could
bc dcfincd as the duty of states to prevent and punish wrongful acts against personnel
in peace operations corresponding to their legal status. Vhilc this duty lalls primarily
upon thc statc hosting a pcacc opcration, it has, through thc Salcty Convcntion,
bccomc clcvatcd lrom a national to a univcrsal lcvcl.
A statc that lails to protcct pcrsonncl prcscnt within its tcrritory might wcll
bc in brcach ol an intcrnational obligation, cithcr ol a trcatybascd or ol a cus
tomary law charactcr. Tc vcry naturc ol pcacc opcrations, howcvcr, mcans that
thc pcrsonncl conccrncd will bc dcploycd in arcas charactcriscd by human suffcr
ing, violcncc, possiblc armcd conflicts and chaos. !t is thcrclorc not uncommon
to find such a host statc not in control ol ccrtain arcas ol its tcrritory. !t may cvcn
bc that no govcrnmcntal authority at all cxists to cxcrcisc tcrritorial control. Tc
obligations ol thc host statc conccrncd must thus bc judgcd against thosc things
that arc practically possiblc in rclation to thc rcquircmcnts ol thc situation at
hand. Tis lact docs not altcr thc lcgal status ol thc pcrsonncl in qucstion but it
may affcct thcir lcgal protcction. !t is possiblc that a statc may not bc in brcach
ol its intcrnational obligations il it shows duc diligcncc in its cfforts to cnsurc thc
lcgal status ol pcrsonncl.
±o

Anothcr important aspcct in this rcgard is thc way pcrsonncl in pcacc opcr
ations arc pcrccivcd by thc local population. An cffcctivc protcction is probably
dcpcndcnt on thc lact that thc lcgal status ol thc pcrsonncl in qucstion appcars
as lcgitimatc by thc population within thc host statc. Tis could bc a particularly
important issuc in rclation to immunity lrom criminal jurisdiction ol thc host
statc. Anothcr arca ol conccrn lics in thc applicability ol intcrnational humani
tarian law in situations whcrc lorcc is uscd bctwccn a pcacc opcration’s military
Òpinion) .ooo, !C] Rcp 6a. Tcsc lattcr cascs arc ol grcat conccrn lor pcrsonncl rcp
rcscnting thc UN. Tcy arc dcalt with in Chaptcr ¡.a.
¡o !n thc Homc Missionary Socicty Claim thc Tribunal statcd, “!t is a wcllcstablishcd
principlc ol intcrnational law that no govcrnmcnt can bc hcld rcsponsiblc lor thc
act ol rcbcllious bodics ol mcn committcd in violation ol its authority, whcrc it is
itscll guilty ol no brcach ol good laith, or ol no ncgligcncc in supprcssing insurrcc
tion.” Homc Missionary Socicty Claim (Unitcd Statcs ol Amcrica v Grcat 8ritain)
(.oac) 6 Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ¡a. Howcvcr, it should bc notcd that thc standard
ol rcsponsibility dcpcnds on thc contcnt ol thc primary obligation in qucstion. Tcrc
is, lor cxamplc, no gcncral rulc in this rcspcct in thc !LC’s Ðralt Articlcs on Statc
Rcsponsibility ol acc.. Scc ]amcs Crawlord, Tc !ntcrnational Law Commission’s
Articlcs on Statc Rcsponsibility. !ntroduction, Tcxt and Commcntarics, ·a (acca).
.. Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
pcrsonncl and local opposition. ¡vcn il thcorctically sound, it is ol importancc
lor thc matcrialisation ol thc protcction that it is also pcrccivcd as such. Tc
bchaviour ol thc protcctcd pcrsonncl conccrncd is thcrclorc ol thc utmost impor
tancc. Any abusc ol thcir status could provc to bc dctrimcntal in rclation to thc
rcspcct shown towards thc opcration as a wholc.
Personnel
Currcnt pcacc opcrations includc a widc rangc ol lunctions involving an incrcas
ing numbcr ol civilians. An important catcgorisation ol pcrsonncl is that which
lalls bctwccn military and civilian pcrsonncl. Tc lattcr catcgory includcs pcr
sonncl rcprcscnting statcs, intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations (!GÒs)
and intcrnational nongovcrnmcntal organisations (NGÒs).
¡o
Rcprcscntativcs
ol statcs and !GÒs gcncrally cnjoy privilcgcs and immunitics in thc host statc.
Tc naturc and contcnt ol thcsc privilcgcs and immunitics may, howcvcr, vary.
Rcprcscntativcs ol NGÒs oltcn cnjoy only a basic lcgal status providcd, lor
cxamplc, by human rights law and intcrnational humanitarian law. !n prac
ticc, howcvcr, rcprcscntativcs ol NGÒs arc also accordcd ccrtain privilcgcs and
immunitics through agrccmcnts with intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations
– thc UN, lor cxamplc, as implcmcnting partncrs ol thc mandatc cntrustcd by
thc lattcr. !n pcacc opcrations ol a latcr datc intcrnational contractors oltcn cnjoy
protcction undcr applicablc SÒFAs. A usual rcquircmcnt is that thcy must bc
engaged by thc organisation lcading thc opcration.
¡+

Military pcrsonncl cithcr participatc as mcmbcrs ol national contingcnts, or
hold a position in thc opcration in thcir individual capacitics.
¡:
8oth catcgorics
rcprcscnt thc cntity lcading thc opcration but mcmbcrs ol national contingcnts
rcmain in thc national scrvicc ol thcir scnding statcs. !n gcncral tcrms thcir lcgal
status dcpcnds upon thc conclusion ol a SÒFA, whilc military officcrs cmploycd
in thcir various individual capacitics cnjoy privilcgcs and immunitics providcd lor
by intcrnational instrumcnts ol a diffcrcnt naturc.
Tc widc array ol activitics and pcrsonncl includcd in a contcmporary pcacc
opcration tcnds to makc it difficult to arrivc at a usclul and working dcfinition ol
pcrsonncl taking part in such opcrations. Tc draltcrs ol thc Salcty Convcntion
wcrc laccd with similar difficultics. Notwithstanding thcir diffcring lcgal statuscs,
thc Salcty Convcntion protccts “Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl”.
¡:
To
·c Pagani makcs a distinction bctwccn intcrnational staff, local staff and intcrnational
contractual pcrsonncl. Scc Fabrizio Pagani, Tc rccruitmcnt ol civilian pcrsonncl ol
pcacckccping opcrations, . International Peacekeeping, ¡., ¡¡ (.oo6).
·. Scc, lor cxamplc, Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and Sicrra Lconc
Conccrning thc Status ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission in Sicrra Lconc, Articlc .(g),
a..· UNTS .oc, (accc).
·a An cxamplc ol thc lattcr is military obscrvcrs.
·. “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” mcans: (i) Pcrsons cngagcd or dcploycd by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations as mcmbcrs ol thc military, policc or civilian compo
.¡ Chapter 1
qualily as UN or associatcd pcrsonncl it is ncccssary to show thc cxistcncc ol a
lormal conncction to a UN opcration. !n this rcspcct this study lollows thc cxam
plc ol thc Salcty Convcntion. Tc conccpt ol “pcacc opcration” is in this study,
howcvcr, in somc rcspccts widcr than a “Unitcd Nations opcration” and thc cat
cgorics ol pcrsonncl covcrcd arc thus corrcspondingly widcr.
Peace operations
Tc tcrm “pcacc opcration” is hcrc uscd as an ovcrall tcrm dcnoting thc widc rangc
ol activitics in support ol thc maintcnancc ol intcrnational pcacc and sccurity. !t
includcs opcrations ranging lrom traditional pcacckccping to pcacc cnlorccmcnt
opcrations, bascd upon a UN mandatc but not ncccssarily undcr UN command
and control. !n many rcspccts thc tcrm pcacc opcration, as applicd hcrc, is similar
to thc tcrm “Unitcd Nations opcration” in thc Salcty Convcntion.
¡±
!t is widcr,
howcvcr, sincc it docs not cxcludc opcrations conductcd by othcr intcrnational
organisations or statcs. !t is also narrowcr sincc thc tcrm “pcacc opcration” in this
work is primarily locuscd on opcrations involving a military componcnt. Tc tcr
minology in this arca, howcvcr, is vast, but it is possiblc to distinguish somc cat
cgorics ol pcacc opcration.
¡¡

According to thc Rcport ol thc Pancl on Unitcd Nations Pcacc Òpcrations
(8rahimi Rcport), pcacc opcrations includc “conflict prcvcntion and pcacc
ncnts ol a Unitcd Nations opcration, (ii) Òthcr officials and cxpcrts on mission ol
thc Unitcd Nations or its spccialiscd agcncics ol thc !ntcrnational Atomic ¡ncrgy
Agcncy who arc prcscnt in an official capacity in thc arca whcrc a Unitcd Nations
opcration is bcing conductcd, (b) “Associatcd pcrsonncl” mcans: (i) Pcrsons assigncd
by a Govcrnmcnt or an intcrgovcrnmcntal organisation with thc agrccmcnt ol thc
compctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd Nations, (ii) Pcrsons cngagcd by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations or by a spccialiscd agcncy or by thc !ntcrnational
Atomic ¡ncrgy Agcncy, (iii) Pcrsons dcploycd by a humanitarian nongovcrn
mcntal organisation or agcncy undcr an agrccmcnt with thc SccrctaryGcncral ol
thc Unitcd Nations or with a spccialiscd agcncy or with thc !ntcrnational Atomic
¡ncrgy Agcncy, to carry out activitics in support ol thc lulfilmcnt ol thc mandatc ol
a Unitcd Nations opcration, (Articlc .).
·¡ “Unitcd Nations opcration” mcans an opcration cstablishcd by thc compctcnt organ
ol thc Unitcd Nations in accordancc with thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations and
conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority and control: (i) Vhcrc thc opcration is
lor thc purposc ol maintaining or rcstoring intcrnational pcacc and sccurity, or (ii)
Vhcrc thc Sccurity Council or thc Gcncral Asscmbly has dcclarcd, lor thc purposcs
ol this Convcntion, that thcrc cxists an cxccptional risk to thc salcty ol thc pcrsonncl
participating in thc opcration, (Articlc .).
·· Ðurch, lor cxamplc, rclcrs to lour catcgorics ol pcacc opcrations: “traditional pcacc
kccping, multidimcnsional pcacc opcrations, humanitarian intcrvcntion, and pcacc
cnlorccmcnt”. Villiam ]. Ðurch, Kccping thc Pcacc: Politics and Lcssons ol thc
.oocs, in UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ., ..c
(Villiam ]. Ðurch, cd., .oo6).
.· Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
making, pcacckccping, and pcaccbuilding.”
¡6
8othc statcs that thc Sccrctary
Gcncral’s rcport An Agenda for Peace
¡·
including its supplcmcnt
¡8
and thc 8rahimi
Rcport on thc cvaluation ol pcacckccping “rcflcct a practicc ol opcrations, in thc
ncw tcrminology ‘pcacc opcrations’, ol a much morc complcx charactcr than thc
initial pcacckccping opcrations.”
¡o
As thc prcscnt study is primarily limitcd to
thosc opcrations that includc a military componcnt, pcacckccping opcrations (as
thc tcrm is uscd within thc UN systcm) arc ccntral to this thcsis. Pcacc opcra
tions also includc thosc opcrations mandatcd with cnlorccmcnt powcrs undcr
Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr. Tis study, howcvcr, stops short ol cascs whcrc
opcrations involvc pcrsonncl as a party to an armcd conflict.
Tc lcgality ol pcacckccping opcrations undcr thc UN Chartcr has bccn
approvcd by thc !C] in thc Certain Expenses Case and it is now bcyond doubt that
it lalls within thc compctcncc ol thc UN to cstablish such opcrations.
6o
Tc !C]
acknowlcdgcd that thc Gcncral Asscmbly had thc powcr to crcatc pcacckccping
lorccs, although not including cnlorccmcnt powcrs. Tc Sccurity Council, how
cvcr, is cmpowcrcd to cstablish pcacc opcrations with cnlorccmcnt powcrs undcr
Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr.
6+
Tc conccpt ol peacekeeping has dcvclopcd in
practicc and is undcrpinncd by thrcc basic principlcs:
6:
“conscnt ol thc partics,
impartiality and thc nonusc ol lorcc cxccpt in sclldclcncc.”
6:
!t was introduccd
by thc UN in .o·6 in a rcsponsc to thc Sucz crisis. A UN lorcc was dcploycd in
·6 Rcport ol thc Pancl on Unitcd Nations Pcacc Òpcrations, para. .c, UN Ðoc. A/··/.c·
– S/accc/·co (accc).
·· UN SccrctaryGcncral, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peace-keeping, UN Ðoc. A/¡·/a·· – S/a¡... (.ooa).
·· UN SccrctaryGcncral, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the
Secretary-General on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN
Ðoc. A/·c/6cS/.oo·/. (.oo·).
·o Michacl 8othc, Pcacckccping, Te Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, \ol.
., 6¡·, 66. (8runo Simma ct al cds., a
nd
cd., acca). Tc conclusions ol thc rcports havc
as a mattcr ol principlc bccn cndorscd by thc Sccurity Council. !bid.
6c Ccrtain ¡xpcnscs ol thc Unitcd Nations (Advisory Òpinion) .o6a, !C] Rcp ¡, .·..
6. Nigcl Ð. Vhitc, Tc UN Chartcr and Pcacckccping Forccs: Constitutional !ssucs, a
International Peacekeeping, ¡o (.oo·).
6a !t will, lrom a lcgal point ol vicw, lall somcwhcrc bctwccn Chaptcr \! and \!! ol
thc UN Chartcr. A pcacckccping opcration would bc ol a morc intcrlcring charactcr
than that is cnvisagcd undcr Chaptcr \! ol thc UN Chartcr but lcss intcrlcring than
cnlorccmcnt mcasurcs undcr Chaptcr \!!. Pcacckccping opcrations arc thcrclorc
at timcs rclcrrcd to as opcrations coming undcr thc imaginary Chaptcr \! ½. Scc
Òvc 8ring, FN-stadgan och världspolitiken: Om folkrättens roll i en föränderlig värld,
.· (¡
th
cd., acca). !n practicc, howcvcr, traditional pcacckccping opcrations arc oltcn
rclcrrcd to as “Chaptcr \! opcrations” and thosc involving cnlorccmcnt mcasurcs
“Chaptcr \!! opcrations”. Tc UN has no lorccs ol its own and cach opcration is
dcpcndcnt on voluntary contributions ol mcmbcr statcs.
6. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, para. ... Nigcl Ð. Vhitc, Keeping the Peace, a.a
a¡¡ (.oo·).
.6 Chapter 1
¡gypt with thc task to “sccurc and supcrvisc thc ccssation ol hostilitics”

and
lunctioncd as an intcrpositionary lorcc bctwccn ¡gypt and !sracl. 8cing a ncutral
body that both partics could rcly on, thc UN lorccs lunctioncd as a tool put at thc
disposal ol thc warring statcs. !n this rcspcct, thc UN lorccs contributcd to thc
proccss ol improving lcvcls ol confidcncc bctwccn thc partics, and in thc cnd to
a pcacclul rcsolution ol thc conflict. !n opcrations whcrc military lorcc has bccn
rcquircd to act as a buffcr bctwccn warring partics, thc adhcrcncc to thcsc basic
principlcs appcars to havc gcncrally workcd wcll.


Howcvcr, by thc cnd ol thc Cold Var thc UN had takcn on a much grcatcr
rcsponsibility in rclation to opcrations both in volumc and ambition.
66
Òpcrations,
known as second-generation peace-keeping,

bccamc multilunctional and includcd
a widc varicty ol actors, oltcn with a largc civilian componcnt.
68
Such opcra
tions havc also bccn dcscribcd as, lor cxamplc, expanded peacekeeping or wider
peacekeeping.
6o
Tc rolc ol thc pcrsonncl cngagcd in such opcrations has bccn
cxplaincd as onc whcrc thcy arc “mandatcd to scck just and lasting rcsolutions”
ol a conflict, in contrast to carlicr opcrations whcrc thc pcrsonncl conccrncd had
6¡ GA Rcs. oo· (¡S!) (.o·6).
6· Scc c.g. Unitcd Nations Pcacckccping Forcc in Cyprus (UN!F!CYP) SC Rcs. .·6,
UN SCÒR, ..ca
nd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·6 (.o6¡), Unitcd Nations ¡mcrgcncy
Forcc !! (UN¡F !!) SC Rcs. .¡c, UN SCÒR, .··c
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡c(.o·.),
Unitcd Nations Ðiscngagcmcnt Òbscrvcr Forcc (UNÐÒF) SC Rcs. .·c, UN SCÒR,
.··¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·c (.o·¡), Unitcd Nations !ntcrim Forcc in Lcbanon
(UN!F!L) SC Rcs. ¡a·, UN SCÒR, ac·¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/¡a· (.o··).
66 !n .o··, .. .a. pcrsonncl (military, policc and civilian) wcrc dcploycd in UN pcacc
kccping opcrations and in Ðcccmbcr .oo¡, ·· ··. pcrsonncl wcrc dcploycd. Te Blue
Helmets, ¡.
6· Ratncr dcfincs sccondgcncration opcrations as “UN opcrations, authorizcd by
political organs or thc SccrctaryGcncral, rcsponsiblc lor ovcrsccing or cxccuting
thc political solution ol an intcrstatc or intcrnal conflict, with thc conscnt ol thc par
tics”. Stcvcn R. Ratncr, Te New UN Peacekeeping. Building Peace in Lands of Conflict
After the Cold War, .· (.oo·).
6· Scc Te Blue Helmets, ·. Michacl, V. Ðoylc, !an ]ohnstonc, and Robcrt C. Òrr,
!ntroduction, Kccping thc pcacc, in Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia
and El Salvador, ., .· (Michacl, V. Ðoylc, !an ]ohnstonc, and Robcrt C. Òrr ¡ds.,
Ðoylc, ]ohnstonc, and Òrr, .oo·). A. 8. Fcthcrston, Towards a Teory of United
Nations Peacekeeping, a.a¡ (.oo¡). ¡xamplcs arc Unitcd Nations Angola \crification
Mission ! – !!! (UNA\¡M ! !!!), SC Rcs. 6a6, UN SCÒR, a·.¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc.
S/R¡S/6a6 (.o··), SC Rcs. 6o6, UN SCÒR, aoo.
st
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/6o6 (.oo.),
SC Rcs. o·6, UN SCÒR, .¡oo
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/o·6 (.oo·), Unitcd Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), SC Rcs. ·¡·, UN SCÒR, .c··
th

mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·¡· (.ooa), Unitcd Nations Mission in Haiti (UNM!H) SC
Rcs. ·6·, UN SCÒR, .a·a
nd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·6· (.oo.).
6o Scc, c.g. Trcvor Findlay, Te Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, ·6 (acca), and
Francois Hampson, Statc’s military opcrations authorizcd by thc Unitcd Nations
and intcrnational humanitarian law, in Te United Nations and International
Humanitarian Law, .··6 (Luigi Condorclli, cd., .oo·).
.· Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
“studiously avoidcd tackling thc root causcs ol armcd conflict in lavour ol con
tainmcnt and dccscalation”.
·o
Somctimcs this typc ol opcration is also charac
tcriscd by a lack ol conscnt by partics in thc mission arca, which do not rcprcscnt
thc host statc. Hampson has dcscribcd this kind ol opcration, with rcgard to thc
qucstion ol conscnt, that “|o|pcrational conscnt must bc prcscnt but tactical or
local conscnt may bc lacking.”
·+

From bcing largcly intcrnational in charactcr, thc grcat majority ol armcd
conflicts during thc .oocs and up to thc timc ol writing wcrc nonintcrnational
in charactcr. As a rcsult, UN opcrations havc primarily bccn dcploycd in thc
arca ol internal conflict, such as Somalia,
·:
thc lormcr Yugoslavia,
·:
Cambodia,
·±

Mozambiquc,
·¡
Haiti
·6
and Rwanda.
··
Tc naturc ol conflict has madc it difficult
to hold on to thc principlcs ol conscnt, impartiality and thc usc ol lorcc in scll
dclcncc.
·8
A sustaincd lack ol disciplinc among rival lorccs, oltcn accompanicd
by thc objcctivc ol cxtcrminating or othcrwisc rcmoving pcoplc ol a particu
lar cthnic, rcligious or cultural group, which in itscll contravcncs intcrnational
·c Findlay, ·. Ratncr asscrts that |w|hilc thc carlicr missions primarily sought to mini
mizc cxtcrnal conflict by monitoring ccascfircs, thc latcst cfforts strivc to advancc
morc lundamcntal goals: civil ordcr and domcstic tranquillity, human rights, lrom
thosc most basic to human dignity to thosc cmpowcring a pcoplc to choosc its gov
crnmcnt, and cconomic and social dcvclopmcnt.” Ratncr, ..
·. Hampson, .··. Somc authors also rclcr to a third gcncration ol pcacckccping.
Against thc background ol thc cxpcricnccs ol UNÒSÒM !!, opcrations authoriscd
to usc lorcc bcyond thc conccpt ol sclldclcncc havc bccn rcgardcd as thirdgcn
cration pcacckccping. Mari Katayanagi, Human Rights Functions of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, ·.a (acca).
·a Unitcd Nations Òpcration in Somalia !!! (UNÒSÒM !!!), SC Rcs. ··., UN
SCÒR, .c6o
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/··. (.ooa), SC Rcs. ·.¡, UN SCÒR, ..··
th

mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·.¡ (.oo.).
·. Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc (UNPRÒFÒR) SC Rcs. ·¡., UN SCÒR, .c··
th

mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·¡. (.ooa).
·¡ Unitcd Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), SC Rcs. ·¡·, UN
SCÒR, .c··
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·¡· (.ooa).
·· Unitcd Nations Òpcration in Mozambiquc (ÒNUMÒZ), SC Rcs. ·o·, UN SCÒR,
..¡o
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·o· (.oo·).
·6 Unitcd Nations Mission in Haiti (UNM!H) SC Rcs. ·6·, UN SCÒR, .a·a
nd
mtg.,
UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·6· (.oo.).
·· Unitcd Nations Assistancc Mission lor Rwanda (UNAM!R), SC Rcs. ··a, UN
SCÒR, .a··
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/··a (.oo.).
·· According to thc Pancl on Unitcd Nations Pcacc Òpcrations, thcsc principlcs havc
bccn challcngcd, in thc contcxt ol modcrn pcacc opcrations dcploycd in intcrnal
conflicts, by socallcd spoilcrs who scck to undcrminc thc pcacc proccss. Tc princi
plcs ol conscnt, impartiality and usc ol lorcc in sclldclcncc should, howcvcr, accord
ing to thc Pancl ‘rcmain thc bcdrock principlcs ol pcacckccping’. Rcport ol thc Pancl
on Unitcd Nations Pcacc Òpcrations, Part a, para. ¡·. Scc paras. a.aa, and ¡··· at
http://www.un.org/pcacc/rcports/pcacc_opcrations/docs/parta.htm.
.· Chapter 1
humanitarian law, rcsultcd in a dctcriorating sccurity situation lor UN pcrson
ncl.
Tc Sccurity Council bascs peace enforcement operations on a Chaptcr \!!
rcsolution.
·o
UN Sccurity Council rcsolutions that providc an opcration with a
pcacc cnlorccmcnt mandatc arc commonly charactcriscd by thc tcrminology ol
“thc usc ol all ncccssary mcans” to lulfil a sct ol dcfincd tasks.
8o
Tc principal cri
tcria ol traditional pcacckccping opcrations do not as such apply to pcacc cnlorcc
mcnt opcrations. !n pcacc cnlorccmcnt opcrations, thc consent ol thc host nation
conccrncd is not ncccssary. !n practicc, howcvcr, it is sought, and oltcn rcccivcd.
8+

A Chaptcr \!! mandatc providcs pcacc opcration lorccs with thc authority to
cnlorcc thc tasks cntrustcd to thcm, irrcspcctivc ol thc conscnt ol thc host nation.
Tc lorccs thcrclorc maintain a strong position in rclation to thc host nation. Tc
critcrion ol conscnt is thc principal dividc bctwccn war and pcacc. So long as
pcacc opcration lorccs arc prcscnt with thc conscnt ol thc host nation, thcy will
not simultancously bc cngagcd in armcd conflict with that nation. Tc conscnt ol
thc host nation is thcrclorc ol lundamcntal importancc to thc lcgal status ol thc
lorccs. !l pcacc opcration lorccs arc drawn into armcd conflict, lor cxamplc, with
rcsistancc movcmcnts prcscnt in thc tcrritory ol thc host nation, thc lcgal posi
tion ol thosc lorccs visavis thc host nation will not bc affcctcd. Tc capability
ol thc host nation to guarantcc thc rights ol pcrsonncl undcr applicablc SÒFAs
may, howcvcr, bc rcstrictcd in arcas whcrc it docs not cxcrcisc cffcctivc control.
Impartiality is a conscqucncc ol thc dcpcndcncy ol conscntcritcrion. ¡vcn
though impartiality is somcthing to strivc lor, it is, in lact, not indispcnsablc in
a pcacc cnlorccmcnt opcration. Tc vcry naturc ol pcacc cnlorccmcnt opcra
tions gocs bcyond self-defence limitations on thc usc ol lorcc. !t should bc notcd,
howcvcr, that thc principlc ol sclldclcncc has bccn givcn a widc intcrprctation
by thc UN. !t has rcpcatcdly bccn statcd that sclldclcncc includcs “rcsistancc to
·o Tc Sccurity Council has thc right to takc cnlorccmcnt mcasurcs against any mcmbcr
ol thc UN whcn it finds that a situation poscs a thrcat to intcrnational pcacc and
sccurity according to Articlc .o ol thc UN Chartcr. Òn thc practicc ol thc Sccurity
Council in this rcspcct, scc !ngcr Östcrdahl, Treat to the peace: the interpretation by
the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter (.oo·).
·c Scc c.g., SC Rcs. ·o¡, UN SCÒR, ..¡·
th
mtg., para. .c, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·o¡ (.ooa),
(Somalia), SC Rcs. oao, UN SCÒR, ..oa
nd
mtg., para. ., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/oao (.oo¡),
(Rwanda).
·. Scc c.g., ¡ast Timor, SC Rcs. .a6¡, UN SCÒR, ¡c¡·
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.a6¡
(.ooo), Haiti, pcacclul dcploymcnt ol thc USlcd multinational lorcc, SC Rcs. o¡¡, UN
SCÒR, .¡.c
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/o¡¡ (.oo¡), thc Military Tcchnical Agrccmcnt
bctwccn KFÒR and thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol Yugoslavia and thc Rcpublic ol Scrbia
at http://www.nato.int/klor/klor/documcnts/mta.htm, and thc Gcncral Framcwork
Agrccmcnt lor Pcacc in 8osniaHcrzcgovina at http://www.nato.int/ilor/gla/gla
homc.htm.
.o Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
attcmpts by lorcclul mcans to prcvcnt it lrom discharging its dutics undcr thc
mandatc ol thc Sccurity Council”.
8:
Although pcacc opcration lorccs may not initially act as combatants in an
armcd conflict, thc naturc ol thcir tasks and thc cnvironmcnt in which thcy act
may havc thc cffcct ol drawing thcm into an armcd conflict and thus bccom
ing combatants undcr intcrnational humanitarian law. Tc situation may bccomc
vcry difficult to dctcrminc in cascs whcrc thcrc is no govcrnmcnt in officc to
cxcrcisc control ovcr its tcrritory and whcrc thcrc is no countcrpart lrom which
to obtain conscnt.
Tc opcrations against North Korca
8:
and !raq,

dccidcd undcr Chaptcr
\!! ol thc UN Chartcr, arc dcfincd as enforcement operations. Tcy arc cxamplcs ol
opcrations cstablishcd against thc will ol thc targct statcs (North Korca and !raq
clcarly did not conscnt). !n thcsc opcrations thcrc wcrc idcntificd cncmics, and
thc laws ol war applicd uncquivocally to thc usc ol lorcc by thc UNmandatcd
coalitions. Pcacc cnlorccmcnt opcrations conductcd upon thc basis ol conscnt ol
thc host nation takc on thc charactcr ol robust policc opcrations rathcr than ol
military lorccs cngagcd in armcd conflict.


Command and control
Sincc thc mid.oocs, it has bccn thc practicc to authorisc coalitions ol thc will
ing, rcgional organisations or singlc statcs to carry out opcrations bascd upon a
·a Scc c.g. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc implcmcntation ol Sccurity Council
rcsolution .¡c (.o·.), UN Ðoc. S/..c·a/Rcv. . (.o·.) and Rcport ol thc Sccrctary
Gcncral on thc implcmcntation ol Sccurity Council rcsolution ¡a· (.o··), UN Ðoc.
S/.a6.. (.o··).
·. SC Rcs. ·¡, UN SCÒR, ¡·6
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·¡ (.o·c) |S/.···|.
·¡ SC Rcs. 6··, UN SCÒR, ao6.
rd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/6·· (.ooc).
·· A study ol thc pcacckccping doctrincs ol thc Unitcd Kingdom, Unitcd Statcs and
Francc shows thcsc statcs’ cfforts to comc to tcrms with thc problcms conncctcd with
thc ncw charactcr ol conflicts whcrc thc conscnt ol thc partics is limitcd. !t is pos
siblc to distinguish thrcc pillars (with somc variations), i) traditional pcacckccping,
ii) pcacc cnlorccmcnt, iii) war. Tc first pillar is bascd upon Chaptcr \! ol thc UN
Chartcr and thc usc ol lorcc is limitcd to sclldclcncc. Pillars ii) and iii) arc bascd
upon Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr, involving cnlorccmcnt mcasurcs and lorcc is
pcrmittcd bcyond thc conccpt ol sclldclcncc. Tc third pillar (war) is diffcrcnt lrom
thc othcr two in that it involvcs a dcsignatcd cncmy. Scc, Pctcr \iggo ]akobscn Tc
¡mcrging Conscnsus on Grcy Arca Pcacc Òpcrations Ðoctrinc: Vill !t Last and
¡nhancc Òpcrational ¡ffcctivcncss:, 7 International Peacekeeping, ¡. (accc).
ac Chapter 1
mandatc ol thc Sccurity Council,
86
such as in 8osniaHcrzcgovina,

Kosovo,
88

Rwanda,
8o
¡ast Timor
oo
and Alghanistan.
o+
Tis practicc has brought to thc lorc
qucstions on thc cxcrcisc ol command and control ovcr such opcrations. Tc
cxcrcisc ol command and control, morcovcr, is an indication ol thc cxtcnt to
which pcrsonncl should bc rcgardcd as agcnts ol thc cntity lcading thc opcration
and whcthcr or not thcir actions arc imputablc to that cntity.
o:
!t is thc position ol
thc UN “that liability lor damagc causcd by mcmbcrs ol Unitcd Nations Forccs is
attributablc to thc Òrganisation”.
o:
Tc UN docs not, howcvcr, rccognisc liability
lor combatrclatcd activitics unlcss it cxcrciscs cxclusivc command and control
ovcr thc opcration in qucstion.

!n cascs whcrc thc Sccurity Council has author
iscd a Chaptcr \!! opcration to bc “conductcd undcr national command and
control, intcrnational rcsponsibility lor thc activitics ol thc lorcc is vcstcd in thc
Statc or Statcs conducting thc opcration”.


Rcsponsibility undcr intcrnational law lor statcs or intcrnational organisa
tions lor pcacc opcration activitics is a complcx issuc and bcyond thc scopc ol
this work.
o6
Tc cxcrcisc ol command and control, howcvcr, is also ol importancc
·6 Ðaphna Shraga, Tc Unitcd Nations as an actor bound by intcrnational humani
tarian law, in Te United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, .a· (Luigi
Condorclli, cd., .oo·).
·· Tc NATÒlcd !mplcmcntation Forcc (!FÒR), SC Rcs. .c.., UN SCÒR, .6c·
th

mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.c.. (.oo·).
·· Tc NATÒlcd Kosovo Forcc (KFÒR) SC Rcs. .a¡¡, UN SCÒR, ¡c..
th
mtg., UN
Ðoc. S/R¡S/.a¡¡ (.ooo).
·o Tc Frcnchlcd Òpcration Turquoisc in Rwanda assisting thc Unitcd Nations
Mission in Rwanda (UNAM!R), SC Rcs. oao, UN SCÒR, ..oa
nd
mtg., UN Ðoc.
S/R¡S/oao (.oo¡).
oc Tc Australialcd !ntcrnational Forcc in ¡ast Timor (!NT¡RF¡T) in ¡ast Timor
SC Rcs. .a6¡, UN SCÒR, ¡c¡·
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.a6¡ (.ooo).
o. Tc, initially, UKlcd !ntcrnational Sccurity Assistancc Forcc (!SAF) SC Rcs. ..·6,
UN SCÒR, ¡¡¡.
rd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/..·6 (acc.).
oa !C] has dcclarcd an “agcnt” to bc “any pcrson who, whcthcr paid official or not,
or hclping to carry out, onc ol its lunctions – in short, any pcrson whom it acts.”
Reparation Case, .··. !n thc Nicaragua Case, thc !C] rcquircd, in principlc, thc cxcrcisc
ol “cffcctivc control” ovcr military lorccs in ordcr lor thc acts ol such lorccs to givc
risc to intcrnational rcsponsibility ol thc statc in qucstion. Military and Paramilitary
Activitics in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v Unitcd Statcs ol Amcrica) (Mcrits)
.o·6, !C] Rcp .¡, para. ..·.
o. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Financing thc Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc, thc
Unitcd Nations Confidcncc Rcstoration Òpcration in Croatia, thc Unitcd Nations
Prcvcntivc Ðcploymcnt Forcc and thc Unitcd Nations Pcacc Forccs Hcadquartcrs,
paras. 6·, UN Ðoc. A/·./.·o (.oo6).
o¡ !bid., para. .6.
o· !bid.
o6 Scc Final Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Association, 8crlin Conlcrcncc
Accountability of International Organisations, a. (acc¡), Nicls 8lokkcr, !s thc
a. Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
in ordcr to cstablish thc naturc ol thc spccial protcction whcrc, no agrccmcnt on
thc lcgal status ol pcrsonncl would at thc timc havc bccn concludcd with thc host
nation. Should thc pcrsonncl bc considcrcd agcnts ol thc organisation, or statc(s),
lcading

thc opcration or ol thcir statc ol nationality: !s it in such cascs possi
blc to rcly on thc customary law ol diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics or thc
privilcgcs and immunitics ol an intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisation: Tis
work docs not purport to cxaminc all UNauthoriscd opcrations lrom a com
mand and control pcrspcctivc.
o8
Sufficc to say, it is thc cxcrcisc ol command and
control that has to bc cxamincd in cach casc to asccrtain whcthcr or not thc pcr
sonncl conccrncd arc agcnts ol thc cntity lcading thc opcration or ol thcir statc
ol nationality.
oo

1.3 Procedural Mechanisms
Undcr this hcading, thc right ol statcs and intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisa
tions to claim rcparation lor injurious acts against its citizcns, or agcnts, in thc
statc hosting a pcacc opcration, is discusscd. To bc ablc to find out whcthcr or
not a citizcn, or agcnt, has bccn maltrcatcd it is ncccssary to judgc thc bchav
iour ol thc host statc against a rclcvant standard ol trcatmcnt. Undcr thc law ol
diplomatic protcction, thc standard ol trcatmcnt that has dcvclopcd in practicc
is known as thc intcrnational minimum standard. Tis standard is today largcly
rcflcctcd in thc intcrnational human rights law. !l a citizcn, or agcnt, is cntitlcd
to a highcr lcvcl ol protcction, such as privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in a
Authorization Authorizcd: Powcrs and Practicc ol thc UN Sccurity Council to
Authorizc thc Usc ol Forcc by ‘Coalitions ol thc Ablc and Villing’, .. EJIL, ·¡., ·¡·
(accc).
o· Tc tcrm “lcading” docs in this rcspcct not imply lull command and control ovcr thc
opcration.
o· According to thc UN, thc principlc in joint opcrations is that “intcrnational rcspon
sibility lor thc conduct ol thc troops lics whcrc opcrational command and control
is vcstcd according to thc arrangcmcnts cstablishing thc modalitics ol coopcration
bctwccn thc Statc or Statcs providing thc troops and thc Unitcd Nations”. Rcport ol
thc SccrctaryGcncral, Financing thc Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc, para. .·.
oo Tc Artcmis opcration may bc takcn as an cxamplc ol an opcration involving
complcx command and control issucs. 8ascd upon a Chaptcr \!!mandatc ol thc
Sccurity Council, dircctcd to mcmbcr statcs, thc multinational opcration Artemis
was launchcd by thc ¡U to support thc pcacc proccss in thc Ðcmocratic Rcpublic
ol thc Congo in closc coordination with thc UN opcration MÒNUC. Francc actcd
as thc “Framcwork nation” with thc opcrational hcadquartcrs bascd in Paris. Undcr
thc rcsponsibility ol thc Council, political control and stratcgic dircction ol thc
opcration was cxcrciscd by thc ¡U’s Political and Sccurity Committcc. Scc oo··/c.
(Prcssc .·6), 8russcls, · ]unc acc., Adoption by thc Council ol thc ]oint Action
on thc ¡uropcan Union military opcration in thc Ðcmocratic Rcpublic ol Congo
(ÐRC), and SC Rcs. .¡·¡, UN SCÒR, ¡·6¡
th
mtg., paras. . and ¡, UN Ðoc. S/
R¡S/.¡·¡ (acc.).
aa Chapter 1
multilatcral or bilatcral trcaty, thc rclcvant standard ol trcatmcnt is thus corrc
spondingly highcr.
+oo

1.3.1 Diplomatic Protection
Ðiplomatic protcction is primarily a mcchanism to salcguard thc intcrcsts ol a
statc whcn its citizcns havc bccn maltrcatcd in a lorcign statc.
+o+
Ðiplomatic pro
tcction as a disciplinc ol intcrnational law has traditionally bccn trcatcd undcr thc
hcading ol statc rcsponsibility.
+o:
!n principlc, statc rcsponsibility lor injurics to
alicns mcans that any statc admitting pcrsons into its tcrritory has a lcgal rcspon
sibility lor thcir protcction, cvcn though thc naturc ol this obligation may vary
according to circumstanccs.
+o:
From thc standpoint ol thc statc having citizcns
abroad, thc institution ol diplomatic protcction has bccn dcscribcd as “csscntially
a proccdural dcvicc dcsigncd to triggcr thc application ol thc substantivc law
govcrning thc Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor !njurics to Alicns.”
+o±

8clorc thc Sccond Vorld Var, and thc dcvclopmcnt ol convcntional human
rights law, thcrc was no codificd standard according to which statcs should trcat
alicns. Historically, disputcs conccrning injurics to alicns havc bccn dccidcd by
intcrnational tribunals and claims commissions, which havc produccd a juris
prudcncc through which an intcrnational minimum standard has cmcrgcd. Tc
.cc !t should bc notcd that thc law ol diplomatic, or lunctional, protcction conccrns
thrcc lcvcls ol lcgal rclations: that bctwccn thc host statc and thc scnding statc (or
intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisation), that bctwccn thc scnding statc (or intcr
national govcrnmcntal organisation) and thc individual in qucstion, and thc host
statc and thc individual in qucstion. Carmcn Tiburcio, Te Human Rights of Aliens
under International and Comparative Law, 666· (acc.). Tiburcio spcaks ol diplo
matic protcction in gcncral and thus docs not rclcr to thc casc ol pcacc opcrations.
.c. Tc right ol diplomatic protcction is a right lor statcs and not individuals. !t lalls
within thc cxclusivc discrction ol thc statc whcthcr or not it dccidcs to cxcrcisc its
right ol diplomatic protcction. Scc C. F. Amcrasinghc, State Responsibility for Injuries
to Aliens, ·66. (.o66).
.ca !t may thcn bc hcld rcsponsiblc by thc injurcd statc and compcllcd to makc rcpa
ration. Tc obligation to makc rcparation is rcgardcd as thc corc principlc ol statc
rcsponsibility and is wcll cstablishcd in customary intcrnational law. Tc Pcrmancnt
Court ol !ntcrnational ]usticc (PC!]) has confirmcd its lundamcntal charactcr. !n
thc Chorzów Factory Case (!ndcmnity) (Mcrits) it commcntcd “… it is a principlc
ol intcrnational law, and cvcn a gcncral conccption ol law, that any brcach ol an
cngagcmcnt involvcs an obligation to makc rcparation.” Scc Casc Conccrning thc
Factory at Chorzów (Gcrmany v Poland) PC!] Rcp Scrics A. No .· at ao (.oa·).
.c. Tc “obligation to makc rcparation” rclcrs mainly to thc consequences lacing thc statc
which brcachcs an intcrnational obligation and thc possibilitics availablc lor thc
injurcd statc to rcccivc compcnsation. Tc naturc and contcnt ol thc obligations has
not rcccivcd thc samc attcntion.
.c¡ Richard Lillich, Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens, .6. RdC, .ao, .··,
(.o··!!!).
a. Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
intcrnational minimum standard has not bccn codificd, and thc asscssmcnt ol its
contcnt rcquircs an cxamination ol somc ccntral dccisions ol tribunals and com
missions. !n many rcspccts, thc intcrnational minimum standard is closcly rclatcd
to thc rcsponsibility ol statcs and thc acts ol thcir officials. An asscssmcnt ol
thc rclcvant standard, thcrclorc, will also involvc thcsc aspccts. Tc intcrnational
minimum standard rcquircs, inter alia, thc prcvcntion and punishmcnt ol crimi
nal acts committcd against alicns, an obligation, cstablishcd in customary law,
and in many rcspccts rcscmbling thc dutics stipulatcd in thc Salcty Convcntion.
Tc protcction ol lorcigncrs has strong traditions.
+o¡
!n his trcatisc on Te
Law of Nations, ¡mmcrich dc \attcl lormulatcd a thcsis on thc protcction ol citi
zcns abroad. Hc statcd:
Vhocvcr illtrcats a citizcn indircctly injurcs thc Statc, which must protcct
that citizcn. Tc Sovcrcign ol thc injurcd citizcn must avcngc thc dccd and, il
possiblc, lorcc thc aggrcssor to givc lull satislaction or punish him, sincc oth
crwisc thc citizcn will not obtain thc chicl cnd ol civil socicty, which is pro
tcction.
+o6
Tc obvious risk ol abusc by a strong statc ol a wcakcr onc gavc risc to objcctions
against this thcsis.
+o·
Òpposition against thc practicc ol diplomatic protcction
.c· !n thc Middlc Agcs, an individual sccking rcdrcss lor injurics allcgcdly donc to him
had thc opportunity ol cngaging in scllhclp, or to obtain a socallcd lcttcr ol rcprisal
lrom his hcad ol statc. A lcttcr ol rcprisal would havc thc cffcct, to a ccrtain cxtcnt, ol
lcgalising thc action. Morc importantly, it providcd a thcorctical conncction bctwccn
thc injurcd alicn and his homc statc. !n that scnsc, thc disputc translcrrcd lrom thc
national law lcvcl to thc intcrnational law lcvcl. Tc disputc, thcrclorc, bccamc in
a scnsc a disputc bctwccn statcs. Tc systcm with lcttcrs ol rcprisals that could bc
issucd by thc rulcr to his citizcns was obviously somcthing that could bc abuscd and
did not support lricndly rclations with othcr statcs. For thcsc rcasons, modifications
ol both a customary as wcll as a trcatybascd naturc bcgan to cvolvc. Tc purposc
was to put rcstrictions on thc possibilitics ol cxccuting rcprisals. !t inter alia took thc
lorm ol a nccd to dcmonstratc by thc allcgcdly injurcd citizcn, lor his rulcr, that his
causc was a just onc. Hc could, morcovcr, bc rcquircd to show that hc had tricd, but
lailcd, to obtain rcdrcss undcr thc law ol thc host statc. Scc Richard 8. Lillich, Tc
Human Rights ol Alicns in Contcmporary !ntcrnational Law, · (.o·¡).
.c6 ¡mmcrich dc \attcl, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la con-
duite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains, !!!, ..6 (translation ol thc cdition
ol .··· by Charlcs G., Fcnwick .o.6). According to Ðunn, “this cclcbratcd passagc
is lrcqucntly citcd as thc rcal basis ol thc practicc ol diplomatic protcction ol citi
zcns abroad.” Frcdcrick Shcrwood Ðunn, Te Protection of Nationals: a Study in the
Application of International Law, ¡· (.o.a).
.c· !ntcrcstingly, \attcl also providcd support lor thosc who sought to rcstrict diplo
matic protcction. Conccrning thc cxclusivcncss ol thc sovcrcign’s jurisdiction ovcr
his tcrritory, \attcl claimcd: “Sovcrcignty lollowing upon owncrship givcs a Nation
jurisdiction ovcr thc tcrritory which bclongs to it. !t is thc part ol thc Nation, or ol its
sovcrcign, to cnlorcc justicc throughout his tcrritory subjcct to it, to takc cognizancc
a¡ Chapter 1
bcgan to grow in Latin Amcrica. !n .·6·, thc Argcntincan Carlos Calvo pub
lishcd an cxtcnsivc trcatisc on thc law ol nations. Hc argucd that lorcigncrs could
not cxpcct a supcrior lorm ol trcatmcnt comparcd with that ol thc citizcns ol thc
country conccrncd and that an intcrnational rcsponsibility could not bc incurrcd
by a statc that pcrmittcd lorcigncrs acccss to thc courts in thc samc way as its
citizcns. His vicws camc to bc known as thc Calvo Ðoctrinc, and lound cxtcnsivc
support among Latin Amcrican statcs.
+o8
8y thc cnd ol thc cightccnth ccntury, thc Unitcd Statcs and Grcat 8ritain
includcd in thc ]ay Trcaty ol .·o¡ (namcd altcr ]ohn ]ay, thc first chicl justicc
ol thc US Suprcmc Court) provisions lor thc cstablishmcnt ol thrcc arbitration
commissions. !t was thc bcginning ol thc modcrn cra ol intcrnational arbitration
and thc bilatcral ]ay trcatics camc to havc a significant influcncc on thc dcvclop
mcnt ol diplomatic protcction in intcrnational law.
+oo
Ad hoccstablishcd claims
commissions during thc ninctccnth ccntury considcrably dcvclopcd thc juris
prudcncc ol thc subjcct.
++o
Tc publication in .o.· ol 8orchard’s trcatisc on Te
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad causcd thc subjcct to bc rccogniscd as a
scparatc branch ol intcrnational law.
+++

Tc Unitcd Nations !ntcrnational Law Commission (!LC) had consid
crcd at its first scssion that “Tc Law ol Statc Rcsponsibility” was onc ol .¡
ol crimcs committcd thcrcin, and ol thc diffcrcnccs arising bctwccn thc citizcns.
Òthcr Nations must rcspcct this right, and as thc administration ol justicc ncccssar
ily rcquircs that cvcry scntcncc, pronounccd in duc lorm and by thc court ol thc last
rcsort, bc rcgardcd as and cxccutcd as such, whcn oncc a casc in which lorcigncrs arc
involvcd has bccn dccidcd in duc lorm, thc sovcrcign ol thc litigants may not rcvicw
thc dccision. To undcrtakc to inquirc into thc justicc ol a dcfinitivc scntcncc is an
attack upon thc jurisdiction ol thc court which passcd it. Hcncc a sovcrcign should
not intcrlcrc in thc suits ol his subjccts in lorcign countrics nor grant thcm his pro
tcction, cxccpt in cascs whcrc justicc has bccn dcnicd or thc dccision is clcarly and
palpably unjust, or thc propcr proccdurc has not bccn obscrvcd, or finally, in cascs
whcrc his subjccts, or lorcigncrs in gcncral, havc bccn discriminatcd against…. Tc
principlc may bc acccptcd without any rclcrcncc to thc mcrits ol thc particular casc
which turncd on thc lacts involvcd.” \attcl, ..o.
.c· Ðunn, ·6.
.co !bid., ·a·..
..c Claims commissions wcrc sct up bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Mcxico undcr
thc convcntions ol .·.o, .·¡·, .·6· and .oa.. Similar commissions wcrc cstablishcd
bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Grcat 8ritain undcr thc convcntions ol .··., .··., and
.oc·.
... !n thc Unitcd Statcs, thc titlc ol thc work camc to bc known as thc tcchnical
namc lor thc subjcct, and cvcn his classification and tcrminology bccamc gcncrally
acccptcd. Scc Ðunn, 6c. Tc traditional law on thc trcatmcnt ol alicns, naturally, did
not dcal with protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. !ts primary aim was rathcr
to maintain “a unificd cconomic and social ordcr lor thc conduct ol intcrnational
tradc and intcrcoursc” Ðunn, ., Lillich .6·.
a· Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
topics ripc lor codification.
++:
Up until thc rcports by thc spccial rapportcur, Ðr
GarcíaAmador, bctwccn .o·6 and .o6.,
++:
thcy had dcalt cxclusivcly with Statc
Rcsponsibility lor !njurics to Alicns. Vith thc appointmcnt ol spccial rapportcur
Ago to thc !LC, thcrc was a shilt ol locus to a morc gcncral approach on thc law
ol statc rcsponsibility.
++±
Tis gcncral approach is illustratcd by thc sct ol dralt
articlcs adoptcd by thc !LC in acc..
++¡
Howcvcr, in .o6·, 8ishop wrotc on thc
topic ol statc rcsponsibility that
..a Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission to thc Gcncral Asscmbly, Yearbook of
the International Law Commission, !!, a··, a·., (.o¡o). !n Scptcmbcr .oa·, thc Asscmbly
ol thc Lcaguc ol Nations had submittcd thrcc subjccts to an intcrnational conlcr
cncc on thc codification ol intcrnational law. Ònc ol thcsc was thc rcsponsibility ol
statcs lor damagc donc in thcir tcrritorics to thc pcrson or propcrty ol lorcigncrs.
Fortyscvcn statcs (including cight statcs not mcmbcrs ol thc Lcaguc ol Nations)
wcrc rcprcscntcd at thc first conlcrcncc lor thc Codification ol !ntcrnational Law
hcld at thc Haguc on .. March .o.c. Although thc subjcct was thoroughly cxamincd
during thc conlcrcncc, thc statcs lailcd to rcach an agrccmcnt on a luturc convcntion.
Scc Ðunn, 6·.
... GarcíaAmador, First Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, !!, .·. (.o·6), GarcíaAmador, Sccond Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, !!, .c¡ (.o··), GarcíaAmador, Tird
Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, !!,
¡· (.o··), GarcíaAmador, Fourth Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, !!, . (.o·o), GarcíaAmador, Filth Rcport on Statc
Rcsponsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, !!, ¡. (.o6c), and
GarcíaAmador, Sixth Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, !!, . (.o6.).
..¡ !n its work on codilying thc law ol statc rcsponsibility, Spccial Rapportcur Ago
thought it usclul to rccapitulatc prcvious codification attcmpts to thc mcmbcrs ol
thc !ntcrnational Law Commission. From this rcvicw, it is apparcnt that thc codi
fication on thc law ol statc rcsponsibility has attractcd a lot ol attcntion lrom pri
vatc, rcgional, as wcll as intcrnational bodics. Òn thc onc hand, it may bc hcld that
thcsc codification attcmpts havc not rcccivcd sufficicnt support and thcrclorc is not
significant whcn analysing thc contcnt ol thc customary standard ol trcatmcnt ol
alicns. Òn thc othcr hand, thcy may at lcast bc considcrcd to bc a subsidiary sourcc
ol intcrnational law as it is an cxprcssion ol thc “most highly qualificd publicists”.
Scvcral ol thc dralt articlcs may also bc rcgardcd as rcflccting an opinio juris sharcd
by a numbcr ol statcs. Togcthcr with thc vast numbcr ol dccisions ol thc arbitra
tion tribunals, thcsc attcmpts at codification will bc rclcrrcd to bclow as support lor
vicws on thc contcnt ol thc rclcvant standard ol trcatmcnt. Scc First rcport on Statc
Rcsponsibility, by Mr. Robcrt Ago, Spccial RapportcurRcvicw ol prcvious work on
codification ol thc topic ol thc intcrnational rcsponsibility ol Statcs, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, !!, .a·, .a· (.o6o).
..· Ðralt Articlcs on Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor intcrnationally wronglul acts adoptcd
by thc !ntcrnational Law Commission at its filtythird scssion (acc.). Rcport ol thc
!ntcrnational Law Commission on thc work ol its filtythird scssion, GAÒR, ·6
th
Scss., Supp. No. .c, Chaptcr !\.¡.., UN Ðoc. A/·6/.c (acc.).
a6 Chapter 1
Vhcn wc spcak ol “Statc Rcsponsibility” wc mcan that arca ol intcrna
tional law which lrom thc standpoint ol thc dclcndant statc is thought ol as
“Statc rcsponsibility lor injury to alicns”, lrom thc plaintiff statc rcgardcd as
“Ðiplomatic protcction ol citizcns abroad”, and lrom thc proccdural stand
point dcscribcd as “!ntcrnational claims”. Tcrc arc, ol coursc, othcr typcs ol
statc rcsponsibility, as lor brcach ol trcaty or dircct statctostatc injury, but in
prcscntday usagc thc tcrm “statc rcsponsibility” is rcscrvcd primarily lor this
arca ol thc law.
++6
!n .oo6 thc topic ol diplomatic protcction rcsurlaccd on thc agcnda ol thc !LC,
thc commission idcntilying it as onc ol thrcc topics appropriatc lor codification
and progrcssivc dcvclopmcnt.
++·
Tc lollowing ycar a working group within thc
!LC rcportcd “thc incrcascd cxchangc ol pcrsons and commcrcc across Statc
lincs, claims by Statcs on bchall ol thcir nationals will rcmain an arca ol signifi
cant intcrcst.”
++8
Tc working group lurthcr hcld that thc work ol thc commission
“should locus on thc conscqucnccs ol an intcrnationally wronglul act”. As with
thc topic ol statc rcsponsibility, thc topic ol diplomatic protcction is limitcd to
thc study ol sccondary rulcs and lcavcs asidc thc contcnt ol thc intcrnational lcgal
obligation that is incumbcnt on a statc.
++o

1.3.2 Functional Protection
Tc historical account ol diplomatic protcction clcarly shows that this is a qucs
tion on thc intcrnational planc bctwccn statcs. Vhcn an agcnt ol thc UN was
killcd on a mission lor that organisation this also bccamc a mattcr lor intcr
national govcrnmcntal organisations. Tc assassination ol UN official Count
8crnadottc, a Swcdish citizcn, in !sracl in .o¡· lcd thc Gcncral Asscmbly to ask
thc !C] to givc an Advisory Òpinion on thc qucstion ol whcthcr thc UN had “as
an Òrganisation, thc capacity to bring an intcrnational claim against thc rcspon
siblc de jure or de facto govcrnmcnt with a vicw to obtaining thc rcparation duc in
rcspcct ol thc damagc causcd (a) to thc Unitcd Nations, (b) to thc victim or thc
pcrsons cntitlcd through him:”
+:o
Tc Court lound that thc UN was “a subjcct ol
intcrnational law and capablc ol posscssing intcrnational rights and dutics, and
..6 Villiam V. 8ishop, Gcncral Coursc ol Public Law, ..· RdC .¡·, .·¡ (.o6·!!).
..· Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission on thc work ol its lortycighth scs
sion, GAÒR, ·.
st
Scss., Supp. No. .c, para. a¡o and Anncx !! Addcndum ., UN Ðoc.
A/·./.c (.oo6).
..· Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission on thc work ol its lortyninth scssion,
GAÒR, ·and Scss., Supp. No. .c, para. .·a, UN Ðoc. A/·a/.c (.oo·).
..o !bid., paras. .·c..
.ac Reparation Case, .·¡.
a· Introduction: Te Safety Convention and its Legal Environment
that it ha|d| capacity to maintain its rights by bringing intcrnational claims”.
+:+

Tc UN invokcd its own right, and not that ol thc agcnt, and sccurcd rcspcct
lor its lunctions. Tc organisation’s conncction to thc individual injurcd was not
onc ol nationality but onc ol lunction and thc task hc had bccn authoriscd to
pcrlorm. Tc protcction could thcrclorc not bc dcfincd as traditional diplomatic
protcction but instcad thc Court rclcrrcd to a “lunctional protcction.”
+::
Tc rcl
crcncc to lunctional protcction is cvidcncc ol thc diffcrcncc bctwccn statcs and
intcrnational organisations as illustratcd in thc naturc ol privilcgcs and immuni
tics accordcd thc rcprcscntativcs ol thcsc cntitics.
!s it possiblc lor both thc statc ol nationality and thc intcrnational organi
sation to claim rcparation ol thc statc hosting a pcacc opcration, il onc ol its
nationals/agcnts has bccn injurcd: Ðuring thc Unitcd Nations opcration in thc
Congo (ÒNUC .o6c.o6¡), thc qucstion ol rcsponsibility ol thc govcrnmcnt lor
violcnt acts committcd against thc lorcc was not covcrcd in thc status agrccmcnt.
According to Higgins, such rcsponsibility “rcsts nonc thc lcss in gcncral intcrna
tional law, and thc gcncral intcrnational law right ol thc UN to claim on bchall
ol its lorccs rcmaincd unimpaircd.”
+::
!t would sccm that thcrc cxist concurrcnt
lcgal rights ol basing such protcst or claim. As dcfincd in thc Reparation Case, thc
organisation may basc such a right upon thc brcach ol a lunctional protcction ol
onc ol its mcmbcrs whilc thc statc may basc such right upon thc customary law
ol diplomatic protcction.
+:±

No lcgal claims sccm to havc bccn brought against thc govcrnmcnt ol thc
Congo but instcad thc UN protcstcd on numcrous occasions against thc acts ol
violcncc dircctcd against its lorccs. At timcs, cvcn thc homc statc ol thc attackcd
lorccs protcstcd.
+:¡
Tc protcsts brought by national statcs sccm to havc rccog
niscd thc cxclusivc intcrnational charactcr ol thc lorcc and, according to 8owctt,
.a. !bid., .·o.
.aa !bid., .·¡. Tc Court notcd, howcvcr, that thcrc may bc compcting claims in cascs
ol injurics to agcnts ol intcrnational organisations by both thc organisation and thc
statc ol nationality ol agcnts but lound no rulc assigning priority to cithcr thc statc
or Òrganisation. !bid.
.a. Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, Documents and Commentary, III Africa,
ac· (.o·c).
.a¡ 8owctt bclicvcs, howcvcr, that whilc, in gcncral, “thc UN and not thc participating
Statc |was| thc primary claimant in rcspcct ol injurics to ÒNUC pcrsonncl … this
would only bc truc whcrc thc agcnt was injurcd in thc coursc ol his official dutics
as agcnt. !l hc wcrc, lor cxamplc on lcavc it may wcll bc that thc right ol lunctional
protcction has no basis and only thc national Statc could claim.” 8owctt, a¡., notc
oo.
.a· Tc arrcst ol thrcc Swcdish hclicoptcr pilots on . March .o6., causcd thc Swcdish
Govcrnmcnt to protcst to Prcsidcnt Kasa\ubu and cxprcsscd “thc cxpcctation ol
thc Swcdish Govcrnmcnt that mcasurcs will bc takcn to prcvcnt thc rccurrcncc ol
such acts ol violcncc, which in thc Swcdish govcrnmcnt’s vicw inlringc thc con
ditions lor thc prcscncc and activitics ol thc UN lorccs in thc Congo in accord
a· Chapter 1
wcrc cvcn “in thc naturc ol an association ol thc Statc with lormal Unitcd
Nations protcst and did not attcmpt to prcss a scparatc claim on thc basis ol a
brcach ol thc Congo’s dutics towards alicns.”
+:6
8owctt accordingly concludcs
that thcrc was “no qucstion ol concurrcnt protcction, lunctional and diplomatic,
on two diffcrcnt bascs, lor both protcsts wcrc bascd on thc lact that thc pcrsonncl
wcrc Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl and ncithcr protcst involvcd an actual claim.”
+:·

Higgins, on thc othcr hand, asscrts that it is “arguablc that thc contributing statcs
rctaincd a right ol protcst at thc diplomatic lcvcl, and thc issuc ol thc prclcr
ablc protccting authority in rcspcct ol a lcgal claim ncvcr arosc.”
+:8
Although thc
!C] hcld that thc UN may basc a right to claim rcparation upon thc brcach ol a
lunctional protcction ol onc ol its mcmbcrs, whilc thc statc ol nationality may
basc such right upon thc customary law ol diplomatic protcction, it dcclarcd in
thc Reparation Case that thcrc is “no rulc ol law which assigns priority to thc onc
or to thc othcr”.
+:o
Tc Court bclicvcd, howcvcr, that thc partics wcrc capablc ol
finding “solutions inspircd by goodwill and common scnsc”.
+:o
!t is probablc that thc intcrnational organisation would havc a primary right
to claim rcparations lor injurics to thc agcnt in his official capacity, whilc thc
statc ol nationality would havc thc primary right lor acts not rclatcd to thc offi
cial dutics ol thc agcnt.
ancc with thc rclcvant UN rcsolutions.” Scc Scycrstcd, ..¡. Ðocumcnts on Swcdish
Forcign Policy .o6., ·· (Utrikcslrågor) Royal Ministry lor Forcign Affairs (.o6a).
.a6 8owctt, a¡..
.a· !bid.
.a· Higgins, ac·.
.ao Reparation Case, .··.
..c !bid., .·6.
Chapter 2
]urisdiction and !mmunity
Tis chaptcr dcals with gcncral principlcs on jurisdiction and immunity ol statcs
and intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations. !ts purposc is to providc a back
ground to thcsc important arcas ol intcrnational law. Tc protcction ol pcrsonncl
in pcacc opcrations is closcly rclatcd to issucs ol jurisdiction and immunity and
it is thcrclorc ncccssary to givc a bricl account ol somc ol thc csscntial princi
plcs and rulcs in this rcspcct. A numbcr ol gcncral principlcs, according to which
national courts may cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr criminaliscd acts, havc dcvclopcd
in intcrnational law with varying support.
+
Somc ol thcsc principlcs ol jurisdic
tion arc dcalt with in this chaptcr. Tc principlc ol prosccutcorcxtraditc has
bccn incorporatcd in many trcatics and thc jurisdiction bascd upon thcsc trcatics
is dcscribcd hcrc. Tc scction on jurisdiction cnds with an ovcrvicw ol thc com
pctcncc ol intcrnational tribunals and thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court (!CC).
Rulcs on immunity will thcrcaltcr bc bricfly cxamincd with rclcrcncc to multilat
cral and bilatcral trcatics. As this chaptcr aims to providc ncccssary background
inlormation to issucs discusscd latcr in this work, a short introduction is also
givcn to thc bilatcral agrccmcnt on thc status ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations,
known as a statusollorccs agrccmcnt.
Tc cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction compriscs lcgislativc, judicial and cxccutivc com
pctcncc. ]urisdiction may bc dcfincd as “thc tcrm that dcscribcs thc limit ol thc
lcgal compctcncc ol a Statc or othcr rcgulatory authority |…| to makc, apply,
and cnlorcc rulcs ol conduct upon pcrsons.”
:
!l host statc jurisdiction is limited
in rclation to catcgorics ol pcrsonncl in a pcacc opcration it affccts all thc abovc
mcntioncd branchcs ol statc jurisdiction. Vhilc thc most apparcnt branch is that
ol thc judiciary, rcstricting local courts lrom cxcrcising jurisdiction ovcr somc
pcrsonncl, thc lcgislativc and cxccutivc powcrs ol thc rccciving statc will also bc
subjcct to rcstrictions.
Host statcs havc primary rcsponsibility lor cxcrcising jurisdiction ovcr crim
inal acts dircctcd against protcctcd pcrsonncl. At thc samc timc pcrsonncl par
ticipating in pcacc opcrations gcncrally cnjoy somc sort ol immunity against thc
cxcrcisc ol local jurisdiction. Highlcvcl mcmbcrs ol an opcration may bc accordcd
. !an 8rownlic Principles of Public International Law, aoo (6
th
cd., acc.).
a \aughan Lowc, ]urisdiction, in International Law, .ao (Malcolm Ð. ¡vans, cd.,
acc.).
.c Chapter 2
privilcgcs and immunitics similar to thosc ol diplomatic agcnts. Mcmbcrs ol thc
civilian componcnt normally cnjoy lunctional immunity lor acts pcrlormcd in an
official capacity. Military contingcnts arc usually subjcct to thc cxclusivc criminal
jurisdiction ol thc scnding statcs.
Tc ad hoc intcrnational criminal tribunals lor thc lormcr Yugoslavia
(!CTY) and Rwanda (!CTR) havc indictcd pcrsons suspcctcd ol crimcs against
pcacc opcration pcrsonncl. Tc !CTY has jurisdiction ovcr crimcs committcd on
thc tcrritory ol thc lormcr Yugoslavia sincc .oo.. Tat would also includc crimcs,
undcr thc jurisdiction ol thc tribunal, committcd by pcrsonncl in pcacc opcra
tions.
Tc cstablishmcnt ol thc !CC has pushcd qucstions ol jurisdiction cvcn
morc to thc lorc. 8ctwccn ]uly, acca, and ]uly, acc¡, two rcsolutions lrom thc
Sccurity Council aimcd to cxcmpt pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations, supplicd by
a nonmcmbcr statc ol thc !CC, lrom thc jurisdiction ol thc !CC.
:
Trough
a numbcr ol bilatcral trcatics, modcllcd on Articlc o· ol thc !CC statutc, thc
Unitcd Statcs has sought assuranccs lrom othcr statcs that thcy will not hand
ovcr US pcrsonncl to thc !CC.
±

2.1 Principles of !urisdiction
Tc Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion on ]urisdiction (.o.·), idcntificd thc
lollowing fivc gcncral principlcs ol jurisdiction: thc tcrritorial principlc, thc
nationality principlc, thc protcctivc principlc, thc univcrsality principlc, and thc
passivc pcrsonality principlc.
¡
Vhilc thc first lour wcrc adoptcd as pcrmittcd by
intcrnational law, thc passivc pcrsonality principlc was qucstioncd, and thus not
includcd in thc dralt convcntion.
6
. SC Rcs. .¡aa, UN SCÒR, ¡··and mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡aa (acca) and SC Rcs.
.¡··, UN SCÒR, ¡··a
nd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡·· (acc.). Scc Carstcn Stahn, Tc
Ambiguitics ol Sccurity Council .¡aa (acca), 14 EJIL, ·· (2003).
¡ Articlc o· ol thc !CC Statutc. Scc, lor cxamplc, ¡fforts to Òbtain !mmunity lrom
!CC lor U.S. Pcacckccpcrs, in Contcmporary practicc ol thc Unitcd Statcs Rclating
to !ntcrnational Law, (Scan Ð. Murphy cd.,), o6 AJIL, ·a· (acca), U.S. 8ilatcral
Agrccmcnts Rclating to !CC, in Contcmporary practicc ol thc Unitcd Statcs
Rclating to !ntcrnational Law, (Scan Ð. Murphy, cd.), o· AJIL, acc (acc.).
· ¡dwin, Ð. Ðickinson, !ntroductory Commcnt to thc Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt
Convcntion on ]urisdiction with Rcspcct to Crimc .o.·, ao AJIL, Supp., ¡¡., ¡¡·
(.o.·). Tc Ðralt Convcntion, with its commcnts, is not a lcgally binding instrumcnt
but is bascd upon a considcrablc rcscarch ol intcrnational national cascs, lcgislation
and writcrs ol thc timc and is a documcnt ol grcat importancc cspccially as a statc
mcnt ol customary intcrnational law.
6 !bid.
.. Jurisdiction and Immunity
Territoriality
!t is univcrsally acccptcd that a statc has jurisdiction ovcr crimcs committcd on
its tcrritory.
·
Tc sovcrcignty ol cach statc ncccssarily cntails thc right ol cxcrcis
ing jurisdiction ovcr criminal acts committcd on its tcrritory. Notwithstanding
thc lact that thc tcrritorial principlc is rcgardcd as thc most lundamcntal princi
plc ol jurisdiction, it is not ncccssarily ol an cxclusivc charactcr. Vhcn thcrc cxist
compcting claims ol jurisdiction, priority dcpcnds upon custody.
8
Tc univcrsal
acccptancc ol thc tcrritorial principlc largcly finds its basis in practical consid
crations. Tc statc must havc thc right to cnlorcc its own laws and is gcncrally
bcst suitcd to carry out thc ncccssary invcstigations, hcar witncsscs, and takc sus
pcctcd individuals into custody. Tcrritoriality is thc main rcason lor thc cxcrcisc
ol jurisdiction, and although not an cxclusivc ground lor jurisdiction “thc major
ity ol prosccutions occurring whcrc a crimc has bccn involvcd takc placc bccausc
thc crimc was committcd within thc tcrritory ol thc statc.”
o

Tc gcncral rulc is that a statc, including a host statc, shall cxcrcisc tcrritorial
jurisdiction ovcr pcrsons and propcrty situatcd in its tcrritory.
+o
Tis gcncral rulc,
howcvcr, is subjcct to limitations in rcspcct ol immunity rulcs and agrccmcnts on
allocation ol jurisdiction bctwccn scnding and rccciving statcs. A host statc may
bc prcvcntcd lrom cxcrcising its jurisdiction ovcr pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations
insolar as thc pcrsonncl conccrncd can claim immunity lrom local jurisdiction.
From anothcr and incrcasingly important pcrspcctivc, thc host statc has a duty
to cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr crimcs committcd on its tcrritory. Tc inability, or
unwillingncss, ol host statcs to takc this duty scriously has lcd to thc cstablish
mcnt ol a culturc ol impunity in rclation to criminal acts committcd against pcr
sonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations.
Nationality
To claim jurisdiction bascd upon thc nationality ol an offcndcr is in lact ol an
oldcr datc than thc tcrritorial principlc. Tc nationality principlc cmanatcs lrom
thc timc whcn rulcrs asscrtcd jurisdiction ovcr pcrsons owing allcgiancc to thc
rulcr. Tc risc ol thc tcrritorial statc has causcd thc tcrritorial principlc to assumc
a much grcatcr importancc than thc nationality principlc.
++
Ncvcrthclcss, thc
nationality principlc is univcrsally acccptcd.
+:
Sincc thcrc is no clcarly acccptcd
· 8rownlic, aoo.
· Ð. ]. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, a·. (¡
th
cd., .oo.).
o M. N. Shaw, International Law, ··c (·
th
cd., acc.).
.c Lowc, ..6.
.. Tc lattcr is in lact “uscd rclativcly inlrcqucntly”, Lowc, ..o.
.a Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion on ]urisdiction with Rcspcct to Crimc, ao
AJIL, (Supp), ·.o (.o.·).
.a Chapter 2
dcfinition ol nationality in intcrnational law, statcs arc ablc to cxcrcisc a widc dis
crction in thc granting ol nationality.
+:

Tc principlc ol nationality plays a promincnt rolc in pcacc opcrations. Tc
cxclusivc cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction ol scnding statcs rcflccts thc principlc ol nation
ality. Tis was a point ol major conccrn during thc cstablishmcnt and thc dcploy
mcnt ol thc Unitcd Nations ¡mcrgcncy Forcc. To cnsurc that no “jurisdictional
vacuum” arosc, thc UN concludcd agrccmcnts with contributing statcs that wcrc
bascd upon thc undcrstanding that thosc statcs “would cxcrcisc such jurisdiction
as might bc ncccssary with rcspcct to crimcs or offcnccs committcd in ¡gypt by
any mcmbcrs ol thc Forcc providcd lrom thcir own military scrviccs.”

A Modcl
Agrccmcnt on thc rclationship bctwccn UN and contributing statcs was issucd in
.oo. incorporating a similar provision.

Ðifficult qucstions may surlacc il an act
is criminaliscd in thc host statc in qucstion but not in thc contributing statc.
Protective
Tc protcction ol vital statc intcrcsts lorms thc loundation lor thc protcctivc
principlc.
+6
!n thc cvcnt ol individuals thrcatcning a vital intcrcst ol thc statc it
may cxcrcisc its jurisdiction ovcr thcm, dcspitc thc lact that thcy arc nonnation
als acting abroad. Typical crimcs arc currcncy and immigration offcnccs. Tc pro
tcctivc principlc cnablcs thc statc to combat thrcats against thosc arcas that arc
vital to its intcrcsts, cvcn though it might not bc an offcncc within thc statc
itscll whcrc such acts might bc committcd. Tc protcctivc principlc is also onc
ol thc csscntial conditions to bc lound in thc Salcty Convcntion. !t providcs lor
thc right ol a statc party to cstablish jurisdiction ovcr thc crimcs dcfincd thcrcin
whcn inter alia thcy arc committcd “|i|n an attcmpt to compcl that Statc to do or
to abstain lrom doing any act.”

Tis principlc is also includcd in othcr trcatics
incorporating thc aut dedere aut judicare principlc.
+8
!t is particularly justificd in
cascs ol political crimcs. Such crimcs arc oltcn not cxtraditablc and thc thrcat
.. Shaw, ···.
.¡ Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Summary study ol thc cxpcricnccs dcrivcd lrom
thc cstablishmcnt and opcration ol thc Forcc, para. ..6, UN Ðoc. A/.o¡. (.o··).
.· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Modcl Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations
and Mcmbcr Statcs contributing pcrsonncl and cquipmcnt to Unitcd Nations
pcacckccping opcrations, UN Ðoc. A/¡6/.·· (.oo.).
.6 Lowc, .¡a.
.· Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, o Ðcc. .oo¡,
Articlc .c, ac·. UNTS .6..
.· Scc, lor cxamplc, !ntcrnational Convcntion against thc Taking ol Hostagcs,
.· Ðcccmbcr .o·o, .· !LM .¡·6, Montrcal Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol
Unlawlul Acts against thc Salcty ol Civil Aviation, a. Scptcmbcr .o·., o·¡ UNTS .··,
Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs against !ntcrnationally
Protcctcd Pcrsonncl including Ðiplomatic Agcnts, .¡ Ðcccmbcr .o·., .c.· UNTS
.6·.
.. Jurisdiction and Immunity
cncd statc might wish to cstablish its own jurisdiction ovcr acts that thrcatcn a
vital statc intcrcst.
+o
According to thc Harvard Ðralt Convcntion thc protcctivc
principlc, with a lcw cxccptions, is incorporatcd as a mattcr ol coursc in national
pcnal codcs and “t|hc basis ol such jurisdiction is thc naturc ol thc intcrcst injurcd
rathcr than placc ol thc act or thc nationality ol thc offcndcr.”
:o
Tc protcctivc principlc, howcvcr, should bc applicd with caution. !t docs
not rcquirc doublc jcopardy, and applying thc principlc might thcrclorc not only
inlringc upon thc sovcrcignty ol othcr statcs, but also lcad to ncgativc cffccts lor
thc individual bccausc that pcrson might not cvcn bc awarc ol thc lact that thc
act is a criminal offcncc in anothcr statc.
:+

Passive Nationality
According to thc principlc ol passivc nationality, jurisdiction may bc claimcd by
rclcrcncc to thc nationality ol thc victim. !t is, howcvcr, a controvcrsial ground
lor jurisdiction,
::
but has lound a ncw lcgitimacy in thc strugglc against tcrror
ism and othcr intcrnational crimcs.
::
!t is, lor cxamplc, stipulatcd in Articlc o ol
thc !ntcrnational Convcntion against thc Taking ol Hostagcs,

Articlc · (.) c ol
thc Convcntion against Torturc,

Articlc . (.) c ol thc !PP Convcntion
:6
and in
Articlc .c ol thc Salcty Convcntion. Tc Unitcd Statcs, which has historically
opposcd thc passivc pcrsonality principlc,

claimcd jurisdiction ovcr a Lcbancsc
citizcn in intcrnational watcrs upon thc basis that hc had allcgcdly bccn involvcd
in thc hijacking ol a ]ordanian airlincr carrying scvcral US nationals. Tc Court,
acccpting both thc univcrsality principlc and thc passivc pcrsonality principlc,
statcd with rcgard to thc lattcr that although bcing thc most controvcrsial princi
.o Shaw, ·o..
ac Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion on ]urisdiction with Rcspcct to Crimc, ao
AJIL, Supp., ·¡. (.o.·).
a. !ain Camcron, Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction, .a (.oo¡).
aa Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion on ]urisdiction, ao AJIL, Supp ··o (.o.·). !t was
lurthcr statcd that “|o|l all principlcs ol jurisdiction having somc substantial sup
port in contcmporary national lcgislation, it is thc most difficult to justily in thcory.”
!bid.
a. Shaw, ·o..
a¡ !ntcrnational Convcntion against thc Taking ol Hostagcs, .· Ðcccmbcr .o·o ...6
UNTS ac6.
a· Convcntion against Torturc and Òthcr Crucl, !nhuman or Ðcgrading Trcatmcnt or
Punishmcnt, .c Ðcccmbcr .o·¡, .¡6· UNTS ··.
a6 Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs against !ntcrnationally
Protcctcd Pcrsonncl including Ðiplomatic Agcnts, .¡ Ðcccmbcr .o·., .c.· UNTS
.6·.
a· According to Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion on ]urisdiction “|i|t has bccn vig
orously opposcd in AngloAmcrican countrics.”, ··o.
.¡ Chapter 2
plc ol jurisdiction in intcrnational law, “thc intcrnational community rccogniscs
its lcgitimacy.”
:8

According to Restatement (Tird), thc principlc ol passivc pcrsonality “has
not bccn gcncrally acccptcd lor ordinary torts or crimcs, but it is incrcasingly
acccptcd as applicd to tcrrorist and organizcd attacks on a statc’s nationals by
rcason ol thcir nationality, or to assassination ol a statc’s diplomatic rcprcscnta
tivcs or othcr officials.”
:o

!n rclation to pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations, thc passivc pcrsonality
principlc providcs a basis ol jurisdiction that cnablcs contributing statcs to pros
ccutc individuals rcsponsiblc lor criminal acts against thcir nationals. Tis could
bc ol particular importancc whcn thc statc hosting a pcacc opcration lacks, lor
cxamplc, a lunctional judicial systcm. !n such cascs thc principlc scrvcs as a com
plcmcntary basis ol jurisdiction. Tc importancc ol this principlc in thc dcploy
mcnt ol pcacc opcrations is also rcflcctcd in thc Salcty Convcntion.
:o
Universality
Tc conccptualisation ol thc principlc ol univcrsal jurisdiction has in thc lcgal
doctrinc bccn subjcct to divcrsc intcrprctations and catcgorisations. !t partly
sccms to bc an cffcct ol thc diffcrcnt lcgal traditions ol civil law statcs and statcs
bclonging to thc common law tradition. Civil law statcs arc lcss willing to cxtra
ditc and thus asscrt a widc scopc ol cxtratcrritorial jurisdiction whilc common
law statcs gcncrally havc choscn thc oppositc solution.
:+
8clow lollows a bricl
account on somc vicws on thc principlc ol univcrsal jurisdiction.
Undcr thc principlc ol univcrsality, Camcron makcs a distinction bctwccn
two typcs ol jurisdiction. Tc first conccrns cxtratcrritorial jurisdiction ovcr
acts that arc “univcrsally” acccptcd as bcing offcnccs in all socictics, acts such as
murdcr. Tc statc that claims jurisdiction on this basis would rcprcscnt thc statc
with a closcr conncction to thc crimc. Camcron finds this to bc closc to rcprcscn
tational jurisdiction although it is not, as opposcd to thc lattcr principlc, condi
a· Scc Unitcd Statcs v Yunis 6·. F. Supp ·o6 (.o··), Unitcd Statcs Ðistrict Court,
Ðistrict ol Columbia. Martin Ðixon, & Robcrt McCorquodalc, Cases & Materials
on International Law, a·. (¡
th
cd., acc.).
ao Amcrican Law !nstitutc, Restatement (Tird) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (.o··), \ol. ., Part !\, § ¡ca, Commcnt g and Rcportcr’s Notc ., at a¡c.
Malanczuk finds it qucstionablc il thc solc lact that a national has bccn injurcd con
ccrns thc gcncral intcrcst ol thc national statc but on thc othcr hand il thc tcrritorial
statc is unablc or unwilling to prosccutc an allcgcd offcndcr it could bc argucd that
thc statc ol nationality ol thc victim has a right to prosccutc thc suspcct whcn undcr
control ol compctcnt authoritics as a mcasurc ol protcction ol its own citizcns. Scc
Pctcr Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, ..., (·
th
rcviscd
cd., .oo·).
.c Salcty Convcntion, Articlc .c (a) (b).
.. Camcron, ac.
.· Jurisdiction and Immunity
tional upon a rcqucst lrom anothcr statc.
::
Tc othcr typc ol univcrsal jurisdiction
rclatcs, “to offcnccs dcfincd by customary intcrnational law or multilatcral con
vcntions”.
::
Tis typc ol jurisdiction may itscll bc dividcd into offcnccs against
intcrnational law and offcnccs whcrc intcrnational law pcrmits a statc to cxcrcisc
univcrsal jurisdiction but which arc not as such crimcs against intcrnational law.
Tc lormcr catcgory is dcscribcd as an intcrnational crimc and thc lattcr a crimc
ol univcrsal jurisdiction.

A rcccnt analysis ol thc conccpt ol univcrsal jurisdiction distinguishcs thrcc
catcgorics: “coopcrativc gcncral univcrsality principlc, coopcrativc limitcd uni
vcrsality principlc, and unilatcral limitcd univcrsality principlc”.

Tc coopcra
tivc gcncral univcrsality principlc providcs a basis lor jurisdiction lor thc custodial
statc ovcr both common crimcs and intcrnational crimcs whcn thc cxtradition ol
an allcgcd offcndcr is not possiblc. !n rclation to common crimcs, thc basis lor
jurisdiction is also rclcrrcd to as thc rcprcscntation principlc or “vicarious admin
istration ol justicc”.
:6
Tc coopcrativc limitcd univcrsality principlc rclatcs only
to intcrnational offcnccs and cxcludcs common crimcs. ]urisdiction is bascd upon
thc naturc ol thc crimc and thc only rcquircmcnt “is thc voluntary prcscncc ol
thc offcndcr”.

Tc unilatcral limitcd univcrsality principlc rclatcs solcly to thc
naturc ol thc crimc and allows lor any statc to launch invcstigations cvcn in
abscntia.
:8
Òthcrs dcscribc univcrsal jurisdiction mainly in rclation to crimcs ol such
a typc and naturc that thcir propcr punishmcnt is in thc intcrcsts ol thc wholc
ol intcrnational socicty.
:o
Tc principlc ol univcrsal jurisdiction providcs a lcgal
basis lor national courts to cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr nonnationals committing
.a Camcron, ·c. Undcr thc principlc ol rcprcscntational jurisdiction, jurisdiction is not
cxcrciscd in thc primary intcrcsts ol thc custodial statc but rathcr in thc intcrcsts
ol anothcr statc as part ol thc intcrnational coopcration in pcnal mattcrs. !n such
cascs, thc custodial statc rcprcscnts a statc, which bascs its jurisdiction upon ordi
nary jurisdiction critcria. Rcprcscntational jurisdiction is not an indcpcndcnt basis
ol jurisdiction but is dcrivcd lrom thc right ol anothcr statc to cxcrcisc jurisdic
tion. Tc custodial statc may cxcrcisc jurisdiction undcr thc rcprcscntational prin
ciplc il rcqucstcd, in somc lorm, by a statc with an indcpcndcnt jurisdictional basis.
Scc !ntcrnational Crimcs and Swcdish ]urisdiction, Rcport ol thc Commission on
!ntcrnational Criminal law, A Swcdish Govcrnmcntal Òfficial Rcport, in Statcns
Òffcntliga Utrcdningar ·., (SÒ\ acca:o·) and Christoffcr Vong, Criminal Act,
Criminal Jurisdiction and Criminal Justice, ..a (acc¡).
.. Camcron, ·c.
.¡ !bid. Scc in this rcspcct, 8rownlic, .c..
.· Luc Rcydams, Universal Jurisdiction. International and Municipal Legal Perspectives,
a· (acc.).
.6 !bid., .¡ – .·.
.· !bid., .·.
.· !bid.
.o Lowc, .¡., Shaw, ·oa., Restatement (Tird) §¡c¡ a·¡a·6.
.6 Chapter 2
hcinous crimcs on lorcign tcrritory or at sca in thosc cascs whcrc othcr rccog
niscd conncctions to thc crimc in qucstion and to thc pcrpctrator or pcrpctrators
arc missing.
±o
Casscsc dcfincs univcrsal jurisdiction as a principlc cmpowcring statcs “to
bring to trial pcrsons accuscd ol intcrnational crimcs, rcgardlcss ol thc placc ol
thc commission ol thc crimc, or thc nationality ol thc author or ol thc victim.”
±+

Hc draws a distinction bctwccn conditional univcrsal jurisdiction and absolutc
univcrsal jurisdiction. Tc lormcr includcs piracy, part ol customary intcrnational
law, and war crimcs, torturc and tcrrorism, which arc trcatybascd. A prcrcqui
sitc ol this catcgory is that a suspcctcd offcndcr must bc prcscnt on thc tcrri
tory ol thc statc claiming jurisdiction.
±:
Undcr thc principlc ol absolutc univcrsal
jurisdiction a statc may prosccutc pcrsons suspcctcd ol committing intcrnational
crimcs rcgardlcss ol whcthcr thc accuscd was prcscnt in thc tcrritory ol that statc.
As statcs normally do not conduct trials in absentia, a suspcct or suspccts must
thcrclorc bc prcscnt lor thc initiation ol procccdings. National authoritics, how
cvcr, may bcgin thcir criminal invcstigations in advancc against such pcrsons.
±:

Tc abovcmcntioncd catcgorisations ol univcrsal jurisdiction havc in
common that thcy all acknowlcdgc a right ol statcs to cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr
pcrsons accuscd ol ccrtain crimcs whcn thcrc is no conncction to thc crimc othcr
than thc custody ol thc offcndcr.
±±
Somc cvcn includc trials in absentia. !t is,
howcvcr, mainly in rclation to spccific crimcs that thc principlc ol univcrsal juris
diction has latcly rcccivcd a lot ol attcntion. !n thc progrcss ol a comprchcnsivc
intcrnational criminal systcm, in which thc cstablishmcnt ol thc !ntcrnational
Criminal Court (!CC) rcprcscnts a major stcp lorward, national courts still play
a significant rolc.
±¡
Tc jurisdiction ol thc !CC is subsidiary to thc jurisdiction
ol national courts. Ad hoc tribunals, such as thc !ntcrnational Criminal Tribunal
lor thc lormcr Yugoslavia
±6
(!CTY) and thc !ntcrnational Criminal Tribunal lor
Rwanda
±·
(!CTR), arc gcographically limitcd and trcatics cstablishing a “prosc
¡c Scc Unitcd Statcs v Yunis 6·. F. Supp ·o6 (.o··), Ðixon & McCorquodalc, a·., a··.
¡. Antonio Casscsc, International Criminal Law, a·¡ (acc.).
¡a !bid., a·6.
¡. !bid.
¡¡ ]urisdiction undcr thc rcprcscntational jurisdiction rcquircs a rcqucst lrom anothcr
statc with closcr conncction to thc crimc.
¡· Rcydams has shown that ovcr thc past tcn ycars, approximatcly ac cascs ol thc cxcr
cisc ol jurisdiction undcr thc principlc ol univcrsality havc takcn placc.
¡6 !ntcrnational Tribunal lor thc Prosccution ol Pcrsons Rcsponsiblc lor Scrious
\iolations ol !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law Committcd in thc Tcrritory ol thc
Formcr Yugoslavia sincc .oo., SC Rcs. ·a·, UN SCÒR, .a.·
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/
R¡S/·a· (.oo.).
¡· !ntcrnational Criminal Tribunal lor thc Prosccution ol Pcrsons Rcsponsiblc lor
Gcnocidc and Òthcr Scrious \iolations ol !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law
Committcd in thc Tcrritory ol Rwanda and Rwandan Citizcns rcsponsiblc lor gcn
.· Jurisdiction and Immunity
cutc or cxtraditc” mcchanism aim lor univcrsal jurisdiction lor spccific crimcs but
as yct, in most cascs, arc only applicablc bctwccn partics to thc agrccmcnts.
Vhat arc thc crimcs that cnablc a national court to cxcrcisc thc right ol
jurisdiction whcn thcrc cxists no spccific conncction to thc statc: !ntcrnational
law in .o.· lound piracy to bc thc only crimc subjcct, unambiguously, to univcr
sal jurisdiction.
±8
!n thc national pcnal codcs ol thc timc thcrc wcrc, howcvcr,
cxamplcs ol othcr crimcs that wcrc to bc trcatcd in a similar way to piracy. Tcsc
wcrc thc slavc tradc, thc countcrlciting ol lorcign moncy and sccuritics, traffic
in womcn and childrcn lor immoral purposcs, thc usc ol cxplosivcs or poisons
to causc a common dangcr, and traffic in narcotics, and so on.
±o
8ut according to
thc Commcnt to thc Ðralt Convcntion, thcrc was insufficicnt lcgal authority lor
trcating crimcs prcciscly likc thc crimc ol piracy, which stood alonc. ]urisdiction
was satisficd undcr othcr and diffcrcnt principlcs ol jurisdiction.
¡o
Vhilc piracy
has bccn acccptcd as bcing subjcct to univcrsal jurisdiction owing to thc vcry
naturc ol thc crimc, thc main considcration is not ncccssarily thc notion that its
atrocious charactcr rcquircs its pcrpctrators to bc punishcd. !t is rathcr thc uni
vcrsal rcalisation ol its harmlul cffccts on thc wholc labric ol intcrnational soci
cty.
¡+
According to thc Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion, thc original basis
lor prosccuting thc act ol piracy was gcncrally dcscribcd as lollows “that thc
piratc who prcycd upon all alikc was thc cncmy ol all alikc.”
¡:
Howcvcr, in .o.·
thc act ol piracy was bcttcr thought ol as bcing bascd upon thc lact that it was
committcd at sca whcrc “thc salcty ol commcrcc” was in thc intcrcsts ol all statcs
and whcrc no statc cxcrciscd tcrritorial jurisdiction.
¡:
Tc Princcton Projcct, ol acc., lound that acts ol piracy, slavcry, war crimcs,
crimcs against thc pcacc, crimcs against humanity, gcnocidc and torturc to bc “scri
ocidc and othcr such violations committcd in thc tcrritory ol ncighbouring Statcs,
bctwccn . ]anuary .oo¡ and .. Ðcccmbcr .oo¡, SC Rcs. o··, UN SCÒR, .¡·.
rd
mtg.,
UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/o·· (.oo¡).
¡· Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion on ]urisdiction, ·6.¡, ··a.
¡o !bid., p. ··c –.. Tc Costa Rica Pcnal Codc (.oa¡), Articlc a.o, scc. .. and thc
\cnczucla Pcnal Codc (.oa6), Articlc ¡, scc. o, “crimcs against humanity” is uscd
as an ovcrall tcrm lor crimcs ol which thcy asscrt jurisdiction on this basis. !bid. at
··..
·c !bid., ··a (.o.·). !n conclusion, thc Commcnt statcd that “|w|hilc intcrnational law
undoubtcdly rcquircs such trcatmcnt in thc casc ol piracy, it docs not at thc prcscnt
timc do so with rcspcct to othcr socallcd delicta juris gentium.” !bid.
·. Casscsc, a¡.
·a Harvard Rcscarch Ðralt Convcntion on ]urisdiction, ·66.
·. !bid. !t also madc room lor thc cxcrcisc ol univcrsal jurisdiction, “on thc solc basis
ol thc prcscncc ol thc alicn within thc tcrritory ol thc Statc assuming jurisdiction”.
Tc compctcncc ol thc statc assuming jurisdiction was, howcvcr, limitcd to thc point
whcrc it is “distinctly subsidiary and onc which will bc rarcly invokcd.” !bid., ··..
.· Chapter 2
ous crimcs” subjcct to univcrsal jurisdiction.
¡±
According to Restatement (Tird),
“piracy, slavc tradc, attacks on or hijacking ol aircralt, gcnocidc, war crimcs, and
pcrhaps ccrtain acts ol tcrrorism” arc lrom a customary law pcrspcctivc sub
jcct to univcrsal jurisdiction.
¡¡
Lowc finds that acts ol “gcnocidc, crimcs against
humanity and scrious war crimcs” lall within this catcgory,
¡6
whilc Malanczuk
contcnds that piracy, thc slavc tradc, war crimcs and crimcs against humanity
all arc subjcct to univcrsal jurisdiction.
¡·
According to Shaw, howcvcr, thc act ol
piracy and war crimcs arc thc only catcgorics that “clcarly bclong to thc sphcrc
ol univcrsal jurisdiction.”
¡8
Casscsc dcfincs “intcrnational crimcs” as “brcachcs ol
intcrnational rulcs cntailing thc pcrsonal criminal liability ol thc individuals con
ccrncd”.
¡o
Òthcr cumulativc critcria rclcrrcd to arc that thcrc must bc a violation
ol customary rulcs that protcct univcrsal valucs and whcrc thcrc cxists a common
intcrcst among statcs to rcprcss crimcs ol this naturc. Lastly, thcrc is no immu
nity lor pcrpctrators acting in an official capacity cxccpt lor ccrtain officials, such
as hcads ol statc, and lorcign ministcrs whilc still in officc. 8ascd upon this dcfi
nition, intcrnational crimcs includc “war crimcs, crimcs against humanity, gcno
cidc, torturc (as distinct lrom torturc as onc ol thc catcgorics ol war crimcs or
crimcs against humanity) aggrcssion, and somc cxtrcmc lorms ol tcrrorism (scri
ous acts ol Statcsponsorcd or – tolcratcd intcrnational tcrrorism). 8y contrast,
thc notion at issuc docs not cmbracc othcr classcs.”
6o
8rownlic distinguishcs bctwccn thc principlc ol univcrsality and that ol
crimcs undcr intcrnational law.
6+
An cxamplc ol thc lattcr is that ol war crimcs.
Tc right ol any statc to punish a pcrson rcsponsiblc lor war crimcs is bascd
upon a brcach ol intcrnational law. Tis is diffcrcnt lrom thc act ol piracy, lor
instancc, lor which intcrnational law providcs thc right lor all statcs to punish
undcr national law, although it is not considcrcd a crimc undcr intcrnational
law.
6:
!ntcrnational law thus providcs lor national courts to cxcrcisc jurisdiction
ovcr crimcs that nccd not ncccssarily bc criminaliscd undcr intcrnational law.
8rownlic, howcvcr, also statcs that “|i|t is incrcasingly rccognizcd that thc princi
·¡ Te Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction, Program in Law and Public Affairs,
Princcton Univcrsity, Principlc a (.), ao (acc.). Tc Princcton Principlcs arc, how
cvcr, “a progrcssivc rcstatcmcnt ol intcrnational law” and includc componcnts ol
both lex lata and lex ferenda. !bid., .o.
·· Restatement (Tird) §¡c¡.
·6 Lowc, .¡..
·· Malanczuk, ....
·· Shaw, ·o. (acc.).
·o Casscsc, a..
6c !bid., a¡.
6. 8rownlic, .c..
6a !bid.
.o Jurisdiction and Immunity
plc ol univcrsal jurisdiction is an attributc ol thc cxistcncc ol crimcs undcr intcr
national law.”
6:
A similar distinction appcars to havc bccn madc by Kittichaisarrc, who
rcgards univcrsal jurisdiction in rclation to thc act ol piracy to bc bascd mainly
upon thc rationalc that thc high scas arc outsidc thc jurisdiction ol any statc and
that piratcs arc common cncmics to all. Hc notcs, howcvcr, that “piratcs arc tricd
by municipal courts and punishablc undcr municipal law, not intcrnational law.
!ntcrnational law mcrcly conccdcs that cvcry Statc has univcrsal jurisdiction to
try and punish piratcs whcn thcy comc within thcir rcspcctivc jurisdiction.”

!t should also bc notcd that a morc rcstrictivc approach to univcrsal jurisdic
tion is somctimcs advanccd. !n thc Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Congo v Belgium) Prcsidcnt Guillaumc argucd in a Scparatc Òpinion that
“intcrnational law knows only onc truc casc ol univcrsal jurisdiction: piracy.”

Hc
citcd, in support ol a rcstrictivc approach to univcrsal jurisdiction, Lord Slynn
ol Hadlcy, in thc first Pinochet Case: “Tc lact cvcn that an act is rccogniscd as a
crimc undcr intcrnational law docs not mcan that thc Courts ol all Statcs havc
jurisdiction to try it … Tcrc is no univcrsality ol jurisdiction lor crimcs against
intcrnational law”.
66
Tcrc arc clcarly diffcrcnt opinions on univcrsal jurisdiction, and whcthcr it
should bc distinguishcd lrom intcrnational crimcs. Tcrc arc also divcrgcnt opin
ions on what prccisc acts constitutc intcrnational crimcs, although somc common
ground may bc idcntificd. Currcntly, many crimcs committcd undcr intcrnational
law arc subjcct to a trcatybascd duty to prosccutc or cxtraditc thc pcrpctrators ol
such crimcs, and may thus bc dcscribcd as a quasiunivcrsal jurisdiction sincc it
only applics bctwccn and among thc partics to such trcatics. ]urisdiction undcr
thc principlc ol rcprcscntation may also comc into cffcct undcr trcatics ol an
aut dedere aut judicare charactcr. !t has bccn hcld that thc crimcs addrcsscd in
such trcatics arc ol such a naturc that cvcry statc posscsscs a right to cxcrcisc
jurisdiction. !n this rcspcct, thc adoption ol thc Gcncral Asscmbly ol convcn
tions addrcssing, among othcr things, offcnccs against intcrnationally protcctcd
pcrsons, hostagctaking and torturc, may wcll support such an intcrprctation.


Tc distinction bctwccn compulsory and optional univcrsal jurisdiction is ol thc
6. !bid., ·6·. 8rownlic finds that thc statutc ol thc !CC providcs lor cvidcncc ol crimcs
undcr gcncral intcrnational law, that is, gcnocidc, crimcs against humanity, war
crimcs and thc crimc ol aggrcssion. To this list ol intcrnational crimcs hc also adds
torturc in timcs ol pcacc. !bid., ·6., ·6¡.
6¡ Kriangsak Kittichaisarrc, International Criminal Law, .· (acc.).
6· Scc Casc Conccrning thc Arrcst Varrant ol April .. accc (Congo v 8clgium), !C]
Rcp. .¡ Fcbruary acca, Scparatc Òpinion ol Prcsidcnt Guillaumc, ·.
66 !bid..
6· Scc Kcnncth C. Randall, Univcrsal ]urisdiction Undcr !ntcrnational Law, 66 Texas
Law Review ···, ·a··a· (.o··) and Òscar Schachtcr, International Law in Teory
and Practice, a6·a6o (.oo.).
¡c Chapter 2
utmost importancc lor thc cmcrging lcgal rcgimc against thc culturc ol impunity
lor criminal acts against pcacc opcration pcrsonncl. An cffcctivc rcgimc against
impunity rcquircs a duty to prosccutc suspcctcd pcrpctrators ol crimcs against
protcctcd pcrsonncl.
2.2 Multilateral Treaties Providing !urisdiction
A numbcr ol trcatics havc cstablishcd jurisdiction ovcr crimcs charactcriscd
by thcir transboundary naturc.
68
Tcsc trcatics arc gcncrally modcllcd upon a
lormula whcrc statc partics arc rcquircd to cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr dcfincd
offcnccs by making thcm punishablc in thcir rcspcctivc national pcnal codcs.
Tcy includc a prosccutcorcxtraditc mcchanism. Tc purposc ol this mccha
nism, oltcn rclcrrcd to as aut dedere aut judicare, is to cnsurc that thosc commit
ting thc stipulatcd crimcs arc prosccutcd. Tc statc in which an offcndcr is lound
must cithcr prosccutc or cxtraditc to a statc with a closcr conncction to thc crimc.
Tc offcnccs stipulatcd in thcsc kinds ol convcntion should thcrclorc bc dccmcd
to bc includcd in any cxisting cxtradition trcatics as cxtraditablc offcnccs bctwccn
statc partics. !n cascs whcrc thcrc is no cxtradition trcaty, thc convcntion itscll
may bc rcgardcd as bcing an cxtradition trcaty lor thc purposc ol thc offcncc.
6o

Tc purposc ol thcsc kinds ol convcntion is to cstablish a “nct” that grows tightcr
thc morc that statcs bccomc partics, thus narrowing thc possibility ol salc havcns
lor thosc committing crimcs ol intcrnational conccrn.
·o

6· Scc c.g. thc Haguc Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Scizurc ol Aircralt
ol .6 Ðcccmbcr .o·c, ·6c UNTS .c·, Montrcal Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion
ol Unlawlul Acts against thc Salcty ol Civil Aviation ol a. Scptcmbcr .o·., o·¡
UNTS .··, Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs against
!ntcrnationally Protcctcd Pcrsons, including Ðiplomatic Agcnts, ol .¡ Ðcccmbcr
.o·., .c.· UNTS .6·, Convcntion Against thc Taking ol Hostagcs ol .· Ðcccmbcr
.o·o, ...6 UNTS ac6, Convcntion Against Torturc and Òthcr Crucl, !nhuman
or Ðcgrading Trcatmcnt or Punishmcnt ol .c Ðcccmbcr .o·¡, .¡6· UNTS ·· thc
Montrcal Protocol ol a¡ Fcbruary .o·· conccrning acts ol violcncc at airports, a·
!LM 6a·, thc Romc Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Acts Against
thc Salcty ol Maritimc Navigation ol .c March .o··, a· !LM 66·, thc \icnna
Convcntion Against !llicit Traffic in Narcotic Ðrugs and Psychotropic Substanccs
ol ac Ðcccmbcr .o··, a· !LM ¡o., Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Tcrrorist
8ombings ol .· Ðcccmbcr .oo·, .· !LM a¡o, and thc Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion
ol thc Financing ol Tcrrorism ol o Ðcccmbcr .ooo, .o !LM a·c.
6o Scc c.g. Articlc · ol thc Haguc Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Scizurc
ol Aircralt ol .6 Ðcccmbcr .o·c. Tis provision has bccn uscd as a modcl lor othcr
agrccmcnts. M. Chcril 8assiouni and ¡dward M. Visc, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: Te
Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law, .c (.oo·).
·c Lowc finds thc lact that thc trcaty is only applicablc bctwccn thc partics may, in
thcory, havc conscqucnccs il a pcrson whosc national statc was not a party to thc
convcntion was prosccutcd lor a crimc committcd outsidc thc tcrritory ol thc pros
ccuting statc (or not on an aircralt rcgistcrcd in that statc). Tcrc appcars, howcvcr,
¡. Jurisdiction and Immunity
Tc aut dedere aut judicare mcchanism is not only an oltcn uscd mcasurc
in thc fight against tcrrorism it may also bc an csscntial tool to cnlorcc compli
ancc with intcrnational law norms by nonstatc actors.
·+
According to Lowc, thc
“most important basis lor thc asscrtion ol cxtratcrritorial jurisdiction is now thc
largc, and constantly growing, nctwork ol trcatics in which Statcs coopcratc to
sccurc thc cffcctivc and cfficicnt subjcction to thc law ol offcnccs ol common
conccrn.”
·:
Tc Salcty Convcntion includcs thc samc prosccutcorcxtraditc mccha
nism as traditional “antitcrrorist” convcntions and an initial dralt was mod
cllcd on thc !ntcrnational Convcntion against thc Taking ol Hostagcs and thc
!PP Convcntion.
·:
Tc lattcr convcntion is ol particular intcrcst in this rcspcct.
Growing conccrn ovcr incrcasing attacks on diplomatic agcnts and othcr pcrsons
spccially protcctcd undcr intcrnational law at thc bcginning ol thc .o·cs bcgan a
proccss that cvcntually lcd to thc conclusion ol thc !PP Convcntion. !t rcscmblcs
thc Salcty Convcntion in thc way that it was a criminal law rcsponsc, aiming lor
univcrsal jurisdiction through thc inclusion ol an aut dedere aut judicare mccha
nism, to cnlorcc rcspcct lor thc protcctcd status ol pcrsonncl undcr intcrnational
law. !t was cvcn suggcstcd during thc ncgotiations on thc Salcty Convcntion
that instcad ol a ncw convcntion, thcrc should bc an additional protocol to thc
!PP Convcntion.
·±
Tc similaritics bctwccn thc Salcty Convcntion and thc !PP
Convcntion mcrit a bricl cxamination ol ccntral parts ol thc lattcr.
Tc lcgal status ol thosc protcctcd by thc !PP Convcntion has bccn largcly
bascd upon convcntions such as thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations
(.o6.),
·¡
thc \icnna Convcntion on Consular Rclations (.o6.),
·6
thc Convcntion
on Spccial Missions (.o6o),
··
and thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and
not to havc bccn any protcsts against statcs asscrting jurisdiction in this rcspcct.
Lowc, .¡¡.
·. 8y limiting thc possibility ol salc havcns ol pcrsons suspcctcd ol crimcs undcr such
trcatics thc risk ol prosccution incrcascs. Tis will hopclully lcad to an cnhanccd
awarcncss ol applicablc law. Tc norms ol such trcatics arc translormcd to obliga
tions ol nonstatc actors in statcs partics to thcsc convcntions. Scc Martin Schcinin
on thc obligations ol intcrnational humanitarian law and compliancc ol nonstatc
actors, Commission on Human Rights, Promotion and Protcction ol Human
Rights, Appcndix a, 8ackgroundpapcr, ¡xpcrt mccting on lundamcntal standards ol
humanity aaa¡ Fcbruary, accc, ¡· UN Ðoc ¡/CN.¡/accc/.¡· (accc).
·a Lowc, .¡..
·. Convcntion Against thc Taking ol Hostagcs ol .· Ðcccmbcr .o·o, ...6 UNTS ac6,
Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs against !ntcrnationally
Protcctcd Pcrsons, !ncluding Ðiplomatic Agcnts, ol .¡ Ðcccmbcr .o·., .c.· UNTS
.6·.
·¡ Scc chaptcr ·.a.
·· \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations, .· April .o6., ·cc UNTS o·.
·6 \icnna Convcntion on Consular Rclations a¡ April .o6., ·o6 UNTS a6..
·· Convcntion on Spccial Missions, · Ðcccmbcr .o6o, .¡cc UNTS a...
¡a Chapter 2
!mmunitics ol thc UN (.o¡6).
·8
Tc pcnal law provisions ol thc !PP Convcntion
wcrc principally influcnccd by morc rcccntly adoptcd convcntions such as thc
Haguc Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Scizurc ol Aircralt (.o·c)
·o

and thc Montrcal Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Acts Against thc
Salcty ol Civil Aviation (.o·.).
8o

Articlc a ol thc !PP Convcntion scts out acts that statc partics to thc convcn
tion arc rcquircd to criminalisc undcr thcir intcrnal laws. Tcsc arc “(a) murdcr,
kidnapping or othcr attack upon thc pcrson or libcrty ol an intcrnationally pro
tcctcd pcrson, (b) a violcnt attack upon thc official prcmiscs, thc privatc accom
modation or thc mcans ol transport ol an intcrnationally protcctcd pcrson likcly
to cndangcr his pcrson or libcrty.”
8+
Tc convcntion also asscrts that thrcats, and
attcmpts to commit any ol thcsc offcnsivc acts should also bc criminaliscd – as
wcll as participation as an accomplicc.
8:

Tc principlc ol aut dedere aut judicare is clcarly cxprcsscd in thc convcntion.
!t is stipulatcd that “Tc Statc Party in whosc tcrritory thc allcgcd offcndcr is
prcscnt shall, il it docs not cxtraditc him, submit, without cxccption whatsocvcr
and without unduc dclay, thc casc to its compctcnt authoritics lor thc purposc
ol prosccution, through procccdings in accordancc with thc laws ol that Statc.”
8:

!t is lor thc statc having custody ol thc allcgcd offcndcr to dccidc whcthcr or
not it wants to prosccutc.

Tc obligation ol thc statc is not to prosccutc but to
submit thc casc to thc compctcnt authoritics lor thc purposc ol prosccution. !l
·· Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc UN, .. Fcbruary .o¡6, . UNTS
.·.
·o Tc Haguc Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Scizurc ol Aircralt, .6
Ðcccmbcr .o·c, ·6c UNTS .c·.
·c Tc Montrcal Convcntion lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Acts against thc Salcty
ol Civil Aviation, a. Scptcmbcr .o·., o·¡ UNTS .··.
·. !PP Convcntion Articlc a. Tc cxprcssion “violcnt attack”, proposcd by thc !LC,
was criticiscd during thc dcbatcs in thc Gcncral Asscmbly as bcing particularly
vaguc and imprccisc. Louis M. 8loomficld and Gcrald F. FitzGcrald, Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons: Prevention and Punishment. An Analysis of the UN
Convention, ·6·· (.o··).
·a Somc rcprcscntativcs in thc Sixth Committcc hcld that thc “cstablishmcnt ol a uni
vcrsal or quasiunivcrsal jurisdiction was, in thcir vicw, acccptablc only in rcspcct ol
spccific crimcs ol cxccptional scriousncss” but not in rclation to thc typcs ol crimc
listcd in Articlc a. 8loomficld and FitzGcrald, ·a.
·. !PP Convcntion Articlc ·.
·¡ According to thc !LC, thc statc may rclusc to cxtraditc lor any rcason it rcgards suit
ablc. Tc position could also bc rcvcrscd, whcrc no statc rcqucsts cxtradition and thus
lcavcs thc statc holding thc suspcct with only onc option – submitting thc casc to thc
compctcnt authoritics lor prosccution. 8loomficld and FitzGcrald, o6.
¡. Jurisdiction and Immunity
thc authoritics dccidc not to prosccutc, lor cxamplc, through lack ol cvidcncc, thc
statc has still lulfillcd its obligations undcr thc convcntion.


Articlc · stipulatcs diffcrcnt proccdurcs ol cxtradition dcpcnding on thc
possiblc national law rcquircmcnts ol cxisting cxtradition trcatics. !l a statc upon
whosc tcrritory an allcgcd offcndcr is prcscnt chooscs not to cxtraditc, it is undcr
an obligation to cstablish its own jurisdiction ovcr thc crimcs allcgcdly commit
tcd.
86
Tc lunction ol such provision is clcarly to aim at a univcrsal jurisdiction in
rclation to crimcs committcd against intcrnationally protcctcd pcrsons.


Can citizcns ol statcs not party to thc convcntion violatc thc provisions
thcrcin and bc prosccutcd lor thc crimcs laid down in Articlc a: An individual
who is a citizcn ol statc A, which is not party to thc convcntion, attacks an intcr
nationally protcctcd pcrson in thc tcrritory ol statc 8, and is prcscnt in statc C,
which is party to thc convcntion. Statc C docs not cxtraditc thc offcndcr to statc
8 bccausc ol its usc ol thc dcath pcnalty. !l thc offcndcr’s national statc is a party
to thc convcntion thcn it has also agrccd to thc duty ol thc statc, in which thc
offcndcr is prcscnt, to cstablish its jurisdiction cvcn though no “clcar” conncction
to thc crimc cxists. Vhcn an offcndcr’s national statc is not party to thc convcn
tion thcrc is no such agrccmcnt. How is it possiblc to rcconcilc a right to pros
ccutc nationals ol nonstatc partics with thc \icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol
Trcatics: Tc trcaty statcs, “A trcaty docs not crcatc cithcr obligations or rights
lor a third Statc without its conscnt.”
88
Vhilc a right to prosccutc nationals ol nonstatc partics to antitcrrorist
convcntions has bccn thc subjcct ol criticism,
8o
it sccms that such a right has
bccn acccptcd in practicc.
oo
A valid policy argumcnt in this rcspcct would bc that
an abscncc ol ability to subjcct individuals ol nonstatc partics to prosccution
“would mcan that thc community ol statcs is csscntially hclplcss to takc lcgal
·· Tc rcquircmcnt that a casc should bc submittcd to thc compctcnt authoritics “with
out unduc dclay” aims at a morc cffcctivc implcmcntation ol a statc’s obligation and
providcs at thc samc timc protcction lor an allcgcd offcndcr lrom bcing hcld in cus
tody lor an unrcasonably long timc. !bid., .c..ca.
·6 Tc provision lollows thc cxamplcs ol Articlc ¡(a) ol thc Haguc Convcntion and
Articlc ·(a) ol thc Montrcal Convcntion.
·· Commcnting on thc !LC Ðralt Articlcs, Rozakis lound that this was a dcvclopmcnt
ol thc law and statcd that, “nowhcrc can onc find any lcgal trcnd indicating that in
thc past, crimcs against ‘intcrnationally protcctcd pcrsons’ wcrc in any way consid
crcd as delicta juris gentium.” Christos L., Rozakis, Tcrrorism and !ntcrnationally
Protcctcd Pcrsons in thc Light ol thc !LC’s Ðralt Articlcs, a. ICLQ, ¡¡, ·a (.o·¡).
·· \icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol Trcatics (.o6o), ..·· UNTS ..., Articlc .¡.
·o ]ordan Paust, ¡xtradition and Unitcd Statcs Prosccution ol thc Achillc Lauro
HostagcTakcrs: Navigating thc Hazards, ac Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
a.·, a·¡ (.o··).
oc Scc Tomas M. Franck and Stcphcn H Yuhan, Tc Unitcd Statcs and thc
!ntcrnational Criminal Court: Unilatcralism Rampant, .· New York University
Journal of International Law and Politics, ·.o, ·.· (acc.).
¡¡ Chapter 2
mcasurcs against tcrrorists who arc nationals ol statcs that do not ratily thc con
vcntions.”
o+

Vithout a customary lcgal basc ol compulsory univcrsal jurisdiction, thc
univcrsality principlc would bc conditional upon thc numbcr ol statc partics to
thc convcntion. Òn thc journcy towards complctc univcrsalism, an important
cffcct ol thc obligation to prosccutc or cxtraditc is to bc lound in thc narrowing
down ol thc numbcr ol statcs offcring salc havcns to thosc who havc committcd
crimcs against intcrnationally protcctcd pcrsons.
!s it possiblc, howcvcr, that thc obligation to prosccutc or cxtraditc offcnd
crs has bccomc a duty ol customary intcrnational law with rcgard to intcrnational
crimcs: 8assiouni argucs that thc principlc aut dedere aut judicare is a rulc ol cus
tomary intcrnational law. Tc main rcason appcars to bc that thc prosccution ol
intcrnational crimcs is in cffcct a duty ol carc owcd by all statcs to thc intcrna
tional community as a wholc. A lack ol cffcctivc intcrnational institutions mcans
that individual statcs must acccpt thc rcsponsibility ol prosccuting offcndcrs in
thc national courts. Tis principlc has bccn acccptcd in a numbcr ol multilat
cral trcatics. According to 8assiouni, with rcgard to intcrnational offcnccs, it is
“acccptcd as a positivc norm ol gcncral intcrnational law.”
o:
Tis argumcnt, how
cvcr, is bascd upon a vicw ol intcrnational law which, lrom bcing a law bctwccn
sovcrcign statcs, is “bccoming thc law ol a planctary community ol which all
human bcings arc mcmbcrs.”
o:
8assiouni finds support lor this vicw in thc dcvcl
opmcnt ol thc body ol intcrnational criminal law dcaling not only with coopcra
tion in criminal mattcrs bctwccn statcs “but also with thc rcprcssion ol conduct
pcrccivcd to bc harmlul to thc intcrcsts ol thc intcrnational community as a
wholc.”


8assiouni’s coauthor, Visc, docs not sharc this vicw. Howcvcr, thcy both
cxprcss intcrcst in thc qucstion ol whcthcr thc principlc ol aut dedere aut judicare
should bc rcgardcd as bcing a rulc ol gcncral intcrnational law to bc trcatcd as il
it wcrc implicitly incorporatcd in any dccision that a ccrtain conduct should bc
trcatcd as an intcrnational offcncc. !t is thus ncccssary to study how thcy dcfinc
an intcrnational offcncc. !ntcrnational offcnccs arc “thosc offcnscs which arc ol
sufficicnt intcrnational conccrn so as to bc thc subjcct ol a multilatcral trcaty
rcquiring thc partics to takc stcps ol somc sort to coopcratc in thcir supprcs
o. Malvina Halbcrstam, Tcrrorism on thc High Scas: Tc Achillc Lauro, Piracy and
thc !MÒ Convcntion on Maritimc Salcty, ·a AJIL, a6o, a·. n. .c (.o··). Cl. Michacl
Vood, Tc Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs Against
!ntcrnationally Protcctcd Pcrsons, including Ðiplomatic Agcnts, a. ICLQ ·co
(.o·¡).
oa 8assiouni and Visc, a¡.
o. !bid., ..
o¡ !bid.
¡· Jurisdiction and Immunity
sion.”

Tcy point out that intcrnational offcnccs, in thc loosc scnsc, should bc
distinguishcd lrom a) “intcrnational crimcs” in thc scnsc ol wrongs lor which
a statc is rcsponsiblc, and b) “crimcs undcr intcrnational law” or “intcrnational
offcnscs stricto sensu”. Crimcs ol thc lattcr catcgory gcncrally rclcr to a coursc ol
conduct dircctly prohibitcd by intcrnational law lor which thcrc is an individual
criminal rcsponsibility.
o6
!t is apparcnt that an intcrnational offcncc, according
to thc abovcmcntioncd dcfinition, is a broadcr conccpt than thc notion ol an
intcrnational crimc, as has bccn dcscribcd in thc abovc scction on univcrsal juris
diction.
Crimcs undcr thc Salcty Convcntion (and, lor cxamplc, thc !PP convcn
tion) should thus bc rcgardcd as intcrnational offcnccs. !n thc vicw ol 8assiouni,
thc obligation to prosccutc or cxtraditc pcrsons rcsponsiblc lor such acts rcprc
scnts an obligation undcr gcncral intcrnational law. Tc principlc ol aut dedere
aut judicare, as it has bccn lormulatcd in, lor cxamplc, thc Salcty Convcntion
lcavcs only two options – to prosccutc or cxtraditc. Tcrc is no third way. As will
bc discusscd latcr, an obligation ccrtainly cxists undcr gcncral intcrnational law
to criminalisc such acts as murdcr and kidnap, as stipulatcd undcr thc Salcty
Convcntion. Tc principlc ol aut dedere aut judicare in rcspcct ol such crimcs is ol
yct, howcvcr, only applicablc bctwccn statcs partics to thc convcntion.
2.3 Ad Hoc Tribunals and Criminal Courts
Tc Ad Hoc tribunals and thc !CC arc ol intcrcst to thc protcction ol pcr
sonncl in pcacc opcrations lrom two pcrspcctivcs. First, it is ol importancc that
thcsc institutions havc thc powcr and authority to punish pcrsons rcsponsiblc lor
crimcs committcd against protcctcd pcrsonncl. Tat will hopclully act as a dctcr
rcnt to potcntial pcrpctrators and would bc in linc with thc spirit ol thc Salcty
Convcntion. Sccond, it is ol intcrcst whcthcr thc protcctcd pcrsonncl conccrncd
can thcmsclvcs bc prosccutcd bclorc thcsc institutions. Tc lcgal discussions on
this aspcct havc mainly ccntrcd on thc powcrs ol thc !CC but arc also rclcvant in
rclation to thc !CTY.
Tc !CTY was cstablishcd by thc Sccurity Council in .oo. in rcsponsc to
thc scrious violations ol intcrnational humanitarian law that had bccn commit
tcd within thc tcrritory ol lormcr Yugoslavia sincc .oo..

Tc dccision to crcatc
thc tribunal was takcn undcr Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr bccausc thcsc vio
lations wcrc dccmcd to posc a thrcat to intcrnational pcacc and sccurity. !n .oo¡
thc !CTR was cstablishcd by thc Sccurity Council lor thc purposc ol adjudi
cating ovcr thc prosccution ol pcrsons suspcctcd ol committing gcnocidc and
othcr scrious violations ol intcrnational humanitarian law within thc tcrritory ol
o· !bid., ·6 (lootnotc omittcd).
o6 !bid., 6 notc ...
o· SC Rcs. ·a·, UN SCÒR, .a.·
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·a· (.oo.).
¡6 Chapter 2
Rwanda bctwccn . ]anuary .oo¡ and .. Ðcccmbcr .oo¡.
o8
Tc dccision to crcatc
thc !CTR was also takcn undcr Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr.
Òffcnccs that lall within thc jurisdiction ol thc !CTY includc gravc brcachcs
ol thc .o¡o Gcncva Convcntions, violations ol thc laws or customs ol war, acts ol
gcnocidc and crimcs against humanity.
oo
Tc tribunal had, and still has, jurisdic
tion to hcar thc prosccution ol natural pcrsons accuscd ol thc commission ol any
ol thosc stipulatcd crimcs committcd on thc tcrritory ol thc lormcr Yugoslavia in
and altcr .oo..
+oo
!n cascs ol concurrcnt jurisdiction thc tribunal had, and still has,
primacy ovcr national courts.
+o+

Tc subjcctmattcr jurisdiction ol thc !CTR is gcnocidc, crimcs against
humanity and violations ol Articlc . common to thc Gcncva Convcntions and
violations ol Additional Protocol !!.
+o:
Tc tribunal is compctcnt to adjudicatc in
cascs whcrc natural pcrsons arc accuscd ol any ol thc abovcmcntioncd crimcs
committcd within thc tcrritory ol Rwanda, and in thc tcrritory ol ncighbouring
statcs, in rclation to scrious violations ol intcrnational humanitarian law com
mittcd by Rwandan citizcn bctwccn . ]anuary .oo¡ and .. Ðcccmbcr .oo¡.
+o:
Tc
!CTR rctains primacy ovcr national courts in cascs ol concurrcnt jurisdiction.
+o±
Tosc scrious crimcs ovcr which thcsc tribunals had jurisdiction, and at thc
timc ol writing, still had, involvc crimcs which pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations
would hardly commit, il at all. Howcvcr, against thc background ol what hap
pcncd in Somalia, such things cannot bc rulcd out and thc jurisdiction ol thc
!CTY is thcrclorc ol importancc lor pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations.
+o¡
Unlikc
thc !CTR, thc !CTY had no timc limit on its cxistcncc and thosc committing
criminal acts stipulatcd in thc !CTY statutc at any timc in or altcr .oo. could still
bc brought bclorc it. Tc most significant point to bc rcaliscd with rcgard to thc
jurisdictional compctcncc ol thcsc tribunals is thcir primacy ovcr national courts
in cascs ol concurrcnt jurisdiction. Tc tcrritorial principlc would gcncrally givc
thc tcrritorial statc, whcrc thc crimc had bccn committcd, primary jurisdiction
in cascs whcrc thc pcrpctrator was in thc custody ol that statc. Tc primacy ol
thcsc tribunals is bascd upon thc lact that thc Sccurity Council cstablishcd thcm
in ordcr to maintain intcrnational pcacc and sccurity and thcrclorc rctaincd thc
o· SC Rcs. o··, UN SCÒR, .¡·.
rd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/o·· (.oo¡).
oo Articlcs a· ol thc Statutc ol thc !CTY.
.cc Articlc · ol thc Statutc ol thc !CTY.
.c. Articlc o ol thc Statutc ol thc !CTY.
.ca Articlcs a¡ ol thc Statutc ol thc !CTR.
.c. Articlc · ol thc Statutc ol thc !CTR.
.c¡ Articlc · ol thc Statutc ol thc !CTR.
.c· Scc c.g. thc Court Martial Appcal Court ol Canada, CMAC.·¡, Òttawa, Òntario,
May .6, .oo· and Court Martial Appcal Court ol Canada, CMAC.·6, in, How Does
Law Protect in War, .c·¡, .c·· (Marco Sassòli and Antoinc A. 8ouvicr, cds., .ooo).
¡· Jurisdiction and Immunity
right to intcrlcrc in thc domcstic jurisdiction ol rclcvant statcs.
+o6
!n cffcct, thc
jurisdiction ol thc !CTY is valid in thc tcrritory ol thc lormcr Yugoslavia and
any pcacc opcration pcrsonncl suspcctcd ol committing any ol thc crimcs stipu
latcd in thc statutc ol thc !CTY would risk prosccution bclorc it. Tc cxclusivc
criminal jurisdiction ol scnding statcs, and thc immunity ol ccrtain pcrsonncl
lrom local jurisdiction undcr applicablc statusollorccs agrccmcnts could not bc
rclicd upon in rclation to thc primary jurisdiction ol thc !CTY.
+o·
!n addition to thcsc intcrnational tribunals lor thc lormcr Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, a numbcr ol mixcd (or intcrnationaliscd) criminal courts havc bccn
cstablishcd to support thc rcbuilding ol socicty in thc altcrmath ol conflict, or to
intcrvcnc in thc cvcnt ol a brcakdown ol thc judicial systcm.
+o8
!n August, accc,
thc Sccurity Council adoptcd Rcsolution ...· which cxprcsscd dccp conccrn ovcr
thc widcsprcad attacks that wcrc taking placc against thc pcoplc ol Sicrra Lconc
and UN and associatcd pcrsonncl within that country, togcthcr with thc cxist
ing situation ol impunity.
+oo
!t notcd thc urgcnt nccd lor intcrnational coopcra
tion to assist in thc strcngthcning ol thc judicial systcm in thc Rcpublic ol Sicrra
Lconc. !t rcqucstcd thc start ol ncgotiations bctwccn thc govcrnmcnt ol Sicrra
Lconc and thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc cstablishmcnt ol an indcpcndcnt spc
cial court lor Sicrra Lconc.
++o
An agrccmcnt was rcachcd on .6 ]anuary acca.
+++

Articlc . ol thc agrccmcnt stipulatcd thc cstablishmcnt ol thc spccial court to
“prosccutc pcrsons who bcar thc grcatcst rcsponsibility lor scrious violations ol
intcrnational humanitarian law and Sicrra Lconcan law committcd in thc tcrri
tory ol Sicrra Lconc sincc .c Novcmbcr .oo6.”
++:
.c6 Articlc a (·) ol thc UN Chartcr.
.c· !t has bccn notcd that US conccrns ovcr thc rcach ol thc !CC jurisdiction conccrn
ing its unilormcd pcrsonncl stationcd abroad has no cquivalcnt with rcgard to thc
jurisdiction ol thc !CTY. At thc timc ol writing, largc contingcnts ol US troops wcrc
dcploycd in Kosovo and 8osnia and wcrc thcrclorc subjcct to thc primary jurisdic
tion ol thc !CTY. Scc Franck and Yuhan, ·.·.
.c· Such courts arc ncithcr intcrnational nor national in charactcr but a mixturc ol both.
Courts ol this typc havc bccn cstablishcd in Sicrra Lconc, ¡ast Timor and Kosovo.
A similar such court has bccn proposcd lor Cambodia. Scc Antonio Casscsc,
International Law, ¡··o (a
nd
cd. acc·).
.co SC Rcs. ...·, UN SCÒR, ¡.·6
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/...· (accc).
..c SC Rcs. ...·, UN SCÒR, ¡.·6
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/...· (accc), para.a.
... Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt ol Sicrra Lconc on thc
¡stablishmcnt ol a Spccial Court lor Sicrra Lconc, donc at Frcctown on .6 ]anuary
acca. Scc Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc cstablishmcnt ol a Spccial Court
lor Sicrra Lconc, Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt ol
Sicrra Lconc on thc ¡stablishmcnt ol a Spccial Court lor Sicrra Lconc, .6 ]anuary
(acca), Anncx, UN Ðoc. S/accc/o.·. Scc also http://www.scsl.org/scslagrccmcnt.
html.
..a !bid., Articlc ..
¡· Chapter 2
According to its statutc, thc spccial court would havc thc powcr and author
ity to prosccutc thosc who committcd crimcs against humanity (Articlc a), includ
ing violations ol Articlc . common to thc Gcncva Convcntions and ol Additional
Protocol !! (Articlc .), othcr scrious violations ol intcrnational humanitarian law
(Articlc ¡) and thc commission ol crimcs undcr Sicrra Lconcan law (Articlc
·).
++:
Articlc ¡ b dcscribcd thc lollowing acts as scrious violations ol intcrnational
humanitarian law: “!ntcntionally dirccting attacks against pcrsonncl, installa
tions, matcrial, units or vchiclcs involvcd in a humanitarian assistancc or pcacc
kccping mission in accordancc with thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations, as long
as thcy arc cntitlcd to thc protcction givcn to civilians or civilian objccts undcr
thc intcrnational law ol armcd conflict.” Tc tcxt rcplicatcs thc tcxt ol Articlc ·
(a) (b) (iii) ol thc !CC statutc.
++±

Tc !CC camc into lorcc on . ]uly acca. Mindlul ol its subsidiary principlc
on national jurisdiction, it rcprcscnts, howcvcr, a major achicvcmcnt in thc fight
against impunity in rclation to intcrnational crimcs ol a scrious naturc. Unlikc
thc tribunals lor thc lormcr Yugoslavia and Rwanda, thc !CC was cstablishcd
through an intcrnational agrccmcnt granting it ccrtain powcrs ol jurisdiction.
++¡

A numbcr ol statcs wcrc rcluctant to grant thc Court primary jurisdiction ovcr
national jurisdictions, and thc powcr and authority ol thc Court was thcrc
lorc curtailcd by thc principlc ol complcmcntarity.
++6
Ðcspitc this principlc, thc
Court may cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr any pcrson committing a crimc, rclcrrcd to
in Articlc · ol thc !CC statutc, on thc tcrritory ol a statc party, irrcspcctivc ol
whcthcr that pcrson’s statc ol nationality was a mcmbcr, or not, ol thc !CC.
++·

Conccrns cxprcsscd by thc Unitcd Statcs ovcr its armcd lorccs, during thc
ncgotiations ol thc !CC statutc, lcd to a succcsslul USsponsorcd bid sccking
cxccption lrom thc obligation ol mcmbcr statcs to surrcndcr, upon rcqucst, a
pcrson to thc Court il it rcquircd thc rcqucstcd statc to act contrary to its obli
gations undcr intcrnational agrccmcnts.
++8
Tis cxccption is ol particular impor
tancc lor pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations sincc thc intcrnational agrccmcnts that
... Statutc ol thc Spccial Court ol Sicrra Lconc, scc Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral
on thc cstablishmcnt ol a Spccial Court lor Sicrra Lconc, and http://www.scsl.org/
scslstatutc.html.
..¡ !t is intcrcsting to notc that it rclcrs to thc international law ol armcd conflict. Tat
would cncompass both thc law applicablc in intcrnational and nonintcrnational
armcd conflicts.
..· For commcnts on thc statutc ol thc !CC, scc Commentary on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court. Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, (Òtto Trifftcrcr,
cd.,.ooo), Te Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, \ol.
!!!, (Antonio Casscsc, Paola Gacta, and ]ohn R. V. Ð. ]oncs, cds., acca).
..6 Scc c.g. articlcs .·.o ol thc Statutc. Scc, lor cxamplc, Villiam A. Schabas, An
Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 6··c (acc.).
..· Articlc .a.
..· Articlc o·(a) ol thc !CC statutc.
¡o Jurisdiction and Immunity
wcrc in thc minds ol thc sponsors wcrc SÒFAs, which in pcacc opcrations allo
catc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr military pcrsonncl to thc contributing
statcs.
++o
According to an applicablc SÒFA, statcs hosting a pcacc opcration arc
undcr a duty not to cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr such pcrsonncl. To surrcndcr thcm
to thc Court would in cffcct bc contrary to its obligations undcr thc SÒFA. Tis
is a provision ol thc statutc conccrning thc co-operation ol mcmbcr statcs and
docs not limit thc powcrs ol jurisdiction ol thc Court. Tc statutc docs, in lact,
cxplicitly statc that it “shall apply cqually to all pcrsons without any distinction
bascd on official capacity.”
+:o

Articlc o· (a) providcs thc ncccssary tool lor statcs hosting pcacc opcrations
to balancc thc compcting intcrcsts ol thc !CC and ol an applicablc SÒFA.
+:+
Tc
Unitcd Statcs, howcvcr, has cntcrcd into a numbcr ol bilatcral agrccmcnts with
statcs lor thc purposc ol protccting US citizcns lrom thc cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction
ol thc Court. Tcsc agrccmcnts arc oltcn rclcrrcd to as “Articlc o·” agrccmcnts or
bilatcral immunity agrccmcnts (8!As).
+::
A muchcriticiscd rcsolution by thc Sccurity Council in acca aimcd to
intcrlcrc with thc powcrs ol thc !CC in rclation to pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations.
According to thc Sccurity Council Rcsolution .¡aa, thc !CC may not commcncc
or procccd with thc invcstigation or prosccution ol any casc “involving currcnt or
lormcr officials or pcrsonncl lrom a contributing Statc not a Party to thc Romc
Statutc ovcr acts or omissions rclating to a Unitcd Nations cstablishcd or author
izcd opcration” lor a pcriod ol .a months lrom . ]uly acca, thc intcntion ol thc
rcsolution was to rcncw thcsc conditions cach . ]uly.
+::
Howcvcr, in thc summcr
ol acc¡ thc US dccidcd not to pursuc a ncw rcsolution on this mattcr.
+:±

Tc !CC, lor othcr rcasons, is also ol spccial intcrcst in rclation to thc pro
tcction ol pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations. !ts statutc cstablishcs that
intcntional attacks on pcrsonncl involvcd in humanitarian assistancc or pcacc
..o Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Tc Romc Statutc ol thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court, o.
AJIL, aa, ¡. (.ooo).
.ac Articlc a· ol thc Statuc.
.a. Tcsc agrccmcnts arc discusscd lurthcr in chaptcr ¡.....
.aa Scc thc Coalition lor thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court www.iccnow.org.
.a. SC Rcs. .¡aa, UN SCÒR, ¡··a
nd
mtg., paras. . and a, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡aa (acca). .
]uly acc. thc pcriod was rcncwcd through thc adoption ol SC Rcs. .¡··, UN SCÒR,
¡··a
nd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡·· (acc.).
.a¡ According to Hans Corcll, Lcgal Counscl to thc UN March .oo¡ – March acc¡,
thc rcsolutions dcalt with a nonissuc. Tc !CC judgcs would not rccognisc thc
validity ol thcsc rcsolutions and simply rcquirc a ncw rcsolution, to stop procccd
ings, in thc casc a pcacckccpcr would bc brought bclorc thc !CC. Scc A Òucstion
ol Crcdibility. http://www.iccnow.org/documcnts/dcclarationsrcsolutions/
CorcllHansArticlconUS!CCa.Mayc¡.pdl.
·c Chapter 2
kccping missions constitutc a spccial catcgory ol war crimc,
+:¡
cqually punishablc
in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts as in intcrnational armcd conflicts.
+:6

2.4 Multilateral Treaties on Immunity
Statc rcprcscntativcs arc normally accordcd immunity lrom local jurisdiction
whcn visiting othcr statcs. Tc immunity ol diplomatic agcnts is onc ol thc
oldcst tcncts ol intcrnational law and onc that is rcgularly uphcld in rclation
ships bctwccn statcs. !mmunity ol diplomatic agcnts is thus firmly rootcd in
customary intcrnational law but has bccn codificd (and dcvclopcd) through thc
\icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
+:·
Tc immunity cnjoycd is not lor
thc pcrsonal bcncfit ol thc diplomatic agcnt conccrncd. Rathcr it is to cnsurc thc
cfficicnt lunctioning ol diplomatic missions rcprcscnting thc statc.
+:8
!mmunity,
howcvcr, can bc waivcd by thc scnding statc.
+:o
Tc privilcgcs and immunitics ol
a diplomatic agcnt apply in rclation to local jurisdiction, but not to jurisdiction ol
thc scnding statc. Ðiplomatic immunitics arc also charactcriscd by thcir rcciproc
ity. Tc systcm ol diplomatic immunitics, bccausc ol this clcmcnt ol rcciprocity,
is largcly scllrcgulating.
+:o

!n contrast, thc immunity ol rcprcscntativcs ol intcrnational govcrnmcn
tal organisations involvcs no clcmcnt ol rcciprocity. Tcsc privilcgcs and immu
nitics, oltcn rclcrrcd to as intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics,
+:+
arc a
rclativcly ncw dcvclopmcnt and arc almost cntircly bascd upon convcntional law.
8ascd upon Articlc .c· ol thc UN Chartcr, thc main trcaty in this rcspcct is
thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations (thc
Gcncral Convcntion).
+::
Tc immunitics cnjoycd by rcprcscntativcs ol intcrna
tional organisations arc bascd in total upon thc principlc ol lunctional ncccssity.
!mmunity is thus limitcd to thcir official acts. !ntcrnational privilcgcs and immu
nitics apply in rclation to thc jurisdiction ol all statcs. Tis has provcd to bc ol
particular importancc in cascs whcrc socallcd “cxpcrts on missions”, pcrlorm
.a· Articlc · (b) (iii) ol thc !CC statutc. Scc also Articlc · (b) (vii) undcr which it is a
war crimc to makc impropcr usc ol thc flag or insignias ol thc UN.
.a6 Articlc · (c) (iii) ol thc !CC statutc.
.a· Scc Articlc .. ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations, .· April .o6., ·cc
UNTS, o·.
.a· !bid., ¡
th
prcambular paragraph.
.ao !bid., Articlc .a.
..c Casc Conccrning Unitcd Statcs Ðiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tchran (Unitcd
Statcs ol Amcrica v !ran) .o·c, !C] Rcp ., para. ·6.
... Scc Ð. 8. Michacls, International Privileges and Immunities: a Case for a Universal
Statute, (.o·.), C. Villrcd ]cnks, International Immunities (.o6.), C. F. Amcrasinghc,
Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, (.oo6).
..a Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations, .. Fcbruary
.o¡6, . UNTS .·.
·. Jurisdiction and Immunity
ing spccial lunctions lor thc UN, arc rcqucstcd to act within thc jurisdictions ol
thcir rcspcctivc national statcs.
+::
Tc nccd to subjcct thc immunity to a waivcr
institutc is in this rcspcct ol significancc. According to thc Gcncral Convcntion,
thc SccrctaryGcncral has thc right and duty to waivc thc immunity ol agcnts
rcprcscnting thc organisation il that immunity wcrc to impcdc thc coursc ol jus
ticc.
+:±
Tc Sccurity Council is in turn authoriscd to waivc thc immunity ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral.
+:¡

!n this work, thc tcrm “diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics” rclcrs to thc
status accordcd diplomatic agcnts and othcr pcrsonncl rcprcscnting thcir vari
ous statcs. Tc tcrm “intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics” rclcrs to pcrson
ncl rcprcscnting intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations. !n thc litcraturc this
division, howcvcr, is not always uphcld. Vith rcgard to pcacc opcrations thc
tcrms “absolutc immunity” and “lunctional immunity” or “onduty immunity” arc
somctimcs rclcrrcd to.
+:6
!t appcars that thc tcrms “lunctional immunity” and
“onduty immunity” arc both cqual to intcrnational immunity accordcd pcrson
ncl rcprcscnting intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations. Tc tcrms “absolutc
immunity” or “absolutc criminal immunity” appcar to rclatc to diplomatic immu
nity. Tc lattcr, howcvcr, is not wholly corrcct, sincc thc scnding statc can waivc
thc immunity ol thc agcnt. Tis is probably so that thc practicc ol allocating
cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction, in a statusollorccs agrccmcnt, on thc part ol thc
scnding statc ovcr its military lorccs, is trcatcd as a rulc ol immunity. Tc cxclu
sivc cxcrcisc ol criminal jurisdiction ol scnding statcs docs not, howcvcr, appcar
to rcflcct traditional rulcs ol immunity.
+:·
!n this rcspcct, it should bc notcd that
statusollorccs agrccmcnts allocating thc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction to thc
scnding statc do not contain waiving clauscs.
2.5 Status-of-Iorces Agreements
+:8
!t is an cstablishcd practicc ol thc organisation lcading a pcacc opcration to con
cludc a statusollorccs agrccmcnt (SÒFA) on thc lcgal status ol both thc opcr
ation and its mcmbcrs in thc tcrritory ol thc host nation. 8ascd upon carlicr
practicc, a UN Modcl Agrccmcnt was issucd in .ooc to lunction as a basis lor
... Applicability ol Articlc \!, Scction aa, ol thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and
!mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations (Advisory Òpinion) .o·o, !C] Rcp .o¡.
..¡ Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations (.o¡6) .
UNTS .·, Articlc \, Scction ac (Òfficials) and Articlcs \!, Scction a. (¡xpcrts on
Missions).
..· !bid.
..6 Robcrt C. Sickmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-keeping Forces, .·.
(.oo.).
..· Stcffcn Virth, !mmunitics, Rclatcd Problcms, and Articlc o· ol thc Romc Statutc,
.a Criminal Law Forum, ¡ao, ¡·· (acc.).
..· StatusolForccs Agrccmcnts arc dcalt with in Chaptcr ¡...
·a Chapter 2
luturc SÒFAs.
+:o
Tc most important parts ol thcsc agrccmcnts arc pcrhaps thc
provisions on criminal jurisdiction. According to Articlc ¡6 ol thc UN Modcl
Agrccmcnt all mcmbcrs ol thc opcration, including locallycmploycd pcrson
ncl, arc immunc lrom any lcgal proccss with rcgard to words spokcn or writ
tcn, and acts pcrlormcd, in an official capacity. Tc Gcncral Convcntion is cithcr
rclcrrcd to, or incorporatcd in, thc rclcvant SÒFA.
+±o
Although not cxplicitly
statcd, thc rclcrcnccs to thc Gcncral Convcntion imply that thc waivcr ol immu
nity mcchanism ol thc SccrctaryGcncral rcmains intact lor officials ol thc UN
and “cxpcrts on missions”.
+±+
!mmunity lor official acts, and thc right and duty ol
thc SccrctaryGcncral to waivc such immunity, is in accordancc with thc wcll
cstablishcd practicc ol privilcgcs and immunitics lor agcnts ol rccogniscd intcr
national govcrnmcntal organisations.
Military mcmbcrs ol thc military componcnt (oltcn most ol thc pcrson
ncl rclcrrcd to as pcacckccpcrs) arc accordcd thosc privilcgcs and immunitics
cxplicitly statcd in thc SÒFA.
+±:
According to Articlc ¡6 (b) ol thc UN Modcl
SÒFA military pcrsonncl, rclcrrcd to abovc, arc subjcct to thc cxclusivc criminal
jurisdiction ol scnding statcs in rclation to any criminal offcncc that might bc
committcd by thcm. Tc SÒFA provisions on criminal jurisdiction ovcr military
mcmbcrs ol thc lorcc in qucstion arc influcnccd by conccrns othcr than lor civil
ian pcrsonncl. !t is appropriatc, thcrclorc, to bricfly rccapitulatc thc traditional
vicw on jurisdiction and lorcign military lorccs, and how this is rcflcctcd in thc
SÒFAs ol contcmporary pcacc opcrations.
]urisdiction in rclation to lorcign military lorccs is influcnccd by two oppos
ing doctrincs. Tcsc arc thc jurisdiction ol thc scnding statc (thc “law ol thc
flag”) and thc tcrritorial jurisdiction ol thc rccciving statc.
+±:
Tc .·.a casc ol thc
schooncr Exchange is oltcn rclcrrcd to as a point ol dcparturc in any discussions
on immunity lor lorcign military lorccs. Two Amcrican shipowncrs claimcd pos
scssion ol a Frcnch naval ship, at thc timc in Philadclphia lor rcpairs, on thc basis
that it was in lact thc schooncr Exchange owncd by thcm, but had bccn scizcd by
..o Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Modcl statusollorccs agrccmcnt lor pcacckccp
ing opcrations, UN Ðoc A/¡·/·o¡ (.ooc).
.¡c Scc paras. a·a6 ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt. Locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl arc
accordcd lunctional immunity by rclcrcncc to .· (a) – (c) ol thc Gcncral Convcntion
in para. a· ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt.
.¡. Tis conclusion is supportcd by thc lact that il a mcmbcr ol thc civilian componcnt,
or a civilian mcmbcr ol thc military componcnt, is accuscd ol a criminal offcncc, thc
Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr ol thc Forcc is obligcd to rcach an agrccmcnt
with thc host govcrnmcnt, on whcthcr or not procccdings should bc institutcd. !l thc
partics lail to rcach such agrccmcnt, thc issuc will thcn bc rclcrrcd to an arbitration
tribunal. Para. ¡· (a) and para. ·. ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt.
.¡a Para. a· ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt.
.¡. Ðictcr Flcck, !ntroduction, in Te Handbook of Te Law of Visiting Forces, 6 (Ðictcr
Flcck, ct al cds. acc.).
·. Jurisdiction and Immunity
Francc on thc high scas in .·.c. According to Chicl ]usticc Marshall ol thc US
Suprcmc Court, thc jurisdiction ol all statcs within thcir tcrritorics is “ncccssarily
cxclusivc and absolutc.” ¡xccptions to this principlc must thcrclorc bc bascd upon
thc conscnt ol thc tcrritorial statc, cithcr cxprcss or implicd. Tcrc cxists, howcvcr,
a catcgory whcrc thc sovcrcign in qucstion must havc bccn undcrstood to havc
waivcd part ol thc cxclusivc tcrritorial jurisdiction. Ònc such casc would bc whcrc
a sovcrcign allows troops ol a lorcign statc to pass through its tcrritory.
!n such casc, without any cxprcss dcclaration waiving jurisdiction ovcr thc
army to which this right ol passagc has bccn grantcd, thc sovcrcign who should
attcmpt to cxcrcisc it would ccrtainly bc considcrcd as violating his laith. 8y
cxcrcising it, thc purposc lor which thc lrcc passagc was grantcd would bc
dclcatcd, and a portion ol thc military lorcc ol a lorcign indcpcndcnt nation
would bc divcrtcd lrom thosc national objccts and dutics to which it was appli
cablc, and would bc withdrawn lrom thc control ol thc sovcrcign whosc powcr
and whosc salcty might grcatly dcpcnd upon rctaining thc cxclusivc command
and disposition ol his lorcc. Tc grant ol a lrcc passagc, thcrclorc, implics a
waivcr ol all jurisdiction ovcr thc troops during thcir passagc and pcrmits thc
lorcign gcncral to usc that disciplinc and to inflict thosc punishmcnts which
thc govcrnmcnt ol his army may rcquirc.
+±±
Tc csscncc ol thc doctrinc ol thc law ol thc flag is that lorcign lorccs arc not
subjcct to thc jurisdiction ol thc host statc. Tc scnding statc rctains cxclusivc
jurisdiction ovcr its lorccs. Tc dccision in thc schooncr Exchange casc rcprcscnts
a clcar statcmcnt ol thc law ol thc flag principlc. !t is apparcnt, howcvcr, that thc
lrcc passagc ol lorcign armcd lorccs is not ncccssarily thc samc as that ol thc sta
tioning ol troops.
+±¡
Tc prcscncc ol lorcign lorccs within a statc is a rathcr rcccnt
phcnomcnon. !n gcncral, up until about .o.¡, thcsc prcscnccs occurrcd only as
occupying lorccs during timcs ol war or pcacc.
+±6
Following thc cnd ol thc Sccond
Vorld Var, thcrc arosc a nccd lor clcar rulcs on thc lcgal status ol lorcign armcd
lorccs in pcacctimc. Tc primc cxamplc ol this body ol law is thc multilatcral
SÒFA ol .o·. dcfining thc status ol visiting lorccs ol thc North Atlantic Trcaty
Òrganisation (NATÒ).
+±·
Applying thc law ol thc flag principlc would providc
.¡¡ Tc Schooncr “¡xchangc” v McFaddon, Suprcmc Court ol thc Unitcd Statcs, ·
Cranch, ..6 (.·.a), . AJIL, aa· (.oco).
.¡· ]cnnings, Sir Robcrt and Vatts Sir Arthur (¡ds.), Oppenheim’s International Law,
..·6 (o
th
cd., \ol. !! .ooa).
.¡6 Scrgc Lazarcff, Status of Military Forces under Current International Law, · (.o·.).
Ðuring thc .·
th
Ccntury thcrc wcrc instanccs ol military lorccs passing through lor
cign tcrritory or bcing stationcd during a bricl pcriod.
.¡· Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Partics to thc North Atlantic Trcaty Rcgarding thc Status
ol Tcir Forccs, ]unc .o, .o·., .oo UNTS 6·, at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/
b·.c6.oa.htm.
·¡ Chapter 2
thc scnding statc with cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr its lorccs, whilc thc tcr
ritorial principlc would givc thc rccciving statc cxclusivc jurisdiction ovcr visiting
lorccs. According to Lazarcff thcrc cxists no “unqualificd statcmcnt in lavour ol
thc principlc ol thc immunity ol jurisdiction.”
+±8
A customiscd principlc ol tcr
ritorial sovcrcignty appcars instcad as thc principlc de lege lata in thc abscncc ol
an agrccmcnt.
+±o
Tc rccciving statc must takc into considcration thc lact that
thc pcrsonncl ol thc lorcign lorccs conccrncd arc to somc cxtcnt rcprcscntativcs
ol thc scnding statc. Tc ncgotiations lcading up to thc conclusion ol thc mul
tilatcral NATÒ SÒFA in .o·., with rcgard to criminal jurisdiction, did rcsult
in a compromisc bctwccn thc opposing principlcs and stipulatcd a concurrcnt
jurisdiction bctwccn thc scnding and rccciving statcs.
+¡o
Nowadays, concurrcnt
jurisdiction rcprcscnts thc norm in rclation to trcatics rcgulating status ol visiting
lorccs, but in .o·. it rcprcscntcd a brcak with carlicr practicc whcrc scnding statcs
oltcn had cxtcnsivc, il not cxclusivc, jurisdictional powcrs ovcr thcir lorccs.
+¡+

According to thc NATÒ SÒFA, scnding and rccciving statcs arc, in gcn
cral, grantcd cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction in rclation to offcnccs that violatc
thcir own laws. !l a crimc wcrc to violatc thc law ol both statcs, thc cxcrcisc ol
jurisdiction would bc rcsolvcd through a systcm ol priority ol rights. Tc scnd
ing statc has thc primary right to cxcrcisc jurisdiction both ovcr offcnccs arising
out ol thc pcrlormancc ol official dutics and offcnccs dircctcd solcly against its
sccurity, propcrty or pcrsonncl. Tc rccciving statc rctains primary jurisdiction in
all othcr instanccs.
Tc lavourcd solution ol criminal jurisdiction in rclation to visiting lorccs is
that ol concurrcncc. Ðcvclopmcnt with rcgard to pcacc opcrations has lollowcd
a diffcrcnt path. !n thc first opcration, UN¡F in .o·6, thc scnding statcs rctaincd
cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr thcir lorccs. Tis principlc has survivcd and
is cxprcsscd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA. Also in NATÒlcd pcacc opcrations, such
as thc !mplcmcnting Forcc (!FÒR) dcploymcnt in 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina, thc
scnding statcs cxcrciscd cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr thcir military contin
gcnts. Tc rcason lor thcsc opposing solutions is to bc lound in thc “opcrational
contcxt” whcrc pcacc opcration lorccs arc dcploycd in contrast with thosc ol vis
iting lorccs.
+¡:
.¡· Lazarcff, .·.
.¡o !bid.
.·c Articlc \!! ol thc NATÒ SÒFA.
.·. Paul ]. Condcrman, ]urisdiction, in Te Handbook of Te Law of Visiting Forces, .c.
(Ðictcr, Flcck, ct al cds., acc.).
.·a Typical diffcrcnccs bctwccn visiting lorccs and Unitcd Nations Forccs arc, according
to 8owctt, “(.) thc Unitcd Nations Forcc is not that ol an ally: indccd it will gcncr
ally bc complctcly indcpcndcnt ol thc local authoritics, (a) thc Forcc gcncrally may
bc actually opcrating, in thc military scnsc, within thc tcrritory ol thc Statc and not
mcrcly stationcd thcrc.” Ðcrck, V. 8owctt, United Nations Forces. A Legal Study of
United Nations Practice, ¡.¡ (.o6¡).
·· Jurisdiction and Immunity
Tc SÒFAs, both conccrning visiting lorccs and pcacc opcration lorccs,
approach thc qucstions ol jurisdiction and immunity lrom slightly diffcrcnt pcr
spcctivcs lrom thosc that arc usual lor civil scrvants. A SÒFA allocatcs jurisdic
tion bctwccn scnding and rccciving statcs by applying thc lormula ol concurrcnt
or cxclusivc jurisdiction. Tc NATÒ SÒFA ol .o·. lavours thc solution ol con
currcnt jurisdiction. !n thc UN Modcl SÒFA, thc cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction is cxclu
sivc lor scnding statcs and has thus bccn allocatcd in lull lor thcsc statcs. Scnding
statcs arc oltcn not partics to thc SÒFA in qucstion, but lunction as bcncficiar
ics to thc agrccmcnt to which thc rccciving statc and thc organisation lcading
thc opcration arc partics. Sincc thc rccciving statc rctains no right ol cxcrcising
criminal jurisdiction ovcr thc military mcmbcrs ol thc military componcnt, thc
qucstion ol immunity nccd not bc raiscd at all. Tis position is lurthcr supportcd
by thc lact that in thc SÒFA thcrc is no provision on a right or duty to waivc
any immunity lor military pcrsonncl subjcct to thc cxclusivc criminal jurisdic
tion ol thcir scnding statcs. Strictly spcaking, military pcrsonncl do not bcncfit
lrom traditional rulcs on immunity lrom local jurisdiction, but rathcr cnjoy thc
bcncfits ol bcing subjcct to thc cxclusivc cxcrcisc ol criminal jurisdiction ol scnd
ing statcs.
A SÒFA is pcrhaps thc singlc most important instrumcnt on thc status ol
pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. !t providcs dctailcd provisions on privilcgcs and
immunitics lor pcrsonncl, as wcll as dutics, and cmphasiscs thc duty ol thc host
nation to punish pcrsons rcsponsiblc lor criminal acts committcd against pro
tcctcd pcrsonncl. !n somc SÒFAs ol a latcr datc, ccrtain kcy provisions ol thc
Salcty Convcntion havc bccn includcd. SÒFAs will bc cxamincd latcr in somc
dctail.
2.6 Conclusions
Tc thrcc partitc rclationships bctwccn thc cntity lcading a pcacc opcration, thc
scnding statc and thc host statc involvc complicatcd issucs on jurisdiction and
immunity. Tc survcy abovc ol thc law on jurisdiction and immunity providcs,
in this rcspcct, a basis lor thc lollowing analysis ol thc protcction ol pcrsonncl
in pcacc opcrations. Such pcrsonncl oltcn cnjoy somc sort ol immunity lrom
criminal jurisdiction ol thc statc hosting an opcration. For agcnts ol an intcr
national govcrnmcntal organisation, thcsc arc mcasurcd against thc principlc ol
lunctional ncccssity. Tc limits ol thc lunctional ncccssity critcrion, howcvcr, arc
not casily dcfincd.
+¡:
!n rcspcct ol military lorccs, scnding statcs rctain cxclusivc
.·. Klabbcrs cxprcsscs strong criticism against thc thcory ol lunctional ncccssity, cspc
cially with rcgard to its normativc charactcr. Hc finds that it may scrvc as a usclul
dcscription ol privilcgcs and immunitics providcd to an intcrnational organisation.
Howcvcr, hc finds that what is rcquircd lor an organisation to pcrlorm its lunctions
·6 Chapter 2
criminal jurisdiction according to an applicablc SÒFA. !n cascs whcrc no SÒFA
has bccn concludcd such a proposition must bc bascd upon an argumcnt ol cus
tomary intcrnational law, or that it is implicd in thc invitation ol thc host statc ol
thc pcacc opcration. Tc building blocks ol thc cmcrging lcgal rcgimc against thc
culturc ol impunity lor hostilc acts against pcacc opcrations pcrsonncl arc inter
alia thc intcrnational tribunals and thc !CC. Tc probably most important com
poncnt is still national courts, whcrc thc Salcty Convcntion plays a significant
rolc. !t is argucd that crimcs stipulatcd undcr thc Salcty Convcntion arc subjcct
to univcrsal jurisdiction ol an optional charactcr, providing a right lor all statcs
to prosccutc offcndcrs in rclation to such crimcs. Univcrsal jurisdiction ol a com
pulsory charactcr is probably still only applicablc inter partes.
is csscntially sccn in thc cycs ol thc bcholdcr. Tc lunctional ncccssity thcory is thcrc
lorc too abstract lor it to havc a normativc charactcr. ]an Klabbcrs, An Introduction to
International Law, .¡o.·. (acca).
Chapter 3
Gcncral Protcction
Tis study on gcncral protcction is bascd upon an cxamination ol thrcc arcas ol
intcrnational law: (.) Tc law on diplomatic protcction ol alicns and morc spc
cifically thc intcrnational minimum standard, (a) intcrnational human rights law,
and (.) intcrnational humanitarian law ol armcd conflict. Tcsc ficlds ol intcrna
tional law providc a basic protcction lor pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. A bricl
background to cach arca ol law is prcscntcd, as wcll as an ovcrvicw ol thc spccific
charactcristics ol thc diffcrcnt lcgal rcgimcs.
Numcrous books and articlcs havc bccn writtcn on human rights law and
intcrnational humanitarian law. Tc purposc ol this chaptcr is not to analysc thosc
arcas in all thcir aspccts, but rathcr to cxaminc how thcy rclatc to thc protcction
ol pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations. Tcir scopc ol application, dutics ol
host nations and customary law dcvclopmcnt arc in this rcspcct ol importancc.
Tc rclationship bctwccn human rights law and intcrnational humanitarian law
is also ol intcrcst sincc modcrn day conflicts arc oltcn ol an intcrnal lowintcn
sity naturc and charactcr, and thc application ol thcsc scts ol norms may bccomc
blurrcd in such contcxts.
Tc lact that most currcnt armcd conflicts arc ol a nonintcrnational charac
tcr, and that protcction undcr human rights law may bc dcrogatcd lrom in situa
tions ol cmcrgcncy, has lcd to thc ncccssity ol idcntilying lundamcntal standards
protccting individuals applicablc in all situations, irrcspcctivc ol how a particu
lar conflict bccomcs classificd. A proccss ol idcntilying fundamental standards of
humanity was at thc timc ol writing taking placc within thc lramcwork ol thc UN
Commission on Human Rights.
+
Tis proccss was initiatcd by a group ol non
govcrnmcntal cxpcrts who adoptcd thc Ðcclaration on Minimum Humanitarian
Standards in .ooc.
:
!t appcars to bc a common undcrstanding that thcrc is no a
nccd to crcatc ncw standards.
:
Tc idcntification ol lundamcntal standards ol
humanity is rathcr dircctcd towards strcngthcning thc implcmcntation ol cxist
. Fundamcntal standards ol humanity. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral submittcd
pursuant to Commission Rcsolution accc/6o, para. ¡, UN Ðoc. ¡/CN.¡/acc./o.
(acc.).
a Tcodor Mcron, Allan Rosas, A Ðcclaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards,
·· AJIL, .··.·. (.oo.).
. Fundamcntal standards ol humanity, UN Ðoc. ¡/CN.¡/acc./o. (acc.), para. 6.
·· Chapter 3
ing lcgal norms. Four kcy issucs havc bccn idcntificd that posc spccific challcngcs
in this arca: “thc thrcshold ol applicability ol intcrnational humanitarian law, thc
qucstion ol how to dcal with Statcs and othcr actors which havc not ratificd or
cannot ratily trcatics, thc qucstion ol dcrogation lrom human rights trcatics, and
thc accountability ol armcd groups and othcr nonStatc actors.”
±
Rcccnt rcports
havc locuscd on thc “nccd to sccurc practical rcspcct lor cxisting intcrnational
human rights and humanitarian law standards in all circumstanccs and by all
actors.”
¡
Tis may bc achicvcd in part through thc clarification ol unccrtaintics
in thc practical application ol such standards.
6
Factors that havc contributcd to
thc clarification ol such unccrtaintics arc inter alia thc dcvclopmcnt ol intcr
national criminal law, cspccially thc jurisprudcncc ol thc war crimcs tribunals
lor thc lormcr Yugoslavia and lor Rwanda, and thc Gcncral Commcnt by thc
Human Rights Committcc on thc right ol dcrogation lrom human rights trca
tics as wcll as thc Ðralt Articlcs on statc rcsponsibility. Tc dcvclopmcnt ol lun
damcntal standards ol humanity may provc to bc a valuablc pcdagogical tool and
an important sct ol rulcs as a basis lor rclcrcncc. Howcvcr, thcrc is also thc risk
ol thc distinction bctwccn thcsc diffcrcnt scts ol norms bccoming blurrcd, with
standards thus pcrccivcd as bcing thc only norms rclcvant – undcrmining both
scts ol norms.
·

Tc lcvcl ol protcction lor pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations might
also bcncfit lrom thc traditional rulcs on statc rcsponsibility lor injury to alicns.
Tc rclcvant standard ol trcatmcnt dcvclopcd in customary law might in many
rcspccts bc rcgardcd as bcing thc lorcrunncr to thc human rights law ol today.
8

,.r International Minimum Standard
Tc trcatmcnt ol alicns has traditionally bccn subjcct to two opposing standards:
thc principlc ol an intcrnational minimum standard, and thc standard ol national
trcatmcnt. Tc discussion on thc rclcvant standard ol trcatmcnt is in lact also a
discussion rcflccting, to somc cxtcnt, opposing vicws ol cconomic and political
intcrcsts. Tc lormcr vicw sccks to cstablish a standard applicablc to all, irrcspcc
tivc ol thc prcvailing conditions in ccrtain statcs. Tc application ol this principlc
¡ !bid., para. ·.
· Fundamcntal standards ol humanity. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral submittcd
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights dccision acc./..a, para. ., UN Ðoc. ¡/
CN.¡/acca/.c. (acc.).
6 !bid.
· Sia Spiliopoulou Akcrmark, Humanitär rätt och mänskliga rättigheter: samspel under
utveckling, (acca).
· Òn thc rclationship bctwccn human rights law and thc law ol statc rcsponsibility lor
injury to alicns, scc Tomas ¡. Carbonncau, Tc Convcrgcncc ol thc Law ol Statc
Rcsponsibility lor !njury to Alicns and !ntcrnational Human Rights Norms in thc
Rcviscd Rcstatcmcnt, a· Virginia Journal of International Law, oo.a. (.o·¡).
·o General Protection
has bccn criticiscd as lavouring thc position ol alicns and ccmcnting thc diffcr
cnccs bctwccn individuals lrom “rich” and “poor” statcs.
o
Tc sccond standard
sccks to maintain cquality among all individuals on a statc’s tcrritory, irrcspcctivc
ol nationality.
Òn thc topic ol “Tc 8asis ol Protcction to Citizcns Rcsiding Abroad”, US
Sccrctary ol Statc, ¡lihu Root, in his .o.c prcsidcntial addrcss to thc Amcrican
Socicty ol !ntcrnational Law, on thc rclcvant standard ol trcatmcnt, said this:
“Tcrc is a standard ol justicc, vcry simplc, vcry lundamcntal, and ol such gcncral
acccptancc by all civilizcd countrics as to lorm a part ol thc intcrnational law ol
thc world.”
+o
Tc intcrnational minimum standard has rcccivcd considcrablc support in
casc law. !n thc .oa6 Neer Claim, thc Commission, rccognising thc difficultics
involvcd in pronouncing a lormula ol gcncral naturc, hcld “that thc trcatmcnt ol
an alicn, in ordcr to constitutc an intcrnational dclinqucncy, should amount to an
outragc, to bad laith, to willul ncglcct ol duty, or to an insufficicncy ol govcrn
mcntal action so lar short ol intcrnational standards that cvcry rcasonablc and
impartial man would rcadily rccognisc its insufficicncy.”
++
!n thc .oa6 Roberts Claim, thc Unitcd Statcs claimcd, inter alia, that onc ol
its citizcns had bccn subjcctcd to crucl and inhumanc trcatmcnt during thc timc
hc scrvcd in a Mcxican prison. Tc conditions rcportcd to cxist in thc prison wcrc
not disputcd by thc Mcxican authoritics. Tcy statcd that thc claimant’s trcat
mcnt was no diffcrcnt lrom that ol othcr prisoncrs. Tc USMcxican Gcncral
Claims Commission rulcd that thc cquality ol trcatmcnt ol alicns and nationals
“is not thc ultimatc tcst ol thc propricty ol such acts ol authoritics in thc light
ol intcrnational law. Tat tcst is, broadly spcaking, whcthcr alicns arc trcatcd in
accordancc with ordinary standards ol civilization”.
+:
Tc USMcxican Claims Commission rccogniscd thc lact that thc appli
cability ol such a standard might at timcs afford alicns bcttcr trcatmcnt than a
particular statc affordcd its own citizcns. Tat in itscll was not to bc rcgardcd as
o Scc, lor cxamplc, S. N. Guha Roy, !s thc Law ol Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor !njurics
to Alicns a Part ol Univcrsal !ntcrnational Law:, ·· AJIL, ·6. (.o6.).
.c ¡lihu Root, Tc 8asis ol Protcction to Citizcns Rcsiding Abroad, ¡ AJIL ·.·, ·a.
(.o.c).
.. US v Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards 6. (.oa6). Scc also Mecham Case, (US v
Mcxico) ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ¡¡c, (.oao) in which thc Commission hcld:
“cvcn though morc cfficacious mcasurcs might pcrhaps havc bccn cmploycd to
apprchcnd thc murdcrcrs ol Mccham, that is not thc qucstion but rathcr whcthcr
what was donc shows such a dcgrcc ol ncgligcncc, dclcctivc administration ol justicc,
or bad laith, that thc proccdurc lalls bclow thc standards ol intcrnational law”. !bid.,
¡¡..
.a US v Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ·· (.oa6), Òpinion ol thc Commission,
para. ·. Scc also Garcia and Garza Case (Mcxico v US) ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards
..o (.oa6), Chattin Case (US v Mcxico) ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards a·a (.oa·) with
rclcrcnccs to “intcrnational standards ol civilization” paras. .o, aa, ao.
6c Chapter 3
constituting discrimination bctwccn a statc’s own citizcns and alicns, but rathcr
as “a qucstion ol diffcrcncc in thcir rcspcctivc rights and rcmcdics. Tc citizcns ol
a nation may cnjoy many rights which arc withhcld lrom alicns, and, convcrscly,
undcr intcrnational law alicns may cnjoy rights and rcmcdics which thc nation
docs not accord to its own citizcns.”
+:
Tc contcnt ol thc intcrnational minimum standard, howcvcr, is difficult to
dcfinc. Tc .o.c asscrtion by Sccrctary ol Statc Root that thc standard was “vcry
simplc, vcry lundamcntal”, has bccn criticiscd. According to Lillich, no dcfinitc
standard cxists. Rathcr, it is a “proccss ol dccision”, during which thc rcsponsibil
ity ol thc statc “could bc wcighcd and rcsolvcd givcn thc contcxt and lacts ol a
particular claim.”


Tc standard ol national trcatmcnt, bascd upon thc Calvo doctrinc, drcw
considcrablc support primarily lrom thc statcs ol Latin Amcrica. Ðuring thc
carly .o6cs thc !ntcrAmcrican ]uridical Committcc prcparcd a rcport on thc
Amcrican doctrinc ol statc rcsponsibility rcflccting thc contribution by Amcrican
statcs to thc dcvclopmcnt and codification ol thc subjcct. !n .o6. a rcport was prc
scntcd to thc !ntcrAmcrican Council ol ]urists, rcflccting thc LatinAmcrican
vicw. Tc sccond ol thc proposcd Articlcs statcd: “Tc Statc is not rcsponsiblc lor
acts or omissions with rcspcct to lorcigncrs cxccpt in thosc samc cascs and condi
tions whcrc, according to its own laws, it has such rcsponsibility towards its own
nationals.”

!n a .o6· rcport, rcflccting thc vicw ol thc Unitcd Statcs, thc first ol
thc proposcd Articlcs statcd: “Vhcn a Statc admits lorcigncrs to its tcrritory, it
has an intcrnational duty to protcct thcir lilc and propcrty according to a mini
mum standard ol rights dctcrmincd by intcrnational law. Ncithcr thc rccciving
Statc nor thc lorcigncr’s Statc can by its own law dctcrminc this intcrnational
standard. !t is dctcrmincd by intcrnational law.”
+6

.. Hopkins Case, (US v Mcxico) ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ¡. (.oa·), Òpinions ol thc
Commissioncrs ¡a, ¡· (.oa·).
.¡ Richard Lillich, Ðutics ol Statcs Rcgarding thc Civil Rights ol Alicns, .6. RdC, .ao,
.·c.·a, (.o··!!!).
.· Scc First Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility, by Mr. Robcrt Ago, Spccial Rapportcur
Rcvicw ol prcvious work on codification ol thc topic ol thc intcrnational rcsponsi
bility ol Statcs, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, !!, .a·, .·..·¡ (.o6o).
Tc !ntcrAmcrican ]uridical Committcc argucd that it was thc Latin Amcrican law
alonc, which contributcd to thc dcvclopmcnt ol intcrnational law on statc rcspon
sibility. Tc position ol thc Unitcd Statcs did, in thcir vicw, rcprcscnt old standards
dcvclopcd by ¡uropcan powcrs in ordcr to sccurc a privilcgcd status to lorcigncrs.
!ntcrAmcrican ]uridical Committcc, Contribution ol thc Amcrican Contincnt to
thc Principlcs ol !ntcrnational Law Tat Govcrn thc Rcsponsibility ol Statcs ··, in
F. \., GarcíaAmador, Sohn, Louis, and 8., 8axtcr, R., R., Recent Codification of the
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Anncx !!, .·o.6c (.o·¡).
.6 Scc First Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility, .·..·¡.
6. General Protection
¡arlicr, in .o··, GarcíaAmador, in his rolc as Spccial Rapportcur to thc
!ntcrnational Law Commission (!LC) on thc subjcct ol statc rcsponsibility,
applicd thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc intcrnational human rights norms as a tool to
rcconcilc thc thcory ol thc intcrnational minimum standard with thc thcory ol
national trcatmcnt. Hc argucd that both thcorics had bccn supcrscdcd by thc (at
thc timc) rathcr ncw dcvclopmcnt ol human rights law. GarcíaAmador claimcd
that
both thc “intcrnational standard ol justicc” and thc principlc ol cquality
bctwccn nationals and alicns, hithcrto considcrcd as antagonistic and irrcc
oncilablc, can wcll bc rclormulatcd and intcgratcd into a ncw lcgal rulc incor
porating thc csscntial clcmcnts and scrving thc main purposcs ol both. Tc
basis ol this ncw principlc would bc thc “univcrsal rcspcct lor, and obscrvancc
ol, human rights and lundamcntal lrccdoms” rclcrrcd to in thc Chartcr ol thc
Unitcd Nations and in othcr gcncral, rcgional and bilatcral instrumcnts. Tc
objcct ol “intcrnationalization” (to coin a tcrm) ol thcsc rights and lrccdoms is
to cnsurc thc protcction ol thc lcgitimatc intcrcsts ol thc human pcrson, irrc
spcctivc ol nationality. Vhcthcr thc pcrson conccrncd is a citizcn or an alicn
is thcn immatcrial: human bcings, as such, arc undcr thc dircct protcction ol
intcrnational law.

!n Articlc · ol thc dralt convcntion on statc rcsponsibility containcd in his
Sccond Rcport this thcsis bccamc articulatcd in this way: “Tc Statc is undcr
a duty to cnsurc to alicns thc cnjoymcnt ol thc samc civil rights, and to makc
availablc to thcm thc samc individual guarantccs as arc cnjoycd by its nationals.
Tcsc rights and guarantccs shall not, howcvcr, in any casc bc lcss than thc ‘lun
.· GarcíaAmador, ct al, ·. Strcssing thc importancc ol thc dcvclopmcnt ol human
rights hc, in thc ncxt passagc, lurthcr hcld that “|i|t will bc casily sccn how, lrom a
purcly lcgal point ol vicw, both ol thc two traditional principlcs havc bccn rcndcrcd
obsolctc by thc dcvclopmcnt ol intcrnational law. ….. Tc distinction |bctwccn thc
two principlcs| itscll, howcvcr, disappcarcd lrom contcmporary intcrnational law
whcn that law gavc rccognition to human rights and lundamcntal lrccdoms with
out drawing any distinction bctwccn nationals and alicns.” ….. “|T|hc “intcrnational
rccognition ol human rights and lundamcntal lrccdoms” constitutcs prcciscly a syn
thcsis ol thc two principlcs.” …. “!n lact, lrom a study ol thc instrumcnts in which
thcsc rights and lrccdoms havc rcccivcd intcrnational rccognition, (…), it bccomcs
cvidcnt that all ol thcm accord a mcasurc ol protcction which gocs wcll bcyond thc
minimum protcction which thc rulc ol thc ‘intcrnational standard ol justicc’ was
mcant to cnsurc to alicns. Morcovcr, in all thcsc documcnts thcrc is no rclcrcncc to
any casc or circumstancc in which alicns cnjoy a lcgal status morc lavourablc than
that ol nationals. !n rcality, thc idca ol cquality ol rights and lrccdoms constitutcs
thc vcry csscncc ol thcsc instrumcnts.” !bid.
6a Chapter 3
damcntal human rights’ rccogniscd and dcfincd in contcmporary intcrnational
instrumcnts.”
+8
Tc rclcrcncc to “lundamcntal human rights” implics a distinction bctwccn
such rights and othcr human rights. !n an attcmpt to spccily what sort ol rights
should bc rcgardcd as bcing “lundamcntal human rights”, Articlc 6 ol thc dralt
convcntion offcrs a noncxhaustivc cnumcration ol rights lalling within thc ambit
ol thc gcncral dcfinition in Articlc ·.
+o
Tis ncw approach did not find sufficicnt
support in thc !LC. At thc timc, it was probably morc a rcflcction ol “progrcssivc
dcvclopmcnt” than purc codification ol thc law ol statc rcsponsibility. Sincc thcn
thc !LC has changcd its locus and in its Ðralt Articlcs ol acc. approachcd thc
topic ol statc rcsponsibility on a morc gcncral lcvcl.
:o

Tc dividing linc bctwccn statcs lavouring a national trcatmcnt and thosc
lavouring an intcrnational minimum standard is not so much ol a lcgal naturc
as ol an cconomic/political naturc. Ðcvcloping statcs, in gcncral, tcnd to lollow
thc lormcr standard whilc dcvclopcd statcs, in gcncral, support thc lattcr.
:+
Altcr
thc Sccond Vorld Var, criticism dircctcd towards thc traditional law in this arca
grcw in strcngth.
::
Tc strong rcjcction ol thc intcrnational minimum standard by
.· Sccond Rcport on Statc Rcsponsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
!!, .c¡ (.o··).
.o Ðralt Articlc 6 rcad:
.. For thc purposc ol thc lorcgoing articlc |·|, thc cxprcssion “lundamcntal human
rights” includcs, among othcrs, thc rights cnumcratcd bclow:
(a) thc right to lilc, libcrty and sccurity ol pcrson, (b) thc right ol thc pcrson to thc
inviolability ol his privacy, homc and corrcspondcncc, and to rcspcct lor his honour
and rcputation, (c) thc right to lrccdom ol thought, conscicncc and rcligion, (d) thc
right to own propcrty, (c) thc right ol thc pcrson to rccognition cvcrywhcrc as a
pcrson bclorc thc law, (l ) thc right to apply to thc courts ol justicc or to thc compc
tcnt organs ol thc Statc, by mcans ol rcmcdics and procccdings which offcr adcquatc
and cffcctivc rcdrcss lor violations ol thc alorcsaid rights and lrccdoms, (g) thc right
to a public hcaring, with propcr salcguards, by thc compctcnt organs ol thc Statc, in
thc dctcrmination ol rights and obligations undcr civil law, (h) in criminal mattcrs,
thc right ol thc accuscd to bc prcsumcd innoccnt until provcd guilty, thc right to bc
inlormcd ol thc chargc madc against him in a languagc which hc undcrstands, thc
right to spcak in his dclcncc or to bc dclcndcd by a counscl ol his choicc, thc right
not to bc convictcd ol any punishablc offcncc on account ol any act or omission
which did not constitutc an offcncc, undcr national or intcrnational law, at thc timc
whcn it was committcd, thc right to bc tricd without dclay or to bc rclcascd. García
Amador, Sccond Rcport, ..a....
ac Ðralt Articlcs on Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor intcrnationally wronglul acts adoptcd
by thc !ntcrnational Law Commission at its filtythird scssion (acc.). Rcport ol thc
!ntcrnational Law Commission on thc work ol its filtythird scssion, UN GAÒR
·6
th
Scss., Supp. No. .c UN Ðoc. A/·6/.c (acc.).
a. Scc Ð. ]. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, ¡o¡ (¡
th
cd., .oo.).
aa Lillich has idcntificd thrcc main rcasons lor this criticism, “thc dcclinc in thc rcsort
to intcrnational adjudication, thc convcntion by thc ncw or dcvcloping Statcs that
6. General Protection
a group ol statcs docs, ol coursc, affcct thc lormation ol customary intcrnational
law and considcration should bc givcn to thc lact that it is possiblc that thcsc
statcs, lrom thc vicwpoint ol customary intcrnational law, might not bc bound
by it. !t should, howcvcr, bc notcd that thc dcbatc lollowing thc Sccond Vorld
Var ccntrcd almost cxclusivcly on qucstions ol wcalth dcprivation. According to
Lillich, “no othcr rulcs lrom thc cntirc trcatmcnt ol alicns arca cvcr havc bccn
criticizcd” by thosc who, in lact, challcngc thc cntirc corpus ol this arca ol intcr
national law.
::

Although thc intcrnational minimum standard has bccn contcstcd by somc
statcs, it mustcrs considcrablc support in statc practicc, arbitration awards and
bilatcral invcstmcnt trcatics (8!Ts).

!t has clcarly bccn strcngthcncd by thc
strong dcvclopmcnt in human rights law, and as GarciaAmador oncc argucd,
has possibly lcd to thc mcrging ol two standards.

Tc traditional intcrnational
minimum standard, howcvcr, is not onc with a fixcd contcnt. !t is rathcr a qucs
tion ol attitudc towards thc law, and its contcnt is sct on a cascbycasc basis. Òn
that point, thc dcvclopmcnt ol human rights law must bc notcd. Tc position ol
intcrnational human rights law in thc contcmporary world cndorscs thc intcrna
tional minimum standard as thc rclcvant standard ol trcatmcnt. !t could in lact
bc argucd that human rights law has madc thc rolc ol thc traditional law on thc
trcatmcnt ol alicns rcdundant, but this is not wholly truc. Tc dcvclopmcnt ol
human rights has considcrably strcngthcncd and articulatcd thc obligations ol
thc statc. !t has, morcovcr, providcd thc intcrnational community with a rclcvant
standard ol trcatmcnt applicablc to all individuals, irrcspcctivc ol thcir status as
alicns or citizcns. Tc national trcatmcnt standard, thcrclorc, cannot imply that
thc trcatmcnt ol lorcigncrs lorms a topic that is a purcly domcstic mattcr. !l it
wcrc to mcan that lorcigncrs could not cxpcct bcttcr trcatmcnt than a statc’s own
citizcns, a dcmand could rightly bc madc upon thc statc conccrncd that its own
citizcns must bc trcatcd in accordancc with, at lcast, basic human rights norms.
thcy should not bc bound by carlicr rulcs lashioncd bclorc thcir appcarancc and
allcgcdly against thcir intcrcsts, and thc dcmand by thcsc samc Statcs lor a “Ncw
!ntcrnational ¡conomic Òrdcr”. Lillich, Ðutics ol Statcs Rcgarding thc Civil Rights
ol Alicns, .··.
a. Richard 8. Lillich, Tc Currcnt Status ol thc Law ol Statc Rcsponsibility lor !njurics
to Alicns, in International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, .. (R.
Lillich cd., .o·.).
a¡ Òvc 8ring, Det folkrättsliga investeringsskyddet. En studie i u-ländernas inflytande på
den internationella sedvanerätten, 6a6¡ (.o·o).
a· Harris finds that thc dcvclopmcnt ol human rights law, ol both a trcatybascd and
customary law charactcr, may havc, with rcgard to thc national trcatmcnt standard
involvc “a shilt, as GarciaAmador intcndcd, lrom an cxpcctation that statcs must
trcat alicns as thcy, in thcir discrction, trcat thcir nationals to an cxpcctation instcad
that thcy must trcat alicns as thcy arc rcquircd by intcrnational law to trcat thcir
nationals”. Harris, ¡oo.
6¡ Chapter 3
From this it ought not to bc takcn lor grantcd that thc traditional law has
bccn supcrscdcd. !t has bccn pointcd out by Harris that thc continucd impor
tant rolc ol statc rcsponsibility rclating to thc trcatmcnt ol alicns “lollows lrom
thc unccrtainty as to thc rulcs on thc cnlorccmcnt ol customary human rights
law and thc lcss than pcrlcct rcmcdics and univcrsal acccptancc ol human rights
trcatics.”
:6
As onc lcgal authority on this topic has claimcd, “rcvitalizcd, contcm
porary trcatmcnt ol alicns’ law will havc a significant rolc to play in intcrnational
affairs until such timc as an allinclusivc and truly cffcctivc intcrnational human
rights systcm rcndcrs it supcrfluous.”


3.1.1 Te Standard in Practice
A brcach ol an intcrnational obligation can bc thc rcsult ol an act ol commission
or omission by a statc organ.
:8
Tc rcsponsibility ol thc statc will bc incurrcd il
officials pcrlorm acts bcyond thcir compctcncc (and in brcach ol an intcrnational
obligation binding on thc statc) but within thcir apparcnt authority.
:o
Howcvcr,
acts committcd by statc officials purcly in thcir privatc capacity will not gcncr
ally cntail thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc. To hold thc statc rcsponsiblc lor its offi
cials cvcn whcn thcy havc actcd outsidc thcir compctcncc or powcr (ultra vires)
a6 Harris, ¡oo·cc (lootnotcs omittcd). Harris lurthcr statcs, “|l |or thc timc bcing at
lcast, thc possibility ol diplomatic protcction by onc’s national is a valuablc altcrna
tivc and supplcmcnt to such guarantccs and proccdurcs undcr intcrnational human
rights law.” !bid.
a· Lillich, Ðutics ol Statcs Rcgarding thc Civil Rights ol Alicns, .¡.. Scc in this rcspcct
also thc rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Association, London Conlcrcncc (accc),
Committcc on Ðiplomatic Protcction ol Pcrsons and Propcrty.
a· Tc Commissioncr in thc Massey Case hcld “that it is undoubtcdly a sound gcncral
principlc that misconduct |ol statc officials|, whatcvcr may bc thcir particular status
or rank undcr domcstic law, rcsults in thc lailurc ol a nation to pcrlorm its obliga
tions undcr intcrnational law, thc nation must bcar thc rcsponsibility lor thc wrong
lul acts ol its scrvants.” US v Mcxico, ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards, .··, .·o (.oa·).
Masscy, an Amcrican citizcn, had bccn killcd by a Mcxican citizcn. Tc lattcr was
arrcstcd and imprisoncd but thc assistant jailkccpcr unlawlully hclpcd thc accuscd
to cscapc. According to Crawlord and Òllcson, “thc scopc ol Statc rcsponsibility
lor official acts is broad, and thc dcfinition ol ‘organ’ lor this purposc comprchcnsivc
and inclusivc. Tcrc is no distinction bascd on thc lcvcl ol scniority ol thc rclcvant
officials in thc Statc hicrarchy, as long as thcy arc acting in thcir official capac
ity, rcsponsibility is cngagcd”. ]amcs Crawlord and Simon Òllcson, Tc Naturc and
Forms ol !ntcrnational Rcsponsibility, in International Law ¡·· (Malcolm Ð. ¡vans
cd., acc.).
ao Scc Articlc · ol thc !LC Ðralt Articlcs (acc.). According to Crawlord, to draw “thc
linc bctwccn unauthoriscd but still ‘official’ conduct, on thc onc hand, and ‘privatc’
conduct on thc othcr” is rathcr a qucstion whcthcr thc official “actcd with apparcnt
authority” or not. ]amcs Crawlord, Te International Law Commission’s Articles on
State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries, .c· (acca).
6· General Protection
is clcar motivation lor thc statc to cxcrcisc cffcctivc control ovcr its organs. Tc
nccd lor control may bc cvcn morc important rcgarding thc cxccutivc organs ol
thc statc, such as thc armcd lorccs and thc policc. ¡ffcctivc supcrvision should
lcad to bcttcr disciplinc and thus limit thc potcntial scopc lor individual officials
to abusc thc rights ol alicns. !t will, howcvcr, rcquirc a gcnuinc will on part ol thc
statc not to conduct a policy dctrimcntal to thc protcction ol lorcigncrs in viola
tion ol intcrnational standards.
8clow lollows somc cxamplcs ol cascs dcaling inter alia with rcsponsibility
lor acts and omissions ol statc organs in situations ol spccial conccrn lor pcrson
ncl in pcacc opcrations. Tcsc cxamplcs dcal with thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc
lor ultra vires acts ol law cnlorccmcnt officials and military pcrsonncl against thc
background ol applicablc lcgal standards on trcatmcnt.
Iife, liberty and security of person
Rcsponsibility may dcrivc lrom thc act ol thc official conccrncd or lrom impropcr
handling by othcr institutions to dcal cffcctivcly with thc conscqucnccs ol thc act
in qucstion.
:o
A common cxamplc ol thc lattcr is to do with ncgligcncc in pros
ccuting thc pcrpctrator ol an offcncc. !n thc Janes Case, a Mcxican cmploycc shot
dcad a supcrintcndcnt ol a US mining company in Mcxico. Although it took
placc in lront ol a largc numbcr ol witncsscs, thc authoritics lailcd to apprc
hcnd thc pcrson rcsponsiblc. Tc Mcxican govcrnmcnt was lound liablc “lor not
having mcasurcd up to its duty ol diligcntly prosccuting and propcrly punishing
thc offcndcr”.
:+

Statc rcsponsibility has bccn incurrcd lor thc usc ol fircarms disproportion
atc to thc aim pursucd. !n thc Garcia and Garza Case, a US law officcr shot dcad a
Mcxican girl as shc crosscd thc Rio Grandc rivcr. Hc had suspcctcd hcr ol smug
gling liquor. According to thc Gcncral Claims Commission a violation occurrcd
ol thc “intcrnational standard conccrning thc taking ol human lilc”.
::
Tcrc was
a lack ol proportion bctwccn thc usc ol fircarms, involving a high risk to human
lilc, and thc supposcd offcncc. As to thc usc ol fircarms by bordcr officials thc
Commission rcgardcd a combination ol lour rcquircmcnts to bc ncccssary:
(a) thc act ol firing, always dangcrous in itscll, should not bc indulgcd in unlcss
thc dclinqucncy is sufficicntly wcll statcd, (b) it should not bc indulgcd in
unlcss thc importancc ol prcvcnting or rcprcssing thc dclinqucncy by firing is
in rcasonablc proportion to thc dangcr arising lrom it to thc livcs ol thc cul
prits and othcr pcrsons in thcir ncighbourhood: (c) it should not bc indulgcd
in whcncvcr othcr practicablc ways ol prcvcnting or rcprcssing thc dclinqucncy
.c !an 8rownlic, Principles of Public International Law, ¡.a (6
th
cd., acc.).
.. Scc US v Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ·a, ·· (.oa·).
.a Mcxico v US ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ..o, .a..aa (.oa6).
66 Chapter 3
might bc availablc: (d) it should bc donc with sufficicnt prccaution not to
crcatc unncccssary dangcr, unlcss it bc thc officials intcntion to hit, wound, or
kill.
::
Tc Commission concludcd that in no manncr can it “cndorsc thc conccption
that a usc ol fircarms with distrcssing rcsults is sufficicntly cxcuscd by thc lact
that thcrc cxists prohibitivc laws, that cnlorccmcnt ol thcsc laws is ncccssary, and
that thc mcn who arc instructcd to cnlorcc thcm arc lurnishcd with fircarms.”

!n thc Kling Case, a group ol US citizcns in Mcxico had bccn firing shots
in thc air lor lun. Mcxican soldicrs, who had bccn lollowing thc party, dclibcr
atcly fircd scvcral shots at thc group thcrcby killing onc ol thc Amcricans. Tc
McxicoUnitcd Statcs Gcncral Claims Commission lound that “it cannot prop
crly bc considcrcd that thc shooting was thc rcsult ol any attcmpt to sccurc thc
apprchcnsion ol a pcrson cndcavouring to cscapc arrcst.”

Tc acts ol thc troops,
in thc circumstanccs, had bccn “indiscrcct, unncccssary and unwarrantcd”.
:6
Tc
position ol thc Mcxican govcrnmcnt, that thc soldicrs wcrc not undcr thc com
mand ol an officcr and that it thcrclorc could not bc rcsponsiblc lor thcir acts,
was rcjcctcd by thc Commission, which statcd “|m|cn on patrol duty arc not
acting in thcir privatc capacity, cvcn though an officcr may not bc prcscnt on thc
spot whcrc acts ol soldicrs allcgcd to bc wronglul arc committcd.”

!t morcovcr
dcclarcd that “|!|n cascs ol this kind it is mistakcn action, crror in judgmcnt, or
rccklcss conduct ol soldicrs lor which a govcrnmcnt in a givcn casc has bccn hcld
rcsponsiblc. Tc intcrnational prcccdcnts rcvcal thc application ol principlcs as to
thc vcry strict accountability lor mistakcn action”.
:8
.. !bid. Tc status ol war that cxistcd bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Gcrmany during
thc timc ol thc shooting did not affcct thc outcomc ol thc casc. Tc Commission
rclcrrcd to thc lourth Haguc Convcntion ol .oc· in which Articlc ¡6 ol thc
“Rcgulations rcspccting thc laws and customs ol war on land” statcs an obligation to
protcct thc livcs ol pcrsons in occupicd tcrritory. Articlc . ol thc trcaty itscll, statcs
that a bclligcrcnt party is “rcsponsiblc lor all acts committcd by pcrsons lorming part
ol its armcd lorccs.”
.¡ !bid.
.· US v Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ···, ··c (.o.c).
.6 !bid. Scc also Falcón Case (Mcxico v US) ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards .c¡ (.oa6), whcrc
US soldicrs uscd fircarms contrary to US military rcgulations that lorbadc firing on
unarmcd pcrsons, and Roper Case (US v Mcxico) ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards .¡·
(.oa·). !n that casc shots wcrc fircd by policc officcrs with thc purposc to intimidatc
a group ol mcn suspcctcd ol robbcry. As a rcsult thcy jumpcd into thc watcr whcrc
thrcc ol thcm dicd, onc ol thcm probably shot by thc policc. Tc acts ol thc policc
wcrc rcgardcd as “rccklcss and unncccssary usc ol fircarms by pcrsons cngagcd in thc
cnlorccmcnt ol law.” !bid., .¡·.
.· US v Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ···, ··· (.o.c).
.· !bid., ··o.
6· General Protection
A statc’s rcsponsibility lor its armcd lorccs mcasurcs up to a high standard ol
control. !n thc Caire Claim, Mcxican soldicrs killcd a Frcnch national in Mcxico
altcr thcy had dcmandcd moncy lrom him. Mcxico dcnicd liability, inter alia,
on thc grounds ol thc privatc naturc ol thc acts. Tc Prcsidcnt ol thc Frcnch
Mcxican Claims Commission hcld that a statc may bc rcsponsiblc cvcn in thc
abscncc ol any lault on its part. Any illcgal act committcd undcr intcrnational law
by statc organs will incur thc liability ol thc statc irrcspcctivc ol whcthcr or not
thc officials conccrncd had actcd within thcir compctcncc. Tc important point
was whcthcr thcy had cxcrciscd powcrs conncctcd with thcir official dutics or, at
lcast apparcntly, actcd as authoriscd officcrs. Mcxico was lound to bc liablc lor
thc acts ol its soldicrs.
:o
Tc trcatmcnt ol alicns by a statc’s armcd lorccs, in timcs ol pcacc, was
apparcntly judgcd according to an intcrnational standard.
±o
Tis standard also
sccms to rcquirc thc statc to usc thc mcans at its disposal in a manncr ncccssary
and proportionatc to thc aim pursucd. Tc rcsponsibility lor ultra vires acts
±+
will
.o Hc statcd: “Tc officcrs in qucstion, whatcvcr thcir prcvious rccord, consistcntly con
ductcd thcmsclvcs as officcrs in thc brigadc ol thc \illista gcncral, Tomás Urbina, in
this capacity thcy bcgan by cxacting thc rcmittancc ol ccrtain sums ol moncy, thcy
continucd by having thc victim takcn to a barracks ol thc occupying troops, and it
was clcarly bccausc ol thc rclusal ol M. Cairc to mcct thcir rcpcatcd dcmands that
thcy finally shot him. Undcr thcsc circumstanccs, thcrc rcmains no doubt that, cvcn
il thcy arc to bc rcgardcd as having actcd outsidc thcir compctcncc, which is by no
mcans ccrtain, and cvcn il thcir supcrior officcrs issucd a countcrordcr, thcsc two
officcrs havc involvcd thc rcsponsibility ol thc Statc, in vicw ol thc lact that thcy
actcd in thcir capacity ol officcrs and uscd thc mcans placcd at thcir disposition by
virtuc ol that capacity.” Francc v Mcxico · Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ·.6 (.oao).
¡c !n thc Youmans Claim, thrcc US nationals wcrc trappcd insidc a housc in Mcxico
with a mob gathcrcd around. Tc mayor ol thc town scnt troops, lcd by a licutcn
ant, to dispcrsc thc mob. !nstcad, thc troops opcncd firc on thc housc killing onc ol
thc Amcricans. Tc troops and thc rcst ol thc mob thcn killcd thc othcr two. Tc
Unitcd Statcs claimcd, inter alia, that thc Mcxican authoritics had lailcd to cxcrcisc
duc diligcncc to protcct US citizcns against thc mob. Tc Mcxican Govcrnmcnt
hcld that thcy wcrc not rcsponsiblc lor thc wronglul acts ol thc soldicrs bccausc thc
highcst official in thc arca had ordcrcd that thc Amcricans should bc protcctcd but
thc soldicrs had actcd in violation ol thc ordcrs. Tc Commission lound that thcrc
might bc somc unccrtainty on what kind ol acts ol soldicrs should bc rcgardcd as
bcing privatc acts. Tcy could not, howcvcr, bc rcgardcd as privatc acts whcn thcy
wcrc committcd whilc on duty and undcr supcrvision ol a commanding officcr. Tc
Commission hcld that “|s|oldicrs inflicting pcrsonal injurics or committing wanton
dcstruction or looting always act in disobcdicncc ol somc rulcs laid down by supc
rior authority. Tcrc could bc no liability whatcvcr lor such misdccds il thc vicw
wcrc takcn that any acts committcd by soldicrs in contravcntion ol instructions must
always bc considcrcd as pcrsonal acts.” US v Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ..c,
para .¡ (.oa6).
¡. Howcvcr, scc thc Gordon Case, whcrc two Mcxican officcrs injurcd an Amcrican citi
zcn during shooting practicc. Mcxico was not hcld liablc duc to thc privatc charactcr
ol thc act, which was rcgardcd to bc “outsidc thc linc ol scrvicc and thc pcrlorm
6· Chapter 3
probably lunction as an cffcctivc instrumcnt lor thc statc to cxcrcisc cffcctivc
control ovcr its lorccs.
±:
!t also sccms clcar that statcs arc undcr an obligation to
prosccutc offcndcrs.
Treatment during detention and arrest
!n thc Quintanilla Claim a young man ol Mcxican nationality was killcd in Tcxas
in .oaa. Altcr throwing a girl off hcr horsc, Òuintanilla was takcn in custody by
car by a dcputy shcriff and thrcc ol his mcn. His corpsc was latcr lound ncar thc
road. !t was unclcar whcthcr thc dcputy shcriff and his mcn had murdcrcd thc
young man, but it was clcar that hc had ncvcr rcachcd a lawlul placc ol dctcn
tion. Tc Commission drcw parallcls with thc intcrnational law ol war conccrn
ing thc trcatmcnt ol war prisoncrs and lound that thcrc cxistcd a lcgal obligation
to account lor pcrsons takcn into custody. Tat casc was lound to bc analogous
insolar as it conccrncd thc taking into custody ol a lorcigncr by a statc official.
Although a govcrnmcnt could not bc rcsponsiblc lor cvcrything that happcncd
to a pcrson in custody “it has to account lor him. Tc Govcrnmcnt can bc hcld
liablc il it is provcn that it has trcatcd him cruclly, harshly, unlawlully, so much
thc morc it is liablc il it can say only that it took him into custody, cithcr in jail or
in somc othcr placc and lorm, and that it ignorcs what happcncd to him.”
±:
Tc Turner Case supports thc principlc that a statc is undcr an obligation
to account lor an alicn takcn into custody by a statc official. Turncr dicd whilc
bcing illcgally hcld in custody. !t was not provcd whcthcr or not his trcatmcnt in
prison causcd his dcath, but it was lound that this trcatmcnt would, at thc lcast,
havc madc it difficult lor him to rcgain his hcalth. Tc Prcsiding Commissioncr
statcd: “|!|l having a man in custody obligatcs a Govcrnmcnt to account lor him,
having a man in illcgal custody doubtlcss rcndcrs a Govcrnmcnt liablc lor dan
gcrs and disastcrs which would not havc bccn his sharc, or in a lcss dcgrcc, il hc
had bccn at libcrty”.
±±
ancc ol a duty ol a military officcr”. US v Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ··6, ···
(.o.c). According to thc McxicoUnitcd Statcs Gcncral Claims Commission, “|t|hc
principlc is that thc pcrsonal acts ol officials not within thc scopc ol thcir authority
do not cntail rcsponsibility upon a Statc”. Tc targct practicc cxcrciscd in this casc
was not prcscribcd by Mcxican Army Rcgulations.
¡a Scc in this rcspcct Articlc o. ol Additional Protocol ! to thc Gcncva Convcntions,
stating that a party to a conflict “shall bc rcsponsiblc lor all acts committcd by pcr
sons lorming part ol its armcd lorccs.”
¡. Mcxico v US ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards .c., .c. (.oa6), Òpinion ol thc
Commission.
¡¡ US v Mcxico, ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards a··, a·. (.oa·) Tc Harvard Ðralt
Convcntion on thc !ntcrnational Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor !njurics to Alicns out
lincd thc norms applicablc to arrcst and dctcntion ol alicns: “Tc arrcst or dctcntion
ol an alicn is wronglul: il it is a clcar and discriminatory violation ol thc law ol thc
arrcsting or dctaining Statc, il thc causc or manncr ol thc arrcst or dctcntion unrca
sonably dcparts lrom thc principlcs rccognizcd by thc principal lcgal systcms ol thc
6o General Protection
¡vcn il thc norms on trcatmcnt ol alicns arc not sufficicntly idcntificd, thc
rcsponsibility ol thc statc lor thc trcatmcnt ol alicns takcn into custody, irrcspcc
tivc ol thc actions ol thc officials dircctly rcsponsiblc lor this trcatmcnt, appcars
to havc considcrablc support in thc practicc ol arbitral awards and statc prac
ticc.
±¡
world, il thc Statc docs not havc jurisdiction ovcr thc alicn, or il thc arrcst or dctcn
tion othcrwisc involvcs a violation by thc Statc ol a trcaty. Tc dctcntion ol an alicn
bccomcs wronglul altcr thc Statc has lailcd: to inlorm him promptly ol thc causc ol
his arrcst or dctcntion, or to inlorm him within a rcasonablc timc altcr his arrcst or
dctcntion ol thc spccific chargcs against him, to grant him prompt acccss to a tri
bunal cmpowcrcd both to dctcrminc whcthcr his arrcst or dctcntion is lawlul and
to ordcr his rclcasc il thc arrcst or dctcntion is dctcrmincd to bc unlawlul, to grant
him a prompt trial, or to cnsurc that his trial and any appcllatc procccdings arc not
unduly prolongcd. Tc mistrcatmcnt ol an alicn during his dctcntion is wronglul.”
Articlc · ol thc Convcntion on thc !ntcrnational Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor !njurics
to Alicns, Final Ðralt with ¡xplanatory Notcs 8y Louis 8. Sohn and R. R. 8axtcr, in
Recent Codification of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, .·o (García
Amador, Sohn and 8axtcr cds., .o·¡).
¡· !n thc Chevreau Case (.o..) 8ritish troops arrcstcd a Frcnch citizcn, Chcvrcau, during
military opcrations conductcd in Pcrsia with thc conscnt ol thc Pcrsian Govcrnmcnt,
in .o.·. Tc Arbitrator hcld that thc nccd ol thc 8ritish lorccs to takc ncccssary mcas
urcs to protcct thcmsclvcs against harmlul acts madc thc arrcst itscll lawlul, togcthcr
with thc lact that Chcvrcau had not bccn illtrcatcd during his dctcntion. Tc lact
that thc 8ritish Govcrnmcnt had lailcd to initiatc propcr inquircs into thc accura
cics ol thc chargcs on which Chcvrcau had bccn arrcstcd madc it liablc to pay lor
thc moral and thc matcrial injury suffcrcd. Francc v Grcat 8ritain a Rcp !ntl Arbitral
Awards ...., ..ao (.o..). !n .o··, thc Unitcd Statcs protcstcd to thc Haitian govcrn
mcnt against thc dcath ol onc ol its nationals, Shiblcy ]can Talamas. According to
thc U.S. Notc, Talamas was bcatcn to dcath by thc Haitian policc authoritics. Hc had
surrcndcrcd voluntarily altcr thc officcr in chargc had assurcd rcprcscntativcs ol thc
U.S. ¡mbassy that hc would not bc mistrcatcd. Tc Notc rcqucstcd that thc pcrsons
rcsponsiblc should bc punishcd, compcnsation to thc victim’s survivors should bc
offcrcd, and assurancc that thc livcs and propcrty ol U.S. citizcns should bc propcrly
protcctcd should bc givcn. !n thc rcsponding Notc lrom thc Haitian govcrnmcnt, it
was statcd that thc intcrrogating officcrs had actcd in sclldclcncc and bccn lorccd
to hit Talamas with clubs. Hc had dicd shortly thcrcaltcr lrom hcart lailurc. Tc
Haitian govcrnmcnt acknowlcdgcd rcsponsibility ol thc dcath ol Talamas, bccausc
thc blows hc rcccivcd, whilc in custody ol Haitian authoritics, clcarly contributcd
to his dcath. !t proposcd a scttlcmcnt, which was acccptcd by thc Unitcd Statcs
that includcd disciplinary mcasurcs against thc guilty officcrs, compcnsation to thc
victim’s wilc and inlant child, and guarantccs on thc protcction at all timcs ol U.S.
citizcns. Scc Vhitcman, Marjoric M., · Ðigcst ol !ntcrnational Law, ·o·o (.o6·),
and Gcorgc T. Yatcs !!!, Statc Rcsponsibility lor Nonwcalth !njurics to Alicns in thc
Postwar ¡ra, a.., aaaaa., in International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens (Richard Lillich cd., .o·.).
·c Chapter 3
Protection against wrongful acts of private persons: the standard of due
diligence
Statcs arc undcr a duty to prcvcnt and punish wronglul acts committcd by pri
vatc pcrsons.
±6
Failurcs in thc protcction ol alicns havc in a numbcr ol arbitra
tion awards cntailcd thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc. Vhat thcn is thc naturc and
charactcr ol such a duty: Sincc that duty will vary with diffcring circumstanccs,
thc standard most commonly acccptcd in thc jurisprudcncc, and adoptcd in thc
various dralts aiming to codily thc law ol statc rcsponsibility, is thc standard ol
duc diligcncc.
±·
Tc tcrm duc diligcncc docs not in itscll add anything morc to
thc dcfinition ol thc duty ol protccting alicns. Commcnting on thc protcction ol
alicns, GarciaAmador lound that “that thcrc is a prcsumption against rcspon
sibility” and thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc is not incurrcd “unlcss it displaycd, in
thc conduct ol its organs or officials, patcnt or manilcst ncgligcncc in taking thc
mcasurcs which arc normally takcn in thc particular circumstanccs to prcvcnt or
punish thc injurious acts”.
±8
A lcw cascs lrom intcrnational tribunals and somc ol thc codification pro
posals scrvc to illustratc this “prcsumption against rcsponsibility”. !n thc Home
Missionary Society Claim thc Unitcd Statcs claimcd compcnsation lrom Grcat
8ritain lor thc dcstruction ol its missions and thc dcaths ol a numbcr ol mis
sionarics that occurrcd during thc coursc ol an uprising in thc Protcctoratc ol
Sicrra Lconc. Tc Unitcd Statcs argucd that thc rcbcllion, which startcd on a·
April .·o· and lastcd lor scvcral days, was thc rcsult ol a ncwly imposcd “hut tax”
by Grcat 8ritain. According to thc Unitcd Statcs, thc 8ritish govcrnmcnt was
awarc ol thc prcvailing “dccp nativc rcscntmcnt, that in thc lacc ol thc nativc
dangcr thc 8ritish Govcrnmcnt wholly lailcd to takc propcr stcps lor thc main
tcnancc ol ordcr and thc protcction ol lilc and propcrty.” Tc tribunal lound that
thc “hut tax” was in accordancc with thc 8ritish Govcrnmcnts lcgitimatc cxcrcisc
ol sovcrcignty and that a widcsprcad rcbcllion could not havc bccn lorcsccn. Tc
tribunal rulcd: “!t is a wcllcstablishcd principlc ol intcrnational law that no gov
crnmcnt can bc hcld rcsponsiblc lor thc act ol rcbcllious bodics ol mcn commit
tcd in violation ol its authority, whcrc it is itscll guilty ol no brcach ol good laith,
or ol no ncgligcncc in supprcssing insurrcction.”
±o
¡6 Scc Gordon A. Christcnson, Attributing Acts ol Òmission to thc Statc, .a Michigan
Journal of International Law, ..¡· (.oo.).
¡· ]cnnings, Sir Robcrt and Vatts Sir Arthur (cds.), Oppenheim’s International Law,
\ol. ! ·¡o (o
th
cd., .ooa).
¡· Ðralt Articlcs on thc Rcsponsibility ol thc Statc lor !njurics Causcd in its Tcrritory
to thc Pcrson or Propcrty ol Alicns, by F. \. GarciaAmador, in Recent Codification,
a· GarcíaAmador ct al. GarciaAmador acknowlcdgcd that thc problcms con
ncctcd propcrly dcfincd thc standard ol duc diligcncc and hc dcclarcd that duty ol
thc statc was a duty “thc contcnt and scopc ol which arc as a rulc vcry hard to dcfinc,
and in ccrtain spccific cascs uttcrly undcfinablc.” !bid., a6.
¡o US v Grcat 8ritain 6 Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ¡a (.oac).
·. General Protection
!n thc Noyes Claim (.o..) a US citizcn was attackcd by a crowd ol pcoplc
in Panama. Tc Unitcd Statcs claimcd that thc Panamanian govcrnmcnt had
lailcd “to providc to thc claimant adcquatc policc protcction, to cxcrcisc duc dili
gcncc in thc maintcnancc ol ordcr and to takc adcquatc mcasurcs to apprchcnd
and punish thc aggrcssors”.
¡o
Tc claim was disallowcd, thc Commission finding
that
thc mcrc lact that that an alicn has suffcrcd at thc hands ol privatc pcrsons
an aggrcssion, which could havc bccn avcrtcd by thc prcscncc ol a sufficicnt
policc lorcc on thc spot, docs not makc a govcrnmcnt liablc lor damagcs undcr
intcrnational law. Tcrc must bc shown spccial circumstanccs lrom which thc
rcsponsibility ol thc authority ariscs: cithcr thcir bchaviour in conncction with
thc particular occurrcncc, or a gcncral lailurc to comply with thcir duty to
maintain ordcr, to prcvcnt crimcs or to prosccutc and punish criminals. Tcrc
wcrc no such circumstanccs in thc prcscnt casc.
¡+

!n .o·¡ prolcssors Louis Sohn and Richard 8axtcr prcscntcd a Ðralt Convcntion
on thc !ntcrnational Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor !njurics to Alicns, undcrtakcn
as part ol thc Program ol !ntcrnational Studics, at thc Harvard Law School.
¡:

Articlc .. ol thc Ðralt dcalt with thc “Lack ol Ðuc Ðiligcncc in Protccting
Alicns”. Paragraph . statcs
·c US v Panama 6 Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards .c· (.o..).
·. !bid. Scc also Rosa Gelbtrunk Claim, US v Salvador X\ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards
¡6., ¡6¡¡66 (.oca). !n thc Sambaggio Case, thc Umpirc in dcclaring that a statc was
not rcsponsiblc lor thc acts ol unsucccsslul rcvolutionarics, statcd: “Govcrnmcnts
arc rcsponsiblc, as a gcncral principlc, lor thc acts ol thosc thcy control. 8ut thc vcry
cxistcncc ol a flagrant rcvolution prcsupposcs that a ccrtain sct ol mcn havc gonc
tcmporarily or pcrmancntly bcyond thc powcr ol thc authoritics, and unlcss it clcarly
appcars that thc govcrnmcnt has lailcd to usc promptly and with appropriatc lorcc
its constitutcd authority, it cannot rcasonably bc said that it should bc rcsponsiblc
lor a condition ol affairs crcatcd without its volition. Vc find oursclvcs thcrclorc
obligcd to concludc, lrom thc standpoint ol gcncral principlc, that, savc undcr thc
cxccptional circumstanccs indicatcd, thc Govcrnmcnt should not bc hcld rcsponsi
blc lor thc acts ol rcvolutionists bccausc Rcvolutionists arc not thc agcnts ol govcrn
mcnt, and a natural rcsponsibility docs not cxist. Tcir acts arc committcd to dcstroy
thc govcrnmcnt, and no onc should bc hcld rcsponsiblc lor thc acts ol an cncmy
attcmpting his lilc. Tc rcvolutionists wcrc bcyond govcrnmcntal control, and thc
Govcrnmcnt can not bc hcld rcsponsiblc lor injurics committcd by thosc who havc
cscapcd its rcstraint. Scc !taly v \cnczucla, .c Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards ¡oo (.oc.).
·a Convcntion on thc !ntcrnational Rcsponsibility ol Statcs lor !njurics to Alicns,
Final Ðralt with ¡xplanatory Notcs 8y Louis 8. Sohn and R. R. 8axtcr, in Recent
Codification, ..· GarcíaAmador ct al.
·a Chapter 3
Failurc to cxcrcisc duc diligcncc to afford protcction to an alicn, by way ol prc
vcntivc or dctcrrcnt mcasurcs, against any act wronglully committcd by any
pcrson, acting singly or in conccrt with othcrs, is wronglul:
il thc act is criminal undcr thc law ol thc Statc conccrncd, or thc act
is gcncrally rccogniscd as criminal by thc principal lcgal systcms ol thc
world.
¡:
!n dctcrmining whcthcr duc diligcncc has bccn shown by statc authoritics, its
lorcsccablity ol thc risk and cffcctivc usc ol availablc mcasurcs arc lactors ol
importancc.
¡±
Tc Claims Commission in thc Solis Case advanccd similar argu
mcnts on thc rcsponsibility lor thc acts ol insurgcnts.
¡¡
!t lound two points ol
significancc in that rcspcct – “namcly, thc capacity to givc protcction, and thc dis
position ol authoritics to cmploy propcr, availablc mcasurcs to do so. !rrcspcctivc
ol thc lacts ol any givcn casc, thc charactcr and cxtcnt ol an insurrcctionary
movcmcnt must bc an important lactor in rclation to thc qucstion ol powcr to
givc protcction.”
¡6
According to Òppcnhcim, thc duty ol thc statc, with rcgard to acts ol pri
vatc pcrsons, is limitcd to “cxcrcisc duc diligcncc to prcvcnt intcrnationally inju
rious acts on thc part ol privatc pcrsons, and, in casc such acts havc ncvcrthclcss
bccn committcd, to procurc satislaction and rcparation lor thc wrongcd statc as
lar as possiblc, by punishing thc offcndcrs and compclling thcm to pay damagcs
whcrc rcquircd.”
¡·
Tc samc is truc lor acts committcd by insurgcnts and riotcrs.
Rcsponsibility is assumcd on thc part ol thc statc only whcn duc diligcncc could
havc immcdiatcly prcvcntcd or dclcatcd an insurrcction or riot.
¡8
Tc statc has a
duty to punish any riotcrs convictcd ol committing criminal acts against lorcign
crs. !t is, howcvcr, not incumbcnt upon thc statc to rcpair all thc losscs sustaincd
by lorcign subjccts through an insurgcncy or riot, providcd thc statc had cxcr
ciscd duc diligcncc. Accordingly lorcigncrs nccd to takc into account thc possiblc
risk ol insurrcction or riot. Tc duty ol thc statc is to cnablc lorcigncrs to gain
acccss to thc courts to claim damagcs lrom guilty partics. !n thc cvcnt ol allcgcd
·. !n thc ¡xplanatory Notc it is maintaincd that “thc duty ol a Statc to afford protcc
tion may vary with thc charactcr ol thc tcrritory in qucstion in thc vcry samc manncr
that thc acts ncccssary lor thc cxcrcisc ol sovcrcignty may vary with thc naturc ol thc
tcrrain, thc population, and thc dcgrcc ol civilization ol thc arca claimcd.” !bid., a.·.
·¡ !bid.
·· !n this casc, cattlc had bccn takcn lrom thc ranch ol Solis, an Amcrican citizcn, both
by insurgcnt and by rcgular lorccs. Tc claim against thc lattcr was succcsslul, but
thc claim against thc lormcr was rcjcctcd on thc ground that it conccrncd thc acts ol
rcvolutionary lorccs and in abscncc ol ncgligcncc ol thc Mcxican authoritics. US v
Mcxico ¡ Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards .··, .6a. (.oa·).
·6 !bid.
·· Oppenheim’s International Law, ·¡o.
·· !bid., ··c··..
·. General Protection
offcndcrs bcing convictcd ol criminal acts it is, morcovcr, thc duty ol thc statc to
punish thcm.
¡o
Tc traditional customary law duty ol statcs to punish individuals
lound guilty ol criminal acts, may in contcnt bc similar to thc spccific dutics ol
mcmbcr statcs to thc Salcty Convcntion to punish thosc convictcd ol thc crimcs
stipulatcd thcrcin.
6o

Succcsslul rcvolutions may lcad to thc assumption ol rcsponsibility on thc
part ol thc ncw statc lor wronglul acts committcd during thc rcvolution. !n thc
Pinson Case (.oa·) thc Prcsidcnt ol thc FrcnchMcxican Claims Commission
hcld that positivc intcrnational law did not at that timc rccognisc a gcncral obli
gation lor statcs to award compcnsation lor losscs to alicns as a rcsult ol riot or
civil war. A statc, howcvcr, was liablc lor thc acts ol its armcd lorccs in cxccss ol
military ncccssity, pillagc and lailurc to supprcss adcquatcly civil unrcst such as
mutinics or riots.
6+
Òn juridical acts, or ol intcrnational dclinqucncics ol rcvo
lutionarics, thc statc could only bc rcsponsiblc il thc rcvolution conccrncd was
succcsslul, in which casc rcsponsibility would bccomc rctroactivc lrom thc start
ol thc rcvolution.
6:
Tc rcvolution in !ran and thc occupation ol thc Unitcd Statcs ¡mbassy
is an cxamplc ol thc duc diligcncc standard bcing subjcct to surrounding cir
cumstanccs. !n that particular casc most ol thc US nationals (·c out ol ·a) in
thc occupicd cmbassy wcrc diplomatic or consular pcrsonncl. Tc Unitcd Statcs
claimcd that !ran had inter alia violatcd thc .o6. and thc .o6. Vienna Conventions
on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and rcqucstcd thc !ntcrnational Court ol
]usticc to makc an ordcr dcmanding thc rclcasc ol thc hostagcs, thc punishmcnt
ol thosc rcsponsiblc and thc paymcnt ol rcparation.
6:
According to thc Court, thc
dcmonstrators who attackcd thc cmbassy lackcd any lorm ol status as officials ol
thc statc and could not on that ground alonc incur thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc.
Tc Court lound, howcvcr, that thc govcrnmcnt ol !ran had “lailcd altogcthcr to
takc any ‘appropriatc stcps’ to protcct thc prcmiscs, thc staff and archivcs ol thc
Unitcd Statc’s mission against attack by thc militants, and to takc any stcps cithcr
to prcvcnt this attack or to stop it bclorc it rcachcd its complction”.

Tat lailurc
was all thc morc scrious sincc !ran, in accordancc with thc \icnna Convcntions
ol .o6. and .o6., was “placcd undcr thc most catcgorical obligations, as a rccciv
ing Statc, to takc appropriatc stcps to cnsurc thc protcction ol thc Unitcd Statcs
¡mbassy and consulatcs, thcir staffs, thcir archivcs, thcir mcans ol communica
·o !bid., ··..
6c Scc Articlcs o and .c ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
6. Francc v Mcxico · Rcp !ntl Arbitral Awards .a·, .·a.·¡ (.oa·).
6a !bid., ¡.o¡...
6. Casc Conccrning Unitcd Statcs Ðiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tchran (Unitcd
Statcs ol Amcrica v !ran) .o·c, !C] Rcp ..
6¡ !bid., ]udgcmcnt ol thc Court, para. 6..
·¡ Chapter 3
tion and thc lrccdom ol movcmcnt ol thc mcmbcrs ol thcir staffs”.

!t was thc
opinion ol thc Court that “thc lailurc ol thc !ranian Govcrnmcnt to takc such
stcps was duc to morc than mcrc ncgligcncc or lack ol appropriatc mcans”.
66

Tc lact that thc Court lound that thc lailurc ol !ran amountcd to morc
than just mcrc ncgligcncc supports thc contcntion by GarciaAmador that thc
conduct in qucstion must “show patcnt or manilcst ncgligcncc” on thc part ol
thc statc organs or officials in thc protcction ol alicns to incur thc rcsponsibility
ol thc statc. !t is also apparcnt that thc Court mcasurcd thc conduct ol thc statc
against a highcr standard bccausc ol thc privilcgcd status ol thc pcrsonncl.
Tc many rclcrcnccs to customary law on thc trcatmcnt ol alicns cxprcsscd
by thc !ranUS Claims Tribunal is cvidcncc ol thc rolc that this rcgimc contin
ucs to play in intcrnational rclations, and thus in thc protcction ol pcrsonncl on
intcrnational assignmcnts. Tc lact that thc topic ol diplomatic protcction con
tinucd to bc dcalt with by thc !LC is in itscll lurthcr cvidcncc ol thc continuing
importancc ol customary law in rclation to thc trcatmcnt ol alicns.

3.1.2 Conclusions
Tc contcnt ol thc intcrnational minimum standard largcly rcflccts norms ol
human rights law. Tc naturc ol thc diplomatic protcction in qucstion, howcvcr,
is clcarly diffcrcnt lrom that ol human rights law and it is submittcd that thcsc
arcas ol intcrnational law will continuc to cxist in parallcl. As has bccn pointcd
out, this arca ol thc law may scrvc as an important complcmcnt to thc morc
dctailcd human rights law rcgimc, cspccially in situations whcrc thc host statc is
not a party to thc rclcvant trcatics. Vhilc this survcy has locuscd on thc contcnt
ol thc intcrnational minimum standard, this arca ol thc law is closcly conncctcd,
ol coursc, to thc law ol diplomatic protcction. Tc right ol statcs to claim rcpa
ration lor injurious acts to its citizcns has its countcrpart in thc right ol intcr
national organisations to cxcrcisc thcir lunctional protcction. Tc intcrnational
minimum standard as such, is ol rclcvancc lor both proccdural mcchanisms.
6· !bid., para., 6..
66 !bid., para., 6..
6· Tc Gcncral Asscmbly Ðcclaration on thc Human Rights ol !ndividuals who arc
not Nationals ol thc Country in which thcy Livc (.o··)

is indicativc ol thc rolc
that human rights law plays in this arca. !t is also indicativc ol thc limitations on
human rights protcction with rcgard to alicns. Scc GA Rcs. ¡c/.¡¡, Tc Gcncral
Asscmbly Ðcclaration on thc Human Rights ol !ndividuals who arc not Nationals
ol thc Country in which thcy Livc, UN GAÒR, ¡c
th
Scss., Supp. ·., a·., UN Ðoc.
A/R¡S/¡c/.¡¡ (.o··). !n thc prcamblc it is statcd, inter alia, “Conscious that, with
improving communications and thc dcvclopmcnt ol pcacclul and lricndly rcla
tions among countrics, individuals incrcasingly livc in countrics ol which thcy arc
not nationals”. !n Articlc ., thc tcrm Alicn is dcfincd as “any individual who is not
national ol thc Statc in which hc or shc is present”. (¡mphasis addcd).
·· General Protection
Casc law on thc intcrnational minimum standard includcs to a grcat cxtcnt
issucs conccrning statc rcsponsibility, ultra vires acts and thc principlc ol duc dili
gcncc. Many ol thcsc qucstions havc now bccn dcalt with by thc !LC in its sct ol
Ðralt Articlcs on Statc Rcsponsibility ol acc.. Tcsc articlcs havc also contrib
utcd to clarilying rclcvant standards ol trcatmcnt, sincc thcy constitutc thc cir
cumstanccs undcr which a statc can bc in brcach ol its intcrnational obligations.
Pcrhaps thc most important conclusion to bc drawn lrom this survcy is thc
customary law obligation incumbcnt upon all statcs to cxcrcisc duc diligcncc to
prcvcnt illcgal acts against lorcigncrs and to punish thosc convictcd ol pcrpctrat
ing thcm. Tc lact that all statcs arc undcr such an obligation mcans that ccrtain
provisions (but not all) ol thc Salcty Convcntion arc dcclaratory ol customary
intcrnational law. Anothcr important conclusion to bc drawn is that luturc host
statcs arc dutybound to organisc thcir statc organs, cspccially thosc with cxccu
tivc tasks, in such a way that thcy arc ablc to cxcrcisc cffcctivc control ovcr thcm.
Tat proposition is also supportcd by Ðralt Articlc · on statc rcsponsibility, which
lays down that it is considcrcd to bc an act ol statc rcsponsibility il onc or morc ol
thc statc’s organs, authoriscd to cxcrcisc govcrnmcntal authority, and docs so in
that capacity, and thcn cxcccds that authority or contravcncs instructions.
,.a Human Rights Iaw
!ntcrnational human rights law plays a major rolc in thc gcncral protcction ol
pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations. !n contrast to thc intcrnational minimum
standard, protcction undcr human rights norms docs not hingc upon nationality
rcquircmcnts.
68
Human rights law cstablishcs a norm according to which statcs
arc obligcd to trcat nationals and lorcigncrs alikc. Tc law ol human rights, how
cvcr, is partly conditional upon thc ratification ol rclcvant trcatics by thc host
statc. !l thc statc in which an opcration is conductcd is not party to thc major
trcatics on human rights, thc cmcrging customary human rights law will bc ol
particular importancc. Major human rights trcatics providc lor dcrogation ol thc
rulcs thcrcin, with thc cxccption ol somc lundamcntal rulcs, in timcs ol cmcr
gcncy. Tc cstablishmcnt ol a pcacc opcration might in lact bc in rcsponsc to an
cmcrgcncy, and dcrogation lrom human rights trcatics could havc a scrious affcct
on thc protcction ol thc pcrsonncl conccrncd. !n timcs ol intcrnal disturbanccs, it
might not bc possiblc lor thc govcrnmcnt ol thc statc in qucstion to havc cffcc
tivc control ovcr all ol its tcrritory. Acting in such situations, thcrclorc, could
cntail scrious conscqucnccs lor thc protcction ol pcrsonncl.
Tc avowcd protcction ol cvcry individual’s human rights was sccn to bc
an important part ol thc ncw, and morc pcacclul, world ordcr that was aimcd
at in .o¡·. Ðuring thc San Francisco conlcrcncc it bccamc clcar that thc Grcat
Powcrs wcrc not at that stagc rcady to crcatc a univcrsal protcctivc systcm ol
6· Philip C. ]cssup, A Modern Law of Nations – An Introduction, .ca (.o6·).
·6 Chapter 3
human rights. 8ut provisions incorporatcd within thc UN Chartcr can ncvcr
thclcss bc rcgardcd as laying down thc lcgal loundation lor thc dcvclopmcnt ol a
univcrsal human rights law systcm.
6o
Tc protcction ol human rights bccamc onc
ol thc purposcs ol cxistcncc lor thc UN.
·o
According to Articlc ·· “thc Unitcd
Nations shall promotc: ... (c) univcrsal rcspcct lor, and obscrvancc ol, human
rights and lundamcntal lrccdoms lor all without distinction as to racc, scx, lan
guagc, or rcligion.” !n strcngthcning thc obligation to promotc rcspcct lor human
rights, Articlc ·6 statcs: “All mcmbcrs plcdgc thcmsclvcs to takc joint and scpa
ratc action in coopcration with thc Òrganization lor thc achicvcmcnt ol thc
purposcs sct lorth in Articlc ··.”
Tc Univcrsal Ðcclaration ol Human Rights was adoptcd by thc Gcncral
Asscmbly in Ðcccmbcr, .o¡·.
·+
!t was thc first intcrnational instrumcnt to dcal
cxclusivcly with human rights and it can bc sccn as a rcaction to thc atrocitics that
wcrc rcvcalcd during and altcr thc Sccond Vorld Var. !ts purposc was to dcclarc
and articulatc ccrtain basic rights bclonging inhcrcntly to mankind irrcspcctivc
ol racc, rcligion, cthnicity or nationality. ¡ightccn ycars latcr thc two trcatics,
thc !ntcrnational Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights and thc !ntcrnational
Covcnant on ¡conomic, Social and Cultural Rights, wcrc adoptcd.
Òn thc rcgional lcvcl thc ¡uropcan Convcntion lor thc Protcction ol Human
Rights and Fundamcntal Frccdoms was signcd in .o·c and cntcrcd into lorcc in
.o·..
·:
Tc ¡uropcan Convcntion bccamc thc first systcm providing protcction
lor human rights. !t is now by lar thc most dcvclopcd and cffcctivc human rights
rcgimc. Tc Amcrican Convcntion ol Human Rights camc into lorcc in .o·· and
largcly incorporatcs thosc rights containcd within thc ¡uropcan Convcntion.
·:

Tc convcntion is an instrumcnt ol thc Òrganization ol Amcrican Statcs (ÒAS)
and its cnlorccmcnt is closcly conncctcd with thc ÒAS. Tc !ntcrAmcrican
Commission on Human Rights, an ÒAS organ, and thc Amcrican Court ol
Human Rights, arc thc organs cntrustcd with its cnlorccmcnt.
·±
Tc Alrican Chartcr on Human Rights and Pcoplc’s Rights cntcrcd into
lorcc .o·6. Tc Chartcr was closcly rclatcd to thc Òrganization ol Alrican Unity
(ÒAU), now thc Alrican Union (AU), and was draltcd undcr ÒAU sponsor
ship. Tc Chartcr diffcrs lrom thc othcr univcrsal and rcgional human rights
6o Tomas 8ucrgcnthal, International Human Rights, a. (a
nd
cd., .oo·).
·c Articlc .(.) ol thc Unitcd Nations Chartcr, a6 ]unc .o¡·, . UNTS X\!.
·. GA Rcs. a.· (!!!), Univcrsal Ðcclaration ol Human Rights, UN GAÒR .
rd
Scss.,
UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/a.· (!!!) (.o¡·).
·a ¡uropcan Convcntion lor thc Protcction ol Human Rights and Fundamcntal
Frccdoms (.o·c), Romc ¡ Novcmbcr, .o·c, ¡TS ·.o·c.
·. Amcrican Convcntion on Human Rights (.o6o) aa Novcmbcr .o6o ..¡¡ UNTS
.a.. For a bricl comparativc study ol thcsc convcntions scc ]ochcn A. Frowcin, Tc
¡uropcan and thc Amcrican Convcntions on Human Rights – A Comparison, .
Human Rights Law Journal, ¡¡6· (.o·c).
·¡ Ð. ]. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, ·.¡ (¡
th
cd., .oo.).
·· General Protection
instrumcnts. ¡mphasis has bccn placcd upon pcoplc’s rights (Articlcs .oa¡) and
upon thc individual’s dutics (Articlcs a·ao). Tcrc is no dcrogation clausc in thc
Chartcr.
·¡
An Alrican Commission on Human and Pcoplc’s Rights has bccn
cstablishcd but its cnlorccmcnt rolc is limitcd. Tcrc is as yct no Court undcr thc
Alrican Chartcr.
·6
Tc lollowing analysis ol protcction undcr human rights law will bc limitcd
to thc !ntcrnational Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights (!CCPR) on thc uni
vcrsal lcvcl and thc ¡uropcan Convcntion lor thc Protcction ol Human Rights
and Fundamcntal Frccdoms (¡CHR) and thc Amcrican Convcntion ol Human
Rights (ACHR) on thc rcgional lcvcl. Tc Univcrsal Ðcclaration ol Human
Rights docs not as such cntail thc lcgal obligations ol host statcs and thc Alrican
Chartcr is ol limitcd valuc as thcrc is as yct no court cstablishcd in conncction
with thc Chartcr, and thc rolc ol thc Commission is limitcd.
3.2.1 Scope of Application
Tc thrcc human rights trcatics hcrc analyscd all dctcrminc thcir own ficld ol
application. Tcrc arc, howcvcr, striking similaritics to bc lound bctwccn thcsc
instrumcnts with rcgard to thc ficld ol pcrsonal application (ratione personae), thc
gcographical ficld ol application (ratione loci) and thc matcrial ficld ol applica
tion (ratione materiae). Tc !CCPR statcs: “¡ach Party to thc prcscnt Covcnant
undcrtakcs to rcspcct and to cnsurc to all individuals within its tcrritory and sub
jcct to its jurisdiction thc rights rccogniscd in thc prcscnt Covcnant”.
··
According
to thc ¡CHR, thc “Partics shall sccurc to cvcryonc within thcir jurisdiction thc
rights and lrccdoms dcfincd in Scction . ol this Convcntion”.
·8
Tc ACHR statcs
that thc Partics to thc Convcntion “undcrtakc to rcspcct thc rights and lrccdoms
rccogniscd hcrcin and to cnsurc to all pcrsons subjcct to thcir jurisdiction thc lrcc
and lull cxcrcisc ol thosc rights and lrccdoms”.
·o
·· 8ut scc Articlcs o and ...
·6 Òn thc mandatc ol thc Commission, scc, !ngcr Östcrdahl, Implementing Human
Rights in Africa: Te African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and Individual
Communications, (acca). Shc also discusscs thc prospccts ol crcating an Alrican
Court on Human Rights, .c... Scc also Nsongurua ]. Udombana, So Far, so Fair:
Tc Local Rcmcdics Rulc in thc ]urisprudcncc ol thc Alrican Commission on
Human and Pcoplc’s Rights, o· AJIL, . (acc.).
·· Articlc a, ol thc !ntcrnational Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights (.o66), .o
Ðcccmbcr .o66, ooo UNTS .·..
·· Articlc . ol thc ¡CHR.
·o Articlc . ol thc ACHR. Scc also thc Univcrsal Ðcclaration ol Human Rights, com
monly rcgardcd as having a customary law status, which dcclarcs in its prcamblc thc
nccd to sccurc thc rights and lrccdoms containcd thcrcin “both among thc pcoplcs
ol Mcmbcr Statcs thcmsclvcs and among thc pcoplcs ol tcrritorics undcr thcir juris
diction”, GA Rcs. a.·A (!!!) (.o¡·).
·· Chapter 3
Ratione personae
Tc rclcrcnccs to “all individuals”, “cvcryonc”, “all pcrsons” in thc thrcc convcn
tions indicatc that thcy apply to individuals per se, irrcspcctivc ol nationality. Tis
is, ol coursc, an important prcrcquisitc lor thc cxpcctcd protcction ol intcrna
tional pcrsonncl by thc host statc. Forcigncrs may lacc ccrtain rcstrictions on
political activity in anothcr statc but such rcstrictions arc not considcrcd to bc a
brcach ol that statc’s human rights obligations. Tcrc is, howcvcr, no diffcrcncc
bctwccn nationals and nonnationals in thc convcntional human rights law con
ccrning basic protcction lor thc human bcing.
8o

Pcacc opcration pcrsonncl acting within thc tcrritory ol a statc that is party
to onc ol thc major human rights trcatics could thus cxpcct to bc trcatcd in
accordancc with thc standard prcscribcd by that trcaty.
Ratione loci
Vith rcgard to gcographical applicability ol thc human rights trcatics, it is appar
cnt that this is not primarily a condition in rclation to tcrritory but rathcr on thc
cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction. Tc ¡uropcan Court ol Human Rights has intcrprctcd
thc tcrm “jurisdiction” to mcan an arca in which a mcmbcr statc has “cffcctivc
control”.

8caring in mind thc objcct and purposc ol thc Convcntion, thc rcsponsibil
ity ol a Contracting Party may also arisc whcn as a conscqucncc ol military
action – whcthcr lawlul or unlawlul – it cxcrciscs cffcctivc control ol an arca
outsidc its national tcrritory. Tc obligation to sccurc, in such an arca, thc rights
and lrccdoms sct out in thc Convcntion dcrivcs lrom thc lact ol such control
whcthcr it bc cxcrciscd dircctly, through its armcd lorccs, or through a subor
dinatc local administration.
8+
¡ffcctivc control ovcr tcrritory would sccm to cntail jurisdiction, and thus
rcsponsibility to cnsurc thc cnjoymcnt ol human rights by individuals in that
arca. Mirroring that conclusion, loss ol cffcctivc control ovcr tcrritory could makc
it impossiblc to sccurc human rights in such an arca. A statc, thcrclorc, might not
bc rcsponsiblc lor violations ol human rights il it was prcvcntcd lrom cxcrcising
control ovcr that part ol its tcrritory whcrc such violations had occurrcd. Pcacc
opcration pcrsonncl dcploycd in an arca de jure, bclonging to onc statc but de facto
controllcd by anothcr statc, might thus cxpcct thc samc lcvcl ol trcatmcnt by thc
lattcr – dcpcnding, ol coursc, upon that statc’s human rights obligations.
8:

·c P. van Ðijk and G.].H. van Hool, Teory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights, . (.rd cd., .oo·).
·. Loizidou v Turkcy, Prcliminary Òbjcctions, A ..c .oo·, para. 6a.
·a !l thc host statc wcrc unablc to control all ol its tcrritory bccausc ol armcd rcsist
ancc by rcbcl movcmcnts, thc human rights obligations might not “translcr” ovcr to
·o General Protection
Ðcpcnding upon thc circumstanccs, thc rclcrcncc to “jurisdiction” could
thus bc both a limiting and an cxpanding lactor with rcspcct to tcrritory. Tc
limiting lactor will comc into play in a statc unablc to cxcrcisc cffcctivc control
ovcr its tcrritory owing to intcrnal disturbanccs or cxtcrnal influcnccs. Tc tcrm
“jurisdiction” may bc an cxpanding lactor, insolar as thc statc cxcrciscs cffcctivc
control ovcr tcrritory that docs not de jure bclong to that statc. Control ovcr tcrri
tory will usually causc thc controlling statc to assumc rcsponsibility ol guarantcc
ing thc salcty and sccurity ol individuals living or travclling in that arca.
8:

Tc !ntcrAmcrican Commission on Human Rights adoptcd a similar
approach to thc applicability ol thc ACHR. !n rclation to thc military action lcd
by US military lorccs in Grcnada in .o·., thc Commission lound that thc con
vcntion had cxtratcrritorial application. According to thc Commission, thc obli
gation to cnsurc thc human rights ol cvcry pcrson within its jurisdiction could
includc situations whcrc a pcrson might bc prcscnt within thc tcrritory ol onc
statc but undcr thc control ol anothcr statc through its agcnts abroad. Tc impor
tant lact was whcthcr “thc Statc obscrvcd thc rights ol a pcrson subjcct to its
authority and control”.

!n vicw ol thc abovc, thc languagc ol thc !CCPR Convcntion, “tcrritory
and subjcct to its jurisdiction”, appcars ambiguous. According to thc wording,
thc rcsponsibility ol mcmbcr statcs could not bc cntailcd outsidc thcir tcrritorics.
8ucrgcnthal offcrs anothcr intcrprctation. Hc asscrts that a mcmbcr statc has an
obligation to cnsurc and rcspcct thc human rights in thc covcnant “to all individ
that group. For insurgcnts to lall undcr thc obligation ol cnsuring human rights to
individuals within thc tcrritory controllcd by thcm, thcy must first attain thc status
ol a subjcct ol intcrnational law as intcrnational human rights law dircctly binds
only subjccts ol intcrnational law. Scc, lor cxamplc, Tcodor Mcron, Allan Rosas, A
Ðcclaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards, ·· AJIL, .··, .·6.·· (.oo.).
·. !n thc Bankovic Case, thc applicant argucd that victims ol NATÒ bombing in
8clgradc, during thc conflict bctwccn NATÒ statcs and thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol
Yugoslavia in .ooo, camc undcr thc “cffcctivc control” ol thcsc statcs and thcir right to
lilc had thcrclorc bccn violatcd. Tc Court lound that it had rccogniscd cxtratcrri
torial jurisdiction whcn thc rcspondcnt statc cxcrciscd cffcctivc control ovcr tcrritory
and inhabitants as a rcsult ol a military occupation or by thc conscnt ol thc govcrn
mcnt ol that tcrritory. Tc court rcjcctcd thc argumcnt that thc positivc obligation
ol Articlc . cxtcndcd to sccurc thc Convcntion’s rights proportional to thc lcvcl ol
control cxcrciscd in a givcn situation. 8ankovic and othcrs v 8clgium, Admissibility
Ðccision, .a Ðcccmbcr (acc.), Rcports acc.X!! paras. ·. and ··. For commcnts on
this casc scc, Matthcw Happold, 8ankovic v 8clgium and thc Tcrritorial Scopc ol
thc ¡uropcan Convcntion on Human Rights, . Human Rights Law Review, ··oc
(acc.) and Ruth Alcxandra and Trilsch Mirja, 8ankovic v. 8clgium (Admissibility).
App. No. ·aac·/oo, o· AJIL, .6·.·a (acc.).
·¡ !ntcrAmcrican Commission on Human Rights, Rcport No. .co/oo, Casc .c.o·.,
Coard ct al v Unitcd Statcs, ao Scptcmbcr, .ooo, para. .·.
·c Chapter 3
uals within its tcrritory” and “to all individuals subjcct to its jurisdiction”.

Tcrc
arc strong argumcnts in lavour ol such an intcrprctation. !n Articlc . ol thc First
Òptional Protocol to thc !ntcrnational Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights,
a mcmbcr statc ol thc !CCPR bccoming a party to thc Protocol “rccognizcs thc
compctcncc ol thc Committcc to rcccivc and considcr communications lrom
individuals subjcct to its jurisdiction”.
86

Tc Human Rights Committcc has rcpcatcdly supportcd 8ucrgcnthal’s
intcrprctation. !n a Gcncral Commcnt on Articlc a·, thc Committcc intcrprctcd
Articlc a(.) to apply to all individuals “within thc tcrritory or undcr thc jurisdic
tion ol thc statc.”

Commcnting on a rcport submittcd by !raq undcr Articlc ¡c,
thc Committcc cxprcsscd conccrn ovcr lailurc to includc cvcnts in Kuwait during
thc !raqi occupation “givcn !raq’s clcar rcsponsibility undcr intcrnational law lor
thc obscrvancc ol human rights during its occupation ol that country.”
88
!t should
bc notcd, howcvcr, that in thc Legal Guide to Peace Operations, publishcd by thc
US Army Pcacckccping !nstitutc, it is hcld that thc !CCPR docs not apply to
thc cxtratcrritorial conduct ol its statc organs.
8o
Tc propcr intcrprctation, how
cvcr, must bc to intcrprct thc applicability ol thc !CCPR in linc with thc vicws
ol 8ucrgcnthal and thc Human Rights Committcc.
Ratione materiae
Tc possibilitics opcn to statcs to dcrogatc lrom thcir human rights obligations
arc ol thc utmost importancc lor pcrsonncl involvcd in pcacc opcrations. Tc
right to dcrogatc lrom human rights trcatics must bc trcatcd scparatcly lrom any
inability on thc part ol a statc to lulfil its obligations through loss ol tcrritorial
control. Tc lormcr is an cxplicit right lor mcmbcr statcs in human rights trcatics
in timcs ol public cmcrgcncy, and docs not dcal with tcrritorial control.
According to Articlc ¡ (.) ol thc !CCPR thc Statcs Partics rctain thc right
to dcrogatc lrom thcir obligations in “timc ol cmcrgcncy which thrcatcns thc
lilc ol thc nation and thc cxistcncc ol which is officially proclaimcd”, but only
·· Tomas 8ucrgcnthal, To Rcspcct and to ¡nsurc: Statc Òbligations and Pcrmissiblc
Ðcrogations, in Te International Bill of Rights: Te Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, ·a, ·¡ (Louis Hcnkin cd., .o·.).
·6 First Òptional Protocol to thc !ntcrnational Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights,
.o Ðcccmbcr .o66, ooo UNTS .ca.
·· Human Rights Committcc, Gcncral Commcnt Adoptcd by thc Human Rights
Committcc Undcr Articlc ¡c, Paragraph ¡, ol thc !ntcrnational Covcnant on Civil
and Political Rights, Addcndum, para. ¡ UN Ðoc. CCPR/C/a./Rcv../Add.· (.oo¡)
(cmphasis addcd).
·· Rcport ol thc Human Rights Committcc, UN GAÒR, ¡6
th
Scss., Supp. No. ¡c, para.
6·a, UN Ðoc. A/¡6/¡c (.oo.).
·o Glcnn 8owcns, Legal Guide to Peace Operations, ..· (.oo·), Cl. Nihal, ]ayawickrama,
Te Judicial Application of Human Rights Law. National, Regional and International
Jurisprudence, ¡· (acca).
·. General Protection
“to thc cxtcnt strictly rcquircd by thc cxigcncics ol thc situation, providcd that
such mcasurcs arc not inconsistcnt with thcir othcr obligations undcr intcrna
tional law”. Tc Human Rights Committcc has cxplaincd its position on Articlc
¡, stating that thc rcquircmcnt that dcrogation must bc strictly rcquircd by thc
cxigcncics ol thc situation “rclatcs to thc duration, gcographical covcragc and
matcrial scopc ol thc statc ol cmcrgcncy and any mcasurcs ol dcrogation rcsortcd
to bccausc ol thc cmcrgcncy”.
oo
Ccrtain lundamcntal rights do not pcrmit dcro
gation – lor cxamplc, thc right to lilc and protcction against torturc.
o+
Any statc
cxcrcising thc right to dcrogatc must immcdiatcly inlorm othcr statcs partics,
through thc UN thc provisions ol, and thc rcasons lor, thc dcrogation.
o:

Articlc .· ol thc ¡CHR providcs lor dcrogation “|i|n timc ol war or othcr
public cmcrgcncy thrcatcning thc lilc ol thc nation”. Tc rclcrcncc to “timc ol
war” may bc intcrprctcd as thc cxistcncc ol cithcr an intcrnational armcd con
flict bctwccn two statcs or a nonintcrnational armcd conflict bctwccn thc statc
conccrncd and armcd lactions ol thc samc nationality. !n both situations thc law
ol armcd conflict applics in rclcvant parts. Vhcthcr or not an intcrnal uphcaval
rcachcs thc lcvcl ol a nonintcrnational armcd conflict is not ol significant impor
tancc conccrning thc right ol dcrogation, sincc this is also possiblc in public
cmcrgcncics. Tc ¡uropcan Court lound, on thc intcrprctation ol “public cmcr
gcncy thrcatcning thc lilc ol thc nation”, that it was cqual to “an cxccptional situ
ation ol crisis or cmcrgcncy which affccts thc wholc population and constitutcs a
thrcat to thc organiscd lilc ol thc community ol which thc statc is composcd.”
o:

Tc statc is lclt with a lairly widc margin ol discrction and apprcciation in
dctcrmining thc scriousncss ol any situation that ariscs in rclation to whcthcr or
not it might dcrogatc lrom its obligations. !n thc Ireland v UK Case thc Court
hcld, with rcgard to “public cmcrgcncy” that duc to “thcir dircct and continuous
contact with thc prcssing nccds ol thc momcnt, thc national authoritics arc in
principlc in a bcttcr position than thc intcrnational judgc to dccidc both on thc
prcscncc ol such cmcrgcncy and on thc naturc and scopc ol dcrogations ncccs
sary to avcrt it. !n this mattcr Articlc .·(.) lcavcs thc authoritics a widc margin
ol apprcciation.”


¡vcn il thc Court makcs its own asscssmcnt, it has ncvcrthclcss bccn con
cludcd that “it cannot bc asscrtcd that thc margin ol apprcciation allowcd to a
oc Human Rights Committcc, Gcncral Commcnt No. ao, Statcs ol ¡mcrgcncy (Articlc
¡), para. ¡, UN Ðoc. CCPR/C/a./Rcv../Add..., .. August acc..
o. Scc Articlc ¡ (a).
oa Scc Articlc ¡ (.).
o. Casc ol Lawlcss v !rcland, ]udgmcnt (Mcrits), . ]uly (.o6.) A., para. a·.
o¡ Casc ol !rcland v UK, ]udgmcnt (Mcrits and ]ust Satislaction) .· ]anuary (.o··) Aa·,
para. a·.
·a Chapter 3
statc on thc qucstion ol thc cxistcncc ol thc cmcrgcncy is anything but widc.”


Ònc commcntator finds, lrom cxamining thc jurisprudcncc lrom thc ¡CHR,
!CCPR and thc ACHR, that a lcw principal charactcristics can bc obscrvcd on
thc typc ol cmcrgcncy stipulatcd undcr thcsc trcatics:
thc cmcrgcncy must bc actual or at lcast immincnt, thcrclorc an cmcrgcncy ol
a “prcvcntivc naturc” is not lawlul, thc cmcrgcncy should bc ol such magnitudc
as to affcct thc wholc ol thc nation, and not just part ol it, thc thrcat must bc to
thc vcry cxistcncc ol thc nation, this bcing undcrstood as a thrcat to thc physi
cal intcgrity, or to thc lunctioning ol thc organs ol thc Statc, thc dcclaration ol
cmcrgcncy must bc uscd as a last rcsort oncc thc normal mcasurcs uscd to with
public ordcr disturbanccs havc bccn cxhaustcd, thc dcclaration ol cmcrgcncy
is a tcmporary mcasurc which cannot last longcr than thc cmcrgcncy itscll,
thcrclorc, thc socallcd “pcrmancnt statcs ol cmcrgcncy” arc not lawlul.
o6
!n thc thrcc main convcntions ccrtain rights arc listcd as bcing nondcrogativc in
charactcr cvcn in timcs ol war. !t has bccn suggcstcd that two critcria havc guidcd
thc work ol idcntilying thosc rights nondcrogativc in charactcr in thc thrcc con
vcntions: rights rcgardcd as bcing “indispcnsablc lor thc protcction ol thc human
bcing”, and thosc rights which havc no “dircct bcaring on thc cmcrgcncy” and
whcrc dcrogation lrom thosc rights could ncvcr bc justificd lor that purposc.


Tcrc arc lour rights rcgardcd as bcing nondcrogativc in charactcr in all thrcc
convcntions: “thc right to lilc, thc right to bc lrcc lrom torturc and othcr inhu
man or dcgrading trcatmcnt or punishmcnt, thc right to bc lrcc lrom slavcry and
scrvitudc, and thc principlc ol nonrctroactivity ol pcnal laws”.
o8

Tosc lour rights arc thc only onc rights listcd as bcing nondcrogativc in
charactcr within thc ¡CHR. Tc !CCPR contains scvcn rights and thc ACHR
rclcrs to clcvcn rights rcgardcd as bcing nondcrogativc. !t is notcworthy that thc
right to bc lrcc lrom arbitrary arrcst and thc right to duc proccss ol law, which
arc at particular risk in cmcrgcncy situations, havc not bccn madc nondcrogativc
in charactcr in any ol thc major trcatics.
!n thc Aksoy v Turkey Case
oo
(.oo6), thc ¡uropcan Court ol Human Rights
lound a violation ol Articlc ·(.) had occurrcd, cvcn though Turkcy had dcpositcd
o· Harris, Ò’8oylc, Varbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, ¡o.
(.oo·). Scc also Rosalyn Higgins, Ðcrogations undcr Human Rights Trcatics, ¡·
BYIL, a·., ao6.cc (.o·6.o··).
o6 ]aimc Òraá, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law, .. (.ooa).
o· Òraá, o¡. Scc in this rcspcct ]oan F. Hartman, Vorking Papcr lor thc Committcc ol
¡xpcrts on thc Articlc ¡ Ðcrogation Provision, · Human Rights Quarterly ·o, ....¡
(.o··).
o· Òraá, o6.
oo Casc ol Aksoy v Turkcy Rcports .oo6!\, (.oo6).
·. General Protection
a notification ol dcrogation in rcspcct ol that provision. Tc Court lound that thc
mcasurcs had bccn takcn pursuant to thc dcrogation but it “was not pcrsuadcd
that thc cxigcncics ol thc situation ncccssitatcd thc holding ol thc applicant on
suspicion ol involvcmcnt in tcrrorist offcnccs lor lourtccn days or morc in incom
municado dctcntion without acccss to a judgc or othcr judicial officcr”.
+oo

Tc Human Rights Committcc has listcd ccrtain rights, which in its opin
ion may not bc dcrogatcd lrom, although not listcd as such in Articlc ¡ ol thc
!CCPR. !t is statcd in rclation to onc ol thosc rights that “thc prohibitions
against taking ol hostagcs, abductions or unacknowlcdgcd dctcntion arc not sub
jcct to dcrogation. Tc absolutc naturc ol thcsc prohibitions, cvcn in timcs ol
cmcrgcncy, is justificd by thcir status as norms ol gcncral intcrnational law”.
+o+

Tc lact that ccrtain lundamcntal rights havc not bccn madc nondcrogativc in
charactcr undcr thc convcntions may bc balanccd by thc lact that thc court may
judgc cach mcasurc against thc rcquircmcnt ol ncccssity, as it did in thc Aksoy
Case mcntioncd abovc.
+o:

Òwing to thc lact that thc intcrnational human rights instrumcnts havc not
as yct rcccivcd univcrsal adhcrcncc, it is important to analysc thc customary law
govcrning human rights in public cmcrgcncics. Furthcrmorc, it is ol importancc,
lor instancc, in rclation to thc Alrican Chartcr on Human Rights, which docs
not contain any dcrogation clausc. For this purposc, Òráa conductcd a dctailcd
cxamination ol thc cxisting cvidcncc ol thc customary charactcr ol thc principlcs
cmbodicd in thc dcrogation clauscs. 8ascd upon this, hc lound scvcral principlcs
that can bc rcgardcd as bcing “cmcrgcnt principlcs ol gcncral intcrnational law in
a vcry advanccd statc ol crystallization.”
+o:
Tcsc principlcs arc lound to bc thosc
ol cxccptional thrcat, nondcrogation ol lundamcntal rights, proportionality and
nondiscrimination.
+o±
Òráa suggcsts that “thc principlc ol proportionality, which
.cc !bid., para ·¡. Rodlcy notcs that thc lact that lrccdom lrom incommunicado dctcn
tion is a right that can bc dcrogatcd lrom undcr thc ¡CHR and that it has “bccn val
idly dcrogatcd lrom docs not prcvcnt a finding that thc provision has bccn violatcd,”
and hc thcrclorc, holds that in cffcct “thc Convcntion has to bc rcad as prohibiting
in all circumstanccs prolongcd incommunicado dctcntion, rcgardlcss ol any statc ol
cmcrgcncy.” Nigcl S. Rodlcy, Te Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, .¡·
(a
nd
cd., .ooo).
.c. Gcncral Commcnt No. ao, Statcs ol ¡mcrgcncy (Articlc ¡).
.ca Òráa has suggcstcd that thc right ol statcs to dcrogatc lrom human rights obliga
tions in timcs ol public cmcrgcncy “is conditioncd by thc principle of proportionality,
which statcs that mcasurcs must bc strictly rcquircd by thc cxigcncics ol thc situa
tion, by thc principle of non-discrimination, which statcs that thc mcasurcs must not
involvc any discrimination, and finally, by thc principle of consistency, which statcs
that thc mcasurcs should not bc inconsistcnt with thc Statc’s othcr obligations undcr
intcrnational law.” Òraá, ..o (lootnotcs omittcd).
.c. !bid., a6·6o.
.c¡ !t is conccdcd that “somc ol thcsc substantivc principlcs arc in lact alrcady principlcs
ol gcncral intcrnational law. Tis sccms to bc thc casc with thc principlcs ol pro
·¡ Chapter 3
is thc main critcrion lor dcrogation in gcncral intcrnational law, providcs a strong
salcguard against possiblc doubts in concrctc cascs conccrning thc nondcroga
blc charactcr ol ccrtain rights.
” +o¡

A conncction cxists bctwccn intcrnational humanitarian law and human
rights law in rclation to thc right to dcrogatc. All thrcc instrumcnts statc that
dcrogation lrom thc convcntion’s rights shall not bc inconsistcnt with thc statc’s
othcr obligations undcr intcrnational law. Articlc .· ol thc ¡uropcan convcntion
rclcrs spccifically to “timc ol war”. Tc applicability ol intcrnational humanitar
ian law, howcvcr, dcpcnds upon thc cxistcncc ol an armcd conflict. !t is, howcvcr,
a difficult task to asscss whcn a statc ol cmcrgcncy cnds and dcvclops into an
armcd conflict to which intcrnational humanitarian law applics.
+o6
Ðcrogation
lrom human rights law docs not ncccssarily mcan thc cxistcncc ol an armcd con
flict. Situations ol intcrnal violcncc, whcrc thc statc in qucstion has dcrogatcd
lrom its human rights obligations, which havc not rcachcd thc thrcshold ol an
armcd conflict, may in lact bc rcgardcd as thc most troublcsomc circumstancc
with rcgard to protcction ol individuals.
+o·

!t should bc notcd that human rights institutions rclcrs to intcrnational
humanitarian law. Tc !ntcrAmcrican Commission has cvcn applicd it in situ
ations which, according to thc Commission, should bc charactcriscd as armcd
conflicts.
+o8
Ðocs human rights law continuc to apply during armcd conflict: Tc
!C] commcntcd on this point, with rcgard to thc right to lilc, in its advisory opin
ion on thc Lcgality ol thc Trcat or Usc ol Nuclcar Vcapons:
portionality and nondiscrimination, and, at lcast as lar as thc lour common non
dcrogablc rights arc conccrncd, thc casc with thc principlc ol nondcrogability. Tc
samc could probably bc said in rcspcct ol thc principlc ol cxccptional thrcat”. Òraá,
a6c.
.c· !bid., a6·. According to Òraá “|t|hc principlc ol proportionality rclcrs not only to
thc naturc ol thc mcasurcs takcn, in thc scnsc that thcy must bc proportionatc to thc
thrcat, but also includcs what thc !ACHR has callcd thc “principlc ol tcmporarincss”
(which mcans that thcy cannot last longcr that thc cmcrgcncy itscll ), and thc limita
tion that thcy must bc cxtcndcd in gcographical tcrms only to thosc placcs affcctcd
by thc cmcrgcncy.” !bid, a6..
.c6 Kcnncth Vatkin, Controlling thc Usc ol Forcc: A Rolc lor Human Rights Norms in
Contcmporary Armcd Conflict, o· AJIL, ., a6 (acc¡). Vatkin suggcsts that thc lcvcl
ol violcncc and thc statc’s ability to cxcrcisc normal control may bc usclul critcria in
this rcspcct.
.c· Fundamcntal Standards ol Humanity. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral submittcd
pursuant to Commission rcsolution accc/6o para. 6, UN Ðoc., ¡/CN.¡/acc./o., .a
]anuary acc..
.c· !ntcrAmcrican Commission on Human Rights, Rcport No. ··/o·, Casc .....· para.
.6., Abclla ct al v Argcntina (Tablada Case), Novcmbcr .·, .oo·. For criticism ol thc
argumcnts put lorward by thc Commission in this rcspcct, scc Licsbcth Zcgvcld,
Tc !ntcrAmcrican Commission on Human Rights and intcrnational humanitar
ian law: A commcnt on thc Tablada Casc, .a¡ IRRC, ·c··.. (.oo·).
·· General Protection
Tc Court obscrvcs that thc protcction ol thc !ntcrnational Covcnant ol Civil
and Political Rights docs not ccasc in timcs ol war, cxccpt by opcration ol
Articlc ¡ ol thc Covcnant whcrcby ccrtain provisions may bc dcrogatcd lrom
in a timc ol national cmcrgcncy. Rcspcct lor thc right to lilc is not, howcvcr,
such a provision. !n principlc, thc right not arbitrarily to bc dcprivcd ol onc’s
lilc applics also in hostilitics. Tc tcst ol what is an arbitrary dcprivation ol lilc,
howcvcr, thcn lalls to bc dctcrmincd by thc applicablc lex specialis, namcly, thc
law applicablc in armcd conflict which is dcsigncd to rcgulatc thc conduct ol
hostilitics. Tus whcthcr a particular loss ol lilc, through thc usc ol a ccrtain
wcapon in warlarc, is to bc considcrcd an arbitrary dcprivation ol lilc con
trary to Articlc 6 ol thc Covcnant, can only bc dccidcd by rclcrcncc to thc law
applicablc in armcd conflict and not dcduccd lrom thc tcrms ol thc Covcnant
itscll.
+oo
Tis sccms to bc a valid modcl with which to cxplain thc rclationship bctwccn
human rights law and intcrnational humanitarian law. Human rights law con
tinucs to apply to thc cxtcnt that no dcrogation has bccn madc by thc statc in
qucstion.
++o
!l human rights law and intcrnational humanitarian law apply simul
tancously, thc lattcr is rcgardcd as bcing lex specialis. !l a qucstion ol law is rcgu
latcd in that lcgal lramcwork it takcs prcccdcncc ovcr human rights law.
!n conclusion, undcr thc thrcc major human rights trcatics statcs partics
havc bccn affordcd a widc margin ol apprcciation in dctcrmining thc cxistcncc ol
a situation constituting a public cmcrgcncy that would providc thcm with a right
to dcrogatc lrom somc ol thcir human rights obligations. Tcrc arc ccrtain rights
that arc not subjcct to dcrogation. Tc rights considcrcd to bc nondcrogativc
in charactcr arc ol a diffcrcnt naturc undcr thc thrcc major human rights trca
tics. Tcrc arc, howcvcr, lour rights considcrcd to bc nondcrogativc in all thrcc
trcatics: thc right to lilc, thc right to bc lrcc lrom torturc and othcr inhuman or
dcgrading trcatmcnt or punishmcnt, thc right to bc lrcc lrom slavcry and scr
vitudc, and thc right ol cnjoymcnt ol thc principlc ol nonrctroactivity ol pcnal
laws. Tcsc rights havc also bccn considcrcd to havc achicvcd jus cogens status.
+++

.co Lcgality ol thc Trcat ol Usc ol Nuclcar Vcapons (Advisory Òpinion), .oo6 !C]
Rcp aa6, para. a·.
..c Louisc Ðoswald8cck and Sylvain \ité, !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, ao. IRRC, o¡, .ca (.oo.).
... Scc Restatement, (Tird), \ol. a, §·ca .·¡·. A jus cogens norm is dcfincd in Articlc
·. ol thc \icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol Trcatics. !t is thcrc statcd: “A trcaty is
void il, at thc timc ol its conclusion, it conflicts with a pcrcmptory norm ol gcncral
intcrnational law. For thc purposcs ol thc prcscnt Convcntion, a pcrcmptory norm
ol gcncral intcrnational law is a norm acccptcd and rccognizcd by thc intcrnational
community ol Statcs as a wholc as a norm lrom which no dcrogation is pcrmittcd
and which can bc modificd only by a subscqucnt norm ol gcncral intcrnational law
having thc samc charactcr.” !t is not thc right to lilc as such that has bccn rccog
·6 Chapter 3
Tc lact that any dcrogation must takc account ol thc cxigcncics ol thc situation
conccrncd and bc proportionatc to thc objcctivcs sought, mcans that dcrogation
ol thosc rights that arc ablc to bc dcrogatcd lrom could in thc actual situation bc
judgcd to bc a brcach ol a statc’s human rights obligations.
Pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations may find thcmsclvcs in situations
ol public cmcrgcncy or caught up in armcd conflicts that can bc intcrnational or
nonintcrnational in charactcr. Conscqucntly, thc host statc’s dcrogation lrom
human rights trcatics could affcct thcir protcction to a scrious cxtcnt. Tc lact
that thc right ol lrccdom lrom arbitrary arrcst and thc right to duc proccss ol
law arc rights that can bc subjcct to dcrogation is particularly troublcsomc in
such situations. Although cach mcasurc takcn should bc sct against thc princi
plc ol proportionality, and whcthcr or not thcy wcrc ncccssitatcd by thc cxigcn
cics ol thc particular situation, it must not bc lorgottcn that in practicc statcs arc
affordcd a widc margin ol apprcciation in judging thc appropriatcncss ol dcro
gating mcasurcs.
!l a host statc has not dcrogatcd lrom its obligations undcr human rights
law, pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations can cxpcct to bc trcatcd in accord
ancc with such standards. !n timcs ol public cmcrgcncy, whcrc thc host statc has
lcgitimatcly dcrogatcd lrom its human rights obligations, thc lcvcls ol protcction
ol such pcrsonncl might bc considcrably limitcd. !l thc statc ol cmcrgcncy turns
into an armcd conflict, thc protcction ol pcrsonncl might in lact bc cnhanccd,
dcpcnding upon thc naturc ol thc armcd conflict – whcthcr intcrnational or non
intcrnational.
Human Rights as customary international law
!t is pcrhaps appropriatc to makc somc bricl points on thc customary law status
ol human rights in gcncral. Sincc thc dcvclopmcnt ol human rights law is a lairly
ncw phcnomcnon, thc intcrnational trcatics havc largcly statcd ncw norms bascd
at that point only upon convcntional lorm.
++:
Trcatics that arc not by naturc codi
ficatory ol customary law might bc normativc in charactcr, and thcrclorc instcad
dcvclop thc law. Tc diffcrcnt lcgal norms cmbodicd in a multilatcral trcaty may
ol coursc bc ol a diffcrcnt charactcr. Vhilc somc may codily cxisting law, othcrs
may dcvclop ncw law, crystallising cmcrgcnt law or mcrcly crcatc obligations
bctwccn statcs partics to thc convcntion.
++:
Mcron has notcd that “|j|ust as spc
cial rulcs conccrning rcciprocity, brcach and intcrprctation ol trcatics oltcn apply
niscd as a jus cogens norm. !t is rathcr thc prohibition against “arbitrary killings” that
havc a pcrcmptory status. Scc Lauri Hannikaincn, Peremptory Norms ( Jus Cogens) in
International Law, ¡.6, ·.¡·.o (.o··).
..a Although partly bascd upon thc intcrnational minimum standard, human rights law
was a ncw phcnomcnon as it also applicd to a statc’s own citizcns.
... Tcodor Mcron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, oc
(.o·o).
·· General Protection
to human rights instrumcnts, diffcrcnt typcs ol cvidcncc may bc rclcvant to thc
crcation ol customary human rights law.”
++±
Tc US Restatement adopts a similar
position and statcs that “thc practicc ol Statcs that is acccptcd as building cus
tomary intcrnational law ol human rights includcd somc lorms ol conduct dil
lcrcnt lrom that building customary intcrnational law gcncrally”.
++¡
8ascd upon
thcsc critcria thc Restatement lists rights rcgardcd as bcing norms ol customary
intcrnational law. !t is a violation ol intcrnational law il a statc,
as a mattcr ol policy, it practiccs, cncouragcs, or condoncs (a) gcnocidc, (b)
slavcry or slavc tradc, (c) thc murdcr or causing thc disappcarancc ol individu
als, (d) torturc or othcr crucl, inhuman, or dcgrading trcatmcnt or punishmcnt,
(c) prolongcd arbitrary dctcntion, (l ) systcmatic racial discrimination, or (g)
a consistcnt pattcrn ol gross violations ol intcrnationally rccogniscd human
rights.
++6
!n thc Commcnt to this articlc it is statcd that that thc human rights norms
listcd in (a) to (l ) arc ol jus cogens status. 8rcachcs ol thcsc rights, by thcrc vcry
naturc, arc rcgardcd as bcing “gross” human rights violations cvcn il thcy do not
lorm part ol a “consistcnt pattcrn”. Paragraph (g) rclcrs to human rights, brcachcs
ol which would constitutc a violation ol customary law only il thcy lormcd part
ol a “consistcnt pattcrn ol gross violations”. A gross violation is dcfincd as bcing
“particularly shocking bccausc ol thc importancc ol thc right or thc gravity ol thc
violation”.
++·
¡xamplcs ol rights grossly violatcd as a consistcnt pattcrn ol statc
policy arc ipso facto “systcmatic harassmcnt, invasions ol thc privacy ol thc homc,
arbitrary arrcst and dctcntion (cvcn il not prolongcd)”.
++8

Mcron is ol thc opinion that finds thc US Restatement is “somcwhat too
cautious”. Among othcr things, hc would likc to scc includcd a corc numbcr ol
duc proccss guarantccs as wcll as thc humanc trcatmcnt ol dctainccs.
++o
Tcrc
is lurthcr rclcrcncc to thc !CCPR and thc obligations ol mcmbcr statcs to “not
..¡ !bid., .cc.
..· Restatement (Tird), \ol. a, §·c., .·¡. Schachtcr, in cxprcssing support lor thc samc
position, claboratcs on thc rcasons: “Statcs do not usually makc claims on othcr
statcs or protcst violations that do not affcct thcir nationals. !n that scnsc, onc can
find scant statc practicc accompanicd by opinio juris. Arbitral awards and intcrna
tional judicial dccisions arc also rarc cxccpt in tribunals bascd on trcatics such as thc
¡uropcan and !ntcrAmcrican Courts ol human rights. Tc argumcnts advanccd in
support ol a finding that rights arc a part ol customary law rcly on diffcrcnt kinds
ol cvidcncc.” Òscar Schachtcr, !ntcrnational Law in Tcory and in Practicc, Gcncral
Coursc in Public !ntcrnational Law, .·· RdC, o, ..¡ (.o·a\).
..6 Restatement (Tird) \ol. a, § ·ca, .6·.
..· !bid.
..· !bid.
..o Mcron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law o·o·.
·· Chapter 3
only rcspcct but also to ‘cnsurc’ thc rights rccogniscd by thc Covcnant, suggcst
ing an obligation to act to prcvcnt thcir violation whcthcr by officials or by pri
vatc pcrsons.”
+:o
According to thc !C], customary intcrnational law prohibits
“|w|ronglully to dcprivc human bcings ol thcir lrccdom and to subjcct thcm to
physical constraint in conditions ol hardship.”
+:+

!t is not within thc ambit ol this study to analysc morc cxactly thc cxtcnt
to which human rights law has dcvclopcd into customary intcrnational law. !t is
clcar, howcvcr, that at lcast somc norms havc acquircd this status. !t is also clcar,
that thc analysis ol human rights law as customary law must takc duc account
ol thc spccial contcxt in which thcsc norms havc dcvclopcd. Tc work on lunda
mcntal standards ol humanity will bc ol hclp in clarilying which norms apply in
cascs whcrc host statcs arc not party to thc rclcvant human rights law trcatics.
3.2.2 Duties of the Host Nation
Tc dutics ol mcmbcr statcs to thc major human rights convcntions arc lor
mulatcd in tcrms ol a duty to “rcspcct”,
+::
“cnsurc”
+::
and “sccurc”
+:±
thc rights
stipulatcd in thc convcntions. !n practicc thcrc arc lcw il any cascs, rclating to a
particular duty to protcct thc human rights ol pcrsonncl involvcd in pcacc opcr
ations. Guidancc, howcvcr, may bc sought lrom thc practicc ol thc ¡uropcan
Court ol Human Rights, thc !ntcrAmcrican Court ol Human Rights, and thc
Human Rights Committcc. Tcsc institutions dcal with issucs conccrning thc
organisation ol a statc’s sccurity lorccs, thc usc ol lorcc by law cnlorccmcnt offi
cials, and thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc lor acts ol armcd groups and individuals.
From this practicc, it is possiblc to dctcct norms ol a gcncral charactcr that arc ol
intcrcst to thc subjcct ol protcction ol pcrsonncl cmploycd in pcacc opcrations.
.ac Restatement, (Tird) \ol. a, §·ca, Rcportcr’s Notcs. Mcron statcs: “Givcn thc rapid,
continucd dcvclopmcnt ol intcrnational human rights, thc list as now constitutcd
should bc rcgardcd as csscntially opcncndcd. Human rights arc undcrgoing a stagc
ol continuing cvolution. Trough a proccss ol accrction, in which thc rcpctition ol
thc articulation and thc asscrtion ol ccrtain norms in various rcsolutions and dcc
larations and trcatics plays an important rolc, clcmcnts ol statc practicc and opinio
juris lorm ncw customary norms ol human rights. Tis continuing proccss, in which
opinio juris appcars to havc grcatcr wcight than statc practicc, is morc intcrcsting
than thc static picturc ol human rights as rcflcctcd by thc Restatement. Many othcr
rights will bc addcd in thc coursc ol timc.” Mcron, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Norms as Customary Law, oo.
.a. Casc Conccrning Unitcd Statcs Ðiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tchran (Unitcd
Statcs ol Amcrica v !ran) .o·c, !C] Rcp ., ¡a.
.aa Articlc a ol thc !CCPR and Articlc . ol thc ACHR.
.a. !bid.
.a¡ Articlc . ol thc ¡CHR.
·o General Protection
Tc !ntcrAmcrican Court ol Human Rights, in thc casc ol \clásqucz v
Honduras,
+:¡
intcrprctcd thc obligation to “cnsurc” human rights as implying that
“thc duty ol thc Statcs Partics to organizc thc govcrnmcntal apparatus and, in
gcncral, all thc structurcs through which public powcr is cxcrciscd, so that thcy
arc capablc ol juridically cnsuring thc lrcc and lull cnjoymcnt ol human rights.”
+:6

According to thc Court, thc obligation to “cnsurc” thc cxcrcisc ol thc rights cnu
mcratcd in thc Convcntion mcans that “thc Statcs must prcvcnt, invcstigatc and
punish any violation ol thc rights rccognizcd by thc Convcntion and, morcovcr,
il possiblc attcmpt to rcstorc thc right violatcd and providc compcnsation as war
rantcd lor damagcs rcsulting lrom thc violation”.
+:·
Tc Court lurthcr dcclarcd that not only would acts committcd by authori
tics and officials bc attributablc to thc statc, but acts committcd by privatc pcr
sons or pcrsons not idcntificd might also cntail thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc ovcr
a “lack ol duc diligcncc to prcvcnt thc violation or to rcspond to it as rcquircd by
thc Convcntion.”
+:8
Tc Court thcrclorc concludcd, that on rcsponsibility in gcn
cral undcr thc convcntion, thc dccisivc lactor was whcthcr thc allcgcd violation ol
rights had takcn placc “with thc support or thc acquicsccncc ol thc govcrnmcnt,
or whcthcr thc Statc has allowcd thc act to takc placc without taking mcasurcs
to prcvcnt it or to punish thosc rcsponsiblc”.
+:o
Tc Court lound, inter alia, that
lailurc to invcstigatc thc disappcarancc ol \clásqucz, to pay compcnsation and
to punish thosc rcsponsiblc constitutcd a brcach ol thc obligations stipulatcd by
thc convcntion. Tc Honduran authoritics had lailcd to “takc cffcctivc action to
cnsurc rcspcct lor human rights within thc jurisdiction ol that Statc as rcquircd
by Articlc .(.) ol thc Convcntion”.
+:o
From thc ¡uropcan Court ol Human Rights somc cascs arc to bc lound
on thc positivc obligation to “sccurc” thc cffcctivc cnjoymcnt ol human rights.
!n ¡rgi v Turkcy (.oo·) thc ¡uropcan Court ol Human Rights was laccd with
thc qucstion ol thc rcsponsibility ol Turkcy lor thc dcath ol thc applicant’s sistcr
who was accidcntally killcd during a shooting incidcnt bctwccn Turkcy’s sccurity
.a· !ntcrAmcrican Court ol Human Rights, ]udgmcnt ol ]uly ao, .o··, a· !LM. ao¡
(.o·o). !t conccrncd thc rcsponsibility ol thc statc lor thc disappcarancc ol \clásqucz,
a Honduran national, in .o·.. Tc Court lound, inter alia, that “(.) a practicc ol dis
appcaranccs carricd out or tolcratcd by Honduran officials cxistcd bctwccn .o·. and
.o·¡, (a) Manlrcdo \clásqucz disappcarcd at thc hands ol or with thc acquicsccncc
ol thosc officials within thc lramcwork ol that practicc”, para. .¡·.
.a6 !bid., .66.
.a· !bid.
.a· !bid., para. .·a. Shclton finds that thc rcasoning ol thc Court in this rcspcct mirrors
thc traditional law ol statc rcsponsibility lor alicns. Ðinah Shclton, Privatc \iolcncc,
Public Vrongs, and thc Rcsponsibility ol Statcs, .. Fordham International Law
Journal, ., .· (.o·o.ooc).
.ao !ntcrAmcrican Court ol Human Rights. ]udgmcnt ol ]uly ao, .o··, para. .·..
..c !bid., para. .·c.
oc Chapter 3
lorccs and thc PKK.
+:+
Tc lacts ol thc casc, according to thc Court, did not rcvcal
with sufficicnt ccrtainty whcthcr or not thc sccurity lorccs had fircd thc bullct
that actually killcd Havva ¡rgi.
+::
Tc Court thcn turncd to thc intcrprctation ol
Articlc a.
+::
!n its asscssmcnt thc Court statcd that, not only would thc actions ol
statc agcnts nccd to bc takcn into considcration, cspccially whcn dclibcratc lorcc
was applicd, “but also all thc surrounding circumstanccs, including such mattcrs
as thc planning and control ol thc actions undcr cxamination”.
+:±
Òn thc obliga
tion to “sccurc” thc right to lilc, thc Court hcld that thc rcsponsibility ol thc Statc
may “bc cngagcd whcrc thcy lail to takc all lcasiblc prccautions in thc choicc ol
mcans and mcthods ol a sccurity opcration mountcd against an opposing group
with a vicw to avoiding and, in any cvcnt, to minimising, incidcntal loss ol civil
ian lilc.”
+:¡

Tc Court concludcd in thc casc undcr considcration that villagcrs had bccn
at considcrablc risk ol bcing caught in thc crossfirc bctwccn sccurity lorccs and
PKK tcrrorists and “|c|vcn il it might bc assumcd that thc sccurity lorccs would
havc rcspondcd with duc carc lor thc civilian population in rcturning firc against
tcrrorists caught up in thc approachcs to thc villagc, it could not bc assumcd that
thc tcrrorists would havc rcspondcd with such rcstraint.”
+:6
Vith rcgard to thc
lack ol cvidcncc produccd by thc rcspondcnt statc on thc planning and conduct
ol thc opcration, thc Court lound that “thcrc was no inlormation to indicatc
that any stcps or prccautions had bccn takcn to protcct thc villagcrs lrom bcing
caught up in thc conflict.”
+:·
... Casc ol ¡rgi v Turkcy, ]udgmcnt (Mcrits and ]ust Satislaction) a· ]uly (.oo·), Rcports
.oo·!\.
..a !bid., para. ··.
... Articlc a ol thc ¡CHR statcs “.. ¡vcryonc’s right to lilc shall bc protcctcd by law. No
onc shall bc dcprivcd ol his lilc intcntionally savc in thc cxccution ol a scntcncc ol a
court lollowing his conviction ol a crimc lor which this pcnalty is providcd by law. a.
Ðcprivation ol lilc shall not bc rcgardcd as inflictcd in contravcntion ol this articlc
whcn it rcsults lrom thc usc ol lorcc which is no morc than absolutcly ncccssary: (a)
in dclcncc ol any pcrson lrom unlawlul violcncc, (b) in ordcr to cffcct a lawlul arrcst
or to prcvcnt cscapc ol a pcrson lawlully dctaincd, (c) in action lawlully takcn lor thc
purposc ol quclling a riot or insurrcction.” Tc Court notcd that thc usc ol thc tcrm
“absolutcly ncccssary” implicd “a strictcr and morc compclling lorm ol ncccssity”
than that normally applicablc undcr thc tcst ol “ncccssary in a dcmocratic socicty” as
stipulatcd by paragraph a ol Articlcs · to ... !t lound it particularly important that
thc usc ol lorcc “must bc strictly proportionatc to thc achicvcmcnt ol thc aims sct
out in subparagraphs a (a), (b) and (c) ol Articlc a.” !bid., para. ·o.
..¡ Casc ol ¡rgi v Turkcy, para. ·o.
..· !bid.
..6 !bid., para. ·c.
..· !bid. Òn thc duty to carclully control and organisc an opcration whcrc lcthal lorcc
might bc uscd, scc thc opinion ol thc Court in thc Casc ol McCann and othcrs v
o. General Protection
Tc gcncral rcquircmcnt to “rcspcct” thosc rights rccogniscd in thc human
rights trcatics would by implication bc accomplishcd by thc statc in its not actu
ally violating thosc rights. Tc obligation to activcly “cnsurc” or “sccurc” is indica
tivc ol thc positivc dutics placcd upon mcmbcr statcs to takc dcfinitc mcasurcs in
ordcr to guarantcc thosc rights.
+:8
Tc positivc dutics undcr thcsc instrumcnts arc
larrcaching. Statcs arc rcquircd to prcvcnt and punish any violation ol thc con
vcntional human rights law. Statcs arc not only rcsponsiblc lor thc acts commit
tcd by thcir own officials but also lor acts ol omission in rclation to acts by privatc
pcrsons il thcrc is lound to bc a lack ol duc diligcncc on thc part ol thc statc. Tc
most important obligation, howcvcr, may bc thc duty ol organising govcrnmcn
tal structurcs in such a way that it bccomcs possiblc to cnsurc lull cnjoymcnt ol
human rights by all pcrsons rcsiding or travclling within thc jurisdiction con
ccrncd. Tis also bccomcs apparcnt with rcgard to thc rcsponsibility lor thc plan
ning ol law cnlorccmcnt opcrations in such a way that thcy do not unncccssarily
or arbitrarily violatc thc human rights ol innoccnt pcoplc. Tcsc positivc dutics
arc ol considcrablc rclcvancc in rclation to thc implcmcntation ol adcquatc lcvcls
ol protcction undcr human rights law lor pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations.
Tc duty to prcvcnt and punish violations ol human rights is ol spccific rclcvancc
and onc which is largcly rcflcctcd in thc Salcty Convcntion.
2.2.3 Conclusions
Human rights law obligations arc closcly conncctcd to such principlcs ol intcr
national law as statc sovcrcignty and jurisdiction. Tc cxcrcisc ol cffcctivc control
ovcr tcrritory constitutc jurisdiction on thc part ol thc statc in qucstion. Host
statcs thus assumc an obligation to sccurc, or cnsurc, human rights law with
rcgard to all pcrsons within thc tcrritorics ovcr which thcy cxcrcisc cffcctivc con
trol. !n timcs ol pcacc, human rights law cstablishcs thc lundamcntal norms upon
which all pcoplc can rcly. Human rights law, howcvcr, may bc subjcct to dcroga
tion in timcs ol cmcrgcncy. Tc protcction affordcd by thcsc norms may undcr
Unitcd Kingdom, (Mcrits and ]ust Satislaction) a· Scptcmbcr (.oo·) A.a¡, paras.
acaa...
..· Halûka, Kabaalioglu, Tc Òbligations to “Rcspcct” and to “¡nsurc” thc Right to
Lilc, in Te Right to Life in International Law, .6· (8. G. Ramcharan cd., .o··). Tc
Gcncral Asscmbly statcd in Rcsolution No. ¡a.(\) on thc !CCPR that “it was csscn
tial that thc Covcnant should includc provision rcndcring it obligatory lor Statcs to
promotc thc implcmcntation ol thc human rights and lundamcntal lrccdoms pro
claimcd in thc Covcnant and to takc thc ncccssary stcps, including lcgislation, to
guarantcc to cvcryonc thc rcal opportunity ol cnjoying thosc rights and lrccdoms.”
GA Rcs. ¡a.(\), Ðralt !ntcrnational Covcnant on Human Rights and mcasurcs ol
implcmcntation: luturc work ol thc Commission on Human Rights, UN GAÒR ·
th

Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/¡a.(\) .o·c.
oa Chapter 3
such circumstanccs bc rcduccd to a lcw lundamcntal norms. Tc right to dcro
gatc, howcvcr, is subjcct to ccrtain lormal rcquircmcnts. Morcovcr, dcrogation
lrom thc matcrial law must, lor cxamplc, takc thc principlc ol proportionality
into account. Tc right to dcrogatc is ol particular conccrn lor pcrsonncl involvcd
in pcacc opcrations, sincc thcy arc oltcn dcploycd in arcas ol conflict.
!t is apparcnt that statcs arc undcr a positive duty to sccurc and uphold thc
human rights ol cvcryonc within thcir jurisdiction. Tat duty, howcvcr, could bc
impossiblc to lulfil il thc host govcrnmcnt conccrncd wcrc unablc to cxcrcisc
cffcctivc control ovcr all parts ol its tcrritory. Tis is not an unusual situation in
pcacc opcrations. Nonstatc actors, which havc not attaincd thc status ol a sub
jcct ol intcrnational law, arc not lormally bound by human rights law standards.
Pcacc opcration pcrsonncl dcploycd in such arcas cannot rcly on thc protcction
ol such norms. Howcvcr, acts contravcning human rights law might constitutc
crimcs undcr thc provisions ol intcrnational law and thc pcrpctrators ol such
crimcs would lacc thc risk ol bcing prosccutcd not only by thcir own statcs but
also by othcr statcs. Tc cffcctivc application ol thc Salcty Convcntion could in
this rcspcct havc a dctcrrcnt cffcct.
,., International Humanitarian Iaw
Introduction
Rulcs govcrning thc conduct ol war havc a history almost as old as mankind
+:o
and
wcrc locuscd primarily upon thc waging ol war.
+±o
Tc rulcs govcrning thc mcans
and mcthods ol warlarc arc oltcn rclcrrcd to as thc law ol Tc Haguc. Tc most
pcrtincnt rulcs protccting pcrsons and propcrty lrom thc cffccts ol war arc to bc
lound in a sct ol laws known as thc law ol Gcncva. Tis law locuscs on thc pro
tcction ol individuals not taking part in thc hostilitics and mainly compriscs thc
lour Gcncva Convcntions ol .o¡o.
+±+
Tc Additional Protocol ! (AP !) (.o··) to
thc lour Gcncva Convcntions compriscs rulcs ol both thc law ol Gcncva and thc
law ol Tc Haguc, whilc Additional Protocol !! (AP !!) (.o··) was thc first con
..o Scc Lcslic Grccn, Te Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Chaptcr a (a
nd
cd.,
accc).
.¡c Scc c.g. .oc· Haguc Convcntion !\ Rcspccting thc Laws and Customs ol Var
on Land and anncxcd Rcgulations, a AJIL Supp. oc..· (.oc·) and .oc· Haguc
Convcntion !X Conccrning 8ombardmcnt by Naval Forccs in Timc ol Var, a AJIL
Supp. .¡6.·. (.oc·).
.¡. Scc Gcncva Convcntion lor thc Amclioration ol thc Condition ol thc Voundcd
and Sick in Armcd Forccs in thc Ficld ol August .a, .o¡o, ·· UNTS .. (Gcncva
Convcntion !), Gcncva Convcntion lor thc Amclioration ol thc Condition ol
Voundcd, Sick and Shipwrcckcd Mcmbcrs ol Armcd Forccs at Sca ol August .a,
.o¡o, ·· UNTS ·· (Gcncva Convcntion !!), Gcncva Convcntion Rclativc to thc
Trcatmcnt ol Prisoncrs ol Var ol August .a, .o¡o, ·· UNTS ..· (Gcncva Convcntion
!!!), Gcncva Convcntion Rclativc to thc Protcction ol Civilian Pcrsons in Timc ol
Var ol August .a, .o¡o, ·· UNTS .·· (Gcncva Convcntion !\).
o. General Protection
vcntion to dcal cxclusivcly with nonintcrnational armcd conflicts.
+±:
Somctimcs
a third catcgory is addcd, rclcrrcd to by Kalshovcn as thc law ol Ncw York. Tis
contains thc implcmcntation ol lundamcntal human rights norms in situations
ol armcd conflict.
+±:
Hc rcgards, howcvcr, a trcnd to bc a mcrgcr bctwccn thosc
thrcc catcgorics. ¡vidcncc ol such a mcrgcr, lor cxamplc, is thc codification ol
rulcs govcrning thc mcans and mcthods ol warlarc in thc Additional Protocol
! and thc Convcntion on Prohibitions or Rcstrictions on thc Usc ol Ccrtain
Convcntional Vcapons Vhich May bc Ðccmcd to bc ¡xccssivcly !njurious or to
Havc !ndiscriminatc ¡ffccts, with Protocols (CCV).
+±±
Tc tcrm “intcrnational
humanitarian law” (!HL) is uscd hcrc as an ovcrall tcrm lor thc protcction ol pcr
sons and propcrty in timcs ol war, and mcans and mcthods ol warlarc.
+±¡
At thc hcart ol intcrnational humanitarian law applicablc in armcd conflicts
lics thc distinction bctwccn civilians and combatants. Civilians and civilian prop
crty must not bc thc dircct objcct ol attacks. Combatants arc lcgitimatc military
targcts, as arc military installations ol thc warring lactions. Undcr intcrnational
humanitarian law, a civilian is dcfincd as any pcrson who docs not lall undcr thc
various catcgorics ol combatant.
+±6
!n casc ol doubt, a pcrson shall bc rcgardcd
as bcing a civilian.
+±·
Military pcrsonncl in a pcacc opcration thcrclorc cnjoy thc
protcction affordcd to civilians il thcy act in thc arca ol an armcd conflict so long
as thcy do not cngagc as a party to thc conflict.
+±8
Tc .o¡o Gcncva Convcntions madc an important contribution to thc pro
tcction ol nonparticipants to an armcd conflict. As is wcll known, thcy pro
.¡a Protocol Additional to thc Gcncva Convcntions ol .a August .o¡o, and Rclating to
thc Protcction ol \ictims ol !ntcrnational Armcd Conflicts, ..a· UNTS . (Additional
Protocol !), Protocol Additional to thc Gcncva Convcntions ol .a August .o¡o, and
Rclating to thc Protcction ol \ictims ol Non!ntcrnational Armcd Conflicts, ..a·
UNTS 6co (Additional Protocol !!).
.¡. Frits Kalshovcn, Constraints on the Waging of War, · (a
nd
cd., .oo.).
.¡¡ Convcntion on Prohibitions or Rcstrictions on thc Usc ol Ccrtain Convcntional
Vcapons Vhich May bc Ðccmcd to bc ¡xccssivcly !njurious or to Havc
!ndiscriminatc ¡ffccts, .c Òctobcr .o·c .o !LM .·a. (.o·c).
.¡· !n a strict scnsc, thc intcrnational humanitarian law docs not comprisc all thc norms
in what is usually rclcrrcd to as thc Laws ol Var, c.g. thc law ol ncutrality. Scc
Christophcr Grccnwood, Historical Ðcvclopmcnt and Lcgal 8asis, in Te Handbook
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, ., o (Ðictcr Flcck ct al cds., .oo·). Scc also
8ring and Korlol who dcscribc thc intcrnational law in war, ‘thc laws ol war’, to
comprisc thrcc lcgal lramcworks: thc humanitarian law, thc law ol ncutrality and
thc law ol occupation. Òvc 8ring and Anna Korlol, Folkrätt för Totalförsvaret. En
Handbok, .c ( .
rd
cd., acca).
.¡6 AP !, Articlc ·c. Tis dcfinition has thc advantagc ol bcing final.
.¡· HansPctcr Gasscr, Protcction ol thc Civilian Population, in Te Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, aco, a.c, (Ðictcr Flcck, ct al cds., .oo·).
.¡· Scc thc Romc Statutc ol thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court, Articlc · (b) (iii) and (c)
(iii), at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statutc/romclra.htm.
o¡ Chapter 3
vidc standards ol protcction lor civilians, thc sick and woundcd, prisoncrs ol war
and mcdical pcrsonncl. As a rulc, such protcctcd pcrsons must not bc madc thc
objccts ol attack. Tc convcntions rccognisc thc dcsirc ol armcd lorccs to attack
lcgitimatc military objcctivcs locatcd ncar civilian installations. Undcrlying thc
rulcs on intcrnational humanitarian law is a balancc that has to bc struck bctwccn
military ncccssity and rcspcct lor humanity.
+±o

Tc lollowing chaptcr dcals with thc protcction ol pcrsonncl, dcploycd in
pcacc opcrations, undcr !HL. As this work stops short ol situations whcrc such
pcrsonncl act as combatants to an armcd conflict, rulcs protccting combatants
will not bc cxamincd. Pcrsonncl participating in pcacc opcrations will gcncr
ally cnjoy a similar protcction as that affordcd to civilians undcr intcrnational
humanitarian law. Ccrtain groups ol civilians, such as rcligious and mcdical pcr
sonncl, cnjoy a special protcction undcr intcrnational humanitarian law. As pcacc
opcrations arc a rclativcly ncw conccpt, thcrc arc lcw rulcs that dcal spccifically
with thc protcction ol such pcrsonncl.
+¡o

Tc .o¡o Gcncva Convcntion !\ on thc protcction ol civilian pcrsons in
timcs ol war was thc first trcaty to dcal cxclusivcly with thc protcction ol civil
ians in timcs ol war. Common Articlc . to thc lour Gcncva Convcntions stipu
latcs basic norms applicablc in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts.
+¡+
Additional
Protocol !! dcvclops thc law lurthcr in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts but its
applicability is inter alia dcpcndcnt on a thrcshold ol control ol tcrritory by dis
sidcnt armcd lorccs.
+¡:
!n customary intcrnational law thc gap bctwccn thcsc two
scts ol rulcs may slowly bc closing. Largc parts ol thc convcntional law, in gcncral,
arc now rcgardcd as bcing dcclaratory ol customary intcrnational law.
+¡:

Tc lollowing survcy ol intcrnational humanitarian law will primarily dcal
with thc law applicablc in international armcd conflict. Tc convcntional law appli
cablc in nonintcrnational armcd conflict is ol a rudimcntary charactcr and pro
vidcs only a basic lcvcl ol protcction. !n thc lcw cascs whcrc AP !! has applicd,
+¡±

.¡o Grccnwood, Historical Ðcvclopmcnt, .a.
.·c Scc, howcvcr, Articlc .a (a) (a) ol Protocol on Prohibitions or Rcstrictions on thc
Usc ol Mincs, 8oobyTraps and Òthcr Ðcviccs as amcndcd on . May .oo6 (Protocol
!! to thc .o·c Convcntion as amcndcd on . May .oo6) and thc prohibition without
authorisation making usc ol distinctivc cmblcms ol thc UN, AP !, Articlc .·.
.·. Scc common Articlc . ol Gcncva Convcntions !!\.
.·a For an cvaluation ol that protocol, scc Hcikc Spickcr, Twcntyfivc Ycars Altcr thc
Adoption ol Additional Protocol !!: 8rcakthrough or Failurc ol Humanitarian Lcgal
Protcction:, ¡ Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law,.ao (acc.).
.·. Scc notc .··, Hcnckacrts and Louisc Ðoswald8cck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law, \ol. !, !CRC (acc·), Grccnwood, Historical Ðcvclopmcnt a¡
a6 and thc authoritics citcd thcrc.
.·¡ Tc protocol was applicd lor thc first timc in ¡l Salvador during thc .o·cs. Scc
Grccnwood, Historical Ðcvclopmcnt, ¡·. Hc rclcrs also to thc !CRC Annual Rcport
.o (.o·o).
o· General Protection
a morc cxtcnsivc protcction is providcd lor thosc not participating in thc conflict
conccrncd. An intcrcsting dcvclopmcnt in this rcspcct, howcvcr, is thc cxtcnt to
which customary law norms ol thc law ol intcrnational armcd conflict also apply
in situations ol nonintcrnational armcd conflict.
+¡¡
3.3.1 Scope of Application
Armed conflicts
Tc applicability ol intcrnational humanitarian law, both ol an intcrnational and
nonintcrnational charactcr, dcpcnds upon thc cxistcncc ol an armcd conflict, or
cascs ol partial or total occupation. An international armcd conflict is considcrcd
as bcing “all cascs ol dcclarcd war or ... any othcr armcd conflict which may arisc
bctwccn two or morc ol thc High Contracting Partics”.
+¡6
Tc application ol thc
convcntions bctwccn statcs partics docs not dcpcnd upon a lormal dcclaration
ol war, or cvcn thc rccognition ol war, or an armcd conflict. According to thc
Commcntary to thc Gcncva Convcntions (hcrcinaltcr thc Commcntary), thc
convcntions apply in “|a|ny diffcrcncc arising bctwccn two Statcs and lcading to
thc intcrvcntion ol mcmbcrs ol thc armcd lorccs is an armcd conflict within thc
mcaning ol Articlc a, cvcn il onc ol thc Partics dcnics thc cxistcncc ol a statc ol
war. !t makcs no diffcrcncc how long thc conflict lasts, or how much slaughtcr
takcs placc.”
+¡·

!n non-international armcd conflicts common Articlc . to thc lour Gcncva
Convcntions applics, and undcr ccrtain circumstanccs, Additional Protocol
!!. Tc lattcr applics only in cascs “which takc placc in thc tcrritory ol a High
Contracting Party bctwccn its armcd lorccs and dissidcnt armcd lorccs or othcr
organizcd armcd groups which, undcr rcsponsiblc command, cxcrcisc such con
trol ovcr a part ol its tcrritory as to cnablc thcm to carry out sustaincd and con
ccrtcd military opcrations and to implcmcnt this Protocol”.
+¡8
According to thc
samc articlc, thc protocol docs not apply in situations ol “intcrnal disturbanccs
and tcnsions, such as riots, isolatcd and sporadic acts ol violcncc and othcr acts ol
a similar naturc, as not bcing armcd conflicts”.
!n its first casc (thc Tadic Case .oo·) thc !CTY statcd thc nccd to first cxam
inc thc critcria govcrning thc cxistcncc ol an armcd conflict as such. Tc appcl
lant asscrtcd that no armcd conflict cxistcd at thc timc or placc, intcrnational or
.·· Grccnwood, Historical Ðcvclopmcnt, ¡o. ]canMaric.
.·6 Tc Gcncva Convcntions, morcovcr, apply in situations ol partial or total occupa
tion ol a tcrritory and in rclation to a Powcr that is not party to thc Convcntions
il it ‘acccpts and applics thc provisions thcrcol.’ Scc common Articlc a ol Gcncva
Convcntions !!\.
.·· Commcntary on thc Gcncva Convcntions ol .a August .o¡o: Commcntary, Articlc
a GC !\, ac ( ]can S. Pictct ct al cds., .o··).
.·· Articlc . ol AP !!.
o6 Chapter 3
nonintcrnational, that thc allcgcd crimcs wcrc said to havc bccn committcd. Tc
Court addrcsscd both thc tcmporal and gcographic scopc ol application ol intcr
national humanitarian law. Tc Court rulcd:
… an armcd conflict cxists whcncvcr thcrc is a rcsort to armcd lorcc bctwccn
Statcs or protractcd armcd violcncc bctwccn govcrnmcntal authoritics and
organizcd armcd groups or bctwccn such groups within a statc. !ntcrnational
humanitarian law applics lrom thc initiation ol such armcd conflicts and
cxtcnds bcyond thc ccssation ol hostilitics until a gcncral conclusion ol pcacc
is rcachcd, or, in thc casc ol intcrnal conflicts, a pcacclul scttlcmcnt is achicvcd.
Until that momcnt, intcrnational humanitarian law continucs to apply in thc
wholc tcrritory ol thc warring statcs or, in thc casc ol intcrnal conflicts, thc
wholc tcrritory undcr thc control ol a party, whcthcr or not actual combat takcs
placc thcrc.
+¡o

A situation may also arisc in which nonc ol thc statcs rccogniscs thc cxistcncc
ol an armcd conflict. Common Articlc a ol thc lour Gcncva Convcntions only
providcs lor thc casc ol onc ol thc partics to a conflict not rccognising it. !t is
statcd in thc Commcntary that cvcn in thosc cascs it would not appcar as il thc
partics to thc conflict conccrncd could prcvcnt thc convcntions lrom applying.
Tc purposc ol thc convcntion, to protcct individuals, is undcrlincd togcthcr with
thc lact that its provisions arc not primarily lor scrving thc intcrcsts ol statcs.
+6o

Tc purposc ol paragraph a is also to makc thc convcntion apply in situations ol
occupation not prcccdcd by any hostilitics or dcclaration ol war. An occupation
ol tcrritory, as part ol thc ongoing hostilitics would bc rcgulatcd by thc convcn
tions through thcir application to thc conflict in qucstion.
+6+
Tc application ol trcatics to thc rulcs ol warlarc had carlicr bccn bascd upon
rcciprocity, containing an allparticipation clausc. Unlcss all partics to thc con
flict wcrc also partics to thc rclcvant convcntions, thcn nonc ol thc bclligcrcnts
would bc bound.
+6:
Paragraph . ol Articlc a stipulatcs that thc convcntion also
applics in rclation to nonpartics il thc lattcr “acccpts and applics” thc convcn
tion. Tc cumulativc naturc ol thcsc conditions is discusscd in thc Commcntary.
Could a statc party to thc convcntion rclusc to apply thc provisions thcrcin in
cascs whcrc thc nonstatc party applics thc convcntion but has lailcd to dcclarc a
lormal acccptancc ol it: Òwing to thc naturc ol thc convcntion, on thc trcatmcnt
ol civilians, thc condition ol acccptancc must also bc undcrstood as including a
.·o Prosccutor v Tadic, Casc !To¡.AR·a, Appcal on ]urisdiction, a Òctobcr .oo·,
para. ·c.
.6c Commcntary, Articlc a GC !\, a..
.6. !bid.
.6a Grccn, .¡.
o· General Protection
tacit or de facto acccptancc through thc application ol thc convcntion.
+6:
To thc
cxtcnt that customary humanitarian law compriscs largc parts ol convcntional
humanitarian law, thc critcrion ol rcciprocity is lcss important sincc all armcd
conflicts arc subjcct to rulcs ol customary humanitarian law.
+6±
!t is possiblc to disccrn diffcrcnt lcvcls ol protcction dcpcnding upon thc
naturc and charactcr ol a particular conflict. !n cascs ol intcrnal uphcaval, riots
and suchlikc intcrnational humanitarian law docs not apply. Such a situation
could bc particularly troublcsomc, sincc thc statc in qucstion could dcrogatc lrom
its human rights law obligations. !l thc situation turncd out to bc an armcd con
flict, within thc statc, at lcast common Articlc . to thc lour Gcncva Convcntions
would apply. As pointcd out abovc, this articlc only providcs a basic lcvcl ol pro
tcction. !l armcd groups opposing govcrnmcnt lorccs cxcrcisc cffcctivc control
ovcr tcrritory thcn AP !! may apply to thc conflict, thus stipulating highcr stand
ards ol protcction lor thosc not participating in thc conflict. !l thc armcd conflict
in qucstion turns out to bc an intcrnational armcd conflict, thcn standards ol
protcction arc considcrably strcngthcncd.
Largc parts ol intcrnational humanitarian law, howcvcr, arc now rcgardcd
as bcing part ol customary intcrnational law. Tis has, lor cxamplc, bccn con
firmcd by thc !C].
+6¡
Tc law that is lormally applicablc in intcrnational armcd
conflicts might also apply in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts.
+66
Tc !CTY, lor
cxamplc, in thc Tadic Case statcd that basic rulcs ol customary law applicd both
in intcrnational and nonintcrnational armcd conflicts.
+6·
Tc !CRCstudy on
customary intcrnational humanitarian law shows that thc csscntial rulcs ol thc
.6. Commcntary, Articlc a, GC !\, a¡.
.6¡ Rcné Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, .·· (acca).
.6· !n thc Advisory Òpinion ol · ]uly .oo6 on thc Legality of the Treat of Use of Nuclear
Weapons, thc Court hcld, lor cxamplc, that “Tc cxtcnsivc codification ol humanitar
ian law and thc cxtcnt ol thc acccssion to thc rcsultant trcatics, as wcll as thc lact that
thc dcnunciation clauscs that cxistcd in thc codification instrumcnts havc ncvcr bccn
uscd, havc providcd thc intcrnational community with a corpus ol trcaty rulcs thc
grcat majority ol which had alrcady bccomc customary and which rcflcctcd thc most
univcrsally rccognizcd humanitarian principlcs. Tcsc rulcs indicatc thc normal con
duct and bchaviour cxpcctcd ol Statcs.” !C] Rcports .oo6, aa6, para. ·a. Scc also in
this rcspcct, \inccnt Chctail, Tc contribution ol thc !ntcrnational Court ol ]usticc
to intcrnational humanitarian law, ··c IRRC a.·, a¡6 (acc.).
.66 Christophcr Grccnwood, Scopc ol Application ol Humanitarian Law, in Te
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, .o, ¡o (Ðictcr Flcck ct al cds.,
.oo·). 8ring and Korlol, a.¡.
.6· Tc Court analyscd customary rulcs applicablc in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts
(paras. o6.a·) and providcd cxamplcs ol arcas whcrc such rulcs applicd: “protcction
ol civilians lrom hostilitics, in particular lrom indiscriminatc attacks, protcction ol
civilian objccts, in particular cultural propcrty, protcction ol all thosc who do not (or
no longcr) takc activc part in hostilitics, as wcll as prohibition ol mcans ol warlarc
proscribcd in intcrnational armcd conflicts and ban ol ccrtain mcthods ol conduct
ing hostilitics”, Casc No. !To¡.AR·a, Òctobcr a, .oo·, para. .a·.
o· Chapter 3
two additional protocols havc bccomc part ol customary law. A grcat numbcr ol
thosc rulcs arc also applicablc as customary law in nonintcrnational armcd con
flicts.
+68
¡xamplcs ol rulcs applicablc in all typcs ol armcd conflict, idcntificd in
thc !CRCstudy on customary intcrnational humanitarian law, arc thc principlc
ol distinction (bctwccn civilians and combatants and bctwccn civilian objccts and
military objcctivcs), thc prohibition ol indiscriminatc attacks, thc principlc ol
proportionality and thc duty to takc prccautions in attack.
+6o
Òthcr cxamplcs ol
rulcs binding upon all typcs ol conflict arc thc duty to rcspcct and protcct mcdi
cal and rcligious pcrsonncl and objccts, humanitarian rclicl pcrsonncl and objccts
and prohibition to dirccting an attack against pcrsonncl and objccts involvcd in
a pcacckccping mission.
+·o
Peace operation forces engaged in armed conflict and applicable law
Pcrsonncl dcploycd in pcacc opcrations arc cntitlcd to thc protcction affordcd
civilians undcr intcrnational humanitarian law so long as thcy do not cngagc as
combatants in an armcd conflict. Vhat constitutcs an armcd conflict has prcvi
ously bccn dcscribcd. Clcarly, not any usc ol lorcc by military pcrsonncl would
turn thcm into combatants. Forccs involvcd in thc classical pcacckccping opcra
tion arc cntitlcd to usc lorcc in sclldclcncc, but that would not mcan per se that by
doing so thcy would bccomc combatants. Scycrstcd points to thc lact that pcacc
kccping lorccs may bc “involvcd in gcnuinc hostilitics with anothcr organizcd
lorcc, cvcn il this was not cxpcctcd whcn thc Forcc was sct up and whcn national
contingcnts lor it wcrc prcparcd”.
+·+
¡vcn in opcrations whcrc lorccs arc cntitlcd
to usc lorcc to achicvc thcir mandatcd objcctivc, thc lorcc uscd docs not ncccssar
ily mcan that thosc involvcd bccomc combatants cngagcd in an armcd conflict.
Hampson applics an analogy takcn lrom domcstic law to illustratc thc dis
tinctions bctwccn thc various uscs ol lorcc applicd in sclldclcncc, or uscd in
ordcr to attain ccrtain objcctivcs and situations whcrc such lorccs arc cngagcd as
combatants to an armcd conflict. Tc policc arc authoriscd to usc lorcc to protcct
thc intcrcsts ol pcacclul citizcns, lor cxamplc, by quclling a riot. Tis docs not
mcan that thcy arc biascd or that thcy act as soldicrs in an armcd conflict in rcla
tion to thc riotcrs.
+·:
Tc analogy ol thc right ol thc policc in domcstic laws to usc
.6· ]canMaric Hcnckacrts and Louisc Ðoswald8cck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law, \ol. !, !CRC (acc·). Òl thc .6. rulcs idcntificd in thc study,
approximatcly .·· arc applicablc in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts. Scc also ]can
Maric Hcnckacrts, Study on customary intcrnational law: A contribution to thc
undcrstanding and rcspcct lor thc rulc ol law in armcd conflict, IRRC, \ol. ··, No.
··· (acc·).
.6o Hcnckacrts and Ðoswald8cck, chaptcrs .6.
.·c !bid., chaptcrs ·o.
.·. Finn Scycrstcd, United Nations Forces. In the Law of Peace and War, a.c (.o66).
.·a Françoisc Hampson, Statcs’ military opcrations authorizcd by thc Unitcd Nations
and intcrnational humanitarian law, in Te United Nations and International
oo General Protection
lorcc, is rathcr a good illustration ol thc position ol military pcrsonncl cngagcd
in pcacc opcrations.
+·:
!n opcrations such as thc UNauthoriscd cnlorccmcnt opcration against
!raq in .ooc, thc UN mandatcd lorccs wcrc clcarly cngagcd as combatants in an
armcd conflict with !raqi lorccs.
+·±
A much morc difficult situation ariscs whcn
pcacc opcration lorccs comc undcr attack in othcr typcs ol situation. At what
point do thcy bccomc combatants: !s it possiblc to rcly on thc critcria lrom thc
Tadic Case, rclcrrcd to bclorc, that “an armcd conflict cxists whcncvcr thcrc is
a rcsort to armcd lorcc bctwccn Statcs or protractcd armcd violcncc bctwccn
govcrnmcntal authoritics and organizcd armcd groups or bctwccn such groups
within a statc”: Tc challcngcs surrounding this lundamcntal issuc arc ol grcat
importancc lor thc lcgal status ol thc pcrsonncl and rclatc to thc application ol
thc Salcty Convcntion.
Tc dcploymcnt ol a military lorcc in thc contcxt ol an intcrnational or non
intcrnational armcd conflict clcarly poscs spccific problcms. Òn thc onc hand,
wc havc thc rcquircmcnt ol intcrnational humanitarian law that all partics to an
armcd conflict arc cntitlcd to cqual trcatmcnt – a horizontal rclationship bctwccn
thc partics to an armcd conflict – and on thc othcr hand, wc havc situations
whcrc pcacc opcration lorccs act upon a mandatc ol thc Sccurity Council that
cntails a vcrtical rclationship with othcr subjccts ol intcrnational law.
+·¡
Tis tcn
sion bctwccn thc rcquircmcnts ol intcrnational humanitarian law and thc “policc”
lunctions ol UNmandatcd military lorccs colours thc dcbatc on thc lcgal status
ol such pcrsonncl whcn thcy rcsort to lorcc. Tc issuc ol thc applicability ol intcr
national humanitarian law to military lorccs in pcacc opcrations has bccn mainly
conccrncd with whcthcr or not thc wholc sct ol that law applics. Lcss cmphasis
has bccn placcd upon thosc circumstanccs whcrc such lorccs can bc rcgardcd as
bcing combatants to an armcd conflict. !t is, howcvcr, possiblc to disccrn diffcr
cnt positions on this issuc in thc litcraturc. Glick advocatcs strongly thc appli
cability ol thc intcrnational humanitarian law to UN lorccs whcn cngagcd in an
armcd conflict.
+·6
Hc appcars to support a low thrcshold lor thc involvcmcnt ol
Humanitarian Law, .·., .·· (Luigi Condorclli ct al cds., .oo6).
.·. Òn this position scc also Gcrt]an F. van Hcgclsom, Tc Law ol Armcd Conflict
and UN PcaccKccping and Pcacc¡nlorcing Òpcrations, 6 Hague Yearbook of
International Law, ¡·, ·· (.oo.). According to Articlc a(a) ol thc ¡uropcan Convcntion
on Human Rights, dcadly usc ol lorcc docs not contravcnc that convcntion il it was
absolutcly ncccssary lor onc ol thc lollowing purposcs: “(a) in dclcncc ol any pcrson
lrom unlawlul violcncc, (b) in ordcr to cffcct a lawlul arrcst or to prcvcnt thc cscapc
ol a pcrson lawlully dctaincd, (c) in action lawlully takcn lor thc purposc ol quclling
a riot or insurrcction.” ¡uropcan Convcntion ol Human Rights, Articlc a
.·¡ Christcr Ahlstrom, Gulfkriget och den humanitära folkrätten, (.ooa).
.·· Richard Ð. Glick, Lip Scrvicc to thc Laws ol Var: Humanitarian Law and Unitcd
Nations Armcd Forccs, .· Michigan Journal of International Law, ·., ·o (.oo·).
.·6 !bid., ··.
.cc Chapter 3
UN lorccs in an armcd conflict, whcrcby such lorccs will losc thcir protcction
as civilians. For cxamplc, hc criticiscs thc Salcty Convcntion lor wrongly crimi
nalising acts that would bc covcrcd by thc combatant privilcgc ol lorccs attack
ing UN pcrsonncl.
+··
Hc also finds it worrying that thc UN intcrprctation ol thc
right ol sclldclcncc ol its pcacc opcration lorccs includcs thc right to dclcnd thc
mandatc. Such “dclcnsivc” usc ol lorcc would thus not bc subjcct to intcrnational
humanitarian law. According to Glick, this could undcrminc rcspcct lor intcrna
tional humanitarian law.
+·8

Shraga rclcrs to a condition that intcrnational humanitarian law applics “to
Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl whcn, in thc conduct ol Chaptcr \!! mandatc opcra
tions, thcy arc actively cngagcd in combat mission”.
+·o
Howcvcr, shc finds that
intcrnational humanitarian law also applics in pcacckccping missions “whcrc
UN pcrsonncl in sclldclcncc rcsort to thc usc ol lorcc”.
+8o
Tc lact that UN
lorccs could, and pcrhaps would, cngagc in armcd conflict whcn acting in scll
dclcncc sccms to bc supportcd by Grccn.
+8+
Kolb, on thc othcr hand, asscrts that
sclldclcncc against sporadic attacks docs not givc risc to a situation whcrc it
could bc construcd that such lorccs wcrc involvcd in an armcd conflict. Howcvcr,
“il thc attacks dcgcncratc into a gcncral pattcrn and thc lorccs start conduct
ing military opcrations on thcir own so as to rcspond to thc acts ol war ol thc
othcr sidc, wc would find oursclvcs in thc contcxt ol an armcd conflict, and thc
mcrc lact ol attacking a mcmbcr ol thc lorccs would no longcr bc a crimc in
itscll ”.
+8:
Grccnwood contcnds that a highcr lcvcl ol lorcc is tolcratcd in ccr
tain pcacc opcrations, so that !HL would not apply. Tis vicw is bascd upon thc
background cxpcricnccs ol UNPRÒFÒR and UNÒSÒM. Tosc opcrations had
clcarly rcachcd a lcvcl whcrc in othcr cascs it would bc rcgardcd as sufficicnt to
constitutc an armcd conflict.
+8:
.·· !bid., o..
.·· !bid., ··.
.·o Ðaphna Shraga, Tc Applicability ol !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law to Unitcd
Nations Òpcrations, in Blue Helmets: Policemen or Combatants?, .·, .c (Claudc
¡manuclli, cd., .oo·) (cmphasis addcd). Tc critcrion ol bcing “activcly” cngagcd in
an armcd conflict appcars to bc supportcd by Tittcmorc. Scc 8rian Ð. Tittcmorc,
8clligcrcnts in 8luc Hclmcts: Applying !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law to Unitcd
Nations Pcacc Òpcrations, .. Stanford Journal of International Law, 6., .co (.oo·).
.·c Shraga, .c.
.·. Grccn, .¡·.
.·a Robcrt Kolb, Applicability ol intcrnational humanitarian law to lorccs undcr thc
command ol an intcrnational organization, 8ackground Ðocumcnt ., Rcport.
¡xpcrt Mccting on Multinational Pcacc Òpcrations. Applicability ol !ntcrnational
Humanitarian Law and !ntcrnational Human Rights Law to UN Mandatcd Forccs,
6., 6·, Gcncva ...a Ðcccmbcr (acc.).
.·. Christophcr Grccnwood, !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law and Unitcd Nations
Military Òpcrations, . Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, ., a¡ (.oo·).
.c. General Protection
Grcat difficultics arc involvcd in dcfining thc circumstanccs whcrc military
pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations arc to bc rcgardcd as combatants, and thcrcby losc
thcir protcctcd status as civilians undcr intcrnational humanitarian law. Tc idca
that thcrc is a highcr thrcshold lor such lorccs to bc rcgardcd as combatants, than
that normally applicd in rclation to othcr military lorccs, sccms to bc supportcd
by writcrs who rclcr to a critcrion ol bcing “activcly” cngagcd in an armcd conflict.
No such critcrion cxists undcr thc Gcncva Convcntions. Civilians losc thcir pro
tcctcd status il “thcy takc a dircct part in hostilitics”
+8±
but that docs not mcan that
thcy ncccssarily or automatically bccomc combatants. Tc “SccrctaryGcncral’s
8ullctin on Òbscrvancc by Unitcd Nations lorccs ol intcrnational humanitarian
law” issucd on 6 August .ooo also includcs this condition.
+8¡
Tc principlcs and
rulcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law stipulatcd thcrcin apply to:
Unitcd Nations lorccs whcn in situations ol armcd conflict thcy arc activcly
cngagcd thcrcin as combatants, to thc cxtcnt and lor thc duration ol thcir
cngagcmcnt. Tcy arc accordingly applicablc in cnlorccmcnt actions, or in
pcacckccping opcrations whcn thc usc ol lorcc is pcrmittcd in sclldclcncc.
+86

Tc sccond scntcncc appcars to contain thc mcaning that thc 8ullctin applics
whcn UN lorccs arc activcly cngagcd in an armcd conflict notwithstanding thc
mandate ol thc opcration.
+8·

!n a rcccnt rcport ol thc !CRC lrom an cxpcrt mccting on thc applicability
ol intcrnational humanitarian law to multinational pcacc opcrations most cxpcrts
supportcd thc idca that thc application ol intcrnational humanitarian law to such
lorccs csscntially dcpcndcd on thc lacts on thc ground. Òthcrs bclicvcd that such
.·¡ Articlc ·.(.) AP !.
.·· SccrctaryGcncral’s 8ullctin, Òbscrvancc by Unitcd Nations lorccs ol intcrnational
humanitarian law, 6 August .ooo, UN Ðoc. ST/SG8/.ooo/... 8cing part ol thc
UN’s intcrnal law, thc 8ullctin applics to thc mcmbcrs ol thc UN staff. Scction ¡ ol
thc 8ullctin stipulatcs, howcvcr, that troopcontributing nations rctain thc cxclu
sivc jurisdiction ol violations ol intcrnational humanitarian law and violations ol
thc 8ullctin’s provisions will, thcrclorc, not bc handlcd in thc usual administrativc
proccsscs availablc lor UN staff. Scc Martcn Zwancnburg, Tc SccrctaryGcncral’s
8ullctin on Òbscrvancc by Unitcd Nations lorccs ol intcrnational humanitarian
law:: A Pyrrhic \ictory:, Ra·c .o Revue de Droit Militaire de la Guerre, ¡, · (nos. .¡:
accc).
.·6 SccrctaryGcncral’s 8ullctin, prcamblc and Scction ....
.·· Tc ambiguous wording could also bc intcrprctcd to mcan that thc 8ullctin also
applics in cvcry pcacckccping and cnlorccmcnt opcration irrcspcctivc ol thc rcquirc
mcnt in thc first scntcncc. Tat would, howcvcr, lcad to strangc conscqucnccs lor thc
status ol UN lorccs il thcy wcrc to apply intcrnational humanitarian law in tradi
tional pcacckccping opcrations. Scc Michacl 8othc and Tomas Ðorschcl, Tc UN
Pcacckccping ¡xpcricncc, in Te Handbook on Te Law of Visiting Forces, ¡··, ·c.
(Ðictcr Flcck ct al cds., acc.).
.ca Chapter 3
lorccs would bccomc combatants only in situations whcrc thcy took sidcs against
a particular party.
+88
Grccnwood concludcs that thc dcgrcc ol ambiguity sur
rounding this qucstion is rcgrcttablc “and cannot bc rcconcilcd with principlc”.
+8o

Hampson finds that thc qucstion rcmains unclcar.
+oo
!t would sccm that thc dccision on whcn a pcacc opcration lorcc crosscs
thc point at which its mcmbcrs bccomc combatants to an armcd conflict must
bc judgcd against an objcctivc critcrion (lacts on thc ground) and to somc cxtcnt,
a subjcctivc critcrion. !l such lorccs lall undcr attack thcy should bc allowcd to
rcspond with a limitcd usc ol lorcc in kccping with thcir protcctcd status and to
cnablc thcm to rctain it. !l such usc ol lorcc could bc rcgardcd as bcing lcgiti
matc undcr human rights law standards, such as undcr Articlc a ol thc ¡CHR,
thcy would not bccomc combatants. !l thc purposc ol thc lorcc uscd wcnt bcyond
sclldclcncc, or thc conditions stipulatcd by human rights law, thc status ol thc
military pcrsonncl as civilians undcr intcrnational humanitarian law would bc
compromiscd. !n that rcspcct it should bc notcd that thc UN intcrprctation ol
thcir lorccs’ right ol sclldclcncc is cxtcnsivc. !t has rcpcatcdly bccn statcd that
sclldclcncc includcs “rcsistancc to attcmpts by lorcclul mcans to prcvcnt it lrom
discharging its dutics undcr thc mandatc ol thc Sccurity Council”.
+o+
Tc lact
that modcrn opcrations oltcn involvc an cxplicit mandatc to protcct civilian pop
ulation lurthcr blurs thc distinction bctwccn sclldclcncc and actions takcn in
an armcd conflict.
+o:
!n this rcspcct it should also bc rccallcd that thc Sccrctary
Gcncral has notcd that
Tc opcrational cnvironmcnts ol many pcacckccping opcrations today arc par
ticularly thrcatcning. For a pcacckccping mission to succccd in thosc cnviron
mcnts, thcrc must bc a sharcd undcrstanding ol thc nccd lor a robust lorcc,
.·· Rcport lrom thc ¡xpcrt Mccting on Multinational Pcacc Òpcrations. Applicability
ol !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law and !ntcrnational Human Rights Law to UN
Mandatcd Forccs, ¡xccutivc Summary .a, Gcncva ...a Ðcccmbcr (acc.).
.·o Grccnwood, !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law, a6.
.oc Hampson, .··.
.o. Scc c.g. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc implcmcntation ol Sccurity Council
rcsolution .¡c (.o·.), para. ¡ (d), UN Ðoc. S/..c·a/Rcv. . (.o·.) and Rcport ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral on thc implcmcntation ol Sccurity Council rcsolution ¡a· (.o··),
para. ¡ (d), UN Ðoc. S/.a6.. (.o··).
.oa Scc, lor cxamplc, SC Rcs. .ao., UN SCÒR, ¡.c¡
th
mtg., para. ·, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.ao.
(accc), SC Rcs. .·¡·, UN SCÒR, ¡o··
th
mtg., para. · UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·¡· (acc¡),
SC Rcs. .·a·, UN SCÒR, ¡o.·
th
mtg., para. 6(i) UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·a· (acc¡). Tc
Sccurity Council has dcclarcd “its intcntion to cnsurc, whcrc appropriatc and lcasi
blc, that pcacckccping missions arc givcn suitablc mandatcs and adcquatc rcsourccs
to protcct civilians undcr immincnt thrcat ol physical dangcr”. SC Rcs. .ao6, UN
SCÒR, ¡..c
th
mtg., para. ·, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.ao6 (accc).
.c. General Protection
dcploycd and configurcd not only to bc ablc to usc lorcc, but also to kccp thc
initiativc and, il challcngcd, to dclcnd itscll and its mandatc.
+o:
¡vcn il lorcc is uscd lor thc purposc ol sclldclcncc, such lorcc must also bc
judgcd against thc objcctivc critcrion ol thc lcvcl ol lorcc uscd (intcnsity ol thc
conflict) and its duration. Tc argumcnt ol sclldclcncc cannot bc rclicd upon
indcfinitcly in ordcr to cscapc thc application ol intcrnational humanitarian law.
Anothcr aspcct ol importancc is thc lact that in nonintcrnational armcd
conflicts, rcbcl groups may still bc punishcd lor attacking govcrnmcnt soldicrs
in accordancc with national criminal law. Tis is so cvcn il thcir actions wcrc in
kccping with intcrnational humanitarian law applicablc in such conflicts. Rulcs
applicablc in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts arc mainly dircctcd to thc protcc
tion ol thosc not participating in thc conflict. Tc conccpts ol “combatant” and
“prisoncr ol war” arc not lound in convcntional !HL applicablc in such conflicts.
Nor docs it sccm to havc cvolvcd any customary rulc on combatant status in non
intcrnational armcd conflicts.
+o±
Tcsc aspccts arc ol particular importancc in sit
uations whcrc pcacc opcration lorccs bccomc involvcd in fighting with armcd
groups within thc host statc, and havc dircct implications lor thc applicability ol
thc Salcty Convcntion. Tcsc issucs will bc lurthcr dcalt with in Chaptcr ·.....
3.3.2 Standards of Protection
Tcrc arc lcw provisions in intcrnational humanitarian law dcaling cxplicitly with
thc protcction ol pcrsonncl dcploycd in pcacc opcrations. !t is lorbiddcn lor par
tics to a conflict to usc thc cmblcm ol thc UN, il not authoriscd to do so by thc
UN. !t is, morcovcr, considcrcd a war crimc (pcrfidy) to kill, injurc or capturc an
advcrsary by lcigning thc protcctcd status ol thc UN by using its signs, cmblcms
or unilorms. Tc Mincs Protocol to thc CCV (.o·c) rcquircs partics to a conflict
to takc ncccssary mcasurcs to protcct pcacc opcration lorccs “lrom thc cffccts ol
mincs, boobytraps and othcr dcviccs undcr its control”.
+o¡
Tc amcndcd Protocol
(.oo6) also applics to nonintcrnational armcd conflicts.
+o6
Apart lrom thcsc spc
cially dcsigncd rulcs, pcrsonncl involvcd in pcacc opcrations who arc prcscnt in
an arca ol armcd conflict havc to rcly on gcncral rulcs ol protcction undcr !HL,
.o. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, !mplcmcntation ol thc rccommcndations ol
thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping Òpcrations, para. ¡, UN Ðoc A/··/6o¡
(acc¡).
.o¡ Hcnckacrts and Ðoswald8cck, Rulcs .· with commcntarics.
.o· Articlc · ol thc Protocol on Prohibitions or Rcstrictions on thc Usc ol Mincs, 8ooby
Traps and Òthcr Ðcviccs (.o·c Protocol !!) .c Òctobcr .o·c .o !LM .·a. (.o·c).
.o6 Articlcs . and .a ol thc Amcndcd Protocol on Prohibitions or Rcstrictions on thc
Usc ol Mincs, 8oobyTraps and Òthcr Ðcviccs (.oo6 Amcndcd Protocol !!) . May
.oo6, .· !LM .ac6 (.oo6).
.c¡ Chapter 3
such as thosc on protcction against attacks and cffccts ol hostilitics and thosc on
protcction against arbitrary trcatmcnt in thc hands ol a party to thc conflict.
Protection against attacks and effects of hostilities
Tc catcgorisation ol combatants and civilians scrvcs thc purposc ol protccting
civilians lrom bcing dircct targcts. !t docs not mcan, howcvcr, that civilians cnjoy
a complctc protcction lrom attacks and othcr cffccts ol hostilitics. Lcgitimatc
military targcts may comc undcr attack by a party to thc conflict, and thc prcs
cncc ol civilians closc to that targct docs not ncccssarily makc thc attack illcgal. !t
is, in lact, thc rcsponsibility ol all partics to a conflict to protcct civilians by scpa
rating military targcts lrom civilians and civilian objccts. Ccrtain principlcs havc
dcvclopcd in intcrnational humanitarian law rcstricting thc mcans and mcthods
ol warlarc by thc partics to a conflict.
Somc basic principlcs arc ol thc utmost importancc lor thc protcction ol
civilians during armcd conflict. Vhat is oltcn rclcrrcd to, as thc most lundamcn
tal rulc ol intcrnational humanitarian law, is thc duty ol thc partics to a conflict
to ncvcr dclibcratcly attack civilians.
+o·
Tis has bccn clcarly statcd in AP ! whcrc
Articlc ¡· (basic rulc) rcads:
!n ordcr to cnsurc rcspcct lor and protcction ol thc civilian population and
civilian objccts, thc Partics to thc conflict shall at all timcs distinguish bctwccn
thc civilian population and combatants and bctwccn civilian objccts and mili
tary objcctivcs and accordingly shall dircct thcir opcrations only against mili
tary objcctivcs.
+o8
Tc protcction affordcd civilians undcr intcrnational humanitarian law is condi
tional upon thc lact that thcy do not takc a dircct part in hostilitics.
+oo
Any dircct
attack on civilians is also considcrcd to bc a war crimc undcr thc statutc ol thc
!CC.
:oo
!ncidcntal loss ol civilian lilc and propcrty may bc thc lcgitimatc consc
qucncc ol a military opcration. !n cffcct it mcans that thc prcscncc ol civilians
ncar a military objcctivc docs not dcprivc it ol its status as a lcgitimatc targct.
Acts that causc cxccssivc loss ol civilian lilc and propcrty, howcvcr, arc prohibitcd
.o· Commcntary on thc Additional Protocols ol · ]unc .o·· to thc Gcncva Convcntions
ol .a August .o¡o: Commcntary, Articlc ¡· AP !, ·o· (Yvcs Sandoz, Christophc
Swinarski and 8runo Zimmcrman cds., .o··), statcs that “!t is thc loundation on
which thc codification ol thc laws and customs ol war rcsts: thc civilian popula
tion and civilian objccts must bc rcspcctcd and protcctcd in armcd conflict, and lor
this purposc thcy must bc distinguishcd lrom combatants and military objcctivcs”.
Scc also Grccn, .a¡, and Yoram Ðinstcin, Te Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of
International Armed Conflict, ..· (acc¡).
.o· Articlc ¡· ol AP !.
.oo Articlc ·.(.) ol AP !.
acc Articlc ·(a)(b)(i) and (c)(i) ol thc !CC Statutc.
.c· General Protection
undcr thc principlc ol proportionality. According to AP !, a prohibitcd attack is
onc “which may bc cxpcctcd to causc incidcntal loss ol civilian lilc, injury to civil
ians, damagc to civilian objccts, or a combination thcrcol, which would bc cxccs
sivc in rclation to thc concrctc and dircct military advantagc anticipatcd.”
:o+
Tc
principlcs ol distinction and proportionality arc rcgardcd as bcing part ol intcr
national customary law.
:o:

Pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations run thc risk ol bcing killcd in thc
coursc lcgitimatc military opcrations il thcy find thcmsclvcs in thc vicinity ol
military targcts. Partics to a conflict, howcvcr, must takc all lcasiblc prccautions in
planning an attack, cvcn cancclling or postponing it il is suspcctcd that it would
causc a disproportionatc loss ol civilian lilc.
:o:
An obligation cxists on thc part ol
thosc planning and dcciding on attacks to show and cxcrcisc conccrn, but it pri
marily involvcs thosc who actually carry thcm out.
:o±
Protection against arbitrary treatment in the hands of a party to the
conflict
Vhilc all civilians thcorctically cnjoy protcction lrom thc cffccts ol war, somc
catcgorics ol thc civilian population arc also, undcr intcrnational humanitarian
law, protcctcd against arbitrary trcatmcnt whcn in thc hands ol a party to thc
conflict. Tcsc arc primarily thosc who livc or arc othcrwisc prcscnt in thc tcr
ritory ol a statc that bccomcs a party to an armcd conflict with thcir own statc
(cncmy alicns) and civilians ol a statc subjcct to military occupation.
:o¡
!n timcs
ol war, civilians who arc in thc hands ol thc cncmy arc considcrcd to bc particu
larly vulncrablc. Such cncmy civilians arc thcrclorc classificd as protcctcd pcrsons
undcr Gcncva Convcntion !\. According to its Articlc ¡ protcctcd pcrsons arc
thosc
who, at a givcn momcnt and in any manncr whatsocvcr, find thcmsclvcs, in casc
ol a conflict or occupation, in thc hands ol a Party to thc conflict or Òccupying
Powcr ol which thcy arc not nationals.
Nationals ol a Statc which is not bound by thc Convcntion arc not protcctcd
by it. Nationals ol a ncutral Statc who find thcmsclvcs in thc tcrritory ol a bcl
ligcrcnt Statc, and nationals ol a cobclligcrcnt Statc, shall not bc rcgardcd as
ac. A similar provision is lound in Articlc ·· (a) (a) (.) AP ! rcgarding prccautions in
attack.
aca Christophcr Grccnwood, A Critiquc ol thc Additional Protocols to thc Gcncva
Convcntions ol .o¡o, in Te Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International
Humanitarian Law, ., .c (Hclcn Ðurham and Timothy L. H. McCormack cds., .ooo)
Scc !C], Lcgality ol thc Trcat ol Usc ol Nuclcar Vcapons (Advisory Òpinion), .oo6
!C] Rcp aa6, para. ··, and Ðinstcin, .ac.
ac. Articlc ··(a) ol AP !.
ac¡ Commcntary, Articlc ·· AP !, 6·6.
ac· Gcoffrcy 8cst, War and Law Since 1945, ..· (.oo¡).
.c6 Chapter 3
protcctcd pcrsons whilc thc Statc ol which thcy arc nationals has normal dip
lomatic rcprcscntation in thc Statc in whosc hands thcy arc.
:o6
Tc first paragraph ol Articlc ¡ addrcsscs thc topic ol protcction ol nonnationals
in thc hands ol a party to thc conflict or that ol an occupying powcr. Nationals ol
a ncutral statc, prcscnt in thc tcrritory ol a bclligcrcnt, arc not rcgardcd as bcing
protcctcd pcrsons in cascs whcrc thcir statc ol nationality maintains normal dip
lomatic rcprcscntation in thc bclligcrcnt statc. Nationals ol a ncutral statc in thc
hands ol an occupying powcr, howcvcr, arc rcgardcd as bcing protcctcd pcrsons,
irrcspcctivc ol any diplomatic rcprcscntation. Tc rationalc sccms to bc that cvcn
il diplomatic rcprcscntativcs rcmain in occupicd tcrritory, thcy arc not accrcditcd
to thc occupying powcr.
:o·
Nationals ol cobclligcrcnt statcs arc not rcgardcd as
bcing protcctcd pcrsons il such statcs havc normal diplomatic rcprcscntation in
thc tcrritory ol cithcr bclligcrcnt statcs or occupicd statcs. !t was assumcd that
nationals ol cobclligcrcnt statcs would not bc in nccd ol thc protcction undcr
thc convcntion.
:o8

Tc purposc ol cxcluding thc abovcmcntioncd nationals lrom thc catcgory
ol protcctcd pcrsons was that thcy could rcly on diplomatic protcction ol thcir
statc ol nationality. Pcrsons arc cithcr protcctcd pcrsons undcr thc convcntion
or can bcncfit lrom thc diplomatic protcction ol thcir statc ol nationality. Tc
dcpcndcncc on nationality lor dctcrmining whcthcr or not a pcrson has pro
tcctcd status has, howcvcr, provcd to bc an inadcquatc tcst in conflicts triggcrcd
by thc disintcgration ol a statc.
:oo
!n thc Tadic Case,
:+o
thc !CTY appcals cham
bcr hcld that thc rcquircmcnt ol nationality was in .o¡o, whcn thc lour Gcncva
Convcntions wcrc adoptcd, alrcady rcgardcd as bcing ol lcss importancc than
thc cxistcncc ol diplomatic protcction. !l thcrc was no true diplomatic protcction
availablc, lor cxamplc, to rclugccs, dcspitc a lormal link ol nationality, thcy would
bc rcgardcd as bcing protcctcd pcrsons undcr !HL.
:++
According to thc Court,
ac6 Articlc ¡ ol GC !\.
ac· !n thc Commcntary on this articlc it is statcd: “Tis sccms to bc a lcgitimatc distinc
tion. !n thc tcrritory ol thc bclligcrcnt Statcs thc position ol ncutrals is still govcrncd
by any trcatics conccrning thc lcgal status ol alicns and thcir diplomatic rcprc
scntativcs can takc stcps to protcct thcm. !n occupicd tcrritory, on thc othcr hand,
thc diplomatic rcprcscntativcs ol ncutral Statcs, cvcn assuming that thcy rcmain
thcrc, arc not accrcditcd to thc Òccupying Powcr but only to thc occupicd Powcr.”
Commcntary, Articlc ¡ GC !\, ¡o.
ac· !bid.
aco Tcodor Mcron, Tc Humanization ol Humanitarian Law, o¡ AJIL, a.o, a··a6c
(accc).
a.c Prosccutor v Tadic, !To¡.A, ]uly .· .ooo.
a.. !bid., para. .6·. Tc Court rclcrrcd to thc prcparatory works ol Articlc ¡¡ ol GC
!\ and notcd that rclugccs wcrc mcntioncd as pcrsons having thc nationality ol an
occupying powcr but who could not rcly on diplomatic protcction ol thcir statc ol
.c· General Protection
nationals ol a ncutral statc or a cobclligcrcnt statc “arc not ‘protcctcd pcrsons’ as
long as thcy bcncfit lrom thc normal diplomatic protcction ol thcir Statc, whcn
thcy losc it or in any cvcnt do not cnjoy it, thc Convcntion automatically grants
thcm thc status ol ‘protcctcd pcrsons’”.
:+:
Tc Court obscrvcd that in modcrn
conflicts ncw statcs may bc crcatcd during thc conflict itscll. Allcgiancc to thc
ncw statc is not bascd upon nationality but rathcr on cthnicity. A bcttcr critcrion
than nationality would thcrclorc, according to thc Court, bc whcthcr pcrsons
wcrc in thc hands ol an advcrsc party to thc conflict.
:+:
All ol that will bc ol lim
itcd cffcct lor pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations not acting as a party to thc conflict. !t
shows, howcvcr, a disposition on thc part ol thc !CTY to apply !HL in a progrcs
sivc manncr. !t is disposcd to cxtcnd thc catcgory ol protcctcd pcrsons in cascs ol
doubt and to intcrprct thc law in thc contcxt ol contcmporary armcd conflicts.
Tc cxprcssion “in thc hands ol ” should bc intcrprctcd in a broadcr way than
in a physical scnsc. !t rclcrs to thc prcscncc ol a pcrson within tcrritory undcr
thc control ol a bclligcrcnt party or occupying powcr.
:+±
Tc !CTY rcinlorccd
this intcrprctation by stating that thc cxprcssion “in thc hands ol ” was not to
bc limitcd to situations whcrc pcrsons wcrc physically in thc hands ol a party or
occupying powcr. Tc tribunal hcld that “thosc pcrsons who lound thcmsclvcs in
tcrritory cffcctivcly occupicd by a party to thc conflict can bc considcrcd to bc in
thc hands ol that party”.
:+¡
nationality. Tis was illustratcd by thc Court by thc cxamplc ol Gcrman ]cws who
flcd to Francc bclorc .o¡c and thcrcaltcr lound thcmsclvcs in thc hands ol Gcrman
occupying lorccs.) !bid., para. .6¡.
a.a !bid., para. .6·.
a.. !bid., para. .66. Scc also thc Celebici Case, Prosccutor v Ðclalic ct al., !To6a.T, .6
Novcmbcr .oo·, para. a6·, whcrc thc Court statcs that thc victims “wcrc arrcstcd and
dctaincd mainly on thc basis ol thcir Scrb idcntity. As such, and insolar as thcy wcrc
not protcctcd by any ol thc othcr Gcncva Convcntions, thcy must bc considcrcd to
havc bccn ‘protcctcd pcrsons’ within thc mcaning ol thc Fourth Gcncva Convcntion,
as thcy wcrc clcarly rcgardcd by thc 8osnian authoritics as bclonging to thc oppos
ing party in an armcd conflict and as posing a thrcat to thc 8osnian Statc.” Tc Trial
Chambcr also notcd on thc rcquircmcnt ol nationality in gcncral in conflicts charac
tcriscd by thc disintcgration ol thc statc: “Tc provisions ol domcstic lcgislation on
citizcnship in a situation ol violcnt Statc succcssion cannot bc dctcrminativc ol thc
protcctcd status ol pcrsons caught up in conflicts which cnsuc lrom such cvcnts. Tc
Commcntary to thc Fourth Gcncva Convcntion chargcs us not to lorgct that ‘thc
Convcntions havc bccn drawn up first and lorcmost to protcct individuals, and not
to scrvc Statc intcrcsts’ and thus it is thc vicw ol this Trial Chambcr that thcir pro
tcctions should bc applicd to as broad a catcgory ol pcrsons as possiblc.” !bid., para.
a6. (lootnotcs omittcd).
a.¡ According to thc Commcntary it “nccd not ncccssarily bc undcrstood in thc physical
scnsc, it simply mcans that thc pcrson is in tcrritory which is undcr thc control ol thc
Powcr in qucstion. Commcntary, Articlc ¡ GC !\, ¡·.
a.· Prosccutor v Tadic, !To¡.T, · May .oo·, para. ··o.
.c· Chapter 3
Arc pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations “protcctcd pcrsons” undcr intcrnational
humanitarian law: Tc guiding principlc lor protcctcd pcrson status is that it
conccrns civilians in thc hands ol thc cncmy. Solcly upon this prcmisc, pcrsonncl
in pcacc opcrations would hardly qualily as protcctcd pcrsons. !t could naturally
bc pcrsons involvcd in thc pcacc opcration who in lact rctaincd thc nationality ol
thc advcrsc party to thc particular conflict. !t is possiblc that such pcrsons could
bc rcgardcd as bcing protcctcd pcrsons il thcy wcrc mistrcatcd by thc bclligcrcnt
statc on thc basis ol thcir nationality. Pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations arc, how
cvcr, first and lorcmost dcploycd as pcrsonncl rcprcscnting thcir mission and thc
organisation, or statc, cxcrcising command and control ovcr thc opcration, and
not as nationals ol thcir homc statcs. As such, thcy would not naturally qualily as
protcctcd pcrsons within thc mcaning ol Articlc ¡ ol GC !\.
Pcrsonncl participating in a pcacc opcration may possibly bc rcgardcd as
protcctcd pcrsons il thc organisation, or statc, commanding thc opcration in
qucstion did not havc normal diplomatic rclations with thc statc in qucstion. As
thc nationality rcquircmcnt ol a protcctcd pcrson has bccn givcn a widc intcrprc
tation, such analogy should not bc rulcd out.
:+6
!t should also bc pointcd out that
thc prosccutor cngagcd in thc indictmcnt against Karadzic and Mladic, conccrn
ing inter alia thc taking ol UN pcrsonncl as hostagcs, cxplicitly statcd that UN
pcrsonncl wcrc rcgardcd at all rclcvant timcs as bcing pcrsons protcctcd by thc
Gcncva Convcntions.
:+·
A largc numbcr ol rathcr dctailcd provisions cxist that aim to sccurc thc
protcction ol thosc pcrsons. Tc lollowing survcy ol thc lcvcls ol protcction will
takc a somcwhat gcncral approach idcntilying thc main principlcs ol protcction
ol intcrcst to pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. Part !!! ol G C !\ dcals with thc
status and trcatmcnt ol protcctcd pcrsons. Tc kcy provision is Articlc a·, which
statcs:
Protcctcd pcrsons arc cntitlcd, in all circumstanccs, to rcspcct lor thcir pcrsons,
thcir honour, thcir lamily rights, thcir rcligious convictions and practiccs, and
thcir manncrs and customs. Tcy shall at all timcs bc humancly trcatcd, and
shall bc protcctcd cspccially against all acts ol violcncc or thrcats thcrcol and
against insults and public curiosity.
Vomcn shall bc cspccially protcctcd against any attack on thcir honour, in par
ticular against rapc, cnlorccd prostitution, or any lorm ol indcccnt assault.
Vithout prcjudicc to thc provisions rclating to thcir statc ol hcalth, agc
and scx, all protcctcd pcrsons shall bc trcatcd with thc samc considcra
a.6 According to Frccman, pcacckccpcrs in thc UNÒSÒM opcration qualificd as pro
tcctcd pcrsons sincc Somalia did not havc normal diplomatic rclations with thc UN.
Scc Kcnncth S. Frccman, Punishing Attacks on Unitcd Nations Pcacckccpcrs: A
Casc Study ol Somalia, · Emory International Law Review, ·¡·, ··6 (.oo¡).
a.· Prosccutor v Karadzic & Mladic, !ndictmcnt, !To··!, a¡ ]uly .oo·, para. ¡6.
.co General Protection
tion by thc Party to thc conflict in whosc powcr thcy arc, without any
advcrsc distinction bascd, in particular, on racc, rcligion or political opinion.
Howcvcr, thc Partics to thc conflict may takc such mcasurcs ol control and
sccurity in rcgard to protcctcd pcrsons as may bc ncccssary as a rcsult ol thc
war.
:+8
Tc provision is applicablc both to thc tcrritorics ol thc partics to thc conflict as
wcll as to occupicd tcrritory. Tc right ol rcspcct lor thc pcrson should bc intcr
prctcd in its widcst scnsc, including “in particular, thc right to physical, moral
and intcllcctual intcgrity – an csscntial attributc ol thc human pcrson.”
:+o
Tcrc
is room availablc lor thc partics to thc conflict to placc ncccssary rcstrictions on
protcctcd pcrsons lor thc purposc ol its sccurity. Such rcstrictions could includc
limitations on thc lrccdom ol movcmcnt ol protcctcd pcrsons. Tc right to lcavc
thc tcrritory in qucstion during an armcd conflict is cxprcsscd in Articlc .·, but is
also subjcct to thc national intcrcsts ol thc statc.
::o

Prohibition against any lorm ol corporal punishmcnt, torturc or any othcr
lorm ol brutality against pcrsons in thc hands ol a party to thc conflict is cxplic
itly statcd in Articlc .a. To cnsurc that all protcctcd pcrsons shall bc cntitlcd to
humanc trcatmcnt thc prohibition cxtcnds to “any mcasurc as to causc” such
cffccts.
::+
Tc lormula is thus not limitcd to intcntional acts. GC !\ contains
an cxplicit prohibition against thc usc ol human shiclds. Articlc a· statcs: “Tc
prcscncc ol a protcctcd pcrson may not bc uscd to rcndcr ccrtain points or arcas
immunc lrom military opcrations.” Protcctcd pcrsons must ncvcr bc punishcd lor
crimcs thcy did not commit and collcctivc punishmcnts arc prohibitcd. Rcprisals,
morcovcr, arc prohibitcd against protcctcd pcrsons and thcir propcrty.
:::
Tc pro
hibition against thc taking ol hostagcs should bc undcrstood in its widcst scnsc.
!t includcs all lorms ol hostagctaking and applics both to intcrnational and non
intcrnational conflicts.
:::

For pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcrations thc rulcs dcaling with thc status
ol alicns in thc tcrritory ol a party to thc conflict arc ol particular importancc.
Alicns in thc tcrritory ol a party to thc conflict shall havc thc right to lcavc thc
tcrritory, subjcct to thc national intcrcsts ol thc statc, and il confincd pcnding
procccdings thcy shall bc humancly trcatcd.
::±
Tc main principlc guiding thc
protcction ol alicns in thc tcrritory ol a party to thc conflict is that pcacctimc
a.· Articlc a· ol GC !\.
a.o Commcntary, Articlc a· GC !\, ac..
aac Articlc .· ol GC !\.
aa. Commcntary, Articlc .a GC !\, aaa.
aaa Articlc .. ol GC !\.
aa. Commcntary, Articlc .¡ GC !\, a.ca... According to thc Commcntary thc prohi
bition “is absolutc in charactcr.” !bid. a...
aa¡ Articlcs .· and .· ol GC !\.
..c Chapter 3
rulcs continuc to apply. Tosc rulcs arc subjcct to somc rcstrictions, such as thc
right ol thc statc to takc thc ncccssary mcasurcs ol control and sccurity, as statcd
in GC !\, Articlc a·.
::¡
Tc intcntion ol applying pcacctimc rulcs to alicns is not
that thcy should cscapc thc cffccts ol war, but that rcstrictions with rcgard to thc
civilian population as a wholc, should also apply to alicns.
::6

Tis work is bascd upon thc prcmisc that thc pcrsonncl ol a pcacc opcra
tion do not act as combatants to an armcd conflict. Such pcrsonncl, thcrclorc,
arc not conncctcd to any party to thc conflict. !t mcans that thc spccial protcc
tion, undcr intcrnational humanitarian law, accordcd to mcdical pcrsonncl ol thc
bclligcrcnt armcd lorccs will not bc cxamincd. ¡xccpt lor mcdical pcrsonncl,
othcr catcgorics cnjoy a spccial protcction undcr intcrnational humanitarian law.
Tcsc includc womcn and childrcn, thc sick and woundcd (combatants), victims
ol shipwrcck, surrcndcring mcmbcrs ol armcd lorccs, rcligious pcrsonncl, civil
dclcncc pcrsonncl, journalists and rclicl pcrsonncl. Rcligious pcrsonncl must bc
attachcd to thc armcd lorccs and civil dclcncc pcrsonncl arc thosc so dcsignatcd
by a party to thc conflict. Tc spccial protcction ol thc abovcmcntioncd catcgo
rics gcncrally lalls outsidc thc scopc ol this work. Tc spccial protcction ol rclicl
pcrsonncl, howcvcr, is ol intcrcst in rclation to thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in
pcacc opcrations.
Tcrc arc somc provisions in thc GC !\ rclating to thc lrcc passagc ol con
signmcnts ol lood and mcdical supplics and thc protcction ol such consignmcnts
(a., ··, ·o). For dctails ol thc protcction availablc lor pcrsonncl participating in
such missions onc should turn to AP ! and Articlc ·.. !t statcs in lull:
.. Vhcrc ncccssary, rclicl pcrsonncl may lorm part ol thc assistancc pro
vidcd in any rclicl action, in particular lor thc transportation and distri
bution ol rclicl consignmcnts, thc participation ol such pcrsonncl shall
bc subjcct to thc approval ol thc Party in whosc tcrritory thcy will carry
out thcir dutics.
a. Such pcrsonncl shall bc rcspcctcd and protcctcd.
.. ¡ach Party in rcccipt ol rclicl consignmcnts shall, to thc lullcst cxtcnt
practicablc, assist thc rclicl pcrsonncl rclcrrcd to in paragraph . in carry
ing out thcir rclicl mission. Ònly in casc ol impcrativc military ncccssity
may thc activitics ol thc rclicl pcrsonncl bc limitcd or thcir movcmcnts
tcmporarily rcstrictcd.
¡. Undcr no circumstanccs may rclicl pcrsonncl cxcccd thc tcrms ol thcir
mission undcr this Protocol. !n particular thcy shall takc account ol thc
sccurity rcquircmcnts ol thc Party in whosc tcrritory thcy arc carrying
aa· According to thc Commcntary thc gcncral rulc is that alicns rctain thcir pcacctimc
status and “that rccoursc may only bc had to cxccptional mcasurcs in cascs ol abso
lutc ncccssity.” Commcntary, Articlc .· GC !\, a¡6.
aa6 !bid.
... General Protection
out thcir dutics. Tc mission ol any ol thc pcrsonncl who do not rcspcct
thcsc conditions may bc tcrminatcd.
Rclicl pcrsonncl thus cnjoy thc gcncral protcction undcr intcrnational humani
tarian law as civilians, and a spccial protcction undcr AP !. Pcrsonncl ol thc
!CRC, howcvcr, always cnjoy protcction undcr thc cmblcm ol thc Rcd Cross.
::·

An important condition lor thc rclicl opcration in qucstion and thc participation
ol its pcrsonncl is “thc approval ol thc Party in whosc tcrritory thcy will carry
out thcir dutics”. !t should bc intcrprctcd as mcaning thc party cxcrcising control
ovcr thc tcrritory in qucstion.
::8

Pcrsonncl in a rclicl action shall bc “rcspcctcd” and “protcctcd”. As to thc
mcaning ol thcsc impcrativcs, thcy havc thc samc contcnt as in othcr parts ol thc
Gcncva Convcntions.
::o
Tc tcrm “rcspcct” mcans “to sparc, not to attack” whilc
thc tcrm “protcct” mcans “to comc to somconc’s dclcncc, to lcnd hclp and sup
port”.
::o

Undcr intcrnational humanitarian law, pcrsonncl bclonging to rclicl opcra
tions would continuc to bc rcgardcd as protcctcd pcrsons il thcy lcll into thc
hands ol thc cncmy ol thc rccciving party. A situation could arisc whcrc thcir
statc ol nationality maintains diplomatic rcprcscntation in thc statc that holds
thcm. According to Articlc ¡ ol GC !\ thcy would, in that casc, not bc consid
crcd protcctcd pcrsons. Howcvcr, undcr Articlc ·. ol AP ! thcrc is no such quali
fication. Paragraph a clcarly statcs that thcy shall bc “rcspcctcd and protcctcd.”
::+

As lor rcpatriation, although not cxplicitly articulatcd, such pcrsons should bc
cntitlcd to rcturn to thcir own statcs as soon as possiblc and not suffcr dctcn
tion.
:::
A parallcl may bc drawn with mcdical pcrsonncl ol a statc not party to
thc conflict. !l thcy wcrc to lall into thc hands ol thc cncmy ol thc party rccciving
assistancc ol such pcrsonncl, thcy should not bc dctaincd but rcpatriatcd.
:::

Tcrc arc also conditions imposcd upon rclicl pcrsonncl. Undcr no circum
stanccs may thcy cxcccd thc tcrms ol thcir mission. Tcy should naturally only
providc rclicl consignmcnts to thosc who arc lcgitimatc bcncficiarics ol such sup
aa· Commcntary Articlc ·. AP !, ·.a.
aa· !bid., ·... Although a rclicl action is subjcct to thc approval ol thc rccciving Party,
this should not bc intcrprctcd as giving “this Party thc discrctionary powcr to rclusc
a rclicl action.” !bid.
aao Commcntary, Articlc ·. AP !, ·.¡ and notc .. with rclcrcnccs.
a.c Commcntary, Articlc .c AP !, .¡6.
a.. Tc Commcntary to thc articlc statc that il thcy should lall into thc hands ol thc
cncmy ol thc rccciving party, “thcy should obviously still bc cntitlcd to rcspcct and
protcction. Commcntary, Articlc ·. AP !, ·.¡.
a.a !bid.
a.. Scc Articlc .a ol GC ! and Commcntary, Articlc ·. AP !, ·.¡ lootnotc .¡.
..a Chapter 3
plics.
::±
Tat would not includc combatants.
::¡
A morc dclicatc situation ariscs
il rclicl pcrsonncl pass on inlormation ol a military naturc. Tis would clcarly
cxcccd thc tcrms ol thcir mission. !t would, howcvcr, not automatically rcsult in
thc ccssation ol thcir protcctcd status undcr intcrnational humanitarian law. Tc
only sanction, which appcars to bc availablc lor thc rccciving statc il pcrsonncl
cxcccd thc tcrms ol thcir mission, is that thcy may bc rcqucstcd to lcavc thc tcr
ritory in qucstion immcdiatcly.
::6
!ntcrnational humanitarian law, howcvcr, docs
not providc immunity lrom thc cxcrcisc ol criminal jurisdiction ol thc rccciving
statc il any ol thc pcrsonncl havc committcd a criminal offcncc.
::·
Tis docs not,
in itscll, mcan that thc pcrsonncl conccrncd would losc thcir protcction undcr
intcrnational humanitarian law.
As a gcncral lormula, howcvcr, protcctcd pcrsons arc protcctcd lrom attack
il thcy do not takc a dircct part in hostilitics.
::8
!t is usually cxplicitly statcd that
thcy will losc thcir protcctcd status il thcy commit acts harmlul to thc cncmy.
::o

As rclicl pcrsonncl havc no cncmics, anothcr lormula is applicd: thcy must not
“cxcccd thc tcrms ol thcir mission.” Howcvcr, it docs not say that thcy will losc
thcir protcction il thcy cxcccd thc tcrms ol thcir mission. !l rclicl pcrsonncl wcrc
to takc a dircct part in thc hostilitics thcy could clcarly not claim protcction
against attack. Howcvcr, Ðinstcin appcars to suggcst that such pcrsonncl would
losc thcir protcctcd status il thcy wcrc to cxcccd thc tcrms ol thcir mission.
:±o

Givcn thc cxplicit languagc ol Articlc ·., it is possiblc that this should bc intcr
prctcd so as to bc limitcd to situations ol taking dircct parts in hostilitics or, pos
sibly, to cascs ol committing acts harmlul to any ol thc partics to thc conflict.
:±+

Additional Protocol ! cstablishcs lundamcntal guarantccs lor all pcrsons
in thc powcr ol a party to a conflict. All who find thcmsclvcs in thc powcr ol a
party to a conflict, and do not bcncfit lrom a morc lavourablc trcatmcnt undcr
thc Gcncva Convcntions or AP ! shall, at thc minimum, cnjoy thc protcction
affordcd undcr Articlc ·· ol AP !.
:±:
Articlc ·· is influcnccd by human rights law
norms and stipulatcs thc basic guarantccs applicablc to all pcrsons in thc powcr
a.¡ !bid., ·.·.
a.· Articlc ·c AP !.
a.6 Commcntary, Articlc ·. AP !, ·.6.
a.· According to thc Commcntary it is advisablc that thc agrccmcnt with thc rccciv
ing statc conccrning thc rclicl action stipulatcs that thc pcrsonncl conccrncd should
cnjoy immunity bclorc local courts. !bid., ·.6.
a.· Articlc ·.(.) AP !.
a.o Scc Ðinstcin, .·c.
a¡c !bid.
a¡. As Ðinstcin points out, thc phrasc “acts harmlul to thc cncmy” gocs bcyond taking
part in hostilitics. !bid. According to thc Commcntary on Articlc .. AP !, thc dcfini
tion ol “harmlul” includcs “attcmpts at dclibcratcly hindcring |thc cncmy’s| military
opcrations in any way whatsocvcr.” .··.
a¡a Articlc ·· AP !.
... General Protection
ol a party to a conflict. !t contains wcllcstablishcd standards and rulcs rclating
to thc arrcst, dctcntion and intcrnmcnt ol civilians and thc proccdurcs govcrning
a lair trial. Tcsc standards undoubtcdly rcflcct customary intcrnational law.
:±:

Tc acts prohibitcd arc ol a similar charactcr to thosc rcgardcd as bcing gravc
brcachcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law.
Grave breaches of international humanitarian law
Tc rcgimc ol gravc brcachcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law was introduccd
in thc Gcncva Convcntions ol .o¡o. Tcsc arc war crimcs ol particular scrious
ncss and cntail a duty ol statcs partics to prosccutc offcndcrs ol such crimcs.
:±±
Tc
notion ol ‘war crimcs’ covcrs both ‘gravc brcachcs’ and ‘othcr scrious violations’ ol
thc laws and customs ol war. Tis is particularly clcar in Articlc · ol thc !CC
Statutc. Tcrc is, howcvcr, no diffcrcncc in conscqucnccs bctwccn ‘gravc brcachcs’
and ‘othcr scrious violations’ undcr thc Statutc. Undcr customary intcrnational
law it is ncccssary to distinguish bctwccn war crimcs subjcct to permissive univcr
sal jurisdiction and thosc subjcct to compulsory univcrsal jurisdiction.
:±¡
According
to Mcron, thcrc is somc conlusion in thc litcraturc with rcgard to thc conccpt
ol univcrsal jurisdiction and thc Gcncva Convcntions. Tc lact that compulsory
univcrsal jurisdiction is cxplicitly stipulatcd only with rcgard to gravc brcachcs ol
thc Gcncva Convcntions docs not ncccssarily mcan that othcrs (Mcron rclcrs to
nongravc brcachcs) arc not subjcct to pcrmissivc univcrsal jurisdiction.
:±6
Tis
docs not mcan that all offcnccs ol thc Gcncva Convcntions providc statcs with
a right to cxcrcisc jurisdiction but in rclation to “offcnccs that arc rccognizcd by
thc community ol nations as ol univcrsal conccrn, and as subjcct to univcrsal
condcmnation”.
:±·
Tis intcrprctation is supportcd in this work and is ol spccific
importancc in rclation to war crimc ol such scrious charactcr that, had it lulfillcd
thc conditions ol bcing committcd against a protcctcd pcrson in an intcrnational
a¡. !t lists a numbcr ol acts that arc “prohibitcd at any timc and in any placc whatsocvcr,
whcthcr committcd by civilian or by military agcnts: (a) violcncc to thc lilc, hcalth,
or physical or mcntal wcllbcing ol pcrsons, in particular: (i) murdcr, (ii) torturc ol
all kinds, whcthcr physical or mcntal, (iii) corporal punishmcnt, and (iv) mutila
tion, (b) outragcs upon pcrsonal dignity, in particular humiliating and dcgrading
trcatmcnt, cnlorccd prostitution and any lorm ol indcccnt assault, (c) thc taking ol
hostagcs, (d) collcctivc punishmcnts, and (c) thrcats to commit any ol thc lorcgoing
acts.” Articlc ··(a) AP !.
a¡¡ Scc articlcs common to thc lour Gcncva Convcntions, ¡o/·c/.ao/.¡6 and
·c/·./..c/.¡·.
a¡· Knut Ðormann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Sources and Commentary, .a·.ao (acc.).
a¡6 Tcodor Mcron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, a¡·, a·. (.oo·). Mcron finds this lorm
ol univcrsal jurisdiction to bc thc truc mcaning ol thc conccpt.
a¡· Mcron, a·.. Hc rclcrs in this rcspcct to thc Restatement (Tird) §¡c¡.
..¡ Chapter 3
armcd conflict, it would havc bccn classificd as a gravc brcach ol thc Gcncva
Convcntions.
:±8

Gravc brcachcs includc inter alia willul killing, torturc or inhuman trcat
mcnt, il committcd against any pcrsons and propcrty protcctcd by thc convcn
tion. Tc gravc brcachcs rcgimc is conditional upon whcthcr thc victim or victims
ol such acts, lor thc purposcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law, arc rcgardcd as
bcing protcctcd pcrsons and whcthcr thc acts in qucstion wcrc committcd within
thc contcxt ol an international armcd conflict. As prcviously statcd, pcrsonncl
participating in pcacc opcrations may not ncccssarily lall undcr that catcgory. Tc
murdcr ol a mcmbcr ol a pcacc opcration would still bc a criminal offcncc. 8ut it
would not qualily as a gravc brcach ol intcrnational humanitarian law, and would
thus not bc subjcct to a duty on thc part ol statcs partics to prosccutc or cxtraditc
thc allcgcd murdcrcr, il thc victim was a mcmbcr ol pcrsonncl not rcgardcd as
bcing in thc catcgory ol protcctcd pcrson.
Tc catcgory ol protcctcd pcrson has bccn cxtcndcd through AP !, but docs
not per se includc pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations.
:±o
Tc conccpt ol gravc brcachcs
has also bccn cxtcndcd through AP !, by including violations ol thc principlcs
protccting civilians lrom thc cffccts ol war and lrom unjustificd mcdical procc
durcs, particularly mcdical cxpcrimcnts.
:¡o
At thc prcscnt timc thcrc appcars to
bc a lacuna in rclation to thc protcction ol pcrsonncl cngagcd in pcacc opcra
tions insolar as scrious crimcs committcd against thcm might not ncccssarily
bc rcgardcd as constituting gravc brcachcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law,
sincc thcy arc not, as such, considcrcd to bc protcctcd pcrsons. Howcvcr, this is
bascd upon a strict rcading ol thc law.
:¡+
A tclcological intcrprctation ol thc rulcs
may wcll lcad to thc inclusion ol pcacc opcration pcrsonncl as protcctcd pcrsons.
Tis intcrprctation should also find support in thc Salcty Convcntion, whcrc thc
intcrnational community has shown a will to crcatc a systcm ol aut dedere aut
judicare lor scrious crimcs against such pcrsonncl.
Tc othcr rclcvant condition lor thc gravc brcachcs rcgimc rclatcs to thc
contcxt ol an intcrnational armcd conflict. Tcrc is no mcntion ol gravc brcachcs
in common Articlc . or in AP !!. Tcrc arc also authoritativc statcmcnts that cus
a¡· Tc distinction bctwccn gravc brcachcs and othcr scrious violations ol thc laws and
customs ol war is somctimcs dcscribcd as thc lormcr bcing subjcct to univcrsal juris
diction whilc thc lattcr “rcmain war crimcs and arc punishablc as such”. Te Manual
of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry ol Ðclcncc, ¡aa (acc¡). Grccn, .c..
a¡o Articlc ·· AP !.
a·c Articlcs ·· and .. AP !.
a·. Articlc .¡· GC !\, which dcfincs gravc brcachcs ol thc convcntion, rclcrs not to
“protcctcd pcrsons” but to “pcrsons or propcrty protcctcd by thc prcscnt Convcntion”.
Tis may pcrhaps bc intcrprctcd as suggcsting a widcr catcgory ol pcrsons. According
to thc Commcntary on Articlc .¡·, howcvcr, it appcars as though thc gravc brcachcs
rcgimc is limitcd to pcrsons dcfincd as protcctcd pcrsons undcr Articlc ¡ ol thc
Convcntion. Commcntary, Articlc .¡· GC !\, ·o·.
..· General Protection
tomary law, as it stood in .oo¡, did not includc thc conccpt ol war crimcs in non
intcrnational armcd conflicts. According to a commission ol cxpcrts, cstablishcd
by thc SccrctaryGcncral to analysc cvidcncc on whcthcr or not gravc brcachcs
ol thc Gcncva Convcntions had bccn committcd in thc tcrritory ol thc lormcr
Yugoslavia, “thcrc docs not appcar to bc a customary intcrnational law applicablc
to intcrnal armcd conflicts which includcs thc conccpt ol war crimcs”.
:¡:
Tcrc
is, howcvcr, cvidcncc ol a ncw approach which cstablishcs individual criminal
rcsponsibility lor violations ol thc applicablc in nonintcrnational armcd con
flicts.
:¡:
Tc statutc ol thc !CTR conlcrs jurisdiction in rclation to pcrsons com
mitting scrious violations ol common Articlc . and ol AP !!.
:¡±
Tc jurisprudcncc
ol thc !CTY shows a dcvcloping tcndcncy towards an cnhanccd individual crim
inal rcsponsibility lor violations ol humanitarian law applicablc in nonintcrna
tional armcd conflicts. Tc jurisdiction ol thc !CTY is limitcd to gravc brcachcs
ol thc Gcncva Convcntions (Articlc a) and violations ol thc laws and customs
ol war (Articlc .).
:¡¡
Tc !CTY has constantly uphcld thc proposition that thc
gravc brcachcs rcgimc is only applicablc in intcrnational armcd conflicts.
:¡6
!t
has, howcvcr, intcrprctcd thc violations ol thc laws and customs ol war to includc
violations ol common Articlc . and othcr customary rulcs govcrning thc conduct
ol intcrnal armcd conflicts. Tc !CC havc jurisdiction in rcspcct ol violations ol
humanitarian law applicablc in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts.
:¡·
A rcccnt study on this topic rcvcals that thcrc is a movcmcnt towards a
rclaxation ol thc strict upholding ol thc division bctwccn intcrnational and non
intcrnational armcd conflicts. Tc rcscarch, howcvcr, did not find sufficicnt cvi
dcncc to cstablish that thc gravc brcachcs rcgimc was as yct also applicablc in
nonintcrnational armcd conflicts on a customary law basis. !t did, howcvcr, find
that “thcrc arc indications ol an cnhanccd rcgulatory contcnt ol violations com
mittcd in intcrnal armcd conflicts”.
:¡8

a·a Final rcport ol thc Commission ol ¡xpcrts cstablishcd Pursuant to Sccurity Council
Rcsolution ··c (.ooa), para. ·a, UN Ðoc. S/.oo¡/6·¡, Anncx (.oo¡).
a·. Provost, o·.
a·¡ Scc articlcs ¡ and 6 ol thc !CTR statutc.
a·· !t also includcs thc crimc ol gcnocidc and crimcs against humanity.
a·6 Prosccutor v Tadic, Casc No. !To¡AR·a, a Òctobcr .oo·, para. ·.. Natalic Vagncr,
Tc dcvclopmcnt ol thc gravc brcachcs rcgimc and ol individual criminal rcsponsi
bility by thc !ntcrnational Criminal Tribunal lor thc lormcr Yugoslavia, ·· IRRC, .·.,
.·· (acc.).
a·· Articlc · a (c) ol thc !CC Statutc.
a·· Sonja 8oclacrtSuomincn, Gravc 8rcachcs, Univcrsal ]urisdiction and !ntcrnal
Armcd Conflicts: !s Customary Law Moving Towards a Unilorm ¡nlorccmcnt
Mcchanism lor all Armcd Conflicts:, · Journal of Conflict and Security Law 6., .c.
(accc). Scc in this rcspcct also ]amcs G. Stcwart, Towards a singlc dcfinition ol
armcd conflict in intcrnational humanitarian law: A critiquc ol intcrnationalizcd
armcd conflict, ·· IRRC, 6., ... (acc.).
..6 Chapter 3
!t should bc notcd, howcvcr, that according to thc study on customary law
by thc !CRC, thcrc is alrcady at this point sufficicnt practicc “to cstablish thc
obligation undcr customary intcrnational law to invcstigatc war crimcs allcgcdly
committcd in nonintcrnational armcd conflicts and to prosccutc thc suspccts il
appropriatc.”
:¡o

!t thus sccms to bc divcrgcnt vicws on this issuc (il not thc customary law in
this arca has dcvclopcd considcrably during thc ycars bctwccn thcsc studics). !l
it is bcyond doubt that thcrc cxists an obligation undcr customary intcrnational
law to prosccutc individuals suspcctcd ol war crimcs in nonintcrnational armcd
conflicts, thcn all statcs would bc dutybound to prosccutc such suspccts il thcy
wcrc prcscnt within thcir jurisdictions. 8ascd on thc argumcnts prcscntcd abovc
it could still bc somcwhat prcmaturc to claim that position. Tc trcnd is, howcvcr,
clcar. Vhat might still bc doubtlul is whcthcr thc law has in lact dcvclopcd to thc
point whcrc statcs arc undcr a customary law duty to prosccutc:
Tc gravc brcachcs rcgimc is thus conditional upon whcthcr or not thc pun
ishablc act has bccn committcd against a protcctcd pcrson and, possibly, within
thc contcxt ol an intcrnational armcd conflict. !t is not thc nationality ol thc
victim per se that is thc most important rcquircmcnt. Rathcr, it is thc lactual cir
cumstanccs ol whcthcr thc pcrson conccrncd is in thc hands ol an advcrsc party
or il that pcrson could rcly upon thc pcacctimc rcgimc ol diplomatic protcc
tion. !t should bc notcd, howcvcr, that thc prosccutor cngagcd in thc indictmcnt
against Karadzic and Mladic, conccrning inter alia thc taking ol UN pcrsonncl as
hostagcs, cxplicitly statcd that UN pcrsonncl wcrc rcgardcd at all rclcvant timcs as
bcing pcrsons protcctcd by thc Gcncva Convcntions.
:6o
Tc nccd to dcclarc thcir
status as protcctcd pcrsons may pcrhaps bc duc to thc lcss than clcar rulcs in this
arca ol thc law. Tc lact that gravc brcachcs still might bc conditional upon thc
cxistcncc ol an intcrnational armcd conflict limits thc applicability ol thc rcgimc.
Although individual criminal rcsponsibility lor violations ol humanitarian law
applicablc in intcrnal armcd conflicts sccms to havc dcvclopcd ovcr thc past ycars,
thcrc is pcrhaps not, as yct, a customary intcrnational law duty to prosccutc or
cxtraditc pcrsons allcgcd to havc committcd such crimcs. Givcn thc naturc ol
armcd conflicts in thc modcrn world, thc gravc brcachcs rcgimc appcars thcrc
lorc somcwhat limitcd. !t is in this rcspcct that thc Salcty Convcntion may wcll
havc a particularly important rolc to play. Tc partics to thc Salcty Convcntion
arc undcr a duty to prosccutc or cxtraditc pcrsons suspcctcd ol crimcs against
protcctcd pcrsonncl. Tis systcm ol aut dedere aut judicare should also havc a sup
a·o Hcnckacrts and Ðoswald8cck, 6co6.c. Tc study bascs its findings on intcr alia
military manuals, agrccmcnts and official statcmcnts and somc rcsolutions by thc
Sccurity Council.
a6c Prosccutor v Karadzic & Mladic, !ndictmcnt, !CTY Casc No. !To··!, a6 ]uly
.oo·, para. ¡6.
..· General Protection
porting cffcct upon thc intcrprctation ol thc gravc brcachcs rcgimc rcgarding
pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations.
3.3.3 Conclusions
!ntcrnational humanitarian law providcs high standards ol protcction lor partics
to armcd conflicts in rclation to pcrsons not participating in thc fighting. Pcacc
opcration pcrsonncl cnjoy thc protcction affordcd to civilians so long as thcy do
not cngagc as combatants in an armcd conflict. Civilian pcrsonncl cmploycd in
a pcacc opcration continuc to cnjoy such protcction cvcn in that situation, whilc
military mcmbcrs ol thc military componcnt assumc thc rolc ol combatants.
Vith lcw cxccptions thcrc is no mcntion ol pcacckccping opcrations and it
is apparcnt that pcacckccping was not contcmplatcd as an cndcavour or cntcr
prisc in its own right by thc draltcrs ol thc Gcncva Convcntions. Analogics,
howcvcr, may bc drawn to thc spccial protcction affordcd to rclicl pcrsonncl
undcr intcrnational humanitarian law. Pcrsonncl ol pcacc opcrations do not
ncatly fit in with thc dcfinition ol protcctcd pcrsons undcr convcntional intcrna
tional humanitarian law. !t may havc somc affcct on thc gravc brcachcs rcgimc,
whcrc ccrtain crimcs ol war arc subjcct to univcrsal jurisdiction. Tis rcgimc, lor
pcacc opcration pcrsonncl, may not so rcadily bc applicablc. First, thcy may not
bc rcgardcd as bcing protcctcd pcrsons undcr intcrnational humanitarian law,
and sccondly, thcy arc oltcn dcploycd within thc contcxt ol a nonintcrnational
armcd conflict whcrc thc gravc brcachcs rcgimc might not as yct havc attaincd a
customary law status. Tc Salcty Convcntion in this rcspcct providcs a valuablc
contribution towards thc intcrnationalisation ol crimcs committcd against pcacc
opcration pcrsonncl.
Tc dcploymcnt ol pcacc opcration pcrsonncl within thc contcxt ol non
intcrnational armcd conflict poscs spccial problcms rcgarding thcir protcction.
Not only arc thc rulcs in such conflicts rudimcntary in charactcr, although cus
tomary law norms apply, partics in addition oltcn display a disrcgard lor rccog
niscd standards.
:6+
Tc work on a sct ol Fundamcntal Standards ol Humanity,
which arc standards applicablc in all typcs ol conflict, may provc to bc ol particu
lar importancc in thcsc arcas. Tis projcct has attcmptcd to draw attcntion to thc
lact that thc protcction ol pcrsons in timcs ol conflict is not an arca primarily in
nccd ol ncw rulcs, but rcquircs rcspcct lor cxisting oncs. Tc duty ol statcs partics
to thc Salcty Convcntion, to prosccutc or cxtraditc thosc allcgcd to havc commit
a6. 8ring and Korlol a.c. Spickcr, statcs that thc main problcm in nonintcrnational
armcd conflicts rclatcs to obscrvancc ol thc, vcry rudimcntary, rulcs and thc appli
cation ol morc cxtcnsivc norms would probably not stand a bcttcr chancc ol bcing
rcspcctcd. Spickcr, .6¡. Tcodor Mcron, Human Rights in Internal Strife: Teir
International Protection, ¡o (.o··).
..· Chapter 3
tcd crimcs against UN and associatcd pcrsonncl, may thus havc a dctcrring cffcct
upon thosc who show scant rcspcct lor applicablc rulcs.
Chapter 4
Spccial Protcction
Tc Corlu Affair ol .oa. involvcd thc issuc ol spccial protcction lor intcrna
tional commissioncrs. !n .oa., !talian mcmbcrs ol an intcrnational commission,
appointcd by thc Conlcrcncc ol Ambassadors, to dclimit thc lronticr bctwccn
Albania and Grcccc, wcrc murdcrcd on thc Grcck sidc ol thc bordcr. Tc affair
attractcd a grcat dcal ol intcrcst in thc Council ol thc Lcaguc ol Nations and its
mcmbcrs dccidcd to rclcr thc mattcr to a Committcc ol ]urists. Subscqucntly thc
Council unanimously adoptcd thc rcasoning ol thc Committcc ol ]urists. Tc
rcport ol thc committcc rcad, in part:
Tc rcsponsibility ol a statc is only involvcd by thc commission in its tcrritory
ol a political crimc against thc pcrsons ol lorcigncrs il thc statc has ncglcctcd
to takc all rcasonablc mcasurcs lor thc prcvcntion ol thc crimc, and thc pursuit,
arrcst, and bringing to justicc ol thc criminals. Tc rccognizcd public charactcr
ol thc lorcigncr and thc circumstanccs in which hc is prcscnt in its tcrritory
cntail upon thc Statc a corrcsponding duty ol spccial vigilancc on his bchall.
+
Commcnting on thc casc, ¡aglcton rightly points out that thc rcport makcs no
contribution to clarilying thc status ol officials not having thc status ol diplo
matic cnvoys. Hc lound that thcrc appcarcd to bc an intcrmcdiatc group bctwccn
diplomats and ordinary alicns, that statcs wcrc obligatcd to providc a spccial pro
tcction. 8ut thc dcgrcc ol protcction, and thosc bclonging to such a group would
still nccd clarification.
:
Givcn thc lacts ol thc casc, mcmbcrs ol intcrnational
commissions could probably cxpcct highcr lcvcls ol protcction than providcd to
“ordinary” alicns. Vhcthcr thcy could cxpcct a protcction similar to that ol dip
lomatic cnvoys is unclcar. Tc “duty ol spccial vigilancc” providcs nothing morc in
clarilying thc protcction ol intcrnational officials in this rcspcct.
:
Pcrsonncl rcprcscnting a statc or an intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisa
tion arc oltcn accordcd a highcr lcgal status in a host statc than that cnjoycd by
. Lcaguc ol Nations, Official Journal, ·a¡ (.oa¡), citcd in ]ohn Kcrry King, Te Privileges
and Immunities of the Personnel of International Organizations .. (.o¡o).
a Clydc ¡aglcton, Tc Rcsponsibility ol thc Statc lor thc Protcction ol Forcign
Òfficials, .o AJIL ao., .c· (.oa·).
. King, ...
.ac Chapter 4
ordinary lorcigncrs. Tc rccciving statc has a duty to cnsurc thc lcgal status ol
pcrsonncl in its tcrritory, in othcr words, to providc protcction in accordancc with
thcir lcgal status. Tc tcrm “spccial protcction” is not ncw. Tc !PP Convcntion
rclcrs to a pcrson who “is cntitlcd pursuant to intcrnational law to spccial protcc
tion lrom any attack on his pcrson, lrccdom or dignity”. Tc convcntion docs not,
howcvcr, offcr a dcfinition ol “spccial protcction”. According to somc vicws put
lorward during thc ncgotiations ol thc !PP Convcntion, thc tcrm spccial pro
tcction could bc intcrprctcd to mcan inviolability or immunity. Tc lormcr tcrm
implics a larrcaching duty on thc part ol thc host statc to takc all appropriatc
mcasurcs to prcvcnt any attacks upon thc pcrson coming undcr spccial protcc
tion. Tc lattcr tcrm mcans protcction lrom intcrlcrcncc by thc host statc, but not
protcction against thc violcnt acts ol othcrs, such as tcrrorists.
±

Tc conccrn ol thosc who draltcd thc !PP Convcntion was to not cxcrcisc
too broad a scopc ol application ol thc convcntion. For thc purposc ol this study,
thcrc is no nccd to cxcludc pcrsonncl cnjoying a lowcr dcgrcc ol inviolability or
immunity than pcrsonncl protcctcd by thc !PP Convcntion. Tc rclcrcncc to a
spccial protcction hcrc is rathcr to illustratc thc diffcrcncc bctwccn thc protcction
cnjoycd by all pcrsonncl (gcncral protcction), irrcspcctivc ol whom thcy rcprc
scnt, and thc protcction providcd to pcrsonncl rcprcscnting statcs and intcrna
tional govcrnmcntal organisations (spccial protcction).
Tis chaptcr dcals with diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics, normally
accordcd to officials rcprcscnting statcs, such as diplomatic agcnts and interna-
tional privilcgcs and immunitics, gcncrally accordcd rcprcscntativcs ol intcrna
tional govcrnmcntal organisations through multilatcral and bilatcral (SÒFAs)
trcatics.
¡.r Ðiplomatic Privileges and Immunities
Tc scnior figurcs in pcacc opcrations, such as thc Forcc Commandcr and thc
Spccial Rcprcscntativc ol thc SccrctaryGcncral to thc Unitcd Nations, arc usu
ally accordcd privilcgcs and immunitics similar to thosc ol diplomatic cnvoys. !n
morc rcccnt timcs, howcvcr, diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics bccamc thc
subjcct ol attcntion lor othcr mcmbcrs ol pcacc opcrations. !n thc ¡Ulcd opcra
tion in Maccdonia thc status agrccmcnt bctwccn Maccdonia and thc ¡U grantcd
all pcrsonncl “trcatmcnt, including immunitics and privilcgcs, cquivalcnt to that
ol diplomatic agcnts”.
¡
Òn pcacc opcrations it is thus thc status ol thc diplo
¡ Louis M. 8loomficld and Gcrald F. FitzGcrald, Crimes Against Protected Persons:
Prevention and Punishment. An Analysis of the UN Convention, 6c, ·.a (.o··).
· Articlc 6 ol thc Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡uropcan Union and thc Formcr Yugoslav
Rcpublic ol Maccdonia on thc status ol thc ¡uropcan Unionlcd Forccs (¡UF)
in thc Formcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia, Anncxcd to Council Ðccision
acc./aaa/CFSP, a. March acc., Anncx, Ò ], L ·a/¡· (acc.).
.a. Special protection
matic agent that is ol thc grcatcst intcrcst, in rclation to diplomatic privilcgcs
and immunitics, and this study’s prcscntation will accordingly ccntrc on thosc
aspccts.
6
Howcvcr, thc naturc and charactcr ol diplomatic privilcgcs and immu
nitics will first bc cxamincd in ordcr to undcrstand thc diffcrcnccs bctwccn privi
lcgcs and immunitics accordcd to diplomatic agcnts and pcrsonncl rcprcscnting
intcrnational organisations.
4.1.1 Background
Tc law on diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics is wcll cstablishcd in customary
intcrnational law. !t is onc ol thc oldcst and most timchonourcd arcas ol intcr
national law. Tc nccd lor sovcrcign statcs to maintain communications with onc
anothcr has rcsultcd in thc longstanding practicc ol thc scnding and rccciving ol
diplomatic agcnts. Ðiplomatic pcrsonncl, as rcprcscntativcs ol thc scnding statc,
havc bccn accordcd a spccial status by thc rccciving statc. Tc systcm ol cxchangc
ol diplomatic rcprcscntativcs is firmly bascd upon thc principlc ol rcciprocity.
Tis is possibly onc ol thc rcasons lor its bcing a rclativcly uncontrovcrsial arca ol
intcrnational law. Until .o6. diplomatic rclations wcrc rcgulatcd undcr custom
ary intcrnational law. Tc codification, and dcvclopmcnt, ol thcsc customary law
norms has bccn madc through thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
·

Tc \icnna Convcntion largcly codifics cxisting customary law principlcs but
includcs clcmcnts ol dcvclopmcnt. Tc lact that this convcntion docs not prc
ciscly rcflcct customary law is, bccausc ol thc largc numbcr ol ratifications, not
particularly important. Today .·¡
8
statcs arc partics to thc convcntion and thc
rulcs stipulatcd thcrcin arc thosc that arc most widcly acccptcd.
o
Tc lollowing
cxamination ol diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics is bascd upon this convcn
tion.
Ðiffcrcnt thcorics havc bccn proposcd as to what lorms thc loundation
ol thc conccpt ol according privilcgcs and immunitics to diplomatic pcrson
ncl. Tcsc includc thc thcorics ol cxtratcrritoriality, “rcprcscntativc charactcr”,
and lunctional ncccssity. Òn thc qucstion ol a basis lor diplomatic privilcgcs
and immunitics, thc !LC rcgardcd thc thcory ol cxtratcrritoriality (that thc dip
6 For a morc comprchcnsivc study on thc topic ol diplomatic privilcgcs and immuni
tics, scc c.g. ¡ilccn Ðcnza, Diplomatic Law. Commentary on the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, (a
nd
cd., .oo·), Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice, (Lord
Goorc8ooth, cd., ·
th
cd., .o·o), ]cnnings, Sir Robcrt and Vatts Sir Arthur (cds.,)
Oppenheim’s International Law, (o
th
cd., .ooa), 8. Scn, A Diplomat´s Handbook of
International Law and Practice, (.
rd
cd., .o··), Nascimcnto c Silva, Diplomacy in
International Law, (.o·a).
· \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations ·cc UNTS o· (.o6.).
· According to thc UN Trcaty Scction http://untrcaty.un.org/¡nglish/trcaty.asp
(acc6c¡c.).
o !an 8rownlic, Principles of Public International Law, .¡a (6
th
cd., acc.).
.aa Chapter 4
lomatic mission rcprcscntcd an cxtcnsion ol thc scnding statc’s tcrritory) and
thc “rcprcscntativc charactcr” thcory (that thc diplomatic mission pcrsonificd
thc scnding statc) as having influcnccd thc dcvclopmcnt ol such privilcgcs and
immunitics. !t lound, howcvcr, that thc third thcory (“lunctional ncccssity” – thc
justification ol privilcgcs and immunitics on thc basis ol ncccssity lor a mission
to pcrlorm its lunctions) had bccomc morc important in modcrn timcs. Tc !LC
statcd that it “was guidcd by this third thcory in solving problcms on which prac
ticc gavc no clcar pointcrs, whilc also bcaring in mind thc rcprcscntativc charac
tcr ol thc hcad ol thc mission and ol thc mission itscll.”
+o

Privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to statcs and thcir diplomatic rcprcscnt
ativcs havc bccn contrastcd with thosc accordcd to intcrnational organisations
and thcir official pcrsonncl in that thc lormcr is rcgardcd as bcing “largcly bascd
on a thcory ol cquality, supportcd by thc principlc ol rcciprocity, and historically
rcflcctcd thc rcspcct Statcs had lor cach othcr’s sovcrcignty.”
++
Tc lattcr, on thc
othcr hand, is primarily bascd upon trcaty law. Tc privilcgcs and immunitics
accordcd to intcrnational organisations arc entirely bascd upon lunction and only
such privilcgcs and immunitics dccmcd ncccssary to lulfil thc lunctions ol an
intcrnational organisation can bc cxpcctcd.
+:

Tc influcncc ol both thc thcory ol lunctional ncccssity and thc rcprcscnta
tivc thcory on thc diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in thc \icnna
Convcntion, is rcflcctcd in its prcamblc. Tis statcs that “thc purposc ol such
privilcgcs and immunitics is not to bcncfit individuals but to cnsurc thc cfficicnt
pcrlormancc ol thc lunctions ol diplomatic missions as rcprcscnting statcs”.
+:

!t is apparcnt that thc thcory ol lunctional ncccssity has grcatly influcnccd
modcrn diplomatic law and it is thcrclorc ncccssary to asscss with which to rcgard
thc lunctions ol a diplomat.

Tc lunctions ol a diplomatic mission sccm limitcd
.c Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission covcring thc work thc work ol its
tcnth scssion, a· April – ¡ ]uly (.o··), Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
!!, ··, o¡o· (.o··). For critiquc ol thc lunctional ncccssity thcory, scc ]an Klabbcrs,
An Introduction to International Institutional Law, .6.o (acca).
.. C. F., Amcrasinghc, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations,
.6o (.oo6).
.a !bid., .·c.
.. \icnna Convcntion ¡
th
prcambular paragraph. 8rownlic finds that currcnt law is
influcnccd by both thc rcprcscntativc thcory and thc lunctional ncccssity approach.
8rownlic, .¡..
.¡ Tc lunctions ol a diplomatic mission consist, according to Articlc . ol thc \icnna
Convcntion, “intcr alia, in: (a) rcprcscnting thc scnding statc in thc rccciving statc,
(b) protccting in thc rccciving statc thc intcrcsts ol thc scnding statc and ol its
nationals, within thc limits pcrmittcd by intcrnational law, (c) ncgotiating with thc
govcrnmcnt ol thc rccciving statc, (d) asccrtaining by all lawlul mcans conditions
and dcvclopmcnts in thc rccciving statc, and rcporting thcrcon to thc govcrnmcnt ol
thc scnding statc, (c) promoting lricndly rclations bctwccn thc scnding statc and thc
rccciving statc, and dcvcloping thcir cconomic, cultural and scicntific rclations”.
.a. Special protection
to thc intcrcsts ol thc scnding statc and to maintaining amity with thc rccciv
ing statc. According to thc lunctional ncccssity approach, privilcgcs and immu
nitics arc limitcd to thc cfficicnt pcrlormancc ol thc lunctions ol diplomatic
agcnts. Tc clcmcnt ol rcciprocity in diplomatic law should also bc notcd in this
rcgard. Rcspcct lor thc cxtcnt ol diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics bccomcs
in a way scllrcgulatcd bccausc ol thc rcciprocal charactcr ol diplomatic law. Tc
vicw ol thc UK on thc importancc ol thc principlc ol rcciprocity in this rcspcct
was cxprcsscd in a Forcign Affairs Committcc Rcport. Tis was sct against thc
background ol thc usc ol thc Libyan Pcoplc’s 8urcau as a basc lor tcrrorism in
London in .o·¡. Tc rclcvant part ol thc rcport statcd “that thc privilcgcs and
immunitics opcratc to providc a vcry rcal protcction lor our diplomats and thcir
lamilics ovcrscas, and that action should not bc takcn which would cxposc thcm
to pcrsonal dangcr or makc thc carrying out ol thcir diplomatic tasks morc dil
ficult or cvcn impossiblc.”

Tc right ol thc scnding statc to appoint thc hcad ol mission is not unrc
strictcd. !t is conditional upon thc agrément ol thc rccciving ol that particular
pcrson.
+6
Tc rccciving statc may, without giving any rcasons lor its dccision, rclusc
to acccpt thc proposcd pcrson. Tc conscnt ol thc rccciving statc with rcgard to
appointmcnts ol hcads ol mission is closcly rclatcd to thc right ol rccciving statcs
to dcclarc any ol thc diplomatic staff persona non grata or any othcr mcmbcr ol
thc mission as bcing unacccptablc.


Tc privilcgcs and immunitics ol a diplomatic agcnt apply within thc tcr
ritory ol thc rccciving statc. Tis is only natural owing to thc lunctions ol dip
lomatic pcrsonncl. And lor similar rcasons, it is natural that thcsc privilcgcs and
immunitics arc not applicablc in thc scnding statc.
+8
Tc privilcgcs and immu
nitics that arc ol spccial importancc to this study arc primarily thosc rclating to
immunity lrom local jurisdiction and inviolability ol thc pcrson. A diplomatic
agcnt cnjoys immunity lrom local criminal jurisdiction. !mmunity lrom thc civil
and administrativc jurisdiction ol thc rccciving statc, howcvcr, is limitcd in ccr
tain cascs whcrc a diplomat acts in a privatc capacity.
+o
.· Foreign Affairs Committee Report, para. ·6 in Rosalyn Higgins, Tc Abusc ol
Ðiplomatic Privilcgcs and !mmunitics: Rcccnt Unitcd Kingdom ¡xpcricncc, ·o
AJIL 6¡., 6·c (.o··).
.6 Articlc ¡ ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
.· !bid., Articlc o.
.· Scc c.g. Articlc .. ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations stipulating
immunity ol criminal jurisdiction ol thc rccciving statc and which cxprcssly statcs
that thcrc is no cxcmption lrom scnding statc’s jurisdiction.
.o Scc Articlc .. ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
.a¡ Chapter 4
4.1.2 Diplomatic Agents
Tc principlc ol inviolability
:o
ol diplomatic agcnts is gcncrally rcgardcd to bc
at thc corc ol diplomatic law.
:+
Tc duty ol thc rccciving statc is twolold: to not
cxcrcisc local jurisdiction ovcr diplomatic agcnts and to protcct thcm against
attacks lrom third partics.
::
Òn thc first aspcct, thc duty ol thc rccciving statc to
abstain lrom any arrcst or dctcntion ol such agcnts has in thc past bccn honourcd
almost without cxccption.
::
A significant casc ol a brcach ol duty in this rcspcct
was thc unlawlul dctcntion by thc govcrnmcnt ol !ran ol diplomatic and consular
staff in thc US cmbassy in Tchcran in .o·o. Although thcrc arc lcw cascs whcrc
thc rccciving statc has arrcstcd or dctaincd a diplomatic agcnt, thcrc arc instanccs
whcrc diplomats havc bccn subjcct to ccrtain mcasurcs ol jurisdiction within thc
rccciving statc.


Ðiplomatic agents not liable to any form of arrest or detention
Tc practicc ol statcs on thc obligation to abstain lrom dctaining or arrcsting
diplomatic agcnts has bccn constantly positivc. Tc outstanding cxccption, as
mcntioncd carlicr, ol a brcach ol a statc’s duty in this rcspcct was thc unlawlul
dctcntion ol US diplomatic and consular staff. Tc !C] in thc US Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in the Tehran Case considcrcd thc dutics ol thc rccciving statc.


Tc Court lound that thc militants attacking thc cmbassy had no official status.
Tcir acts could not bc rcgardcd as bcing imputablc to thc statc ol !ran. Tcrc was
also no rcliablc cvidcncc that thcy had rcccivcd instructions or dircctions lrom
any compctcnt statc organ to carry out thc opcration on its bchall. Tis did not
ac “Tc pcrson ol a diplomatic agcnt shall bc inviolablc. Hc shall not bc liablc to any
lorm ol arrcst or dctcntion. Tc rccciving statc shall trcat him with duc rcspcct and
shall takc all appropriatc stcps to prcvcnt any attack on his pcrson, lrccdom or dig
nity.” Articlc ao ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
a. Scc Said Mahmoudi, Somc Rcmarks on Ðiplomatic !mmunity lrom Criminal
]urisdiction, Festskrift till Lars Hjerner, ..o ( ]an Rambcrg, Òvc 8ring, and Said
Mahmoudi, cds., .ooc), Franciszck Przctacnik, Protection of Officials of Foreign States
according to International Law, .. (.o·.), Ðcnza, a.c.
aa ]ohn Lawrcncc Hargrovc, Sccurity ol Ðiplomats as a Problcm ol !ntcrnational
Community Policy, in Diplomacy in a Dangerous World. Protection for Diplomats under
International Law, .·, a· (Natalic Kaulman Hcvcncr cd., .o·6).
a. Ðcnza, a.·.
a¡ Tc status ol diplomatic agcnts docs not cxcludc thc nccd to scarch all airlinc pas
scngcrs. Airlincs arc not rcquircd to takc passcngcrs, including diplomats, who rclusc
a sccurity scarch. !bid., a.·.
a· Casc Conccrning Unitcd Statcs Ðiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tchran (Unitcd
Statcs ol Amcrica v !ran) .o·c, !C] Rcp .. Òn ¡ Novcmbcr .o·o thc cmbassy ol thc
Unitcd Statcs ol Amcrica in Tchran was occupicd by hundrcds ol militant studcnts
and othcr dcmonstrators protcsting ovcr thc lact that thc lormcr Shah ol !ran had
bccn givcn mcdical trcatmcnt in thc Unitcd Statcs.
.a· Special protection
mcan, thc Court rulcd, that thc statc ol !ran was not in brcach ol its obligations
stipulatcd in thc \icnna Convcntion, as wcll as undcr gcncral intcrnational law.
!t lound !ran to bc in brcach ol its lcgal obligation to takc “appropriatc stcps” to
protcct thc mission and its prcmiscs.
:6
!naction by thc govcrnmcnt ol !ran, in
this rcspcct, “constitutcd a clcar and scrious violation” ol its obligations undcr thc
\icnna Convcntion, including Articlc ao.

Vhcn thc occupation bccamc a lact
with diplomatic pcrsonncl bcing hcld against thcir will, thc duty ol thc govcrn
mcnt ol !ran undcr both thc provisions ol thc \icnna Convcntion and gcncral
intcrnational law was “manilcst”, thc Court rulcd. Tc duty ol thc govcrnmcnt ol
!ran was to “at oncc to makc cvcry cffort, and to takc cvcry appropriatc stcp, to
bring thcsc flagrant inlringcmcnts ol thc inviolability ol thc prcmiscs, archivcs
and diplomatic and consular staff ol thc Unitcd Statcs ¡mbassy to a spccdy
cnd”
:8
. !nstcad “thc scal ol official govcrnmcnt approval” was sct by a dccrcc by
Ayatollah Khomcini, cxprcssing thc approval ol thc continucd occupation ol thc
cmbassy.
:o
Tis act thcrclorc translatcd into an act ol thc statc that accordcd thc
militants thc status ol agcnts ol thc statc ol !ran.
:o

Anothcr cxamplc was thc Swcdish diplomat Raoul Vallcnbcrg, who was
arrcstcd by Sovict Union lorccs in Hungary in .o¡· and kcpt in prison until hc,
rcportcdly, dicd ol natural courscs in .o¡·. !n .o·· a rclativc ol thc diplomat pur
sucd thc casc in a US district court, which, altcr finding thc ncccssary basis ol
jurisdiction, hcld that thc inlringcmcnt ol thc inviolability ol Mr Vallcnbcrg was
a “clcar violation ol thc law ol nations”.
:+
Vhilc it appcars to bc a wcllcstablishcd rulc ol intcrnational law that dip
lomatic agcnts must not bc liablc to any lorm ol arrcst or dctcntion, thcrc has
cmcrgcd a dcvcloping practicc ol cxccptions to this rulc. Tis rclatcs to situa
tions whcrc diplomatic agcnts constitutc a dangcr to othcr pcoplc, lrcqucntly
with rcgard to drunkcn driving.
::
Arrcst and dctcntion may also bc bascd upon
a right ol sclldclcncc and ncccssity. Tc !LC hcld thc lollowing vicw in thc
Commcntary to its dralt Articlc: “8cing inviolablc, thc diplomatic agcnt is
cxcmptcd lrom ccrtain mcasurcs that would amount to dircct cocrcion. Tis
principlc docs not cxcludc cithcr sclldclcncc or, in cxccptional circumstanccs,
a6 !bid., para. 6..
a· !bid., para. 6·.
a· !bid., para. 6o.
ao !bid., paras. ·.·¡.
.c Tc lact that this action was takcn by thc statc itscll, and not by privatc individuals,
was somcthing that thc Court lound to bc uniquc – and particularly troublcsomc.
.. \on Ðardcl v USSR, Unitcd Statcs Ðistrict Court, Ðistrict ol Columbia, .· Òctobcr
.o··, ·· !LR a··, a6..
.a According to Ðcnza, it is standard policc practicc in thc Unitcd Statcs and thc UK
to rcstrain diplomatic agcnts, driving undcr thc influcncc ol alcohol, lrom lurthcr
driving and to makc arrangcmcnts lor thcir salc transport by othcr mcans. Ðcnza,
a.o.
.a6 Chapter 4
mcasurcs to prcvcnt thc diplomatic agcnt lrom committing crimcs or offcnccs.”
::

A proposal at thc \icnna Conlcrcncc to incorporatc thc tcxt ol thc commcntary
into thc proposcd articlc was rcjcctcd, supposcdly on thc grounds that it was
unncccssary and could crcatc ambiguitics with rcgard to thc right ol sclldclcncc
in rclation to othcr provisions ol thc convcntion.

!n thc Tehran Case thc !C] supportcd thc right ol sclldclcncc as an cxccp
tion to thc rulc against any lorm ol arrcst or dctcntion ol diplomatic agcnts. Tc
Court hcld that thc principlc ol inviolability could not bc intcrprctcd to mcan
“that a diplomatic agcnt caught in thc act ol committing an assault or othcr
offcncc may not, on occasion, bc bricfly arrcstcd by thc policc ol thc rccciving
Statc in ordcr to prcvcnt thc commission ol thc particular crimc”.

Vhilc thc obligation to rclrain lrom any arrcst or dctcntion ol diplomatic
agcnts appcars to bc part ol gcncral intcrnational law, it should bc notcd that this
obligation is not absolutc. !t allows a littlc room lor manocuvrc lor thc authori
tics ol thc rccciving statc to takc thc ncccssary mcasurcs to prcvcnt a crimc, cspc
cially whcn livcs arc at risk.
:6
Tis limitcd room ol cxccption is ol importancc in
thosc pcacc opcrations whcrc pcrsonncl, including mcmbcrs ol military contin
gcnts, cnjoy privilcgcs and immunitics cquivalcnt to thosc ol diplomatic agcnts.
Pcrsonncl with cxccutivc tasks naturally find thcmsclvcs in situations whcrc thcy
would somctimcs nccd to usc lorcc. !l thc proposcd lorcc lookcd likc bcing cxccs
sivc in rclation to attaining thc objcctivc, govcrnmcntal authoritics might wcll bc
cntitlcd to takc action to prcvcnt a criminal act.
Prevention of attacks on the person, freedom or dignity
According to Articlc ao ol thc \icnna Convcntion, rccciving statcs “shall takc all
appropriatc stcps to prcvcnt any attack” on diplomatic agcnts. Tc duty ol rccciv
ing statcs to protcct diplomatic agcnts lrom attacks by third partics has morc or
lcss bccn takcn lor grantcd, and prior to thc \icnna Convcntion thc issuc was
not much discusscd or dcbatcd.

8ut whcn diplomatic agcnts bccamc targcts lor
murdcr and kidnap, particularly in thc .o6cs and carly .o·cs, thc cxtcnt ol thc
obligation to afford protcction against attacks bccamc highly topical. Tc kid
napping ol thc Vcst Gcrman ambassador to Guatcmala, Count von Sprcti, is a
casc in point. Tc kidnappcrs said thcir hostagc would bc lrccd upon thc rclcasc
.. Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission covcring thc work ol its ninth scssion,
a. April – a· ]unc (.o··), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, !!, ..., ..·
(.o··).
.¡ Ðcnza, a...
.· Casc Conccrning Unitcd Statcs Ðiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tchran (Unitcd
Statcs ol Amcrica v !ran) .o·c, !C] Rcp ., para. ·6.
.6 8. S. Murty, Te International Law of Diplomacy. Te Diplomatic Instrument and World
Public Order, .·a (.o·o).
.· Ðcnza, a.a.
.a· Special protection
ol prisoncrs and thc paymcnt ol a ransom. Tc govcrnmcnt ol Guatcmala rcluscd
to givc way on thc grounds that it would violatc national lcgislation and cndangcr
thc sccurity ol thc nation. Tc govcrnmcnt ol thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol Gcrmany
hcld that Guatcmala was undcr an obligation to do whatcvcr it took to sccurc thc
ambassador’s rclcasc. Hc was subscqucntly murdcrcd and Gcrmany hcld thc statc
ol Guatcmala rcsponsiblc, asscrting that it had violatcd its obligations undcr thc
\icnna Convcntion.
:8
Òn othcr occasions, govcrnmcnts had mct thc dcmands ol kidnappcrs.
Tc rcsult was a dramatic risc in thc numbcr ol hostagcs takcn and it bccamc
apparcnt “that a policy ol capitulating to unlawlul dcmands was not an inhcrcnt
rcquircmcnt ol Articlc ao ol thc \icnna Convcntion”.
:o
Although thc kidnap
ping ol diplomats bccamc lcss lrcqucnt altcr .o·., possibly bccausc ol thc ncw
policy ol Vcstcrn govcrnmcnts ol rcjccting thc dcmands ol kidnappcrs, a collcc
tivc rcsponsc was still nccdcd. Tc UN Gcncral Asscmbly rcqucstcd thc !LC to
prcparc dralt articlcs on thc protcction ol diplomatic agcnts and othcr pcrsons
cntitlcd to spccial protcction undcr intcrnational law.
±o
Tc rcsponsc by thc UN to attacks on diplomatic agcnts was in many
rcspccts a modcl lor how thc UN would rcspond to thc dclibcratc onslaughts
upon its pcrsonncl during thc carly .oocs, and lcd to thc crcation ol thc Salcty
Convcntion.
Immunity from jurisdiction
!mmunity lrom criminal jurisdiction ol diplomatic agcnts is wcll cstablishcd in
intcrnational law and appcars to lcavc no room lor cxccptions.
±+
!n contrast to
immunity lrom civil jurisdiction, thcrc arc no conditions attachcd to immunity
lrom criminal jurisdiction. Tcrc is, in thc \icnna Convcntion, no qualifica
tion with rcgard to crimcs in rcspcct ol thcir gravity. Ðiplomatic immunity lrom
criminal jurisdiction, undcr thc \icnna Convcntion, is absolutc. !mmunity lor
socallcd corc crimcs (such as war crimcs and crimcs against humanity) must,
.· !bid., a.. Scc ]crzy Sztucki, Somc Rcflcctions on thc \on Sprcti Casc, ¡c Nordisk
Tidsskrift for International Ret .· (.o·c). Òn thc intcrprctation ol “appropriatc stcps”,
Sztucki notcs that what is appropriatc must bc judgcd in rclation to thc circum
stanccs. !t is, howcvcr, thc rccciving statc that dccidcs on what mcasurcs nccd to bc
takcn. !bid., aaa..
.o Ðcnza, a...
¡c !bid., a.¡. Tis was to bccomc thc Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol
Crimcs against !ntcrnationally Protcctcd Pcrsons.
¡. Articlc .. ol thc \icnna Convcntion statcs: “A diplomatic agcnt shall cnjoy immu
nity lrom thc criminal jurisdiction ol thc rccciving statc.” !t sccms, howcvcr, that
somc writcrs havc tricd to approach thc mattcr in diffcrcnt ways, particularly in thc
ninctccnth ccntury, ranging lrom a total abolition ol diplomatic immunitics to thosc
rccognising thc nccd lor such immunity but prcscnt somc cxccptions to thc rulc. Scc
Nascimcnto c Silva, .a.a.
.a· Chapter 4
undcr ccrtain conditions, yicld to thc highcr intcrcsts ol punishing thosc rcspon
siblc lor criminality ol that naturc. !t should bc notcd that thc !CC statutc makcs
no cxccption lor immunitics accordcd to diplomatic agcnts, hcads ol statcs, or
mcmbcrs ol govcrnmcnts.
±:
!ncumbcnt ministcrs ol lorcign affairs and hcads ol
statc may, howcvcr, cnjoy somc sort ol immunity during thcir timcs in officc.
According to a dccision by thc !C] in acca, such officials may, in lact, cnjoy
immunity lrom thc conscqucnccs ol official acts, cvcn altcr lcaving officc. Tis
ruling has bccn thc subjcct ol criticism.
±:

Tc immunity bcstowcd rcprcscnts lrccdom lrom subjcction to thc cxcrcisc
ol local jurisdiction. !t docs not mcan immunity lrom thc obligation to rcspcct
thc law ol thc rccciving statc. Tc diplomatic agcnt cnjoys immunity lrom lcgal
proccss but may still bc liablc undcr thc law.
±±
Tc lact that thc !ranian authori
tics threatened to put US cmbassy staff on trial, lcd thc !C] to statc that il thosc
thrcats had bccn “put into cffcct, that would constitutc a gravc brcach by !ran ol
its obligations undcr Articlc .., paragraph . ol thc .o6. \icnna Convcntion.”
±¡
Òppcnhcim concludcs that Articlc .. ol thc \icnna Convcntion confirms
thc cstablishcd rulc “that rccciving statcs havc no right, in any circumstanccs
whatcvcr, to prosccutc and punish diplomatic agcnts.”
±6
Tcrc is, howcvcr, an obli
gation to rcspcct local laws and rcgulations
±·
and diplomatic agcnts arc prcsumcd
to bchavc accordingly. Rcpcatcd bchaviour contrary to local law will cvcntually
lcad to a rcqucst lor thc rccall ol offcnding diplomatic agcnts by thc rccciving
statc. Tcrc sccms to bc no controvcrsy on thc immunity lrom criminal jurisdic
tion ol thc rccciving statc and Articlc .. paragraph . ol thc \icnna Convcntion
rcflccts thc wcllcstablishcd position in intcrnational customary law.
±8

¡a Articlc a· ol thc !CC Statutc.
¡. Casc Conccrning thc Arrcst Varrant ol April .. accc (Ðcmocratic Rcpublic ol
thc Congo v 8clgium) acca, !C] Rcp .. Scc, lor cxamplc, Antonio Casscsc, Vhcn
May Scnior Statc Òfficials 8c Tricd lor !ntcrnational Crimcs: Somc Commcnts on
thc Congo v 8clgium Casc, .. EJIL ··. (acca), Stcffcn Virth, !mmunity lor Corc
Crimcs: Tc !C]’s ]udgmcnt in thc Congo v. 8clgium Casc, .. EJIL ··· (acca).
¡¡ Scc Mahmoudi, ..·.
¡· Casc Conccrning Unitcd Statcs Ðiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tchran (Unitcd
Statcs ol Amcrica v !ran) .o·c, !C] Rcp ., para. ·o. According to Scn, immunity
lrom local jurisdiction “is absolutc, and hc cannot undcr any circumstanccs bc tricd
or punishcd by thc local criminal courts ol thc country to which hc is accrcditcd.”
Scn, ..6.
¡6 Oppenheim’s International Law, \ol, ., .co·6 (lootnotcs omittcd).
¡· Articlc ¡. ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
¡· Scc lor instancc 8rownlic, .·..
.ao Special protection
Waiver of immunity
Tc scnding statc rctains thc right to waivc thc immunity ol thc diplomatic agcnt.
Such a waivcr must always bc cxprcss.
±o
Ðiplomatic immunity rcsidcs ultimatcly
with thc scnding statc, not with thc individual. !t is thcrclorc only thc scnding
statc that posscsscs thc authority to waivc immunity. !t is, howcvcr, unusual lor
scnding statcs to waivc thc immunity ol diplomatic agcnts in cascs ol crimc. Tc
rcasons lor not waiving immunity oltcn rclatc to diffcrcnccs bctwccn lcgal sys
tcms, thc pcrccivcd risks ol thcrc not bcing an impartial lcgal proccss and thc
possiblc punishmcnt itscll. !t is instcad customary to rccall thc diplomatic agcnt
conccrncd whcn a rcqucst lor waivcr ol immunity is prcscntcd by thc rccciving
statc.
¡o
Tc waivcr institutc is ol particular intcrcst with rcgard to pcacc opcrations
whcrc mcmbcrs ol military contingcnts arc accordcd privilcgcs and immunitics
cquivalcnt to thosc ol diplomatic agcnts. !l thc right to waivc thc immunitics
ol such pcrsonncl lorms part ol thcir status, thcn which cntity would havc this
right: Vould it bclong to thc organisation lcading thc opcration or to scnding
statcs: Tc lunction ol thcsc immunitics would assumc thc lormcr, but thc naturc
ol thc diplomatic immunitics suggcsts thc lattcr.
Persona non grata
Tc rccciving statc may at any timc, without having to cxplain its dccision, dcclarc
a diplomatic agcnt persona non grata.
¡+
According to Ðcnza, thc persona non grata
institutc has provcd to bc thc kcy instrumcnt lor rccciving statcs to protcct thcm
sclvcs lrom activitics in contravcntion ol diplomatic lunctions and balanccs in a
propcr way thc immunitics conlcrrcd upon diplomatic agcnts.
¡:
For diplomatic
agcnts involvcd in criminal activity rccciving statcs usually makc a rcqucst lor a
waivcr ol immunity. !n situations whcrc a waivcr is not grantcd it is thc practicc
ol somc statcs to dcclarc thc diplomatic agcnt persona non grata. Tc lact that
no rcasons nccd to bc lurnishcd whcn dcclaring a diplomatic agcnt persona non
grata, is in this way balanccd il thc rccciving statc is prcparcd to initiatc pro
cccdings against thc diplomat in qucstion. !n thc United States Guidance for Law
Enforcement Officers, issucd in .o··, it is morcovcr cxprcssly statcd that givcn thc
lact that thc Unitcd Statcs is a socicty govcrncd by thc rulc ol law it is ncccssary
that any usc ol thc persona non grata instrumcnt must bc ablc to bc dclcndcd “in
appropriatc dctail”.
¡:
Statcs gcncrally usc this instrumcnt with carc, and only in
rclation to scrious violations ol local laws and rcgulations.
¡±
¡o Articlc .a ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
·c Mahmoudi, .·..
·. Articlc o ol thc \icnna Convcntion.
·a Ðcnza, 6a.
·. !bid., 6o·c.
·¡ Mahmoudi, .·¡.
..c Chapter 4
Again, this is an intcrcsting aspcct in rclation to thosc ¡Ulcd opcrations
whcrc mcmbcrs ol military contingcnts cnjoy privilcgcs and immunitics cquiva
lcnt to thosc ol diplomatic agcnts.
4.1.3 Conclusions
Tc privilcgcs and immunitics ol diplomatic agcnts sccm to bc undisputcd.
Vhilc thcrc is somc room lor limitcd cxccptions to thc rulc against dctcntion
with rcgard to acts that put othcrs in dangcr, immunity lrom local criminal juris
diction appcars not to allow any cxccptions. Tc naturc ol diplomatic privilcgcs
and immunitics will bc ol lcss importancc so long as thcir status is propcrly
protcctcd. !n cascs whcrc thcir lcgal status is in doubt, thc naturc ol thcir privi
lcgcs and immunitics could, howcvcr, bc ol importancc. Tc thcory ol lunctional
ncccssity, with influcnccs ol thc rcprcscntativc charactcr thcory, providcs thc basis
lor diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics. Tc rcciprocal clcmcnt is also a char
actcristic ol diplomatic law. Vhcthcr or not, it is right and propcr to cxtcnd dip
lomatic privilcgcs and immunitics to pcrsonncl not having a diplomatic lunction
nor rcprcscnting a statc, rcquircs cvaluation. Vhat in cffcct docs it mcan to bc
accordcd “trcatmcnt, including immunitics and privilcgcs, cquivalcnt to that ol
diplomatic agcnts.”:
¡¡
!s it at all possiblc to takc a part out ol a carclully dcvcl
opcd systcm and thcn apply it to pcrsonncl not conncctcd to thc tasks ol diplo
matic agcnts: Such issucs will bc thc subjcct ol considcration within thc contcxt
ol ¡Ulcd pcacc opcrations.
¡.a International Privileges and Immunities
Provided by Multilateral Treaties
Pcrsonncl rcprcscnting intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations arc cndowcd
with privilcgcs and immunitics similar to thosc ol diplomatic pcrsonncl, but dil
lcrcnt in naturc.
¡6
!ntcrnational organisations play a significant rolc in thc main
tcnancc ol pcacc and sccurity. Tc most promincnt organisation in this rcgard,
ol coursc, is thc Unitcd Nations. 8ut many othcr intcrnational organisations
arc today also involvcd in supporting pcaccrclatcd initiativcs and in allcviat
ing human suffcring. Tcsc bodics arc mainly nongovcrnmcntal organisations
(NGÒs) that do not havc thc authority to grant thcir pcrsonncl spccial privi
·· Articlc 6 ol thc Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡uropcan Union and thc Formcr Yugoslav
Rcpublic ol Maccdonia on thc status ol thc ¡uropcan Unionlcd lorccs in thc
Formcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia.
·6 Historically, intcrnational organisations arc a rclativcly ncw conccpt. Tc first signs
ol thc nccd lor a lorum whcrc problcms affccting scvcral statcs could bc solvcd wcrc
thc ad hoc intcrnational conlcrcnccs, rcsulting inter alia in thc Pcacc ol Vcstphalia
.6¡·, thc cnd ol thc Napolconic wars in .·.· through thc Congrcss ol \icnna, and
thc Trcaty ol \crsaillcs .o.o.
... Special protection
lcgcs and immunitics. Ònly ccrtain govcrnmcntal organisations could posscss
this authority ol affording individuals rcprcscnting thcm, spccific privilcgcs and
immunitics within thc tcrritorics ol thc mcmbcr statcs conccrncd. Mcmbcr statcs
cxcrcisc thcir sovcrcignty by admitting agcnts ol an organisation into thcir tcrri
torics by adhcring to thc lcgal norms cxprcsscd in thc organisation’s constitution
or to a spccial convcntion stipulating thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol individu
als acting on bchall ol thc organisation. Clcarly, nongovcrnmcntal organisations
do not posscss thc authority lor cndowing thcir pcrsonncl with privilcgcs and
immunitics applicablc in thc tcrritory ol statcs that arc not, by thc vcry naturc ol
nongovcrnmcntal organisations, mcmbcrs ol such organisations.
Vhilc thc law ol diplomatic privilcgc and immunity may bc rcgardcd as
bcing as old as intcrnational law itscll, thc samc cannot bc said ol privilcgcs and
immunitics accordcd to officials ol intcrnational organisations.
¡·
From an his
toric point ol vicw, thc lcgal basis providing such privilcgcs and immunitics is
lundamcntally diffcrcnt. Ðiplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to statc
agcnts arc bascd upon customary intcrnational law, whilc thosc accordcd to intcr
national officials arc bascd upon trcaty law.
¡8
Vhcn statcs dccidc to lorm an intcrnational organisation lor a ccrtain pur
posc, that organisation may acquirc a lcgal pcrsonality ol its own, such as thc
UN.
¡o
For an intcrnational organisation to posscss intcrnational lcgal pcrsonal
ity mcans that it is cntitlcd to acquirc ccrtain rights and othcr attributcs distinct
lrom its mcmbcr statcs.
6o
!n thc Reparation Case, thc !C] lound thc UN to bc an
organisation having intcrnational pcrsonality. Tc Court rulcd that this was sub
jcct to ccrtain distinctions. Tc UN could not bc rcgardcd as bcing a statc, nor
could it posscss rights or assumc dutics in a similar way to statcs. Nor could it bc
rcgardcd as bcing a supcr statc. According to thc Court it did not
cvcn imply that all rights and dutics must bc upon thc intcrnational planc, any
morc than all thc rights and dutics ol a Statc must bc upon that planc. Vhat it
docs mcan is that it is a subjcct ol intcrnational law and capablc ol posscssing
intcrnational rights and dutics.
6+
Vhilc intcrnational organisations may not bc rcgardcd as bcing imbucd with
similar rights and dutics as thosc ol statcs, it docs not mcan that in somc aspccts
·· King, a·.
·· For an ovcrvicw ol thc position ol intcrnational officials prior to thc UN Chartcr
and thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol Pcrsonncl ol thc Unitcd
Nations (.o¡6), scc King, a·.·a.
·o Rcparation lor !njurics Suffcrcd in thc Scrvicc ol thc Unitcd Nations, (Advisory
Òpinion) .o¡o, !C] Rcp .·¡.
6c Amcrasinghc, ··.
6. Reparation case, .·o.
..a Chapter 4
thc functions ol intcrnational organisations may not bc similar to thosc ol statcs.
To bc ablc to cxcrcisc such lunctions cffcctivcly, intcrnational organisations nccd
to providc thcir officials and agcnts with thc ncccssary privilcgcs and immuni
tics. Tcsc arc on an intcrnational planc, bctwccn thc organisations and statcs, but
thcir cffccts may bc sccn primarily on thc planc ol national law. Tcsc privilcgcs
and immunitics involvc protccting thc agcnts ol organisations against thc influ
cncc ol statcs in thc subjcction ol agcnts to national law. Statcs thcrclorc nccd to
stipulatc in thcir national laws thc ncccssary provisions so as to givc cffcct to thc
privilcgcs and immunitics such agcnts havc bccn affordcd on thc intcrnational
planc. Tcsc privilcgcs and immunitics arc primarily obtaincd by an organisa
tion’s mcmbcr statcs through its constitutivc instrumcnt or through a spccial con
vcntion.
6:
Vhat arc thc ncccssary critcria to bc mct lor an intcrnational organisa
tion to bc rcgardcd as bcing an intcrnational pcrson: !n thc Reparation Case, thc
!C] took a primarily inductivc approach by cstablishing ccrtain lacts and lrom
thcm drcw thc conclusion that thc UN had lcgal pcrsonality.
6:
Tough thc Court
strcsscd thc lact that thc UN was thc suprcmc organisation cndowcd with partic
ularly important lunctions, it is now gcncrally acccptcd that othcr organisations
also posscss intcrnational pcrsonality.

!n thc UN Chartcr thc only cxplicit cvi
dcncc ol intcrnational pcrsonality is to bc lound in Articlc .c¡ whcrc it is statcd
that “|t|hc Òrganization shall cnjoy in thc tcrritory ol cach ol its Mcmbcrs such
lcgal capacity as may bc ncccssary lor thc cxcrcisc ol its lunctions and thc lulfil
mcnt ol its purposcs.” An intcrnational organisation may thus havc lcgal pcrson
ality rccogniscd by its mcmbcrs and cffcctivc in rclation to thc national laws ol
its mcmbcr statcs. !n thc Reparation Case thc situation upon which thc rcqucst
lor an Advisory Òpinion was bascd, involvcd an intcrnational organisation (thc
UN) and a nonmcmbcr statc (!sracl). Tc findings ol thc Court with rcgard to
thc lcgal pcrsonality ol thc UN arc thcrclorc rclcvant as bctwccn intcrnational
organisations and nonmcmbcr statcs.


6a Philippc Sands and Picrrc Klcin, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, ¡·6 (·
th

cd., acc.).
6. Tc Court rulcd that “thc organisation was intcndcd to cxcrcisc and cnjoy, and is in
lact cxcrcising and cnjoying, lunctions and rights which can only bc cxplaincd on
thc basis ol thc posscssion ol a largc mcasurc ol intcrnational pcrsonality and thc
capacity to opcratc upon an intcrnational planc. !t is at prcscnt thc suprcmc typc ol
intcrnational organisation, and it could not carry out thc intcntions ol its loundcrs il
it was dcvoid ol intcrnational pcrsonality. !t must bc acknowlcdgcd that its mcmbcrs,
by cntrusting ccrtain lunctions to it, with thc attcndant dutics and rcsponsibilitics,
havc clothcd it with thc compctcncc rcquircd to cnablc thosc lunctions to bc cffcc
tivcly dischargcd.” Reparation Case, .·o.
6¡ Sands and Klcin, ¡·a. Schcrmcrs and 8lokkcr, International Institutional Law, para.
.·6· (.
rd
cd., .oo·).
6· Most intcrnational organisations that havc bccn cstablishcd sincc thc cnd ol thc
Sccond Vorld Var havc bccn conccrncd with assuming a lcgal pcrsonality in rcla
... Special protection
!s rccognition ol nonmcmbcr statcs ncccssary lor an intcrnational organisa
tion to havc lcgal pcrsonality visavis thosc statcs: Amcrasinghc finds that thcrc
arc no rcccnt cxamplcs whcrc nonmcmbcr statcs havc rcluscd to acccpt thc lcgal
pcrsonality ol an intcrnational organisation on thc grounds that it had not rccog
niscd it as an intcrnational pcrson.
66
¡vcn il thc Court in thc Reparation Case had
not dcalt with thc issuc ol rccognition cxplicitly, subscqucnt practicc appcars to
point only to thc lulfilmcnt ol ccrtain basic critcria in ordcr to achicvc thc status
ol intcrnational pcrsonality. Applying thc analogy ol statchood, Amcrasinghc
finds that no similar practicc cxists ol rccognition with rcgard to intcrnational
organisations on thc intcrnational planc. !nstcad, it is a qucstion ol lacts.


As an intcrnational pcrson, thc organisation conccrncd may obtain intcr
national rights and dutics.
68
Tc ability to cxtcnd privilcgcs and immunitics to
officials and agcnts acting on bchall ol thc intcrnational organisation is thus onc
effect ol thc acquircd intcrnational pcrsonality. Tc privilcgcs and immunitics pro
vidcd to officials ol an intcrnational organisation diffcr markcdly, howcvcr, lrom
thosc affordcd to diplomatic pcrsonncl rcprcscnting a statc. As obscrvcd in thc
prcvious chaptcr, diplomatic agcnts ol a statc act on bchall ol a spccific govcrn
mcnt whilc intcrnational officials and cxpcrts act on bchall ol all statcs mcmbcrs
ol an intcrnational organisation. Tc lact that thcsc intcrnational lunctionar
ics rcprcscnt thc intcrcsts ol all mcmbcr statcs cnablcs thcm to bc indcpcndcnt
ol national jurisdictions including, unlikc diplomatic agcnts, thosc ol thcir own
statcs. Vhcn an intcrnational official is postcd within his own statc’s jurisdiction,
this may bccomc vcry clcar. !n that rcspcct, thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol an
tion to thcir mcmbcr statcs. Tc custom ol cxplicitly assuming an intcrnational lcgal
pcrsonality, howcvcr, has bccomc morc lrcqucnt. Sands and Klcin, ¡·.. 8ccausc no
common rccogniscd proccss cxists lor cstablishing whcthcr or not an intcrnational
organisation posscsscs an intcrnational pcrsonality, thc primary tcst is onc ol lunc
tion. 8rownlic summariscs thc critcria lor cstablishing thc lcgal pcrsonality ol intcr
national organisations, which hc bascs mainly upon thc Advisory Òpinion ol thc
!C] in thc Reparation Case, on thrcc points: “.. a pcrmancnt association ol statcs,
with lawlul objccts, cquippcd with organs, a. a distinction, in tcrms ol lcgal powcrs
and purposcs, bctwccn thc organization and its mcmbcr statcs, .. thc cxistcncc ol
lcgal powcrs cxcrcisablc on thc intcrnational planc and not solcly within thc national
systcms ol onc or morc statcs.” 8rownlic, 6¡o. For othcr, in csscncc, similar critcria,
scc Finn Scycrstcd, !ntcrnational Pcrsonality ol !ntcrgovcrnmcntal Òrganisations, ¡
Indian Journal of International Law ·. (.o6¡), and Amcrasinghc, ·.
66 !bid., ·6.
6· !bid., ··, o.. Tc acccptancc ol an intcrnational organisation’s lcgal pcrsonality in
national law may bc subjcct to diffcrcnt critcria.
6· Tc tcrms “intcrnational” pcrsons and “lcgal” pcrsons will bc uscd intcrchangcably
without implying a diffcrcncc in mcaning.
..¡ Chapter 4
intcrnational official arc morc cxtcnsivc than thosc ol a diplomatic agcnt, sincc
thc lattcr do not cnjoy immunity lrom national jurisdiction.
6o

Tc rcciprocal clcmcnt, so important in thc protcction ol diplomatic agcnts,
docs not cxist in rclation to intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics. Tc basis lor
thc lattcr is instcad onc ol lunctional ncccssity. According to thc !C], thc naturc
and limitations ol thc intcrnational rights and dutics acquircd by an intcrnational
organisation nccds to bc judgcd against thc ncccssity ol discharging its lunctions
(lunctional ncccssity).
·o

Vhilc thc lunctional thcory is rcgardcd as bcing thc currcnt justification
lor diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics “|t|hc lunctional basis lor immunitics
is cvcn morc cmphatically rccogniscd in thc casc ol privilcgcs and immunitics ol
intcrnational organisations”.
·+
According to ]cnks, “thc currcnt régimc ol intcr
national immunitics has bccn cvolvcd as thc rcsult ol thorough appraisal by gov
crnmcnts ol thc lunctional nccds ol cffcctivc intcrnational organisations. !t is
thcsc lunctional nccds which constitutc both thc justification lor and thc mcas
urc ol intcrnational immunitics.”
·:
Tc cnjoymcnt ol privilcgcs and immunitics
arc thcrclorc not intcndcd lor pcrsonal bcncfit, but lor thc bcncfit ol thc organi
sation itscll.
·:
Tc lunctional ncccssity tcst is thus a lundamcntal tcst lor thc
naturc and limitations ol thc rights and dutics gcncrally affordcd an intcrnational
organisation, and thc privilcgcs and immunitics in particular.
Tc obvious problcm lacing anyonc intcnding to analysc thc contcnt and
practicc ol intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics is that thcrc is no singlc con
6o Ðavid 8. Michacls, International Privileges and Immunities. A Case for a Universal
Statute, .6..6¡ (.o·.). Scc Articlc ..(¡) ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic
Rclations.
·c Reparation Case, .·c. !n a scparatc opinion in thc WHO Agreement Case, ]udgc Gros
statcd that “cach intcrnational organization has only thc compctcncc which has bccn
conlcrrcd on it by thc Statcs which loundcd it, and its powcrs arc strictly limitcd to
whatcvcr is ncccssary to pcrlorm thc lunctions which its constitutivc chartcr has
dcfincd. Tis is thus a competence d’attribution, i.c., only such compctcncc as Statcs
havc “attributcd” to thc organization.” !ntcrprctation ol thc Agrccmcnt ol a· March
.o·. bctwccn thc VHÒ and ¡gypt (Advisory Òpinion) .o·c, !C] Rcp ·.. .c.. !n this
rcspcct thc Court did not havc anothcr opinion.
·. Ð. V. 8owctt, United Nations Forces. A Legal Study of United Nations Practice, ¡.a. Hc
rclcrs to Articlc .c· ol thc UN Chartcr, (.o6¡).
·a C. Villrcd ]cnks, International immunities, xxxviixxxviii , (.o6.).
·. Tc lunctional tcst bcing thc basis lor thc immunitics lcads to “(.) that thc pcrsons
cntitlcd to thc immunitics arc ncvcrthclcss obligcd to comply with local law, (a) that
thcrc should bc somc proccdurc lor mccting just claims in rcspcct ol which immu
nity may bc claimcd including, possibly, somc provisions lor waiving thc immunity
conccrncd. Tc ncccssity lor waivcr is grcatcr in thc casc ol an intcrnational official
who is cntitlcd to lull immunitics than in thc casc ol a diplomat lor thc rcason that
thcrc is no ‘scnding’ Statc, thc courts ol which would havc jurisdiction ovcr thc indi
vidual.” 8owctt, ¡.a..
..· Special protection
vcntion,
·±
such as thc \icnna Convcntion lor Ðiplomatic Agcnts. !nstcad cach
intcrnational organisation has its own constitution, and possiblc convcntions,
affording thcir agcnts with privilcgcs and immunitics. Howcvcr, thc UN Chartcr
has had a prcccdcntial cffcct upon thc constitutions ol intcrnational organisa
tions, ol both univcrsal and rcgional charactcr, in thc way that thc privilcgcs and
immunitics adoptcd arc mcasurcd against a principlc ol lunctional ncccssity.
·¡

Tis principlc, as cstablishcd in Articlc .c· ol thc Chartcr, has bccn introduccd
“into all major status convcntions and has sincc bccomc a lundamcntal rulc ol thc
wholc systcm ol intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics.”
·6
Tc main rolc playcd
by thc UN as an intcrnational organisation in thc maintcnancc ol intcrnational
pcacc and sccurity and thc considcrablc numbcr ol its pcrsonncl involvcd in this
ficld, cmphasiscs thc importancc ol thc UN Chartcr and its Articlc .c·, as docs
thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations (thc
Gcncral Convcntion).
··
Tcsc instrumcnts will thcrclorc dctcrminc thc basis lor
this bricl study ol intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics providcd by multilat
cral trcatics.
4.2.1 Scope of Application
Tc currcnt law on intcrnational immunitics is csscntially convcntional in naturc.
According to Zacklin, thc nccd to invokc customary law or gcncral principlcs ol
law scldom occurs.
·8
Hc dividcs thc convcntional law into thrcc main catcgorics:
“constitutivc instrumcnts, gcncral multilatcral convcntions, and bilatcral agrcc
mcnts.”
·o

Articlc .c· ol thc UN Chartcr stipulatcs thosc privilcgcs and immunitics
that apply in thc tcrritorics ol thc mcmbcr statcs ol which thc organisation is
composcd. Morcovcr, officials ol thc organisation and thc rcprcscntativcs ol thc
UN mcmbcrs arc accordcd privilcgcs and immunitics ncccssary lor thcir lunc
tions. Articlc .c· rcads:
·¡ Scc, howcvcr, Convcntion on thc Rcprcscntation ol Statcs in thcir Rclations with
!ntcrnational Òrganisations ol a Univcrsal Charactcr (not yct in lorcc). For thc
tcxt ol thc Convcntion scc, Convcntion on thc Rcprcscntation ol Statcs in thcir
Rclations with !ntcrnational Òrganisations ol a Univcrsal Charactcr, 6o AJIL, ·.c
(.o··). Tc convcntion has bccn criticiscd by govcrnmcnts duc to thc poor protcction
givcn to host nations, 8rownlic 6·..
·· ]cnks, .·.
·6 Michacl Gcrstcr and Ðirk Rotcnbcrg, Articlc .c·, in Te Charter of the United
Nations. A Commentary, \ol. a, ...¡, ...· (8runo Simma ct al, cds., a
nd
cd., acca).
·· Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations, .. Fcbruary
.o¡6, . UNTS .·.
·· Ralph Zacklin, Diplomatic Relations: Status, Privileges and Immunities, A Handbook
on International Organizations, ao· (Rcné]can Ðupuy cd., a
nd
cd ., .oo·).
·o !bid.
..6 Chapter 4
(.) Tc Òrganization shall cnjoy in thc tcrritory ol cach ol its Mcmbcrs such
privilcgcs and immunitics as arc ncccssary lor thc lulfilmcnt ol its pur
poscs.
(a) Rcprcscntativcs ol thc Mcmbcrs ol thc Unitcd Nations and officials ol
thc Òrganization shall similarly cnjoy such privilcgcs and immunitics as
arc ncccssary lor thc indcpcndcnt cxcrcisc ol thcir lunctions in conncc
tion with thc Òrganization.
(.) Tc Gcncral Asscmbly may makc rccommcndations with a vicw to dctcr
mining thc dctails ol thc application ol paragraph . and a ol this Articlc
or may proposc convcntions to thc Mcmbcrs ol thc Unitcd Nations lor
this purposc.
Tc rclcrcncc to thc organisation includcs all UN organs, ol both principal
and subsidiary charactcr, not rcgardcd as spccialiscd agcncics.
8o
Such agcncics
comc undcr thc rcgimc ol Articlc .c¡ and thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and
!mmunitics ol thc Spccializcd Agcncics (.o¡·).
8+
!n thc Commcntary to Articlc
.c·, Committcc !\/a statcd:
!n ordcr to dctcrminc thc naturc ol thc privilcgcs and immunitics thc Committcc
has sccn fit to avoid thc tcrm “diplomatic” and has prclcrrcd to substitutc a
morc appropriatc standard, bascd, lor thc purposcs ol thc Òrganization, on thc
ncccssity ol rcalizing its purposcs and, in thc casc ol thc rcprcscntativcs ol its
mcmbcrs and thc officials ol thc Òrganization, on providing lor thc indcpcnd
cnt cxcrcisc ol thcir lunctions.
8:
Tc Committcc, morcovcr, hcld this vicw: “|!|l thcrc is onc ccrtain principlc, it
is that no mcmbcr statc may hindcr in any way thc working ol thc Òrganization
or takc any mcasurcs thc cffcct ol which might bc to incrcasc its burdcns, finan
cial or othcr.”
8:
Paragraph a would sccm to makc clcar that privilcgcs and immu
nitics arc cxtcndcd only to acts pcrlormcd in an official capacity. Tcy must bc
“ncccssary lor thc indcpcndcnt cxcrcisc ol thcir lunctions in conncction with thc
Òrganization.”
!n accordancc with paragraph . ol thc Articlc, thc Gcncral Asscmbly actcd
on thc opportunity, and bcgan thc work on a convcntion dcfining thc privilcgcs
·c Gcrstcr and Rotcnbcrg, ..·..
·. Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Spccializcd Agcncics .. UNTS
a6. (.o¡·).
·a Ðocumcnts ol thc Unitcd Nations Conlcrcncc on !ntcrnational Òrganization, San
Francisco, .o¡·, \ol. X!!!, ·c.¡, citcd in King, .··6.
·. !bid., King, .··.
..· Special protection
and immunitics ol thc pcrsonncl in qucstion.

King considcrs that thc convcn
tion, in cffcct, rcprcscnts a codification ol thc privilcgcs and immunitics that thc
Gcncral Asscmbly rcgardcd as bcing ncccssary lor implcmcnting Articlcs .c¡
and .c·.


Articlc .c· ol thc UN Chartcr applics bctwccn statcs mcmbcrs ol thc UN.
Tis is cxplicitly providcd lor in thc articlc. Tc Gcncral Convcntion applics
bctwccn statcs that arc partics to thc convcntion in accordancc with gcncral rulcs
ol trcaty law. Tc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to officials and cxpcrts
on mission arc valid in rclation to all mcmbcr statcs, cvcn in rclations bctwccn
nationals and thcir own statcs. Tc convcntion has also bccn madc applicablc
through bilatcral agrccmcnts bctwccn thc UN and statcs hosting UN pcrsonncl
but not party to thc convcntion. Tc customary status ol thc convcntion and its
possiblc applicability in statcs not partics to it is cxamincd bclow.
8ascd upon Articlc .c· ol thc UN Chartcr, thc Gcncral Convcntion accords
ncccssary protcction to thc organisation as such, as wcll as to ccrtain catcgorics
ol pcrsonncl. Tc Gcncral Convcntion accords privilcgcs and immunitics to thc
Rcprcscntativcs ol Mcmbcrs (Articlc !\), Òfficials (Articlc \), and ¡xpcrts on
Missions lor thc Unitcd Nations (Articlc \!). Tc Rcprcscntativcs ol Mcmbcrs
rclcrs to Mcmbcr statcs’ rcprcscntativcs to thc organs ol thc UN and will not bc
considcrcd lurthcr.
Officials
To rcsidc within thc rcgimc ol thc convcntion, thc pcrsonncl conccrncd must
cithcr bc rcgardcd as officials ol thc UN or as cxpcrts on mission. Tc critc
ria lor officials ol thc UN arc stipulatcd as lollows in Scction .· ol thc Gcncral
Convcntion:
Tc SccrctaryGcncral will spccily thc catcgorics ol officials to which thc
provisions ol this Articlc and Articlc \!! shall apply. Hc shall submit thcsc
catcgorics to thc Gcncral Asscmbly. Tcrcaltcr thcsc catcgorics shall bc com
municatcd to thc Govcrnmcnt ol all Mcmbcrs. Tc namcs ol thc officials
includcd in thcsc catcgorics shall lrom timc to timc bc madc known to thc
Govcrnmcnts ol Mcmbcrs.
!t is lor thc SccrctaryGcncral to dccidc upon thc catcgorics ol officials ol thc
UN that should cnjoy thc privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in thc convcntion.
!n .o¡6 thc Gcncral Asscmbly adoptcd a rcsolution, bascd upon a proposal lrom
·¡ !n .o¡6, thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations
was adoptcd, . UNTS .·, (.o¡6).
·· King, .6¡. Articlc .c¡ ol thc UN Chartcr providcs thc Òrganisation with thc ncc
cssary lcgal capacity in thc tcrritory ol cach mcmbcr statc to bc ablc to cxcrcisc its
lunctions.
..· Chapter 4
thc SccrctaryGcncral, which grantcd thc privilcgcs and immunitics in Articlcs
\ and \!! “to all mcmbcrs ol thc staff ol thc Unitcd Nations, with thc cxccption
ol thosc who arc rccruitcd locally and arc assigncd to hourly ratcs.”
86
Tc only distinction to bc drawn bctwccn staff mcmbcrs was on locally
cmploycd staff, who wcrc also assigncd to hourly ratcs. All othcr staff, irrcspcc
tivc ol rank, nationality and so on, wcrc to cnjoy thc privilcgcs and immunitics
rclcrrcd to in Articlcs \ and \!!. Howcvcr, highranking officials would cnjoy
additional privilcgcs and immunitics.

Tc SccrctaryGcncral and all Assistant
SccrctaricsGcncral, togcthcr with thcir lamilics, wcrc to bc affordcd privilcgcs
and immunitics cnjoycd by diplomatic cnvoys according to intcrnational law in
addition to thc privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in thc convcntion.
Ònc ol thc main issucs on who could bc considcrcd to bc an official has bccn
rclatcd to thc nationality ol thc individual in qucstion. Somc statcs, lor instancc,
havc bccn rcluctant to rcspcct thc cxcmption lrom taxation ol officials locally
cmploycd. !t has, howcvcr, bccn thc constant position ol thc UN to uphold thc
privilcgcs and immunitics ol all officials so catcgoriscd in thc Gcncral Asscmbly
Rcsolution ol .o¡6, bascd upon thc argumcnt that thc privilcgcs and immunitics
conlcrrcd arc not lor pcrsonal bcncfit but to cnablc thc organisation, through its
officials, to carry out its lunctions.
UN officials arc not accrcditcd to a host nation, as is thc casc with diplomats.
!nstcad, thc UN is obligatcd, according to Scction .· ol thc Gcncral Convcntion,
to inlorm mcmbcr statcs ol thc namcs ol thc rclcvant officials. For this rcason,
annual lists arc prcparcd ol UN officials. Tc purposc ol thc lists is to inlorm gov
crnmcnts ol mcmbcr statcs ol thc idcntitics ol pcrsonncl having thc status ol UN
officials. Tc lists and inlormation do not havc a constitutivc cffcct and thc partics
to thc Gcncral Convcntion arc rcquircd to rcspcct thc privilcgcs and immuni
tics ol UN officials cvcn il thcy havc not rcccivcd in advancc propcr inlormation
on thc status ol a particular individual. Tc UN’s position is that “thc annual lists
mcrcly constitutc an administrativc dcvicc to assist in thc practical application ol
thc Convcntion.”
88

Ixperts on Missions
According to thc Gcncral Convcntion, cxpcrts on missions arc thosc “(othcr
than officials coming within thc scopc ol Articlc \) pcrlorming missions lor thc
·6 GA Rcs. ·6 (!), Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Staff ol thc Sccrctariat ol thc
Unitcd Nations, UN GAÒR .
st
Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/·6 (!) (.o¡6). Scc Paul
C. Szasz, !ntcrnational Òrganizations, Privilcgcs and !mmunitics, in Encyclopedia of
Public International Law, ..a·, ...c (R. 8crnhardt cd., \ol. !! .ooo).
·· Articlc \ Scction .o and Articlc \!! Scction a· ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
·· Tc Practicc ol thc Unitcd Nations, thc spccializcd agcncics and thc !ntcrnational
Atomic ¡ncrgy Agcncy conccrning thcir status, privilcgcs and immunitics: study
prcparcd by thc Sccrctariat (.o6·), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
!!, .·¡, a6· (.o6·).
..o Special protection
Unitcd Nations”.
8o
Tc tcrm “cxpcrts on missions” is not lound in Articlc .c· ol
thc UN Chartcr. !t is clcar lrom thc tcxt that it is not possiblc, lor thc purposcs ol
thc convcntion, to bc at thc samc timc both an official and an cxpcrt on mission
lor thc UN. Tc only othcr cxplicit critcrion to bc mct in ordcr to bc rcgardcd as
an cxpcrt on mission, is thc nccd to pcrlorm missions lor thc UN. Tc !C] has
twicc bccn callcd upon to givc an Advisory Òpinion in rclation to thc intcrprcta
tion ol thc mcaning ol cxpcrts on missions.
!n .o·o thc !C] hcld that a Spccial Rapportcur ol thc Subcommission on thc
Prcvcntion ol Ðiscrimination and Protcction ol Minoritics ol thc Commission
on Human Rights was an cxpcrt on mission within thc mcaning ol Articlc \!
ol thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations.
oo

According to thc Court, “mission”, originally mcant that a pcrson travelled on
a mission. 8ut tcrm has acquircd a broadcr mcaning and it no longcr cntails a
rcquircmcnt ol travcl and now includcs missions undcrtakcn by pcrsons within
thcir statcs ol nationality. Tc Court cmphasiscd that thc task cntrustcd to an
cxpcrt on mission was in thc intcrcsts ol thc UN to cnablc thc organisation to
pcrlorm its indcpcndcnt dutics. Tcrc would bc strangc cffccts il such protcc
tion dcpcndcd on whcthcr or not travclling was involvcd. Tc Court lound that
Articlc \!, Scction aa, ol thc Gcncral Convcntion did not providc inlormation
on issucs as to thc naturc, placc, or duration ol such missions. !t statcd, howcvcr,
that thc purposc ol thc provision was to cnablc thc UN to cntrust pcrsons, not
considcrcd to bc officials ol thc UN, with tasks on bchall ol thc organisation and
to providc thcm with thc ncccssary privilcgcs and immunitics in that rcspcct. Tc
Court rulcd that “|t|hc csscncc ol thc mattcr lics not in thcir administrativc posi
tion but in thc naturc ol thcir mission.”
o+
·o Articlc \! Scction aa ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
oc Applicability ol Articlc \!, Scction aa, ol thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and
!mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations (Advisory Òpinion), .o·o, !C] Rcp .o¡.
o. !bid., para. ¡·. !n a mcmorandum to thc Assistant Spccial Rcprcscntativc ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral lor Vcstcrn Sahara, thc Unitcd Nations Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs
rcspondcd to a qucstion conccrning immunity lor rcprcscntativcs ol thc partics
(Morocco and Frcntc PÒL!SAR!Ò) in thc !dcntification Commission, cstablishcd
to idcntily and rcgistcr votcrs in thc lramcwork ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission lor
thc Rclcrcndum in Vcstcrn Sahara (M!NURSÒ). Tc !dcntification Commission
was cstablishcd by thc UN to assist M!NURSÒ in thc dischargc ol its lunction. Tc
rcprcscntativcs ol thc partics would thcrclorc pcrlorm official lunctions ol thc Unitcd
Nations in accordancc with thc mcaning ol articlc \! ol thc Gcncral Convcntion
and could thcrclorc bc accordcd ¡xpcrt on Mission status. ¡vcn obscrvcrs lrom thc
ÒAU participatcd in thc !dcntification Commission. !nsolar as thcy wcrc rcgular
staff mcmbcrs ol that organisation it was not lound to bc appropriatc to providc
thcm with ¡xpcrt on Mission status duc to thc protcction alrcady accordcd through
thc rclcvant instrumcnts ol that organisation. Scc Mcmorandum to thc Assistant
Spccial Rcprcscntativc ol thc SccrctaryGcncral lor Vcstcrn Sahara, .. April .oo.,
in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, ¡c.¡ca (.oo.).
.¡c Chapter 4
!n thc Advisory Òpinion conccrning Ðiffcrcncc Rclating to !mmunity lrom
Lcgal Proccss ol a Spccial Rapportcur ol thc Commission on Human Rights
in .ooo, thc Court bascd its analysis upon thc mandatc and tasks ol thc Spccial
Rapportcur ol thc Commission on Human Rights on Rcsolution .oo¡/¡. ol thc
Commission cntitlcd Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and
Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers.
o:
Tc Court lound that thc Spccial
Rapportcur must bc rcgardcd as an cxpcrt on mission “by virtuc ol his capac
ity.”
o:
Tc Court also addrcsscd thc qucstion ol thc possibility ol invoking thc
privilcgcs and immunitics in rclation to thc statcs ol which cxpcrts on mission
wcrc nationals, or on thc tcrritory upon which thcy rcsidcd. !t lound that thc
convcntion cxplicitly providcd that Scctions .., .a and .. ol Articlc !\ on thc
rcprcscntativc status ol mcmbcrs wcrc not applicablc bctwccn such rcprcscnta
tivcs and thcir statcs ol nationality. Conccrning cxpcrts on mission, and officials
ol thc organisation, no rulc ol similar contcnt is containcd within thc convcn
tion. Tc rcason bchind this rulc is that cxpcrts on missions, and officials ol thc
organisation, rcprcscnt thc organisation and thcir indcpcndcncc must bc assurcd
by all statcs. Tc lact that somc statcs cntcrcd rcscrvations with rcgard to somc
aspccts ol thc privilcgcs and immunitics in rclation to thcir nationals is cvidcncc
that thcsc statcs bclicvcd that thc privilcgcs and immunitics could othcrwisc bc
invokcd in lull by thcir nationals.


Tc incrcasing usc ol pcrsonncl providcd by civilian contractors lor UN
pcacckccping opcrations has lcd to conccrn ovcr thcir lcgal status, and whcthcr
thcy could and should bc grantcd status as cxpcrts on missions. !n rcsponsc to
a qucstion lrom by thc Ðcputy Ðircctor ol Ficld Òpcrations Ðivision conccrn
ing possiblc “cxpcrts on missions” status lor pcrsonncl who workcd as “vchiclcs
mcchanics, dispatchcrs, drivcrs, clcctricians, carpcntcrs and plumbcrs” thc Òfficc
ol Lcgal Affairs rclcrrcd to thc Advisory Òpinion ol thc !C], .o·o, and thc intcr
prctation ol thc tcrm “cxpcrts on missions”.

Tc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs rcgardcd
thc intcrprctation ol thc Court to conlorm in a gcncral scnsc to UN and statc
practicc and that thc tasks pcrlormcd by thc civilian contractors in qucstion could
not bc rcgardcd as lalling within thc cxprcssion “cxpcrts on missions” undcr its
currcnt mcaning.
o6

oa Ðiffcrcncc Rclating to !mmunity lrom Lcgal Proccss ol a Spccial Rapportcur ol thc
Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Òpinion) .ooo, !C] Rcp 6a, para. ¡¡.
o. !bid., para. ¡·.
o¡ Applicability ol Articlc \!, Scction aa, ol thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and
!mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations (Advisory Òpinion) .o·o, !C] Rcp .o¡, para ·c.
o· Mcmorandum to thc Ðcputy Ðircctor, Ficld Òpcrations Ðivision, .. Fcbruary .oo.,
in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, ¡cc¡c. (.oo.).
o6 !bid. !n this rcspcct it is appropriatc to mcntion that in thc opinion ol thc Òfficc
ol Lcgal Affairs, UN guards having spccial scrvicc agrccmcnts with thc UN, should
bc rcgardcd as cxpcrts on mission. Scc Mcmorandum to thc Ðircctor ol thc Ficld
.¡. Special protection
!n a mcmorandum to thc Assistant SccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping
Òpcrations in .oo·, thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs again addrcsscd thc qucstion ol
privilcgcs and immunitics lor contractors supplying goods and scrviccs in sup
port ol UN pcacckccping opcrations and whcthcr thcy ought to bc considcrcd
“cxpcrts on missions” in accordancc with thc Gcncral Convcntion.

!t lound that
thc tcrm “cxpcrts on missions” was not dcfincd but that thc dcscription by thc
!C] in its Advisory Òpinion on thc applicability ol Articlc \!, Scction aa, ol thc
convcntion, that cxpcrts on missions “havc bccn cntrustcd with mcdiation, with
prcparing rcports, prcparing studics, invcstigations or finding and cstablishing
lacts”, in gcncral conlormcd with thc UN and statc practicc.
o8
Accordingly, thc
Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs’ opinion was that activitics such as thc supply ol construc
tion and catcring scrviccs, lor cxamplc, could not bc rcgardcd as lunctions lalling
within thc mcaning ol thc tcrm “cxpcrts on missions” in thc way that this tcrm
had dcvclopcd within thc organisation. !n this rcspcct, thc commcrcial naturc ol
such lunctions was lound to bc ol particular importancc.
oo
Lcgal issucs conccrn
ing thc cmploymcnt and status ol contractors arc oltcn addrcsscd in applicablc
SÒFAs and will bc considcrcd lurthcr bclow.
Privileges and immunities
Off icials
UN officials cnjoy immunity lrom lcgal proccss with rcgard to acts committcd,
and words spokcn or writtcn, by thcm in thcir official capacitics. Tc “official
capacity” critcrion is naturally takcn into account in rclation to privilcgcs and
immunitics accordcd to officials ol intcrnational organisations, which arc bascd
upon what is ncccssary lor pcrlorming thcir official lunctions. Apart lrom thc
important immunity lrom lcgal proccss, thc lollowing provisions apply to UN
officials:
Òpcrations Ðivision, Òfficc ol Gcncral Scrviccs, ¡ Scptcmbcr .ooa, in United Nations
Juridical Yearbook, ¡·o (.ooa).
o· Mcmorandum to thc Assistant SccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations, a.
]unc .oo·, in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, ¡c· (.oo·).
o· !bid.
oo !bid. Òn salcguarding thc risk ol abusc ol thc immunitics and privilcgcs accordcd
to pcrsonncl working lor privatc organisations, ]cnks cmphasiscs thc importancc
ol noting that “intcrnational immunitics ncvcr apply to a contractor as a mattcr ol
right, thcy apply only whcn in thc light ol thc circumstanccs ol thc casc thc govcrn
mcnt conccrncd has agrccd by a spccial arrangcmcnt such as that lor thc clcarancc ol
thc Sucz Canal or by thc Plan ol Òpcrations agrccd lor a particular projcct with thc
Unitcd Nations Spccial Fund that it is appropriatc to grant spccificd immunitics in
thc particular casc. Govcrnmcnts arc thcrclorc in a position to protcct thcmsclvcs by
making thc grant ol such immunitics subjcct to any appropriatc salcguards.” ]cnks,
.¡.¡.
.¡a Chapter 4
(b) 8c cxcmpt lrom taxation on thc salarics and cmolumcnts paid to thcm by
thc Unitcd Nations,
(c) 8c immunc lrom national scrvicc obligations,
(d) 8c immunc, togcthcr with thcir spouscs and rclativcs dcpcndant on thcm,
lrom immigration rcstrictions and alicn rcgistration,
(c) 8c accordcd thc samc privilcgcs in rcspcct ol cxchangc lacilitics as arc
accordcd to thc officials ol comparablc ranks lorming part ol thc diplo
matic missions to thc Govcrnmcnt conccrncd,
(l ) 8c givcn, togcthcr with thcir spouscs and rclativcs dcpcndant on thcm,
thc samc rcpatriation lacilitics in timc ol intcrnational crisis as diplo
matic cnvoys,
(g) Havc thc right to import lrcc ol duty thcir lurniturc and cffccts at thc
timc ol first taking up thcir post in thc country in qucstion.
+oo
!n addition to thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to “ordinary” officials, thc
SccrctaryGcncral and all thc Assistant SccrctaricsGcncral, togcthcr with thcir
spouscs and minor childrcn, all cnjoy thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to
diplomatic cnvoys, in kccping with intcrnational law.
+o+

Experts on Missions
!t is a rcquircmcnt that cxpcrts on missions shall bc accordcd thc ncccssary priv
ilcgcs and immunitics lor “thc indcpcndcnt cxcrcisc ol thcir lunctions during
thcir missions, including thc timc spcnt on journcys in conncction with thcir
missions.”
+o:
!n this rcspcct thcy will cnjoy
(a) !mmunity lrom pcrsonal arrcst or dctcntion and lrom scizurc ol thcir
pcrsonal baggagc,
(b) !n rcspcct ol words spokcn or writtcn and acts donc by thcm in thc coursc
ol thc pcrlormancc ol thcir mission, immunity lrom lcgal proccss ol cvcry
kind. Tc immunity lrom lcgal proccss shall continuc to bc accordcd not
withstanding that thc pcrsons conccrncd arc no longcr cmploycd on mis
sions lor thc Unitcd Nations:
(c) !nviolability lor all papcrs and documcnts,
.cc Articlc \, Scction .· ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
.c. !bid., Scction .o. Tc UN may issuc a laissez-passer to its officials, and such pcrmits
shall bc acccptablc as valid travcl documcnts. Tcy arc not substitutcs lor visas in
thosc statcs whcrc such passcs arc rcquircd. Howcvcr, accompanicd with a ccrtifi
catc showing that thc official conccrncd is travclling on UN busincss, applications
madc by holdcrs ol a laissez-passer arc rcquircd to bc dcalt with as quickly as possiblc.
Furthcrmorc, thcy must bc grantcd lacilitics lor spccdy travcl. Articlc \!!, Scctions
a¡ and a·.
.ca !bid., Articlc \!, Scction aa.
.¡. Special protection
(d) For thc purposc ol thcir communications with thc Unitcd Nations, thc
right to usc codcs and to rcccivc papcrs ol corrcspondcncc by couricr or
in scalcd bags,
(c) Tc samc lacilitics in rcspcct ol currcncy or cxchangc rcstrictions as arc
accordcd to rcprcscntativcs ol lorcign govcrnmcnts on tcmporary official
missions,
(l ) Tc samc immunitics and lacilitics in rcspcct ol thcir pcrsonal baggagc as
arc accordcd to diplomatic cnvoys.
Vhilc immunity lrom local jurisdiction is similar to that ol officials, cxpcrts on
missions arc also protcctcd against pcrsonal arrcst or dctcntion. Tis immunity
docs not cxtcnd to officials, cxccpt lor official acts. Tc rcason lor this cxtcndcd
immunity is that cxpcrts on missions arc oltcn scnt to arcas ol conflict whcrc
lrccdom ol movcmcnt is ol particular importancc.
+o:

Official capacity and the right and duty to waive immunity
Tc privilcgcs and immunitics ol both officials and cxpcrts on missions arc thus
bascd upon thc principlc ol lunctional ncccssity and pcrlormancc in an official
capacity. !n practicc, it might provc difficult to dcfinc an cxact diffcrcncc bctwccn
privatc and official acts. For instancc, is a UN official acting in an official capacity,
out in thc ficld, whcn driving to work in a UN car during a mission: For officials
and cxpcrts on missions, thc SccrctaryGcncral plays a crucial rolc in dctcrmin
ing which acts can bc rcgardcd as official. Hc has, morcovcr, thc powcr to waivc
immunity lor both catcgorics. For thcsc rcasons, officials and cxpcrts on mission
will bc cxamincd jointly.
Vhcrc docs thc ultimatc authority rcsidc on thc final dccision on whcthcr
or not an official or cxpcrt on mission has actcd in an official capacity: !t might
appcar that judgmcnt on whcthcr an act by a UN official constitutcs cithcr an
official or privatc act, rcsts with thc local courts.
+o±
!t should bc notcd that thc
Gcncral Convcntion providcs machincry lor thc scttlcmcnt ol disputcs (Articlc
\!!!). !l thc UN disagrccs with a dccision ol thc court, thc issuc may bc rcsolvcd
by thc organisation and thc mcmbcr statc in accordancc with thc Provisions on
Scttlcmcnt ol Ðisputcs.
+o¡
!t has, howcvcr, bccn thc consistcnt position ol thc UN
that such things arc solcly a mattcr lor thc SccrctaryGcncral.
.c. Carol McCormick Crosswcll, Protection of International Personnel Abroad. Law and
practice affecting the Privileges and Immunities of International Organization, o· (.o·a).
¡xpcrts on missions may not acquirc a UN laissez-passer, but havc thc right to cnjoy
similar trcatmcnt as holdcrs ol a ccrtificatc showing that thcy arc travclling on bchall
ol thc UN. Scction a6 ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
.c¡ King, .·o.
.c· !bid.
.¡¡ Chapter 4
!n thc opinion ol thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs, it was statcd by that officc in a
lcttcr to thc Ministcr Counscllor, Unitcd Statcs Mission to thc Unitcd Nations,
dccisions on whcthcr or not acts wcrc to bc rcgardcd as official, wcrc not, as a
mattcr ol principlc, a mattcr lor local courts.
+o6
!t bascd its position upon Articlc
o· ol thc UN Chartcr, which statcs that thc SccrctaryGcncral “shall bc thc
chicl administrativc officcr ol thc Òrganization”, and Scction ac ol thc Gcncral
Convcntion, which grants thc SccrctaryGcncral “thc right and duty to waivc thc
immunity ol any official in any casc whcrc, in his opinion, thc immunity would
impcdc thc coursc ol justicc and can bc waivcd without prcjudicc to thc intcrcsts
ol thc Unitcd Nations”.
+o·
!t lurthcr statcd that “this has bccn a longlasting and
uncontcstcd practicc” and that it “has ncvcr rccognizcd or acccptcd that courts
ol law or any othcr national authoritics ol Mcmbcr Statcs havc jurisdiction in
making dctcrminations in thcsc mattcrs.”
+o8
!n its Advisory Òpinion conccrning Ðiffcrcncc Rclating to !mmunity lrom
Lcgal Proccss ol a Spccial Rapportcur ol thc Commission on Human Rights
in .ooo, thc !C] lound that thc Gcncral Convcntion (Articlc \! Scction aa (b))
applicd to thc spccial rapportcur with rcgard to statcmcnts madc in an intcrvicw
by thc International Commercial Litigation. Vhilc thc partics agrccd on thc status
ol thc spccial rapportcur as an cxpcrt on mission, with privilcgcs and immuni
tics that could also bc invokcd against his statc ol nationality, thc qucstion turncd
on whcthcr thcsc particular statcmcnts could bc rcgardcd as having bccn madc
in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc ol his mission. Òn bchall ol thc Sccrctary
Gcncral, thc Lcgal Counscl lor thc UN argucd that thc Court should
cstablish that, subjcct to Articlc \!!!, Scctions ao and .c ol thc Convcntion,
thc SccrctaryGcncral has cxclusivc authority to dctcrminc whcthcr or not thc
words or acts arc spokcn, writtcn or donc in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc ol a
mission lor thc Unitcd Nations and whcthcr such words or acts lall within thc
scopc ol thc mandatc cntrustcd to a Unitcd Nations cxpcrt on mission.
+oo
Tc govcrnmcnt ol Malaysia, on thc othcr hand, claimcd that “thc Sccrctary
Gcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations has not bccn vcstcd with thc cxclusivc author
ity to dctcrminc whcthcr words wcrc spokcn in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc
ol a mission lor thc Unitcd Nations within thc mcaning ol Scction aa (b) ol thc
Convcntion.”
++o

.c6 Lcttcr to thc Ministcr Counscllor, Unitcd Statcs Mission to thc Unitcd Nations, a¡
]anuary .oo·, in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, ¡c¡ (.oo·).
.c· !bid.
.c· !bid.
.co Ðiffcrcncc Rclating to !mmunity lrom Lcgal Proccss ol a Spccial Rapportcur ol thc
Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Òpinion) .ooo, !C] Rcp 6a, para. ...
..c !bid., para. .a.
.¡· Special protection
!t was lor thc Court to dccidc il thc SccrctaryGcncral had an cxclusivc
right to judgc whcthcr or not acts pcrlormcd by an cxpcrt on mission wcrc ol
an official charactcr or whcthcr it was a mattcr lor thc local courts to dctcrminc.
Tc Court did not confirm an cxclusivc right in thcsc mattcrs lor thc Sccrctary
Gcncral, but rathcr that hc had a “pivotal rolc to play” in dctcrmining whcthcr a
ccrtain cxpcrt on mission, taking account ol prcvailing circumstanccs, was cnti
tlcd to thc immunity providcd by Scction aa (b).
+++
Tc dccision ol thc Sccrctary
Gcncral rcgarding immunity “crcatcs a prcsumption which can only bc sct asidc
lor compclling rcasons and is thus to bc givcn thc grcatcst wcight by national
courts.”
++:

According to thc Court, thc dctcrmination ol thc SccrctaryGcncral is
thus not a final dccision. Howcvcr, in practicc it may provc to havc that cffcct.
Tc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs will continuc to uphold thc dctcrmination ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral on this issuc and thc margin ol apprcciation lor national
courts is thcrcby probably cxtrcmcly limitcd.
Rclcrring to thc wcllcstablishcd rulc that an act ol a statc organ is consid
crcd to bc an act ol thc statc, thc Court lound that thc govcrnmcnt ol Malaysia
had a lcgal obligation to convcy inlormation to thc courts rcgarding thc position
takcn by thc SccrctaryGcncral.
++:
As a rulc, thc Court statcd that whcncvcr a
casc dcpcndcd on thc immunity ol an agcnt ol thc UN and was dcalt with by a
national court, such court should bc inlormcd immcdiatcly ol any finding by thc
SccrctaryGcncral rcgarding that immunity.
++±

!n addition to thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd officials, thc Sccrctary
Gcncral and all Assistant SccrctaricsGcncral arc cntitlcd to “thc privilcgcs and
immunitics, cxcmptions and lacilitics accordcd to diplomatic cnvoys, in accord
ancc with intcrnational law.”
++¡
An obvious diffcrcncc in thc protcction accordcd
... !bid., para. ·c.
..a !bid., para. 6.. Scc Hazcl Fox, Tc Advisory Òpinion on thc Ðiffcrcncc to !mmunity
From Lcgal Proccss ol a Spccial Rapportcur ol thc Commission ol Human Rights:
Vho has thc Last Vord on ]udicial !ndcpcndcncc:, .a LJIL ··o, o.¡ (.ooo). !n this
particular casc, thc Court statcd that thc SccrctaryGcncral had actcd corrcctly
whcn finding thc words spokcn by thc Spccial Rapportcur to bc in thc coursc ol thc
pcrlormancc ol his mission, and thus cntitlcd him to thc immunity providcd lor in
Scction aa (b) ol Articlc \! ol thc Gcncral Convcntion. Advisory Òpinion conccrn
ing Ðiffcrcncc Rclating to !mmunity lrom Lcgal Proccss ol a Spccial Rapportcur ol
thc Commission on Human Rights in .ooo, para. ·6.
... !bid., para. 6a.
..¡ According to thc Court, thc “govcrnmcntal authoritics ol a party to thc Gcncral
Convcntion arc thcrclorc undcr an obligation to convcy such inlormation to thc
national courts conccrncd, sincc a propcr application ol thc Convcntion by thcm is
dcpcndcnt on such inlormation.” !bid., para. 6..
..· Tcsc privilcgcs and immunitics arc also cxtcndcd to thcir spouscs and minor chil
drcn.
.¡6 Chapter 4
“ordinary” officials is that thcsc high officials arc not subjcct to local jurisdiction
lor any acts.
Tc SccrctaryGcncral has thc powcr to waivc thc immunity lor officials
and cxpcrts on mission il, “in his opinion, thc immunity would impcdc thc coursc
ol justicc and can bc waivcd without prcjudicc to thc intcrcsts ol thc Unitcd
Nations”.
++6
!n this rcspcct, thc common car accidcnt is an intcrcsting cxamplc.
Tis is bccausc thcrc cxists a rclativcly high risk lor UN and associatcd pcrsonncl
in bccoming involvcd in such incidcnts in pcacc opcrations. !n rcply to a rcqucst
lor a waivcr ol immunity with rcgard to a car accidcnt involving a UN volun
tccr, who through thc UNÐP Standard 8asic Assistancc Agrccmcnt cnjoycd thc
samc privilcgcs and immunitics as UN officials, UN policy on car accidcnts was
outlincd as lollows by thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs:

As a gcncral rulc, travcl bctwccn homc and officc is not in itscll considcrcd to
bc an official act within thc mcaning ol articlc \, scction .·, ol thc Convcntion.
Tcrclorc, officials who commit traffic violations in transit bctwccn thcir homc
and thc officc and vicc vcrsa arc not considcrcd to bc pcrlorming an official act
lor which thcy can asscrt immunity lrom lcgal proccss.
|…|
Howcvcr, thcrc may bc cxccptions to thc abovcmcntioncd gcncral rulc in
thc light ol particular circumstanccs, and in such casc, thc SccrctaryGcncral
would considcr raising thc qucstion ol lunctional immunity il thc particular
lacts surrounding thc incidcnt would warrant it.
++·
!t is apparcnt that with car accidcnts, although a gcncral rulc has dcvclopcd on
travcl bctwccn homc and officc, thc circumstanccs ol cach casc nccd to bc takcn
into account whcn dcciding on whcthcr or not a particular incidcnt occurrcd in
thc coursc ol an official act.
Tc SccrctaryGcncral, in rclation to cxpcrts on mission, also posscsscs thc
right, and rctains thc duty, ol waiving that immunity.
++8
Pcrsonncl in pcacc opcra
tions cntrustcd with cxpcrts on missions status arc usually military obscrvcrs, civil
policc officcrs and suchlikc.
++o
Tcir main lunctions arc to obscrvc and rcport
..6 Tc Sccurity Council has thc right to waivc thc immunity ol thc SccrctaryGcncral.
Scction ac ol thc Gcncral Convcntion. !n ordcr “to lacilitatc thc propcr administra
tion ol justicc” and prcvcnt any abusc ol thc stipulatcd privilcgcs and immunitics, thc
UN and thc authoritics ol mcmbcr statcs “shall coopcratc at all timcs”. Scc scction
a. ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
..· Mcmorandum to thc Scnior Policy Òfficcr (Lcgal), Ðivision ol Pcrsonncl, Unitcd
Nations Ðcvclopmcnt Programmc, a. ]anuary .ooa, in United Nations Juridical
Yearbook, ¡·a (.ooa).
..· Scction a. ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
..o !t should bc notcd that both military and civilian pcrsonncl in thc battalion pro
vidcd by Gcrmany lor UNÒSÒM !! acquircd thc status ol cxpcrts on mission lor
.¡· Special protection
to thc UN. Tcy gcncrally lack cxccutivc powcrs. Howcvcr, in thc opcrations
conductcd in Kosovo and ¡ast Timor, thc civilian policc wcrc chargcd with an
cxccutivc mandatc.
+:o
Tc lact that cxpcrts on mission pcrlorm tasks similar to
thosc ol a statc’s cxccutivc branch may havc conscqucnccs lor thcir privilcgcs and
immunitics, and thc powcr and authority ol that position nccds to bc rcflcctcd
in thc individual rcsponsibility ol thc pcrsonncl conccrncd. Òn military pcrson
ncl participating in a pcacc opcration, thc statc providing thc pcrsonncl cxcrciscs
cxclusivc national jurisdiction, in accordancc with thc SÒFAs concludcd so lar
(and rcflcctcd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA). Tc obligation to do so is stipulatcd in
contribution agrccmcnts bctwccn thc UN and thc scnding nation. A morc dcli
catc situation ariscs whcrc cxpcrts on missions cxcrcisc cxccutivc lunctions.
Vhilc thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to officials and cxpcrts on
missions may not bc thc subjcct ol any particular difficultics in rclation to statcs
mcmbcrs ol thc intcrnational organisation conccrncd, a morc difficult qucstion
ariscs on thc status ol such pcrsonncl in rclation to nonmcmbcr statcs. Vhat
arc thc lcgal obligations ol a statc acccpting thcm on its tcrritory in thc capacity
ol agcnts ol thc UN, or ol othcr intcrnational organisations: Tcsc issucs will bc
analyscd bclow in thc scction on customary intcrnational law.
4.2.2 Customary Law
Tc appcarancc ol intcrnational officials is rclativcly ncw in intcrnational rcla
tions, and thcir customary law status has bccn madc lar lrom clcar. Vith rcgard
to mcmbcrs ol intcrnational commissions it was hcld in .o.. that il thcy wcrc
appointcd by, and rcsponsiblc to, thcir govcrnmcnts thcn thcy had a claim on
diplomatic immunitics bascd upon customary intcrnational law, although thc
law could not at that timc bc rcgardcd as bcing scttlcd.
+:+
According to ]cnks, a
statc not a party to a particular organisation clcarly docs not havc an obligation
to admit such an organisation to opcratc on its tcrritory. Howcvcr, il it docs, it
“must, it is suggcstcd, rcspcct thc immunitics appropriatc to such an cntity. Tis
thc UN, through an ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs bctwccn thc Gcrman govcrnmcnt and thc
UN SccrctaryGcncral. Scc Ðictcr Flcck and Michacl Saallcld, Combining cfforts
to improvc thc lcgal status ol UN pcacckccping lorccs and thcir cffcctivc protcc
tion, . International Peacekeeping, ·a, ·. (.oo¡).
.ac Scc SC Rcs. .a¡¡, UN SCÒR, ¡c..
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.a¡¡ (.ooo) (Kosovo) and
SC Rcs. .¡.c, UN SCÒR, ¡·.¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡.c (acca) (¡ast Timor).
.a. Lawrcncc Prcuss, Ðiplomatic Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol Agcnts !nvcstcd
with Functions ol an !ntcrnational !ntcrcst, a· AJIL 6o¡, 6o· (.o..). Hc wrotc:
“!ntcrnational lunctionarics, acting in thc intcrcsts ol thc collcctivity ol statcs com
priscd in an organization, cnjoy thc bcncfits ol diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics
only by virtuc ol cxprcss trcaty provisions or by thc conccssion ol thc statcs on whosc
tcrritorics thcy act.” !bid., 6o·.
.¡· Chapter 4
gcncral linc ol rcasoning is supportcd by thc analogy ol thc rccognition in third
Statcs ol thc immunitics ol diplomatic agcnts.”
+::

According to thc Restatement, rcgional and othcr major organisations – thc
UN and its spccialiscd agcncics arc mcntioncd spccifically, – also havc intcrna
tional lcgal pcrsonality towards nonmcmbcr statcs. Tcsc organisations may
largcly dcpcnd upon customary intcrnational law in thc upholding ol privilcgcs
and immunitics in rclation to all statcs.
+::
!n this rcspcct, 8rownlic contcnds that
|b|y analogy with thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to diplomats, thc
rcquisitc privilcgcs and immunitics in rcspcct ol thc tcrritorial jurisdiction ol
host statcs arc rccogniscd in thc customary law. Howcvcr, thcrc is as yct no
gcncral agrccmcnt on thc prccisc contcnt ol thc customary law conccrning thc
immunitics ol intcrnational organizations. Tc minimum principlc appcars to
bc that officials ol intcrnational organizations arc immunc lrom lcgal proccss
in rcspcct ol all acts pcrlormcd in thcir official capacity.
+:±
!s thcrc a customary rulc ol intcrnational law by which intcrnational organisa
tions arc to cnjoy privilcgcs and immunitics: A gcncral acccptancc lor such cus
tomary rulc is probably only valid lor thc UN bccausc ol “thc constant trcaty
practicc ol granting immunity to that organisation.”
+:¡
Tough statcs in gcncral
do not conlcr upon intcrnational organisations privilcgcs and immunitics in thc
abscncc ol a trcaty, thcrc arc cxccptions.
+:6
!t should not, howcvcr, bc concludcd
.aa ]cnks, .¡. Ðiscussing thc dcvclopmcnt ol intcrnational immunitics, ]cnks asscrts
that thc “propcr mcasurc ol intcrnational immunitics is what is ncccssary lor thc
impartial, cfficicnt and cconomical dischargc ol thc lunctions ol thc organisation
conccrncd, and in particular what contributcs to thc cffcctivc indcpcndcncc ol thc
organisation lrom thc individual control ol its scparatc mcmbcrs cxcrciscd by mcans
ol thcir national law and cxccutivc authority as distinguishcd lrom thcir collcctivc
control cxcrciscd in a rcgular manncr through thc appropriatc intcrnational organs.”
!bid., .6·.
.a. Amcrican Law !nstitutc, Restatement (Tird) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, \ol. . §¡6·, ¡o. (.o··). !t is thcrc statcd that in accordancc with “intcrnational
law, an intcrnational organization gcncrally cnjoys such privilcgcs and immunitics
lrom thc jurisdiction ol a mcmbcr statc as arc ncccssary lor thc lulfilmcnt ol thc pur
poscs ol thc organization, including immunity lrom lcgal proccss, and lrom financial
controls, taxcs, and dutics”. Restatement (Tird), ¡o¡. According to thc commcntary,
othcr organisations arc accordcd only spccific privilcgcs and immunitics as stipu
latcd in intcrnational agrccmcnts and may thcrclorc only rcly on thcsc privilcgcs and
immunitics against mcmbcr statcs.
.a¡ 8rownlic, 6·a.
.a· Sands and Klcin, ¡·o. Scc Pctcr H. F. 8ckkcr, Te Legal Position of Intergovernmental
Organizations. A Functional Necessity Analysis of Teir Legal Status and Immunities,
.·c. (.oo¡).
.a6 Tc Ðistrict Court ol Maastricht, in ¡ckhardt v ¡urocontrol (No. a), (.o·¡), o¡ !LR
..., ..·.
.¡o Special protection
lrom this that without a lormal agrccmcnt intcrnational organisations would not
bc ablc to cnjoy privilcgcs and immunitics. A valid argumcnt is that whcn a statc
has givcn its conscnt lor thc prcscncc ol an organisation, to lulfil ccrtain lunc
tions on its tcrritory, it is obligcd to cxtcnd thc ncccssary privilcgcs and immuni
tics to cnablc thc organisation to achicvc its objcctivcs.
+:·

4.2.3 Conclusions
Pcrsonncl rcprcscnting intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations arc oltcn
accordcd intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics whcn prcscnt in statcs mcm
bcrs to thc organisation. Tc naturc ol such privilcgcs and immunitics is diffcrcnt
lrom diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics in that thc lattcr is cxclusivcly bascd
upon lunction and lack an clcmcnt ol rcciprocity. Tc scopc ol intcrnational priv
ilcgcs and immunitics contrast to diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics as thc
lormcr also applics in rclation to thc pcrsonncl’s statc ol nationality.
Vhilc thcrc is no singlc convcntion in this arca ol thc law, thc convcntion
on thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol thc UN (Gcncral Convcntion), bascd upon
Articlc .c· ol thc UN Chartcr, is an instrumcnt ol ccntral importancc. Tc two
catcgorics ol pcrsonncl, “officials” and “cxpcrts on missions” arc ol spccial intcr
cst to pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. !mportant conditions in this rcspcct arc that
intcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics only apply in rclation to acts pcrlormcd
in an official capacity and that, in thc casc ol thc UN, thc SccrctaryGcncral has
thc right and duty to waivc thc immunity “in any casc whcrc, in his opinion, thc
immunity would impcdc thc coursc ol justicc and it can bc waivcd without prcju
dicc to thc intcrcsts ol thc Unitcd Nations”.
Òn thc qucstion ol who has thc final say on what constitutcs an act takcn in
an official capacity, thc !C] has dclivcrcd its opinion that although thc Sccrctary
Gcncral docs not havc an cxclusivc right in such mattcrs, his dccision is “to bc
givcn thc grcatcst wcight by national courts”.
Tc cxtcnt ol thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol pcrsonncl rcprcscnting thc
UN has attractcd ncw intcrcst in rclation to pcacc opcrations, such as thosc on
Kosovo and in ¡ast Timor, whcrc civilian policc, with cxpcrts on mission status,
havc cxccutivc powcrs. !ntcrnational privilcgcs and immunitics arc a rclativcly
ncw phcnomcnon and as such rcsts primarily on trcaty law. Howcvcr, thc princi
.a· Sands and Klcin, ¡oc. According to ]cnks, thc csscntial lunction ol intcrnational
immunitics “is to bridlc thc sovcrcignty ol Statcs in thcir trcatmcnt ol intcrnational
organisations.” Tc curbing ol thc sovcrcignty ol statcs in rclation to intcrnational
organisations will bcncfit all statc partics. Tc organisation will not bccomc a tool ol
somc statcs but continuc to scrvc thc common intcrcsts ol thc organisation as stipu
latcd in its constitution. ]cnks, .66. Òn thc lunctional ncccssity doctrinc as custom
ary law, scc Charlcs H. 8rowcr, !ntcrnational !mmunitics: Somc Ðissidcnt \icws on
thc Rolc ol Municipal Courts, ¡. Virginia Journal of International Law, ., · (accc).
.·c Chapter 4
plc ol immunity lor acts pcrlormcd in an official capacity appcars to havc acquircd
a customary law status, and is thus rclcvant in rclation to third statcs.
¡., International Privileges and Immunities Provided by SOIAs
!n .o·6, whcn thc first UN pcacckccping opcration was launchcd, thc UN lorccs
involvcd wcrc prcscnt with thc conscnt ol thc host nation, but thcy wcrc intcndcd
to play a morc activc rolc than traditionally visiting lorccs had playcd in thc
past.
+:8
8ccausc thc majority ol pcacckccpcrs wcrc providcd by mcmbcr statcs
and not rcgardcd as officials ol thc UN or cxpcrts on mission, and thcrclorc
not includcd undcr thc rcgimc ol thc Gcncral Convcntion, thc nccd to clarily
and strcngthcn thcir lcgal protcction bccamc ncccssary. Trough an ¡xchangc ol
Lcttcrs bctwccn thc UN and ¡gypt, thc host nation, agrccmcnt was rcachcd on
ccrtain privilcgcs and immunitics applicablc to thc mcmbcrs ol thc opcration.
+:o

Tc practicc that arosc lrom thc UN¡F opcration was gcncrally lollowcd in sub
scqucnt oncs and in .ooc thc SccrctaryGcncral issucd a modcl statusollorccs
agrccmcnt (UN Modcl SÒFA).
+:o
!t is cxplicitly statcd that thc modcl agrccmcnt
was bascd “upon cstablishcd practicc and drawing cxtcnsivcly upon carlicr and
currcnt agrccmcnts” and was intcndcd to lunction as a modcl lor luturc individ
ual agrccmcnts bctwccn thc UN and host nations.
+:+
Tcsc typcs ol agrccmcnt
arc now oltcn rclcrrcd to as Statusol Forccs Agrccmcnts (SÒFAs) or Statusol
Missions Agrccmcnts (SÒMAs).
+::

.a· !t may bc hcld that thc diffcrcncc bctwccn thc law ol visiting lorccs and UN lorccs
is in rcspcct ol thc contcxt in which thcy arc dcploycd. Tc lattcr troops arc dcploycd
in an ‘opcrational contcxt’, although not in a warlikc modc, whilc visiting lorccs arc
not chargcd with any opcrational tasks in thc host nation. 8ascd upon thc naturc and
charactcr ol thc opcration, thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol thc mcmbcrs ol pcacc
opcrations arc thcrclorc partly diffcrcnt lrom c.g. thosc stipulatcd in thc NATÒ
SÒFA. Scc, gcncrally, A. P. \. Rogcrs, \isiting Forccs in an Òpcrational Contcxt, in
Te Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, ·.. (Ðictcr Flcck ct. al. cds. acc.). Michacl
8othc, Pcacckccping, in Te Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, \ol. ., 6¡·,
6·. (8runo Simma ct al cds., a
nd
cd., acca).
.ao ¡xchangc ol lcttcrs constituting an agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and
thc Govcrnmcnt ol ¡gypt conccrning thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations ¡mcrgcncy
Forcc in ¡gypt, Ncw York, .o··, a6c UNTS 6..
..c Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Modcl statusollorccs agrccmcnt lor pcacckccp
ing opcrations, UN Ðoc. A/¡·/·o¡ (.ooc).
... !bid., para. ..
..a Although rcqucstcd by thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping Òpcrations to
dralt a UN Modcl SÒMA as wcll, thc SccrctaryGcncral was not disposcd to do
so bccausc thc UN Modcl SÒFA scrvcd as thc basic lramcwork lor thc dralting ol
both individual SÒFAs and SÒMAs. Scc !mplcmcntation ol thc rccommcndations
ol thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping Òpcrations. Rcport ol thc Sccrctary
Gcncral, !mplcmcntation ol thc rccommcndations ol thc Spccial Committcc on
.·. Special protection
!l, and whcn, a SÒFA is concludcd it will apply bilatcrally bctwccn thc UN
and thc host nation. A SÒFA dcals mainly with logistic and financial issucs and
its aim is to lacilitatc thc implcmcntation ol thc opcration’s mandatc. To this cnd,
it also scts out privilcgcs and immunitics lor thc opcration as such, as wcll as lor
thc mcmbcrs ol thc opcration. Troopcontributing nations arc not partics to a
SÒFA, but rathcr lunction as its bcncficiarics. A Modcl Agrccmcnt was issucd in
.oo. on thc rclationship bctwccn thc UN and thc statcs contributing pcrsonncl
and cquipmcnt to pcacc opcrations.
+::
Tc most obvious diffcrcncc comparcd with thc NATÒ SÒFA (.o·.) is
that thc scnding nations rctain exclusive criminal jurisdiction ovcr thcir lorccs.
+:±

Òn this issuc thc thcn SccrctaryGcncral Ðag Hammarskjold, in his Summary
Study ol thc UN¡F opcration, concludcd:
Tc most important principlc in thc status Agrccmcnt cnsurcs that UN¡F
pcrsonncl, whcn involvcd in criminal actions, comc undcr thc jurisdiction ol
thc criminal courts ol thcir homc countrics. Tc cstablishmcnt ol this principlc
lor UN¡F, in rclation to ¡gypt, has sct a most valuablc prcccdcnt. ¡xpcricncc
shows that this principlc is csscntial to thc succcsslul rccruitmcnt by thc Unitcd
Nations ol military pcrsonncl not othcrwisc undcr immunity rulcs, lrom its
Mcmbcr countrics. Tc position cstablishcd lor UN¡F should bc maintaincd
in luturc arrangcmcnts.
+:¡
Ðuring thc .oocs, rcgional organisations camc to play an incrcasingly important
rolc in carrying out pcacc opcrations mandatcd by thc UN Sccurity Council. Tc
privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA has had a signifi
cant influcncc on arrangcmcnts madc, and arrangcmcnts rcachcd, on thc status ol
Pcacckccping Òpcrations, 6c, UN Ðoc. A/·¡/6·c (accc). SÒMAs arc gcncrally
concludcd in thc lorm ol an ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs.
... Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Modcl Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations
and Mcmbcr Statcs contributing pcrsonncl and cquipmcnt to Unitcd Nations
pcacckccping opcrations, UN Ðoc. A/¡6/.·· (.oo.). Such agrccmcnts had bccn con
cludcd in thc UN¡F !, thc UN Sccurity Forcc (UNSF), and UNF!CYP. According
to 8othc, similar documcnts wcrc not concludcd lor othcr opcrations. Hc assumcs
that agrccmcnts in othcr lorms, inlormal or cvcn oral, cxist that rclcr to thc practicc
upon which thc Modcl Agrccmcnt is bascd. 8othc, Pcacckccping, 6oc.. Tc Rcport
ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, ol which thc Modcl Agrccmcnt is anncxcd, statcs: “8asing
itscll upon cstablishcd practicc and drawing cxtcnsivcly upon currcnt agrccmcnts
with countrics contributing pcrsonncl”, UN Ðoc. A/¡6/.··, para. ..
..¡ Articlc ¡·(b) ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA. Comparc Scctions ac and a. ol thc Gcncral
Convcntion whcrc thc SccrctaryGcncral has thc right and duty to waivc thc immu
nity il ‘thc immunity would impcdc thc coursc ol justicc and can bc waivcd without
prcjudicc to thc intcrcsts ol thc Unitcd Nations.’
..· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral: Summary study ol thc cxpcricnccs dcrivcd lrom
thc cstablishmcnt and opcration ol thc Forcc, para. .6., UN Ðoc. A/.o¡. (.o··).
.·a Chapter 4
lorccs in pcacc opcrations not conductcd undcr UN command and control.
+:6
Tc
practicc ol rcgional organisations and statcs lcading pcacc opcrations, whcthcr
authoriscd by thc UN or initiatcd and conductcd outsidc UN authority will also
bc thc subjcct ol study.
Tc UN Modcl SÒFA will bc uscd as a rclcrcncc point and comparcd with
status agrccmcnts in opcrations conductcd both bclorc and altcr. 8ccausc thc
UN Modcl SÒFA is bascd upon thc cstablishcd practicc ol .ooc, thc locus will
bc on agrccmcnts ol a latcr datc. Tc study ol thcsc status agrccmcnts, howcvcr, is
somcwhat hampcrcd by thc unavailability ol official documcnts.
+:·

A prcrcquisitc to any agrccmcnt on thc status ol an opcration and its pcr
sonncl with thc host nation is that any opcration is bascd upon thc conscnt ol
thc host nation. !rrcspcctivc ol thc mandatc ol thc opcration, thc conscnt ol thc
host nation is ncccssary in ordcr to bcgin ncgotiations on a status agrccmcnt.
Although a host nation might havc conscntcd to a ccrtain opcration, thcrc may
still bc room lor opposing vicws on thc prccisc contcnt ol a spccific SÒFA. Tc
strcngth ol a SÒFA lics in thc lact that it can bc dcsigncd to mcct thc pcculi
aritics ol cach opcration. Tc norms cxprcsscd thcrcin rcflcct a carclul balancc
bctwccn thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to intcrnational scrvants and thc
law ol visiting lorccs.
+:8
A ncgativc aspcct is that agrccmcnts must bc concludcd
lor cach and cvcry opcration, and thcsc things usually takc somc considcrablc
timc to ncgotiatc.
+:o
!t is not uncommon lor mcmbcrs ol a pcacc opcration to bc
dcploycd long bclorc thc conclusion ol a SÒFA.
+±o
!n somc opcrations it has not
..6 Scc Anncx .A to thc Gcncral Framcwork Agrccmcnt lor Pcacc (Ðayton
Agrccmcnt), .· !LM ·· (.oo6) http://www.nato.int/ilor/gla/glaap.a.htm, UNM!K/
R¡G/accc/¡· Òn thc Status, Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol KFÒR and UNM!K
and thcir Pcrsonncl in Kosovo http://www.unmikonlinc.org/rcgulations/accc/
rcg¡·cc.htm, and Anncx A to thc Military Tcchnical Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc
!ntcrnational Sccurity Assistancc Forcc (!SAF) and thc !ntcrim Administration ol
Alghanistan, ¡. !LM .c.a (acca) http://www.opcrations.mod.uk/isalmta.pdl.
..· Vhilc thc agrccmcnts thcmsclvcs oltcn arc availablc, it is difficult to comc by docu
mcnts conccrning thc ncgotiations on such agrccmcnts and subscqucnt practicc.
..· 8owctt bclicvcs that thcsc statuscs ol lorccs agrccmcnts “rcprcscnt compromiscs and
shilts bctwccn thc law ol visiting lorccs on thc onc hand and thc law ol intcrna
tional privilcgcs and immunitics on thc othcr, against thc background ol lunctional
ncccssity.” Typical diffcrcnccs bctwccn visiting lorccs and Unitcd Nations Forccs
arc, according to 8owctt, “(.) thc Unitcd Nations Forcc is not that ol an ally: indccd
it will gcncrally bc complctcly indcpcndcnt ol thc local authoritics, (a) thc Forcc
gcncrally may bc actually opcrating, in thc military scnsc, within thc tcrritory ol thc
Statc and not mcrcly stationcd thcrc.” 8owctt, ¡.¡.
..o Tc ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA took fivc months to ncgotiatc. Scc Migucl dc 8rito, Tc
Rclationship bctwccn Pcacckccpcrs, Host Govcrnmcnts and thc Local Population,
Monograph Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and peacebuilding, a (No. .c, .oo·).
¡volving customary law in this rcgard nccds, howcvcr, to bc takcn into considcration.
.¡c !n thc UNPRÒFÒR opcration a SÒFA was not concludcd until .oo·. Ðuring that
timc it was thc practicc to rclcr to thc SÒFA applicablc in thc UNF!CYP opcration.
.·. Special protection
in lact bccn possiblc to concludc a SÒFA at all. Vhilc thc main rcasons lor such
lcngthy ncgotiations sccms to bc rcsolving controvcrsial issucs such as cxcmption
ol dutics in gcncral, and in particular lor civilian contractors, and rclatcd issucs
affccting thc host nation’s rcvcnuc, thcrc arc othcr issucs, ol a morc lundamcntal
importancc to thc lcgal protcction ol such pcrsonncl, (lrccdom ol movcmcnt, thc
right to usc communications cquipmcnt and qucstions ol jurisdiction) that do
not sccm to spark controvcrsics to a similar cxtcnt.
Tc lact that UN lorccs arc somctimcs dcploycd bclorc a particular SÒFA
has bccn concludcd, crcatcs ambiguitics conccrning thcir lcgal status. Tis was
notcd in .oo. by thc UN Sccurity Council whcn it statcd that
whcn considcring thc cstablishmcnt ol luturc Unitcd Nations opcrations
authorizcd by thc Council, thc Sccurity Council will rcquirc intcr alia: |…|
(c) Tat an agrccmcnt on thc status ol thc opcration, and all thc pcrsonncl
cngagcd in thc opcration in thc host country bc ncgotiatcd cxpcditiously and
should comc into lorcc as ncar as possiblc to thc outsct ol thc opcration.
+±+

!n authorising thc dcploymcnt ol troops to pcacc opcrations, thc Sccurity Council
has rcqucstcd govcrnmcnts conccrncd to concludc a SÒFA with thc Sccrctary
Gcncral within .c days, and has rccallcd, “that pcnding thc conclusion ol such
agrccmcnts, thc modcl statusollorccs agrccmcnt ol o Òctobcr .ooc (A/¡·/·o¡)
shall apply provisionally”.
+±:

¡vcn dcploymcnt undcr thc rcgimc ol a SÒFA will involvc ccrtain difficul
tics. Modcrn opcrations arc oltcn ol a multilunctional charactcr involving both
civilian and military pcrsonncl with diffcrcnt lcvcls ol status accordcd to diffcrcnt
catcgorics. Òn thc matcrial law, thc Gcncral Convcntion will in cffcct bc bctwccn
thc partics to thc SÒFA, as stipulatcd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA, cithcr through
thc SÒFA itscll or by way ol rclcrcncc to thc convcntion il thc host nation is
alrcady a party to it. Mcmbcrs ol thc opcration in qucstion may bc accordcd priv
ilcgcs and immunitics similar to thosc ol diplomatic cnvoys, and bc rcgardcd as
officials or cxpcrts on mission. Tc military pcrsonncl conccrncd will bc accordcd
such privilcgcs and immunitics providcd lor in thc SÒFA.
!t is apparcnt that what in modcrn timcs havc now bccomc customary prin
ciplcs applicablc in pcacc opcrations wcrc largcly “invcntcd” in thc .o·6 UN¡F
opcration. Tis is ol particular rclcvancc sincc it was thc birth ol thc pcacckccping
For thc lcgal implications ol that practicc scc, Ray Murphy, !rcland: Lcgal issucs
arising lrom participation in Unitcd Nations opcrations, . International Peacekeeping,
6., 6. (.oo¡).
.¡. SC Rcs. ·6·, UN SCÒR, .a·.
rd
mtg., para. 6 c), UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·6· (.oo.).
.¡a SC Rcs. .·co, UN SCÒR, ¡·.c
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·co (acc.). Scc also Unitcd
Nations Òpcration in 8urundi (UNU8), SC Rcs. .·¡·, UN SCÒR, ¡o··
th
mtg., UN
Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·¡· (acc¡).
.·¡ Chapter 4
conccpt and thc UN was laccd with unprcccdcntcd challcngcs. Tc UN¡F rcgu
lations lor thc dcploymcnt illustratc how thcsc challcngcs wcrc mct. According
to thc rcgulations lor thc lorcc, UN¡F was “a subsidiary organ ol thc Unitcd
Nations consisting ol thc Unitcd Nations Command |…| and all military pcr
sonncl placcd undcr thc Unitcd Nations Command by Mcmbcr Statcs.”
+±:

Tc mcmbcrs ol thc lorcc, “although rcmaining in thcir national scrvicc, arc,
during thc pcriod ol thcir assignmcnt to thc Forcc, intcrnational pcrsonncl
undcr thc authority ol thc Unitcd Nations and subjcct to thc instructions ol thc
Commandcr through thc chain ol command.”
+±±
8cing a subsidiary organ ol thc
UN, thc lorcc cnjoycd “thc status, privilcgcs and immunitics ol thc Òrganization
providcd in thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd
Nations.”
+±¡
Tc lorcc mcmbcrs wcrc undcr a duty to rcspcct local laws and rcgu
lations and to “conduct thcmsclvcs at all timcs in a manncr bcfitting thcir status
as mcmbcrs ol thc Unitcd Nations ¡mcrgcncy Forcc.”
+±6
Morcovcr, it was statcd
that “|m|cmbcrs ol thc Forcc arc cntitlcd to thc lcgal protcction ol thc Unitcd
Nations and shall bc rcgardcd as agcnts ol thc Unitcd Nations lor thc purposc ol
such protcction.”
+±·

!t is truc that no fixcd lcgal lramcwork cxists on thc status ol pcacckccping
lorccs. Rathcr, it is bascd upon UN practicc and thcrc is much room lor spccific
solutions in cach particular casc. Tis practicc has bccn dcscribcd as “adhoc
racy”.
+±8
!t is, howcvcr, possiblc to distinguish norms, adhcrcd to almost con
stantly, ovcr thc past ·c ycars. Tcsc arc norms, it is hcrc argucd, that arc intcgral
to thc wholc conccpt ol pcacc opcrations.
Tis position is largcly supportcd by thc practicc ol othcr organisations and
statcs lcading such opcrations. 8ricl backgrounds will hcrc bc givcn to somc ol
thosc opcrations lcd by two incrcasingly important actors in this ficld – NATÒ
and ¡U. Statutcs on pcacc opcrations ol thc Commonwcalth ol !ndcpcndcnt
Statcs (C!S) and thc ¡conomic Community ol Ccntral Alrican Statcs (¡CCAS)
will also bc prcscntcd.
+±o
.¡. Rcgulations lor thc Unitcd Nations ¡mcrgcncy Forcc, para. 6, a·. UNTS .6·
(.o··).
.¡¡ !bid.
.¡· !bid., para. .c.
.¡6 !bid., para. ao.
.¡· !bid., para., .c. Scc Scycrstcd, United Nations Forces, ....
.¡· Scc Robcrt C. R. Sickmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-keep-
ing Forces, · (.oo.) and Hcnry Viscman, Pcacckccping: Tc Ðynamics ol Futurc
Ðcvclopmcnt, in Peacekeeping. Appraisals and Proposals, .¡. (Hcnry Viscman cd.,
.o6.).
.¡o Òn rcgional pcacc opcrations, scc Gustal Lind, Te Revival of Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter. Regional Organisations and Collective Security, a..a6o (acc¡).
.·· Special protection
NATO
Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (European Force)
Undcr thc Gcncral Framcwork Agrccmcnt lor Pcacc, also known as thc Ðayton
Agrccmcnt altcr thc placc whcrc it was concludcd, applicablc bctwccn thc Rcpublic
ol 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina, thc Rcpublic ol Croatia, and thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol
Yugoslavia, a NATÒlcd !mplcmcntation Forcc (!FÒR) was chargcd with thc task
ol implcmcnting thc pcacc agrccmcnt’s military objcctivc’s.
+¡o
Trough rcsolution
.c.. (.oo·), adoptcd undcr Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr, thc Sccurity Council
cndorscd thc rolc ol !FÒR.
+¡+
Tc partics to thc Ðayton Agrccmcnt also concludcd
agrccmcnts on thc status ol thc NATÒ lorccs on thcir tcrritory.
+¡:
Tcsc status
agrccmcnts lormcd part ol thc Ðayton Agrccmcnt.
+¡:
Tc advantagcs arc obvious.
!t allowcd agrccmcnt on thc status ol thc lorccs bclorc thcir dcploymcnt.
Vhilc thrcc sovcrcign statcs wcrc partics to thc Ðayton Agrccmcnt, thc
thrcc cntitics within thc Rcpublic ol 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina wcrc partics to its
anncxcs.
+¡±
Appcndix 8 (hcrcinaltcr thc 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina SÒFA) is in
many rcspccts influcnccd by thc multilatcral NATÒ SÒFA lor visiting lorccs.
!t was, howcvcr, modificd to an opcrational contcxt, thus incorporating provi
sions ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA. Tc qucstion ol dcpcndants, lor cxamplc, was not
includcd in thc status agrccmcnts with 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina and thc dcfini
tion ol pcrsonncl was in that rcspcct narrowly construcd.
Altcr onc ycar thc Stabilization Forcc (SFÒR) succccdcd thc !FÒR opcra
tion. From a Ðcccmbcr acc¡, thc ¡U has lcd a multinational stabilisation lorcc
(¡UFÒR) as thc lcgal succcssor to SFÒR.
+¡¡
Tc SÒFA anncxcd to thc 8osnia
and Hcrzcgovina continucs to apply in rclation to ¡UFÒR.
+¡6
.·c Gcncral Framcwork Agrccmcnt lor Pcacc in 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina with Anncxcs,
Ðonc at Paris Ðcccmbcr .¡, .oo·, .· !LM ·· (.oo6).
.·. SC Rcs. .c.., UN SCÒR, .6c·
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.c.. (.oo·).
.·a Such agrccmcnts had in lact alrcady bccn ncgotiatcd lor missions planncd at an carlicr
phasc, such as thc \anccÒwcn Plan and thc possiblc withdrawal ol UNPRÒFÒR
lrom 8osnia. Scc ]amcs A. 8urgcr, Lcssons Lcarncd in thc Formcr Rcpublic ol
Yugoslavia, in Te Handbook of Te Law of Visiting Forces, ·.c (Ðictcr Flcck ct. al.,
cds., acc.).
.·. Appcndix 8 to Anncx .A ol thc Ðayton Agrccmcnt.
.·¡ Tcsc cntitics arc thc Rcpublic ol 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina, thc Fcdcration ol 8osnia
and Hcrzcgovina, and thc Rcpublika Srpska.
.·· Council Ðccision acc¡/·c./CFSP ol a· Novcmbcr acc¡ on thc launching ol thc
¡uropcan Union military opcration in 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina, Ò] L .·./a. (acc¡).
For thc purposc ol this study, howcvcr, SFÒR is thc lorcc principally rclcrrcd to in
this rcspcct.
.·6 SC Rcs. .··., UN SCÒR, ·cc.
th
mtg., para. ac, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.··. (acc¡), SC Rcs.
.···, UN SCÒR, ·c··
th
mtg., para. .a, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.··· (acc¡).
.·6 Chapter 4
Kosovo Force
Tc NATÒlcd !ntcrnational Sccurity Forcc (KFÒR) in Kosovo is bascd
upon Sccurity Council Rcsolution .a¡¡ and thc Military Tcchnical Agrccmcnt
bctwccn KFÒR and thc govcrnmcnts ol thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol Yugoslavia and
thc Rcpublic ol Scrbia.
+¡·
Kosovo is part ol ScrbiaMontcncgro but it docs not
cxcrcisc control ovcr thc tcrritory, which at thc timc ol writing was administcrcd
by thc Unitcd Nations !ntcrim Administration in Kosovo (UNM!K).
+¡8

Tc Military Tcchnical Agrccmcnt providcs lor a spccial status lor KFÒR
and its pcrsonncl in Kosovo. According to Appcndix a to thc agrccmcnt, “|t|hc
intcrnational sccurity lorcc (“KFÒR”) nor any ol its pcrsonncl or staff shall bc
liablc lor any damagcs to public or privatc propcrty that thcy may causc in thc
coursc ol dutics rclatcd to thc implcmcntation ol this Agrccmcnt. Tc partics will
agrcc a StatusolForccs Agrccmcnt (SÒFA) as soon as possiblc.”
+¡o

8asing itscll upon thc mandatc givcn to it by thc Sccurity Council, UNM!K
has rcgardcd itscll as bcing authoriscd to issuc Rcgulations govcrning thc tcrri
tory ol Kosovo. Tc status ol KFÒR and UNM!K is dcalt with in Rcgulation
.·· SC Rcs. .a¡¡, UN SCÒR, ¡c..th mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.a¡¡ (.ooo). Military
Tcchnical Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc !ntcrnational Sccurity Forcc (“KFÒR”) and thc
Govcrnmcnts ol thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol Yugoslavia and thc Rcpublic ol Scrbia, ]unc
o, .ooo, .· !LM .a.· (.ooo). http://www.nato.int/klor/klor/documcnts/mta.htm.
.·· Although this situation was (and at thc timc ol writing still was) diffcrcnt lrom most
pcacc opcrations, it was not uniquc. !n thc casc ol Vcst Ncw Guinca, whcrc thc UN
administcrcd thc tcrritory, thcrc did not sccm to bc any critical nccd lor rcgulat
ing thc status ol thc mcmbcrs ol thc lorcc bccausc ol that lact. Ð. S. Vijcwardanc,
Criminal ]urisdiction ovcr \isiting Forccs with Spccial Rclcrcncc to !ntcrnational
Forccs, ¡. BYIL .aa, .o· (.o6·). Undcr thc authority ol thc Lcaguc ol Nations, an
intcrnational lorcc was placcd at thc disposal ol thc govcrning commission in thc
Saar to maintain ordcr during thc Saar plcbiscitc. Tc Saar was govcrncd by thc
Lcaguc ol Nations, which was vcstcd with powcrs ol lcgislation and thc administra
tion ol justicc, and thcrc is no cvidcncc ol any problcms in conncction with crimi
nal jurisdiction in rclation to mcmbcrs ol thc lorcc. !bid., .··. Cl. 8arton who claim
that thc intcrnational lorcc was immunc lrom thc jurisdiction ol thc local courts,
bascd upon its having thc status ol an occupying lorcc. G. P. 8arton, Forcign Armcd
Forccs: !mmunity From Criminal ]urisdiction, a· BYIL .·6, aac (.o·c).
.·o http://www.nato.int/klor/klor/documcnts/mta.htm. Max ]ohnson, scnior lcgal
adviscr to NATÒ, commcntcd on thc status ol KFÒR and hcld that “|s|omc
lorm ol SÒFA customarily covcrs visiting lorccs. For KFÒR, thc SÒFA is lound
in thc MTA and UNSCR .a¡¡. Ncithcr documcnt rcscmblcs a standard SÒFA,
but takcn togcthcr, thcy vcst KFÒR, in its spccificd domain, with virtual plcnary
powcr within Kosovo”. Max S. ]ohnson, Hcadquartcrs KFÒR, in Te Handbook of
Te Law of Visiting Forces, ..o, .¡. (Ðictcr Flcck ct. al. cds. acc.). Tc NATÒlcd
lorcc was clcarly acting in an opcrational contcxt with apparcnt cnlorccmcnt capa
bilitics. ]ohnson’s rclcrcncc to thc law ol visiting lorccs should pcrhaps bc intcrprctcd
broadly, so as to includc situations whcrc such lorccs havc bccn cntrustcd with a
pcacc opcration mandatc.
.·· Special protection
No. accc/¡·.
+6o
!t hardly had thc samc lcgal charactcr as a SÒFA, but thc norms
cxprcsscd thcrcin lulfillcd thc samc purposc and it appcarcd to havc had thc
rcquircd cffcct. At thc timc ol writing this was still thc casc.
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
Tc !ntcrnational Sccurity Assistancc Forcc (!SAF) in Alghanistan was a UN
authoriscd opcration which at thc timc ol writing was undcr NATÒ command
and control. Undcr thc “Agrccmcnt on Provisional Arrangcmcnts in Alghanistan
pcnding thc Rccstablishmcnt ol Pcrmancnt Govcrnmcnt !nstitutions” (8onn
Agrccmcnt) a UNmandatcd Sccurity Forcc was rcqucstcd to assist in thc main
tcnancc ol sccurity in Kabul and surrounding arcas.
+6+
Acting undcr Chaptcr
\!! ol thc UN Chartcr, thc Sccurity Council authoriscd thc cstablishmcnt ol
thc lorcc. !t lurthcrmorc wclcomcd “thc commitmcnt ol thc partics to thc 8onn
Agrccmcnt to do all within thcir mcans and influcncc to cnsurc sccurity, includ
ing to cnsurc thc salcty, sccurity and lrccdom ol movcmcnt ol all Unitcd Nations
pcrsonncl and all othcr pcrsonncl ol intcrnational govcrnmcntal and nongov
crnmcntal organizations dcploycd in Alghanistan,”
+6:
!SAF, initially lcd by thc UK, concludcd a Military Tcchnical Agrccmcnt
with thc !ntcrim Administration ol Alghanistan with an anncx on thc status ol
thc !ntcrnational Sccurity Assistancc Forcc (thc SÒFA).
+6:
As in thc casc with
KFÒR it was not NATÒ (or in this casc thc UK) that was party to thc Military
Tcchnical Agrccmcnt, but rathcr thc ad hoccstablishcd sccurity lorcc.
+6±
Tis was
diffcrcnt lrom thc opcration in 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina whcrc NATÒ was party
to thc agrccmcnt stipulating thc lcgal status ol thc lorcc, as lound in Appcndix
8 to Anncx . ol thc Ðayton agrccmcnt. Tc mission ol !SAF was to assist in
thc maintcnancc ol sccurity in thc arca ol rcsponsibility, which largcly includcd
Kabul and thc surrounding arcas.
+6¡
.6c Rcgulation No. accc/¡· Òn thc Status, Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol KFÒR and
UNM!K and thcir Pcrsonncl in Kosovo (UNM!K/R¡G/accc/¡·), .· August
accc.
.6. Scc Anncx . to thc 8onn Agrccmcnt. Undcr thc 8onn Agrccmcnt, an !ntcrim
Authority was cstablishcd to rcprcscnt Alghanistan in its cxtcrnal rclations. Tc
!ntcrim Authority consistcd inter alia ol an !ntcrim Administration. http://www.
unamaalg.org/docs/_nonUNºacÐocs/_!ntcrnationConlcrcnccs&Forums/
8onnTalks/bonn.htm.
.6a SC Rcs. ..·6, UN SCÒR, ¡¡¡.
rd
mtg., para. ·, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/..·6 (acc.).
.6. ¡. !LM .c.a (acca) (!SAF SÒFA).
.6¡ Tc lact that an ad hoccstablishcd military lorcc, instcad ol a statc or organisation
with intcrnational pcrsonality, is a party to a SÒFA may affcct qucstions rclating to
rcsponsibilitics undcr thc agrccmcnt.
.6· Tc !SAF AÒR is markcd out on a map attachcd in Anncx 8 to thc MTA.
.·· Chapter 4
Iuropean Union
Concordia
Following thc tcrmination ol thc NATÒlcd undcrtaking, Allied Harmony, in
thc lormcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia, thc ¡uropcan Union launchcd its
first military cntcrprisc to cnsurc a succcsslul lollowup to thc NATÒ opcra
tion.
+66
Tc ¡Ulcd opcration, namcd Concordia, aimcd at contributing to a stablc
cnvironmcnt and to allow lor thc implcmcntation ol thc Òhrid Framcwork
Agrccmcnt.
+6·
!t lound its lcgal basis by way ol dircct rcqucst ol thc lormcr
Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia govcrnmcnt and Sccurity Council Rcsolution
..·.. Concordia ran lrom .. March acc. to .· Ðcccmbcr acc.. Tc lcgal status
ol thc ¡U lorccs (¡UF) was sct out in an agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡U and thc
Formcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia whcrc thc pcrsonncl conccrncd cnjoycd
trcatmcnt cquivalcnt to that ol diplomatic agcnts.
+68

Artemis
!n May, acc., thc UN Sccurity Council authoriscd thc dcploymcnt ol an !ntcrim
¡mcrgcncy Multinational Forcc in thc Ðcmocratic Rcpublic ol Congo, in sup
port ol thc UN MÒNUC opcration, to hclp improvc sccurity situation in that
country.
+6o
Acting upon a rcqucst lrom thc UN SccrctaryGcncral, thc ¡U agrccd
to providc thc ncccssary lorccs.
+·o
Tc ¡U dcvclopcd a SÒFA lor thc opcration,
callcd Artemis, according to which thc pcrsonncl conccrncd cnjoycd trcatmcnt
cquivalcnt to that ol diplomatic agcnts.
+·+
.66 Council ]oint Action acc./oa/CFSP ol a· ]anuary acc. on thc ¡uropcan Union
military opcration in thc Formcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia, Ò ] L .¡/a6
(acc.), Articlc .. Catriona Macc, Òpcration Concordia: Ðcvcloping a ‘¡uropcan’
approach to crisis managcmcnt:, .. International Peacekeeping ¡·¡ (acc¡).
.6· http://www.coc.int/T/¡/Lcgal_affairs/Lcgal_coopcration/Policc_and_intcrnal_
sccurity/ÒHR!кacAgrccmcntºac..augustacc..asp.
.6· Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡uropcan Union and thc Formcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol
Maccdonia on thc status ol thc ¡uropcan Unionlcd Forccs (¡UF) in thc Formcr
Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia.
.6o SC Rcs. .¡·¡, UN SCÒR, ¡·6¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡·¡ (acc.).
.·c Council Ðccision acc./¡.a/CFSP ol .a ]unc acc. on thc launching ol thc ¡uropcan
Union military opcration in thc Ðcmocratic Rcpublic ol Congo, Ò ] L .¡·/¡a (acc.).
Scc Stålc Ulrikscn, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Macc, Òpcration Artemis: Tc
shapc ol things to comc:, .. International Peacekeeping ·c· (acc¡).
.·. Tc dralt is on filc with thc author. Tc tcmporary lorcc was opcrational only lor
lour months and thc SÒFA was in lact not concludcd during thc timc ol thc opcra
tion.
.·o Special protection
Commonwealth of Independent States
+·:
Òn .o ]anuary .oo6, thc Council ol Hcads ol Statc ol thc Commonwcalth ol
!ndcpcndcnt Statcs (C!S) adoptcd a numbcr ol dccisions on thc scttlcmcnt ol
conflicts and pcacckccping lorccs. A dccision was takcn on a Statutc on Collcctivc
Pcacckccping Forccs in thc Commonwcalth ol !ndcpcndcnt Statcs. Tis statutc
was attachcd as an appcndix to Anncx \ ol thc C!S rcsolution.
+·:

Tc status ol thc pcrsonncl is sct out in paragraph .o ol thc statutc:
For thc duration ol thcir scrvicc in thc Collcctivc Pcacckccping Forccs, pcr
sonncl shall cnjoy thc status, privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to Unitcd
Nations pcrsonncl whcn conducting pcacckccping opcrations in accordancc
with thc Convcntion on Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations
adoptcd by thc Gcncral Asscmbly on .. Fcbruary .o¡6, thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl approvcd by thc
Gcncral Asscmbly on o Ðcccmbcr .oo¡, thc Protocol ol .· May .ooa on thc
Status ol military obscrvcr groups and collcctivc pcacckccping lorccs in thc
Commonwcalth ol !ndcpcndcnt Statcs, and this Statutc.
+·±
Iconomic Community of Central African States
!n .ooo mcmbcr statcs ol thc ¡conomic Community ol Ccntral Alrican Statcs
(¡CCAS) dccidcd to cstablish an organisation lor thc promotion and maintc
nancc ol pcacc and sccurity in ccntral Alrica, to bc callcd thc Council lor Pcacc
and Sccurity in Ccntral Alrica. Ònc ol thrcc tcchnical organs ol thc Council
was a nonpcrmancnt Ccntral Alrican Multinational Forcc (FÒMAC).
+·¡
Tc
status ol thc lorcc was sct out in thc Standing Òrdcrs ol thc Ccntral Alrican
Multinational Forcc.
+·6
According to thc standing ordcrs, “FÒMAC pcrsonncl shall cnjoy diplo
matic status.”
+··
Morcovcr, thcy wcrc to “cnjoy thc clauscs ol thc Convcntion on
Sccurity ol thc Unitcd Nations staff and associatc staff (sic)”
+·8
Articlc .. containcd
rulcs on disciplinary mattcrs, whcrc thc contingcnt commandcrs wcrc compctcnt
.·a Òn lcgal aspccts ol thc C!S pcacc opcrations, scc 8akthtiyar Tuzmukhamcdov, Tc
Lcgal Framcwork ol C!S Rcgional Pcacc Òpcrations, 6 International Peacekeeping, .
(accc).
.·. Lcttcr datcd a6 ]anuary .oo6 lrom thc pcrmancnt rcprcscntativc ol thc Russian
lcdcration to thc Unitcd Nations addrcsscd to thc SccrctaryGcncral, .· UN Ðoc.
A/·./6a – S/.oo6/·¡.
.·¡ !bid., ao, para. .o.
.·· http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RcgÒrg/unity_to_union/pdls/cccas/¡CCASovcrvicw.
pdl.
.·6 http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RcgÒrg/unity_to_union/pdls/cccas/lomaccng.pdl.
.·· Articlc o ol thc Standing Òrdcrs, http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RcgÒrg/unity_to_
union/pdls/cccas/lomaccng.pdl.
.·· !bid., Articlc .c.
.6c Chapter 4
to dccidc on “gcncral disciplinc mattcrs”, whilc “|d|uly notcd cascs ol shccr indis
ciplinc may bc subjcct to sanctions pronounccd by thc Forcc Commandcr.”
+·o

Common law inlractions ol FÒMAC staff wcrc to rcsidc within thc juris
diction ol thcir national courts and thc suspccts conccrncd wcrc to bc scnt to
thcir countrics ol origin without dclay.
+8o
As lar as crimcs wcnt that could bc
charactcriscd as war crimcs or gcnocidc, thcy would lall within thc jurisdiction ol
ad hoc courts sct up lor that purposc.
+8+
4.3.1 Scope of Application
A SÒFA will gcncrally apply throughout thc tcrritory ol thc host country.
+8:
Tc
tcrritorial application ol a SÒFA is usually cxplicitly statcd in agrccmcnts ol a
.·o !bid., Articlc ...
.·c !bid., Articlc .¡.
.·. !bid., Articlc .·.
.·a Paragraph a ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt. ¡xamplcs ol UN Agrccmcnts in this
rcspcct: Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn Libcria and thc Unitcd Nations Conccrning thc Status
ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission in Libcria (acc.) on filc with thc author (UNM!L
SÒFA), Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Ðcmocratic Rcpublic ol ¡ast Timor and thc
Unitcd Nations Conccrning thc Status ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission ol Support
in ¡ast Timor (acca) a.·· UNTS .6· (UNM!S¡T SÒFA), Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn
thc Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Ccntral Alrican Rcpublic on thc
Status ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission in thc Ccntral Alrican Rcpublic (.oo·) ac.·
UNTS ·.¡ (M!NURCA SÒFA), Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc
Govcrnmcnt ol Mozambiquc on thc Status ol thc Unitcd Nations Òpcration in
Mozambiquc (.oo.) .·aa UNTS .o (ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA), Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc
Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt ol 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina on thc Status
ol thc Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc in 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina (.oo.) .·aa
UNTS ·· (UNPRÒFÒR – 8iH SÒFA), Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations
and thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Rcpublic ol Rwanda on thc Status ol thc Unitcd
Nations Assistancc Mission lor Rwanda (.oo.) .·¡· UNTS .6 (UNAM!R SÒFA),
Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Suprcmc National Council ol
Cambodia on thc Status ol thc Unitcd Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(.ooa) .6·. UNTS .6. (UNTAC SÒFA), ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs constituting an agrcc
mcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc lormcr Yugoslav
Rcpublic ol Maccdonia on thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc in
thc lormcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia (.oo¡) .··· UNTS a·· (UNPRÒFÒR
– Maccdonia SÒFA), Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt
ol Haiti rcgarding thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission in Haiti (.oo·) .·6.
UNTS a6· (UNM!H SÒFA), Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc
Govcrnmcnt ol Angola on thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations Angola \crification
Mission in Angola (.oo·) .·6¡ UNTS .o. (UNA\¡M !!! SÒFA), Agrccmcnt
bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt ol Croatia rcgarding thc status
ol thc Unitcd Nations lorccs and opcrations in Croatia (.oo·) .·6¡ UNTS a··
(UNCRÒ SÒFA), Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Govcrnmcnt ol
Lcbanon on thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations !ntcrim Forcc in Lcbanon (.oo·) .oc.
UNTS .o· (UN!F!L SÒFA). Scc also cxamplcs ol nonUN agrccmcnts: Appcndix
.6. Special protection
latcr datc. Status agrccmcnts in carlicr opcrations somctimcs lackcd such pro
visions. !n thc casc ol UN¡F its opcrational arca was dctcrmincd by rclcrcncc
to its dcploymcnt in cxcrcising its lunctions, thc location ol its military instal
lations and othcr prcmiscs, and its lincs ol communication and supply.
+8:
!n his
Summary study, thc SccrctaryGcncral hcld, with rcgard to thc principlc ol lrcc
dom ol movcmcnt, that an agrccmcnt as to what should bc considcrcd thc arca ol
opcrations ol thc lorcc would bc nccdcd in luturc opcrations.
+8±

A govcrnmcnt lacks thc capability ol cffcctivcly cnsuring thc implcmcnta
tion ol SÒFA norms in tcrritorics whcrc it docs not cxcrcisc cffcctivc control.
+8¡

Tc tcrm “Govcrnmcnt”, in thc UN Modcl SÒFA, is, in lact, dcfincd as “thc
Govcrnmcnt ol thc host country or Administration having dc lacto authority
ovcr thc tcrritory and/or arca ol opcrations in qucstion.”
+86
!n thc Congo opcra
tion (.o6c.o6¡), scccssionist movcmcnts cxcrciscd control lrom timc to timc
ovcr largc tracts ol thc Congolcsc tcrritory. Tc SccrctaryGcncral was thcrclorc
morc or lcss lorccd to ncgotiatc with thosc movcmcnts rathcr than usc lorcc to
cntcr thc tcrritory. Tc UN also concludcd ccascfirc agrccmcnts with lorccs not
undcr thc control ol thc ccntral Congolcsc govcrnmcnt.
+8·

8 to Anncx .A to thc Ðayton Agrccmcnt, .· !LM ·· (.oo6) (!FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA),
Rcgulation No. accc/¡· Òn thc Status, Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol KFÒR and
UNM!K and thcir Pcrsonncl in Kosovo, and Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡U and thc
Formcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia (¡U SÒFA).
.·. UN¡F SÒFA paragraph ·. According to thc rcport by thc SccrctaryGcncral in
prcparation lor UN¡F, it was assumcd that its lunctions could “covcr an arca cxtcnd
ing roughly lrom thc Sucz Canal to thc armisticc dcmarcation lincs cstablishcd in
thc armisticc agrccmcnt bctwccn ¡gypt and !sracl.” Scc Sccond and final rcport ol
thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc plan lor an cmcrgcncy intcrnational Unitcd Nations
lorcc rcqucstcd in rcsolution oo· (¡S!), adoptcd by thc Gcncral Asscmbly on ¡
Novcmbcr .o·6, UN Ðoc. A/..ca (.o·6).
.·¡ Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral: Summary study ol thc cxpcricnccs dcrivcd lrom
thc cstablishmcnt and opcration ol thc Forcc, para. .6¡, UN Ðoc. A/.o¡. (.o··). Tc
SccrctaryGcncral rcitcratcd this point during thc planning ol thc .o6c opcration
in thc Congo. Scc First rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc implcmcntation ol
Sccurity Council rcsolution .¡. (.o6c), para. o, UN Ðoc. S/¡.·o (.o6c). Although thc
tcrritorial scopc ol application was not cxplicitly statcd in thc ÒNUC opcration, thc
lorcc cnjoycd lrccdom ol movcmcnt throughout thc wholc Congolcsc tcrritory.
.·· Tc mission ol !SAF was to assist in thc maintcnancc ol thc sccurity in thc arca ol
rcsponsibility, which largcly includcd Kabul and thc surrounding arcas. Tc MTA,
howcvcr, lays down privilcgcs, such as lrccdom ol movcmcnt lor thc !SAF mcmbcrs
throughout thc whole ol Alghanistan. Tc !ntcrim Administration’s ability to cnsurc
this lrccdom ol movcmcnt dcpcndcd on its capacity to cxcrcisc cffcctivc control ovcr
thc tcrritory. Tis obligation on thc part ol thc !ntcrim Administration must havc
appcarcd impossiblc to lulfil at thc timc thc agrccmcnt was concludcd. Tc !SAF AÒR
is markcd out on a map attachcd in Anncx 8 to thc MTA. ¡. !LM .c.a (acca).
.·6 Scc para. a, notc c/ ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt.
.·· 8owctt, a¡c..
.6a Chapter 4
A SÒFA gcncrally takcs cffcct lrom thc datc ol signaturc and rcmains in
lorcc until thc last clcmcnt ol thc UN opcration conccrncd has dcpartcd lrom
thc tcrritory in qucstion.
+88
Tc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt cxplicitly statcs that
immunity lrom lcgal proccss cnjoycd by thc mcmbcrs ol thc opcration, includ
ing locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl, in rcspcct ol words spokcn or writtcn and all acts
pcrlormcd in thcir official capacity, shall rcmain in lorcc cvcn altcr thcy ccasc to
bc cmploycd by thc opcration.
+8o
Òthcr provisions that also rcmain in lorcc arc
thosc rclatcd to thc scttlcmcnt ol disputcs.
+oo

A comprchcnsivc and timcly SÒFA is not always possiblc to concludc
with thc host nation. Tis has rcsultcd in agrccmcnts having rctroactivc cffcct.
!n thc Unitcd Nations Òpcration in thc Congo (ÒNUC) a noninclusivc 8asic
Agrccmcnt was initially concludcd bctwccn thc UN and thc host nation in ]uly,
.o6c. Ncgotiations bcgan in August on a comprchcnsivc SÒFA but had to bc
postponcd owing to intcrnal disturbanccs. !t cvcntually lcd to thc situation ol
thc Congo having no cstablishcd govcrnmcnt with which to ncgotiatc such an
agrccmcnt.
+o+
Tc SÒFA that was concludcd in Novcmbcr, .o6., was thcrclorc
dccmcd to havc takcn cffcct lrom thc timc ol thc arrival ol thc first ÒNUC clc
mcnts.
+o:
Tc August, accc, “SÒFAarrangcmcnt” in Kosovo similarly took rct
roactivc cffcct.
+o:
!n gcncral, thc provisions ol a SÒFA apply to thc pcacckccping opcration
itscll as wcll as to its mcmbcrs.
+o±
Part !\ ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt stipu
.·· Scc paras. ·o and 6c ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt. ¡xamplcs ol UN Agrccmcnts:
Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn ¡thiopia and thc Unitcd Nations Conccrning thc Status ol thc
Unitcd Nations Mission in ¡thiopia and ¡ritrca, (acc.) paras. 6a6., a.¡. UNTS
a¡ (UNM¡¡ ¡thiopia SÒFA), M!NURCA SÒFA paras. 6.6a. UNM!L SÒFA
paras. 6a6.. ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA paras. ···6. UNPRÒFÒR 8iH SÒFA paras. ·¡··.
UNAM!R SÒFA para. ··, no provision cxplicitly stating thc cntcring into lorcc ol
thc agrccmcnt. UNTAC SÒFA paras. ·.·¡. UNM!H SÒFA paras. ····. UNA\¡M
!!! SÒFA, paras. ···o. UNCRÒ SÒFA paras. ····. According to thc UN!F!L
SÒFA, it applics provisionally until it has bccn ratificd by thc Lcbancsc Govcrnmcnt
in accordancc with its constitutional rcquircmcnts. Scc also !SAF SÒFA, Articlc X,
Anncx A, ¡U SÒFA, Articlc .· and !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA, para aa.
.·o Paras., 6c and ¡6 ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt. Scc notc .·a lor cxamplcs ol othcr
UN Agrccmcnts containing thcsc provisions.
.oc Paragraphs 6c, ·. and ·¡ ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt. Scc notc .·a lor cxamplcs ol
othcr UN Agrccmcnts containing thcsc provisions.
.o. 8owctt, a.·.
.oa Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and thc Rcpublic ol thc Congo (Lcopoldvillc)
rclating to thc lcgal status, lacilitics, privilcgcs and immunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations
Òrganization in thc Congo, (.o6.), para. ¡·, ¡.¡ UNTS aao, (ÒNUC SÒFA).
.o. Scc Rcgulation No.accc/¡· on thc status, privilcgcs and immunitics ol KFÒR and
UNM!K and thcir pcrsonncl in Kosovo, Scction .. “Tis rcgulation shall bc dccmcd
to havc cntcrcd into lorcc on .c ]unc .ooo.”
.o¡ UN Modcl Agrccmcnt para. a. ¡xamplcs ol UN Agrccmcnts: ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA,
para. a, UNTAC SÒFA para. a, UNA\¡M !!! para. a, UNM!H para. a.
.6. Special protection
latcs thc status ol a pcacckccping opcration whilc Part \! dcfincs thc status ol
thc mcmbcrs ol an opcration. An opcration is rcgardcd as a subsidiary organ ol
thc UN and cnjoys thc status, privilcgcs and immunitics ol thc UN in accordancc
with thc Gcncral Convcntion.
+o¡
!n practicc, thc provisions ol a particular agrccmcnt dctcrminc who may
qualily as a mcmbcr ol a pcacc opcration. A mcmbcr is oltcn dcfincd as “any
mcmbcr ol thc civilian or military componcnt”.
+o6
!n gcncral, a “civilian compo
.o· UN Modcl Agrccmcnt, para. .·. ¡xamplcs ol UN Agrccmcnts: UN!F!L SÒFA
para. .·, UNA\¡M !!! para. .6, UNAM!R SÒFA para. .·, ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA, para.
.¡. Tc ÒAU lorcc was rcgardcd as a subsidiary organ ol thc ÒAU and thus “cnti
tlcd to thc status, privilcgcs and immunitics grantcd to thc Òrganization ol Alrican
Unity.” ÒAU Status ol Forccs Agrccmcnt, Nairobi, Novcmbcr a·, .o·., articlc · c), on
filc with thc author. NATÒ includcs lor thc purposc ol thc agrccmcnt “its subsidi
ary bodics, its military Hcadquartcrs and all its constitucnt national clcmcnts/units
acting in support ol, prcparing and participating in thc Òpcration,” !FÒR/SFÒR
SÒFA para. .. KFÒR “mcans thc spccially constitutcd lorcc, composcd by thc North
Atlantic Trcaty Òrganization, including its mcmbcr Statcs, its subsidiary bodics, its
military Hcadquartcrs and national clcmcnts/units, and nonNATÒ contributing
countrics”. Rcgulation NÒ. accc/¡· Òn thc Status, Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol
KFÒR and UNM!K and thcir Pcrsonncl in Kosovo, Scctions. a.. and ¡... Tc MTA
dcfincd !SAF as including “all military pcrsonncl togcthcr with thcir aircralt, vchi
clcs, armourcd vchiclcs, storcs, cquipmcnt, communications, ammunition, wcapons
and provisions as wcll as thc civilian componcnts ol such lorccs, air and surlacc
movcmcnt rcsourccs and thcir support scrviccs.” !SAF SÒFA Articlc ., para. ¡.b
.o6 “Mcmbcr ol UNTAC” – “mcans any mcmbcr ol thc civilian or military clcmcnt
but unlcss spccifically statcd othcrwisc docs not includc locally rccruitcd pcrson
ncl” (UNTAC SÒFA para. .), “Mcmbcr ol ÒNUMÒZ” – “mcans any mcmbcr
ol thc civilian or military componcnt” (ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA para. .), “Mcmbcr ol
UNPRÒFÒR” – “mcans any mcmbcr ol thc military, policc, or civilian componcnts
but unlcss spccifically statcd othcrwisc docs not includc locally rccruitcd pcrson
ncl” (UNPRÒFÒR8iH SÒFA para. .), “Mcmbcr ol UNAM!R” – “mcans any
mcmbcr ol thc civilian or military scction but unlcss spccifically statcd othcrwisc
docs not includc locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl” (UNAM!R SÒFA para. .), “Mcmbcr
ol UNM!H” – “mcans a mcmbcr ol thc civilian or military componcnt” (UNM!H
SÒFA para. .), “Mcmbcr ol UNA\¡M !!!” – “mcans any mcmbcr ol thc civilian,
military ol policc componcnts” (UNA\¡M !!! SÒFA para..), “Mcmbcr ol UN!F!L”
– “mcans any mcmbcr ol thc civilian or military clcmcnt but unlcss spccifically statcd
othcrwisc docs not includc locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl” (UN!F!L SÒFA para. .).
!n thc !FÒR/SFÒR opcration, thc SÒFA applicd in rcspcct ol NATÒ pcrsonncl,
dcfincd as “thc civilian and military pcrsonncl ol |NATÒ| with thc cxccption ol
pcrsonncl locally hircd,” para. . !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA. KFÒR pcrsonncl was dcfincd
as “all military and civilian pcrsonncl ol KFÒR, such pcrsonncl shall bc issucd a
distinctivc !Ð card by or undcr thc authority ol thc KFÒR Forcc Commandcr”.
Rcgulation NÒ. accc/¡· Òn thc Status, Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol KFÒR and
UNM!K and thcir Pcrsonncl in Kosovo, Scction ., pcrsonncl bclonging to thc ¡UF
wcrc “thc civilian and military pcrsonncl assigncd to thc ¡UF, prcscnt, cxccpt as oth
crwisc providcd in thc agrccmcnt, in thc tcrritory ol thc Host Party, with thc cxccp
tion ol pcrsonncl locally hircd, including contractors,” ¡U SÒFA, Articlc .... (h).
.6¡ Chapter 4
ncnt” consists “ol UN officials and ol othcr pcrsons assigncd by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral to assist thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or madc availablc by participating
Statcs” to scrvc as part ol thc opcration.
+o·
A “military componcnt” usually con
sists “ol military and spccial civilian pcrsonncl madc availablc by participating
Statcs” to scrvc as part ol thc opcration.
+o8
Tc opcration itscll is also dcfincd
in cach agrccmcnt. To takc an cxamplc, thc UN Òpcration in Mozambiquc
(ÒNUMÒZ) is dcfincd as thc UN opcration in Mozambiquc
cstablishcd pursuant to Sccurity Council rcsolution ·o· (.ooa) ol .6 Ðcccmbcr
.ooa, in linc with thc Gcncral Pcacc Agrccmcnt lor Mozambiquc, with thc
tcrms ol rclcrcncc as dcscribcd in thc rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral ol .
.o· “Civilian clcmcnt” – “consisting ol Unitcd Nations officials and ol othcr pcrsons
assigncd by thc SccrctaryGcncral to assist thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or madc
availablc by participating Statcs to scrvc as a part ol UNTAC” (UNTAC SÒFA
para. .), “Civilian componcnt” – “consisting ol Unitcd Nations officials and ol othcr
pcrsons assigncd by thc SccrctaryGcncral to assist thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or
madc availablc by participating Statcs to scrvc as part ol ÒNUMÒZ” (ÒNUMÒZ
SÒFA para. .), “Civilian componcnt” – “consisting ol officials ol thc Unitcd Nations”
(UNPRÒFÒR8iH SÒFA para. .), “Civilian scction” – “composcd ol Unitcd
Nations officials and ol othcr pcrsons assigncd by thc SccrctaryGcncral to assist
thc Pcrmancnt Rcprcscntativc or contributcd to UNAM!R by participating Statcs”
(UNAM!R SÒFA para. .), “Civilian componcnt” – “madc up ol Unitcd Nations
officcrs and othcr pcrsons, including thc civilian policc, assigncd by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral to assist thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or placcd at thc disposal ol UNM!H
by thc participating Statcs” (UNM!H SÒFA para. .) , “Civilian componcnt” – “con
sisting ol Unitcd Nations officials and ol othcr pcrsons assigncd by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral to assist thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or madc availablc by participating Statcs
to scrvc as part ol UNA\¡M” (UNA\¡M !!! SÒFA para. .), “Civilian clcmcnt” –
“consisting ol Unitcd Nations officials and othcr pcrsons assigncd by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral to assist thc Forcc Commandcr or madc availablc by participating Statcs to
scrvc as part ol UN!F!L” (UN!F!L SÒFA para. ., includcs also UNTSÒ).
.o· “Military clcmcnt” – “consisting ol military and civilian pcrsonncl madc availablc by
participating Statcs to scrvc as a part ol UNTAC” (UNTAC SÒFA para. .) “mili
tary componcnt” – “consisting ol military and spccial civilian pcrsonncl madc avail
ablc by participating Statcs to scrvc as part ol ÒNUMÒZ” (ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA
para. .), “military componcnt” – “consisting ol military and spccial civilian pcrson
ncl madc availablc by participating Statcs at thc rcqucst ol thc SccrctaryGcncral”
(UNPRÒFÒR8iH SÒFA para. .), “military scction” – “composcd ol military and
civilian pcrsonncl assigncd by participating Statcs to scrvc as part ol UNAM!R”
(UNAM!R SÒFA para. .), “Military componcnt” – “madc up ol military pcrsonncl
and spccializcd civilian pcrsonncl placcd at thc disposal ol UNM!H by thc partici
pating Statcs” (UNM!H SÒFA para. .), “military componcnt” – “consisting ol mili
tary and spccial civilian pcrsonncl madc availablc by participating Statcs to scrvc as
part ol UNA\¡M !!!” (UNA\¡M !!! SÒFA para. ) “Military clcmcnt” – “consist
ing ol military and civilian pcrsonncl madc availablc by participating statcs to scrvc
as part ol UN!F!L” (UN!F!L SÒFA para. .).
.6· Special protection
Ðcccmbcr .ooa (S/a¡·oa) which has bccn approvcd by thc Sccurity Council in
thc abovcmcntioncd rcsolution ·o· (.ooa).
+oo
Òthcr catcgorics ol pcrsonncl may also bc accordcd spccial status undcr appli
cablc SÒFAs such as thosc locally cmploycd.
:oo
An incrcasing dcpcndcncy on
civilian pcrsonncl, not cmploycd by thc UN, has lcd to dcmands lor cxtcnding
privilcgcs and immunitics, lor instancc, to intcrnational contractors and Unitcd
Nations \oluntccrs (UN\).
:o+
Vith rcgard to UN\s, thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs
suggcstcd that thc SccrctaryGcncral, whcn rccommcnding thc cstablishmcnt ol
a ncw opcration, spccificd thc nccd lor such pcrsonncl.
:o:

Tc inclusion ol intcrnational contractual pcrsonncl undcr a SÒFA would,
according to thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs, rcquirc additional support by thc Gcncral
Asscmbly urging that thc govcrnmcnts conccrncd should grant such pcrsonncl
lunctional immunity.
:o:
According to thc SccrctaryGcncral, “|i|ntcrnational con
tractual pcrsonncl arc cmployccs ol thcir rcspcctivc intcrnational scrvicc agcncics.
Tcy arc not staff mcmbcrs, cmployccs or agcnts ol thc Unitcd Nations.”
:o±
Tc
Gcncral Convcntion docs not, thcrclorc, covcr thcm. 8ut sincc such pcrsonncl
pcrlorm lunctions ol UN opcrations thcy should, according to thc Sccrctary
Gcncral, cnjoy lcgal protcction. Such
protcction would cxtcnd to immunity lrom lcgal proccss in rcspcct ol words
spokcn and writtcn and all acts pcrlormcd by thcm in thcir official capac
ity, as wcll as cntitlcmcnt to rcpatriation in timcs ol intcrnational crisis. Tis
lcgal protcction would bc cxprcssly statcd and includcd in thc Status ol
.oo ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA, para. .(a).
acc Articlc a· ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA. ¡xamplcs ol UN Agrccmcnts: UNM¡¡
¡thiopia SÒFA para. .c, UNAM!R SÒFA para. a·, UNTAC SÒFA para. a6,
UNM!L SÒFA para. .c.
ac. Morc than ·ccc voluntccrs havc scrvcd in UN pcacc opcrations sincc .ooa, http://
www.unv.org/inlobasc/lacts/lspcacc_opcrstions.htm.
aca Mcmorandum to thc UndcrSccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations, .a
Novcmbcr .oo., in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, .·· (.oo.). !t should bc notcd
that in thc UNTAC SÒFA, UN\s wcrc accordcd privilcgcs and immunitics cquiva
lcnt to that ol Unitcd Nations officials, UNTAC SÒFA para. a.. Òthcr cxamplcs arc
UNM!H SÒFA, para. a· and UNA\¡M SÒFA, para. a6.
ac. Tc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs also cmphasiscd that thc possibility ol including such
pcrsonncl undcr a SÒFA dcpcndcd on thc conscnt ol thc host nation. Mcmorandum
to thc UndcrSccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations, .a Novcmbcr .oo., in
United Nations Juridical Yearbook, .·· (.oo.).
ac¡ Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Usc ol civilian pcrsonncl in pcacckccping opcra
tions, para. .a UN Ðoc.. A/¡·/·c· (.oo.).
.66 Chapter 4
Forccs Agrccmcnts concludcd bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and luturc host
Govcrnmcnts.
:o¡
8y thc usc ol a common dcfinition ol contractors, thcy arc rcgularly includcd in
thc SÒFAs ol a latcr datc.
:o6
Scc, lor cxamplc, thc Unitcd Nations Mission in
Sicrra Lconc (UNAMS!L) SÒFA:
“Contractors” mcans pcrsons, othcr than mcmbcrs ol UNAMS!L, cngagcd
by thc Unitcd Nations, including juridical as wcll as natural pcrsons and thcir
cmployccs and subcontractors, to pcrlorm scrviccs and/or supply cquipmcnt,
provisions, supplics, matcrials and othcr goods in support ol UNAMS!L activ
itics. Such contractors shall not bc considcrcd third party bcncficiarics to this
Agrccmcnt.
:o·
Tc !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA applics in rcspcct ol NATÒ pcrsonncl, dcfincd as “thc
civilian and military pcrsonncl ol |NATÒ| with thc cxccption ol pcrsonncl locally
hircd,”
:o8
NATÒ includcs lor thc purposc ol thc agrccmcnt “its subsidiary bodics,
its military Hcadquartcrs and all its constitucnt national clcmcnts/units acting in
support ol, prcparing and participating in thc Òpcration,”
:oo
Somc nations, such
as thosc lorming thc NordicPolish brigadc, wcrc assistcd by national support
clcmcnts (NS¡s). Tc pcrsonncl ol such clcmcnts wcrc rcgardcd as !FÒR pcr
sonncl, although stationcd in Hungary. Òthcr statcs wcrc dcpcndcnt on support
lrom national units not part ol !FÒR.
:+o
Tc SÒFA thcrclorc also applics to “thc
civilian and military pcrsonncl, propcrty and asscts ol national clcmcnts/units ol
NATÒ statcs, acting in conncction to thc Òpcration or thc rclicl lor thc civilian
population which howcvcr rcmain undcr national command and control.”
:++
Tc
lact that a numbcr ol nonNATÒ statcs participatcd in thc opcration also madc
it ncccssary to includc pcrsonncl lrom such statcs. Tc agrccmcnt stipulatcs that
ac· !bid., para. .6. Tis was donc c.g. in thc UNCRÒ SÒFA para. ao. Scc also spccial
status lor ‘Unitcd Nations contractors’ in support ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission in
8osnia and Hcrzcgovina, ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs constituting an Agrccmcnt bctwccn
thc Unitcd Nations and 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina on thc Status ol thc Unitcd Nations
Mission in 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina (UNM!8H) .oo6, .o.¡ UNTS ·¡ (UNM!8H
SÒFA).
ac6 UNM!L SÒFA para. ., UNM!S¡T SÒFA para. ., UNAMS!L SÒFA para. .,
M!NURCA SÒFA, para. ., UNM¡¡ SÒFA para. ..
ac· UNAMS!L SÒFA para. .
ac· !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA para. ..
aco !bid.
a.c Villiam Tomas Andcrson and Frank 8urkhardt, Mcmbcrs ol \isiting Forccs,
Civilian Componcnts, Ðcpcndcnts, in Te Handbook of Te Law of Visiting Forces, ·.,
6c (Ðictcr Flcck ct. al. cds., acc.).
a.. !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA para. .o.
.6· Special protection
thc host statc “shall accord nonNATÒ statcs and thcir pcrsonncl participating
in thc Òpcration thc samc privilcgcs and immunitics as thosc accordcd undcr
this agrccmcnt to NATÒ statcs and pcrsonncl.”
:+:
Tc SÒFA, lurthcrmorc, pro
vidcs lor thc possibility ol hiring local pcrsonncl.
:+:
An cxamplc ol what appcars to bc a widc catcgory ol pcrsonncl includcd
in a SÒFA is thc agrccmcnt applicablc in thc !SAF opcration. Tc SÒFA pro
vidcd privilcgcs and immunitics to “!SAF and supporting pcrsonncl, including
associatcd liaison pcrsonncl.”
:+±
Tcrc was no dcfinition ol “supporting pcrsonncl,
including associatcd liaison pcrsonncl”. Tc protcctions sct out in thc agrccmcnt
applicd not only to !SAF and all its pcrsonncl, but also “to lorccs in support ol
thc !SAF and all thcir pcrsonncl.”
:+¡
Tc Gcncral Convcntion applics to thc opcration subjcct to thc provi
sions in thc agrccmcnt. Tc lact that not all statcs arc party to thc convcntion
has lcd to altcrnativc provisions dcpcnding on whcthcr or not thc othcr party
to thc agrccmcnt is also a party to thc convcntion. !l thc othcr party is not a
mcmbcr ol thc convcntion thc agrccmcnt in itscll providcs lor thc application
ol thc convcntion.
:+6
Tc privilcgcs and immunitics spccificd in thc UN Modcl
Agrccmcnt apply to thc “pcacckccping opcration, its propcrty, lunds and asscts,
and its mcmbcrs, including thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr”, and thcy
shall also cnjoy thosc privilcgcs and immunitics providcd lor in thc convcntion.
:+·

Articlc !! ol thc convcntion “shall also apply to thc propcrty, lunds and asscts ol
participating Statcs uscd in conncction with thc Unitcd Nations pcacckccping
opcration.”
:+8
Tc scopc ol application ol a SÒFA is to bc dccidcd upon in cach opcration.
!t is clcar, howcvcr, that thc agrccmcnts arc largcly draltcd in a similar way. Tc
!SAF SÒFA dcviatcs somcwhat lrom this practicc. Vhilc !SAF was dcfincd, thc
cxprcssion “supporting pcrsonncl, including associatcd liaison pcrsonncl” appcars
particularly vaguc. Tc tcrm “supporting pcrsonncl” would probably includc
intcrnational contractors whilc thc rclcrcncc to “associatcd liaison pcrsonncl”, in
a.a !bid., para. a..
a.. !bid., para. .6.
a.¡ !SAF SÒFA Articlc ..
a.· !bid., Articlc .·.
a.6 Notc c/ in thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt.
a.· !bid., para. ¡.
a.· !bid., para. ·. Tc application ol Articlc !! ol thc Convcntion as to thc propcrty, and
so on, ol participating statcs was also agrccd upon in thc first UN pcacckccping
opcration. !n thc ÒNUC opcration, it was a diffcrcnt situation. Tc govcrnmcnt ol
thc Congo had not ratificd thc Gcncral Convcntion, and it was thcrclorc ncccssary
to dcfinc thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol thc lorcc and thc propcrty and such likc ol
thc participating statcs in thc SÒFA. !n this rcspcct, 8owctt notcs that “participating
Statcs cnjoy, ol coursc, thc normal privilcgcs and immunitics lrom suit accordcd to
Statcs by customary intcrnational law”. 8owctt, ... lootnotcs omittcd.
.6· Chapter 4
thc lacc ol a lack ol any dcfinition, could bc intcrprctcd to includc pcrsonncl rcp
rcscnting othcr military lorccs opcrating within thc tcrritory ol Alghanistan. Tis
intcrprctation gains support in Scction 6 ol thc SÒFA conccrning its application
whcrc it is statcd that thc SÒFA protcction also applicd “to lorccs in support ol
thc !SAF and all thcir pcrsonncl”. Tc unclcar dcfinition as to which pcrsonncl
wcrc to bc protcctcd could in lact crodc thc protcction affordcd by thc SÒFA.
!l it wcrc to bc pcrccivcd that pcrsonncl with only a limitcd conncction to thc
opcration cnjoycd thc spccial status providcd by thc SÒFA, rcspcct lor that status
might thcn bc ncgativcly affcctcd. Vith such spccial status thcrc would comc a
corrcsponding assumption ol rcsponsibility in this !SAF opcration. !t was thcrc
lorc ol thc utmost importancc lor !SAF to havc assumcd somc sort ol influcncc
ovcr thosc pcrsonncl cnjoying a privilcgcd status undcr thc SÒFA.
4.3.2 Status of the Operation and Personnel
A SÒFA stipulatcs a numbcr ol rights and obligations on both partics to thc
agrccmcnt. A bricl cxamination ol thosc provisions dcaling with thc status ol thc
opcration, as such, and its pcrsonncl will bc prcscntcd in this chaptcr. !t providcs
a ncccssary background to thc analysis ol thc Salcty Convcntion and its rclation
to othcr instrumcnts on protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations.
Status of the operation
As a gcncral statcmcnt, thc UN opcration, including its mcmbcrs, “shall rclrain
lrom any action or activity incompatiblc with thc impartial and intcrnational
naturc ol thcir dutics or inconsistcnt with thc spirit ol thc prcscnt arrangcmcnts.
Tc Unitcd Nations pcacckccping opcration and its mcmbcrs shall rcspcct all
local laws and rcgulations”.
:+o
!t stipulatcs an obligation on thc part ol thc UN, as a partncr to thc agrcc
mcnt, to cnsurc that its provisions arc rcspcctcd. Tc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Forcc
Commandcr, howcvcr, lacks disciplinary authority ovcr mcmbcrs ol national con
tingcnts. Tcy rcmain undcr thc disciplinary systcms ol thcir own national lcgal
systcms.
::o
!t rcquircs national contingcnts to bc prcparcd to carry out thcir dutics
in good laith and to show a willingncss to rcspcct local laws and rcgulations.
According to onc writcr, thc obligation to rcspcct thc laws ol thc host country
wcnt bcyond psychological importancc. Tc lunction, rathcr was
that it imposcs an obligation undcr intcrnational law to rcspcct thc law ol
thc rccciving statc.|…| Vhat would othcrwisc bc a brcach only ol obligations
undcr rccciving statc law lor which thc rccciving statc has no jurisdiction or
a.o UN Modcl Agrccmcnt para. 6. Tc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or thc Commandcr is
rcsponsiblc lor thcsc obligations bcing obscrvcd.
aac Scc bclow on disciplinary powcrs and criminal jurisdiction.
.6o Special protection
powcrs ol cnlorccmcnt bccomcs also a brcach ol a trcaty obligation undcr Art.
!! SÒFA. Tis brcach ol a trcaty can bc invokcd by thc rccciving Statc in dis
cussions with thc authoritics ol thc lorcc, and, should thc two sidcs bc unablc
to rcach agrccmcnt, thc proccdurcs lor scttling disputcs can bc invokcd.
::+
Tc UN Modcl SÒFA docs not contain any spccific provision on thc duty ol
thc UN to carry out its opcrations in accordancc with rcspcct lor intcrnational
humanitarian law. !n rcsponsc to a lcttcr lrom thc prcsidcnt ol thc !CRC in
.ooa, it was cxplaincd that thc UN Sccrctariat was in thc proccss ol dcvcloping
a lormula on intcrnational humanitarian law to bc inscrtcd in luturc SÒFAs.
:::

Tc proposcd provision outlincd thc duty ol UN lorccs to conduct opcrations
with rcspcct lor thc principlcs and spirit ol thc Gcncva Convcntions ol .o¡o and
thcir Additional Protocols ol .o··, and thc .o·¡ UN¡SCÒ Convcntion on thc
Protcction ol Cultural Propcrty.
:::
Tc sccond part ol thc lormula rclcrrcd to an
obligation on thc part ol thc host statc to trcat UN lorccs with lull rcspcct lor
thc principlcs and spirit ol thc Gcncva Convcntions ol .o¡o and thcir Additional
Protocols ol .o··. From .oo., SÒFAs bcgan to incorporatc such a provision. !n
thc SÒFA concludcd bctwccn thc UN and Rwanda in Novcmbcr, .oo., it was
statcd:
Tc Unitcd Nations shall cnsurc that UNAM!R carricd out its opcrations in
Rwanda in a manncr lully consistcnt with thc principlcs and spirit ol thc gcn
cral convcntions applicablc to thc conduct ol military pcrsonncl. Tc rclcvant
instrumcnts includc thc lour Gcncva Convcntions ol .a August .o¡o and thc
additional Protocols thcrcto ol · ]unc .o··, and thc UN¡SCÒ Convcntion lor
thc Protcction ol Cultural Propcrty in thc cvcnt ol Armcd Conflict ol .¡ May
.o·¡.
::±

aa. Rodncy 8atstonc, Rcspcct lor thc Law ol thc Rccciving Statc, in Te Handbook of Te
Law of Visiting Forces, 6., 6o (Ðictcr Flcck ct. al. cds. acc.) (Footnotc omittcd).
aaa Òucstion ol thc Application ol thc .o¡o Gcncva Convcntions lor thc Protcction
ol Var \ictims and Tcir Additional Protocols in Pcacckccping Òpcrations ol thc
Unitcd Nations. Lcttcr to thc Prcsidcnt ol thc !ntcrnational Committcc ol thc Rcd
Cross .ooa, in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, ¡.c (.ooa).
aa. Tc Modcl Agrccmcnt ol .oo.on thc contribution ol pcrsonncl and cquipmcnt to
UN pcacckccping opcrations contains a provision with similar tcxt. Rcport ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral, Modcl Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and Mcmbcr
Statcs contributing pcrsonncl and cquipmcnt to Unitcd Nations pcacckccping
opcrations, para. .· UN Ðoc. A/¡6/.·· (.oo.).
aa¡ UNAM!R SÒFA para. · (a). Footnotcs omittcd. Scc also thc cxamplcs ol
UNPRÒFÒRMaccdonia SÒFA para. · (a), UN!F!L SÒFA para. · (a), UNA\¡M
!!! SÒFA para. 6 (a).
.·c Chapter 4
!n SÒFAs lrom .oo· onwards, thc tcxt was slightly rcviscd to indicatc a lurthcr
commitmcnt on thc part ol thc UN. !nstcad ol thc rclcrcncc to “principlcs and
spirit” ol intcrnational humanitarian law thc tcxt altcr that ycar rcad “principlcs
and rulcs”.
::¡
Tc rclcrcncc to “rulcs” instcad ol “spirit” clcarly indicatcs a changc
in commitmcnt on thc part ol thc UN.
::6

For its part, thc govcrnmcnt in qucstion takcs on a duty to “trcat thc mili
tary pcrsonncl ol UNAM!R at all timcs in a manncr lully consistcnt with thc
principlcs and spirit ol gcncral convcntions applicablc to thc conduct ol military
pcrsonncl. Tcsc rclcvant instrumcnts includc thc lour Gcncva Convcntions ol .a
April .o¡o and thcir additional protocols thcrcto ol · ]unc .o··”.
::·
!n latcr opcra
tions host govcrnmcnts wcrc also rcquircd to trcat military pcrsonncl “with lull
rcspcct lor thc principlcs and rules” ol thc abovcmcntioncd convcntions.
::8
As a gcncral statcmcnt ol lact thc govcrnmcnt in qucstion “undcrtakcs to
rcspcct thc cxclusivcly intcrnational naturc ol thc Unitcd Nations pcacckccping
opcration.”
::o
Tis is a duty that in many rcspccts is lurthcr dctailcd in thc SÒFA.
Tc UN has a right to display its flag on its hcadquartcrs and othcr prcmiscs, as
wcll as on vchiclcs and vcsscls.
::o
!t is, howcvcr, a rcquircmcnt that vchiclcs, vcs
aa· M!NURCA SÒFA para. 6 (a), UNAMS!L SÒFA 6 (a), UNM!S¡T SÒFA6 (a)
UNM¡¡ ¡thiopia SÒFA para. 6 (a). !n .oo· thc M!NURCA SÒFA morcovcr
statcd that M!NURCA shall conduct its mission “in strict compliancc with thc
principlcs and rulc”. Now thc common tcrminology sccms to bc “with lull rcspcct
lor ”.
aa6 !n .ooo thc SG promulgatcd a 8ullctin idcntilying thcsc principlcs and rulcs,
SccrctaryGcncral’s 8ullctin, Òbscrvancc by Unitcd Nations lorccs ol intcrnational
humanitarian law, 6 August .ooo, UN Ðoc. ST/SG8/.ooo/... For criticism ol this
8ullctin scc Òla ¡ngdahl, Status ol Military Pcrsonncl in Unitcd Nations Pcacc
Òpcrations: !ntcrplay 8ctwccn thc Laws ol Pcacc and Var, in International Law and
Security, (Ðiana Amnéus & Katinka Svanbcrg cds., acc¡).
aa· UNAM!R SÒFA para. · (b). Scc lor othcr cxamplcs with similar tcxt: UNA\¡M
SÒFA para. 6 (b), UNM¡¡ ¡thiopia SÒFA para. 6 (b), UNM!S¡T SÒFA para. 6
(b). 8oth thc Govcrnmcnt and thc UN opcration undcrtakcs to “cnsurc that mcm
bcrs ol thcir rcspcctivc military pcrsonncl arc lully acquaintcd with thc principlcs
and rulcs ol thc abovcmcntioncd intcrnational instrumcnts.” !bid.
aa· ¡mphasis addcd. Scc c.g. UNAMS!L SÒFA 6 (b), “to trcat at all timcs thc mili
tary pcrsonncl ol UNAMS!L with lull rcspcct lor thc principlcs and rulcs ol thc
intcrnational convcntions applicablc to thc trcatmcnt ol military pcrsonncl. Tcsc
intcrnational convcntions includc thc lour Gcncva Convcntions ol .a April .o¡o
and thcir Additional Protocols ol · ]unc .o··.” For othcr cxamplcs with similar tcxt:
UNA\¡M SÒFA para. 6 (b), UNM¡¡ ¡thiopia SÒFA para. 6 (b), UNM!S¡T
SÒFA para. 6 (b). 8oth thc Govcrnmcnt and thc UN opcration undcrtakc to “cnsurc
that mcmbcrs ol thcir rcspcctivc military pcrsonncl arc lully acquaintcd with thc
principlcs and rulcs ol thc abovcmcntioncd intcrnational instrumcnts.” !bid.
aao UN Modcl SÒFA para. ·.
a.c !bid., para. ·. ¡xamplcs ol othcr UN Agrccmcnts: UNA\¡M !!! SÒFA para. o,
UNAM!R SÒFA para. ·, UNM¡¡¡thiopia SÒFA para. ·, UNPRÒFÒR8iH
SÒFA para. ·, ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA ·.
.·. Special protection
scls and aircralt lorming part ol thc UN pcacckccping opcration shall “carry a
distinctivc Unitcd Nations idcntification”.
::+
Tc UN must propcrly inlorm thc
host govcrnmcnt ol such idcntification.
:::
Although it is a rcquircmcnt to carry
distinctivc idcntification, thc status affordcd UN pcrsonncl through a SÒFA
docs not sccm to dcpcnd upon thc cxistcncc ol propcr idcntification.
!n ordcr to makc protcction a rcality, a right to communicatc to and lrom
thc arca ol opcrations through radio, tclcphonc, or any othcr mcans, and within
and bctwccn prcmiscs ol thc lorcc, is ol thc utmost importancc. Such rights
arc cxprcsscd in thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt
:::
and havc bccn rcpcatcdly con
firmcd in practicc.
::±
Paragraph .c ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA rclcrs to thc Gcncral
Convcntion and stipulatcs that similar communications lacilitics shall bc cnjoycd
by thc pcacckccping opcration.
::¡
Articlc !!! ol thc Gcncral Convcntion in turn
statcs that thc UN shall cnjoy in thc tcrritory ol cach mcmbcr statc similar trcat
mcnt as that accordcd by thc govcrnmcnt in qucstion to othcr govcrnmcnts. !n
cffcct, thc articlc says that diplomatic privilcgcs arc to bc cxtcndcd to thc UN and
its pcacckccping opcrations with rcgard to communications lacilitics.
::6
!t should
bc notcd that thc right ol communication rclcrs to thc intcrnal communication
within and bctwccn UN officcs. To opcratc radio broadcasting to disscminatc
inlormation about thc UN and particular opcrations is dcpcndcnt on a spccial
agrccmcnt with thc host nation.
::·
Frccdom ol movcmcnt is clcarly ol spccific importancc lor both thc conduct
ol an opcration and thc salcty ol its pcrsonncl. According to paragraph .a ol thc
UN Modcl SÒFA
a.. UN Modcl SÒFA, para. o. ¡xamplcs ol othcr UN Agrccmcnts: UNA\¡M !!!
SÒFA para. .c, UNAM!R SÒFA para. o, UNM¡¡¡thiopia SÒFA para. o,
UNPRÒFÒR8iH SÒFA para. ·, ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA para. ·.
a.a UN Modcl SÒFA para. o.
a.. !bid., para. .c.
a.¡ ¡xamplcs ol UN Agrccmcnts: UNTAC SÒFA, para. o, UNA\¡M !!! SÒFA para.
.., UNCRÒ SÒFA, para. .c, UN!F!L SÒFA, para. .c, UNM!S¡T SÒFA, para. .c,
UNAMS!L SÒFA, para. .c.
a.· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. .c.
a.6 Gcncral Convcntion, Articlc !!!. Paragraph .. ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA includcs
additional provisions conccrning communications lacilitics adaptcd to opcrational
nccds. Tcsc nccds includc thc right to install and opcratc satcllitc systcms, thc right
to unrcstrictcd communication, thc “laying ol cablcs and land lincs and thc cstab
lishmcnt ol fixcd and mobilc radio scnding, rccciving and rcpcatcr stations” and thc
cstablishmcnt ol postal scrviccs lor privatc mail. Tcsc additional provisions arc sub
jcct to thc provisions ol paragraph .c.
a.· Mcmorandum to thc Acting Ðircctor, Ficld Òpcrations Ðivision, Ðcpartmcnt ol
Pcacckccping Òpcrations, a. Ðcccmbcr .oo¡, United Nations Juridical Yearbook ¡ao
(.oo¡).
.·a Chapter 4
Tc Unitcd Nations pcacckccping opcration and its mcmbcrs shall cnjoy,
togcthcr with its vchiclcs, vcsscls, aircralt and cquipmcnt, lrccdom ol movc
mcnt throughout thc |host country/tcrritory|. Tat lrccdom shall, with rcspcct
to largc movcmcnts ol pcrsonncl, storcs or vchiclcs through airports or on rail
ways or roads uscd lor gcncral traffic within thc |host country/tcrritory|, bc
coordinatcd with thc Govcrnmcnt. Tc Govcrnmcnt undcrtakcs to supply
thc Unitcd Nations pcacckccping opcration, whcrc ncccssary, with maps and
othcr inlormation, including location ol minc ficlds and othcr dangcrs and
impcdimcnts, which may bc usclul in lacilitating its movcmcnts.
::8
Frccdom ol movcmcnt is now a common right cxcrciscd by pcacckccping lorccs
whcrcas during thc first opcration, UN¡F, thc lorcc cnjoycd lrccdom ol movc
mcnt only in ccrtain dcfincd arcas.
::o
Tc limitation appcarcd to bc bascd upon
thc “lunctional rcquircmcnts” ol thc lorcc.
:±o
!n thc ncxt opcration, ÒNUC, thc
UN cnjoycd lrccdom ol movcmcnt throughout thc Congo.
:±+
Tc rcason lor this
cxtcndcd lrccdom ol movcmcnt was basically duc to thc diffcrcnt charactcr ol
thc opcration in comparison with UN¡F.
:±:
Tc important principlc ol lrccdom
ol movcmcnt has rcpcatcdly bccn confirmcd in practicc.
:±:
Howcvcr, it docs not
mcan that in rcality such lorccs constantly cnjoy this lrccdom. Òn thc contrary,
it has oltcn provcd difficult in practicc lor host nations to cnsurc lrccdom ol
movcmcnt, cspccially in thosc cascs whcrc a govcrnmcnt lails to cxcrcisc cffcctivc
control ovcr all ol its tcrritory. !n a latcr opcration (UNAMS!L) thc Prcsidcnt
ol Sicrra Lconc, Ahmcd Tcjan Kabbah, conlcrrcd with lcadcrs ol scvcral lactions
who agrccd, among othcr things, to allow UNAMS!L opcrativcs unhindcrcd
movcmcnt throughout thc tcrritory.
:±±
Òthcr cxamplcs arc thc cxpcricnccs ol
a.· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. .a.
a.o UN¡F SÒFA para. .a.
a¡c 8owctt, .a·.
a¡. ÒNUC SÒFA, para. .c.
a¡a 8owctt, a.oa¡c.
a¡. ¡xamplcs ol UN Agrccmcnts: UNTAC SÒFA para. .., ÒNUMÒZ SÒFA, para. ..,
UNPRÒFÒR8iH SÒFA, para. .., UNM!L SÒFA, para. .a, UNM!S¡T SÒFA
para. .a. !n thc latcr SÒFAs thc provision on lrccdom ol movcmcnt has bccn rcviscd
to includc vchiclcs ol contractors and that thc opcration shall cnjoy lrccdom ol movc
mcnt “without dclay”. !FÒR/SFÒR pcrsonncl “shall cnjoy, togcthcr with thcir vchi
clcs, vcsscls, aircralt and cquipmcnt, lrcc and unrcstrictcd passagc and unimpcdcd
acccss throughout thc Rcpublic ol 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina including airspacc and
tcrritorial watcrs ol thc Rcpublic ol 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina.” !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA
para, o.
a¡¡ Fourth rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc Unitcd Nations Mission in Sicrra
Lconc, para. ., UN Ðoc. S/accc/¡·· (accc).
.·. Special protection
UNPRÒFÒR.
:±¡
!n thc UNM¡¡ opcration both ¡thiopia and ¡ritrca rcstrictcd
thc lrccdom ol movcmcnt ol UN lorccs.
:±6

Tc granting ol “spccdy proccssing ol cntry and cxit lormalitics” may provc
to bc indispcnsablc lor an opcration.
:±·
Such a right is grantcd to all mcmbcrs,
including thc military componcnt ol an opcration, upon prior notification. A
UN pcacckccping opcration’s vchiclcs arc not subjcct to liccncc and rcgistra
tion rcquircmcnts by local authoritics providcd that all vchiclcs carry third party
insurancc. Furthcrmorc, an opcration rctains thc authority to usc roads, canals
and airficlds lrcc ol chargcs or toll and with cxcmption lrom chargcs lor scrviccs
rcndcrcd.
:±8

According to paragraph .· ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA, a UN pcacckccping
opcration is to bc rcgardcd as a subsidiary organ ol thc UN and as such should
cnjoy thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol thc UN.
:±o
Paragraph .· dcals primarily
with issucs ol import and cxport, customs and duty. Tc host govcrnmcnt in
qucstion is obligcd to providc, without chargc, thc rcquircd arcas lor UN hcad
quartcrs, camps and othcr prcmiscs thc pcacckccping opcration nccds lor its
opcrational, administrativc and accommodation purposcs. Such prcmiscs rcmain,
ol coursc, thc sovcrcign tcrritory ol thc host nation but “thcy shall bc inviolablc
and subjcct to thc cxclusivc control and authority ol thc Unitcd Nations.”
:¡o
Tc
UN, morcovcr, alonc may “conscnt to thc cntry ol any govcrnmcnt officials or ol
a¡· Scc Hilairc McCoubrcy and Nigcl Ð. Vhitc, Te Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of
United Nations Military Operations ·¡ (.oo6).
a¡6 Progrcss rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on ¡thiopia and ¡ritrca, paras. 6·, UN
Ðoc. S/acc./··· (acc.).
a¡· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. .c.
a¡· !bid., paras., .. and .¡. Tc distinction bctwccn chargcs and tolls on thc onc hand and
chargcs lor scrviccs rcndcrcd on thc othcr could bc difficult to dcfinc. According to
thc Gcncral Convcntion, Scction · (a), thc UN’s “asscts, incomc and othcr propcrty
shall bc: (a) ¡xcmpt lrom all dircct taxcs which arc, in lact, no morc than chargcs
lor public utility scrviccs,” ¡xamplcs ol such dircct taxation arc landing and park
ing lccs. According to thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs, public utility scrviccs has bccn
intcrprctcd as “applying to supplics or scrviccs rcndcrcd by a Govcrnmcnt … lor
which chargcs arc madc at a fixcd ratc according to thc amount ol supplics lurnishcd
or scrviccs rcndcrcd”. Such scrviccs nccd to bc “scrviccs which can bc spccifically
idcntificd, dcscribcd and itcmizcd” Scc Lcttcr to thc Ministcr ol Forcign Affairs
and !ntcrnational Coopcration ol a Mcmbcr Statc, .· ]unc .oo¡, in United Nations
Juridical Yearbook ¡·. (.oo¡). Tc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs rclcrrcd to thc .o6· study
by thc Sccrctariat on thc Practicc ol thc Unitcd Nations, thc spccializcd agcncics
and thc !ntcrnational Atomic ¡ncrgy Agcncy, in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, !! .·¡ (.o6·).
a¡o UN Modcl SÒFA, para. .·. Tc provision rclcrs to thc Gcncral Convcntion and,
in casc thc Govcrnmcnt is not a party to thc Gcncral Convcntion, to thc prcscnt
Agrccmcnt.
a·c UN Modcl SÒFA, para. .6.
.·¡ Chapter 4
any othcr pcrson not mcmbcr ol thc Unitcd Nations pcacckccping opcration to
such prcmiscs.”
:¡+

!t is thc UN’s right to rccruit local pcrsonncl as and whcn rcquircd. !l
rcqucstcd by thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or thc Forcc Commandcr thc host gov
crnmcnt must lacilitatc thc rccruitmcnt ol qualificd local pcrsonncl.
:¡:
Status of personnel
Highranking mcmbcrs, such as thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc, thc Commandcr ol
thc military componcnt, thc hcad ol thc civilian policc and othcr mcmbcrs ol
thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr’s staff, shall bc accordcd thc privilcgcs
and immunitics ol diplomatic cnvoys, as stipulatcd in Scctions .o and a· ol thc
Gcncral Convcntion.
:¡:

Vhcncvcr mcmbcrs ol thc UN Sccrctariat arc assigncd to thc civilian com
poncnt ol a UN pcacc opcration thcy rcmain officials ol thc UN and accord
ingly cnjoy thc privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in Articlcs \ and \!! ol thc
Gcncral Convcntion.
:¡±
SÒFAs ol a latcr datc includc UN \oluntccrs who arc
rcquircd to bc assimilatcd within thc civilian componcnt ol thc opcration con
ccrncd.
:¡¡
Status as cxpcrts on mission is accordcd to military obscrvcrs, UN civil
ian policc and civilian pcrsonncl, with thc cxccption ol UN officials.
:¡6

Tc majority ol pcacckccpcrs (military pcrsonncl madc up ol national con
tingcnts and assigncd to thc military componcnt ol a pcacc opcration) do not
cnjoy thc privilcgcs and immunitics undcr thc Gcncral Convcntion. Tcy pos
scss only thosc privilcgcs and immunitics “spccifically providcd lor in thc prcscnt
Agrccmcnt.”
:¡·

Locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl cnjoy, as accrcditcd mcmbcrs ol a UN pcacc
kccping opcration, immunity lor official acts as stipulatcd in Scction .· (a) ol
thc Gcncral Convcntion. Tcy arc accordingly “immunc lrom lcgal proccss in
rcspcct ol words spokcn or writtcn and all acts pcrlormcd by thcm in thcir offi
cial capacity”.
:¡8

a·. !bid., para. .o.
a·a !bid., para. aa. !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA, para. .6, KFÒRUNM!K Rcgulation, Articlc
.¡.
a·. UN Modcl SÒFA, para. a¡.
a·¡ !bid., para. a·.
a·· Scc c.g. UNM!S¡T SÒFA, para. a·, UNAMS!L SÒFA, para. a·, and UNM!L
SÒFA para. a·.
a·6 UN Modcl SÒFA, para. a6. “whosc namcs arc lor thc purposc notificd to thc
Govcrnmcnt by thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr”.
a·· !bid., para. a·.
a·· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. a·. Scc Gcncral Convcntion Scction .· (a). Tcy will also bc
“cxcmpt lrom taxation on thc salarics and cmolumcnts paid to thcm by thc Unitcd
Nations” and arc “immunc lrom national scrvicc obligations”, according to Scction
.· (b) and (c) ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
.·· Special protection
Rcgarding “contractors” that supply goods and scrviccs in support ol a UN
pcacckccping opcration, thc UN Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs has rcpcatcdly statcd
that thcy may not, owing to thc commcrcial naturc ol thcir lunctions, bcncfit
lrom thc privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in thc Gcncral Convcntion. Tcy
do not qualily as “cxpcrts on mission” within thc mcaning ol thc intcrprctcd
cxprcssion.
:¡o
Tc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs rccogniscd thc ncccssity ol thc UN to
rcly on commcrcial firms to providc scrviccs and pcrlorm tasks that had tradi
tionally bccn carricd out by military pcrsonncl. Facilitics ncccssary lor thc con
tractors to pcrlorm thcir lunctions wcrc idcntificd to includc
lrccdom ol movcmcnt |…|, prompt issuancc ol ncccssary visas, cxcmp
tion lrom immigration rcstrictions and alicn rcgistration, prompt issuancc ol
liccnccs or pcrmits, as ncccssary, lor rcquircd scrviccs, including lor imports
and lor thc opcration ol aircralt and vcsscls, rcpatriation in timc ol intcrna
tional criscs, right to import lor thc cxclusivc and official usc ol thc Unitcd
Nations, without any rcstriction, and lrcc ol tax or dutics, supplics, cquipmcnt
and othcr matcrials.
:6o
At thc timc thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs was cngagcd in dralting rclcvant provi
sions lor thc purposc ol including thcm into luturc SÒFAs. Rcalising thc rcluc
tancc ol host nations to includc contractors in SÒFAs, it was cmphasiscd by thc
Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs that dcspitc its willingncss to grant contractors thc abovc
mcntioncd lacilitics, this was ultimatcly thc dccision ol thc host nation.
:6+
!n
SÒFAs ol a latcr datc contractors wcrc allowcd, among othcr things, lrccdom ol
movcmcnt, thc provision ol supplics and scrviccs and pcrmits and liccnccs.
:6:
Intry and departure
Vhcncvcr thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Forcc Commandcr so rcquircs, thc mcm
bcrs ol a pcacc opcration may cxcrcisc thc right to cntcr, rcsidc in and dcpart at
will lrom thc host country/tcrritory, and it is thc obligation ol thc host country to
lacilitatc such movcmcnts. Mcmbcrs ol pcacc opcrations “shall bc cxcmpt lrom
passport and visa rcgulations and immigration and rcstrictions on cntcring into
a·o Mcmorandum to thc Assistant SccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations a.
]unc .oo·, in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, ¡c·· (.oo·). Òn thc intcrprctation
ol thc tcrm “cxpcrts on mission” spccial rclcrcncc is madc to thc Advisory Òpinion
ol thc !C] on thc Applicability ol Articlc \!, Scction aa ol thc Convcntion on thc
Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations, !C] Rcp .o¡.
a6c Mcmorandum to thc Assistant SccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations a.
]unc .oo·, in United Nations Juridical Yearbook, ¡c· (.oo·).
a6. !bid.
a6a Scc, UNM!S¡T SÒFA paras. .a, acaa, M!NURCA SÒFA, paras. .a, acaa, and
UNM!L SÒFA paras. .a, acaa.
.·6 Chapter 4
or dcparting lrom” thc host country.
:6:
!n thc UNM¡¡ opcration, ccrtain staff
cxpcricnccd difficultics whcn cntcring and lcaving at airports ol thc capitals ol
¡thiopia and ¡ritrca as thcy wcrc subjcct to a visa rcquircmcnt. Tc Sccrctary
Gcncral lound that this contravcncd thc UN Modcl SÒFA.
:6±
!n this rcspcct it is
intcrcsting to notc thc diffcrcncc bctwccn thc UN Modcl SÒFA and thc Gcncral
Convcntion. According to Scctions a· and a6 ol thc Gcncral Convcntion, thcrc
is no rulc against visa rcquircmcnts lor UN pcrsonncl with a laissez-passer. !t is
only an obligation to dcal with such applications “as spccdy as possiblc.”
:6¡
!n .oo.
thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol Yugoslavia (FRY) sought to imposc
rcquircmcnts on cntry visas lor both pcrsonncl with laissez-passer and pcrsonncl
with national passports ol statcs rcquiring cntry visas lor nationals ol FRY. !n a
mcmorandum to thc UndcrSccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations, thc
Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs lound that “|a|s a gcncral rulc, thc position ol thc Unitcd
Nations in rcspcct ol visa rcquircmcnts is to considcr thc mcrc visa rcquircmcnt
as unobjcctionablc as long as it is a lormality which docs not cntail an impcdi
mcnt to thc spccdy travcl and movcmcnt ol Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl.”
:66
Identification
¡ach mcmbcr ol an opcration must bc in posscssion ol an idcntity card issucd
by thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or thc Forcc Commandcr. Tc card must bc num
bcrcd and contain thc bcarcr’s lull namc, datc ol birth, titlc or rank, scrvicc and
photograph. ¡xccpt lor cntry and dcparturc, whcn movcmcnt ordcrs arc rcquircd,
pcrsonal idcntity cards arc thc only documcnts ncccssary lor pcrsonncl who upon
dcmand lrom appropriatc officials ol thc host govcrnmcnt must producc thcm.
Tcy arc not, howcvcr, rcquircd to surrcndcr thcm.
:6·
Tc pcrsonal idcntity card
is csscntial to thc practical implcmcntation ol thc privilcgcd status and is ol grcat
a6. UN Modcl SÒFA, para. ... Tc only thing rcquircd ol mcmbcrs ol an opcration
during thc coursc ol cntry and dcparturc is to bc in posscssion ol a movcmcnt ordcr
and a pcrsonal idcntity card issucd by thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr. Òn
thc right ol cntry and cxit scc c.g. UNPRÒFÒR8iH SÒFA paras. .c.a, UNAM!R
SÒFA, paras. .a.¡, UNM¡¡¡thiopia SÒFA, paras. .¡.6, UNM!S¡T SÒFA,
paras. .¡.6. !dcntity cards must bc issucd to all mcmbcrs ol thc opcration in qucs
tion, including locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl, as soon as possiblc. !n opcrations ol a latcr
datc contractors wcrc also issucd with idcntity cards. Scc M!NURCA SÒFA, para.
.·, UNM!L SÒFA, para. .·, UNM!S¡T SÒFA, para. .·, UNAMS!L SÒFA, para.
.·. !l this is not possiblc bclorc first cntry into thc host country, a pcrsonal idcntity
card issucd by thc appropriatc authoritics ol a participating statc would bc acccpt
ablc. UN Modcl SÒFA, paras. .¡ and .·.
a6¡ Progrcss rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on ¡thiopia and ¡ritrca, para. · UN Ðoc.
S/acc./··· (acc.).
a6· Gcncral Convcntion Articlc \!! Scction a·.
a66 Mcmorandum to thc UndcrSccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations, .·
Òctobcr .oo., in United Nations Juridical Yearbook ¡co (.oo.).
a6· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. .6.
.·· Special protection
importancc. A lost idcntity card must thcrclorc bc rcportcd as soon as possiblc as
a mattcr ol urgcncy sincc thcrc would bc a risk ol unauthoriscd pcrsons cntcring
rcstrictcd arcas. Tcrc is also to bc considcrcd thc aspcct ol trust towards UN pcr
sonncl. Vhcn it comcs to idcntity cards, markings and UN logos, it is obviously
important to avoid thcir impropcr usc. Givcn thc spccial status ol a UN opcration
and its pcrsonncl, thcrc is always thc risk ol abusc by pcrsons not conncctcd with
thc opcration conccrncd in ordcr to achicvc thcir own cnds. !n thc longtcrm
pcrspcctivc thcrc could bc scrious implications lor thc UN opcration in qucstion
on how it is pcrccivcd by thc local population.
Uniforms and arms
Military pcrsonncl and civilian policc involvcd in UN pcacc opcrations arc
rcquircd to wcar unilorms in thc pcrlormancc ol official dutics. Tcy may also
bcar arms whilc on duty whcn authoriscd to do so by ordcrs.
:68
!n SÒFAs ol a
latcr datc UN Sccurity Òfficcrs and Ficld Scrvicc officcrs may wcar UN unilorms.
UN Sccurity Òfficcrs may also bcar arms whilc on official duty. Pcrsonncl carry
ing wcapons must bc in unilorm, cxccpt lor thosc on closc protcction dutics.
:6o

Tc right to carry arms and to wcar unilorm has bccn intcrprctcd as bcing an
csscntial part ol pcacc opcrations involving a military lorcc.
:·o
4.3.3 Powers of Arrest and Jurisdiction
Tc maintcnancc ol disciplinc and good ordcr among mcmbcrs ol UN opcra
tions, including locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl, is thc rcsponsibility ol thc Spccial
Rcprcscntativc. Pcrsonncl dcsignatcd by thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr
thcrclorc policc thc prcmiscs ol a UN opcration. Òutsidc such prcmiscs such
pcrsonncl may only pcrlorm thcir lunctions undcr arrangcmcnts with thc host
govcrnmcnt in thosc cascs whcrc it is dccmcd ncccssary.
:·+
Tc primary rcspon
sibility ol good disciplinc is to thc host govcrnmcnt. !t should, howcvcr, bc notcd
that cvcn though thc maintcnancc ol disciplinc and good ordcr is thc rcspon
sibility ol thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr, thc UN or its rcprcscnta
tivcs cannot cxcrcisc cxccutivc powcr ovcr mcmbcrs ol national contingcnts. Tc
maintcnancc ol ordcr and disciplinc thcrclorc rcquircs contingcnt commandcrs
to act in accordancc with thc will ol thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr and
uphold disciplinc whcncvcr thc bchaviour ol military pcrsonncl thrcatcns thc
succcss ol thc opcration in qucstion.
a6· !bid., para. .·.
a6o UNM!L SÒFA, para. .o, UNM!S¡T SÒFA, para. .o and UNAMS!L SÒFA, para.
.o (cxccpt that pcrsonncl with closc protcction dutics arc not mcntioncd).
a·c 8owctt argucs that thc host statc must prima facie bc dccmcd to havc conscntcd to
such right whcn agrccing on a military lorcc on its tcrritory. 8owctt, ¡¡·.
a·. UN Modcl SÒFA, para. ¡c.
.·· Chapter 4
Military pcrsonncl ol any UN opcration arc subjcct to powcrs ol arrcst by
thc opcration’s military policc. Any military mcmbcr or mcmbcrs arrcstcd outsidc
thc arca ol thcir contingcnt “shall bc translcrrcd to thcir contingcnt Commandcr
lor appropriatc action.”
:·:
Tis is a conscqucncc ol thc principlc that military
mcmbcrs ol an opcration arc subjcct only to thc disciplinary action ol thcir own
contingcnts. Òn thc prcmiscs ol a UN opcration, pcrsonncl dcsignatcd by thc
Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr may takc any othcr pcrson into custody. Tc
rclcrcncc to “any othcr pcrson” conccrns pcrsons not mcmbcrs ol a UN opcra
tion. Tcy shall, howcvcr, bc translcrrcd immcdiatcly to thc ncarcst appropriatc
official ol thc host govcrnmcnt.
:·:
Undcr ccrtain circumstanccs, thc host govcrn
mcnt rctains thc right to takc into custody any mcmbcr ol a UN opcration. Tat
right is subjcct to thc provisions that conlcr thc status ol diplomatic cnvoy upon
highranking mcmbcrs ol thc opcration conccrncd and thc status ol cxpcrts on
missions lor ccrtain civilian staff.
:·±

Subjcct to thcsc provisions, thc host govcrnmcnt may takc into custody
any mcmbcr ol a UN opcration upon thc rcqucst ol thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/
Commandcr or whcn “apprchcndcd in thc commission or attcmptcd commission
ol a criminal offcncc.”
:·¡
!l dctaincd, that pcrson or pcrsons shall bc immcdiatcly
translcrrcd to thc appropriatc rcprcscntativcs ol thc UN opcration conccrncd
togcthcr with any wcapons or othcr cquipmcnt scizcd. Tc host govcrnmcnt
and thc UN opcration both havc thc right to makc a prcliminary intcrrogation.
Such an intcrrogation should not, howcvcr, dclay thc translcr ol custody to thc
appropriatc authoritics. ¡vcn altcr such translcr thc pcrson or pcrsons conccrncd
should bc madc availablc to thc arrcsting authority il nccdcd lor lurthcr intcr
rogation.
:·6

Tc lorcgoing provisions clcarly rcflcct a will to coopcratc in mattcrs involv
ing criminal offcnccs. At thc samc timc, thcy uphold thc division in thc cxcrcisc
ol jurisdiction bctwccn thc UN opcration conccrncd and thc host govcrnmcnt.
Tis coopcration is takcn cvcn lurthcr, in thc stipulating ol an obligation lor
a·a !bid, para. ¡..
a·. !bid.
a·¡ !bid., para. ¡a. Tc provision rclcrs in rcspcct ol thc highranking mcmbcrs to para
graphs a¡ ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA, which in turn rclcrs to thc scctions .o and a· ol
thc Gcncral Convcntion. According to scction .o, thcsc mcmbcrs arc accordcd privi
lcgcs and immunitics as diplomatic cnvoys. Articlc ao ol thc \icnna Convcntion on
Ðiplomatic Rclations (.o6.) statcs that “Tc pcrson ol a diplomatic agcnt shall bc
inviolablc. Hc shall not bc liablc to any lorm ol arrcst or dctcntion.” Vith rcgard to
cxpcrts on mission rclcrcncc is madc to paragraph a6 ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt,
which in turn rclcrs to Articlc \! ol thc Gcncral Convcntion. According to scction
aa (a) ol Articlc \!, cxpcrts on mission “shall bc accordcd immunity lrom pcrsonal
arrcst or dctcntion and lrom scizurc ol thcir pcrsonncl baggagc,”.
a·· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. ¡a.
a·6 !bid., para. ¡..
.·o Special protection
thc UN opcration and thc host govcrnmcnt to assist cach othcr in invcstigating
offcnccs in which cithcr or both havc an intcrcst. Tcy must, lor cxamplc, producc
witncsscs, cvidcncc and itcms conncctcd to thc allcgcd offcncc in qucstion.
:··

An cffcctivc protcction also includcs an obligation on thc part ol thc host
govcrnmcnt to prcvcnt and punish any wronglul act against protcctcd pcrsonncl.
Such an obligation may bc intcrprctcd as bcing includcd in thc gcncral obligation
ol thc host country in qucstion to “rcspcct thc cxclusivcly intcrnational naturc ol
thc Unitcd Nations pcacckccping opcration” as stipulatcd in paragraph · ol thc
UN Modcl Agrccmcnt. A spccial duty to prosccutc, howcvcr, is incumbcnt on
thc host govcrnmcnt. According to Articlc ¡· ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt, thc
Govcrnmcnt shall cnsurc thc prosccution ol pcrsons subjcct to its criminal
jurisdiction who arc accuscd ol acts in rclation to thc Unitcd Nations pcacc
kccping opcration or its mcmbcrs which, il committcd in rclation to thc lorccs
ol thc Govcrnmcnt, would havc rcndcrcd such acts liablc to prosccution.
:·8

Tc condition that it must bc rcgardcd as an offcncc il committcd in rclation to
its own lorccs possibly indicatcs a limitation in rcspcct ol what is rcquircd undcr
gcncral intcrnational law. !n SÒFAs ol a latcr datc this provision has bccn modi
ficd with thc lollowing tcxt addcd: “or against thc local civilian population”.
:·o

!n this rcspcct, it is intcrcsting to notc 8owctt’s vicw on thc duty ol host statcs
to comply with thc tcrms ol SÒFAs. Hc finds that “whilst various attacks on
UNF!CYP pcrsonncl has occurrcd, it is difficult to say that thc host govcrnmcnt
has not lulfillcd its obligations undcr paragraph .· ol thc Agrccmcnt to cnsurc
thc prosccution ol offcndcrs, lor this cannot imposc an obligation to usc morc
than duc diligcncc in sccking thcm out.”
:8o
Tc duty to cnsurc thc prosccution ol
offcndcrs ol crimcs against pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations is probably subjcct to
thc standard ol cxcrcising duc diligcncc.
!n opcrations ol a latcr datc SÒFAs oltcn contain a provision cxprcssing
thc duty ol thc host statc to cnsurc thc salcty and sccurity ol pcrsonncl. Tc
UNM!S¡T SÒFA rcads:
Tc Govcrnmcnt shall takc all appropriatc mcasurcs to cnsurc thc salcty and
sccurity ol UNM!S¡T and its mcmbcrs. Upon thc rcqucst ol thc Spccial
Rcprcscntativc ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, thc Govcrnmcnt shall providc such
a·· !bid., para. ¡¡.
a·· !bid., para.¡·.
a·o UNM!S¡T SÒFA, para. ·a, UNAMS!L SÒFA, para. ¡o, UNM!L SÒFA, para. ¡·
(v).
a·c 8owctt, ··o.
.·c Chapter 4
sccurity as ncccssary to protcct UNM!S¡T, its propcrty and mcmbcrs during
thc cxcrcisc ol thcir lunctions.
:8+
!t may bc rcgardcd as a lorcrunncr to thc socallcd kcy provisions ol thc Salcty
Convcntion includcd in somc SÒFAs. Tc UNM!S¡T and UNM!L SÒFAs
contain a scction cntitlcd “Salcty and sccurity”. Tc main part ol that scction
includcs thc Salcty Convcntion’s kcy provisions. Tc contribution ol thc Salcty
Convcntions kcy provisions, and critiquc thcrcol, in SÒFAs arc analyscd bclow
in chaptcr ·.....
Criminal jurisdiction
Probably thc most important qucstion to bc dcalt with in a SÒFA conccrns juris
diction. Tc UN Modcl SÒFA rcflccts a carclul balancc bctwccn thc intcrcsts ol
thc govcrnmcnt conccrncd, thc UN pcacc opcration and participating statcs. As
a gcncral rulc, immunity lrom lcgal proccss in thc host country is accordcd to all
mcmbcrs ol a UN pcacc opcration, including local pcrsonncl, in rcspcct ol words
spokcn or any act pcrlormcd in thcir official capacity. An important aspcct ol this
immunity, cspccially lor locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl, is that it continucs altcr thcy
ccasc to bc mcmbcrs ol, or cmploycd by, thc UN opcration in qucstion.
:8:
A host govcrnmcnt suspccting thc commission ol a criminal offcncc by any
mcmbcr ol a UN opcration should immcdiatcly inlorm thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/
Commandcr and prcscnt all availablc cvidcncc. Ðcpcnding upon thc status ol an
accuscd pcrson, thc mattcr is thcn dcalt with in onc ol two ways.
:8:
!l thc accuscd
is a mcmbcr ol thc civilian componcnt, or a civilian mcmbcr ol thc military com
poncnt, thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc/Commandcr will conduct an inquiry il sup
plcmcntary inlormation is nccdcd and thcn, togcthcr with thc host govcrnmcnt,
dccidc on whcthcr criminal procccdings should bc institutcd. !l thcy lail to agrcc
on this mattcr, a tribunal ol thrcc arbitrators will rcsolvc thc qucstion.
:8±

!l thc pcrson conccrncd is suspcctcd ol committing a criminal offcncc and
is a military mcmbcr ol thc military componcnt, thcn thc scnding statc cxcr
ciscs exclusive jurisdiction.
:8¡
According to thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt, criminal
a·. UNAMS!L SÒFA, para. ¡·. Scc also thc UNM¡¡ ¡thiopia SÒFA para. ¡·, and thc
UNM!L SÒFA para. ¡o.
a·a UN Modcl SÒFA, para. ¡6.
a·. !bid., para. ¡·.
a·¡ !bid., para. ¡· which rclcrs to para. ·.. UNTAG SÒFA paras ·. and ·¡ (a), MFÒ
SÒFA, para. .. (b) “official capacity”.
a·· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. ¡· (b). ¡xamplcs ol othcr UN Agrccmcnts: ÒNUMÒZ
SÒFA, para. ¡6 (b), UNTAC SÒFA, para. ¡¡ (b), UNPRÒFÒR8iH SÒFA,
para. ¡¡ (b), UNA\¡M !!! SÒFA, para. ¡· (b), M!NURCA SÒFA, para. ·c (b),
UNAMS!L SÒFA, para. ·. (b). Howcvcr, in thc opcration in thc Congo, civilian
mcmbcrs also camc undcr thc cxclusivc jurisdiction ol thcir national statc. Paragraph
o ol thc ÒNUC SÒFA statcd, “Mcmbcrs ol thc Forcc shall bc subjcct to thc cxclu
.·. Special protection
procccdings can never bc institutcd against any military mcmbcr ol thc military
componcnt ol a UN pcacc opcration. !n his Summary study ol thc UN¡F opcra
tion, thc SccrctaryGcncral undcrlincd thc dangcrs ol a “jurisdictional vacuum”
whcrc an offcndcr cscapcs prosccution by both thc host statc and thc partici
pating statc.
:86
To avoid a lacuna in thc cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction, thc rcsponsibil
ity ol thc scnding statcs in this rcgard is strcsscd in thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt.
Tc SccrctaryGcncral will “obtain assuranccs lrom Govcrnmcnt ol participat
ing statcs” to actually cxcrcisc thcir jurisdiction conccrning crimcs committcd
within thc tcrritory ol thc host nation.
:8·
!t is statcd in thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt
that this provision may not ncccssarily bc inscrtcd in a spccific status agrcc
mcnt but rathcr in a mcmorandum ol undcrstanding containing clarifications
ol thc agrccmcnt.
:88
According to thc Modcl Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn thc UN and
TroopContributing Countrics (.oo.), any statc contributing pcrsonncl to a UN
pcacckccping opcration “agrccs to cxcrcisc jurisdiction with rcspcct to crimcs
or offcnccs which may bc committcd by its military pcrsonncl scrving with” thc
particular opcration.
:8o
Altcr thc UN¡F opcration thc SccrctaryGcncral acknowlcdgcd that ccr
tain difficultics might arisc ovcr thc principlc ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction
lor scnding statcs, particularly in rclation to variations in lcgal systcms and thc
influcncc ol military law ol somc scnding statcs. Although vcry lcw cascs in
thc UN¡F opcration arosc involving such difficultics, it was still considcrcd to
sivc jurisdiction ol thcir rcspcctivc national Statcs in rcspcct ol any criminal offcnccs
which may bc committcd by thcm in thc Congo.”
a·6 Summary study, .o··, para. ..6.
a·· UN Modcl SÒFA, para. ¡·. !n thc UN¡F opcration, thc agrccmcnt bctwccn thc
participating statcs and thc UN thcrclorc containcd within it thc rcquircmcnt that
“immunity lrom thc jurisdiction ol ¡gypt is bascd on thc undcrstanding that thc
authoritics ol thc participating Statcs would cxcrcisc such jurisdiction as might
bc ncccssary with rcspcct to crimcs or offcnccs committcd in ¡gypt by any mcm
bcrs ol thc Forcc providcd lrom thcir own military scrviccs”. Participating Statcs
Agrccmcnts (with Finland) para. ·, a·. UNTS ..6.
a·· UN Modcl SÒFA, notc h/, to para. ¡·. UN¡F SÒFA para. ·, UNF!CYP SÒFA
para. ·. Scc ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs constituting an agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd
Nations and Finland conccrning thc scrvicc with thc Unitcd Nations ¡mcrgcncy
Forcc ol thc national contingcnt providcd by thc Govcrnmcnt ol Finland, a. and
a· ]unc .o··, para. · a·. UNTS ..6. ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs constituting an agrccmcnt
bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and Pakistan conccrning thc Unitcd Nations Sccurity
Forcc in Vcst Ncw Guinca (Vcst !rian), 6 Ðcccmbcr .o6a and .· April .o6., ·c.
UNTS a6, .c. ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs constituting an agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd
Nations and Canada conccrning thc scrvicc with thc Unitcd Nations PcaccKccping
Forcc in Cyprus ol thc national contingcnt providcd by thc Govcrnmcnt ol Canada,
a. Fcbruary .o66, para. ·, ··· UNTS .ac.
a·o Modcl Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and Mcmbcr Statcs contributing
pcrsonncl and cquipmcnt to Unitcd Nations pcacckccping opcrations, Articlc \!!!,
para. a·.
.·a Chapter 4
bc important lor scnding statcs to rcvicw thcir national law in this rcspcct. !n
thc vicw ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, “national laws may diffcr in thc cxtcnt to
which thcy conlcr on courts martial jurisdiction ovcr civil offcnccs in pcacctimc,
or conlcr on cithcr military or civil courts jurisdiction ovcr offcnccs abroad. Somc
providc only lor trial in thc homc country, thus posing practical qucstions about
thc submission ol cvidcncc.”
:oo

According to thc UN Modcl SÒFA, thc duty ol thc scnding statcs to cxcr
cisc jurisdiction ovcr thcir lorccs, is towards thc UN. As is wcll cstablishcd in
intcrnational law a statc cannot cscapc its intcrnational obligations by rclcrring
to its national lcgislation.
:o+
A scnding statc is thcrclorc rcquircd to rcvicw its
national laws so that thcy comply with thc ability and duty to cxcrcisc jurisdic
tion ovcr its lorccs.
:o:

Tcrc sccms to bc somc conlusion in thc litcraturc conccrning thc naturc
ol immunity ol UN pcrsonncl and thc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol scnd
ing statcs ovcr military pcrsonncl. According to Rogcrs, thc principlc ol immu
nity lrom lcgal proccss lor official acts lor UN pcacckccping pcrsonncl “givcs
thc scnding statcs cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr thcir own pcrsonncl lor
all criminal offcnccs. As a conccssion, howcvcr, thc UN SÒFA docs, likc thc
Privilcgcs Convcntion, allow thc UN Sccrctary Gcncral to waivc that right il hc
considcrs it appropriatc to do so.”
:o:
Tis is, howcvcr, only partly truc. Tcrc is
no right ol thc SccrctaryGcncral to waivc thc immunity in rclation to military
pcrsonncl, bcing part ol an opcrations military componcnt, as thcy lall undcr thc
cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol thcir scnding statcs.
:o±

Vijwardanc discusscs thc lack ol a waivcr institutc in UN SÒFAs. Hc
bclicvcs that a waivcr could bc possiblc in vicw ol thc lact that thcrc is no immu
nity lrom liability but only lrom proccss and jurisdiction. Tc UN, arguably docs
not havc thc authority to waivc immunity, nor has any mcmbcr ol thc lorcc, sincc
it is not a pcrsonal immunity. !t would, according to Vijwardanc, il at all pos
aoc Summary study, .o··, para. ..·. Scc in this rcspcct also Gabriclla Rosncr, Te United
Nations Emergency Force, .·c.·. (.o6.).
ao. \icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol Trcatics, Articlc a·. Scc also 8rownlic, .¡.·.
aoa Higgins contcnds that cxclusion in thc .o6cs lrom Congolcsc criminal jurisdiction
ol any criminal offcncc committcd by mcmbcrs ol ÒNUC cmbraccd not only acts
criminal undcr Congolcsc law, but also “undcr customary law so lar as thc conduct ol
hostilitics was conccrncd”. Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping,Documents
and Commentary, III Africa, aco (.o·c). Howcvcr, il thc UN troops wcrc to bc
involvcd in an armcd conflict with governmental lorccs thc conscnt to thc opcration
as such would no longcr bc valid and thc lcgitimacy ol thc status agrccmcnt would
bc qucstioncd.
ao. Rogcrs, ·.6.
ao¡ Tc right and duty ol thc SccrctaryGcncral to waivc such immunity lor othcr kinds
ol pcrsonncl undcr thc SÒFA is not cxplicitly statcd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA but
may bc inlcrrcd lrom thc incorporation ol thc Gcncral Convcntion.
.·. Special protection
siblc, lic with thc contributing statc. !t is thc rcsponsibility ol contributing statcs
to cxcrcisc criminal jurisdiction. !n ordcr to avoid a jurisdictional vacuum thcsc
statcs may thcrclorc lulfil thcir obligations by waiving immunity in lavour ol thc
host statc. Tis could bc thc only cffcctivc way, Vijwardanc argucs, il a crimc
committcd in thc host statc was not a criminal offcncc within thc tcrritory ol
thc contributing statc.
:o¡
Howcvcr, it would not sccm to bc corrcct to rclcr to
immunity and thc possibility to waivc such immunity. !t rathcr conccrns alloca
tion ol jurisdiction. ¡vcn though thc scnding statc may bcncfit lrom thc SÒFA,
thc agrccmcnt is bctwccn thc host statc and thc UN. Any agrccmcnt bctwccn
thc scnding and rccciving statc nccds to takc into considcration thc tcrms ol thc
SÒFA.
!n UN pcacc opcrations it is an cstablishcd practicc that military mcm
bcrs ol thc military componcnt lall undcr thc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol
scnding statcs. Tis practicc can bc traccd to thc law ol visiting lorccs. Vhilc
thc norm on such lorccs today is that ol concurrcnt jurisdiction, cxclusivc crimi
nal jurisdiction ol scnding statcs has survivcd whcn in an opcrational contcxt.
Tc systcm ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol scnding statcs rcquircs that such
statcs cxcrcisc that jurisdiction in good laith, thcrcby prcvcnting a lacuna in thc
cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction. Tc SccrctaryGcncral, in .o··, justificd thc principlc ol
cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol military pcrsonncl on basically two rcasons: thc
indcpcndcnt cxcrcisc ol thcir lunctions and thc availability ol troops lrom thc
mcmbcr statcs.
:o6
Tc practicc ol scnding statcs to rctain cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr
thcir military lorccs is largcly lollowcd in pcacc opcrations not undcr UN com
mand. !n thc Multinational Forcc and Òbscrvcrs (MFÒ) opcration,
:o·
cstab
lishcd pursuant to thc pcacc agrccmcnt bctwccn !sracl and ¡gypt, in .o·o, scnding
statcs rctaincd cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr military mcmbcrs ol thc MFÒ
and mcmbcrs ol its civilian obscrvcr group.
:o8
Òthcr mcmbcrs ol thc MFÒ wcrc
immunc lrom thc criminal jurisdiction ol thc host statc conccrning all acts pcr
ao· Vijcwardanc, .··.
ao6 Summary study, .o··, para. ..6.
ao· !t is cndowcd with thc lunction to obscrvc and rcport on thc implcmcntation ol thc
pcacc agrccmcnt in spccificd zoncs. !ts rights and dutics arc outlincd in thc Anncx
to thc Protocol cstablishing thc MFÒ. !n an attachcd appcndix its lcgal status and
that ol its mcmbcrs is stipulatcd (hcrcinaltcr thc MFÒ SÒFA). According to thc
MFÒ thc “ÐircctorGcncral, his dcputy, thc Commandcr, and his dcputy, shall bc
accordcd in rcspcct ol thcmsclvcs, thcir spouscs and minor childrcn, thc privilcgcs
and immunitics, cxcmptions and lacilitics accordcd to diplomatic cnvoys in accord
ancc with intcrnational law.” Appcndix to thc Anncx to thc Protocol bctwccn thc
Arab Rcpublic ol ¡gypt and thc Statc ol !sracl, . August .o·., para. a· UK Trcaty
Scrics no. .· (.o·a) (Sickmann, Basic Documents, .ca).
ao· MFÒ SÒFA para. ...
.·¡ Chapter 4
lormcd by thcm in an official capacity.
:oo
!t was thc duty ol thc ÐircctorGcncral
to “comply with rcqucsts ol thc Rccciving statc lor thc withdrawal lrom its tcr
ritory ol any mcmbcr ol thc MFÒ who violatcs its laws, rcgulations, customs or
traditions.”
:oo
Tc ÐircctorGcncral, morcovcr, could waivc thc immunity ol any
MFÒ mcmbcr with thc conscnt ol thc scnding statc.
:o+
Tc right ol rccciving
statcs, in cffcct, to dcclarc any mcmbcr ol thc MFÒ persona non grata il bclicvcd
to bc guilty ol violating “its laws, rcgulations, customs or traditions” is rathcr sur
prising. !t could in lact obstruct thc indcpcndcnt pcrlormancc ol thc assigncd
dutics ol thc MFÒ. !t should also bc notcd that thc rclcrcncc to customs and
traditions is lar widcr than thc obligation placcd upon pcrsonncl to rcspcct thc
“laws and rcgulations” ol thc rccciving statc.
:o:

Tc right ol thc ÐircctorGcncral to waivc immunity lor MFÒ mcmbcrs
dcparts lrom thc gcncral conccpt ol UN pcacc opcrations. Tc nccd, in this casc,
to obtain thc conscnt ol thc scnding statc bclorc waiving immunity comcs closc
to rctaining an cxclusivc right to cxcrcisc criminal jurisdiction lor such statcs.
Sickmann concludcs that thc lact that thc conscnt ol thc scnding statc is rcquircd
rcsults in an absolute immunity lor MFÒ pcrsonncl.
:o:

!n an ÒAU opcration (.o·.) mcmbcrs ol thc ÒAU lorcc wcrc “subjcct to thc
criminal jurisdiction ol thcir rcspcctivc countrics, in conlormity with thc laws
and rcgulations in lorcc in thcsc countrics. … Mcmbcrs ol thc Forcc |wcrc| nci
thcr subjcct to thc jurisdiction ol Chad Tribunals nor to any othcr lcgal proccdurc
as rcgards thcir official dutics.”
:o±
Òn thc important qucstion ol criminal jurisdiction, thc !FÒR/SFÒR
SÒFA stipulatcs that “NATÒ military pcrsonncl undcr all circumstanccs and at
all timcs shall bc subjcct to thc cxclusivc jurisdiction ol thcir rcspcctivc national
clcmcnts in rcspcct ol any criminal or disciplinary offcnscs which may bc com
mittcd by thcm in thc Rcpublic ol 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina.”
:o¡
As in thc UN
aoo MFÒ SÒFA, para. .. (b).
.cc !bid., para... (c).
.c. !bid.
.ca !bid., para. 6 (a).
.c. Sickmann, National Contingents, ..o.
.c¡ !n .o·., a PanAlrican pcacckccping lorcc was cstablishcd undcr thc authority ol
thc Òrganization ol Alrican Unity (ÒAU) to support thc Transitional National
Union Govcrnmcnt ol Chad. A SÒFA was concludcd bctwccn thc ÒAU and thc
Transitional National Union Govcrnmcnt ol Chad. According to thc SÒFA, thc
pcacckccping lorcc was an organ ol thc ÒAU and thc mcmbcrs ol thc lorcc, rcmain
ing in thcir national scrviccs, wcrc rcgardcd as bcing intcrnational staff undcr thc
authority ol thc ÒAU. Tc lorcc was rcgardcd as a subsidiary organ ol thc ÒAU and
thus “cntitlcd to thc status, privilcgcs and immunitics grantcd to thc Òrganization ol
Alrican Unity.” Scc ÒAU Status ol Forccs Agrccmcnt, Nairobi, Novcmbcr a·, .o·.,
Articlc · a, c, and i.
.c· Articlc · ol thc NATÒ8iH SÒFA.
.·· Special protection
Modcl Agrccmcnt, thc !FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA includcs a statcmcnt on thc cxclu
sivc criminal jurisdiction ol thc troopcontributing nations. Tc partics to thc
!FÒR/SFÒR SÒFA agrcc to assist cach othcr “in thc cxcrcisc ol thcir rcspcctivc
jurisdictions.”
:o6
Conccrning NATÒ civilian pcrsonncl, thcy arc accordcd thc status ol
cxpcrts on mission and arc thus immunc lrom pcrsonal arrcst and dctcntion.
Rogcrs finds that kcy civilian support staff should havc thc samc status as mili
tary pcrsonncl and that a diffcrcnt status could in lact “impcdc military opcra
tions”.
:o·

!n Kosovo, KFÒR pcrsonncl, not including locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl, wcrc
to bc
immunc lrom jurisdiction bclorc courts in Kosovo in rcspcct ol any admin
istrativc, civil or criminal act committcd by thcm in thc tcrritory ol Kosovo.
Such pcrsonncl shall bc subjcct to thc cxclusivc jurisdiction ol thcir rcspcctivc
scnding Statcs, and
immunc lrom any lorm ol arrcst or dctcntion othcr than by pcrsons acting on
bchall ol thcir rcspcctivc scnding Statcs. !l crroncously dctaincd, thcy shall bc
immcdiatcly turncd ovcr to KFÒR authoritics.
:o8
KFÒR pcrsonncl also includc civilian pcrsonncl and thc cxclusivc cxcrcisc ol
jurisdiction thus includcs an cxpandcd catcgory ol pcrsonncl comparcd with
UN pcacc opcrations. Tc UN SccrctaryGcncral rctaincd thc right and duty to
waivc thc immunity ol UNM!K pcrsonncl il and whcn that immunity impcdcd
thc coursc ol justicc and could bc waivcd without prcjudicc to thc intcrcsts ol
UNM!K. !n thcory thc possibility also cxistcd ol rcqucsting thc waivcr ol juris
diction lor KFÒR pcrsonncl. Such rcqucsts wcrc to bc rclcrrcd to thc commandcr
ol that national clcmcnt.
:oo
.c6 !bid.
.c· Tc lact that “somc statcs arc not ablc by law to cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr accom
panying civilians |…| nccd not bc a driving considcration, it can bc providcd in
thc SÒFA that thc scnding statc has primary right to cxcrcisc jurisdiction.”Rogcrs,
··.. Condcrman argucs that thc granting to all “NATÒ pcrsonncl” (including civil
ians) thc status ol “cxpcrts on missions” and at thc samc timc stipulating that as
such “cxpcrts on mission, NATÒ pcrsonncl shall bc immunc lrom pcrsonal arrcst
and dctcntion” lcads to thc situation whcrc thc host nation has cxclusivc criminal
jurisdiction ovcr US civilians but is prcvcntcd lrom taking thcm into custody. Paul
]. Condcrman, ]urisdiction, in Te Handbook of Te Law of Visiting Forces, oo, .co
(Ðictcr Flcck ct al cds., acc.). As scnding statcs cxcrcisc cxclusivc jurisdiction ovcr
criminal offcnccs committcd by NATÒ military pcrsonncl, it is not clcar, howcvcr,
as to how hc arrivcs at this conclusion.
.c· KFÒRUNM!K Rcgulation, Scction a.¡.
.co !bid., Scctions 6.. and 6.a.
.·6 Chapter 4
!n Alghanistan both !SAF and associatcd pcrsonncl wcrc subjcct to thc
cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol thcir rcspcctivc national clcmcnts.
:+o
!SAF and
associatcd pcrsonncl wcrc, morcovcr, madc immunc lrom pcrsonal arrcst and
dctcntion and il mistakcnly dctaincd thcy wcrc to bc immcdiatcly handcd ovcr
to !SAF authoritics. Although pcrsonncl wcrc to bc undcr thc cxclusivc juris
diction ol thcir national clcmcnts, it was cxplicitly statcd that thcy “may not bc
surrcndcrcd to, or othcrwisc translcrrcd to thc custody ol, an intcrnational tribu
nal or any othcr cntity or Statc without thc cxprcss conscnt ol thc contributing
nation.”
:++
Tc provision clcarly rclcrs to Articlc o· ol thc !CC statutc.
Tc allocation ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction lor scnding statcs is nor
mally rcstrictcd to military mcmbcrs ol an opcration’s military componcnt. To
cxtcnd cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction lor rcspcctivc national clcmcnts to such
a vagucly dcfincd group ol pcrsonncl such as “!SAF and supporting pcrsonncl,
including associatcd liaison pcrsonncl” was clcarly a ncw dcvclopmcnt and it ccr
tainly involvcs a risk ol a “jurisdictional vacuum” in rclation to such pcrsonncl.
!n rclation to thc law ol visiting lorccs, 8owctt finds thc principlc ol cxclu
sivc criminal jurisdiction justificd in pcacc opcrations. Tc lunctions ol thc vari
ous lorccs arc gcncrally diffcrcnt. Tcy “may actually bc opcrating in thc ficld and
may, indccd, bc in control ol ccrtain arcas ol Statc tcrritory ... but it is clcar that a
Unitcd Nations Forcc will invariably bc complctcly indcpcndcnt ol and rarcly, il
cvcr, allicd to thc local lorccs.”
:+:
Tc vcry lact that thcy will bc involvcd in opcra
tions is a valid argumcnt to accord to thcm “absolutc immunity lrom thc juris
diction ol local courts.”
:+:
8owctt, howcvcr, strcsscs thc ncccssity ol not abusing
such an cxccption to thc gcncral rulc on criminal jurisdiction.
:+±
Howcvcr, cxclu
sivc criminal jurisdiction lor military mcmbcrs ol thc military componcnt ol an
opcration appcars to bc absolutc, with no room lor a waivcr.
:+¡

!n this rcspcct thc lcgal status accordcd ¡UF pcrsonncl, which was by naturc
and charactcr diffcrcnt lrom many othcr agrccmcnts on thc status ol lorccs in
pcacc opcrations, should bc notcd. Tc agrccmcnt stipulatcd that ¡UF pcrson
ncl “shall bc grantcd trcatmcnt, including immunitics and privilcgcs, cquivalcnt
to that ol diplomatic agcnts grantcd undcr thc \icnna Convcntion on diplo
..c Articlc . ol thc !SAF SÒFA.
... !bid., Articlc ¡.
..a 8owctt, ¡.··.
... !bid., ¡.·.
..¡ Hc asscrts that “first, it should bc clcarly undcrstood that thc privilcgcs and immu
nitics arc not grantcd lor thc bcncfit ol thc individual conccrncd, sccondly, thcrc
should bc machincry lor prosccuting offcndcrs against local law and an obligation to
usc that machincry, and thirdly, thc immunity should not bc unjustifiably cxtcndcd.”
!bid.
..· Michacl 8othc and Tomas Ðorschcl, Tc UN Pcacckccping ¡xpcricncc, in Te
Handbook of Te Law of Visiting Forces ¡··, ·c· (Ðictcr Flcck ct al cds., acc.). 8owctt,
...¡.
.·· Special protection
matic rclations”.
:+6
8y rclcrring to thc privilcgcs and immunitics ol diplomatic
agcnts, it was thc probablc intcntion ol thc ¡U to ovcrcomc thc insufficicnt lcvcl
ol protcction providcd by international privilcgcs and immunitics lor military
pcrsonncl. !t is intcrcsting to notc, howcvcr, that whcn thc ¡U launchcd its first
military opcration it chosc a quitc diffcrcnt solution lrom what had bccn ham
mcrcd out in practicc by thc UN. Tc UN Modcl SÒFA providcs a tcstcd basis
lor thc conclusion ol individual SÒFAs, which is supportcd by thc lact that this
practicc has largcly bccn lollowcd in pcacc opcrations lcd by NATÒ. Rclcrcncc
to diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics, howcvcr, is rcgularly madc in SÒFAs
concludcd by thc UN conccrning highlcvcl figurcs in pcacc opcrations such as
thc Forcc Commandcr and thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc to thc SccrctaryGcncral.
Vhat was ncw in thc agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡U and FYRÒM was that all pcr
sonncl, both military and civilian, irrcspcctivc ol thcir position in thc opcration,
wcrc accordcd this status.
:+·

Tc purposc ol thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to diplomatic agcnts,
as wcll as to agcnts ol intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations, is to cnsurc thc
cfficicnt pcrlormancc ol thcir lunctions and not lor thcir pcrsonal bcncfit. Tc
lunction ol a diplomatic agcnt, howcvcr, is lundamcntally diffcrcnt lrom that
ol an intcrnational official. Tc intcrprctation ol what is ol lunctional ncccssity
thcrclorc dcpcnds upon thc naturc ol thc status ol thc pcrsonncl conccrncd and
thc purposc ol thc mission.
Tc agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡U and FYRÒM docs not cxplicitly providc
lor thc ability to waivc thc immunity ol pcrsonncl. Tc almost (at lcast in cffcct)
cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol scnding statcs was not, as is othcrwisc thc
custom, rcstrictcd to military pcrsonncl. Such pcrsonncl usually lall within thc
disciplinary systcms ol thcir national contingcnts and jurisdiction in rclation to
thcm is thus rcgularly cxcrciscd. Civilian pcrsonncl may not ncccssarily bc subjcct
to a disciplinary systcm.
..6 ¡U SÒFA, Articlc 6...
..· !t should, howcvcr, bc notcd that in thc UN Ycmcn Òbscrvcr Mission (UNYÒM
.o6..o6¡) and in thc Unitcd Nations Òbscrvation Group in Lcbanon (UNÒG!L
.o··) pcrsonncl wcrc grantcd thosc privilcgcs and immunitics that arc accordcd to
diplomatic agcnts undcr intcrnational law. Tc nccd to accord pcrsonncl diplomatic
privilcgcs and immunitics was duc to thc “spccial importancc and difficult naturc ol
thc lunctions” thcy wcrc to pcrlorm. Scc ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs constituting an agrcc
mcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and Saudi Arabia rclating to privilcgcs, immuni
tics and lacilitics lor thc obscrvation opcration along thc Saudi ArabiaYcmcn bordcr
cstablishcd pursuant to thc Sccurity Council rcsolution ol .. ]unc .o6., ¡·¡ UNTS
.·· (.o6.) and ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs constituting an agrccmcnt bctwccn thc Unitcd
Nations and Lcbanon conccrning thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations Òbscrvation
Group in Lcbanon, .o·· .c. UNTS a·.. According to Vijcwardanc, UNYÒM
should probably bc rcgardcd as an cxccption in thc practicc ol obscrvcr missions.
!t was cquippcd with a rcconnaissancc and an air unit and thc pcrsonncl wcrc fircd
upon and oltcn in dangcr. Vijcwardanc, .6c.
.·· Chapter 4
An csscntial ingrcdicnt ol diplomatic immunity is thc persona non grata
institutc. Tis is a charactcristic ol diplomatic immunitics not lound in intcrna
tional immunitics. Òn thc contrary, thc UN, as thc illustrativc cxamplc, has con
stantly maintaincd thc position that it is thc organisation itscll that dccidcs who
will carry out its lunctions. !t is at thc hcart ol thc diffcrcncc bctwccn immunitics
purcly bascd upon lunction and thosc partly bascd upon its rcprcscntativc char
actcr. Vould FYRÒM in lact havc had thc opportunity to dcclarc any mcmbcr ol
thc ¡UF pcrsonncl persona non grata without, as is customary with this institutc,
providing any cxplanation:
:+8

Tc inclusion ol diplomatic privilcgcs and immunitics thus indicatcs that
such pcrsonncl rcprcscnt thcir homc statcs and not thc ¡U as an organisation.
!t should bc notcd, howcvcr, that participation agrccmcnts bctwccn thc ¡U and
third statcs cxplicitly statc that, although lorccs and pcrsonncl rcmain undcr thc
lull control ol scnding statcs, thc opcrational control ol such lorccs and pcrsonncl
shall bc translcrrcd to thc ¡U Òpcration Commandcr.
:+o
Tc ¡Ulcd Artemis opcration, rclcrrcd to abovc, in lact involvcd incidcnts
whcrc thc opcration’s military pcrsonncl wcrc drawn into combat whcrc lcthal
lorcc was uscd. Òpcrations ol this naturc could start to crodc thc systcm ol dip
lomatic privilcgcs and immunitics which, ol coursc, is part ol a widcr systcm
dcviscd to lostcr diplomatic rclations bctwccn statcs. Tc lact that thc most
scnior figurcs in pcacc opcrations arc accordcd a status cquivalcnt to that ol dip
..· Tc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt docs not stipulatc any right lor thc host nation to rclusc
cntry into its tcrritory ol an individual or to cxpcl a particular individual. !t is lor thc
Spccial Rcprcscntativc or thc Forcc Commandcr to makc such dccisions. Ðcpcnding
on thc position ol thc mcmbcr, it may in practicc provc impossiblc not to takc into
account thc vicws ol thc host nation. !n thc ÒNUC opcration, Prcsidcnt ]oscph
Kasavubu rcqucstcd thc SccrctaryGcncral to rcmovc his Spccial Rcprcscntativc, Mr
Rajcshwar Ðayal. !n rcply, it was pointcd out that this mattcr camc undcr thc cxclu
sivc authority ol thc SccrctaryGcncral. !t was morcovcr madc clcar that Mr Ðayal
could not, as an ambassador, bc dcclarcd persona non grata. Scc Lcttcrs datcd .¡ and
.· ]anuary .o6. (S/¡6ao). According to 8owctt, thc qucstion conccrns thc samc prin
ciplc dctcrmining thc composition ol thc lorcc, namcly that it “was a mattcr lor thc
Unitcd Nations, with thc vicws ol thc host Statc bcing but onc ol thc lactors to bc
takcn into account.” Notwithstanding that thc position was right in principlc it was,
in practicc, an impossiblc situation and Mr Ðayal was rccallcd on .c March .o6.. Scc
8owctt a... Hc discusscs whcthcr or not a statc could rctain thc right undcr cus
tomary intcrnational law to cxpcl any individual posing a potcntial thrcat to a statc’s
intcrnal sccurity. !n vicw ol thc lact that a host statc would lack disciplinary powcrs
ovcr thc mcmbcrs ol an opcration, and that participating statcs havc cxclusivc crimi
nal jurisdiction ovcr thc military lorccs, would tcnd not to support such a proposi
tion. According to 8owctt, it thcrclorc appcars that host statcs do not havc any lcgal
right to cxpcl mcmbcrs ol a lorcc. !bid., .a·.
..o Scc c.g. Agrccmcnt bctwccn thc ¡uropcan Union and thc Rcpublic ol Poland on
thc participation ol Polish armcd lorccs in thc ¡uropcan Union lorcc (¡UF) in thc
lormcr Yugoslav Rcpublic ol Maccdonia, Articlc ·, Ò] L a··/¡¡ (acc.).
.·o Special protection
lomatic agcnts might not constitutc a major problcm cithcr lor thc diplomats or
thc host nation. According such a status to military pcrsonncl, ol all lcvcls, whcn
cngagcd in rcsolving tasks ol an cnlorccmcnt naturc is, howcvcr, an cntircly dil
lcrcnt mattcr. !t should at lcast causc alarm to diplomatic agcnts il thc lcvcl ol
protcction that has cvolvcd ovcr hundrcds ol ycars wcrc to bc compromiscd by
military combat.
8clorc concluding on criminal jurisdiction a lcw words nccds to bc said
rcgarding thc rclationship bctwccn Articlc o·(a) ol thc !CC statutc and SÒFAs.
Articlc o·(a) providcs thc ncccssary room lor statcs partics to thc !CC, host
ing a pcacc opcration, to rcconcilc its obligations undcr a SÒFA and thc !CC.
Conccrn ovcr thc US practicc ol concluding bilatcral agrccmcnts with othcr
statcs, whcrc thc partics to thc agrccmcnt undcrtakc not to surrcndcr or trans
lcr any pcrson prcscnt in thc tcrritory to thc !CC without thc cxprcsscd conscnt
ol thc othcr party,
::o
has also triggcrcd qucstions ol importancc to pcrsonncl
in pcacc opcrations. Vith rcgard to thc lact that thc !CC statutc “shall apply
cqually to all pcrsons without any distinction bascd on official capacity” (Articlc
a·), it has bccn argucd that statcs partics to thc !CC cannot rcly on Articlc o·(a)
with rcgard to SÒFAs concludcd altcr thc statc bccamc a party to thc statutc. !t
is hcld that a SÒFA would bc contrary to thc intcntion ol thc Court, and that
it shall apply cqually to all pcrsons.
::+
Howcvcr, this argumcnt docs not sccm to
takc into account that Articlc o·(a) was dcsigncd particularly lor thc purposc ol
SÒFAs,
:::
and that nothing in thc articlc suggcsts that it should not apply to sub
scqucnt agrccmcnts.
:::
Anothcr argumcnt has also bccn advanccd, to thc cffcct
that agrccmcnts covcrcd by Articlc o·(a) would only bcncfit nonpartics to thc
!CC. According to that argumcnt it is ncccssary to intcrprct Articlc o·(a) as only
applying to nonpartics, as anothcr intcrprctation would scriously undcrminc thc
cffcct ol Articlc a· ol thc statutc.
::±
!n this rcspcct, it should bc notcd that thc
.ac Scc, lor cxamplc, Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs ol
Amcrica and thc Govcrnmcnt ol Uzbckistan Rcgarding thc Surrcndcr ol Pcrsons
to thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court, Scptcmbcr .· acca, ¡a !LM .o (acc.). For thc
purposc ol that agrccmcnt, “pcrsons” arc dcfincd as “currcnt or lormcr Govcrnmcnt
officials, cmployccs (including contractors), or military pcrsonncl or nationals ol onc
Party”.
.a. Stcffcn Virth, !mmunitics, Rclatcd Problcms, and Articlc o· ol thc Romc Statutc,
¡ao, ¡·6 Criminal Law Forum .a (acc.).
.aa Kimbcrly Prost and Angclika Schlunk, Articlc o·, in Commentary on the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article By Article, ...., .... (Òtto
Trifftcrcr cd., .ooo).
.a. Scc Ðapo Apkandc, !ntcrnational Law !mmunitics and thc !ntcrnational Criminal
Court, ¡c·, ¡a6 AJIL .a (acc¡). According to Articlc .c(.) ol thc \icnna Convcntion
on thc Law ol Trcatics, an carlicr trcaty applics bctwccn its partics only to thc cxtcnt
that its provisions arc compatiblc with thosc ol a latcr agrccmcnt bctwccn partics to
both agrccmcnts.
.a¡ !bid.
.oc Chapter 4
!SAF SÒFA includcs a spccial provision stipulating that !SAF pcrsonncl shall
not bc surrcndcrcd to an intcrnational tribunal without thc cxprcss conscnt ol thc
contributing statc,
::¡
and that scvcral ol thc contributing statcs to !SAF wcrc also
partics to thc !CC. Tcsc statcs sccm to bc ol thc vicw that thcy can rcly upon
agrccmcnts covcrcd by Articlc o·(a). Morcovcr, as Articlc o·(a) rclcrs to “obliga
tions undcr intcrnational agrccmcnts”, onc must takc into considcration thc rulcs
on application ol trcatics as stipulatcd in thc \icnna Convcntion on thc Law ol
Trcatics. Articlc .c(a) ol that convcntion statcs: “Vhcn a trcaty spccifics that it
is subjcct to, or that it is not to bc considcrcd as incompatiblc with, an carlicr or
latcr trcaty, thc provisions ol that trcaty prcvail.” Against this background, it docs
sccm that !CC partics would bc ablc to bcncfit lrom SÒFAs. !t should also bc
pointcd out that cvcn il thc !CC statutc is an agrccmcnt ol a lundamcntal char
actcr, it is not as such an agrccmcnt ol a highcr lcgal valuc than othcr agrccmcnts,
likc SÒFAs, in that it prcvails ovcr such agrccmcnts.
!n a rcccnt book on thc prosccution and dclcncc ol pcacckccpcrs, Knoops
dcals, inter alia, with thc rclationship bctwccn thc principlc ol cxclusivc crimi
nal jurisdiction in SÒFAs and crimcs subjcct to univcrsal jurisdiction.
::6
Knoops
argucs that thc principlc ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction lor scnding statcs can
bc sct asidc in cascs involving crimcs ol a univcrsal charactcr. Tc basis lor this
argumcnt appcars to bc that “SÒFAs arc not mcant to cndow thc mcmbcrs ol thc
armcd lorccs ol thc scnding statc with criminal impunity lor crimcs thcy commit,
rathcr thcsc agrccmcnts arc promulgatcd to allocatc and dclcgatc or primarily
distributc thc rcsponsibility lor invcstigating and prosccuting such crimcs”.
::·
Hc
also rclcrs to thc jus cogens charactcr ol war crimcs and holds that this may havc
thc cffcct ol ovcrturning thc principlc ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol scnd
ing statcs.
::8

!t is truc that thcrc is a gcncral right, and somctimcs a duty, lor statcs to
cxcrcisc thcir jurisdiction ovcr offcndcrs in rclation to ccrtain crimcs, such as
gravc brcachcs ol thc Gcncva Convcntions. Howcvcr, in thc pcacc opcration con
tcxt thc cxcrcisc ol criminal jurisdiction ovcr somc pcrsonncl is subjcct to a lex
specialis rcgulation. !n this contcxt, thc principlc ol criminal jurisdiction lor scnd
ing statcs ovcr thcir military pcrsonncl has not bccn contcstcd. Tcrc is nothing
indicating that this spccial rulc should bc conditioncd only in rclation to crimcs
not subjcct to univcrsal jurisdiction. Tc jus cogens charactcr ol war crimcs rclatcs
.a· !SAF SÒFA, Articlc .(¡).
.a6 Gccrt]an Alcxandcr Knoops, Te Prosecution and Defense of Peacekeepers under
International Criminal Law, a¡6 (acc¡).
.a· !bid. (lootnotc omittcd).
.a· !bid., a·a.
.o. Special protection
to a prohibition on committing such crimcs. Tc duty to prosccutc pcrpctrators
ol gravc brcachcs has hardly bccn clcvatcd to that ol a jus cogens duty.
::o

Tc principlc ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction is rclcvant only in rclation
to thc host statc. !l military pcrsonncl suspcctcd ol war crimcs wcrc to travcl to
a third statc – lor cxamplc, on lcavc – thcy could not rcly on thc cxclusivc crimi
nal jurisdiction ol thcir statc ol nationality. !n such circumstanccs thc third statc
would naturally bc within its rights in cxcrcising jurisdiction ovcr such pcrson
ncl.
As Knoops rightly points out, this principlc is bascd upon a systcm ol allo
cation ol jurisdiction bctwccn scnding and rccciving statcs and docs not, as
such, dcal with qucstions ol immunity. As pointcd out prcviously, thc Sccrctary
Gcncral warncd carly on ol thc risk ol a jurisdictional vacuum. Tcrclorc, il in
thc luturc thcrc is lound to bc sufficicnt causc to bclicvc that scnding statcs arc
not willing or ablc to cxcrcisc jurisdiction, thcn thc rulc on cxclusivc criminal
jurisdiction should yicld to thc intcrcsts ol not crcating a rcgimc ol impunity. Tc
systcm ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction is bascd upon a prcsumption that scnd
ing statcs act bona fide and do not crcatc a de facto rcgimc ol impunity.
!n this rcspcct, Sccurity Council rcsolution .¡o· nccds to bc addrcsscd.
According to that rcsolution, which authoriscd thc cstablishmcnt ol a
Multinational Forcc in Libcria, thc Sccurity Council, acting undcr Chaptcr \!!
ol thc UN Chartcr, dccidcd
that currcnt or lormcr officials or pcrsonncl lrom a contributing Statc, which
is not a party to thc Romc Statutc ol thc !ntcrnational Criminal Court, shall
bc subjcct to thc cxclusivc jurisdiction ol that contributing Statc lor all allcgcd
acts or omissions arising out ol or rclatcd to thc Multinational Forcc or Unitcd
Nations stabilization lorcc in Libcria, unlcss such cxclusivc jurisdiction has
bccn cxprcssly waivcd by that contributing Statc,
::o
First, it should bc notcd that in contrast to Sccurity Council rcsolutions .¡aa and
.¡·· (that aimcd to bar thc !CC lrom instituting invcstigation or prosccution ol
any casc “involving currcnt or lormcr officials or pcrsonncl lrom a contributing
Statc not a Party to thc Romc Statutc ovcr acts or omissions rclating to a Unitcd
Nations cstablishcd or authorizcd opcration”), rcsolution .¡o· stipulatcd a rcgimc
.ao !t should also bc notcd that in cascs ol gravc brcachcs, thc Gcncva Convcntions
cxplicitly stipulatc that notwithstanding thc duty to prosccutc thc pcrpctrators
ol such crimcs, statcs partics “may also, il it prclcrs, and in accordancc with thc
provisions ol its own lcgislation, hand such pcrsons ovcr lor trial to anothcr High
Contracting Party conccrncd, providcd such High Contracting Party has madc out
a prima facie casc”. Articlc .¡6, Gcncva Convcntion !\.
..c SC Rcs. .¡o·, UN SCÒR, ¡·c.
rd
mtg., para. ·, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.¡o· (acc.). Francc,
Mcxico and Gcrmany did not votc lor thc rcsolution duc to thc inclusion ol opcra
tivc paragraph ·.
.oa Chapter 4
ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction lor contributing statcs ovcr all thcir pcrsonncl.
Tc tcxt ol this rcsolution clcarly gocs bcyond thc customary principlc cstab
lishcd in SÒFAs, sincc thc catcgorics ol pcrsonncl arc much widcr. Morcovcr, it
makcs a distinction bctwccn pcrsonncl dcpcnding on whcthcr or not thcir statc
ol nationality is a party to thc !CC.
::+
Finally, it is valid against all statcs and not
just thc host statc. A limiting lactor, howcvcr, is that thc allcgcd acts or omissions
would nccd to bc rclatcd to thc Multinational Forcc.
!t is hcrc firmly hcld that rcsolutions ol this kind might in lact bc dctrimcn
tal to thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations. Tc risk involvcd in cxclud
ing largc catcgorics ol undcfincd pcrsonncl lrom thc cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction ol
thc host statc, as wcll as all othcr statcs, clcarly hcightcns thc risk ol crcating a
rcgimc ol de facto impunity lor such pcrsonncl. Tis might in thc longtcrm pcr
spcctivc crcatc ncgativc cffccts lor thc cstablishcd SÒFA norms.
!n conclusion, thc principlc that military pcrsonncl ol a pcacc opcration’s
military componcnt arc subjcct to thc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction is wcll cstab
lishcd in UN pcacc opcrations and has largcly bccn supportcd in opcrations lcd
by othcr organisations. Vhat is ncw in somc ol thosc opcrations is thc cxpansion
ol catcgorics ol pcrsonncl subjcct to cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol thcir scnd
ing statcs, and according military pcrsonncl with a status cquivalcnt to that ol
diplomatic agcnts. A crcdiblc systcm ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction lor scnd
ing statcs rcquircs a wcll dcfincd catcgory ol pcrsonncl subjcct to such a systcm
and an cffcctivc mcans ol cxcrcising this jurisdiction. !t is truc that in opcrations
whcrc thcrc is no lunctioning judicial systcm in thc host statc anothcr solution
may bc callcd lor.
:::
Howcvcr, whcn this is no longcr thc casc, such practicc may
havc an croding cffcct on thc crcdibility ol a systcm. 8y cxtcnding thc catcgorics
ol pcrsonncl, which cffcctivcly cscapc thc cxcrcisc ol local criminal jurisdiction
lor all thcir acts, may crcatc thc imprcssion that such pcrsonncl arc abovc thc law.
Tis must, ol coursc, bc wcighcd against thc availability ol troops lrom potcntial
contributing statcs and thc nccd lor thc indcpcndcnt cxcrcisc ol thcir lunctions.
!t is hcrc hcld that thc UN Modcl SÒFA rcflccts a carclul balancc bctwccn thcsc
intcrcsts. To dcviatc lrom thosc provisions may indccd havc ncgativc cffccts ol
both a short tcrm and longtcrm naturc.
... Scc Salvatorc Zappala, Arc Somc Pcacckccpcrs 8cttcr than Òthcrs: UN Sccurity
Council Rcsolution .¡o· (acc.) and thc !CC, . Journal of International Criminal
Justice, 6·., 6··, (acc.).
..a Tc dcgrcc ol immunity lor pcrsonncl was, lor cxamplc, morc larrcaching undcr
thc ÒNUC agrccmcnt than thc UN¡F SÒFA. Higgins rclcrs to thc “almost total
collapsc ol thc lcgal systcm which thc Congo had cxpcricnccd”. Higgins, United
Nations Peacekeeping, !!!, aco.
.o. Special protection
4.3.4 SOFA Norms as Customary International Law
Vhcthcr or not thc UN Modcl SÒFA rcflccts customary intcrnational law has
attractcd somc locus in thc litcraturc. Sharp, lor cxamplc, rcgards thc provisions
ol thc UN Modcl Agrccmcnt as customary intcrnational law “and thus apply to
military lorccs scrving thc Unitcd Nations cvcn il thc opcration spccific SÒFAs
arc not concludcd.”
:::
Hc bascs this asscrtion on thc lact that thc UN Modcl
Agrccmcnt is cxplicitly bascd upon cstablishcd practicc. Furthcrmorc, hc rclcrs
in thc lollowing tcrms to thc position takcn by UN Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs with
rcgard to thc opcration in Croatia: “in thc abscncc ol a signcd agrccmcnt, thc
status ol thc Unitcd Nations lorccs and opcrations in Croatia arc govcrncd by
thc customary practiccs and principlcs applicablc to UN pcacckccping or simi
lar opcrations as codificd in thc Modcl StatusolForccs Agrccmcnt issucd as a
Gcncral Asscmbly documcnt datcd o Òctobcr .ooc (A/¡·/·o¡)”.
::±
Rclcrring to thc SÒFAs concludcd in thc UN¡F, ÒNUC and UNF!CYP
opcrations, Sommcrcyns statcs that thc “provisions ol thcsc agrccmcnts havc
gradually comc to bc considcrcd as constituting basic principlcs govcrning thc
status and lunctions ol UN pcacckccping lorccs, thcy can bc rcsortcd to in con
ncction with any ncw lorccs pcnding thc conclusion ol spccific agrccmcnts or in
thc abscncc ol such agrccmcnts.”
::¡
Sickmann notcs that “|a|bsolutc criminal immunity would … sccm to havc
bccomc a rulc ol intcrnational customary law and thc samc conclusion may bc
drawn with rcspcct to thc rulcs conccrning privilcgcs and civil jurisdiction (‘on
duty’ immunity).”
::6
Òthcr rulcs ol customary intcrnational law, according to
Sickmann, arc thosc rclating to thc status ol intcrnational pcrsonncl and rcspcct
lor both local law and thc principlcs ol humanitarian law.
::·
8othc asscrts that
in situations whcrc no SÒFA is in lorcc thc “cxcmption lrom civil and criminal
... Valtcr Gary Sharp, Sr., Jus Paciarii. Emergent Legal Paradigms for U.N. Peace
Operations in the 21
st
Century, ..· (.ooo) (lootnotc omittcd). Sharp considcrs thc UN
Modcl SÒFA and its customary law status limitcd to opcrations cstablishcd undcr
thc authority ol thc UN and conductcd undcr its authority and control. !bid.
..¡ Rclcrrcd to by Sharp as a lcttcr lrom Ralph Zacklin, Ðircctor and Ðcputy to thc
UndcrSccrctary Gcncral lor Lcgal Affairs ol thc Unitcd Nations, to Robcrt 8.
Roscnstock, Ministcr Counsclor, Unitcd Statcs Mission to thc Unitcd Nations on
April a· .oo·. Sharp, .o.
..· Raymond Sommcrcyns, Unitcd Nations Forccs, in ¡ Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, ..c6, ...c (R. 8crnhardt cd., accc).
..6 Sickmann rclcrs to thc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol scnding statcs as absolutc
criminal immunity. Sickmann, National Contingents, .·.. Tc lact that Lcbanon did
not protcst at judgmcnts in situ ol thc Ðutch Army Mobilc Court Martial supports
thc customary law charactcr ol thc rulc on cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol scnding
statcs. !bid.
..· Sickmann, National Contingents, .·¡.
.o¡ Chapter 4
jurisdiction probably only rclatcs to official acts”.
::8
Flcck, on thc othcr hand,
bclicvcs that thc UN Modcl SÒFA “contains a sct ol rulcs which may bc consid
crcd as bcing widcly rccognizcd as customary intcrnational law”.
::o
Òn thc rcla
tionship with Articlc o·(a) ol thc !CC statutc and a SÒFA, Flcck acknowlcdgcs
that pcacc opcration lorccs oltcn dcploy without an applicablc SÒFA. Hc asscrts
in this rcspcct, howcvcr, that “cxcmption lrom jurisdiction ol thc rccciving statc
is both common practicc and a wcll cstablishcd principlc. !nclusion ol this prin
ciplc in a SÒFA would only bc dcclaratory in naturc. !n no casc has a rccciving
statc bccn authorizcd to cxcrcisc jurisdiction ovcr a mcmbcr ol a pcacckccping
lorcc”.
:±o

!t is intcrcsting to notc in this rcspcct thc position by Ncw Zcaland. A SÒFA
was concludcd bctwccn thc Australia and thc Govcrnmcnt ol !ndoncsia on thc
status ol thc !ntcrnational Forcc lor ¡ast Timor (!NT¡RF¡T), lcd by Australia.
Ncw Zcaland did not rccognisc !ndoncsian sovcrcignty ovcr ¡ast Timor and
hcld that it was not bound by thc SÒFA. !t hcld, howcvcr, that, bascd upon cus
tomary intcrnational law, its lorccs wcrc immunc lrom local jurisdiction.
:±+

Tc cxamination ol SÒFAs in UN pcacc opcrations supports thc notion
that thc usus critcrion ol a customary law rulc is satisficd rcgarding somc norms.
!t could salcly bc said that thc UN Modcl SÒFA is in itscll cvidcncc ol an
cstablishcd practicc. Tc practicc ol rcgional organisations carrying out pcacc
opcrations bascd upon a mandatc lrom thc Sccurity Council largcly supports
this custom. Tc problcm lor thc claim ol customary law status lor particular
SÒFA norms is to find cvidcncc ol opinio juris. Tc UN Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs
sccms to havc largcly avoidcd thc dircct qucstion ol customary law in rclation to
pcacc opcrations by gcncrally rclcrring to thc customary practice ol such opcra
tions. Howcvcr, in a notc to thc Assistant SccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping
Òpcrations it statcd that “in accordancc with customary law applicablc to Unitcd
Nations pcacckccping opcrations, SÒFAs providc lor privilcgcs and immunitics
to bc grantcd to military pcrsonncl contributcd by Mcmbcr Statcs.”
:±:
A study by Ðorcnbcrg on lcgal aspccts ol pcacckccping opcrations was
bascd upon national rcports and is cvidcncc ol thc opinio juris ol thc statcs partic
ipating in thc study.
:±:
Tc national rcports wcrc submittcd bctwccn Scptcmbcr,
..· 8othc, Pcacckccping, 6oo.
..o Flcck and Saallcld, ·..
.¡c Ðictcr Flcck, Arc Forcign Military Pcrsonncl ¡xcmpt lrom !ntcrnational Criminal
]urisdiction undcr Status ol Forccs Agrccmcnts:, . Journal of International Criminal
Justice, 6·., 66· (acc.).
.¡. Michacl, ]., Kclly, ct al, Lcgal aspccts ol Australia’s involvcmcnt in thc !ntcrnational
Forcc lor ¡ast Timor, ·¡. IRRC, .c., .co (acc.).
.¡a Mcmorandum to thc Assistant SccrctaryGcncral lor Pcacckccping Òpcrations, a.
]unc .oo·, ¡c· in United Nations Juridical Yearbook (.oo·) (cmphasis addcd).
.¡. Arno, ]. T. Ðorcnbcrg, Lcgal Aspccts ol Pcacckccping Òpcrations, a· Te Military
Law and Law of War Review, ... (.o·o).
.o· Special protection
.o··, and August, .oo·, by thc lollowing statcs: Austria, 8clgium, 8razil, Canada,
Ðcnmark, Finland, Gcrmany (FRG), !rcland, !taly, Ncthcrlands, Norway, Poland,
Switzcrland, thc Unitcd Kingdom, thc Unitcd Statcs and Zairc. According to thc
study all national rcports, cxccpt onc, supportcd thc systcm whcrcby mcmbcrs
ol a UN pcacckccping lorcc arc subjcct to thc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ol
thcir rcspcctivc national statcs.
:±±
Ðorcnbcrg concludcd that “|s|incc thc coop
cration ol thc countrics supplying troops is csscntial lor thc cstablishmcnt ol a
pcacckccping opcration, and in vicw ol thc cxtraordinary circumstanccs which
obtain in thc arca whcrc a pcacckccping lorcc opcratcs, it is advisablc that thc
scnding statcs should continuc to havc cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction.”
:±¡
Furthcr
cvidcncc ol opinio juris is also to bc lound in an ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs bctwccn thc
UN and its mcmbcrs rcgarding arrangcmcnts lor standby lorccs.
:±6
!t is in this study argucd that at lcast norms rclating to protcction ol pcrson
ncl in pcacc opcrations includcd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA arc norms ol a custom
ary law charactcr. Tc inclusion ol such norms in spccific SÒFAs, is scldom, il
cvcr, disputcd. Statc practicc is vast and opportunitics lor statcs to prcscnt argu
mcnts against thcsc norms havc bccn plcnty. A largc numbcr ol statcs, (thosc
statcs that havc contributcd pcrsonncl to UN pcacc opcrations) havc in lact lunc
tioncd as bcncficiarics ol such agrccmcnts. Tc acccptancc ol all statcs involvcd
.¡¡ Ðorcnbcrg, .6·. Tc rcason lor kccping thc systcm was, according to thc US rcport,
thc lundamcntal diffcrcncc bctwccn pcacckccping pcrsonncl and military pcrson
ncl dcploycd undcr a collcctivc dclcncc agrccmcnt as visiting lorccs in a rccciving
statc. Such a sccurity arrangcmcnt was bcncficial to both partics. !n pcacckccping
opcrations statcs providing pcrsonncl “rcap no spccific sccurity bcncfit and should
thus rctain thc authority to cxcrcisc criminal jurisdiction” !bid. Zairc statcd, how
cvcr, that cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction should lic with thc host country and gavc
thc lollowing rcasons: a. thc offcncc is a brcach ol thc public ordcr ol thc host coun
try, b. rcspcct lor thc sovcrcignty ol thc host country is at issuc, c. situations should
not occur in which an offcncc gocs unpunishcd bccausc thc offcndcr rcturns to his
country ol origin or bccausc thc offcncc is not punishablc undcr thc law ol thc lattcr
country. !bid.
.¡· Ðorcnbcrg, .6·6.
.¡6 Lcttcr datcd ac March .o6· lrom thc Ðcputy Pcrmancnt Rcprcscntativc ol Finland
addrcsscd to thc Chairman ol thc Spccial Committcc on PcaccKccping Òpcrations,
UN Ðoc. A/AC. .a./.. (.o6·). !n thc cncloscd Mcmorandum on Prcparations madc
by Finland lor cffcctivc participation in Unitcd Nations pcacckccping activitics,
it is statcd: “!n lcgal mattcrs thc pcrsonncl ol thc lorcc is undcr thc jurisdiction
ol Finnish military law and can bc tricd only by Finnish military courts.” Lcttcr
datcd ac March .o6· lrom thc Rcprcscntativc ol Swcdcn to thc Chairman ol thc
Spccial Committcc on PcaccKccping Òpcrations, UN Ðoc. A/AC..a./.. (.o6·) !n
thc cncloscd Mcmorandum conccrning thc Swcdish standby Forcc lor scrvicc with
thc Unitcd Nations it is statcd: “!n agrccmcnt with thc Unitcd Nations it has bccn
cstablishcd that mcmbcrs ol thc Forcc arc subjcct to thc jurisdiction ol Swcdcn in
rcspcct ol criminal offcnccs.”
.o6 Chapter 4
in pcacc opcrations, cithcr as host statcs or contributing statcs, support this posi
tion.
8othc and Ðorschcl bclicvc, howcvcr, that thc possiblc customary law status
ol SÒFA norms is part ol anothcr issuc. Can a largcly unilorm practicc ol bilat
cral agrccmcnts bc rcgardcd as cvidcncc ol customary law and thcrcby includc
clcmcnts ol both practicc and opinio juris:
:±·
Tcy find it difficult to rcgard thc
unilorm practicc, illustratcd by thc UN Modcl SÒFA, “as prool ol customary
intcrnational law”. Tcy do, howcvcr, offcr anothcr way ol rcasoning as to thc
rclcvancc ol carlicr practicc in situations in which no SÒFA has bccn concludcd.
Tc agrccmcnt to host a pcacc opcration may bc intcrprctcd to also includc thc
practicc ol SÒFAs. !n particular, that could bc thc casc il thc SccrctaryGcncral
in his rcports, prcccding thc cstablishmcnt ol thc opcration, rclcrrcd to this prac
ticc. !n that casc, it is “quitc obvious that conscnt ol thc host statc latcr rclcrring to
thc rcsolution also covcrs this practicc as lormulatcd in thc modcl agrccmcnt.”
:±8

!n a statc’s acccpting thc dcploymcnt ol a pcacc opcration on its tcrritory, it
may ccrtainly bc argucd that that statc has also acccptcd thc customary conccpt
ol pcacc opcrations. !t must bc bcyond doubt that such lundamcntal qucstions as
thc rctcntion ol thc homc statc ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction and lrccdom ol
movcmcnt, lorm part ol that conccpt.
:±o
Tis conccpt has dcvclopcd in practicc
and is prcmiscd on somc lundamcntal norms. Tc lact that military contingcnts
may carry arms, wcar unilorms and usc lorcc in sclldclcncc, is ncccssary lor
thc lulfilmcnt ol thc opcration’s lunctions. A practicc ol ·c ycars ol concluding
SÒFAs, primarily bctwccn thc UN and thc host nations conccrncd, has naturally
contributcd to thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc conccpt and should now bc rcgardcd as
bcing part and parccl ol thc modcrn pcacc opcration. Tc rcason why it somc
timcs takcs a considcrablc timc to concludc a SÒFA docs not sccm to dcpcnd
upon divcrging opinions on thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in thc particular opcra
tion.
:¡o
Tc lact that a pcacc opcration nccds to bc ablc to run its communications
.¡· 8othc and Ðorschcl, ¡o.¡o¡.
.¡· !bid.
.¡o 8owctt argucs in a similar way on thc carrying ol arms. !t must prima lacic bc
dccmcd that thc host statc has “agrccd to thc carriagc ol arms and thc wcaring ol
military unilorms whcn it conscnts to thc prcscncc ol a military lorcc.” 8owctt, ¡¡·.
8ascd on thc Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral in .o··, in which thc importancc ol
ccrtain basic principlcs to bc rccogniscd in luturc opcrations, wcrc strcsscd, 8owctt
also finds that “|t|wo ol thosc principlcs havc bccn cstablishcd in all thc SÒFA: lrcc
dom ol movcmcnt and lull immunity lrom thc cxcrcisc ol local criminal jurisdiction.
Tcsc arc, howcvcr, mcrcly two aspccts, admittcdly ol thc grcatcst importancc, ol thc
indcpcndcnt status ol thc Forcc and flow, thc SccrctaryGcncral would arguc, lrom
thc ncccssity lor thc indcpcndcnt lunctioning ol thc Forcc.” !bid., ¡.¡.
.·c According to a rcprcscntativc lrom thc Òfficc ol Lcgal Affairs, addrcssing thc
Sccond Mccting with thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Application ol thc
Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl (acc.), it is
a scrious problcm that it takcs a long timc to concludc a SÒFA. A standard agrcc
.o· Special protection
systcm, rcquircs a rclaxation in visa rcquircmcnts, rcquircs lunctional immunity
lrom thc jurisdiction ol thc host statc as wcll as lrccdom ol movcmcnt and thc
scnding statcs’ rctcntion ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr thcir military con
tingcnts, should comc as no surprisc lor luturc host statcs. 8y conscnting to a
pcacc opcration, such statcs arguably also acccpt thc cstablishcd conccpt ol pcacc
opcrations.
:¡+
Host nation conscnt is rcally thc kcy to pcacc opcrations. Vhilc it
is lcgally possiblc to launch a pcacc opcration against thc will ol a “host” statc this
has, lor good rcasons, bccn avoidcd in practicc.
:¡:

!t is truc that pcacc opcrations arc broadcr than thc traditional conccpt ol
pcacckccping. Howcvcr, as pcacckccping has cvolvcd thc SÒFA norms havc,
with small variations, bccn kcpt. !n thc casc ol thc UN onc has sccn thc inclusion
ol additional provisions clarilying thc dutics on thc part ol thc UN and thc host
nation. Tcsc provisions havc dctailcd thc rcsponsibility ol thc UN to rcspcct
intcrnational humanitarian law. Tcrc arc now provisions (lor limitcd privilcgcs
and immunitics) lor intcrnational contractors and Unitcd Nations \oluntccrs
that havc bccn triggcrcd by thc incrcasing dcpcndcncy ol thc UN on such pcr
sonncl. From thc pcrspcctivc ol protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations, thc
most important addition rclatcs to provisions cmphasising thc duty ol prosccut
ing pcrsons committing crimcs against pcrsonncl. Tc inclusion ol thc Salcty
Convcntion’s kcy provisions in somc modcrn SÒFAs has shown cvidcncc ol thc
commitmcnt to cnding impunity lor attacks on protcctcd pcrsonncl and thc ncw
rolc lor thc Salcty Convcntion. From a lcgal point ol vicw thc inclusion ol thcsc
kcy provisions may not ncccssarily strcngthcn thc lcvcls ol protcction ol pcrson
ncl in rclation to alrcady cstablishcd SÒFA norms. !t will, howcvcr, put addi
mcnt is submittcd to thc host nation. Tc main problcm ol why it takcs timc is thc
cxcmption ol dutics (taxcs, customs) ol contractors pcrlorming tasks lor thc UN
sincc it affccts rcvcnuc. !n opcrations whcrc it has not bccn possiblc to concludc a
SÒFA (which prior to .o·o includc UN¡F !!, UNÐÒF, UN!F!L) thc rcason was
not conflicting opinions on thc status ol thc Forcc but rathcr political diffcrcnccs.
Sickmann, National Contingents, .·.. Scc also on thc difficultics ol rcaching a SÒFA
in thc UN¡F !! opcration, and thc lact that !sracl and ¡gypt agrccd that thc UN¡F
! SÒFA would apply mutatis mutandis in thc UN¡F !! opcration. N.A. ¡laraby, UN
Pcacckccping: Tc ¡gyptian ¡xpcricncc, in Peacekeeping. Appraisals and Proposals, 6·,
·.·a (H. Viscman, cd., .o·.), M. Comay, Tc !sracli ¡xpcricncc, in Peacekeeping.
Appraisals and Proposals, o., .co..c (H. Viscman, cd., .o·.).
.·. !t has bccn claimcd, howcvcr, that onc ol thc rcasons why thc Fcdcral Rcpublic ol
Yugoslavia did not acccpt thc Rambouillct Accords was thc cxtcnsivc privilcgcs ol
thc !mplcmcntation Forcc undcr thc Appcndix on thc Status ol MultiNational
Military !mplcmcntation Forcc, which was largcly bascd upon thc military Anncx
to thc Ðayton Agrccmcnt. Scc Marc Vcllcr, Te Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. From the
Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities. International
Documents & Analysis \ol.., ¡.. and ¡6· (.ooo).
.·a Ònc may assumc that a statc rclusing a pcacc opcration on its tcrritory would usc
lorcc to prcvcnt thc dcploymcnt ol lorcign lorccs, thus prompting thc rulcs ol war.
.o· Chapter 4
tional political prcssurc on thc host statc to cnhancc its cfforts to prcvcnt and
punish pcrpctrators ol attacks on pcrsonncl.
Tc lact that thc UN Modcl SÒFA norms arc now an csscntial part ol thc
pcacc opcration conccpt and is applicablc to thc opcration and its pcrsonncl upon
thc conscnt ol thc host nation, is supportcd by thc practicc ol thc UN Sccurity
Council. !t is possiblc to dctcct a shilt in thc practicc ol thc Sccurity Council
whcn adopting rcsolutions cnabling a ncw pcacc opcration. !n pcacc opcrations
launchcd in acc. and altcr, thc Council, with small variations, includcd in thc
cnabling rcsolution, illustratcd by thc mandatc ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission in
Libcria (UNM!L), a tcxt ol thc lollowing charactcr:
Requests thc Libcrian Govcrnmcnt to concludc a statusollorcc agrccmcnt
with thc SccrctaryGcncral within .c days ol adoption ol this rcsolution, and
notcs that pcnding thc conclusion ol such an agrccmcnt thc modcl statusol
lorcc agrccmcnt datcd o Òctobcr .ooc (A/¡·/·o¡) shall apply provisionally,
:¡:

!n UN opcrations it appcars that thc Sccurity Council considcrs thc provisional
application ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA to bc a mattcr ol law. !n opcrations ol
an carlicr datc thc Council instcad adoptcd thc lollowing passagc, hcrc illus
tratcd in thc rcsolution cnabling thc Unitcd Nations Mission in Sicrra Lconc
(UNAMS!L):
Rcqucsts thc Govcrnmcnt ol Sicrra Lconc to concludc a statusollorccs
agrccmcnt with thc SccrctaryGcncral within .c days ol thc adoption ol this
rcsolution, and rccalls that pcnding thc conclusion ol such an agrccmcnt thc
modcl statusollorccs agrccmcnt datcd o Òctobcr .ooc (A/¡·/·o¡) should
apply provisionally,
:¡±
Tc changc in languagc lrom “should apply” to “shall apply” indicatcs that thc
Sccurity Council now considcrs thc provisional application ol thc UN Modcl
SÒFA a lex lata obligation ol host statcs during thc ncgotiations ol an individ
ual SÒFA. Tc tcrm “should” carrics with it thc suggcstion that thc UN Modcl
.·. SC Rcs. .·co, UN SCÒR, ¡·.c
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·co (acc.). Scc also Unitcd
Nations Òpcration in 8urundi (UNU8), SC Rcs. .·¡·, UN SCÒR, ¡o··
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/
R¡S/.·¡· (acc¡), Unitcd Nations Òpcration in Côtc d’!voirc (ÒNÒC!).
SC Rcs. .·a·, UN SCÒR, ¡o.·
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·a· (acc¡), Unitcd Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (M!NUSTAH), SC Rcs. .·¡a, UN SCÒR, ¡o.·
th

mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.·¡a (acc¡).
.·¡ SC Rcs. .a·c, UN SCÒR, ¡c·¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.a·c (.ooo). Scc also
Unitcd Nations Òrganization Mission in thc Ðcmocratic Rcpublic ol thc Congo
(MÒNUC) SC Rcs. .ao., UN SCÒR, ¡.c¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/.ao. (accc),
Unitcd Nations Mission in ¡thiopia and ¡ritrca (UNM¡¡), SC Rcs. ..ac, UN
SCÒR, ¡.o·
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/..ac (accc).
.oo Special protection
SÒFA ought to bc applicablc, whilc thc tcrm “shall” is indicativc ol a strong asscr
tion or command (rathcr than a wish) that it is applicablc.
:¡¡

Vhilc thc UN Modcl SÒFA is arguably part ol thc wholc conccpt ol UN
pcacc opcrations, can thc samc bc said to bc truc with rcgard to thosc opcrations
lcd by rcgional organisations and othcr allianccs: Tc practicc ol such opcra
tions show a sct ol norms common to almost all ol thcm, dcpcnding on whcthcr
thc pcrsonncl in qucstion rcprcscnt thcir statcs or an intcrnational organisation.
Vhilc thc argumcnt might bc lcss pcrsuasivc in such opcrations, thcrc is a casc
lor asscrting that in opcrations bascd upon a mandatc ol thc Sccurity Council,
lundamcntal norms such as thc right to sct up a communications systcm, lrcc
dom ol movcmcnt, and thc rctcntion ol cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction by scnding
statcs ovcr thcir military contingcnts, lorm part ol thc pcacc opcration conccpt.
!n such pcacc opcrations thc rclationship bctwccn participating statcs and
thc host nation should bc notcd. Tis may not bc a problcm in opcrations whcrc
thcrc is a SÒFA in lorcc. Tc status ol thc mcmbcrs ol thc opcration is thcn stip
ulatcd in that agrccmcnt. !l no SÒFA is concludcd thc qucstion may arisc ovcr
which cntity thc pcrsonncl in qucstion rcprcscnt. !n cascs whcrc thc command
and control structurcs arc ol such a charactcr that participating statcs rctain com
mand and control ovcr thcir own lorccs, thc pcrsonncl may bc rcgardcd as rcp
rcscnting thcir statcs. !n, lor cxamplc, thc two opcrations in Lcbanon and Haiti,
a Multinational Forcc was cstablishcd whcrc thc national contingcnts cxcrciscd
cxclusivc command authority ovcr thcir lorccs.
Altcr thc massacrcs ol Palcstinian civilians in thc rclugcc camps at Sabra
and Shatila, thc Sccurity Council on .o Scptcmbcr .o·a rcqucstcd thc Sccrctary
Gcncral to start consultations on thc possibility ol dcploying UN lorccs to assist
thc Lcbancsc govcrnmcnt “in cnsuring lull protcction lor thc civilian population
in and around 8cirut …”
:¡6
Tc lollowing day thc pcrmancnt Rcprcscntativc ol
Lcbanon inlormcd thc SccrctaryGcncral that hc had rcqucstcd thc rcconsti
tution ol thc Multinational Forcc that had bccn opcrating in Lcbanon during
August.
:¡·
Tc cstablishmcnt ol a UN lorcc would havc ncccssitatcd lcngthy
ncgotiations and it is apparcnt that thc MNF was rccrcatcd bccausc ol thc nccd
lor spccdy action. Tc Multinational Forcc was clcarly not a traditional pcacc
.·· Flcck and Saallcld notc thc important rolc ol thc Sccurity Council in situations
whcrc no SÒFA can bc concludcd. Tcy suggcst that thc Council in such cascs
“should clarily thc status ol thc pcrsonncl involvcd and should not hcsitatc to takc
appropriatc dccisions”. Flcck and Saallcld, ·¡.
.·6 SC Rcs. ·a., UN SCÒR, a.o6
th
mtg., para. ·, UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·a. (.o·a).
.·· !n .o·a thc Sccurity Council condcmncd thc !sracli invasion ol Lcbanon and
dcmandcd thc withdrawal ol its lorccs. Altcr a USbrokcrcd agrccmcnt, PLÒ and
Syrian lorccs, which had bccn surroundcd in Vcst 8cirut, wcrc ablc to withdraw. A
Multinational Forcc monitorcd thc proccss. Lcttcr datcd ac Scptcmbcr .o·a lrom
thc Pcrmancnt rcprcscntativc ol Lcbanon to thc Unitcd Nations addrcsscd to thc
SccrctaryGcncral, UN Ðoc. S/.·¡c·, Anncx !! (.o·a).
acc Chapter 4
opcration. Tc troopcontributing countrics rctaincd command and control ovcr
thcir own lorccs and assistcd thc lcgitimatc govcrnmcnt to maintain its author
ity in thc capital. Tc Multinational Forcc thus constitutcd an intcrstatc coali
tion whcrc thc pcrsonncl involvcd rcprcscntcd thcir own statcs, but whcrc thc
Multinational Forcc itscll ncvcrthclcss actcd in thc bcst intcrcsts ol thc intcrna
tional community.
Tc troopcontributing statcs cntcrcd into bilatcral agrccmcnts on thc lcgal
status ol thcir lorccs with thc Lcbancsc govcrnmcnt: Tc ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs
bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Lcbanon,
:¡8
as wcll as thosc bctwccn thc UK and
Lcbanon,
:¡o
arc illustrativc cxamplcs ol this practicc.
:6o
Tc US and UK contin
gcnts cnjoycd “thc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd thc administrativc and
tcchnical staff” ol thcir rcspcctivc cmbassics in 8cirut.
Tc MNF did not lormally rcprcscnt thc UN. Tcrc was no cstablishcd
intcrnational organisation such as in thc casc ol thc MFÒ and thc national con
tingcnts cxcrciscd cxclusivc command authority ovcr thcir lorccs.
:6+
Accordingly,
mcmbcrs ol thc Multinational Forcc wcrc not affordcd international privilcgcs
and immunitics. Tc privilcgcs and immunitics accordcd to tcchnical and admin
istrativc staff ol a diplomatic mission arc clcarly ol a diplomatic naturc. Tcchnical
and administrativc staffs cnjoy thosc privilcgcs and immunitics stipulatcd in
Articlcs ao.· ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
:6:

!n .oo¡ thc Sccurity Council authoriscd thc cstablishmcnt ol a Multinational
Forcc undcr unificd command and control to apply all mcans ncccssary to sccurc
thc dcparturc ol thc military lcadcrship ol Haiti and thc rcinstatcmcnt ol thc
duly clcctcd prcsidcnt.
:6:
Tc USlcd Multinational Forcc was an intcrim lorcc
lormcd to crcatc a stablc and sccurc cnvironmcnt lor thc dcploymcnt ol thc UN
Mission in Haiti.
.·· ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs bctwccn thc Rcpublic ol Lcbanon and thc Unitcd Statcs ol
Amcrica, a· Scptcmbcr .o·a, Ðcpartmcnt ol Statcs 8ullctin, No. ac6·, ·c (.o·a,)
(Sickmann, Basic Documents, ..c).
.·o ¡xchangc ol Notcs bctwccn thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Unitcd Kingdom ol Grcat 8ritain
and Northcrn !rcland and thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Lcbancsc Rcpublic conccrning
thc dcploymcnt ol a 8ritish contingcnt lor thc Multinational Forcc in Lcbanon, ..
]anuary .o·., UK Trcaty Scrics, No. o (.o·.). (Sickmann, Basic Documents, ...).
.6c Apart lrom thcsc statcs !taly and Francc also contributcd troops to thc MNF.
.6. Tc multinational lorccs workcd in closc coopcration with thc Lcbancsc armcd
lorccs. !n lact, at thc rcqucst ol thc Lcbancsc govcrnmcnt, or at thc dccision ol thc
scnding statcs, thc Multinational Forcc would dcpart lrom Lcbancsc tcrritory. Tc
Lcbancsc govcrnmcnt agrccd to takc all ncccssary mcasurcs to cnsurc thc protcction
ol mcmbcrs ol thc multinational lorcc and to sccurc assuranccs lrom thosc armcd
clcmcnts, not undcr thc control ol thc Lcbancsc govcrnmcnt, not to intcrlcrc with
thc lorcc.
.6a Scc Articlc .· (a) ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations. !mmunity
lrom civil and administrativc jurisdiction is, howcvcr, limitcd.
.6. SC Rcs. o¡c, UN SCÒR, .¡..
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/o¡c (.oo¡).
ac. Special protection
Tc lcgal status ol its military pcrsonncl, and thc civilian cmployccs ol thc
Ðcpartmcnt ol Ðclcnsc, was stipulatcd in an ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs bctwccn thc
Unitcd Statcs and thc Haitian Ministry ol Forcign Affairs. Tcy wcrc accordcd
thc samc status as administrativc and tcchnical staff ol thc Unitcd Statcs ¡mbassy
and had thc right to movc lrccly in and around Haiti, with propcr idcntifica
tion.
:6±
As with thc Multinational Forcc in Lcbanon .a ycars carlicr, thc mcmbcrs
ol this lorcc rcprcscntcd thcir statcs, and not an intcrnational organisation, and
wcrc accordingly providcd thc privilcgcs and immunitics similar to thosc ol dip
lomatic pcrsonncl.
Tc customary law that may comc into play in abscncc ol a SÒFA may
thcrclorc, in somc opcrations, bc bascd upon thcir status as statc agcnts rathcr
than agcnts ol an organisation.
:6¡
4.3.5 Conclusions
Tc subjccts that arc dcalt with in a SÒFA rangc lrom thc lundamcntal qucstion ol
thc cxcrcisc ol criminal jurisdiction to rathcr dctailcd financial issucs. Such agrcc
mcnts, howcvcr, play an important part in thc wholc conccpt ol pcacc opcrations.
SÒFAs havc dcvclopcd considcrably sincc ¡gypt, .o·6. Alongsidc othcr lcaturcs,
thcy now lorm a major part ol pcacc opcrations. Tc vcry notion ol pcacckccp
ing, as it was thcn callcd and by many still is, was a practical invcntion rcspond
ing to thc nccds ol thc intcrnational community at thc timc. Tc claboration ol
thc norms containcd in thc status agrccmcnt with ¡gypt drcw lrom cstablishcd
lcgal lramcworks, such as thc Gcncral Convcntion and thc law ol visiting lorccs,
and wcrc adaptcd to thc particular nccds ol thc spccific contcxt. A SÒFA has bccn
concludcd in almost all pcacc opcrations bctwccn thc UN and host nations. Vith
minor changcs and additions thc contcnt ol thcsc SÒFAs has bccn virtually uni
lorm. For military pcrsonncl (part ol military contingcnts) SÒFAs arc ol particular
importancc. Tcy do not bcncfit lrom a spccial protcction providcd by othcr lcgal
instrumcnts as do othcr catcgorics ol pcrsonncl. Tc conclusion ol SÒFAs mcans
that it is now also possiblc to includc othcr catcgorics ol pcrsonncl who othcrwisc
would not bc cntitlcd to spccial protcction, such as civilian contractors.
!t is intcrcsting to notc how SÒFAs havc bccn dcvclopcd and adaptcd to
ncw situations. Tc SccrctaryGcncral’s vicw is that thc UN Modcl SÒFA shall
continuc to scrvc as a basic lramcwork with thc option ol adding ncw provisions
.6¡ ¡xchangc ol Lcttcrs bctwccn thc Ministry ol Forcign Affairs and Vorship and thc
¡mbassy ol thc Unitcd Statcs ol Amcrica .c.. May, .oo·, in Glcnn 8owcns, Legal
Guide to Peace Operations, .·. (.oo·). Scc also Rogcrs, ·¡..
.6· 8othc rcgards thc lorccs in thc lollowing opcrations to bc organs ol thc partici
pating statcs: NATÒ statcs supporting UNPRÒFÒR in lormcr Yugoslavia .ooa·,
UN!TAF in Somalia, Òpération turquoisc in Rwanda, thc MNF in Haiti, !FÒR/
SFÒR, Òpcration Alba in Albania, KFÒR, and !NT¡RF¡T in ¡ast Timor. 8othc,
Pcacckccping, 6oo.
aca Chapter 4
as and whcn nccdcd and so acccptcd by host nations.
:66
8y taking a acc. SÒFA
as an cxamplc, it is possiblc to idcntily somc ol thc dcvclopmcnts that havc bccn
important lor thc protcction ol pcrsonncl in pcacc opcrations sincc .ooc. A con
tcmporary SÒFA might, lor cxamplc, contain thc lollowing dcvclopmcnts: thc
inclusion ol contractors, UN \oluntccrs and UN Sccurity Òfficcrs, rclcrcncc to
thc principlcs and rulcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law and a scction on salcty
and sccurity ol pcrsonncl, including kcy provisions ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
:6·

As has bccn shown abovc, contcmporary SÒFAs in UN pcacc opcrations incor
poratc thc UN Modcl SÒFA norms with somc changcs and additions. !t is, how
cvcr, possiblc that morc rcccnt dcvclopmcnts, such as thc inclusion ol contractors,
may not yct bc rcgardcd as cstablishcd practicc.
!t is not surprising that thc practicc ol disparatc organisations and constclla
tions shows somc dcgrcc ol incompatibility. !t is instcad surprising how cohcsivc
thcsc status agrccmcnts arc. Tc rcluctancc ol contributing statcs to surrcndcr lull
control ovcr thcir military lorccs is wcll illustratcd by thc abovc status arrangc
mcnts. !n onc way or anothcr, contributing statcs rctain jurisdiction ovcr thcir
military lorccs whcn thcy arc dcploycd in an opcrational contcxt. Tc impor
tancc ol thc contcxt in which military pcrsonncl arc rcquircd to act is particularly
cmphasiscd in opcrations commandcd by NATÒ. !t would havc bccn natural lor
that organisation to rcly on thc norms ol thc NATÒ SÒFA (.o·.) in such opcra
tions as thcsc havc provcd to bc lunctional ovcr thc past ·c ycars. !t is apparcnt,
howcvcr, that thc traditional law ol visiting lorccs is insufficicnt lor thc nccds ol
a pcacc opcration. Tc most obvious diffcrcncc bctwccn thc two scts ol norms
rclatcs to thc cxcrcisc ol criminal jurisdiction ovcr military lorccs.
!n somc ol thc opcrations mcntioncd abovc, command was not vcstcd in an
intcrnational organisation but with statcs. Accordingly, thc pcrsonncl conccrncd
bcncfitcd lrom norms pcrtaining to diplomatic immunity. !n thc casc ol coali
tions ol thc willing, such as thc multinational lorccs in 8cirut in .o·a and Haiti in
.oo¡, thc pcrsonncl conccrncd wcrc accordcd a status similar to that ol tcchnical
and administrativc pcrsonncl.
:68
!n thc casc ol thc ¡U, pcrsonncl wcrc accordcd
a status cquivalcnt to that ol diplomatic agcnts. 8y drawing up a bilatcral agrcc
mcnt it is up to thc partics to agrcc on its contcnt. !t should thcrclorc havc bccn
possiblc, and cvcn advisablc, to basc thc agrccmcnt upon thc status ol thc lorcc on
thc UN Modcl SÒFA. !l thc diplomatic agcnt solution was bornc out ol conccrn
ovcr complctc immunity lrom criminal jurisdiction in thc host nation, this has
bccn propcrly rcsolvcd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA. To providc military pcrsonncl
with thc status ol diplomatic agcnts mixcs thc lunctions ol thcsc two catcgorics
ol pcrsonncl. Against thc backdrop ol thc lunctional ncccssity doctrinc, thc mix
.66 !mplcmcntation ol thc rccommcndations ol thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping
Òpcrations. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, para. ·c, UN Ðoc. A/·¡/6·c (accc).
.6· Scc c.g. thc UNM!S¡T SÒFA.
.6· Scc Articlcs ao.· ol thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Rclations.
ac. Special protection
ol lunctions could lcad to thc crosion ol lundamcntal and wcllcstablishcd norms
protccting pcrsonncl on intcrnational assignmcnts.
:6o
Tc practicc ol concluding a SÒFA in pcacc opcrations is thus wcll cstab
lishcd in thosc lcd by thc UN and by othcr constcllations. A SÒFA is, or at lcast
has thc possibility ol bcing, adaptcd to thc nccds ol particular opcrations. 8ut
instcad ol a linc ol disparatc ad hoc solutions, common norms havc dcvclopcd
ovcr thc past ·c ycars. Tc norms arising lrom this practicc may now bc rcgardcd
as lorming an intcgral part ol thc conccpt ol pcacc opcrations. Although thc
practicc altcr .ooc has not bccn pcrlcctly unilorm, norms dcaling with thc pro
tcction ol pcrsonncl appcar to havc bccn applicd morc or lcss consistcntly.
Òn thc qucstion ol immunity and accountability it should bc notcd that thc
“SÒFAarrangcmcnt” in Kosovo was criticiscd by thc Òmbudspcrson !nstitution
in Kosovo. Among othcr things, it lound that thc UNM!K Rcgulation did
not comply with thc critcria ol prccision and lorcsccability as rcquircd by thc
¡uropcan Convcntion on Human Rights. According to thc Òmbudspcrson, thc
rationalc lor thc granting ol immunity did not apply in Kosovo whcrc UNM!K
cxcrciscd statc lunctions. Accordingly, “|i|t lollows that thc undcrlying purposc
ol a grant ol immunity docs not apply as thcrc is no nccd lor a govcrnmcnt to bc
protcctcd against itscll.”
:·o
!t was, morcovcr, statcd that “thc wholcsalc rcmoval ol
a largc group ol govcrnmcntal agcnts, in this casc intcrnational KFÒR pcrsonncl,
lrom thc jurisdiction ol thc courts ol thc tcrritory within which thcy arc opcrat
ing undcr colour ol law constitutcs a violation ol thc right ol acccss to court guar
antccd undcr Articlc 6 ol thc ¡uropcan Convcntion ol Human Rights.”
:·+
Tc rcport by thc Òmbudspcrson !nstitution highlights thc problcm ol liabil
ity and accountability in pcacc opcrations. Tis is a qucstion bcyond thc scopc ol
this work. Howcvcr, thc usc ol civilian policc in Kosovo and ¡ast Timor with a
mandatc to carry out cxccutivc tasks has cmphasiscd thc conncction bctwccn lia
bility and immunity. 8ccausc ol thc possiblc ncccssity to usc cnlorccmcnt mcasurcs
to implcmcnt thc rcquircmcnts ol thc law, thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping
.6o !t should bc notcd, howcvcr, sincc May acc· thcrc is a Ðralt Modcl Agrccmcnt
on thc status ol ¡uropcan Unionlcd Forccs bctwccn thc ¡uropcan Union and a
Host Statc. !n that agrccmcnt thcrc is no rclcrcncc to thc \icnna Convcntion on
Ðiplomatic Rclations and thc ¡U pcrsonncl shall bc grantcd thosc privilcgcs and
immunitics providcd lor in thc agrccmcnt.
.·c Òmbudspcrson !nstitution in Kosovo. Spccial Rcport No. . on thc compatibility
with rccognizcd intcrnational standards ol UNM!K Rcgulation No. accc/¡· on thc
Status, Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol KFÒR and UNM!K and Tcir Pcrsonncl in
Kosovo (.· August accc) and on thc implcmcntation ol thc abovc Rcgulation, para.
a.. http://www.ombudspcrsonkosovo.org/.
.·. !bid., para. 6·.
ac¡ Chapter 4
Òpcrations rcqucstcd thc Sccrctariat to “considcr assigning such pcrsonncl privi
lcgcs and immunitics cquivalcnt to thosc ol armcd military pcrsonncl.”
:·:

Tat suggcstion appcarcd to havc bccn promptcd by thc lact that thc
SccrctaryGcncral had waivcd thc immunity ol a civil policc officcr scrving with
UNM!K. Tc lact that somc statcs, in accordancc with thcir national laws, do
not havc thc authority to try individuals lor crimcs committcd abroad, was onc
rcason put lorward by statcs objccting to this proposal. Tc ovcrriding rationalc,
howcvcr, against such a suggcstion, sccms to bc that policc officcrs should not bc
pcrccivcd as bcing abovc thc law.
!t is truc that qucstions ol liability arc morc acutc in situations whcrc thcrc
is no lunctioning host nation cxcrcising govcrnmcntal authority. Howcvcr, cvcn
in opcrations such as thc onc in 8osniaHcrzcgovina whcrc thcrc is an cxisting
govcrnmcnt, ¡UFÒR has thc authority to cxcrcisc govcrnmcntal lunctions in
thcir rclations with thc local population. Tc difficultics outlincd in thc Rcport
by thc Òmbudspcrson !nstitution also apply to a ccrtain cxtcnt to that opcration.
Tc widc cxccutivc powcrs vcstcd in pcacc opcration pcrsonncl thcrclorc cntail a
corrcsponding rcsponsibility in thc cxccution ol thcir mandatcd dutics.
.·a Comprchcnsivc rcvicw ol thc wholc qucstion ol pcacckccping opcrations in all thcir
aspccts. Rcport ol thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping Òpcrations, para. ..a UN
Ðoc. A/··/·6· (acc.), Rcport ol thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping Òpcrations
and its Vorking Group at thc acc¡ substantivc scssion, para. ..¡, UN Ðoc. A/··/.o
(acc¡), Rcport ol thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping Òpcrations and its
Vorking Group at thc acc· substantivc scssion, para. ·., UN Ðoc. A/·o/.o (acc·).
Chapter 5
Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl
..r Introduction
!n thc carly .oocs thc Unitcd Nations bccamc involvcd in various opcrations whcrc
its participating pcrsonncl wcrc cndangcrcd. !n thc Unitcd Nations Òpcration in
Somalia (UNÒSÒM !!!), as with thc Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc in thc
lormcr Yugoslavia (UNPRÒFÒR), dclibcratc attacks on its pcrsonncl pointcd
to a growing lack ol rcspcct both lor thc UN and thosc involvcd in its opcra
tions. !n such volatilc and violcnt cnvironmcnts, against which UN and othcr
pcrsonncl constantly strugglcd, it soon bccamc clcar that thc issucs ol salcty and
sccurity wcrc paramount. A growing numbcr ol nations, not only thosc that rcgu
larly contributcd troops to UN opcrations, wcrc bccoming particularly intcrcstcd.
Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl ol
.oo¡ (thc Salcty Convcntion) should thcrclorc bc rcgardcd as a rcsponsc by thc
intcrnational community to thc pcrsistcnt and growing numbcr ol attacks on
pcoplc participating in UN opcrations. Tc convcntion was concludcd in a nota
bly short timc. Lcss than .· months altcr thc itcm had bccn assigncd to thc Sixth
Committcc, thc convcntion was adoptcd without a votc.
+
Tc spccd with which it
was possiblc to rcach conscnsus on thc contcnt ol a ncw intcrnational instrumcnt
points to a common undcrstanding that pcrsonncl in UN pcacc opcrations wcrc
in nccd ol a strcngthcncd lcvcl ol protcction. Howcvcr, thc wcakncsscs ol thc
Salcty Convcntion, which inter alia havc triggcrcd thc crcation ol an Òptional
Protocol, could possibly, at lcast to somc cxtcnt, bc cxplaincd by thc swilt con
clusion ol thc convcntion. !t is thcrclorc ol particular intcrcst to summarisc thc
proccss that lcd to thc adoption ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
..a Process Ieading to the Adoption of the Safety Convention
!n Ðcccmbcr .ooa thc Gcncral Asscmbly adoptcd Rcsolution ¡·/·a cntitlcd
Protection of peace-keeping personnel.
:
Tis notcd, and commcntcd upon, thc
. GA Rcs. ¡o/·o Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ¡o
th
Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/¡o/·o (.oo¡).
a GA Rcs. ¡·/·a, Protcction ol pcacckccping pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ¡·
th
Scss., UN
Ðoc. A/R¡S/¡·/·a (.ooa).
ac6 Chapter 5
rcsponsibility ol govcrnmcnts in host countrics lor thc salcty ol pcacckccping
and othcr pcrsonncl.
:
Tc Sccurity Council was rccommcndcd, in appropriatc
cascs, to makc clcar to thc rclcvant partics that it was prcparcd to takc lurthcr
stcps il UN pcrsonncl wcrc subjcctcd to dclibcratc attacks affccting thc purposc
ol opcrations.
±
Òn .. March .oo. thc Prcsidcnt ol thc Sccurity Council madc a statcmcnt,
pursuant to thc SccrctaryGcncral’s landmark rcport An Agenda for Peace, which
madc spccific rclcrcncc to thc salcty ol UN lorccs and rclatcd pcrsonncl dcploycd
in conditions ol strilc.
¡
Spcaking on bchall ol thc Sccurity Council, thc Prcsidcnt
rccogniscd that thc dcploymcnt ol such pcoplc, in situations ol rcal dangcr, was
bccoming incrcasingly ncccssary in ordcr to undcrtakc its rcsponsibility lor thc
maintcnancc ol intcrnational pcacc and sccurity.
6
Tc Sccurity Council dcmandcd
that statcs should takc cffcctivc mcasurcs to dctcr, prosccutc and punish all thosc
rcsponsiblc lor any such acts ol violcncc.
·
Tc Council, howcvcr, notcd that par
ticular difficultics cxistcd whcrc UN lorccs and pcrsonncl wcrc dcploycd within
statcs whcrc thc authoritics wcrc unablc or unwilling to cxcrcisc jurisdiction in
this rcgard. Tc SccrctaryGcncral was rcqucstcd to rcport on cxisting arrangc
mcnts lor thc protcction ol UN pcacckccpcrs and rclatcd pcrsonncl and to makc
rccommcndations lor cnhancing thcir salcty and sccurity.
Ncw Zcaland actcd upon thc invitation to assist thc SccrctaryGcncral in
making thosc rccommcndations, as rcqucstcd by thc Sccurity Council. !t dcliv
crcd a comprchcnsivc rcport on thc cxisting sccurity arrangcmcnts. !t containcd
a proposal to dcvclop, among othcr things, a convcntion that would not only
codily but also dcvclop intcrnational law with rcgard to thc protcction and salcty
ol UN pcrsonncl.
8

Ðuring thc ¡·
th
Scssion, thc Spccial Committcc on Pcacckccping Òpcrations
dcbatcd thc qucstion ol incrcasing salcty mcasurcs and cnhancing and dcfin
. Tcsc obscrvations on salcty lollowcd gravc conccrns ovcr thc incrcasc in dclibcratc
attacks which had rcsultcd in a growing numbcr ol casualtics. Tc Gcncral Asscmbly
lurthcrmorc cmphasiscd thc nccd lor a swilt conclusion ol a statusollorccsagrcc
mcnt with all partics conccrncd in ordcr to strcss thc intcrnational status ol UN
opcrations and thc obligations ol partics, in accordancc with thc Convcntion on thc
Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations. !bid., para. ·.
¡ !bid., para. ·.
· Notc by thc Prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Nations Sccurity Council, .. March .oo., UN
Ðoc. S/a·¡o..
6 !bid., para .. Tc Sccurity Council, morcovcr considcrcd that acts ol violcncc,
whcthcr actual or thrcatcncd, against UN lorccs and pcrsonncl wcrc wholly unac
ccptablc and “lurthcr mcasurcs” might bc rcquircd to cnsurc thcir salcty and sccurity.
!bid., para. ·.
· !bid., para. 6.
· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Comprchcnsivc Rcvicw ol thc Vholc Òucstion
ol Pcacckccping Òpcrations in All thcir Aspccts, UN Ðoc. A/AC..a./¡c/Add.a
(.oo.).
ac· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
ing thc rolc ol thc UN.
o
!t was thc committcc’s vicw that a ncw lcgally binding
rcgimc on thc status and salcty ol UN pcrsonncl should bc dcvclopcd. !t was
rcqucstcd that thc Gcncral Asscmbly should considcr thc appropriatc lorum lor
such a proccss to bc implcmcntcd.
+o
!n ]unc, .oo., lollowing thc attacks on thc Pakistan contingcnt ol UN lorccs
in Somalia, lcaving a¡ soldicrs dcad and ·6 woundcd,
++
thc Sccurity Council
adoptcd Rcsolution ·.·. Tc Sccurity Council rcaffirmcd thc authorisation to
“takc all ncccssary mcasurcs” against thosc cngagcd in prcvcnting UNÒSÒM !!
lrom carrying out its mandatc. Tcsc mcasurcs includcd thc “arrcst and dctcntion
lor prosccution, trial and punishmcnt” ol thosc rcsponsiblc lor thc outragc.
+:

!n ]unc, .oo., Ncw Zcaland madc a rcqucst lor thc inclusion ol an itcm
cntitlcd Question of Responsibility for Attacks on United Nations and Associated
Personnel and Measures to Ensure that Tose Responsible for such Attacks are Brought
to Justice in thc provisional agcnda ol thc ¡·
th
Scssion ol thc Gcncral Asscmbly.
+:

According to Ncw Zcaland, thc rcsponsc ol thc Sccurity Council dcmonstratcd
thc limitation ol thc currcnt systcm to cffcctivcly dctcr, prosccutc and punish
thosc convictcd ol violcncc against UN pcrsonncl.

Tat country lurthcr strcsscd
thc importancc ol individual rcsponsibility and asscrtcd that thc UN should havc
thc cffcctivc mcans ol holding thc pcrpctrators ol an attack pcrsonally rcspon
siblc. !n that rcspcct, thc principlcs and structurcs cstablishcd in thc Gcncva
Convcntions lor thc protcction ol civilians and noncombatants was notcd.
!ntcrnational law protccting UN lorccs and rclcvant pcrsonncl should at lcast
rcach thc lcvcl ol protcction as that affordcd combatants cngagcd in a war. Ncw
Zcaland wcnt on to dcal with thc qucstion ol UN lorccs dcploycd in an arca ol a
o Rcport ol thc Spccial Committcc ol Pcacckccping Òpcrations, Comprchcnsivc
Rcvicw ol thc Vholc Òucstion ol Pcacckccping Òpcrations in All thcir Aspccts,
UN Ðoc. A/¡·/.·. (.oo.).
.c !bid., para. .a..
.. Rcport pursuant to paragraph · ol thc Sccurity Council rcsolution ·.· (.oo.) on thc
invcstigation into thc · ]unc .oo. attack on Unitcd Nations lorccs in Somalia con
ductcd on bchall ol thc SccrctaryGcncral UN Ðoc. S/a6.·. (.oo.), Anncx, Rcport
ol an invcstigation into thc · ]unc .oo. attacks on Unitcd Nations lorccs in Somalia
by Mr. Tom Farcr, para. ..
.a SC Rcs. ·.·, UN SCÒR, .aao
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·.· (.oo.), para. ·. Tc rcsolu
tion was rcmarkablc considcring thc lact that UNÒSÒM !! had no capability what
socvcr ol cffccting thc prosccution ol any allcgcd offcndcrs, lct alonc thcir trial and,
il convictcd, thcir punishmcnt.
.. Lcttcr datcd a¡ ]unc .oo. lrom thc Chargé d’ affaircs a.i. ol thc Pcrmancnt Mission
ol Ncw Zcaland to thc Unitcd Nations addrcsscd to thc SccrctaryGcncral, UN
Ðoc. A/¡·/.¡¡ (.oo.).
.¡ !bid., ¡xplanatory Mcmorandum. !t rclcrrcd to thc SC Rcs ·oa, UN SCÒR, ..¡.rd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·oa (.ooa), SC Rcs ·c¡, UN SCÒR, ..6·th mtg., UN Ðoc.
S/R¡S/·c¡ (.oo.), and SC Rcs. ·.·, UN SCÒR, .aaoth mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·.·
(.oo.).
ac· Chapter 5
nonintcrnational conflict bctwccn a govcrnmcnt and a laction within a statc. !t
rccogniscd that thc currcnt norms ol intcrnational law did not providc adcquatc
protcction sincc cntitics not rcgardcd as statcs could not bc subjcct to thc obliga
tions ol intcrnational law.

!n August, .oo., thc SccrctaryGcncral submittcd his rcport on thc cxisting
sccurity systcm, as wcll as proposals lor its improvcmcnt, pursuant to thc rcqucst
by thc Sccurity Council.
+6
!n his rcvicw ol thc cxisting sccurity systcm, thc
SccrctaryGcncral cmphasiscd that thc host govcrnmcnt had primary rcsponsi
bility lor UN and rclatcd pcrsonncl.


!n his rcport, thc SccrctaryGcncral also considcrcd possibilitics ol enhanc-
ing thc salcty and sccurity ol UN and rclatcd pcrsonncl. As a longtcrm stratcgy,
in ordcr to codily and lurthcr dcvclop intcrnational law, thc dcvclopmcnt ol a
ncw intcrnational instrumcnt could bc dcvclopcd. Such an instrumcnt could also
“consolidatc in a singlc documcnt thc sct ol principlcs and obligations containcd
in currcnt multilatcral and bilatcral trcatics”.
+8
Tc SccrctaryGcncral strcsscd thc
nccd lor thc propcr protcction ol thosc working lor civilian contractors and non
govcrnmcntal organisations (NGÒs).
+o
Tcsc pcoplc arc oltcn cngagcd in UN
opcrations on a contractual or on somc othcr basis. !n thc shorttcrm pcrspcc
tivc, it was hcld that thc Sccurity Council, whcn dcciding upon a ncw opcration,
might considcr making thc dcploymcnt ol luturc opcrations conditional upon
ccrtain critcria with rcgard to salcty and sccurity.
As ol a¡ Scptcmbcr .oo. thc itcm proposcd by Ncw Zcaland in ]unc was allo
catcd to thc agcnda ol thc Sixth Committcc.
:o
Ðuring thc committcc’s work, Ncw
Zcaland submittcd a proposal lor a dralt convcntion on rcsponsibility lor attacks
.· !bid.
.6 Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations opcrations, UN Ðoc.
A/¡·/.¡o – S/a6.·· (.oo.).
.· !bid., para. ¡. Vith rcgard to convcntional intcrnational law, thc SccrctaryGcncral
drcw attcntion to Articlc .c· ol thc Chartcr, and thc Gcncral Convcntion. Tc
SccrctaryGcncral also rclcrrcd to thc modcl statusollorccs agrccmcnt ol .ooc and
hcld that it “cmbodics rclcvant principlcs ol intcrnational law such as thosc providcd
lor in thc Convcntion on thc Privilcgcs and !mmunitics ol thc Unitcd Nations and
thc customary principlcs and practiccs applicablc to Unitcd Nations pcacckccping
opcrations” !bid. para..¡.
.· !bid., para. .¡.
.o Òn NGÒs scc, lor cxamplc, AnnaKarin Lindblom, Te Legal Status of Non-gov-
ernmental organisations in International Law, (acc.) and Francois Hampson,
Nongovcrnmcntal Òrganizations in Situations ol Conflict: Tc Ncgotiation ol
Changc, International Law Studies, ·. Te Law of Armed conflict: Into the Next
Millennium, a.. (Michacl N. Schmitt & Lcslic C. Grccn, cds., .oo·).
ac Sixth Committcc (¡·th Scssion), Lcttcr datcd a¡ Scptcmbcr .oo. lrom thc Prcsidcnt
ol thc Gcncral Asscmbly addrcsscd to thc Chairman ol thc Sixth Committcc, UN
Ðoc. A/C.6/¡·/. (.oo.).
aco Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
on UN pcrsonncl.
:+
Tc dralt was principally modcllcd on thc !PP Convcntion
::

and thc !ntcrnational Convcntion against thc Taking ol Hostagcs (.o·o).
::
!t was
not, howcvcr, intcndcd to duplicatc alrcady cxisting rights and obligations but
rathcr to locus on thc salcty ol UN pcrsonncl in opcrations cstablishcd pursuant to
a dccision lrom thc Sccurity Council. Tc Ncw Zcaland proposal conccntratcd on
thc notion ol individual rcsponsibility lor attacks on UN and associatcd pcrsonncl.
!ts purposc was to cstablish that thosc rcsponsiblc lor attacks on UN pcrsonncl
“commit a crimc punishablc by any country in which thcy may bc lound”.

A wcck latcr thc Ukrainc submittcd a dralt convcntion ol its own, to bc
includcd in thc matcrial ol thc Sixth Committcc. Tis proposal includcd rclcr
cnccs to thc status ol UN and associatcd pcrsonncl, gcncral obligations ol statcs
partics, and provisions conccrning brcachcs ol thc convcntion ol both statcs par
tics and thc UN.


A working group was cstablishcd within thc lramcwork ol thc Sixth
Committcc, and was assigncd thc task ol providing a basis lor luturc work on thc
itcm. !t lound that it was ncccssary to dccidc whcthcr thc cxisting lcgal instru
mcnts providcd adcquatc protcction lor UN and associatcd opcrativcs in thc
incrcasingly dangcrous circumstanccs in which thcy wcrc rcquircd to pcrlorm
thcir dutics and, il not, to find ways ol bridging any gaps in thc intcrnational law
systcm. 8asically, thrcc possibilitics wcrc suggcstcd.
:6
Tc first was a nonbind
ing dcclaration that would havc thc advantagc ol bcing dcvclopcd quickly and
would rcprcscnt a significant gcsturc on bchall ol thc intcrnational community as
wcll as contributing towards thc prcparation ol a binding instrumcnt. Howcvcr,
a numbcr ol dclcgations pointcd to thc difficulty that thosc involvcd in attacks
on UN pcrsonncl had prcviously ignorcd dcclarations, and it would lurthcrmorc
dclay thc claboration ol a binding instrumcnt. Tc sccond suggcstion was to dralt
an additional protocol to thc !PP Convcntion. Vhilc this idca was lound to bc
intcrcsting and showcd a ccrtain amount ol mcrit, it lailcd in thc cnd to gct thc
support ol thc working group. Tis was largcly duc to thc lact that an additional
a. Sixth Committcc (¡·th Scssion), Proposal lor a dralt convcntion on rcsponsibility
lor attacks on Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡·/L.a (.oo.).
aa Convcntion on thc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt ol Crimcs against !ntcrnationally
Protcctcd Pcrsonncl including Ðiplomatic Agcnts, .¡ Ðcccmbcr .o·., .c.· UNTS
.6·.
a. !ntcrnational Convcntion against thc Taking ol Hostagcs, .· Ðcccmbcr .o·o, ...6
UNTS ac6.
a¡ Sixth Committcc (¡·th Scssion), Proposal lor a dralt convcntion on rcsponsibility
lor attacks on Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl, para. a, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡·/L.a (.oo.).
a· Sixth Committcc (¡·th Scssion), Lcttcr datcd · Òctobcr .oo. lrom thc Pcrmancnt
Rcprcscntativc ol Ukrainc to thc Unitcd Nations addrcsscd to thc SccrctaryGcncral,
UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡·/L.. (.oo.).
a6 Sixth Committcc (¡·th Scssion), Summary rccord ol thc ao
th
mccting, para. a, UN
Ðoc. A/C.6/¡·/SR.ao (.oo.). To thc lollowing scc paras. a – ¡.
a.c Chapter 5
protocol could bc pcrccivcd as il it did not indicatc cnough thc importancc ol
this issuc to thc intcrnational community, and that statcs not party to thc !PP
Convcntion would bc cxcludcd lrom an additional protocol. Furthcrmorc, it was
not dcsigncd lor thc protcction ol pcacckccping pcrsonncl, and to cxpand thc
scopc ol that convcntion might rcsult in lcgal difficultics. Tc third possibility
was to claboratc a ncw intcrnational instrumcnt. Tc proposals by Ncw Zcaland
and thc Ukrainc, as wcll as a conlcrcncc room papcr submittcd jointly by thosc
two countrics, camc to scrvc as thc starting point lor that work.
Vhilc this is not thc appropriatc point to dcal with all thc rclcvant qucstions
conncctcd to thc claboration ol a ncw binding instrumcnt, thc two basic idcas
that influcnccd thc luturc work ol thc convcntion should bc mcntioncd. Tcrc
was both thc dcsirc to cncompass all pcrsons, irrcspcctivc ol thcir affiliations, who
wcrc working in support ol UN goals, and thc possiblc nccd to limit thc scopc ol a
luturc convcntion to situations somcwhat rclatcd to thc control ol thc UN.


Tc Gcncral Asscmbly dccidcd to cstablish an Ad Hoc Committcc opcn to
all mcmbcr statcs, with thc aim ol claborating an intcrnational convcntion on thc
salcty and sccurity ol UN and associatcd pcrsonncl.
:8
Tc Ad Hoc Committcc
had bclorc it thc joint proposal
:o
submittcd by Ncw Zcaland and thc Ukrainc, a
working documcnt
:o
lrom thc Nordic countrics and a Notc
:+
by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral as wcll as a numbcr ol diffcrcnt proposals submittcd by dclcgations. An
claboratcd tcxt callcd thc “ncgotiating tcxt” was produccd during its first scs
sion.
::
Although thoroughly pcnctratcd in dctailcd discussion, it was not possiblc
a· !bid., para. o.
a· GA Rcs. ¡·/.·, Òucstion ol rcsponsibility lor attacks on Unitcd Nations and asso
ciatcd pcrsonncl and mcasurcs to cnsurc that thosc rcsponsiblc lor such attacks arc
brought to justicc, UN GAÒR ¡·
th
Scss., para. . UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/¡·/.· (.oo.).
ao Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Proposal
by Ncw Zcaland and Ukrainc, UN Ðoc A/AC.a¡a/L.a and Corr. . (.oo¡).
.c Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Vorking
documcnt submittcd by Ðcnmark, Finland, !ccland, Norway and Swcdcn, UN Ðoc.
A/AC.a¡a/L.. (.oo¡).
.. Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Notc by
thc SccrctaryGcncral, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/. (.oo¡).
.a Tc Ad Hoc Committcc hcld two scssions. Tc first was bctwccn a· March and ·
April .oo¡ and thc sccond lrom . to .a August. Tc joint proposal submittcd by Ncw
Zcaland and thc Ukrainc providcd thc basis lor thc committcc’s work, whilc thc
“clcmcnts” ol thc working papcr submittcd by thc Nordic countrics wcrc cxamincd
in conjunction with thc rclcvant articlcs ol thc joint proposal. Ðuring thc cxamina
tion ol thc articlcs, it bccamc clcar that thc most important and most difficult part ol
thc proposcd convcntion was its scopc and dcfinitions. Ad Hoc Committcc on thc
¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity
ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on
a.. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
to includc articlcs on scopc and dcfinition in thc ncgotiating tcxt.
::
Ðuring thc
sccond scssion a “rcviscd ncgotiating tcxt” was lormulatcd.


8ccausc it was not ablc to dcvclop a final tcxt, thc committcc rccommcndcd
to thc Gcncral Asscmbly thc rccstablishmcnt ol a working group within thc
lramcwork ol thc Sixth Committcc to continuc thc work ol thc rcviscd ncgotiat
ing tcxt, lrom which it was ablc to dcvclop a dralt convcntion.

A dralt rcsolu
tion
:6
was proposcd by both Ncw Zcaland and thc Ukrainc cntitlcd Convention
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

Tc Sixth Committcc
thcn rccommcndcd its adoption by thc Gcncral Asscmbly, which did so without
a votc at its ·¡
th
Mccting on o Ðcccmbcr .oo¡.
:8
Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl camc into lorcc on .· ]anuary .ooo in
accordancc with Articlc a· ol thc Convcntion.
:o
thc work carricd out during thc pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. a·, UN
Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a (.oo¡).
.. !bid., paras. a· and .·..
.¡ Vhcn introducing this rcvision thc chairman notcd important diffcrcnccs still
rcmaincd, in particular, bctwccn thc naturc ol thc opcrations and thc catcgorics ol
thc opcrativcs to bc covcrcd by thc convcntion. !t was rccogniscd that thc difficul
tics ol rcaching an agrccmcnt on thc dcfinitions and scopc ol thc proposcd instru
mcnt cxtcndcd to thc rcst ol thc tcxt. Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration
ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd
Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl ..a August, para. a6, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (.oo¡).
.· Sixth Committcc (¡oth Scssion), Rcport ol thc Vorking Group, UN Ðoc. A/
C.6/¡o/L.¡ (.oo¡). Tis was submittcd to thc Sixth Committcc lor considcration
with a vicw to its adoption. Tc Sixth Committcc duly considcrcd thc tcxt at its
ao
th
to .a
nd
and .¡
th
to .·
th
mcctings hcld in Novcmbcr .oo¡. Scc Sixth Committcc
(¡oth Scssion), Summary rccord ol thc ao
th
Mccting, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/SR.ao
(.oo¡), Sixth Committcc (¡oth Scssion), Summary rccord ol thc .c
th
Mccting, UN
Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/SR..c (.oo¡), Sixth Committcc (¡oth Scssion), Summary rccord
ol thc ..
st
Mccting, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/SR... (.oo¡), Sixth Committcc (¡oth
Scssion), Summary rccord ol thc .a
nd
Mccting, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/SR..a (.oo¡),
Sixth Committcc (¡oth Scssion), Summary rccord ol thc .¡
th
Mccting, UN Ðoc. A/
C.6/¡o/SR..¡ (.oo¡), Sixth Committcc (¡oth Scssion), Summary rccord ol thc .·
th

Mccting, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/SR..· (.oo¡).
.6 Sixth Committcc (¡o
th
Scssion), Ðralt rcsolution, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/L.o (.oo¡).
.· Tc dralt rcsolution was sponsorcd by ao statcs and latcr joincd by .. morc. At its .·
th

Mccting thc dralt rcsolution was adoptcd without a votc.
.· GA Rcs. ¡o/·o Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ¡o
th
Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/¡o/·o (.oo¡). !n conncction with
thc adoption ol thc convcntion, cight statcs cxplaincd thcir position on thc rcsolu
tion. Scc UN GAÒR, ¡o
th
Scss., ·¡
th
mtg., UN Ðoc A/¡o/P\.·¡ (.oo¡).
.o Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, o Ðcc. .oo¡,
ac·. UNTS .6.. (·c partics acc6c¡c. according to thc UN Trcaty Scction http://
untrcaty.un.org/¡nglish/trcaty.asp.
a.a Chapter 5
New developments
!n .ooo, cight months altcr thc Salcty Convcntion camc into lorcc, thc Sccrctary
Gcncral suggcstcd, that thc scopc ol application ol thc Salcty Convcntion should
bc cxtcndcd to covcr pcrsonncl not thcn covcrcd by it. A concrctc proposal was
madc lor thc crcation ol an additional protocol to thc Salcty Convcntion.
±o

Somc support was cxprcsscd lor cxtcnding thc scopc ol application ol thc Salcty
Convcntion during dcbatcs in thc Sccurity Council on thc protcction ol civil
ians in armcd conflicts.
±+
8ascd inter alia on discussions in thc Sccurity Council,
thc Gcncral Asscmbly rcqucstcd thc SccrctaryGcncral to submit a rcport on
thc scopc ol lcgal protcction availablc undcr thc Salcty Convcntion.
±:
Tc sub
scqucnt rcport was prcscntcd to thc Gcncral Asscmbly in Novcmbcr, accc.
±:
!n
Ðcccmbcr, thc Gcncral Asscmbly cstablishcd anothcr Ad Hoc Committcc, this
timc to considcr thc rccommcndations ol thc SccrctaryGcncral to strcngthcn
and cnhancc thc protcction availablc undcr thc convcntion.
±±
Tc committcc,
opcn to all UN mcmbcr statcs, convcncd lour timcs, bctwccn acca and acc·.
±¡
!n
Ðcccmbcr acc· an Òptional Protocol was adoptcd.
±6

¡c Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral to thc Sccurity Council on thc Protcction ol
Civilians in Armcd Conflict, para. ¡., UN Ðoc. S/.ooo/o·· (.ooo).
¡. Scc c.g. rcmarks by thc dclcgatc ol Argcntina, UN SCÒR, .o··
th
mtg., aa, UN
Ðoc S/P\..o·· (.ooo). Scc also thc dclcgatc ol Finland, spcaking on bchall ol thc
¡uropcan Union, UN SCÒR, ¡c¡6
th
mtg., ·, UN Ðoc S/P\.¡c¡6 (.ooo), and thc
dclcgatc ol thc Rcpublic ol Korca, UN SCÒR, ¡c¡6
th
mtg. .6, UN Ðoc. S/P\.¡c¡6
(Rcsumption .) (.ooo).
¡a Scc GA Rcs. ·¡/.oa, Salcty and sccurity ol humanitarian pcrsonncl and protcction ol
Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ·¡
th
Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/·¡/.oa (.ooo).
¡. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/··/6.· (accc).
¡¡ GA Rcs. ·6/·o, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ·6
th
Scss., UN Ðoc. A/
R¡S/·6/·o (acc.).
¡· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/··/·a (Supp) (acca), UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc
Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc
Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/··/·a (Supp) (acc.),
UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/·o/·a (Supp) (acc¡), UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad
Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty
ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/6c/·a (Supp) (acc·).
¡6 GA Rcs. 6c/¡a, Òptional Protocol to thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd
Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR, 6c
th
Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/6c/¡a
(acc·).
a.. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
.., Analysis of the Safety Convention
Tc Salcty Convcntion bcgins with rathcr dctailcd dcfinitions ol thc kind ol
pcrsonncl and catcgorics ol opcration that lall within its scopc ol application,
as wcll as its rclationship to intcrnational humanitarian law (Articlcs .a). Tis
is lollowcd by provisions rclating to thc lcgal status ol pcrsonncl and thc duty ol
thc protcctcd pcrsonncl conccrncd to rcspcct local laws and rcgulations (Articlcs
.6). An cxplicit duty ol statcs to cnsurc thc salcty and sccurity ol pcrsonncl and
to rclcasc capturcd pcrsonncl is to bc lound in Articlcs · and ·. Spccific crimcs
committcd against protcctcd pcrsonncl arc stipulatcd in Articlc o, and thc duty
ol mcmbcr statcs to cstablish thcir jurisdictions ovcr such crimcs is dcalt with
in Articlc .c. Tc lollowing Articlcs (...·) primarily conccrn coopcration in
criminal mattcrs, including thc important principlc ol aut dedere aut judicare, and
lair trcatmcnt ol allcgcd offcndcrs. Similar to thc Gcncva Convcntions ol intcr
national humanitarian law, partics to thc Salcty Convcntion arc obligcd to dis
scminatc thc tcrms ol thc convcntion as widcly as possiblc and to includc thcm in
thcir military programmcs (Articlc .o). A numbcr ol saving clauscs arc stipulatcd
in Articlc ac, as wcll as a right ol sclldclcncc (Articlc a.). Ðisputc scttlcmcnts
and rcvicw mcctings lorm thc subjcct ol Articlcs aa and a., lollowcd by provi
sions on acccssion and thc cntry into lorcc ol thc convcntion.
Tc lollowing analysis ol thc Salcty Convcntion will dcal primarily with its
scopc ol application. Tcrc arc thrcc rcasons lor this. First, in comparison with
thc substantivc parts ol thc convcntion, dcaling primarily with pcnal provisions,
cstablishmcnt ol jurisdiction and mcasurcs on prosccution or cxtradition, thc
dcbatc ovcr its scopc ol application was a highly politiciscd mattcr. Sccond, thc
ncw Òptional Protocol cxtcnds thc convcntion’s scopc ol application lor partics
to it. Tird, thc inclusion ol pcnal provisions madc it ol thc utmost importancc
to clarily whcn, whcrc and to whom thc convcntion applicd. Tis was particularly
so in rclation to thc principlcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law. A penalised act
undcr thc convcntion may bc a legitimate act undcr intcrnational humanitar
ian law. Tc aim ol thc draltcrs was to cstablish a protcctivc rcgimc lor multi
lunctional pcacckccping opcrations, including humanitarian cfforts. Tc material
provisions contributc to such a protcction but its scopc ol application nccds clari
fication. For thc purposc ol this analysis, thc convcntion has bccn dividcd into
fivc parts: . Scopc ol application, a Lcgal status ol thc pcrsonncl, . Ðuty to pro
vidc protcction, ¡ Criminal law provisions, · Misccllancous.
!n thc cvcnt, thc convcntion has attractcd somc intcrcst lrom lcgal scholars,
but subscqucnt statc practicc is scarcc.
±·
Against this background, thc prcpara
¡· Ðiscussions during thc Ad Hoc Committcc rcvcalcd a lack ol knowlcdgc ol such
practicc. Howcvcr, in a casc lrom thc Housc ol Lords conccrning a 8ritish soldicr
injurcd scrving in thc Unitcd Nations Protcction Forcc in 8osniaHcrzcgovina, thc
Salcty Convcntion was rclicd upon to cstablish whcthcr or not thc attack was a
a.¡ Chapter 5
tory works play a major rolc in thc analysis ol somc parts ol thc convcntion, in
particularly on its scopc ol application. Tc lollowing analysis ol thc convcn
tion will primarily bc bascd upon thc tcxt ol thc convcntion itscll, its prcpara
tory works, lcgal doctrinc and subscqucnt propositions on thc strcngthcning and
cxtcnsion ol its provisions. As to thc lattcr, thc rcport by thc SccrctaryGcncral
on thc scopc ol application ol thc Salcty Convcntion lrom accc has bccn par
ticularly usclul.
5.3.1 Scope of Application
According to Articlc a ol thc convcntion, it applics in rcspcct ol UN and associ
atcd pcrsonncl and UN opcrations, as dcfincd in Articlc ., whcrc “Unitcd Nations
pcrsonncl”, “Associatcd pcrsonncl” and “Unitcd Nations opcrations” arc, within
thc lramcwork ol thc convcntion, dcfincd as lollows:
(a) “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” mcans:
(i) Pcrsons cngagcd or dcploycd by thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc
Unitcd Nations as mcmbcrs ol thc military, policc or civilian com
poncnts ol a Unitcd Nations opcration,
(ii) Òthcr officials and cxpcrts on mission ol thc Unitcd Nations or its
spccializcd agcncics or thc !ntcrnational Atomic ¡ncrgy Agcncy
who arc prcscnt in an official capacity in thc arca whcrc a Unitcd
Nations opcration is bcing conductcd,
(b) “Associatcd pcrsonncl” mcans:
(i) Pcrsons assigncd by a Govcrnmcnt or an intcrgovcrnmcntal organ
ization with thc agrccmcnt ol thc compctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd
Nations,
(ii) Pcrsons cngagcd by thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations
or by a spccializcd agcncy or by thc !ntcrnational Atomic ¡ncrgy
Agcncy,
(iii) Pcrsons dcploycd by a humanitarian nongovcrnmcntal organi
zation or agcncy undcr an agrccmcnt with thc SccrctaryGcncral
ol thc Unitcd Nations or with a spccializcd agcncy or with thc
!ntcrnational Atomic ¡ncrgy Agcncy,
to carry out activitics in support ol thc lulfilmcnt ol thc mandatc ol a
Unitcd Nations opcration,
(c) “Unitcd Nations opcration” mcans an opcration cstablishcd by thc com
pctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd Nations in accordancc with thc Chartcr ol
crimc undcr intcrnational law. Tc casc dcalt, howcvcr, with thc qucstion ol com
pcnsation lor injurics undcr national law. Unitcd Kingdom Housc ol Lords: Rcgina
v 8artlc, ¡x Partc Pinochct, a· Novcmbcr .oo·, .· !LM ..ca (.oo·).
a.· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
thc Unitcd Nations and conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority and
control:
(i) Vhcrc thc opcration is lor thc purposc ol maintaining or rcstoring
intcrnational pcacc and sccurity, or
(ii) Vhcrc thc Sccurity Council or thc Gcncral Asscmbly has dcclarcd,
lor thc purposcs ol this Convcntion, that thcrc cxists an cxccptional
risk to thc salcty ol thc pcrsonncl participating in thc opcration,
·...... “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl”
The Negotiations (roo, –roo¡)
Tc kind ol pcrsonncl thc ncw convcntion should apply to lormcd thc subjcct ol
diffcrcnt opinions, bascd mainly upon whcthcr a rcstrictivc or cxtcnsivc approach
was lavourcd.
±8
Somc dclcgations argucd lor as broad as possiblc a covcragc ol
pcrsonncl, mcaning that irrcspcctivc ol conncction or mandatc, thcy would all
run similar risks ol attack. !t was thought that potcntial attackcrs would not
cxaminc such subtlc considcrations prior to launching an assault. Òthcr dclcga
tions lavourcd a morc rcstrictivc approach and argucd lor limiting thc protcction
ol thc convcntion to mcmbcrs ol a spccific UN opcration.
Tc Ad Hoc Committcc had bclorc it, whcn starting thc work, two prol
lcrcd dcfinitions on “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl”. Tc joint dralt proposal did not
cxplicitly diffcrcntiatc bctwccn “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” and “Associatcd pcr
sonncl” in considcring thc tcxt ol Articlc . ol thc proposal, which rcad: “Unitcd
Nations pcrsonncl mcans thosc pcrsons in rcspcct ol whom this Convcntion
applics in accordancc with Articlc a”.
±o
!n thc working documcnt submittcd by
thc Nordic countrics, thc “Sccond clcmcnt” was cntitlcd “Unitcd Nations pcrson
ncl” and could thcrclorc propcrly bc intcrprctcd as making no diffcrcncc bctwccn
“Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” and “Associatcd pcrsonncl”.
¡o
¡· For thcsc discussions, scc Sixth Committcc (¡oth Scssion) Summary rccord ol thc
ao
th
– .a
nd
, .¡
th
– .·
th
Mcctings, UN Ðocs. A/C.6/¡·/SR.ao – .a, .¡ – .· (.oo¡).
¡o !n Articlc a ol thc joint dralt proposal lrom Ncw Zcaland and Ukrainc, “Unitcd
Nations pcrsonncl” wcrc dcfincd as “(a) Pcrsons dcploycd by thc SccrctaryGcncral
to participatc in a Unitcd Nations opcration, and includcs: (i) Military pcrsonncl,
(ii) Policc pcrsonncl, (iii) Associatcd civilian pcrsonncl, (b) Pcrsons dcploycd by thc
SccrctaryGcncral or a spccialiscd agcncy or othcr organisation or programmc ol thc
Unitcd Nations systcm to carry out activitics in conncction with a Unitcd Nations
opcration, (c) Pcrsons dcploycd by any othcr humanitarian organisation or agcncy
to carry out activitics rclating to a Unitcd Nations opcration whcrc such organisa
tion or agcncy is opcrating pursuant to an agrccmcnt with thc SccrctaryGcncral.”
Scc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Proposal
by Ncw Zcaland and Ukrainc, UN Ðoc A/AC.a¡a/L.a and Corr. . (.oo¡).
·c !t containcd thc lollowing dcfinition ol UN pcrsonncl: “Tc pcrsons covcrcd by thc
ncw instrumcnt should comprisc all pcrsonncl authoriscd by thc Unitcd Nations
a.6 Chapter 5
Ðuring thc coursc ol gcncral dcbatc within thc Ad Hoc Committcc it was
strcsscd that thc dcfinition ol thc tcrm uscd in thc convcntion nccdcd to bc clcar
and prccisc in ordcr to crcatc a widcly acccptcd convcntion which could bc cffcc
tivcly implcmcntcd.
¡+
Tc nccd lor absolutc clarity in this rcgard was consid
crcd to bc particularly important in vicw ol thc convcntion’s pcnal provisions.
¡:

Although thc dcfinition ol thc joint proposal lound gcncral acccptancc it was
lound that thc tcrm “dcploycd” was inappropriatc. !t lailcd to takc into account
thc lact that individuals wcrc oltcn alrcady in thc ficld bclorc thc start ol an opcr
ation.
¡:
Altcr thc sccond Ad Hoc Committcc mccting thc tcxt was amcndcd to
“cngagcd or dcploycd”.
¡±
Tc rcviscd ncgotiating tcxt lrom thc Ad Hoc Committcc rcad:
(i) Pcrsons cngagcd or dcploycd by thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc Unitcd
Nations as mcmbcrs ol thc military, policc or civilian componcnts ol a
Unitcd Nations opcration,
(ii) Òthcr officials and cxpcrts on mission ol thc Unitcd Nations and its spc
cialiscd agcncics who arc prcscnt in an official capacity in thc arca whcrc
a Unitcd Nations opcration is bcing conductcd.
¡¡

opcrations to participatc in a pcacckccping or a pcacccnlorccmcnt opcration.
Pcrsonncl working lor intcrgovcrnmcntal and nongovcrnmcntal organisations
undcrtaking humanitarian rclicl activitics in arcas whcrc a Unitcd Nations opcr
ation has bccn launchcd should also bc providcd adcquatc protcction.” Ad Hoc
Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc
Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Vorking docu
mcnt submittcd by Ðcnmark, Finland, !ccland, Norway and Swcdcn, a, UN Ðoc.
A/AC.a¡a/L.. (.oo¡).
·. Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Rcport ol
thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc work carricd out during thc pcriod lrom a· March
to · April .oo¡, para. a., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a (.oo¡).
·a !bid., .·. Tc dcfinition proposcd by thc Nordic countrics was prclcrrcd by somc
dclcgations, whilc anothcr proposal was a third dcfinition: “Tis Convcntion shall
apply in rcspcct ol Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl dcploycd by thc SccrctaryGcncral,
thc Sccurity Council or thc Gcncral Asscmbly in conncction with a Unitcd Nations
opcration.” !bid., para. .o.
·. !bid., para. ¡..
·¡ Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Rcport
ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion
Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl
..a August, para. a·, Rcviscd Ncgotiating Tcxt Articlc a, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp)
(.oo¡).
·· !bid.
a.· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
Tc rcviscd ncgotiating tcxt distinguishcd bctwccn “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl”
and “Associatcd pcrsonncl”, thc lormcr in paragraph (a) and thc lattcr undcr par
agraph (b). !t was considcrcd by a numbcr ol dclcgations that thc tcxt providcd
a good basis lor lurthcr ncgotiations whilc othcrs clcctcd to rcscrvc thcir posi
tion.
¡6
Tc point was madc that subparagraph (a) (ii) should bc dclctcd, sincc thc
pcrsonncl mcntioncd wcrc alrcady undcr thc protcction ol cxisting instrumcnts
on privilcgcs and immunitics.
¡·

Assessment
Paragraph (a) (i) cncompasscs pcrsonncl contributcd by thc nations participating
in a UN opcration and would thcrclorc probably includc most ol thc pcrsonncl
covcrcd by thc convcntion. Tcy arc commonly vicwcd as thc corc group ol pcr
sons rclcrrcd to as pcacckccpcrs.
¡8

Tc locus on pcrsonncl bcing “cngagcd or dcploycd” by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral ol thc UN rcflcctcd thc conccrn ol scvcral dclcgations that UN pcrson
ncl must bc undcr thc control ol thc UN. !t clcarly givcs no room lor including
national lorccs undcr national command.
¡o
According to thc SccrctaryGcncral
such pcrsonncl “arc accordingly mcmbcrs ol all componcnts ol a Unitcd Nations
pcacckccping opcration”.
6o

Tc inclusion ol thc pcrsonncl rclcrrcd to in Articlc . (a) (ii) satisficd thosc
dclcgations that sought a broad covcragc. Tcrc is no nccd ol a conncction to a
UN opcration lor such pcrsonncl hcrc mcntioncd. Tc only rcquircmcnt is that
thcy would nccd to bc, in thcir official capacity, in thc arca ol a UN opcration.
Tc arca ol a UN opcration is not dcfincd in thc convcntion and must bc dccidcd
upon, in cach casc, ol luturc opcrations.
·6 !bid., Anncx ! para. a.
·· !bid. para. ¡. Tc only substantivc changc in thc dcfinition ol “Unitcd Nations pcr
sonncl” bclorc thc adoption ol thc convcntion was thc inclusion ol thc !ntcrnational
Atomic ¡ncrgy Agcncy in subparagraph (a) (ii). Scc UN Sixth Committcc, Òucstion
ol Rcsponsibility lor Attacks on Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl and
Mcasurcs to ¡nsurc that Tosc Rcsponsiblc lor Such Attacks arc 8rought to ]usticc:
Rcport ol Tc Vorking Group, para. .c(a), UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/L.¡ (.oo¡).
·· Scc ¡van T. 8loom, Protccting pcacckccpcrs: Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ·o AJIL 6a., 6a. (.oo·).
·o Scc, Stcvcn ]. Lcppcr, Tc Lcgal Status ol Military Pcrsonncl in Unitcd Nations
Pcacc Òpcrations: Ònc Ðclcgatc’s Analysis, .· Houston Journal of International Law,
.·o, .·. (.oo6). Lcppcr statcs that it was thc intcntion ol thc U.S. dclcgation to
includc pcrsonncl dcploycd by thcir own nations or multinational organisations
within thc scopc ol thc dcfinition ol Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl. Hc concludcs that
this is clcarly not possiblc considcring thc rcquircmcnt “cngagcd or dcploycd by thc
SccrctaryGcncral”.
6c Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .¡, UN Ðoc. A/··/6.·
(accc).
a.· Chapter 5
Ambassador Philippc Kirsch, chairman ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc and its
working groups, as wcll as thc working groups cstablishcd within thc lramcwork
ol thc Sixth Committcc, obscrvcd a lcw lactors that tcndcd to complicatc thc
proccss. Tc most important ol thcm was that thc work on thc convcntion had
bccomc “a surrogatc battlcground lor thc morc complcx issuc ol thc cxpandcd
powcrs ol thc Sccurity Council”.
6+
Traccs ol this “battlc” arc lound throughout
thc convcntion. Tc final dcfinition on “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” suggcsts an
imprcssion ol victory lor thc rcstrictivc approach. Tc UN, in thc lorm ol its
SccrctaryGcncral, would rctain control ol all pcrsonncl covcrcd by thc dcfinition
in Articlc . (a) (i). Tis rcstrictivc approach, howcvcr, is balanccd by thc dcfinition
ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl”.
·.....a “Associatcd pcrsonncl”
The Negotiations (roo,-roo¡)
Ðcfining “Associatcd pcrsonncl” was lar morc problcmatic than to work out a
dcfinition ol “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl”. Tc ncgotiations ccntrcd mainly on
two issucs: thc inclusion ol NGÒs, and lorccs undcr thc command ol nations and
intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisations.
!n his Notc, thc SccrctaryGcncral lound that thc privilcgcs and immunitics
currcntly cnjoycd by thc UN could also bc considcrcd to bc cxtcndcd to civilian
contractors and to thc pcrsonncl ol NGÒs, cngagcd in UN opcrations through
an agrccmcnt.
6:
Rclcrcncc was also madc to Sccurity Council Rcsolution ·6·
(.oo.) in which thc Council “dccidcd that thc salcty and sccurity arrangcmcnts
undcrtakcn by thc Unitcd Nations or thc host country should cxtcnd to all pcr
sons cngagcd in opcrations authoriscd by thc Council”.
6:
Ðuring dcbatc in thc Ad Hoc Committcc it was strcsscd that lor pcrsonncl
to bc includcd within thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc convcntion, a clcar link must
first bc shown to cxist bctwccn thcm and thc UN.

Vith rcgard to subpara
graph (c) ol thc joint proposal it was, on thc onc hand, lound to bc appropriatc
to includc NGÒs within thc scopc ol thc convcntion bccausc ol thc acknowl
cdgcd rolc thcy playcd, particularly in thc humanitarian ficld, but that thc con
6. Philippc Kirsch, Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, Canadian Council on International Law, Procccdings .·a, .·· (.oo¡).
6a Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Notc by
thc SccrctaryGcncral, para. .., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/. (.oo¡).
6. !bid., para. .a. Scc SC Rcs. ·6·, UN SCÒR, .a·.
rd
mtg., para. 6(b), UN Ðoc. S/
R¡S/·6· (.oo.).
6¡ Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Rcport ol
thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc work carricd out during thc pcriod lrom a· March
to · April .oo¡, para. a., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a (.oo¡).
a.o Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
tractual rclationship should bc tightcncd. Òn thc othcr hand, it was suggcstcd
that subparagraph (c) ol thc joint proposal should bc dclctcd. Tis position was
bascd mainly upon thc lact that thc luturc convcntion was aimcd at statcs, and
thcrclorc it could provc difficult to includc provisions intcndcd lor NGÒs. !t
was argucd that national laws protcctcd both rcsidcnts and nonnationals, and
il additional obligations wcrc to bc imposcd upon statcs, it should bc limitcd to
UN pcrsonncl.


Scvcral dclcgations supportcd thc vicw that thc convcntion should cncom
pass all pcrsons who bccamc involvcd in a UN opcration, including lorccs invitcd
by thc SccrctaryGcncral to participatc or assist in a UN opcration. Tc main
purposc sccmcd to bc that irrcspcctivc ol catcgory, ultimatcly thcy all workcd sidc
by sidc in thc attcmpt to achicvc thc samc objcctivc and logically should thcrc
lorc bc affordcd cqual protcction.
66
!n thc rcviscd ncgotiating tcxt, “Associatcd pcrsonncl” wcrc dcfincd in
Articlc a as:
(i) Pcrsons assigncd by a Govcrnmcnt or an intcrgovcrnmcntal organisation
with thc agrccmcnt ol thc compctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd Nations,
(ii) Pcrsons cngagcd by thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations or by a
spccialiscd agcncy,
(iii) Pcrsons dcploycd by a humanitarian nongovcrnmcntal organisation or
agcncy undcr an agrccmcnt with thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc Unitcd
Nations or with a spccialiscd agcncy,
to carry out activitics dircctly conncctcd with a Unitcd Nations opcration.


Somc dclcgations lound that thc dcfinition ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl” in thc
rcviscd ncgotiating tcxt cxccssivcly cxpandcd thc scopc ol application ol thc
convcntion. !t was thcrclorc ncccssary to providc lor thc possibility ol making
“rcscrvations with rcgard to thc various catcgorics ol pcrsonncl to which thc
convcntion would bc applicablc”.
68
!t was also notcd that “Associatcd pcrson
6· !bid., paras. ¡. – ¡¡.
66 !bid., para. .6..
6· Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Rcport
ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion
Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl
..a August, para. a·, Rcviscd Ncgotiating Tcxt, Articlc a, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp)
(.oo¡).
6· !bid., Anncx ., Summary ol thc Vorking Group’s dcbatc at thc sccond scssion ol
thc Ad Hoc Committcc, para. ·. Poland submittcd a proposal lor a provision in this
rcgard: “¡ach Statc Party may, at thc timc ol signaturc, ratification, acccptancc or
approval ol this Convcntion or acccssion thcrcto, dcclarc that that it docs not con
sidcr itscll bound with rcspcct to any ol thc catcgorics ol pcrsonncl rclcrrcd to in
aac Chapter 5
ncl” could not opcratc in thc tcrritory ol a statc without its conscnt.
6o
Tc dcfini
tion finally agrccd upon includcd rclcrcnccs to thc !ntcrnational Atomic ¡ncrgy
Agcncy,
·o
and thc ncw wording “in support ol thc lulfilmcnt ol thc mandatc ol ”
in subparagraph (b).
·+

¡xplaining its position on thc convcntion, thc dclcgation ol Sudan intcr
prctcd “Associatcd pcrsonncl” to mcan that host and/or transit statcs nccdcd
to bc consultcd bclorc thc dcploymcnt ol any such pcrsonncl. !t lurthcrmorc
lound that pcrsons assigncd by a govcrnmcnt, intcrgovcrnmcntal organisation
or humanitarian NGÒ or agcncy lulfilling ncccssary critcria rcquircd thc con
scnt ol thc host and/or transit statc.
·:
Poland’s dclcgation statcd that thc various
proposals submittcd by a numbcr ol dclcgations aiming at making thc convcn
tion’s scopc ol application “as widc as possiblc havc bccn propcrly rcflcctcd in its
articlcs.”
·:

Assessment
Tc lact that thc UN largcly dcpcnds upon humanitarian organisations, civilian
contractors, and so on, to lulfil its mandatc strongly contributcd to cncompass
thc catcgory ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl” within thc scopc ol thc convcntion. Tc
intcrprctation ol thc final dcfinition ol thc tcrm “Associatcd pcrsonncl”, howcvcr,
is lar lrom clcar.
!n tcrms ol protection affordcd by thc convcntion, thcrc is no diffcrcncc
bctwccn “Unitcd Nations Pcrsonncl” and “Associatcd pcrsonncl”. 8oth catcgo
rics cnjoy thc samc protcction undcr thc convcntion. To bc ablc to lall undcr thc
catcgory ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl” it is ncccssary to havc a link with thc UN. Tat
link may bc cstablishcd in thrcc diffcrcnt ways. A govcrnmcnt, or an intcrgovcrn
mcntal organisation, may assign thc pcrsons in qucstion, by agreement with thc
UN, thcy may bc engaged by thc UN, or bc deployed by a humanitarian NGÒ or
agcncy undcr an agreement with thc UN. Tc UN may act through a compctcnt
organ. Tc conncction to thc UN, howcvcr, is not cnough to qualily as associatcd
paragraph a (b) ol this articlc which it may spccily. Tc othcr Statcs Partics shall not
bc bound by paragraph a (b) ol this articlc with rcspcct to any such catcgorics as
rcgards any Statc Party that has madc such rcscrvation.” Anncx !!, scction R.
6o Tcrc wcrc diffcrcnt opinions on thc prccisc mcaning ol “Pcrsons assigncd by a
Govcrnmcnt”. Somc dclcgations took thc vicw that this catcgory was alrcady cov
crcd undcr thc catcgory “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” whilc othcr dclcgations disa
grccd on this point. !t was, morcovcr, argucd that NGÒs should bc cxcludcd lrom
thc protcction ol thc convcntion. !bid., para. ·, Anncx ., Summary ol thc Vorking
Group’s dcbatc at thc sccond scssion ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc.
·c Tc !ntcrnational Atomic ¡ncrgy Agcncy is not rcgardcd as a Spccialiscd Agcncy.
·. Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group, para. .c, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡o/L.¡
(.oo¡).
·a UN GAÒR, ¡o
th
Scss., ·¡
th
mtg., .¡, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/P\.·¡ (.oo¡).
·. !bid., .6.
aa. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
pcrsonncl. A spccial link to a UN operation is also rcquircd. Tc activitics should
thcrclorc bc in support ol thc mandatc ol thc opcration. Tc paragraph was thc
subjcct ol considcrablc dcbatc and thc inclusion ol a saving clausc madc it pos
siblc to rcach an agrccmcnt.
·±

Tc catcgory ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl” consists ol thrcc diffcrcnt groups. Tc
first rclcrs to pcrsons assigncd by a govcrnmcnt or an intcrgovcrnmcntal organi
sation with thc agrccmcnt ol thc UN. Tis provision cnablcs military lorccs, not
undcr UN control, to bc includcd in thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc convcntion undcr
thc catcgory ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl”. Tc Unitcd Statcs dclcgation, which had
a strong intcrcst in including assisting lorccs within thc protcction ol thc convcn
tion, lound that thc operations in Haiti, Rwanda, 8osnia and Somalia would all
bc covcrcd by thc convcntion. As cxamplcs ol associated forces thc multinational
lorcc supporting thc UN opcration in Haiti (UNM!H), as wcll as mcmbcrs ol
NATÒ supporting thc UN opcration in thc lormcr Yugoslavia (UNPRÒFÒR),
wcrc mcntioncd.
·¡
Anothcr cxamplc ol assisting lorccs might also bc thc US
Òuick Rcaction Forcc that supportcd thc UN opcration in Somalia (UNÒSÒM
!!). Tcsc arc lorccs that cxistcd bclorc or during thc timc ol thc adoption ol thc
convcntion. Tcy assistcd UN lorccs, but wcrc not acting undcr UN command
and control. Tc critical issuc hcrc is to what cxtcnt associatcd pcrsonncl may act
indcpcndcntly. Tcy arc not subjcct to UN command and control but arc rcquircd
to act in support ol a UN opcration’s mandatc. !s thc rcquircmcnt to act in sup
port ol such a mandatc also a rcquircmcnt that thc opcration must includc UN
pcrsonncl:
·6
Tc ambiguous wording ol thc last scntcncc ol subparagraph (b)
may imply an opcning lor thcsc lorccs to act indcpcndcntly. An carlicr vcrsion
ol this scntcncc rcad: “To carry out activitics dircctly conncctcd with a Unitcd
Nations opcration.” Tc substitution ol “opcration” lor “mandatc” supports an
intcrprctation that thc “what” with which thc pcrsonncl nccd to bc associatcd
is not ncccssarily UN pcrsonncl. !t may also bc that thc activitics could bc asso
ciatcd with thc “mandatc”. Tis intcrprctation, howcvcr, is not lully supportcd
by thc paragraph’s ncgotiating history. Scvcral influcntial dclcgations hcld thc
vicw that thc associationrcquircmcnt was with UN pcrsonncl. Association with
a mandatc alonc was not cnough.
··
8oth Grccnwood and Kindrcd havc addrcsscd thc cxamplc ol coalition
lorccs bcing involvcd in thc !raq/Kuwait crisis and whcthcr thcy would havc
bccn protcctcd by thc convcntion, had it bccn in lorcc at thc timc. Grccnwood
finds that thcy would havc lallcn outsidc thc scopc ol thc convcntion sincc thc
·¡ Tc clausc statcs that conscnt ol thc right ol cntry is unaffcctcd by thc convcn
tion. Scc also M.Christianc 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ¡¡ ICLQ, ·6c, ·6· (.oo·).
·· UN GAÒR, ¡o
th
Scss., ·¡
th
mtg., .· UN Ðoc. A/¡o/P\.·¡ (.oo¡).
·6 For an intcrcsting discussion on this aspcct scc Lcppcr, .·6.
·· !bid., .·o.
aaa Chapter 5
opcration was not conductcd undcr UN authority and control.
·8
Kindrcd sug
gcsts, howcvcr, that thc coalition lorccs would havc bccn protcctcd as associatcd
pcrsonncl in accordancc with subparagraph (i). !n vicw ol thc abovc, thc lattcr
intcrprctation would probably not find sufficicnt support, as thcrc wcrc no UN
pcrsonncl dcploycd with which to bc associatcd.
·o

Tc numbcr and tasks ol UN pcrsonncl that “Associatcd pcrsonncl” nccd to
bc associatcd with, arc not obvious. Tc vicw ol thc US dclcgation that pcrsons
includcd in thc multinational lorcc in Haiti should bc considcrcd to bc associatcd
pcrsonncl is not without objcctions. !n lact, thc vcry purposc ol thc lorcc was to
pavc thc way lor thc UN mission which had not bccn ablc to dcploy bccausc ol
carlicr disturbanccs in PortauPrincc.
8o
Tc dcfinition ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl”
is closcly rclatcd to thc dcfinition ol a “Unitcd Nations opcration”. For a morc
thorough discussion on thc typcs ol opcration that pcrsonncl nccd to bc associ
atcd with, scc thc scction on “Unitcd Nations opcration” bclow.
Tc kcy rcquircmcnt lor thc ncxt group ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl”, in para
graph (ii), is thc nccd to bc engaged by onc ol thc organs rclcrrcd to. Tc tcrm
“cngagcd” is not dcfincd but it is bornc upon thc nccd ol a linkagc bctwccn thc
UN and cxtcrnal pcrsonncl. Ðuring thc ncgotiations in thc Sixth Committcc
thc Nordic countrics claimcd, in rclation to thc condition to bc “cngagcd” by thc
SccrctaryGcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations, that thc rclcrcncc to thc Sccrctary
Gcncral “also covcrcd othcr parts ol thc Unitcd Nations systcm such as lunds,
programmcs and officcs, notably, thc Òfficc ol thc Unitcd Nations High
Commissioncr lor Rclugccs (UNHCR)”.
8+
A common vicw, in thc litcraturc, is
that this clausc applics to civilian contractors.
8:
An cxplicit cxamplc ol pcrson
ncl includcd in this catcgory put lorward is that ol “truck drivcrs cngagcd by thc
Vorld Food Program as part ol its rclicl mandatc in a Unitcd Nations opcra
tion”.
8:
Tc third group ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl” includcs thosc pcoplc bclonging
to an NGÒ. Tc link to thc UN is in this casc thc rcquircmcnt ol bcing “dcploycd”
undcr an “agrccmcnt” with onc ol thc bodics listcd in paragraph (iii). Vould this
·· Christophcr Grccnwood, Protcction ol Pcacckccpcrs: Tc Lcgal Rcgimc, · Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law, .··, .o· (.oo6).
·o Hugh M. Kindrcd, Tc Protcction ol Pcacckccpcrs, Canadian Yearbook of International
Law a··, a·6 (.oo·). Tc most rcmarkablc aspcct ol this cxamplc, howcvcr, is that
thcsc lorccs would dcfinitcly havc bccn cxcludcd lrom thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc
convcntion in light ol Articlc a(a), discusscd bclow, bccausc thcy wcrc clcarly acting
as combatants in an intcrnational armcd conflict.
·c Scc, c.g. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc Unitcd Nations Mission in Haiti,
para. ·, UN Ðoc. S/a6·ca (.oo.).
·. Sixth Committcc (¡oth Scssion), Summary rccord ol thc ao
th
mtg., para. .a, UN Ðoc.
A/C.6/¡o/SR.ao (.oo¡). Scc 8ourloyannis\railas, ·66.
·a !bid., 8loom, 6a¡.
·. Kindrcd, a·6.
aa. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
rcquircmcnt cxcludc thc possibility ol making an arrangcmcnt with humanitar
ian organisations alrcady dcploycd in a particular arca bclorc thc launching ol a
UN opcration: !t may bc rccallcd that thc tcrm “dcploycd” was lound to bc inap
propriatc conccrning “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl”, sincc it did not takc propcr
account ol pcrsonncl alrcady in thc ficld bclorc thc start ol an opcration. !t docs
not appcar to havc bccn thc intcntion that pcoplc alrcady dcploycd should bc
cxcludcd lrom thc ambit ol thc convcntion. Tc convcntion, in lact, contains
scvcral tcrminological inconsistcncics and it is plausiblc that thc tcrm “dcploycd”
should not, lor thc purposc ol this paragraph, bc intcrprctcd as cxcluding pcrson
ncl alrcady in thc rclcvant arca bclorc thc start ol a UN opcration. According to
8loom, thc substantivc principlc by which it should bc judgcd is thc cxistcncc ol
a “contractual link” bctwccn thc humanitarian NGÒ and thc UN.

Apart lrom
thc lormal linkagc to a UN opcration, thc rcquircmcnt to “carry out activitics in
support lor thc lulfilmcnt ol a mandatc ol a Unitcd Nations opcration” is valid
also lor this catcgory ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl”.
!n his rcport, ol accc, thc SccrctaryGcncral noticcd that thc naturc and
contcnt ol an agrccmcnt bctwccn a humanitarian NGÒ and thc Sccrctary
Gcncral had not bccn dcfincd but that
it would bc rcasonablc to assumc that any contractual link or a trcaty arrangc
mcnt institutionalizing thc coopcration bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and a
nongovcrnmcntal organization in support ol a Unitcd Nations opcration or
in thc implcmcntation ol its mandatc, would mcct thc rcquircmcnt ol articlc .
(b) (iii) ol thc Convcntion.


According to thc SccrctaryGcncral, two kinds ol agrccmcnt cxist bctwccn NGÒs
and thc UN. Tcrc arc thc so callcd “Partncrship agrccmcnts”, concludcd lor
implcmcntation ol spccific projccts “bctwccn UNHCR, UNÐP, UN!C¡F, VFP
or othcr Unitcd Nations bodics cxccuting humanitarian programmcs, and intcr
national or local nongovcrnmcntal organizations”,
86
and Sccurity Arrangcmcnts
bctwccn thc Òfficc ol thc Unitcd Nations Sccurity Coordinator and NGÒs “par
ticipating in thc implcmcntation ol assistancc activitics ol thc Òrganisation”.


!t is common practicc to concludc “partncrship agrccmcnts” bctwccn thc
UNHCR and humanitarian NGÒs. For this purposc a modcl lramcwork agrcc
mcnt lor thc opcrational partncrship bctwccn thc UNHCR and “implcmcnting
partncrs” has bccn dcvclopcd, cstablishing standards ol conduct lor both part
·¡ 8loom, 6a¡.
·· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .·, UN Ðoc. A/··/6.·
(accc).
·6 !bid.
·· !bid.
aa¡ Chapter 5
ncrs.
88
A similar practicc has dcvclopcd bctwccn UNÐP and NGÒs with spc
cial cxpcrtisc in thc ficld ol sustainablc human dcvclopmcnt. A mcmorandum ol
undcrstanding (MÒU) has bccn dcviscd lor cxtcnding UN security arrangements
to organisations having thc status ol an “implcmcnting partncr”. An “implc
mcnting partncr” is lor thc purposc ol thc MÒU, “any intcrnational nongov
crnmcntal organization which has alrcady cntcrcd into a contractual or a trcaty
arrangcmcnt with an organization ol thc Unitcd Nations systcm to implcmcnt a
particular projcct”.
8o
At thc timc ol writing ol thc rcport, such sccurity arrangc
mcnts had bccn signcd by onc intcrgovcrnmcntal organisation (thc !ntcrnational
Òrganization lor Migration) and ninc NGÒs in thrcc countrics.
Proponcnts lor a broad covcragc ol thc convcntion mct with considcrablc
rcsistancc lrom dclcgations arguing lor a rcstrictivc approach whcn discussing
NGÒs.
oo
Tc lattcr group was primarily conccrncd with thc conscnt ol thc host
statc. As thc savings clausc rcads, thc inclusion ol humanitarian NGÒs in thc
scopc ol thc convcntion was not tantamount to an automatic right ol cntry lor
thosc organisations. Howcvcr, subjcct to thc conscnt ol thc host nation and lul
filmcnt ol thc critcria dcfincd in Articlc . thcy would cnjoy thc protcction ol thc
convcntion.
8clorc turning to thc dcfinition ol a UN opcration it is appropriatc to touch
bricfly on thc subjcct ol locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl. According to thc Sccrctary
Gcncral, thc convcntion’s scopc ol application has primarily bccn qucstioncd in
rclation to humanitarian NGÒs and locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl.
o+
Tc Salcty
Convcntion makcs no distinction bctwccn pcrsonncl rccruitcd locally and intcr
nationally rccruitcd pcrsonncl. Tc SccrctaryGcncral notcs that locally rccruitcd
pcrsonncl in pcacckccping opcrations arc rcgardcd as “mcmbcrs ol thc civilian
componcnt ol a Unitcd Nations pcacckccping opcration”. !n UN officcs cstab
lishcd out ol hcadquartcrs, locally rccruitcd pcrsonncl arc considcrcd to bc UN
officials, with thc cxccption ol thosc assigncd at an hourly ratc. For thc purposc
ol thc convcntion, thc SccrctaryGcncral was ol thc opinion that thcy should
bc rcgardcd as cithcr UN pcrsonncl or associatcd pcrsonncl, dcpcnding on thc
naturc ol thc contractual link to thc UN.
o:
·· !bid., para. .6.
·o !bid., para. .·.
oc UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx ! para. ·, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
o. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .¡, UN Ðoc. A/··/6.·
(accc).
oa !bid., para. .o.
aa· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
·...... “Unitcd Nations opcration”
The negotiations (roo,-roo¡)
!n thc joint proposal by Ncw Zcaland and thc Ukrainc a “Unitcd Nations opcra
tion” was dcfincd as an “opcration cstablishcd pursuant to a mandatc approvcd
by a rcsolution ol thc Sccurity Council”.
o:
Ðuring thc gcncral dcbatc in thc first
scssion ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc thc vicw was cxprcsscd ol cxtcnding thc scopc
ol thc convcntion to opcrations mandatcd by thc Gcncral Asscmbly. !t was sug
gcstcd by somc dclcgations that thc convcntion should only apply to opcrations
initiatcd with thc conscnt ol thc host statc.

Tc cxchangc ol vicws during thc
mcctings rcflcctcd a clcar linc cxisting bctwccn thosc dclcgations striving lor
cxpanding thc scopc ol thc convcntion and thosc who pursucd a narrow dcfini
tion ol thc tcrm “Unitcd Nations opcration”. A rcdralting ol thc wholc ol para
graph a was suggcstcd. !t would rcad as lollows: “Tis Convcntion applics to all
situations whcrc Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl opcratc whcthcr in timc ol pcacc or
during armcd conflict”.


Tc problcm was acknowlcdgcd ol rclying on traditional distinctions con
ccrning UN opcrations. Such opcrations wcrc invariably ol a “hybrid and com
plcx” naturc, changing ovcr timc and could wcll involvc mattcrs ranging lrom
military campaigns to humanitarian rclicl as wcll as issucs such as clcctoral assist
ancc, human rights monitoring and dcvclopmcnt projccts.
o6
Tc tcrm “opcra
tion” was thought to imply a ccrtain dcgrcc ol magnitudc. Tc tcrm “mandatc”
was vicwcd by somc dclcgations as posscssing a constrictcd mcaning, and thus
cxcludcd activitics conductcd by such agcncics as thc Unitcd Nations High
o. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, ¡laboration, Pursuant To Paragraph . ol Gcncral Asscmbly
Rcsolution ¡·/.· ol o Ðcccmbcr .oo., ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
Vith thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, with
Particular Rclcrcncc to Rcsponsibility lor Attacks on Such Pcrsonncl, Proposal by
Ncw Zcaland and Ukrainc’, Anncx, ., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/L.a and Corr. . (.oo¡).
!n thc working documcnt submittcd by thc Nordic countrics a dcfinition ol a UN
opcration can bc inlcrrcd lrom thc sccond clcmcnt rcgarding UN pcrsonncl. !n thc
first paragraph it is rclcrrcd to as a “pcacckccping or pcacccnlorccmcnt opcration”.
UN Gcncral Asscmbly, ¡laboration, Pursuant to Paragraph . ol Gcncral Asscmbly
Rcsolution ¡·/.· ol o Ðcccmbcr .oo., ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with
thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations And Associatcd Pcrsonncl, with Particular
Rclcrcncc to Rcsponsibility lor Attacks on Such Pcrsonncl, Vorking documcnt sub
mittcd by Ðcnmark, Finland, !ccland, Norway and Swcdcn, ., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/
L.. (.oo¡).
o¡ UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. a., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a
(.oo¡).
o· !bid., para. ¡·. Anothcr dcfinition ol thc tcrm “Unitcd Nations opcration” was also
suggcstcd as “an opcration cstablishcd pursuant to a mandatc approvcd by thc Unitcd
Nations”. !bid.
o6 !bid., para. ¡o.
aa6 Chapter 5
Commission lor Rclugccs (UNHCR).

Somc dclcgations cxprcsscd conccrn
ovcr thc tcrm “mandatc” and thc rclation to thc rcquircmcnt ol conscnt ol thc
host statc. !t was concludcd that any luturc convcntion should only covcr opcra
tions bascd upon thc conscnt ol thc rccciving statc.
o8
Vhilc somc dclcgations strcsscd thc dcsirability or ncccssity ol thc rcquirc
mcnt ol conscnt ol thc host statc, arguing that it would solvc many complcx
problcms, othcrs lound that thc convcntion would bc ol littlc importancc il it did
not apply to nonconscnsual opcrations. !t would sccm, howcvcr, to havc bccn
agrccd that only opcrations conductcd undcr thc command and control ol thc
UN should bc covcrcd by thc convcntion.
oo
!n thc rcviscd ncgotiating tcxt thc tcrm “Unitcd Nations opcration” was
dcfincd in this way:
(i) An opcration lor thc purposc ol maintaining or rcstoring intcrnational
pcacc and sccurity cstablishcd by thc compctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd
Nations and conductcd undcr its authority,
(ii) An opcration lor thc purposc ol providing cmcrgcncy humanitarian
assistancc cstablishcd by thc compctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd Nations,
whcrc thc Sccurity Council or thc Gcncral Asscmbly dccidcs that thcrc
cxists an cxccptional risk to thc salcty ol thc pcrsonncl participating in
such an opcration.
+oo
Tc discussion again rcflcctcd thc individual diffcrcnccs ol position on thc scopc
ol thc convcntion. Apart lrom thc “conscnt” and “command and control” argu
o· Tc approach rcflcctcd in thc first clcmcnt ol thc proposal lrom thc Nordic countrics
was instcad lavourcd by somc dclcgations in this rcspcct.
o· !bid., para. ·c. Conccrning thc dcfinition ol thc tcrm “Unitcd Nations opcration”,
thc chairman ol thc working group drcw attcntion to thc lollowing qucstions: (.)
Should thc application ol thc convcntion cxtcnd to opcrations mandatcd by thc
Gcncral Asscmbly or morc gcncrally to all Unitcd Nations opcrations, (a) should
cnlorccmcnt opcrations or Chaptcr \!! opcrations bc covcrcd, (.) in thc affirmativc,
should thc covcragc bc limitcd to opcrations conductcd undcr thc command and
control or supcrvision ol thc Unitcd Nations, (¡) in thc lramcwork ol cnlorccmcnt
opcrations or Chaptcr \!! opcrations, again assuming thcy wcrc brought within thc
ambit ol thc convcntion, should thc applicablc criminal law rcgimc bc that ol thc
convcntion undcr claboration or that applicablc to intcrnational armcd conflicts, (·)
should hybrid and multidimcnsional opcrations bc covcrcd by thc convcntion and
in which way, and (6) should thc convcntion bc applicablc only in thc lramcwork ol
opcrations conductcd with thc conscnt ol thc host statc and undcr statusollorccs
agrccmcnts.” !bid., para. .6a.
oo !bid., paras. .66 – .6·.
.cc UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl’, para. a·, Rcviscd Ncgotiating Tcxt, Articlc a, UN Ðoc.
A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
aa· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
mcnts, it was, howcvcr, obscrvcd that thc mcaning ol “compctcnt organ” in this
rcspcct should bc clarificd. Òn paragraph (ii) it was obscrvcd that thc “applica
tion ol a trcaty was govcrncd by thc law ol trcatics and should not dcpcnd on a
dccision ol a political organ”.
+o+
Tc tcrm “Unitcd Nations opcration” rcccivcd its final and authoritativc
dcfinition altcr ncgotiations in thc Sixth Committcc’s working group. Tc para
graph rcccivcd a ncw structurc and also somc tcxtual changcs. !t is not cntircly
clcar il thcsc changcs arc changcs in substancc. !n its final vcrsion rclcrcncc was
madc to thc UN Chartcr, and thc cxplicit rclcrcncc to “thc purposc ol providing
humanitarian assistancc” is cxcludcd lrom (ii). Tc most substantial changc, at
lcast lrom a prima facie rcading ol thc tcxt, is that an opcration must lrom now
on bc conductcd undcr UN authority and control.
Tc US dclcgation judgcd it appropriatc that opcrations, othcr than lor thc
purposc ol maintaining or rcstoring intcrnational pcacc and sccurity, ought to
bc covcrcd by thc convcntion whcrc thcrc cxistcd an “cxccptional risk” to thc
salcty ol pcrsonncl participating in thosc typcs ol opcration. !t cxprcsscd confi
dcncc that thc Sccurity Council and thc Gcncral Asscmbly would not hcsitatc
in dcclaring whcrc appropriatc thc cxistcncc ol an cxccptional risk. Tc nccd to
obtain such a dcclaration was not vicwcd as posing a barricr lor an cffcctivc appli
cation ol thc convcntion.
+o:
Tc Australian and ]apancsc dclcgations prcsumcd
and cxpcctcd thosc bodics to makc such dcclarations “carly” and “routincly”.
+o:
Tc Cuban dclcgation cxprcsscd rcscrvations on thc dcfinition ol “Unitcd
Nations opcration”, arguing lor a rcquircmcnt ol conscnt ol thc host statc undcr
thc dcfinition.
+o±
Ncw Zcaland’s dclcgation asscrtcd on thc othcr hand that con
scnt could not lorm thc basc upon which protcction was affordcd to UN pcrson
ncl. Òn thc contrary, it was in lact in such situations whcrc thcrc was no cffcctivc
govcrnmcnt that thc luturc convcntion could and would bc ol spccific valuc.
+o¡

Assessment
Operation
!t is apparcnt that thc tcrm “opcration” as such is not dcfincd in thc convcntion.
As 8ourloyannis\railas obscrvcs, an opcration did not ncccssarily havc to bc ol
a high magnitudc. !t could wcll bc limitcd in its rangc, such as a lactfinding mis
sion. Shc concludcs that in thc abscncc ol a prccisc dcfinition ol thc tcrm “a widc
intcrprctation sccms dclcnsiblc”.
+o6
Vhcthcr longtcrm missions, such as human
.c. !bid., paras. 6·, Anncx ..
.ca UN GAÒR, ¡oth Scss., ·¡th mtg., .·, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/P\.·¡ (.oo¡).
.c. !bid., .·.
.c¡ !bid., .6.
.c· !bid., .·. Tc dclcgation ol Ncw Zcaland also cncouragcd thc Sccurity Council and
thc Gcncral Asscmbly to makc prccmptivc dcclarations.
.c6 8ourloyannis\railas, ·66.
aa· Chapter 5
rights officcs, which havc bccn activc lor scvcral ycars in somc statcs, could bc
construcd as an “opcration” is opcn to intcrprctation.
Established
!n ordcr to lall within thc provisions ol thc convcntion a UN opcration nccds to
bc “cstablishcd by thc compctcnt organ” ol thc UN, and in accordancc with thc
Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations. !n rclation both to subparagraph (c) (i) and thc
purposc ol maintaining or rcstoring intcrnational pcacc and sccurity, thc Sccurity
Council is clcarly a compctcnt organ. !t should bc notcd, howcvcr, that UN¡F
was cstablishcd undcr thc authority ol thc Gcncral Asscmbly in accordancc with
thc provisions ol thc “Uniting lor Pcacc Rcsolution”.
+o·
!t is thus possiblc that thc
Gcncral Asscmbly might also bc a compctcnt organ undcr subparagraph (c) (i).
Tc important critcrion lor judgmcnt is that an opcration must bc cstablishcd in
accordancc with thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations.
+o8

Tc condition ol a UN opcration nccding to bc “cstablishcd” has prcviously
bccn intcrprctcd as rclcrring to opcrations considcrcd to bc subsidiary organs
ol thc UN.
+oo
Tcy should thcrclorc bc distinguishcd lrom opcrations that arc
authoriscd by thc UN but undcrtakcn by a statc or a group ol statcs. Tc lact that
a UN opcration nccds to bc “conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority and con
trol” might complicatc such an intcrprctation. An opcration established by thc UN
is normally carricd out undcr its “command and control”.
++o
UN authority
Tc tcrms “authority and control” arc not dcfincd in thc convcntion. !t was
cmphasiscd by somc dclcgations during thc ncgotiations that only opcrations
conductcd undcr thc command and control ol thc UN should bc covcrcd by
thc convcntion.
+++
Tc final tcxt clcarly rcflccts a wcakcr controlrcquircmcnt ol
.c· GA Rcs. .·· (\) Uniting lor pcacc, UN GAÒR ·
th
Scss., UN Ðoc A/R¡S/.·· (\)
(.o·c). Tc rcsolution was adoptcd in .o·c by thc Gcncral Asscmbly in rcsponsc to
thc inability ol thc Sccurity Council to act on a thrcat to thc intcrnational pcacc and
sccurity. Scc 8owctt, oc.
.c· According to Lcppcr, thc qucstion ol which organ has compctcncc is lclt opcn in thc
Convcntion and must bc dccidcd on a cascbycasc basis. Lcppcr, .oa.
.co Claudc ¡manuclli, Blue Helmets: Policemen or Combatants?, ·c, ·., (Claudc ¡manuclli
cd., .oo·), Robcrt Sickmann, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl: its Scopc ol Application, in Reflections on International Law
from the Low Countries, ..·, ..· (¡. Ðcntcrs and N. Schrijvcr cds., .oo·).
..c M.Christianc 8ourloyannis\railas, Crimcs Against Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, in Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law. Te
Experience of International and National Courts, Vol.1 Commentary, ..., .¡¡ (Gabricllc
Kirk McÐonald and Òlivia SwaakGoldman cds., accc).
... UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx ! para. 6, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
aao Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
thc UN. According to Kirsch, this was a “hcavily ncgotiatcd compromisc lan
guagc lalling somcwhcrc bctwccn UN command and control, on thc onc hand,
and UN authority, on thc othcr”.
++:
A tcntativc suggcstion is that any opcration
cstablishcd by a compctcnt organ in accordancc with thc UN Chartcr will auto
matically bc conductcd undcr UN authority. Tc “authorityrcquircmcnt” could,
according to this intcrprctation, thcrclorc bc satisficd by thc mcrc conclusion ol
a UN mandatc. Sincc this standard, or principlc, may not add anything morc to
thc dcfinition ol a UN opcration thc substantial critcrion would thus bc thc tcrm
“control”.
UN control
Possiblc intcrprctations ol thc tcrm “control”, in this contcxt, would bc political
control and opcrational control. Vith rcgard to thc tcrm “command and control”,
thc SccrctaryGcncral has distinguishcd thrcc lcvcls ol authority:
(a) Òvcrall political dircction, which bclongs to thc Sccurity Council,
(b) ¡xccutivc dircction and command, lor which thc SccrctaryGcncral is
rcsponsiblc,
(c) Command in thc ficld, which is cntrustcd by thc SccrctaryGcncral to
thc chicl ol mission (spccial rcprcscntativc ol lorcc commandcr/chicl
military obscrvcr).
++:

Taking thosc lcvcls ol authority as a basis lor thc dcfinition ol thc tcrm “control”,
it should bc clcar that it could not amount to (c), “command in thc ficld”. Tc
tcrm “control”, it is suggcstcd, dcfinitcly rcflccts a wcakcr controlrcquircmcnt ol
thc UN than that which is includcd in UN “command and control”. Tc “ovcr
all political dircction” appcars to bc similar to thc tcrm “authority”, according
to thc dcfinition uscd abovc. Tc tcrm “control”, in thc contcxt ol thc convcn
tion, may wcll bc similar to thc cxccutivc dircction ol thc Sccrctary Gcncral. !t
would, according to Kirsch, lall somcwhcrc bctwccn UN command and control
and UN authority. A possiblc conclusion, thcrclorc, is that opcrational control
should rcsidc with thc Sccrctary Gcncral. Shraga asscrts that thc tcrminology
“command and control” is uscd to dcsignatc “thc political dircction and cxclusivc
opcrational command ol thc Unitcd Nations”.
++±
Howcvcr, in his rcport on thc
scopc ol application ol thc convcntion, thc SccrctaryGcncral statcs, with rcgard
..a Kirsch, .·6.
... Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Supplcmcnt to An Agcnda lor Pcacc, position
papcr ol thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc occasion ol thc Filticth Annivcrsary ol thc
Unitcd Nations, para. .·, UN Ðoc. A/·c/6cS/.oo·/. (.oo·).
..¡ Ðaphna Shraga, Tc Unitcd Nations as an Actor 8ound by !ntcrnational
Humanitarian Law, in Te United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, ..·,
..·..6 (Luigi Condorclli ct al. cds., .oo6).
a.c Chapter 5
to thc critcrion in Articlc . (c) (i) that thc opcration must bc “lor thc purposc ol
maintaining or rcstoring intcrnational pcacc and sccurity”, that such an opcr
ation “is clcarly any pcacckccping opcration conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations
command and control, to thc cxclusion ol Unitcd Nations authorizcd opcrations
conductcd undcr national command and control”.
++¡
Tc rclcrcncc to “command
and control” prompts scvcral qucstions. !s this indicativc ol a morc rcstrictivc cri
tcrion lor pcacckccping opcrations to lall undcr thc rcgimc ol thc convcntion: !s
it an acccptancc that, in practicc, pcacckccping opcrations arc cithcr undcr UN
command and control or undcr thc command and control ol anothcr intcrgov
crnmcntal organisation or statc: Vas thc authority and control rcquircmcnt only
a mcans ol rcaching a conclusion and to adopt thc convcntion:
Operations requiring a declaration of exceptional risk
Rcgarding thc sccond catcgory, . (c) (ii), ol UN opcrations, it would sccm on
closc analysis to cncompass any kind ol opcration, irrcspcctivc ol its purposc, so
long as thcrc had bccn dcclarcd to cxist an cxccptional risk lor thc pcrsonncl con
ccrncd. As ol yct no such dcclaration has bccn madc.
++6
Tc SccrctaryGcncral
lound that an opcration ol thc sccond catcgory “is any othcr Unitcd Nations
prcscncc in a host country cstablishcd by a Unitcd Nations compctcnt organ
– though not ncccssarily thc Gcncral Asscmbly or thc Sccurity Council – such
as, Unitcd Nations political missions, ‘postconflict, pcaccbuilding officcs’, and
Unitcd Nations humanitarian, dcvclopmcnt and human rights prcscnccs”.
++·

!n vicw ol thc lact that thc tcrm “opcration” is not dcfincd, this might bc
rcgardcd as an authoritativc statcmcnt in lavour ol a broad intcrprctation. Tc
tcrm “prcscnccs”, it is contcndcd, dcfinitcly indicatcs somcthing lcss on thc scalc
ol pcrsonncl and tasks. !t is pcrhaps wcll to rccall that during thc ncgotiations
somc dclcgations cxprcsscd conccrn that UNHCR officcs, lor cxamplc, would
not bc includcd, sincc such officcs arc bascd upon a standing mandatc ol thc
UNHCR and as such may not bc rcgardcd as “cstablishcd” in thc way indicatcd
in thc convcntion.
++8
Howcvcr, in vicw ol thc rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral,
thcsc conccrns might now bc ol lcss importancc.
..· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion
on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, paras. 6 – ·, UN Ðoc.
A/··/6.· (accc).
..6 !bid. para. .a. Tc rcport rclcrs to a lcw cascs whcrc pcrsonncl havc bccn at risk but
with a dcclaration lrom rclcvant UN bodics. Tis was onc ol thc main rcasons lor thc
cstablishmcnt ol an Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc
Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl. Scc bclow
on proposcd mcasurcs to cnhancc thc protcction ol thc convcntion.
..· !bid., para. ·
..· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. ·c, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a
(.oo¡).
a.. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
Associated personnel
Tc dcfinition ol thc tcrm “Unitcd Nations opcration” will also affcct thc cat
cgory ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl” with rcgard to thcir obligation to support thc
mandatc ol such an opcration. A UN opcration is dcfincd as “bcing conductcd
undcr Unitcd Nations authority and control”. Tc lact that an opcration nccds to
bc conducted supports thc intcrprctation that a scparatc UN opcration nccds to
exist to cnablc associatcd pcrsonncl to carry out thcir activitics in support ol that
opcration’s mandatc. !n thc UNPRÒFÒR and UNÒSÒM campaigns, whcrc
largc UN opcrations wcrc dcploycd, lorccs outsidc UN command and control
wcrc rcqucstcd to assist. Tis appcars to lall wcll within thc proposcd intcrprc
tation ol thc catcgory ol “Associatcd pcrsonncl”. !n thc casc ol thc UNM!H
opcration thc situation was morc complicatcd and lcd to thc qucstion ol whcthcr
UN pcrsonncl actually nccdcd to bc dcploycd on thc ground. Tc purposc ol
thc multinational lorcc in Haiti was supposcd to crcatc conditions lor thc latcr
dcploymcnt ol UNM!H. Tc Sccurity Council was to dctcrminc thc timc ol
thc transition bctwccn thcsc lorccs. An UNM!H advancc tcam was additionally
cstablishcd in ordcr to coordinatc its work with thc multinational lorcc and to
monitor its opcrations.
++o
!t may bc concludcd that thc multinational lorcc sup
portcd thc lulfilmcnt ol thc UN opcration’s mandatc and that thcy thcrclorc
could bc rcgardcd as bcing associatcd pcrsonncl. Tc problcm, howcvcr, rclatcd
to thc lact that thc UN opcration had not at that timc bccn dcploycd and thcrc
lorc an association could not bc said to cxist in rclation to UN pcrsonncl. Taking
anothcr vicw, it might bc possiblc to considcr thc cstablishmcnt ol thc UN opcra
tion as thc important critcrion, irrcspcctivc ol its dcploymcnt. Tc wording that
thc opcration nccds to bc “conductcd” docs not, howcvcr, complctcly support this
intcrprctation. From a tclcological standpoint it sccm appropriatc to considcr thc
multinational lorcc as associatcd pcrsonncl (had thc Salcty Convcntion bccn in
lorcc at thc timc) sincc thc purposc ol thcir mission was to pavc thc way lor thc
dcploymcnt ol thc UNM!H opcration.
+:o

..o 8y rcsolution SC Rcs. ·6·, UN SCÒR, .a·a
nd
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·6· (.oo.) thc
Sccurity Council approvcd thc cstablishmcnt ol a small UN opcration, consisting ol
policc monitors, a military construction unit and military traincrs, to providc train
ing and guidancc lor thc armcd lorccs and thc ncw policc lorcc. Tc strcngth ol thc
mission was ., a6· pcoplc. \iolcnt dcmonstrations prcvcntcd thc lightly armcd con
tingcnt to dcploy. As a rcsponsc thc Sccurity Council adoptcd rcsolution SC Rcs.
o¡c, UN SCÒR, .¡..
th
mtg., UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/o¡c (.oo¡) whcrc it, acting undcr
Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr, authoriscd Mcmbcr Statcs to lorm a multinational
lorcc. Tc task was, inter alia, to cstablish and maintain a salc and sccurc cnviron
mcnt to cnablc a strcngthcncd UNM!H (thc Sccurity Council dccidcd to incrcasc
thc lcvcl ol troops to 6, ccc) to takc lull control ol thc opcration. Òncc a salc and
sccurc cnvironmcnt cxistcd thc multinational lorcc would tcrminatc its mission.
.ac !t should bc bornc in mind that thc assisting lorccs nccd not to bc subjcct to UN
authority and control. Scc also Lcppcr, .o.a.
a.a Chapter 5
!n thrcc largc NATÒlcd opcrations, in 8osniaHcrzcgovina (SFÒR),
+:+

Kosovo (KFÒR), and Alghanistan (!SAF), cstablishcd altcr thc adoption ol thc
Salcty Convcntion, thc balancc ol powcr bctwccn thc UN and intcrgovcrnmcn
tal organisations shiltcd in lavour ol thc lattcr. !n all ol thosc countrics thcrc is,
or was, a UN prcscncc: UNM!8H
+::
in 8osniaHcrzcgovina, UNM!K in Scrbia
and Montcncgro, and UNAMA in Alghanistan. !l thosc UN prcscnccs arc to
bc rcgardcd as UN opcrations lor thc purposc ol thc Salcty Convcntion, thc
NATÒlcd military opcrations should probably bc considcrcd associatcd pcr
sonncl in accordancc with Articlc . (b) (i). Tc lact that thcsc NATÒlcd opcra
tions wcrc to act upon a mandatc ol thc Sccurity Council probably lulfillcd thc
condition ol agrccmcnt by a compctcnt UN organ. Tcy wcrc assigncd by a statc
to an intcrnational govcrnmcntal organisation with thc agrccmcnt ol a compc
tcnt UN organ. !n vicw ol thc lact that thcsc lorccs actcd upon thc authority ol
a UN mandatc, it could bc argucd that NATÒlcd lorccs accordingly act in sup
port ol thc lulfilmcnt ol a UN opcration’s mandatc. !t appcars to bc a logical con
scqucncc ol thc practicc ol thc Sccurity Council to authorisc and cntrust pcacc
opcrations to thc carc ol rcgional organisations or othcr coalitions. Tc strong
opposition against indcpcndcnt activitics outsidc UN control may, howcvcr, sug
gcst a rcstrictivc intcrprctation in thcsc cascs.
+::

!n thc ncw cra ol UNauthoriscd opcrations, acting undcr national com
mand and control or through that ol an intcrgovcrnmcntal organisation, thcrc
may not bc a parallcl UN opcration cstablishcd lor thc purposc ol maintaining
or rcstoring intcrnational pcacc and sccurity with which thc national lorccs could
bc associatcd. Howcvcr, il thc propcr UN agcncy dcclarcd that thcrc cxistcd an
cxccptional risk lor pcrsonncl taking part in a UN opcration ol anothcr charac
tcr, thc national lorccs may, il supporting thc lulfilmcnt ol thc mandatc ol that
opcration, bc rcgardcd as having “Associatcd pcrsonncl” status lor thc purposcs
ol thc convcntion. Although not cxprcsscd in thc convcntion, it is prcsumcd
that thc opcration must bc within thc arca ol opcrations ol thc military lorcc.
Howcvcr, thc possibility cannot bc rulcd out that an UNauthoriscd opcration
might, in cffcct, support thc mandatc ol a UNHCR officc situatcd in a ncigh
bouring country. Howcvcr, thc nccd to support thc mandatc ol a UN opcration
.a. !t should bc notcd that lrom a Ðcccmbcr acc¡, thc ¡uropcan Union Forcc in 8osnia
Hcrzcgovina (¡UFÒR) is thc lcgal succcssor to SFÒR. CÒUNC!L СC!S!ÒN
acc¡/·c./CFSP ol a· Novcmbcr acc¡ on thc launching ol thc ¡uropcan Union
military opcration in 8osnia and Hcrzcgovina, Ò] L .·./a. (acc¡). For thc pur
posc ol this study, howcvcr, SFÒR is thc lorcc principally rclcrrcd to in this rcspcct.
.aa UNM!8H was tcrminatcd .. Ðcccmbcr acca.
.a. Scc c.g. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc
¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx ! para. ·, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp)
(.oo¡).
a.. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
sccms to bc rcquircd at thc timc ol assignmcnt ol thc lorccs (Articlc . (b)) and
may thcrclorc not rcadily bc inlcrrcd during thc opcration. Òn thc othcr hand, il
an alrcady dcploycd UN opcration latcr camc undcr thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc
Salcty Convcntion duc to a dcclaration ol cxccptional risk, pcrsons assigncd by
a Govcrnmcnt to assist thc UN opcration in thc first placc, should than bccomc
associatcd pcrsonncl lor thc purposc ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
·.....¡ Rclationship to intcrnational humanitarian law
Tc draltcrs ol thc convcntion wcrc conscious ol thc rclationship to intcrnational
humanitarian law and that thc two rcgimcs should not bc simultancously appli
cablc. !n Articlc a(a) it is thcrclorc stipulatcd:
Tis Convcntion shall not apply to a Unitcd Nations opcration authorizcd
by thc Sccurity Council as an cnlorccmcnt action undcr Chaptcr \!! ol thc
Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations in which any ol thc pcrsonncl arc cngagcd as
combatants against organizcd armcd lorccs and to which thc law ol intcrna
tional armcd conflict applics.
The negotiations (roo,-roo¡)
!nitially thc rclationship cxisting bctwccn thc laws ol war and thc scopc ol thc
convcntion was vagucly lormulatcd. Ðralt Articlc 6 “Applicability ol intcrna
tional humanitarian law” ol thc joint proposal by Ncw Zcaland and thc Ukrainc
rcad:
.. !n cascs not covcrcd by this Convcntion or by othcr intcrnational agrcc
mcnts, Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl rcmain undcr thc protcction ol uni
vcrsally rccogniscd principlcs ol intcrnational law, in particular, norms ol
intcrnational humanitarian law.
a. Nothing in this Convcntion shall bc construcd so as to dcrogatc lrom
thc rcsponsibility ol Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl to rcspcct intcrnational
humanitarian law.
+:±
Two gcncral qucstions wcrc raiscd in conncction with this articlc. Tc first con
ccrncd thc participation ol thc UN with intcrnational humanitarian law instru
mcnts. Tc othcr qucstion conccrncd thc rclationship bctwccn thc privilcgcs and
immunitics ol UN and intcrnational humanitarian law. !t was rcmarkcd that thc
.a¡ UN Gcncral Asscmbly, ¡laboration, Pursuant To Paragraph . ol Gcncral Asscmbly
Rcsolution ¡·/.· ol o Ðcccmbcr .oo., ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling
Vith thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, with
Particular Rclcrcncc to Rcsponsibility lor Attacks on Such Pcrsonncl, Proposal by
Ncw Zcaland and Ukrainc, ¡ – ·, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/L.a and Corr. . (.oo¡).
a.¡ Chapter 5
distinction to bc madc was not bctwccn pcacckccping and pcacccnlorccmcnt
opcrations but rathcr bctwccn thosc typcs ol opcration and situations whcrc thc
UN actcd as party to an armcd conflict. !t was also contcndcd that a distinc
tion should bc madc bctwccn traditional pcacckccping opcrations as opposcd to
cnlorccmcnt and military lunctions.
+:¡
Ðuring thc coursc ol thc committcc’s work, a proposal lrom thc US dcl
cgation was lound to bc particularly usclul in thc claboration ol thc convcntion’s
rclationship to thc law ol armcd conflict. Tis proposal rcad:
Tis Convcntion shall not apply whcrc thc opcration was authoriscd by thc
Sccurity Council as an cnlorccmcnt action, thc opcration involvcs an intcr
national armcd conflict to which common articlc a ol thc .o¡o Gcncva
Convcntions apply and thc Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl arc a party or othcrwisc
cngagcd as combatants in thc conflict.
+:6

Somc dclcgations rcmarkcd that it was sufficicnt to rclcr to thc law ol intcr
national armcd conflict instcad ol rclcrring to Articlc a ol thc .o¡o Gcncva
Convcntions. Morcovcr, it was statcd that thcrc should bc no distinction bctwccn
intcrnational and nonintcrnational armcd conflicts.
+:·
!n thc rcviscd ncgotiating
tcxt, paragraph . ol Articlc .a “Scopc ol application and dcfinitions”, rcad:
Tis Convcntion shall not apply to Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl
participating in a Unitcd Nations opcration authoriscd by thc Sccurity Council
as an cnlorccmcnt action undcr Chaptcr \!! ol thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd
Nations in rcspcct ol which any such pcrsonncl arc cngagcd as combatants in
an intcrnational armcd conflict ol thc kind rclcrrcd to in common articlc a ol
thc Gcncva Convcntions ol .a August .o¡o.
+:8
Somc dclcgations lclt that thc paragraph should bc broadcncd, thcrcby limiting
thc scopc ol thc convcntion and anothcr proposal rcad:
Tc prcscnt Convcntion shall not apply to a Unitcd Nations opcration author
iscd by thc Sccurity Council as an cnlorccmcnt action undcr Chaptcr \!! ol
thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations and in which Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl
.a· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd
out Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, paras. ···o, UN Ðoc. A/
AC.a¡a/a (.oo¡).
.a6 !bid., Anncx, Scction F.
.a· !bid., para. .6o.
.a· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. a·, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
a.· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
may bc involvcd as combatants against lorccs opcrating in circumstanccs whcrc
intcrnational humanitarian law is applicablc.
+:o
Anothcr position was to broadcn thc provision cvcn lurthcr to includc all opcra
tions with a Chaptcr \!! mandatc.
+:o
!t was, howcvcr, also suggcstcd that thc
paragraph should bc rcdraltcd to clarily thc position that thc convcntion would
bc applicablc to opcrations not involving military cocrcivc action.
Assessment
Tc intcntion bchind Articlc a(a), is to draw a clcar linc bctwccn thc application
ol thc convcntion and thc applicability ol intcrnational humanitarian law. !l UN
lorccs wcrc to bc drawn into an armcd conflict, acting as combatants, thcy could
not at thc samc timc bc protcctcd by thc convcntion. Such a situation could pcr
haps havc an croding cffcct on thc norms ol intcrnational humanitarian law. Tc
undcrlying principlc ol intcrnational humanitarian law is that anyonc taking part
in hostilitics as a combatant should havc thc samc kind ol lcgal status, irrcspcc
tivc ol whcthcr that pcrson was fighting lor an aggrcssor statc or a dclcnding
party to thc conflict.
+:+

8clorc cxamining this issuc lurthcr, it should bc notcd that both thc con
vcntion and intcrnational humanitarian law might protcct UN lorccs acting in
thc area ol a continuing armcd conflict. Tc warring partics must abidc by thc
laws ol war and trcat UN lorccs accordingly. Tc purposc ol Articlc a(a), is to rcg
ulatc thc situation whcn UN lorccs bccomc part ol an armcd conflict. Tc con
vcntion docs not rcstrict thc protcction UN and associatcd pcrsonncl arc cntitlcd
to undcr intcrnational humanitarian law. Scc, lor instancc, Articlc · ol thc !CC
statutc, according to which it is a war crimc to attack such pcrsonncl whcn thcy
cnjoy protcction as civilians undcr intcrnational humanitarian law.
+::
Civilian
pcrsonncl losc thcir protcction undcr thc convention oncc military pcrsonncl arc
cngagcd as combatants in an intcrnational armcd conflict. Tcir protcctcd status
according to intcrnational humanitarian law, howcvcr, would not changc. Tcrc
sccms to havc bccn somc conlusion on this in thc SccrctaryGcncral’s rcport.
Arguing lor dispcnsing with thc contractual link bctwccn humanitarian NGÒs
and thc UN it is statcd in Notc · ol thc Rcport: “!n conditioning thc protcction to
.ao !bid., Anncx ., para. .a.
..c !bid., para. ...
... Scc Christophcr Grccnwood, Historical Ðcvclopmcnt and Lcgal 8asis, in Te
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, ., · (Ðictcr, Flcck ct al, cds.,
.oo·).
..a Scc Ðormann, howcvcr, who notcs thc linkagc bctwccn thc gcncral rulcs stipu
latcd undcr thc !CC statutc with rcgard to crimcs against pcrsonncl in pcacckccp
ing missions and Articlc a(a) ol thc Salcty Convcntion. Knut Ðormann, Elements
of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Sources and
Commentary, .··.·o (acc.).
a.6 Chapter 5
humanitarian nongovcrnmcntal organizations on an agrccmcnt with thc Unitcd
Nations, thc Convcntion has, in lact, limitcd thc protcction to which thcy arc
cntitlcd undcr intcrnational humanitarian law in situations ol armcd conflict.”
+::

Tc Rcport rclcrs, as support lor this vicw to Articlc ·. ol Additional Protocol !
to thc Gcncva Convcntions and Articlc · ol thc Statutc ol thc !CC. Tc agrcc
mcnt with thc UN makcs thc protcction conditional undcr thc convcntion and in
this rcspcct bcars no rclationship to intcrnational humanitarian law.
Military lorccs acting on bchall ol thc UN cnjoy protcction according to thc
convcntion, but thc authors ol thc convcntion rcaliscd that this would not bc pos
siblc to rctain whcn such lorccs wcrc acting as combatants to an armcd conflict.
Tc rcsult, howcvcr, bcgs a lcw qucstions. Tc paragraph consists ol a cumula
tivc list ol conditions. Vhcn thcsc arc lulfillcd, thc convcntion bccomcs inopcra
tivc. Ònc condition is that it must bc an cnlorccmcnt action authoriscd by thc
Sccurity Council undcr Chaptcr \!! ol thc UN Chartcr. Vith rcgard to com
promiscsolution “authority and control” dcfining a UN opcration, it is surprising
that Articlc a(a) rclcrs to a UN opcration “authoriscd” by thc Sccurity Council.
Sickmann finds that this inconsistcncy in tcrminology adds to thc conlusion ol
thc prccisc mcaning ol a UN opcration and that it suggcsts that only opcrations
undcrtakcn by statcs on bchall ol thc UN would bc cxcludcd, and not thosc con
ductcd by thc UN.
+:±

Shraga idcntifics thc samc problcm, suggcsting that this might imply that
only opcrations authorised by thc UN, but conductcd undcr anothcr organisa
tion’s command and control, would bc cxccptcd lrom thc convcntion’s scopc ol
application.

Tat would, howcvcr, crcatc a limitcd cxccption sincc thc only way
thosc kinds ol opcration would comc undcr thc convcntion’s rcgimc at all would
bc il thc pcrsonncl conccrncd wcrc associated with a UN opcration. Tis intcrprc
tation docs not sccm to bc supportcd by thc ncgotiations and crcatcs unncccssary
ambiguity conccrning thc application ol thc convcntion.
+:¡
Rcgarding thc condition that an opcration must bc authoriscd undcr Chapter
VII ol thc UN Chartcr has bccn cxplaincd by Stcvcn ]. Lcppcr, a mcmbcr ol thc
Unitcd Statcs Ðclcgation to thc Unitcd Nations Ad Hoc Conlcrcncc on thc
Protcction ol Unitcd Nations Pcrsonncl, as bcing “mcrcly a rcflcction ol thc lact
... Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, o notc ·, UN Ðoc. A/··/6.·
(accc).
..¡ Sickmann, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, .a.. For a dctailcd discussion on thc rclationship bctwccn thc notion
“authority and control” and “authority” scc .a..aa.
..· Ðaphna Shraga, Tc Applicability ol !ntcrnational Humanitarian Law to Unitcd
Nations Òpcrations, in Blue Helmets: Policemen or Combatants .·, .c (Claudc
¡manuclli, cd., .oo·).
a.· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
that only such opcrations arc likcly to involvc UN lorccs as combatants in intcr
national armcd conflicts”.
+:6

Tis is ccrtainly truc. Usc ol lorcc bcyond thc conccpt ol sclldclcncc in a
Chaptcr \! opcration would probably violatc thc ordcrs ol thc Forcc Commandcr
as wcll as thc mandatc ol thc opcration. ¡xccssivc usc ol lorcc by military pcrson
ncl ol a pcacc opcration undcr such circumstanccs would arguably not makc thc
convcntion inopcrativc. Acts, othcrwisc bcing criminaliscd undcr thc convcntion,
could thcrclorc bc justificd as sclldclcncc against cxccssivc usc ol lorcc by thc
pcacc opcration military pcrsonncl conccrncd. Tis will not, howcvcr, mcan that
military lorccs in a Chaptcr \! opcration could ncvcr bc involvcd in an armcd
conflict.
Tc momcnt at which somc ol thc pcrsonncl conccrncd bccamc cngagcd
as combatants, all ol thc pcrsonncl would losc thcir protcctcd status, according
to thc convcntion. Anothcr solution would havc bccn to statc that in rclation to
civilian pcrsonncl, thc convcntion would continuc to apply but rclcvant provi
sions ol intcrnational humanitarian law would takc prcccdcncc ovcr thc convcn
tion. A tcntativc proposal in this rcspcct could bc that in situations governed by
international humanitarian law, the convention continues to apply in relation to UN
and associated personnel not engaged as combatants in the armed conflict.
Tc convcntion’s “allornothing” approach could havc strangc cffccts il
small numbcrs ol a largc UN lorcc wcrc cngagcd as combatants in a rcmotc
part ol thc UN lorcc’s arca ol opcration. Anothcr issuc not propcrly dcalt with is
whcthcr thc UN and associatcd pcrsonncl could rcturn to thc convcntion’s pro
tcction at thc cnd ol hostilitics. A UN opcration may bc conductcd ovcr scvcral
ycars and it is possiblc that thc situation on thc ground could changc considcr
ably in charactcr.
Anothcr ol thc cumulativc conditions is that thc law ol intcrnational armcd
conflict should apply to thc situation. Tc spccific rclcrcncc to thc law ol inter-
national armcd conflict implics that thcrc cxist situations whcrc UN lorccs could
takc a dircct part in hostilitics and still bc protcctcd by thc convcntion. Sincc thc
convcntion spccifically rclcrs to thc law ol intcrnational armcd conflict, it appcars
to apply in armcd conflicts ol a nonintcrnational charactcr.
+:·
Such a situation
might arguably appcar whcn UN lorccs act against nonstatc cntitics. Ðuring thc
ncgotiations it was suggcstcd that intcrnational humanitarian law would apply to
situations whcrc UN military pcrsonncl “wcrc cngagcd in combat with organiscd
armcd lorccs having an idcntifiablc command structurc, carrying arms opcnly
..6 Scc Lcppcr, .o·.
..· Scc 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ·6·. Shc finds that this inconsistcncy sccms unclcar and
that thcrc arc no obvious rcasons why this situation should bc protcctcd by thc
Convcntion.
a.· Chapter 5
and controlling part ol thc tcrritory ol thc host Statc”.
+:8
!t would imply a critc
rion comparablc to thc “thrcsholdrcquircmcnt” in Additional Protocol !! to thc
Gcncva Convcntions (AP !!). !t would thus havc crcatcd an “ovcrlap” bctwccn
thc Salcty Convcntion and intcrnational humanitarian law in nonintcrnational
armcd conflicts in which thc opposing party would not havc lulfillcd thc abovc
mcntioncd conditions bascd upon thc AP !!. !n thc currcnt tcxt thc “ovcrlap”
bctwccn thc two rcgimcs is cvcn grcatcr. Tc Salcty Convcntion continucs to
apply to all cascs ol armcd conflict not ol an intcrnational charactcr.
+:o
Should
this bc rcgardcd as a mistakc on thc part ol thc draltcrs, or is it intcntionally
craltcd in ordcr to cnhancc thc protcction ol pcrsonncl: Tc US dclcgation, up
to this point vcry conscious ol thc importancc ol scparating thc rcgimcs, argucd
lor an “ovcrlap” with rcgard to nonintcrnational armcd conflicts. !ts position was
influcnccd by thc tragic cvcnts cnactcd in Somalia and thc capturcd hclicoptcr
pilot Ðurant. Tc US dclcgation rcgardcd this ovcrlapping “as a ncccssary cxccp
tion to that gcncral rulc”.
+±o

Tc SccrctaryGcncral notcd in his rcport, ol accc, that thc “combat
antcxccption” in thc convcntion “givcs risc to thc suggcstion that cnlorccmcnt
actions carricd out in situations ol intcrnal armcd conflict (UNÒSÒM !! typc
ol opcrations), arc includcd within thc scopc ol thc Convcntion and subjcct to
its protcctivc rcgimc.”
+±+
Hc statcs in this rcgard that thc distinction bctwccn
thc two mutually cxclusivc rcgimcs will cvcntually bc scttlcd in practicc. Tc
SccrctaryGcncral concludcd, howcvcr, that it was not thc naturc or charactcr ol
thc conflict that should dctcrminc whcthcr thc convcntion or thc intcrnational
humanitarian law applicd but rathcr “in any typc ol conflict, mcmbcrs ol Unitcd
Nations pcacckccping opcrations arc activcly cngagcd thcrcin as combatants, or
arc othcrwisc cntitlcd to thc protcction givcn to civilians undcr thc intcrnational
law ol armcd conflict”.
+±:
His rcport clcarly supportcd an intcrprctation that thc
rcgimc ol thc Salcty Convcntion and that ol intcrnational humanitarian law arc
mutually cxclusivc. Howcvcr, this prcsumption is only partly truc. Vith civil
..· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx ., para. .. UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
..o Tc lollowing discussion is bascd upon thc assumption that involvcmcnt ol UN
lorccs may not per se makc an armcd conflict an intcrnational onc.
.¡c Lcppcr, .o·. !n nonintcrnational armcd conflicts, thc Gcncva Convcntion on thc
trcatmcnt ol prisoncrs ol war docs not apply and il UN military pcrsonncl arc
cngagcd as combatants in an armcd conflict (without thc currcnt “ovcrlap”) ncithcr
would thc Salcty Convcntion. !n such situations only Common Articlc . to thc lour
Gcncva Convcntions applics or possibly Additional Protocol !!.
.¡. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, o notc ., UN Ðoc. A/··/6.·
(accc).
.¡a !bid.
a.o Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
ians, thc rcgimc ol thc Salcty Convcntion hardly contradicts thc protcction pro
vidcd to thcm undcr intcrnational humanitarian law. Tc rcgimc ol thc Salcty
Convcntion and that ol intcrnational humanitarian law cannot in this rcgard bc
rcgardcd as bcing mutually cxclusivc. !t should also bc notcd that thc Sccrctary
Gcncral appcars to add a condition ol bcing “activcly” cngagcd as a combatant lor
thc intcrnational humanitarian law to bc applicablc.
+±:

Valtcr Gary Sharp, scvcrcly critical ol thc convcntion, has argucd de lege
ferenda that UN lorccs should also havc privilcgcs and immunitics whcn cngagcd
as combatants in an armcd conflict. Sincc thcy actcd on bchall ol thc intcrna
tional community, thcy should also cnjoy spccial protcction in such situations.
Hc thcrclorc suggcsts that thc “combatantcxccption” in thc convcntion should
bc dclctcd. !n addition, hc finds that whilc a singlc attack against UN and asso
ciatcd pcrsonncl is a criminal act, a massivc attack lcading to an armcd rcsponsc,
ol such intcnsity that thc UN lorccs conccrncd would bc cngagcd as combatants,
would avoid illcgality. Hc concludcs that thc convcntion “cncouragcs wouldbc
attackcrs to cnsurc thc lcgality ol thcir actions by incrcasing thc sizc and intcn
sity ol thcir attack”.
+±±
Tcsc vicws arc criticiscd by Grccnwood.
+±¡
!t is a common
undcrstanding within thc intcrnational community that thc principlc ol cqual
application is a corc lcaturc ol thc laws ol armcd conflict. Tis principlc also has
pragmatic implications. ¡vcryonc who is constraincd by thc law should also bcn
cfit lrom thc law.
+±6
Grccnwood concludcs that to “dcpart lrom that principlc
would bc likcly to undcrminc rcspcct lor thc law”.
+±·
Against thc background ol
thc NATÒ air strikcs in 8iH, Grccnwood finds, howcvcr, that a highcr dcgrcc ol
lorcc may bc tolcratcd in situations involving UN lorccs bclorc thc law ol armcd
conflict bccomcs applicablc.
Howcvcr, it should bc notcd that in thc contcxt ol a nonintcrnational
armcd conflict, statcs havc not givcn up thcir right to punish rcbcls according
to national criminal law. Although both partics arc undcr a duty to trcat thosc
.¡. !t is not a condition lor bcing a combatant to havc to takc an activc part in hostili
tics. Howcvcr, it should bc notcd thc protcction affordcd civilians undcr Additional
Protocol ! (AP !) is bascd upon thc condition that thcy do not “takc a dircct part in
hostilitics.” Articlc ·.(.) ol AP !.
.¡¡ Valtcr Gary Sharp, Sr., Jus Paciarii, Emergent Legal Paradigms for U. N. Peace
Operations in the 21
st
Century, ·6 (.ooo). Hc lurthcr claims that, il applying “cxisting
intcrnational law to Unitcd Nations lorccs without any modification allows mcm
bcrs ol organiscd armcd lorccs to simply dcclarc a statc ol hostilitics, thcrcby invok
ing thc application ol thc law ol intcrnational armcd conflict”.
.¡· Grccnwood, Protcction ol Pcacckccpcrs, ac¡.
.¡6 Tc oltquotcd statcmcnt in this rcspcct (by Sir Hcrsch Lautcrpacht) that “|i|t is
impossiblc to visualizc thc conduct ol hostilitics in which onc sidc would bc bound
by rulcs ol warlarc without bcncfiting lrom thcm and thc othcr sidc would bcncfit
lrom thcm without bcing bound by thcm”, Hcrsch Lautcrpacht, Tc Limits ol thc
Òpcration ol thc Law ol Var, .c BYIL, ac6, a.a (.o·.).
.¡· Grccnwood, Protcction ol Pcacckccpcrs, ac¡·.
a¡c Chapter 5
not participating in thc armcd conflict humancly, it may still bc a crimc undcr
national law to attack govcrnmcntal lorccs.
+±8
Tcrc is, lor instancc, no mcntion
ol combatants undcr thc lcgal instrumcnts applicablc in nonintcrnational armcd
conflicts. Rcbcls, and thc likc, can thcrclorc not cxpcct to bc trcatcd as combat
ants (who arc not punishcd lor thcir lcgitimatc acts undcr intcrnational humani
tarian law).
+±o
¡vcn il rcbcl lorccs abidc by thc standards ol humanitarian law
thcy may still lacc prosccution undcr national law lor attacking govcrnmcntal
lorccs.
+¡o
!t may thcrclorc bc argucd that thc military pcrsonncl ol a pcacc opcra
tion, rcprcscnting thc intcrnational community, may havc a similar status as that
ol govcrnmcntal lorccs, visavis armcd groups and rcbcls whcn involvcd in a
nonintcrnational armcd conflict. Tcrc is thus somc support to bc drawn lrom
thc analogy ol thc rclationship bctwccn dissidcnt lorccs and govcrnmcntal lorccs.
Against thc background ol thcsc considcrations, thc ovcrlap bctwccn thc two
rcgimcs may in lact not bc an cxccption to thc gcncral rulc but rathcr an cxprcs
sion ol lex lata. !t should bc notcd that this intcrprctation ol Articlc a(a) is not
supportcd by its ncgotiating history nor by thc position takcn by thc Sccrctary
Gcncral in his rcport lrom accc.
Tc lact that mcmbcrs ol armcd groups can bc prosccutcd undcr thc Salcty
Convcntion lor attacking UN pcrsonncl, cvcn il thcy arc involvcd in an armcd
conflict, providcs a highcr lcvcl ol protcction than il thc pcrpctrators ol such
attacks wcrc to bc immunc lrom prosccution undcr thc prctcxt that thcy had
conductcd a lcgitimatc act ol war. !n practicc, howcvcr, thc aspcct ol how this is
pcrccivcd may also nccd to bc takcn into account. Tcrc is pcrhaps a risk that rcbcl
groups involvcd in an armcd conflict with pcacc opcration lorccs may bc discour
agcd lrom complying with intcrnational humanitarian law il mcmbcrs ol such
groups wcrc to bc punishcd lor acts, which, il takcn in thc contcxt ol an intcr
national armcd conflict, would havc bccn rcgardcd lcgitimatc acts ol war.
+¡+
An
opponcnt involvcd in a nonintcrnational armcd conflict would havc no rcason
.¡· ]amcs G. Stcwart, Towards a singlc dcfinition ol armcd conflict in intcrnational
humanitarian law: A critiquc ol intcrnationalizcd armcd conflict, ·· IRRC, ..., .ac
(acc.).
.¡o Prisoncrolwar status was rcjcctcd militia mcmbcrs lor acts ol violcncc against
mcmbcrs ol thc !ntcrnational Forcc lor ¡ast Timor (!NT¡RF¡T). Michacl, ].,
Kclly, ct al, Lcgal aspccts ol Australia’s involvcmcnt in thc !ntcrnational Forcc lor
¡ast Timor, ·¡. IRRC, .c., ..c... (acc.).
.·c According to Te Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, issucd by thc UK Ministry ol
Ðclcncc, mcmbcrs ol dissidcnt armcd lorccs, unlikc combatants in an intcrnational
armcd conflict, “rcmain liablc to prosccution lor offcnccs undcr domcstic law. Tcsc
can includc normal acts ol combat – lor cxamplc, a dissidcnt combatant who kills
or injurcs a mcmbcr ol thc govcrnmcntal lorccs may bc prosccutcd lor murdcr or
othcr offcnccs against thc pcrson – and cvcn mcmbcrship ol thc dissidcnt group”.
Te Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, .···· (acc¡).
.·. Stcwart, who advocatcs a singlc dcfinition ol armcd conflict, maintains, with rcgard
to prisoncrolwar status in intcrnal armcd conflicts, that “thcrc is vcry littlc othcr
a¡. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
to capturc soldicrs ol a pcacc opcration, as prisoncrs ol war, sincc thc captors,
according to thc convcntion, would bc obligcd to rclcasc captivcs as soon as thcy
had idcntificd thcmsclvcs. !n a worstcasc sccnario this would in lact dccrcasc
thc protcction ol UN soldicrs. Vhy bothcr to capturc il you must immcdiatcly
rclcasc: !n this rcspcct it should also bc notcd that not only do currcnt armcd
conflicts oltcn involvc both intcrnational and nonintcrnational clcmcnts, but
thc distinction bctwccn thcsc two typcs ol armcd conflict is also bccoming lcss
clcar in tcrms ol applicablc law.
A local court might bc callcd upon to makc thosc dclibcrations irrcspcctivc
ol thc applicability ol thc convcntion. Tc lormulation ol thc Salcty Convcntion’s
scopc ol application may, howcvcr, havc complicatcd thc mattcr.
·.....· Proposcd mcasurcs to cxpand thc scopc ol thc
Convcntion and thc ncw Òptional Protocol
As rcqucstcd by thc Sccurity Council, thc SccrctaryGcncral submittcd a rcport
on thc scopc ol lcgal protcction ol thc convcntion in Novcmbcr, accc. According
to thc rcport, thc nccd lor a dcclaration ol cxccptional risk should bc dispcnscd
with. Tc SccrctaryGcncral rclcrrcd to thc political and humanitarian opcra
tions in Alghanistan, 8urundi and ¡ast and Vcst Timor to illustratc thc wcak
ncsscs ol thc convcntion. Ðcspitc thc highly volatilc cnvironmcnt lor UN and
associatcd pcrsonncl in thcsc opcrations, thc propcr UN organs did not dcclarc
thc cxistcncc ol an cxccptional risk. !n lact, thc cxistcncc ol an cxccptional risk
had ncvcr bccn dcclarcd. Vith rcgard to thc catcgorics ol pcrsonncl protcctcd by
thc convcntion, thc SccrctaryGcncral hcld that thc scopc ol application ol thc
convcntion had bccn in doubt with rcspcct to pcrsonncl ol NGÒs and locally
rccruitcd pcrsonncl.
+¡:
Short-term measures
Tc proposal rcad:
(a) A proccdurc to initiatc a “dcclaration” by thc Sccurity Council or thc
Gcncral Asscmbly,
(b) Ðcsignating thc SccrctaryGcncral as thc “ccrtilying authority” lor thc
purposcs ol attcsting to thc lact ol a “dcclaration” or an “agrccmcnt”, and
to thc status ol any ol thc Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl,
inccntivc ol insurgcnt groups to comply with thc laws ol war il thcy arc not ablc to
claim thosc privilcgcs”. Stcwart, .¡·.
.·a Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, paras. o.a and .¡, UN Ðoc.
A/··/6.· (accc).
a¡a Chapter 5
(c) !ncorporating thc kcy provisions ol thc .oo¡ Convcntion in thc status
ollorccs or status ol mission agrccmcnts concludcd bctwccn thc Unitcd
Nations and Statcs in whosc tcrritorics pcacckccping opcrations arc
dcploycd.
+¡:
Tc SccrctaryGcncral should rccommcnd to thc Sccurity Council or thc Gcncral
Asscmbly that a dcclaration ol cxccptional risk should bc madc whcncvcr thcrc
arc sufficicnt warnings ol a dctcriorating sccurity situation lor pcrsonncl. For
cxamplc, whcrc thcrc is an cscalation ol conflict or warnings ol immcdiatc
attacks. !t is proposcd that such a rccommcndation could bc submittcd at thc
timc ol cstablishmcnt ol an opcration or at any timc thcrcaltcr. UN humanitar
ian opcrations arc rcgardcd as bcing particularly difficult bccausc thcy arc not
“cstablishcd” undcr a spccific mandatc but rathcr in thc ficld undcr “a standing
statutory mandatc”.
+¡±
Tc nccd lor a “ccrtilying authority” is bascd upon thc assumption that
qucstions on thc status ol victims arc likcly to occur in rclation to prosccution
and cxtradition. Tc SccrctaryGcncral has thc knowlcdgc on thc cxistcncc ol
ncccssary agrccmcnts lor associatcd pcrsonncl and thcir contcnt and whcthcr a
dcclaration ol cxccptional risk has bccn dcclarcd. !t is, morcovcr, proposcd that
a ccrtificatc by thc SccrctaryGcncral “should bc acccptcd by Statc’s authoritics
and jurisdictions as a prool ol thc lacts attcstcd thcrcin”.
+¡¡

To incorporatc thc kcy provisions ol thc convcntion into luturc SÒFAs or
status ol mission agrccmcnts (SÒMAs) would makc thcsc applicablc within thc
host nation notwithstanding thc lact that thc host statc may not bc a party to
thc convcntion.
+¡6
Tc kcy provisions wcrc idcntificd as bcing thc duty to prcvcnt
.·. !bid., para. ac.
.·¡ !bid., paras. a.aa.
.·· !bid., para. a..
.·6 !n his acc¡ rcport on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc
Salcty Convcntion ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, thc Sccrctary
Gcncral rcportcd, intcr alia, on thc practicc ol including kcy provisions ol thc Salcty
Convcntion into SÒFAs and SÒMAs. According to thc Rcport, such provisions
had bccn includcd in thc agrccmcnt “bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and Mcmbcr
Statcs, including thc agrccmcnt with thc Govcrnmcnt ol Lcbanon rcgarding thc
status ol military obscrvcrs ol thc Unitcd Nations Trucc Supcrvision Òrganization
(UNTSÒ) ol a ]uly acc., thc agrccmcnt with thc Govcrnmcnt ol Libcria conccrn
ing thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations Mission in Libcria (UNM!L) ol .. Òctobcr
acc., thc agrccmcnts with thc Govcrnmcnt ol Côtc d’!voirc on thc status ol thc
mission in Côtc d’!voirc (M!NUC!) ol .· Scptcmbcr acc. and on thc status ol thc
Unitcd Nations Òpcration in Côtc d’!voirc ol ao ]unc acc¡ (ÒNÒC!), thc agrcc
mcnt with thc Govcrnmcnt ol Haiti conccrning thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations
Òpcration in Haiti (M!NUSTAH) ol o ]uly acc¡, and most rcccntly, thc agrccmcnt
with thc Govcrnmcnt ol Sudan conccrning thc activitics ol thc Unitcd Nations
Mission in Sudan ol · August acc¡”. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal
a¡. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
attacks on mcmbcrs ol thc opcration, to makc such attacks crimcs in national law
and thc obligation to prosccutc or cxtraditc pcrpctrators.
+¡·

Iong-term measures
Tc SccrctaryGcncral lound thc shorttcrm mcasurcs to bc ol limitcd cffcct sincc
thcy did not cxtcnd thc scopc ol application ol thc convcntion to all UN opcra
tions and catcgorics ol pcrsonncl bcyond thosc alrcady covcrcd. An Additional
Protocol was suggcstcd which would disposc ol thc rcquircmcnt ol a dcclaration
ol cxccptional risk and thc nccd lor a lormal agrccmcnt bctwccn humanitarian
nongovcrnmcntal organisations and thc UN.
+¡8
Tc proposal by thc SccrctaryGcncral to cxtcnd thc application ol thc
Convcntion to all opcrations rcad:
Tc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc Convcntion shall cxtcnd to all Unitcd Nations
opcrations or prcscnccs cstablishcd in a host country pursuant to a standing or
a spccific mandatc ol a Unitcd Nations compctcnt organ, and in rcspcct ol all
Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl participating in such Unitcd Nations
opcrations and prcscnccs.
+¡o
Tc naturc ol thc opcration should not bc dccisivc lor thc protcction ol pcrsonncl
and thc rcquircmcnt lor a “dcclaration” should bc dispcnscd with. Vhcthcr thcrc
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty Convcntion ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. ¡, UN Ðoc. A/·o/aa6 (acc¡). !n Novcmbcr acc·, kcy pro
visions had bccn includcd in agrccmcnts in thc lollowing opcrations and prcscnccs:
Unitcd Nations opcration in 8urundi, UN Òfficc in TimorLcstc, UN Assistancc
Mission lor !raq (UNAM!), and UNAM! activitics in ]ordan and Kuwait. !n addi
tion agrccmcnts in lollowing opcrations wcrc undcr ncgotiation: thc activitics ol thc
UN Mission in Sudan (UNM!S) in Uganda and in Kcnya, thc activitics ol thc UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti in thc Ðominican Rcpublic, and thc UN !ntcgratcd
Òfficc in Sicrra Lconc. Tc SccrctaryGcncral also sought to amcnd thc SÒFA
bctwccn thc UN and thc Ðcmocratic Rcpublic ol thc Congo in this rcspcct. Sixth
Committcc, Summary rccord ol thc ·th mccting, paras. ····, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/6c/
SR.· (acc·).
.·· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion
on thc Salcty Convcntion ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. a¡,
UN Ðoc. A/·o/aa6 (acc¡). Scc also in thc samc paragraph cxamplc ol incorporating
thcsc provisions in a statusollorccs agrccmcnt. Tc cffcct ol incorporating thcsc
kcy provisions, howcvcr, is limitcd by thc lact that thcy only cxtcnd thc protcction
to pcrsonncl covcrcd by SÒFAs or SÒMAs. Tc SccrctaryGcncral thcrclorc sug
gcstcd that thc kcy provisions ol thc convcntion should also bc incorporatcd in host
country agrccmcnts concludcd in opcrations ol a nonpcacckccping charactcr. Tc
naturc ol such an agrccmcnt, howcvcr, would sct thc limits ol applicability ol thc
convcntion’s kcy provisions. !bid., paras. a·a6.
.·· !bid., para. a·.
.·o !bid., para. .c.
a¡¡ Chapter 5
is a risky or dangcrous cnvironmcnt should not bc a condition lor thc applicabil
ity ol thc convcntion.
+6o
As an altcrnativc mcasurc, il it was dccidcd to rctain thc rcquircmcnt ol a
dcclaration ol cxccptional risk, it was suggcstcd that in addition to thc Sccurity
Council and thc Gcncral Asscmbly, thc SccrctaryGcncral should bc compctcnt
to dcclarc, lor thc purposcs ol thc convcntion, that thcrc cxistcd an cxccptional
risk to thc salcty ol pcrsonncl.
+6+
Tc SccrctaryGcncral also suggcstcd that thc rcquircmcnt ol a contractual
link bctwccn humanitarian nongovcrnmcntal organisations and thc UN, as stip
ulatcd in Articlc . (b) (iii) ol thc Convcntion, should bc dispcnscd with.A ncw
provision was thus suggcstcd:
Tc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc Convcntion shall cxtcnd to all pcrsons dcploycd
by intcrgovcrnmcntal, nongovcrnmcntal and othcr agcncics cngagcd in a
humanitarian rclicl opcration |in thc Unitcd Nations arca ol opcration| in an
indcpcndcnt, ncutral, impartial and nondiscriminatory manncr.
+6:
Vhilc agrccmcnts with humanitarian organisations will still bc ol importancc
lor both partics, it should not, according to thc SccrctaryGcncral, bc a condition
lor thc application ol thc convcntion lor thc pcrsonncl ol such organisations.
Tc Ad Hoc Committcc acca had bclorc it thc rcport ol thc Sccrctary
Gcncral. Tcrc was a gcncral agrccmcnt that thc SccrctaryGcncral alrcady had
thc authority to initiatc thc proposcd shorttcrm mcasurcs and that no lormal
action was rcquircd by thc AdHoc Committcc.
+6:
Òn thc proposal to initiatc
a dcclaration ol cxccptional risk, thcrc was a suggcstion to link that to thc cat
cgorisation ol thc diffcrcnt phascs ol sccurity risk lor UN pcrsonncl, uscd by
thc UN Sccurity Coordinator. Howcvcr, thc political aspccts ol a dcclaration ol
cxccptional risk wcrc howcvcr strcsscd. Tc lact that it could ncgativcly affcct thc
indcpcndcnt work ol thc Sccurity Coordinator in idcntilying whcn and in what
circumstanccs UN and associatcd pcrsonncl wcrc put at risk, was also cmpha
siscd.
+6±
.6c !bid., para. ao.
.6. !bid., para. ...
.6a !bid., para. ...
.6. Scc UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, paras. .c, aa, .., UN Ðoc. A/··/·a (Supp) (acca). Vith rcgard to thc pro
posals to incorporatc kcy provisions lrom thc Salcty Convcntion into SÒFAs and
SÒMAs and to dcvisc a proccdurc to initiatc a dcclaration ol cxccptional risk, somc
dclcgations cxprcsscd conccrn that thc SccrctaryGcncral had not alrcady cxcrciscd
that authority. !bid., paras. .a, aa.
.6¡ !bid., para. a·.
a¡· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
Tc main conccrn ol dclcgations on dcsignating thc SccrctaryGcncral as
a ccrtilying authority, ccntrcd on thc cffccts ol such a ccrtificatc. !t was strcsscd
that a ccrtificatc could not havc binding cffccts on national courts and, con
scqucntly, it was lor national courts to dctcrminc its lcgal valuc in a particular
casc. !t was, morcovcr, cmphasiscd that it should bc limitcd to qucstions ol lact
and not ol law.
+6¡
Tc proposal to incorporatc kcy provisions ol thc convcntion
into SÒFAs, SÒMAs and host country agrccmcnts lound gcncral acccptancc,
although it was hcld that thc naturc ol thc provisions to bc incorporatcd should
bc takcn undcr carclul considcration.
+66
Tc suggcstion to dispcnsc with thc rcquircmcnt ol a dcclaration ol cxccp
tional risk was largcly supportcd. !t was hcld by somc dclcgations that this pro
posal addrcsscd thc main problcm ol thc convcntion and should thcrclorc bc
a local point ol thc dclibcrations ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc.
+6·
According to
thosc dclcgations thcrc should bc no distinction bctwccn pcacckccping and non
pcacckccping opcrations. !rrcspcctivc ol thc lcvcl ol risk, all UN pcrsonncl wcrc
cntitlcd to cqual protcction.
+68
Tosc dclcgations that wcrc positivc on adopting
a protocol disposing ol thc “dcclarationrcquircmcnt” rcgardcd thc proposcd tcxt
in paragraph .c ol thc SccrctaryGcncral’s rcport to bc a sound starting point. !n
this rcspcct it should bc notcd that according to thc proposcd tcxt thc convcn
tion should apply to all “Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl participating
in such Unitcd Nations opcrations and prcscnccs”.
+6o
Tc tcrm “participating”
indicatcs a strictcr rcquircmcnt lor associatcd pcrsonncl to lall undcr thc rcgimc
ol thc convcntion than currcnt conditions.
Òthcr dclcgations disagrccd that thc rcquircmcnt ol dcclaration was an clc
mcnt ol thc crimc but rathcr an clcmcnt ol thc application ol thc trcaty in a spc
cific casc. Tosc dclcgations also supportcd thc distinction to bc drawn bctwccn
pcacckccping and nonpcacckccping bccausc ol thc inhcrcnt charactcristics ol
thosc opcrations. Tcy wcrc also ol thc opinion that thc convcntion was bal
anccd and incorporatcd thc divcrgcnt vicws ol statcs. A protocol cxtcnding thc
.6· !bid., paras. .· and .6.
.66 !bid., para. .·. !t was proposcd to updatc thc UN Modcl SÒFA to incorporatc also
thc kcy provisions in thc Modcl Agrccmcnt. Tis could bc ol particular importancc
in cascs ol dclay in thc conclusion ol a spccific SÒFA during which thc Modcl
Agrccmcnt could apply provisionally. !bid., para. .o.
.6· !bid., para. ¡c.
.6· !bid. Somc dclcgations hcld that thc rcquircmcnt ol a dcclaration ol cxccptional risk
must bc rcmovcd sincc it “madc a political asscssmcnt ol thc lacts on thc ground an
clcmcnt ol thc crimc and in so doing politiciscd what should havc bccn a qucstion
purcly ol criminal law.” !bid., para. ¡..
.6o Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .c, UN Ðoc. A/··/6.·
(accc) (¡mphasis addcd).
a¡6 Chapter 5
applicability ol thc convcntion could, in thcir vicw, havc a ncgativc affcct on that
balancc.
+·o
Ðclcgations in gcncral did not lavour thc altcrnativc proposal, that thc
SccrctaryGcncral should havc thc compctcncc to dcclarc thc cxistcncc ol cxccp
tional risk. Tis was mainly duc to thc lccling that such a rolc ol thc Sccrctary
Gcncral would givc risc to othcr issucs rcgarding compctcncc bctwccn thc
diffcrcnt UN organs.
+·+

Vhilc thcrc was gcncral agrccmcnt that thc convcntion should protcct thc
pcrsonncl ol humanitarian NGÒs working togcthcr with thc UN and with somc
sort ol association with it, thc suggcstion to dispcnsc with thc rcquircmcnt ol a
contractual link altogcthcr did not find sufficicnt support.
+·:
According to somc
dclcgations thc link bctwccn NGÒs and thc UN nccd not ncccssarily bc through
a contractual link. \arious lorms ol administrativc or institutionaliscd links could
also bc acccptablc but it was important that thc link “should bc clcar and objcc
tivcly obscrvablc”.
+·:

Òthcr dclcgations opposcd thc proposal by thc SccrctaryGcncral on thc
ground that thc rclcrcncc to “an indcpcndcnt, ncutral, impartial and nondis
criminatory manncr” was a qucstion ol lact, and could bc subjcct to diffcrcnt
intcrprctations. !t was, in this rcspcct, also hcld that a dispcnsation ol a contrac
tual link with thc UN would limit thc host statc’s right to cxcrcisc its tcrrito
rial jurisdiction ovcr crimcs committcd by thc pcrsonncl ol humanitarian NGÒs
undcr Articlc · ol thc convcntion, which according to thosc dclcgations, providcd
ccrtain privilcgcs and immunitics to thc UN and associatcd pcrsonncl.
+·±
At its sccond mccting, thc Ad Hoc Committcc had bclorc it a proposal
lrom Ncw Zcaland.
+·¡
Ðuring thc dclibcrations a slightly modificd proposal was
madc by thc ¡U
+·6
bascd upon thc Ncw Zcaland proposal. A third proposal was
.·c UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, paras. ¡¡¡·, UN Ðoc. A/··/·a (Supp) (acca).
.·. !bid., para. .·.
.·a !bid., paras. ¡o6c.
.·. !bid., para. ·a. Tosc dclcgations cndorscd thc vicw by thc SccrctaryGcncral, accord
ing to paragraph .· ol his rcport, that “any contractual link or a trcaty arrangcmcnt
institutionalizing thc coopcration bctwccn thc Unitcd Nations and a nongovcrn
mcntal organization in support ol a Unitcd Nations opcration or in thc implc
mcntation ol thc mandatc, would mcct thc rcquircmcnt ol articlc . (b) (iii) ol thc
Convcntion”. !bid.
.·¡ !bid., para. ··.
.·· Proposal by Ncw Zcaland, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc./ÐP.. (acc.).
.·6 For thc partics to this Protocol, articlc . (c) ol thc Convcntion is rcplaccd as lol
lows: “Unitcd Nations opcration” mcans any Unitcd Nations opcration or prcs
cncc cstablishcd |in a host country| pursuant to a standing or spccific mandatc ol a
Unitcd Nations compctcnt organ consistcnt with thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations
and conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority and control. Proposal by Grcccc on
a¡· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
submittcd by thc dclcgation ol Pakistan.
+··
Ncw Zcaland had actcd on thc rcc
ommcndation containcd in thc rcport
+·8
by thc SccrctaryGcncral and draltcd a
protocol to bc discusscd by thc Ad Hoc Committcc with a vicw to rcmoving thc
dcclaration ol risk rcquircmcnt and to apply thc convcntion to all UN opcrations.
Tc Ncw Zcaland proposal was largcly bascd upon thc rccommcndations ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral.
+·o

Ðuring thc discussions no lcwcr than lour positions cmcrgcd on altcrnativc
ways to procccd: i) to wait and scc thc cffccts ol thc shorttcrm mcasurcs, ii) an
optional protocol, iii) an amcnding protocol, and iv) a standalonc agrccmcnt.
!t bccamc clcar that not all statcs wcrc prcparcd to discuss thc dctails ol a
ncw protocol, or cvcn a protocol as such, sincc thcy bclicvcd that thc nccd lor
such a protocol had not as yct bccn propcrly cvaluatcd. Tis position stood in
stark contrast to thc vicws ol thc SccrctaryGcncral as wcll as thc instructions
8chall ol thc ¡uropcan Union rcgarding thc proposal by Ncw Zcaland in documcnt
A/AC.a6¡/acc./ÐP.., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc./ÐP.. (acc.).
.·· Tc SccrctaryGcncral, in consultation with thc conccrncd Statcs, should rcc
ommcnd to thc Sccurity Council or to thc Gcncral Asscmbly that thcy makc a
dcclaration that an cxccptional risk to thc salcty ol thc pcrsonncl participating in
an opcration cxists in rcspcct ol cvcry opcration covcrcd by articlc . (c) (ii) ol thc
Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd pcrsonncl, at thc timc
ol its cstablishmcnt. Subscqucntly, on thc initiativc ol Statcs whosc pcrsonncl arc
participating in such an opcration, thc SccrctaryGcncral may makc such a rcc
ommcndation to thc Sccurity Council or thc Gcncral Asscmbly, whcn considcrcd
ncccssary, il no dcclaration to that cffcct was madc at thc timc ol its cstablishmcnt.
Proposal by Pakistan, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc./ÐP.a (acc.).
.·· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion
on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, paras. a·.., UN Ðoc.
A/··/6.· (accc).
.·o Articlc . ol thc proposal, dcaling with thc Application ol thc Convcntion to UN
opcrations, statcd: “.. Tc Convcntion shall apply in rcspcct ol all Unitcd Nations
and associatcd pcrsonncl, as dcfincd in articlc . ol thc Convcntion, and to all Unitcd
Nations opcrations or prcscnccs cstablishcd in a host country pursuant to a stand
ing or spccific mandatc ol a Unitcd Nations compctcnt organ consistcnt with thc
Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations and conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority and
control. a. Tc provisions ol this articlc shall, lor Partics to thc Protocol, rcplacc arti
clc . (c) ol thc Convcntion.” Articlc a ol thc proposal dcalt with thc rclationship
bctwccn this protocol and thc convcntion. “Tc provisions ol this Protocol and thc
Convcntion shall, lor Partics to this Protocol, bc intcrprctcd and applicd togcthcr as
a singlc instrumcnt. !n thc cvcnt ol any inconsistcncy bctwccn this Protocol and thc
Convcntion, thc provisions ol this Protocol shall prcvail.” Scc Ncw Zcaland proposal,
UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc./ÐP.. Appcndix on Ðralt Protocol to thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl to providc lor thc automatic
application ol thc Convcntion to all Unitcd Nations opcrations.
a¡· Chapter 5
lor thc Ad Hoc Committcc as outlincd in paragraph · ol thc Gcncral Asscmbly
rcsolution ··/a·.
+8o

Tc optional protocol was rcflcctcd in thc proposal by Ncw Zcaland and thc
¡U. An optional protocol would crcatc two scparatc lcgal rcgimcs whcrc statcs
could bc partics to cithcr thc convcntion or to both thc convcntion and thc pro
tocol. !n thc lattcr casc thc statc partics would cmbracc lurthcr lcgal obligations
upon thcmsclvcs duc to thc cnhanccmcnt ol thc scopc ol application ol thc ncw
lcgal rcgimc.
Somc statcs wcrc ol thc opinion that an amending protocol was ncccssary
and would crcatc a morc unificd lcgal rcgimc. An amcnding protocol would,
howcvcr, not avoid thc crcation ol two scparatc lcgal rcgimcs. Tat scparation
would still bc prcscnt bctwccn thosc statcs bcing partics to thc convcntion bclorc
thc coming into cffcct ol thc amcnding protocol and thosc statcs bcing partics to
thc convcntion altcr thc amcnding protocol had takcn cffcct.
Tc Unitcd Statcs proposcd a socallcd standalonc protocol. Tc idca was
that it would bc possiblc to bccomc a party to thc ncw protocol without having to
bc a party to thc convcntion. !t was also suggcstcd that in such a protocol it would
also bc possiblc to updatc provisions othcr than thosc dcaling with thc scopc ol
application ol thc convcntion.
+8+

Tc Ncw Zcaland proposal lormcd thc basis, implicitly or cxplicitly, upon
which thc discussions on spccific issucs wcrc bascd. Tc proposal rclcrrcd to “all
Unitcd Nations opcrations or prcscnccs”. Tc tcrm “prcscnccs” indicatcd somc
thing widcr than “opcrations”. !n this rcgard paragraph · ol thc rcport ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral (accc) was thought to bc usclul lor thc purposc ol dcfining
thc mcaning ol thc tcrm. According to thc rcport a UN opcration rclcrrcd to in
Articlc . (c) (ii) ol thc convcntion is any othcr Unitcd Nations prcscncc in a host
country cstablishcd by a Unitcd Nations compctcnt organ – though not ncccs
.·c Paragraph · ol that Rcsolution rcads: “Ðccidcs that thc Ad Hoc Committcc cstab
lishcd undcr rcsolution ·6/·o shall rcconvcnc lor onc wcck lrom a¡ to a· March
acc., and shall continuc thc discussion on mcasurcs to cnhancc thc cxisting protcc
tivc lcgal rcgimc lor Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl, including addrcss
ing thc application ol thc Convcntion to all Unitcd Nations opcrations, taking into
account thc rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral and thc discussions in thc Ad Hoc
Committcc.” GA Rcs. ··/a·, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc
Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ··
th
Scss., UN Ðoc.
A/R¡S/··/a· (acc.). Tc Pakistan proposal would largcly lall within thc alrcady
proposcd shorttcrm mcasurcs. !t did not amount to anything morc than a suggcs
tion that thc SccrctaryGcncral should rccommcnd thc propcr bodics to makc thc
ncccssary dcclaration. Vhat was ncw was that this was to bc donc at thc outsct ol
cvcry cstablishcd opcration in Articlc . (c) (ii) or upon thc initiativc ol statcs con
tributing pcrsonncl to a particular opcration.
.·. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, para. ¡a, UN Ðoc. A/··/·a (Supp) (acc.).
a¡o Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
sarily thc Gcncral Asscmbly or thc Sccurity Council – such as, Unitcd Nations
political missions, “postconflict, pcaccbuilding officcs”, and Unitcd Nations
humanitarian, dcvclopmcnt and human rights prcscnccs.
+8:
!t was also suggcstcd
that thc tcrm “opcration” could bc intcrprctcd in a broad manncr, to includc thc
abovcmcntioncd list. !t did in lact rcprcscnt what thc SccrctaryGcncral had
alrcady donc whcn hc intcrprctcd thc UN operation in Articlc . (c) (ii). !t is
apparcnt that thc SccrctaryGcncral was alrcady ol thc opinion that thcy wcrc
now to bc includcd in thc tcrm “opcration”, as it now stood in thc convcntion
– although in nccd ol a dcclaration ol an cxccptional risk.
For thc acc¡ scssion thc situation was somcwhat diffcrcnt. Tc appalling
attack upon thc UN hcadquartcrs in 8aghdad on .o August acc. undcrlincd
thc nccd to rcspond with vigour to such onslaughts carricd out with impunity
on UN and associatcd pcrsonncl and to makc it clcar to pcrpctrators that such
attacks would not bc tolcratcd. Tc SccrctaryGcncral submittcd a ncw rcport on
thc scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Salcty Convcntion in ]uly, acc., whcrc
among othcr things, hc statcd that thc difficultics surrounding thc nccd to issuc
a dcclaration ol cxccptional risk rcmaincd “thc singlc most important limitation
to thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc Convcntion”.
+8:

Tc Ad Hoc Committcc during this scssion was cntrustcd with a man
datc to expand thc scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc convcntion.
+8±
A rcviscd
proposal lrom Ncw Zcaland, which took into account thc conccrns ol dclcga
tions during prcvious scssions with thc Ad Hoc Committcc, lunctioncd as a basis
ol discussion during thc acc¡ scssion.
+8¡
Tc purposc ol thc Ncw Zcaland pro
.·a !t was, howcvcr, hcld that this list was not cxhaustivc and in addition to it thcrc
was also mcntioncd “officcs cstablishcd by agcncics, programmcs and lunds ol thc
Unitcd Nations systcm”. !bid., para. a·. Tcrc was no agrccmcnt on thc dcfinition
ol “prcscnccs” and thc point was madc whcthcr it was ncccssary lor such a prcscncc
to bc a ficld mission (whatcvcr that might mcan) or il it only rcquircd an affiliation
with thc UN. !bid., para. a6.
.·. Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. a·, UN Ðoc. A/··/.··
(acc.).
.·¡ GA Rcs. ··/·a, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR ··
th
Scss., para. .., UN Ðoc.
A/R¡S/··/·a (acc.).
.·· Articlc !! ol thc rcviscd proposal rcad: Tc Partics to this Protocol shall, in addi
tion to thosc opcrations as dcfincd in articlc . (c) ol thc Convcntion, apply thc
Convcntion in rcspcct ol all Unitcd Nations opcrations cstablishcd pursuant to a
standing or spccific mandatc ol a Unitcd nations compctcnt organ consistcnt with
thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations and conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority
and control lor thc purposcs ol dclivcring humanitarian, political or dcvclopmcnt
assistancc. A Party to this Protocol shall not bc rcquircd to apply articlc X(.) |para
graph . ol this articlc| ol thc Protocol in rcspcct ol any pcrmancnt Unitcd Nations
officc, such as hcadquartcrs ol thc Òrganisation or its spccialiscd agcncics, cstablishcd
in its tcrritory undcr an agrccmcnt with thc Unitcd Nations. Òn thc rclationship
a·c Chapter 5
posal was to cxpand thc scopc ol application ol thc convcntion by a ncw dcfini
tion ol a “Unitcd Nations opcration.” !t includcd opcrations that wcrc rcgardcd
as bcing inhcrcntly risky and cxcludcd pcrmancnt hcadquartcrs and officcs. To
avoid problcms ol a list ol opcrations to bc includcd in thc ncw articlc, thc dcfini
tion ol a UN opcration was bascd upon its purpose. Tc proposal bascd thc appli
cation ol thc convcntion upon thc mandatc ol thc opcration, such as opcrations
carricd out lor thc purposcs ol “dclivcring humanitarian, political or dcvclopmcnt
assistancc”.
+86
!t would thcrclorc alrcady bc known at thc outsct ol an opcration
whcthcr or not it would lall undcr thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc convcntion.
Tc Ad Hoc Committcc also had bclorc it thc rcport ol thc working group
ol thc Sixth Committcc which containcd a proposal by ]ordan
+8·
on a dcfinition
ol a UN opcration and a proposal by Costa Rica on thc rclationship bctwccn thc
Salcty Convcntion and intcrnational humanitarian law.
+88
Tc purposc ol ]ordan’s
proposal was also to cxpand thc scopc ol application ol thc Salcty Convcntion
by disposing ol thc rcquircmcnt ol a risk dcclaration. !ts proposal, howcvcr, was
bascd upon thc notion ol “risk”. Tc Salcty Convcntion should bc cxpandcd only
to covcr pcrsonncl in opcrations whcrc thcy wcrc cxposcd to grcatcr risks than
thosc ol normal situations. !l thc dcclaration ol cxccptional risk was dispcnscd
with, thc convcntion should only apply to opcrations whcrc thc pcrsonncl wcrc
cxposcd to a ccrtain lcvcl ol risk. !n this rcspcct thc proposal lollowcd thc cxisting
rcgimc. Although thc applicability ol thc convcntion, according to thc ]ordanian
bctwccn thc protocol and thc convcntion, Articlc ! rcad: Tis Protocol supplcmcnts
thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd pcrsonncl donc at
Ncw York on o Ðcccmbcr .oo¡ (hcrcinaltcr rclcrrcd to as “thc Convcntion”) and, as
bctwccn thc partics to this Protocol, thc Convcntion and thc Protocol shall bc rcad
and intcrprctcd togcthcr as a singlc instrumcnt. Rcviscd proposal lor an instrumcnt
cxpanding thc scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc .oo¡ Convcntion lor thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc¡/ÐP.. (acc¡).
.·6 !bid.
.·· “Unitcd Nations opcration” mcans an opcration or prcscncc cstablishcd pursuant to
a standing or spccific mandatc ol a compctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd Nations consist
cnt with thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations and conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations
authority and control:
(a) Vhcrc thc opcration is lor thc purposc ol maintaining or rcstoring intcrnational
pcacc and sccurity, (b) Vhcrc thc opcration is conductcd in situations ol armcd con
flict: (c) Vhcrc thc host Statc docs not or is unablc to cstablish and cxcrcisc national
jurisdiction ovcr crimcs against Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl or takc
all appropriatc mcasurcs to cnsurc thc salcty ol such pcrsonncl, or (d) Vhcrc thc
Unitcd Nations opcration is not conductcd in a host Statc. UN Gcncral Asscmbly,
Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
Anncx . 8, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/··/L..6 (acc.).
.·· Proposal by Costa Rica, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc¡/ÐP.a and Corr.. (acc¡).
a·. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
proposal, did not dcpcnd upon thc dcclaration bcing madc, somc authority was
still nccdcd to qualily a situation as onc involving thc ncccssary dcgrcc ol risk.
+8o
Tc Ncw Zcaland proposal, howcvcr, bccamc thc working documcnt upon
which thc discussions on thc dcfinition ol UN opcrations ccntrcd. Tcrc was
gcncral support lor thc Ncw Zcaland proposal, but somc dclcgations wcrc critical
ol thc lact that it did not propcrly rcflcct thc clcmcnt ol risk as bcing a significant
condition lor thc application ol thc convcntion.
Tc rclcrcncc in thc Ncw Zcaland proposal to a “standing or spccific” man
datc was incorporatcd lrom thc proposal by thc SccrctaryGcncral in his rcport
ol accc. According to thc Sccrctariat, a UN opcration would bc cstablishcd pur
suant cithcr to a standing or spccific mandatc. !t was thcrclorc gcncrally agrccd
that thcsc tcrms wcrc not ncccssary in rcaching a dcfinition ol a UN opcra
tion.
+oo
Tc Ncw Zcaland proposal diffcrcd lrom thc proposcd dcfinition by thc
SccrctaryGcncral in thc way that thc rangc ol opcrations to lall undcr thc ncw
dcfinition was conditional upon thc purpose ol an opcration. No such limitations
cxistcd in thc tcxt suggcstcd by thc SccrctaryGcncral.
Tc intcntion ol thc Ncw Zcaland proposal was clcarly to crcatc an optional
protocol lor thosc statcs alrcady party to thc convcntion. !t was not possiblc lor a
statc to bccomc a party to thc protocol il it was not alrcady a party to thc Salcty
Convcntion. For thosc statcs that wcrc party to thc convcntion and thc protocol,
thc provisions ol both instrumcnts would, according to thc acc. proposal, “bc
intcrprctcd and applicd togcthcr as a singlc instrumcnt”. !n thc rcviscd proposal
.·o ]ordan’s proposal, howcvcr, would provc difficult to apply. Vho should dccidc thc
cxistcncc ol an armcd conflict: Tis might provc to bc a vcry complcx asscssmcnt
in an intrastatc conflict. Furthcrmorc, why should an armcd conflict bc thc dccisivc
critcrion: Tc risk lor pcrsonncl might in lact bc just as gravc in situations ol intcr
nal uphcaval whcrc thc critcria lor qualilying as an armcd conflict had at that stagc
not bccn mct. Paragraph (c) dcalt with situations whcrc a host statc was not capablc
ol propcrly lulfilling its lunctions. !t might in lact lack govcrnmcnt institutions and
in such casc it could bc qucstioncd whcthcr it qualificd as a statc. Again, it would bc
difficult to dccidc on situations ol this kind whcn thcy wcrc at hand. !t should also
bc notcd that thc Salcty Convcntion includcs situations whcrc a host statc lacks thc
capability ol cffcctivcly discharging its lunctions. According to Articlc ·(.) statc par
tics shall coopcratc in ordcr to cffcctivcly implcmcnt thc provisions ol thc Salcty
Convcntion. Tis obligation is particularly aimcd at a situation whcrc a host statc
is unablc to lulfil its obligations as a statc. Vhatcvcr critcria arc uscd to dcfinc a
UN opcration, it would bc difficult to prcdict thosc opcrations whcrc thc Salcty
Convcntion would apply. !t should in this rcspcct also bc cmphasiscd that thc Salcty
Convcntion is in lact a law cnlorccmcnt instrumcnt that criminaliscs ccrtain acts.
Tc critcrion ol prcdictability is ol spccial importancc with rcgard to criminal law.
.oc UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, para. ao, UN Ðoc. A/·o/·a (Supp) (acc¡). Tcrc wcrc also suggcstions to
thc cffcct that thc languagc structurc ol Articlc . (c) should not bc rcpcatcd in a dcfi
nition ol a UN opcration.
a·a Chapter 5
by Ncw Zcaland in acc¡, it was cxplicitly statcd that thc protocol supplcmcnts
to thc Salcty Convcntion and “shall bc rcad and intcrprctcd as a singlc instru
mcnt”.
Tc dralt articlcs govcrning thc rclationship bctwccn thc protocol and
thc Salcty Convcntion, in thc Ncw Zcaland proposal, wcrc bascd upon thc
.o·· Protocol lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Acts ol \iolcncc at Airports
Scrving !ntcrnational Civil Aviation, supplcmcntary to thc Convcntion lor thc
Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Acts against thc Salcty ol Civil Aviation.
+o+
Somc dcl
cgations, howcvcr, cmphasiscd thc link bctwccn thc substancc and lorm and
asscrtcd that thc final lorm ol any instrumcnt would bc dcpcndcnt on thc agrcc
mcnt ol thc substantivc issucs.
+o:
Ðuring thc acc¡ scssion somc intcrcst still
rcmaincd in thc possibility ol crcating a standalonc instrumcnt, but no concrctc
proposals wcrc madc.
Tc Costa Rica proposal conccrncd thc rclationship bctwccn thc Salcty
Convcntion and intcrnational humanitarian law. !t rcad: “Tc Convcntion shall
not apply to any Unitcd Nations opcration in which any pcrsonncl arc cngagcd
as combatants against organizcd armcd lorccs and to which thc intcrnational law
ol armcd conflict applics.”
+o:
According to Costa Rica, it was ncccssary “to clcarly dclincatc thc scopc ol
application ol thc mutually cxclusivc rcgimcs ol intcrnational humanitarian law
and thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc Convcntion”.
+o±
Tc proposal aimcd to mcct thc
conccrn ol thc SccrctaryGcncral in his rcport that it should not bc thc naturc
ol thc conflict that dccidcd thc applicability ol thc Salcty Convcntion, but rathcr
.o. Tc .o·· Protocol lor thc Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Acts ol \iolcncc at Airports
Scrving !ntcrnational Civil Aviation, supplcmcntary to thc Convcntion lor thc
Supprcssion ol Unlawlul Acts against thc Salcty ol Civil Aviation, .··o UNTS ¡·¡.
!n thc acc¡ scssion onc dclcgation took thc vicw that thc proposcd cxpansion was
in lact an amcndmcnt to thc convcntion. !n that rcgard scvcral dclcgations madc
thc point, which thcy had prcviously madc during thc acca mccting, that it was
not an amcndmcnt but an optional protocol supplcmcnting thc Salcty Convcntion,
thcrcby kccping its intcgrity intact. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc
Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty
ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .·, UN Ðoc. A/·o/·a (Supp)
(acc¡).
.oa !bid., para. a.a.
.o. Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
Anncx . A, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/··/L..6 (acc.). Tc proposal was triggcrcd by thc rcport
ol thc SccrctaryGcncral whcrc it was statcd that thc currcnt lormulation suggcstcd
that thc Salcty Convcntion was applicablc in situations ol nonintcrnational armcd
conflict (rclcrcncc was madc to UNÒSÒM !! as a typc ol such an opcration) whcrc
UN pcrsonncl participatcd in such armcd conflict.
.o¡ !bid.
a·. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
il, in any typc ol armcd conflict, pcrsonncl wcrc cngagcd as combatants or wcrc
cntitlcd to protcction as civilians undcr intcrnational humanitarian law.
+o¡

Tc Costa Rica dclcgation also prcscntcd a proposal to bc inscrtcd in an
additional protocol to thc Salcty Convcntion. !t rcad:
Tc partics to this Protocol shall not apply thc Convcntion in rcspcct ol any
acts govcrncd by intcrnational humanitarian law pcrlormcd during an armcd
conflict and dircctcd against any Unitcd Nations or associatcd pcrsonncl who
arc not cntitlcd to thc protcction givcn to civilians undcr thc intcrnational law
ol armcd conflict.
+o6
Tc rcprcscntativc ol thc !CRC was askcd to addrcss thc committcc on thc
rclationship cxisting bctwccn intcrnational humanitarian law and thc Salcty
Convcntion. Hc cndorscd thc position lorwardcd by thc Costa Rican dclcgation,
and thc SccrctaryGcncral, that thcrc might bc situations ol ovcrlap bctwccn
thosc two rcgimcs.
+o·
According to thc !CRC rcprcscntativc it was possiblc to
distinguish bctwccn thrcc situations: i) whcrc only onc ol thc rcgimcs was appli
cablc, ii) whcrc both rcgimcs wcrc applicablc and, iii) whcrc ncithcr ol thc two
rcgimcs wcrc applicablc. A clarification ol thc rclation bctwccn thcsc rcgimcs
would, howcvcr, strcngthcn thc lcgal protcction ol thc pcrsonncl in qucstion.
+o8

!n Òctobcr acc¡ thc Sixth Committcc cstablishcd a Vorking Group to
continuc thc work on cxpanding thc scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Salcty
Convcntion. A Chairman’s tcxt was prcscntcd, which was a product “ol intcrscs
sional inlormal consultations and bilatcral contacts, building upon work accom
plishcd during prcvious scssions”.
+oo
Tc tcxt was basically a combination ol thc
proposals, in brackcts, which wcrc rccommcndcd to lunction as thc basis ol thc
work lor thc Ad Hoc Committcc during thc spring ol acc·. Somc progrcss
on finding common ground, howcvcr, had bccn madc with to thc dcfinition ol
“Unitcd Nations opcrations”.
:oo
.o· !bid.
.o6 Proposal by Costa Rica, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc¡/ÐP.a and Corr...
.o· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, para. ¡·, UN Ðoc. A/·o/·a (Supp) (acc¡).
.o· !bid.
.oo Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
para. ¡, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/·o/L.o (acc¡).
acc Scc Articlc !!, Application ol thc Convcntion to Unitcd Nations opcrations, “.. Tc
Partics to this Protocol shall, in addition to thosc opcrations as dcfincd in articlc . (c)
ol thc Convcntion, apply thc Convcntion in rcspcct ol all othcr Unitcd Nations opcr
ations cstablishcd by a compctcnt organ ol thc Unitcd Nations in accordancc with
thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd Nations and conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority
a·¡ Chapter 5
For thc acc· mccting, thc Ad Hoc Committcc had bclorc it, inter alia,
thc rcport ol thc Vorking Group ol thc Sixth Committcc,
:o+
thc rcport ol thc
SccrctaryGcncral on thc scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Salcty Convcntion
:o:

and a proposal submittcd lor discussion by China, ]apan, ]ordan and Ncw
Zcaland.
:o:

!n thc joint proposal by thc dclcgations ol China, ]apan, ]ordan and Ncw
Zcaland, thc tcrm ‘pcaccbuilding’, was introduccd. !t was to somc cxtcnt dcfincd
in a ncw prcambular paragraph !!!. Tc joint proposal also providcd a possibility
lor host statcs to makc a dcclaration to cxcludc thc application ol thc protocol to
opcrations dclivcring humanitarian assistancc in casc ol natural disastcrs (Articlc
!! para. .). Tc main argumcnt was that such opcrations did not ncccssarily con
tain an clcmcnt ol risk.
:o±
Tis proposal raiscd a numbcr ol qucstions and scvcral
dclcgations cxprcsscd thcir conccrn.
Tc rcasoning bchind introducing thc tcrm ‘pcaccbuilding’ was, according
to thc sponsors ol thc proposal, “its flcxibility and bccausc such opcrations, by
thcir vcry naturc, containcd an clcmcnt ol risk.”
:o¡
Although othcr dclcgations
would havc prclcrrcd thc protocol to includc all opcrations, irrcspcctivc ol any
clcmcnt ol risk, thcy “rccognizcd that thc tcrm ‘pcaccbuilding’ had bccn intro
duccd as a compromisc and scrvcd to bridgc thc divcrgcnt vicws rcflcctcd in thc
diffcrcnt altcrnativcs prcscntcd undcr articlc !! ol thc Chairman’s tcxt.”
:o6
Vhilc
thc tcrm ‘pcaccbuilding’ is flcxiblc thcrc arc ccrtain drawbacks to usc such a tcrm
in an instrumcnt ol a criminal law charactcr. !t was pointcd out during ncgotia
tions that pcaccbuilding is an cvolving conccpt and thus in nccd ol a dcfinition.
:o·

Tcrc wcrc, lor instancc, conflicting vicws whcthcr pcaccbuilding only includcd
and control lor thc |primary| purposcs ol Altcrnativc A dclivcring humanitarian,
political or dcvclopmcnt assistancc. Altcrnativc 8 dclivcring humanitarian, political
or dcvclopmcnt assistancc in armcd conflict or postconflict situations. Altcrnativc
C dclivcring cmcrgcncy humanitarian, spccial political or dcvclopmcnt rcconstruc
tion assistancc.” !bid., Anncx !.
ac. Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
UN Ðoc. A/C.6/·o/L.o (acc¡).
aca Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion
on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/·o/aa6
(acc¡).
ac. Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Proposal by China, ]apan,
]ordan and Ncw Zcaland lor discussion, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc·/ÐP.. (acc·).
ac¡ UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, para. a·, UN Ðoc. A/6c/·a (Supp) (acc·).
ac· !bid., para. .6.
ac6 !bid., para. .·.
ac· !bid., para. .·.
a·· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
postconflict situations or il it also includcd inconflict and postconflict situ
ations.
:o8
!t was, howcvcr, rcmarkcd that this was not a ncw tcrm. Tc Agenda
for Peace and thc proposal by thc SccrctaryGcncral to crcatc a Pcaccbuilding
Commission was mcntioncd in this rcspcct.
:oo
!t should also bc notcd that thc
SccrctaryGcncral alrcady had intcrprctcd opcrations rcquiring a dcclaration ol
cxccptional risk in thc convcntion to includc “pcaccbuilding officcs”.
:+o
!n thc lramcwork ol thc Sixth Committcc it was finally possiblc to rcach
a compromisc bctwccn thc diffcrcnt positions. Tc nccd to finalisc ncgotiations
had also bccn strcsscd in thc acc· Vorld Summit Òutcomc.
:++
Altcr thc Vorking
Group had prcscntcd a Rcviscd Chairman’s tcxt to thc Committcc, inlormal con
sultations continucd.
:+:
Òn .6 Novcmbcr thc tcxt ol thc Òptional Protocol was
introduccd. A dralt rcsolution was prcscntcd by thc Sixth Committcc and in
Ðcccmbcr thc Òptional Protocol was adoptcd by thc Gcncral Asscmbly.
:+:
!t
rcads, in rclcvant parts:
Te States Parties to this Protocol,
Recalling thc tcrms ol thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, donc at Ncw York on o Ðcccmbcr .oo¡,
Deeply concerned ovcr thc continuing pattcrn ol attacks against Unitcd Nations
and associatcd pcrsonncl,
Recognizing that Unitcd Nations opcrations conductcd lor thc purposcs ol
dclivcring humanitarian, political or dcvclopmcnt assistancc in pcaccbuilding
and ol dclivcring cmcrgcncy humanitarian assistancc which cntail particular
ac· Tc discussions on thc ncw typcs ol opcrations conccrncd both thc third prcambu
lar paragraph as wcll as Articlc !! ol thc proposcd protocol. !t was argucd that thc
tcrm ‘pcaccbuilding’ would bc clarificd in thc third prcambular and that it thcrclorc
nccdcd not to bc dcfincd in Articlc !! ol thc protocol. !bid., para. a..
aco !bid., para. .· and .·.
a.c Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion on
thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. ·, UN Ðoc. A/··/6.·
(accc).
a.. GA Rcs. 6c/., Vorld Summit Òutcomc, UN GAÒR, 6c
th
Scss., para. .6·, UN Ðoc.
A/R¡S/6c/. (acc·).
a.a Sixth Committcc, Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty
ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. 6, UN Ðoc. A/6c/·.· (acc·). For
thc Rcviscd Chairman’s tcxt, scc Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group
on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd
Nation and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx !, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/6c/L.¡ (acc·).
a.. GA Rcs. 6c/¡a, Òptional Protocol to thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd
Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN GAÒR, 6cth Scss., UN Ðoc. A/R¡S/6c/¡a
(acc·).
a·6 Chapter 5
risks lor Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl rcquirc thc cxtcnsion ol thc
scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion to such pcrsonncl,
Convinced ol thc nccd to havc in placc an cffcctivc rcgimc to cnsurc that
thc pcrpctrators ol attacks against Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl
cngagcd in Unitcd Nations opcrations arc brought to justicc,
Have agreed as lollows:
Article I
Relationship
Tis Protocol supplcmcnts thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, donc at Ncw York on o Ðcccmbcr .oo¡ (hcrcinaltcr
rclcrrcd to as “thc Convcntion”), and as bctwccn thc Partics to this Protocol,
thc Convcntion and thc Protocol shall bc rcad and intcrprctcd togcthcr as a
singlc instrumcnt.
Article II
Application of the Convention to United Nations operations
.. Tc Partics to this Protocol shall, in addition to thosc opcrations as
dcfincd in articlc . (c) ol thc Convcntion, apply thc Convcntion in rcspcct
ol all othcr Unitcd Nations opcrations cstablishcd by a compctcnt organ
ol thc Unitcd Nations in accordancc with thc Chartcr ol thc Unitcd
Nations and conductcd undcr Unitcd Nations authority and control lor
thc purposcs ol:
(a) Ðclivcring humanitarian, political or dcvclopmcnt assistancc in
pcaccbuilding, or
(b) Ðclivcring cmcrgcncy humanitarian assistancc.
a. Paragraph . docs not apply to any pcrmancnt Unitcd Nations officc, such
as hcadquartcrs ol thc Òrganization or its spccializcd agcncics cstab
lishcd undcr an agrccmcnt with thc Unitcd Nations.
.. A host Statc may makc a dcclaration to thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc
Unitcd Nations that it shall not apply thc provisions ol this Protocol with
rcspcct to an opcration undcr articlc !! (.) (b) which is conductcd lor thc
solc purposc ol rcsponding to a natural disastcr. Such a dcclaration shall
bc madc prior to thc dcploymcnt ol thc opcration.
·.....6 Asscssmcnt
8clorc a morc dctailcd asscssmcnt ol thc ncw protocol a lcw words nccd to bc
said about thc proposcd shorttcrm mcasurcs.
a·· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
Tc proposal to inscrt kcy provisions in status agrccmcnts with host nations
is ccrtainly not dcpcndcnt upon “approval” ol mcmbcr statcs, but rathcr should bc
rcgardcd as lalling within thc compctcncc ol thc SccrctaryGcncral as thc chicl
administrativc officcr ol thc organisation. As notcd abovc, kcy provisions ol thc
Salcty Convcntion havc in lact bccn includcd, lor cxamplc, in thc UNM!S¡T
opcration. Rcgarding thc othcr shorttcrm mcasurcs (thc SccrctaryGcncral as a
certifying authority and initiating thc dcclaration ol an cxccptional risk) proposcd
by thc SccrctaryGcncral it would bc within his powcr to do so, but as yct thcrc
appcars to bc no rccord ol such practicc.
Tc dcfinition ol thc opcrations cncompasscd by thc ncw protocol is mainly
bascd on proposals bcing purposcoricntcd or locusing on thc notion ol risk. Tc
“riskapproach” is dcpcndcnt upon thc lacts on thc ground, which arc incvitably
subjcct to changc in thc coursc ol an opcration. Tcrc was alrcady an clcmcnt ol
common ground bctwccn thc Ncw Zcaland and ]ordan proposals (bclorc thc Ad
Hoc Committcc in acc¡) in that thcy both includcd a risk critcrion, although lcss
cxplicit in thc lormcr proposal. Tc cxclusion ol pcrmancnt officcs in thc Ncw
Zcaland proposal (and in thc Òptional Protocol) is cvidcncc that only opcra
tions dccmcd inhcrcntly risky lor pcrsonncl should bc protcctcd by thc convcn
tion. Tc Russian dclcgation had prcviously rcmarkcd in thc acc. scssion that
thc intcntion bchind an cxpandcd scopc ol application could surcly not bc that
all UN officcs should bc protcctcd by thc convcntion – as lor instancc, thc UN
!nlormation Òfficc in Moscow. Vhilc in principlc thcrc should bc no objcction
to including such officcs, thc main thrust ol thc proposal to dispcnsc with thc
dcclaration ol riskrcquircmcnt was to includc thosc pcrsonncl activc in situa
tions involving pcrsonal risk.
:+±

Tc risk and purposcapproachcs havc colourcd thc discussions in thc work
dcvcloping a ncw protocol and it includcs traccs ol both. Tc ncw opcrations
protcctcd by thc protocol shall cithcr bc cxccutcd lor thc purposc ol “dclivcring
humanitarian, political or dcvclopmcnt assistancc in pcaccbuilding” or “dclivcr
ing cmcrgcncy humanitarian assistancc”.
Tc tcrm “pcaccbuilding” is not dcfincd in thc Convcntion cvcn though
thcrc wcrc suggcstions to that cffcct.
:+¡
!n thc plcnary mccting ol thc Gcncral
a.¡ !n this rcspcct it is intcrcsting to notc thc commcnt by thc Sccrctariat during thcir
bricfing at thc mccting with thc Ad Hoc Committcc (acc.) that thcrc was a diffcr
cncc bctwccn risk and vulncrability. Risk rclatcd to thc situation on thc ground whilc
vulncrability rclatcd to pcrsonncl. Tc military componcnt ol a pcacc opcration was
oltcn dcploycd in risky arcas but was cquippcd to dcal with that risk and thus was
not vulncrablc, whilc humanitarian workcrs wcrc always vulncrablc.
a.· Tc tcxt did in lact, cvcn in Òctobcr acc·, includc, in brackcts, tcxt cxplaining
pcaccbuilding as including prcconflict, conflict, and postconflict situations. Sixth
Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction undcr
thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nation and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx !,
UN Ðoc. A/C.6/6c/L.¡ (acc·).
a·· Chapter 5
Asscmbly, during which thc Òptional Protocol was adoptcd without a votc, a
numbcr ol dclcgations took thc opportunity to cxplain thcir positions on thc
protocol.
:+6
According to onc vicw, thc tcrm pcaccbuilding is not rcstrictcd to
postconflict situations.
:+·
Support lor this position was sought inter alia in a
statcmcnt ol thc Prcsidcnt ol thc Sccurity Council dcclaring that “pcaccbuild
ing is aimcd at prcvcnting thc outbrcak, thc rccurrcncc or continuation ol armcd
conflict”.
:+8
According to anothcr vicw pcaccbuilding could only bc intcrprctcd
as a postconflict opcration.
:+o
Tis position was supportcd by inter alia thc lol
lowing passagc in thc Vorld Summit Òutcomc,
¡mphasizing thc nccd lor a coordinatcd, cohcrcnt and intcgratcd approach to
postconflict pcaccbuilding and rcconciliation with a vicw to achicving sus
tainablc pcacc, rccognizing thc nccd lor a dcdicatcd institutional mcchanism
to addrcss thc spccial nccds ol countrics cmcrging lrom conflict towards rccov
cry, rcintcgration and rcconstruction and to assist thcm in laying thc lounda
tion lor sustainablc dcvclopmcnt, and rccognizing thc vital rolc ol thc Unitcd
Nations in that rcgard, wc dccidc to cstablish a Pcaccbuilding Commission as
an intcrgovcrnmcntal advisory body.
::o
!t was morcovcr apparcnt lrom thc plcnary mccting that somc dclcgations still
argucd lor thc inclusion ol an cxccptional riskcritcrion.
::+
Tcy rclcrrcd in this
rcspcct to thc prcambular paragraph . ol thc Òptional Protocol which rcads
Recognizing that Unitcd Nations opcrations conductcd lor thc purposcs ol
dclivcring humanitarian, political or dcvclopmcnt assistancc in pcaccbuilding
and ol dclivcring cmcrgcncy humanitarian assistancc which cntail particular
risks lor Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl rcquirc thc cxtcnsion ol thc
scopc ol lcgal protcction undcr thc Convcntion to such pcrsonncl,
An intcrprctation e contrario could thus mcan that il such opcrations do not cntail
particular risks lor thc pcrsonncl, thcy would not qualily as pcaccbuilding or
a.6 UN GAÒR, 6c
th
Scss., 6.
st
mtg., UN Ðoc. A/6c/P\.6. (acc·).
a.· Statcs advocating this vicw wcrc thc ¡uropcan Union including a· statcs with .a
othcr statcs aligning thcmsclvcs with ¡U position. Òthcr dclcgations that spokc
in lavour ol that position wcrc Australia, Ncw Zcaland, Canada, Switzcrland, and
]ordan. !bid.
a.· Statcmcnt by thc Prcsidcnt ol thc Sccurity Council, UN Ðoc. S/PRST/acc./·
(acc.).
a.o Support lor this position was cxprcsscd by thc dclcgations ol Colombia, !ndia,
!ndoncsia, Cuba, Korca, \cnczucla and !ran.
aac GA Rcs. 6c/., Vorld Summit Òutcomc, UN GAÒR, 6cth Scss., para. o·, UN Ðoc.
A/R¡S/6c/. (acc·).
aa. Scc thc dclcgations ol !ndia, \cnczucla, !ran, and possibly Cuba.
a·o Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
cmcrgcncy assistancc opcrations. Tis would, howcvcr, lcad to a dcpcndcncy on
an authority dcciding what kind ol opcrations cntail particular risks lor thc pcr
sonncl, which is cxactly thc situation that thc ncw protocol sought to rcctily.
Tcrc is morcovcr no rclcrcncc to particular risks in thc opcrativc Articlc !! para
graph .. !t docs thcrclorc sccm to lollow lrom logic that thc ncw protocol docs
not includc a critcrion ol particular risk.
!t is truc that thc tcrm ‘pcaccbuilding’ is an ambiguous tcrm, cspccially lrom
a criminal law pcrspcctivc. !t is not cvcn clarificd whcthcr it only applics post
conflict, which somc ol thc dclcgations bclicvcd, or il it also includcs situations
ol prcconflict and inconflict charactcr. Tis ambiguous tcrm, howcvcr, sccms to
havc bccn a ncccssary compromisc. !n contrast to thc spccdy proccss ol crcating
thc Salcty Convcntion, thc Òptional Protocol has bccn discusscd rathcr thor
oughly. Tc bridging ol thc diffcrcnt vicws ol a purposcoricntcd approach and
thc onc bascd on a notion ol risk nccdcd a common ground. Tc tcrm ‘pcacc
building’ providcd that ncccssary ground. !t is also truc that a lot ol tcrminology
in this arca is ambiguous. Tc rcsult is pcrhaps not optimal but probably thc bcst
compromisc possiblc undcr thc prcscnt circumstanccs. !t should bc notcd, how
cvcr, that thc sponsors ol this proposals saw it as a “compromisc packagc”, includ
ing thc ncw paragraph ., Articlc !!.
:::

Tc suggcstion that host statcs should bc ablc to opt out ol thc protocol in
casc ol natural disastcrs had not bccn discusscd bclorc thc acc· mccting ol thc
Ad Hoc Committcc. Tc compromisc finally rcachcd on an cxpandcd scopc ol
application includcd both thc tcrm ‘pcaccbuilding’ as wcll as thc right ol host
statcs to dcclarc thc ncw protocol inapplicablc in rcspcct ol opcrations conductcd
lor thc solc purposc ol rcsponding to natural disastcrs.
Scvcral dclcgations wcrc conccrncd ovcr thc possibility to dcclarc thc pro
tocol inapplicablc. !t would contravcnc thc wholc idca ol a protocol cxpanding
thc Convcntion’s scopc ol application. Tcy lound it unrcasonablc and that it in
lact could bc pcrccivcd as an unlricndly act towards thosc organisations provid
ing humanitarian assistancc to a statc struck by a natural disastcr.
:::
Òthcr dcl
cgations bclicvcd that it rcflcctcd thc situations in statcs whcrc a stablc social
ordcr cxistcd and that pcrsonncl dclivcring humanitarian assistancc would bc
adcquatcly protcctcd by domcstic laws.
::±
aaa Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nation and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
Anncx !! para. .6, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/6c/L.¡ (acc·).
aa. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, para. ao, UN Ðoc. A/6c/·a (Supp) (acc·).
aa¡ !bid., para. .a.
a6c Chapter 5
Vhilc it is not pcrlcctly clcar lrom thc tcxt ol paragraph ., it is bcyond doubt
that dcclarations ol host statcs nccd “to bc madc subscqucnt to a natural disastcr
and prior to thc dcploymcnt ol |cmcrgcncy humanitarian| assistancc.”
::¡
!t was also pointcd out that sincc it is only thc host statc that may opt out
thcrc will bc scparatc lcgal rcgimcs applicablc.
::6
An act normally rcgardcd as a
crimc undcr thc Salcty Convcntion, would not bc rcgardcd as such il commit
tcd in a statc that has cxcrciscd its right to dcclarc thc convcntion inapplicablc.
Howcvcr, il thc pcrpctrator thcrcaltcr travcls to anothcr statc party to thc proto
col, that statc would still bc undcr a duty to prosccutc or cxtraditc him/hcr.
!s this a problcm: As thc crimcs undcr thc Salcty Convcntion most ccr
tainly arc criminal acts undcr any national jurisdiction, thc host statc would still
bc dutybound to prosccutc thc allcgcd pcrpctrator. Tc Salcty Convcntion is
primarily aimcd to nonhost statcs. All statcs arc undcr an obligation to pros
ccutc crimcs within thcir jurisdiction. Tc Salcty Convcntion thcrclorc mainly
crcatcs dutics lor othcr statcs. !t cstablishcs a univcrsal jurisdiction rcgimc, ol
a compulsory charactcr, lor statcs partics which arc primarily dircctcd to thosc
statcs which arc not alrcady rcquircd to prosccutc pcrpctrators ol such crimcs,
likc host statcs, undcr gcncral intcrnational law.
Tc obligations ol thc host statc to not intcrlcrc with thc official dutics ol
protcctcd pcrsonncl (Articlc ·) may, howcvcr, crcatc somc additional burdcn on
host statcs. Articlc !!! ol thc Òptional Protocol providcs an intcrprctation ol thc
Salcty Convcntion’s Articlc · and it will thcrclorc bc discusscd togcthcr with that
articlc undcr chaptcr ·.....a.
Tc Salcty Convcntion’s scopc ol application has bccn cxtcndcd lor partics
to thc Òptional Protocol to includc a broadcr dcfinition ol Unitcd Nations opcr
ations. As thc catcgorics ol opcrations has now bccn cxtcndcd so will, naturally,
thc numbcr ol associatcd pcrsonncl. !t mcans that not only will a widcr group
ol humanitarian NGÒ pcrsonncl bc includcd undcr thc protcctivc rcgimc ol thc
Convcntion but also a widcr group ol military pcrsonncl. !t is surprising, how
cvcr, that this has not bccn an issuc lor dcbatc in thc Ad Hoc Committcc.
Tc qucstion conccrning thc rclationship bctwccn thc convcntion and thc
intcrnational humanitarian law was introduccd by Costa Rica during thc acc.
scssion ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc. Tc Costa Rica proposal was commcndablc
in that it tricd to rcctily a situation that was bascd upon thc notion that UN mili
tary pcrsonncl should bc ablc to bcncfit both lrom thc Salcty Convcntion and
intcrnational humanitarian law. Howcvcr, Costa Rica did not allow lor thc lact
that nonmilitary pcrsonncl would largcly rctain thcir protcction undcr intcrna
tional humanitarian law as civilians notwithstanding thc lact that thc UN opcra
tion’s military pcrsonncl could no longcr do so. Tc rcgimcs wcrc not ncccssarily
mutually cxclusivc whcn it camc to civilian pcrsonncl who wcrc mcmbcrs ol an
aa· !bid., para. .¡.
aa6 !bid., para. .·.
a6. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
opcration’s civilian componcnt. Room should also bc madc lor thc intcrprctation
that military pcrsonncl ol a pcacc opcration may attain a status similar to that ol
govcrnmcntal lorccs in rclation to opposition lorccs.
Tc rclationship bctwccn thc Salcty Convcntion and intcrnational humani
tarian law has bccn cxamincd abovc. Sufficc to say, in rcspcct ol luturc dcvclop
mcnts, thc rclationship bctwccn thc two rcgimcs did not attract a similar intcrcst
among dclcgations as did othcr provisions on thc convcntion’s scopc ol applica
tion. Tis may partly bc bascd upon a rcalisation that this issuc was too complcx
to bc dcalt with propcrly in vicw ol thc lact that othcr, lcss complcx, qucstions
had yct to bc rcsolvcd.
Ðuring thc acc· scssion ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc, thc Costa Rica dclcga
tion cnvisagcd thrcc proccdural possibilitics ol a way lorward: “(a) an amcndmcnt
ol thc Convcntion, (b) an intcrprctativc authoritativc statcmcnt, and (c) an addi
tional protocol, which would bc claboratcd in thc contcxt ol an cxtcndcd mandatc
ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc.”
::·
Tcrc wcrc, howcvcr, still somc objcctions rcgard
ing thc substancc ol thc proposal by Costa Rica.
::8
Tc !CRC obscrvcr rcprcscnt
ativc notcd that thc situations ol an ovcrlap bctwccn thc Salcty Convcntion and
!HL would incrcasc in vicw ol an cxpansion ol thc Convcntion’s scopc ol lcgal
protcction.
::o
Tc Ad Committcc rccommcndcd that thc work on an cxpandcd
scopc ol application ol thc Salcty Convcntion would continuc within thc lramc
work ol a working group ol thc Sixth Committcc.
Tc nccd to concludc an optional protocol during thc sixticth scssion,
strongly cmphasiscd in thc Vorld Summit Òutcomc, had thc cffcct, howcvcr,
that somc qucstions including thc onc lrom Costa Rica, had to bc lclt out ol thc
proccss.
::o
Tc qucstions raiscd in that proposal arc thcrclorc, to somc cxtcnt, yct
to bc rcsolvcd.
5.3.2 Provisions on the Legal Status of Personnel
Articlcs .6 arc claboratcd upon similar provisions lound in thc UN Modcl
SÒFA. Tcy dcal with thc rights and obligations ol both UN and host/transit
nations. Somc ol thc provisions cxtcnd duties on UN and associatcd pcrsonncl,
but it appcars to havc bccn a common vicw that thcrc should bc no link bctwccn
aa· !bid., para. ¡c.
aa· !bid., para. ¡·. Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc
ol Lcgal Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx ! 8, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/·o/L.o (acc¡).
aao !bid., para. ¡o.
a.c Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
para. ·, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/6c/L.¡ (acc·).
a6a Chapter 5
thc applicability ol thc convcntion and thc lulfilmcnt ol thc dutics ol thc pcrson
ncl conccrncd.
Identification
.. Tc military and policc componcnts ol a Unitcd Nations opcration and
thcir vchiclcs, vcsscls and aircralt shall bcar distinctivc idcntification.
Òthcr pcrsonncl, vchiclcs, vcsscls and aircralt involvcd in thc Unitcd
Nations opcration shall bc appropriatcly idcntificd unlcss othcrwisc
dccidcd by thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations.
a. All Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl shall carry appropriatc
idcntification documcnts.
Tis tcxt was adoptcd as Articlc . ol thc convcntion. Paragraph . appcars com
prchcnsiblc. Tc military and policc componcnts and thcir transports arc rcquircd
to bcar cxtcrior markings. Òthcr pcrsonncl and thcir vchiclcs and cquipmcnt arc
prcsumcd to bc appropriatcly idcntificd, but thc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc UN
has thc authority to dccidc othcrwisc. Howcvcr, thc tcxt lcnds itscll to diffcrcnt
intcrprctations. !t is surprising, in vicw ol thc cffort put into thc dcfinition ol thc
diffcrcnt catcgorics ol pcrsonncl, that thcsc dcfincd tcrms arc not rclcrrcd to in
Articlc .. Tc only distinction is bctwccn a) “military and policc componcnts ol
a Unitcd Nations opcration” and b) “othcr pcrsonncl … involvcd in thc Unitcd
Nations opcration”. !t is not cntircly clcar how this catcgorisation ol pcrsonncl
is rclatcd to thc onc dcfincd in Articlc .. Might thc military pcrsonncl assigncd
by a govcrnmcnt with thc agrccmcnt ol a compctcnt organ ol thc UN (associ
atcd pcrsonncl) bc considcrcd to bc componcnts ol a UN opcration, or should
thcy bc rcgardcd as othcr pcrsonncl involvcd in a UN opcration: !s it possiblc to
vicw officials and cxpcrts on mission, in thcir official capacity in thc arca ol a UN
opcration, as bcing involved in thc opcration: 8clorc dcaling with thcsc issucs it
would pcrhaps bc lruitlul to cxaminc thc significancc ol idcntification.
Tc provision on “!dcntification” wcnt through considcrablc changcs during
thc ncgotiations. Ònc ol thc main issucs was whcthcr idcntification should bc
obligatory or at thc discrction ol thc SccrctaryGcncral. Advocatcs lor an idcn
tificationrcquircmcnt argucd that distinctivc markings wcrc ncccssary to cnsurc
thc protcction ol UN pcrsonncl. !dcntification, morcovcr, was lound to bc indis
pcnsablc with rcgard to thc criminal law provisions ol thc convcntion. Vithout
idcntification ol UN pcrsonncl, an allcgcd offcndcr could not know ol thc pro
tcctcd status ol a victim and thus might not havc lormcd thc intcntion ol attack
ing such pcrsonncl. Proponcnts lor a diffcrcnt approach, allowing morc flcxibility
in idcntification ol UN pcrsonncl, statcd that thc display ol distinctivc markings
might, in ccrtain situations, incrcasc thc risk to thcm.
::+
Vith rcgard to thc crim
a.. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
a6. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
inal law provisions thcy lound that thcsc did not dcpcnd upon whcthcr or not
protcctcd pcrsonncl worc distinctivc idcntification. !t would bc lor thc national
court ol thc country conccrncd to judgc thc cxistcncc or abscncc ol intcnt ol an
allcgcd offcndcr in cach spccific casc.
:::
!t is clcar lrom thc prcparatory works that thc prcvailing vicw among thc
dclcgations was that idcntification was not a prcrcquisitc lor thc applicability ol
criminal law provisions.
:::
Tcrc is, morcovcr, an cstablishcd practicc in UN pcacc
opcrations lor military and policc pcrsonncl to wcar UN markings togcthcr with
thcir national unilorm. Tc discussion on thc rcquircmcnt ol idcntification thcrc
lorc conccrncd only civilian pcrsonncl.
::±
No particular markings arc rcquircd.
Tc only condition is that thcy must bc distinctivc. !t appcars to havc bccn a
particularly important issuc to somc dclcgations that thcrc was no rcquircmcnt
to wcar bluc hclmcts and to paint vchiclcs whitc. According to thosc dclcgations
“national military vchiclcs, in national livcry, satisficd this gcncral idcntification
rcquircmcnt”.
::¡

Although not clarificd in thc prcparatory works, it sccms to bc a common
undcrstanding in thc litcraturc that thc idcntification rcquircmcnt lor military
and policc componcnts ol a UN opcration also includcd such componcnts whcn
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .6, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡). Rclcrcncc was
madc in this rcgard to thc statcmcnt ol thc rcprcscntativc ol thc Unitcd Nations
Sccurity Coordinator. Tc lact that association with thc UN could contributc to
thc risk ol its pcrsonncl was addrcsscd by thc SccrctaryGcncral in his rcport on
Sccurity ol UN opcrations (A/¡·/.¡o). !n paragraph .· hc statcs, “|w|hcrcas in thc
past pcrsonncl wcrc assurcd protcction by virtuc ol thcir association with thc work ol
thc Unitcd Nations, this is no longcr thc casc. Òn thc contrary, pcrsonncl arc morc
and morc oltcn at risk bccausc ol such association. !n addition, actions by thc Unitcd
Nations in onc part ol thc globc can gcncratc thrcats to Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl
in anothcr.” Scc also 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd
Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ·6o.
a.a UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .·, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
a.. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. 6a, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a
(.oo¡). Tis vicw is supportcd by 8loom, 6a·, 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion
on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ··c and Lcppcr, ¡...
a.¡ 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ·6o. Shc rclcrs to para. .· ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA, which
statcs that “|m|ilitary mcmbcrs and thc Unitcd Nations Civilian Policc ol thc Unitcd
Nations pcacckccping opcration shall wcar, whilc pcrlorming official dutics, thc
national military or policc unilorm ol thc rcspcctivc Statcs with standard Unitcd
Nations accoutrcmcnts”.
a.· Scc Lcppcr, ¡.a and rclcrcnccs thcrc.
a6¡ Chapter 5
thcy wcrc catcgoriscd as associatcd pcrsonncl.
::6
From thc purposc ol thc provi
sion it thus appcars as a rcasonablc intcrprctation to makc no distinction bctwccn
Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl and associatcd pcrsonncl in this rcspcct. Articlc .,
howcvcr, adds to thc tcrminological inconsistcncics ol thc convcntion. Tc phrasc
“military and policc componcnts ol a Unitcd Nations opcration” is clcarly influ
cnccd by thc dcfinition ol “Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl” in Articlc ., paragraph
(a) (i). Vhy military pcrsonncl catcgoriscd as “Associatcd pcrsonncl” should bc
rcgardcd as mcmbcrs ol a UN opcration in this rcspcct is difficult to undcrstand.
Tc othcr option is cvcn hardcr to comprchcnd. Vhy should thcrc bc a rcquirc
mcnt to bcar “distinctivc idcntification” lor somc military pcrsonncl and not lor
othcrs:
Pcrsonncl not bclonging to thc military and policc componcnts ol a UN
opcration shall bc “appropriatcly idcntificd” unlcss dccidcd othcrwisc by thc
SccrctaryGcncral. Tcy also nccd to bc “involvcd in thc Unitcd Nations opcra
tion”. Tc tcrm “involvcd” is not lound in Articlc .. Tc qualification ol involvc
mcnt in thc opcration thcrclorc sccms to cxcludc pcrsonncl dcfincd in Articlc .
(a) (ii) (othcr officials and cxpcrts on mission prcscnt in an official capacity in thc
arca whcrc a UN opcration is conductcd). Tis was also pointcd out during thc
ncgotiations.
::·

All pcrsonncl covcrcd by thc convcntion “shall carry appropriatc idcntifi
cation documcnts”, but no particular documcnt is spccificd.
::8
Paragraph a ol
Articlc . should bc rcad in conjunction with Articlc · ol thc Convcntion which
stipulatcs a “|d|uty to rclcasc or rcturn Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl
capturcd or dctaincd”. Ònc ol thc kcy lcaturcs ol that provision is thc cstablish
mcnt ol thc idcntification ol thc pcrsonncl.
Agreements on the status of the operation
Tc host Statc and thc Unitcd Nations shall concludc as soon as possiblc an
agrccmcnt on thc status ol thc Unitcd Nations opcration and all pcrsonncl
cngagcd in thc opcration including, intcr alia, provisions on privilcgcs and
immunitics lor military and policc componcnts ol thc opcration.
Articlc ¡ is lormulatcd in vcry gcncral tcrms. !t docs not rcally add anything to
thc alrcady cxisting rulcs in this arca rcgarding pcrsonncl participating in UN
opcrations. !ts lunction is rathcr to cstablish a lcgal rcquircmcnt to concludc a
SÒFA. Tcrc is, howcvcr, no lcgal sanction conncctcd to this provision. !n prac
a.6 Scc c.g. 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ·6o·c, Lcppcr, ¡.....
a.· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. aa, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa(Supp) (.oo¡).
a.· Scc thc rcquircmcnts in paras. .¡.· ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA.
a6· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
ticc it will, at bcst, havc an cncouraging cffcct on luturc host nations bcing partics
to thc convcntion.
::o
!n practicc it has, on scvcral occasions, provcd difficult to concludc a SÒFA
with thc host statc. !n situations whcrc thc govcrnmcnt is not in cffcctivc control,
or whcrc thcrc is no govcrnmcnt authority at all, thc dcmands ol Articlc ¡ that an
agrccmcnt shall bc concludcd will bc difficult to comply with. Tosc UN opcra
tions dcfincd in Articlc . (c) (ii) arc cstablishcd lor purposcs othcr than maintain
ing or rcstoring intcrnational pcacc and sccurity. For thcsc kinds ol opcration it is
not thc practicc ol thc UN to concludc a SÒFA with thc host nation.
:±o
For all ol
thc abovc situations thc applicability ol Articlc ¡ is qucstionablc.
:±+
Tc articlc wcnt through ccrtain changcs during thc ncgotiations. Tc final
tcxt, howcvcr, largcly rcflccts thc contcnt ol Sccurity Council Rcsolution ·6·
(.oo.).
:±:
Articlc ¡ docs not scck to cstablish thc naturc ol privilcgcs and immuni
tics that should apply lor thosc pcrsonncl cngagcd in an opcration. Nor docs thc
provision addrcss thc issuc ol thc lcgal status ol an opcration and thc pcrsonncl
during that timc whcn no agrccmcnt on thc status ol thc opcration has bccn con
cludcd. Tis raiscs thc important qucstion ol jurisdiction ovcr UN and associatcd
pcrsonncl. To clarily thc situation, thc Canadian dclcgation, in thc last minutcs
ol thc ncgotiations, proposcd an additional provision to Articlc ¡:
!n thc abscncc ol an agrccmcnt rclcrrcd to in paragraph ., thc mcmbcrs ol
thc military componcnt ol a Unitcd Nations opcration shall bc subjcct to thc
cxclusivc jurisdiction ol thcir rcspcctivc participating Statcs in rcspcct ol any
criminal offcncc which may bc committcd by thcm in thc host Statc during thc
coursc ol a Unitcd Nations opcration.
:±:
a.o UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. a·, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa(Supp) (.oo¡). Scc also 8loom,
6a·.
a¡c Scc Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations opcrations, para.
a¡, UN Ðoc. A/¡·/.¡o – S/a6.·· (.oo.).
a¡. For thcsc issucs scc also 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol
Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ··..
a¡a According to thc rcsolution thc Sccurity Council “|d|ctcrmincs that, whcn con
sidcring thc cstablishmcnt ol luturc Unitcd Nations opcrations authoriscd by thc
Council, thc Sccurity Council will rcquirc intcr alia: (…) |t|hat an agrccmcnt on thc
status ol thc opcration, and all its pcrsonncl, in thc host country bc ncgotiatcd cxpc
ditiously and should comc into lorcc as ncar as possiblc to thc outsct ol thc opcra
tion”. SC Rcs. ·6·, UN SCÒR, .a·.
rd
mtg., para. 6 (C), UN Ðoc. S/R¡S/·6· (.oo.).
a¡. According to Lcppcr it was an !nlormal Vorking Papcr Submittcd by Canada
(unpublishcd documcnt), Lcppcr, ¡.·. !t was thc vicw ol thc Unitcd Statcs that in a
Chaptcr \!! opcration thc scnding statc cxcrciscd cxclusivc jurisdiction. !bid.
a66 Chapter 5
Tc proposcd provision was not adoptcd. !t was mainly duc to lack ol timc at
thc cnd ol thc ncgotiations. Somc dclcgations also rcgardcd thc proposal as “an
attack on thcir sovcrcignty”.
:±±
Howcvcr, thc vicw that scnding statcs cxcrcisc
cxclusivc criminal jurisdiction ovcr thcir military lorccs in pcacc opcrations, cvcn
without an applicablc SÒFA, is wcll cstablishcd. Tc proposcd provision would
mcrcly havc contributcd to a clarification ol thc law in this rcspcct.
:±¡

!t was pointcd out during thc ncgotiations that thc rclcrcncc to all pcrson
ncl “cngagcd” in an opcration cxcludcd catcgorics ol pcrsonncl not so dcfincd
in Articlc ..
:±6
Tat valid rcmark did not influcncc thc final tcxt ol thc provi
sion. !t is thus difficult to undcrstand what kind ol pcrsonncl Articlc ¡ pur
ports to bc includcd in thc status agrccmcnt with thc host nation. Vhy should
“Associatcd pcrsonncl” not bc includcd in a SÒFA: To cxtcnd thc sccurity and
salcty arrangcmcnts undcrtakcn by thc host nation to also includc “contractors,
nongovcrnmcntal organisations and thcir pcrsonncl who arc cngagcd in Unitcd
Nations opcrations” was particularly cmphasiscd by thc SccrctaryGcncral in his
rcport on thc sccurity ol UN opcrations.
:±·
As has bccn shown abovc, thc currcnt
trcnd in pcacc opcrations is to includc pcrsonncl assisting thc opcration in vari
ous ways in SÒFAs. Tis practicc mirrors thc opinion ol thc SccrctaryGcncral,
and thc rcquircmcnts ol Articlc ¡ thcrclorc appcar limitcd in thosc opcrations
whcrc it is possiblc to concludc a SÒFA.
Transit
A transit Statc shall lacilitatc thc unimpcdcd transit ol Unitcd Nations and
associatcd pcrsonncl and thcir cquipmcnt to and lrom thc host Statc.
a¡¡ !bid.
a¡· Howcvcr, in a Canadian rcport on thc tragic cvcnts in Somalia in .oo., whcrc a Somali
was torturcd to dcath by Canadian lorccs, thc qucstion ol jurisdiction was dcalt with.
According to thc rcport, thc Canadian lorccs wcrc clearly subjcct to Canadian pcnal
law, probably subjcct to thc criminal law ol Somalia and possibly subjcct to thc law
ol war. ]amcs M. Simpson, ¡· Law Applicable to Canadian Forces in Somalia 1992/93
– a study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the deployment of Canadian Forces
to Somalia, (.oo·). Tc rcport concludcd that cvcn though thc Somali courts wcrc
not in opcration during thc dcploymcnt ol thc Canadian lorccs it was possiblc that
thcy still rctaincd jurisdiction to try offcnccs that contravcncd local laws during that
timc.
a¡6 UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. a·, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa(Supp) (.oo¡). Tc only cat
cgory ol pcrsonncl, according to Articlc ., “cngagcd in thc opcration” arc thosc who
lall undcr Articlc . (a) (i).
a¡· Rcport ol thc SccrctaryGcncral, Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations opcrations, para. .·,
UN Ðoc. A/¡·/.¡o – S/a6.·· (.oo.). !t is apparcnt that thc SccrctaryGcncral also
uscd thc tcrm “cngagcd”. Tis should not bc conluscd with thc mcaning ol thc tcrm
in thc convcntion, which must bc intcrprctcd against thc dcfinitions uscd thcrcin.
a6· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
Tis tcxt was adoptcd as Articlc · ol thc convcntion. Tc idca ol cmphasising thc
obligations ol thc transit statc was introduccd rathcr latc in thc ncgotiations. Tc
original proposal lrom Austria rcad:
Vithout prcjudicc to thc privilcgcs and immunitics cnjoycd by Unitcd Nations
pcrsonncl or associatcd pcrsonncl undcr applicablc intcrnational trcatics, thc
transit Statc shall takc appropriatc stcps to cnsurc thc unimpcdcd transit ol
Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl and associatcd pcrsonncl and thcir cquipmcnt.
:±8
A major conccrn sccms to havc bccn that through this provision obligations wcrc
imposcd upon third partics. !t was thcrclorc suggcstcd to rcplacc “transit Statc”
with “Statcs Partics”. Tis was mct with objcctions, it would wrongly rcsult in
similar obligations ol transit statcs and thosc ol host statcs in Articlc ¡. !t was
lurthcr rcmarkcd that thc word “cnsurc” imposcd a strong obligation on thc tran
sit statc. !t was suggcstcd that thc word “lacilitatc” should rcplacc it. Òthcr dcl
cgations bclicvcd, howcvcr, that “lacilitatc” would rcquirc thc transit statc to takc
positivc stcps and thus actually placc an cvcn grcatcr burdcn on thcsc statcs.
:±o

!t has bccn argucd that this obligation alrcady cxistcd undcr thc UN Chartcr.
:¡o

According to onc writcr Articlc · did not add much to thc substancc ol thc con
vcntion. !t was mainly to acknowlcdgc thc important rolc ol transit statcs in UN
opcrations and may bc sccn as “an cxprcssion ol gratitudc to thcm”.
:¡+
¡ach mcmbcr ol thc UN has an obligation to acccpt and carry out dccisions
ol thc Sccurity Council according to Articlc a· ol thc UN Chartcr. !t could bc
argucd that it would cntail an obligation to lacilitatc thc transit ol UN pcrsonncl
and cquipmcnt. An opcration not bascd upon a dccision ol thc Sccurity Council
may, howcvcr, not so rcadily imposc an obligation on transit statcs. Howcvcr, as
trcatics cannot imposc obligations on third statcs, thc dutics stipulatcd undcr
Articlc · ol thc convcntion would only affcct statcs partics that also lunction as
transit statcs.
Respect for laws and regulations
.. Vithout prcjudicc to such privilcgcs and immunitics as thcy may cnjoy
or to thc rcquircmcnts ol thcir dutics, Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcr
sonncl shall:
a¡· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. .., UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa(Supp) (.oo¡).
a¡o !bid., paras., ...¡.
a·c 8loom, 6ao. Hc morcovcr rcmarks that “lacilitatc” “is not a particularly oncrous
burdcn lor transit statcs”.
a·. Lcppcr, ¡.·.
a6· Chapter 5
(a) Rcspcct thc laws and rcgulations ol thc host Statc and thc transit
Statc, and
(b) Rclrain lrom any action or activity incompatiblc with thc impartial
and intcrnational naturc ol thcir dutics.
a. Tc SccrctaryGcncral ol thc Unitcd Nations shall takc all appropriatc
mcasurcs to cnsurc thc obscrvancc ol thcsc obligations.
Tc obligation to rcspcct local laws and rcgulations, as lormulatcd in Articlc
6, rcflccts thc languagc uscd in thc UN Modcl SÒFA.
:¡:
Tc words “|w|ithout
prcjudicc” rccognisc that thc dutics authoriscd by thcir mandatc may rcquirc thc
pcrlormancc ol opcrations not in conlormity with local laws (lor cxamplc, traffic
rcgulations). Tc obligation, thcrclorc, is to “rcspcct” local laws and rcgulations.
Pcrsonncl must show that a “brcach” ol thc law was ncccssarily rcquircd by thcir
dutics. UN and associatcd pcrsonncl arc also undcr an obligation to rclrain lrom
actions outsidc thc scopc ol thcir mandatc. Conccrn was cxprcsscd during thc
ncgotiations as to who should dccidc thc outcr limits ol a mandatc.
:¡:

Tc SccrctaryGcncral has a duty to takc “all appropriatc mcasurcs to cnsurc
thc obscrvancc ol thcsc obligations”. Tis will not vcst in him (or thc UN) com
pctcncc ol jurisdiction ovcr pcrsonncl. Tc cxcrcisc ol jurisdiction is dcpcndcnt
on thc privilcgcs and immunitics applicablc to thc UN and associatcd pcrsonncl,
as statcd in paragraph .. Ðuring thc ncgotiations an carlicr vcrsion ol thc tcxt
rcad: “Vithout prcjudicc to thcir privilcgcs and immunitics …”.
:¡±
Tc tcxt was
criticiscd by somc dclcgations on thc ground that UN and associatcd pcrsonncl
“cnjoycd privilcgcs and immunitics to a vcry limitcd cxtcnt il at all”.
:¡¡
Tc lailurc ol UN and associatcd pcrsonncl to comply with obligations
would not affcct thc protcction ol pcrsonncl. An act that qualifics as a crimc
undcr thc convcntion is not dcpcndcnt upon whcthcr or not thc pcrsonncl havc
actcd ultra vires.
:¡6
Tc obligation lor UN and associatcd pcrsonncl to also rcspcct
a·a Para. 6 ol thc UN Modcl SÒFA.
a·. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. ¡a, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa(Supp) (.oo¡). Tc qucstion is
il a national judgc wcrc to intcrprct rcsolutions lrom thc Sccurity Council.
a·¡ !bid., para. .6.
a·· !bid., para. .·. Tc currcnt tcxt was thcn suggcstcd.
a·6 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ··¡. Scc also UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc
Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an !ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc
Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. ¡c, UN Ðoc
A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡). Conccrn was thcrc cxprcsscd “that a linkagc might bc cstab
lishcd bctwccn thc duty to obscrvc thosc norms and thc cntitlcmcnt to thc protcc
tion providcd lor by thc luturc convcntion”.
a6o Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
intcrnational norms and standards is statcd in onc ol thc saving clauscs in Articlc
ac.
5.3.3 Duty to Provide Protection
Comparcd with thc dcbatc on thc scopc ol thc convcntion, thc corc rcgulations
wcrc not subjcct to much dclibcration. Ònc rcason lor this, pcrhaps, is that thcy
arc in gcncral bascd upon othcr convcntions addrcssing similar qucstions, such as
thc !PP Convcntion.
:¡·

Ðuty to ensure the safety and security of personnel
.. Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl, thcir cquipmcnt and prcmiscs
shall not bc madc thc objcct ol attack or ol any action that prcvcnts thcm
lrom discharging thcir mandatc.
a. Statcs Partics shall takc all appropriatc mcasurcs to cnsurc thc salcty and
sccurity ol Unitcd Nations and associatcd pcrsonncl. !n particular, Statcs
Partics shall takc all appropriatc stcps to protcct Unitcd Nations and
associatcd pcrsonncl who arc dcploycd in thcir tcrritory lrom thc crimcs
sct out in articlc o.
.. Statcs Partics shall coopcratc with thc Unitcd Nations and othcr Statcs
Partics, as appropriatc, in thc implcmcntation ol this Convcntion, partic
ularly in any casc whcrc thc host Statc is unablc itscll to takc thc rcquircd
mcasurcs.
Articlc · may bc vicwcd as thc corc provision ol thc convcntion. Paragraph .
rcflccts thc lundamcntal principlc, lound in thc prcamblc to thc Convcntion, that
“attacks against, or mistrcatmcnt ol, pcrsonncl who act on bchall ol thc Unitcd
Nations arc unjustifiablc and unacccptablc, by whomsocvcr committcd”.
:¡8
Vhilc
paragraphs a and . arc addrcsscd dircctly to Statcs Partics, paragraph . is lormu
latcd in a passivc voicc and can bc intcrprctcd to also includc nonstatc actors.
Tc rclcrcncc abovc to thc unacccptability ol attacks against UN pcrsonncl “by
whomsocvcr committcd” supports such an intcrprctation. !ndividuals, armcd
groups or othcr typcs ol nonstatc actors will in gcncral not bc considcrcd as sub
jccts ol intcrnational law and as such thcy arc lormally not bound by intcrnational
law. !t is, howcvcr, incumbcnt on statcs to implcmcnt thcir intcrnational obliga
tions into national laws. Tc obligation not to attack UN and associatcd pcrson
ncl thus flows lrom thc intcrnational norm and is cxprcsscd through national
lcgislation binding upon individuals.
a·· A suggcstion to dralt an additional protocol to thc !PP Convcntion did not find
sufficicnt support in thc working group. Sixth Committcc aoth mccting, Summary
Rccord ol thc ao
th
mtg, para. ., UN Ðoc. A/C.6/¡·/SR.ao (.oo.).
a·· Paragraph a ol thc prcamblc.
a·c Chapter 5
Tc rcsponsibility ol thc statcs partics cxprcsscd in paragraph a rcflccts a
spccial rcsponsibility lor host statcs. Tcy arc obligatcd to takc all appropriatc
mcasurcs to protcct pcrsonncl lrom thosc crimcs sct out in Articlc o. Tc situa
tion in Somalia in .oo., whcrc thc host govcrnmcnt was not ablc to cxcrcisc its
jurisdiction ovcr pcrsons rcsponsiblc lor attacks on UN and associatcd pcrson
ncl, is thc objcct ol paragraph .. Tc first vcrsion ol thc tcxt was in lact bascd
upon thc languagc ol Sccurity Council Rcsolution ·6· (.oo.).
:¡o
According to
8ourloyannis\railas it is important that this principlc is cxprcsscd in thc con
vcntion but it would probably not “providc sufficicnt guidancc in practicc”.
:6o
!t
cntails, howcvcr, an obligation by statcs partics to coopcratc in mattcrs con
ccrning thc protcction ol UN and associatcd pcrsonncl. !l takcn scriously it may
provc to bc invaluablc in thc fight against impunity on thc part ol thosc rcspon
siblc lor criminal acts committcd against protcctcd pcrsonncl. Tis is cvcn morc
so in situations whcrc thc host statc lacks thc capability to takc thc rcquircd
mcasurcs. As thcrc is no rcquircmcnt lor thc host statc to bc a party to thc Salcty
Convcntion, thc provision providcs statcs partics with an inccntivc to coopcratc
in ordcr to punish pcrpctrators ol thosc criminal acts stipulatcd in thc convcn
tion, cvcn whcn thcy arc committcd outsidc thcir own tcrritorics.
Tc Nordic countrics introduccd a proposal whcrcby nonstatc cntitics
would bc ablc to apply thc provisions ol thc convcntion ovcr tcrritory whcrc thcy
cxcrciscd actual control. Tc proposal rcad:
An authority cxcrcising actual control ovcr thc tcrritory in which a Unitcd
Nations opcration is conductcd may undcrtakc to apply thc prcscnt Convcntion
by mcans ol a unilatcral dcclaration addrcsscd to thc Ðcpositary.
|...|
Tc dcposit ol such dcclaration shall not in any way affcct thc lcgal status ol
thc cntity or thc tcrritory it controls.
:6+
Tc proposal, bascd upon Articlc o6(.) ol Additional Protocol ! to thc .o¡o
Gcncva Convcntions, mct with strong rcscrvations by somc dclcgations lcaring
that it would grant rccognition to a nonstatc cntity.
:6:
a·o UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. o., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a
(.oo¡).
a6c 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ···. Shc cxcmplifics thc lcgal issucs involvcd in thc cxtradition
ol an allcgcd offcndcr lrom a statc without a lunctioning govcrnmcnt.
a6. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx !! Scc. V para. ¡, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp)
(.oo¡).
a6a !bid., Anncx !, para. .ac.
a·. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
·...... Ðuty to rclcasc or rcturn pcrsonncl capturcd or dctaincd
Tis provision has bccn intcrprctcd as providing thc pcrsonncl with immunity
lrom local jurisdiction. Tc validity ol such an intcrprctation is, howcvcr, qucs
tioncd in this work. Articlc · rcads:
¡xccpt as othcrwisc providcd in an applicablc statusollorccsagrccmcnt, il
Unitcd Nations or associatcd pcrsonncl arc capturcd or dctaincd in thc coursc
ol thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics and thcir idcntification has bccn cstablishcd,
thcy shall not bc subjcctcd to intcrrogation and thcy shall bc promptly rclcascd
and rcturncd to Unitcd Nations or othcr appropriatc authoritics. Pcnding thcir
rclcasc such pcrsonncl shall bc trcatcd in accordancc with univcrsally rccog
niscd standards ol human rights and thc principlcs and spirit ol thc Gcncva
Convcntions ol .o¡o.
As has bccn shown abovc, a SÒFA accords privilcgcs and immunitics lor pcrson
ncl participating in an opcration, limiting inter alia, thc right to cxcrcisc jurisdic
tion ol thc host statc ovcr such pcrsonncl. Against this background Articlc · was
lormulatcd in a pcculiar way. !t statcs that thc UN and associatcd pcrsonncl, il
dctaincd, should bc promptly rclcascd – il not providcd othcrwisc in an applica
blc SÒFA. According to thc UN Modcl SÒFA, host statc authoritics only havc
thc right to dctain pcrsonncl participating in an opcration whcn so rcqucstcd by
thc commandcr ol thc lorcc or il “apprchcndcd in thc commission or attcmptcd
commission ol a criminal offcncc”.
:6:
Howcvcr, il a pcrson has bccn apprchcndcd
hc or shc shall bc “dclivcrcd immcdiatcly” to thc ncarcst rcprcscntativc ol thc UN
opcration.
:6±
!l a SÒFA is in placc it docs not sccm that Articlc · adds anything
much to thc affordcd protcction othcr than what is alrcady providcd through thc
applicablc SÒFA.
So what in cffcct docs this provision mcan: Tc phrasc “capturcd or dctaincd”
indicatcs that it is dircctcd both to statc organs as wcll as individuals. Tc pro
vision was lormulatcd in thc passivc voicc and may thus cncompass pcrsons or
groups involvcd in thc kidnapping ol thc protcctcd pcrsonncl. A kcy critcrion is
“in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics”. At first sight it appcars as il it
is a statcmcnt ol socallcd “onduty immunity”. Howcvcr, thc ncgotiating history
indicatcs that this was not thc intcntion ol thc draltcrs.
Tc first vcrsion ol this articlc, proposcd by thc US dclcgation, rcad: “Statcs
shall not dctain Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl lor acts takcn in pcrlormancc ol an
cnlorccmcnt or a pcacckccping mission. !l Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl cngagcd
in such a mission arc capturcd or dctaincd, thcy shall bc immcdiatcly rclcascd
a6. UN Modcl SÒFA, para. ¡a.
a6¡ !bid.
a·a Chapter 5
…”
:6¡
!n thc rcviscd ncgotiating dralt thc articlc containcd thc lollowing tcxt: “!l
Unitcd Nations pcrsonncl cngagcd in a Unitcd Nations opcration arc capturcd or
dctaincd, thcy shall bc immcdiatcly rclcascd …”
:66
!n rcsponsc to this proposal, it
was pointcd out that it should also apply to associatcd pcrsonncl. !t was suggcstcd
that thc phrasc “lor acts takcn in pcrlormancc ol an cnlorccmcnt or pcacckccp
ing mission” should bc inscrtcd altcr thc tcrm “dctaincd”. Anothcr proposal was
to inscrt, instcad ol thc abovcsuggcstcd phrasc, “lor acts carricd out in thc coursc
ol a Unitcd Nations opcration”, altcr thc tcrm “dctaincd”.
:6·
!n thc cnd, thc rclcrcncc “lor acts takcn in pcrlormancc ol/lor acts carricd
out in thc coursc ol ” was rcjcctcd lor thc currcnt phrasc “capturcd or dctaincd
in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics”. Tc apparcnt diffcrcncc is that
a phrasc indicating that thc Salcty Convcntion providcs lunctional immunity
lor thc pcrsonncl conccrncd was discardcd lor a phrasc moving away lrom such
an intcrprctation. From a prima facie rcading ol thc tcxt it sccms that UN and
associatcd pcrsonncl shall bc rclcascd, promptly, only il thcy havc bccn “capturcd
or dctaincd in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics”. Vould thc obliga
tion to rclcasc promptly bc diffcrcnt il thcy wcrc capturcd or dctaincd whcn not
pcrlorming thcir dutics: Givcn thc lact that suggcstions to dralt thc articlc so
as to providc lunctional immunity to such pcrsonncl was rcjcctcd thcrc sccm to
bc good rcasons to intcrprct its mcaning as only prohibiting interference with thc
work carricd out by such pcrsonncl and not to providing immunity lor acts pcr
lormcd in an official capacity. So long as thcy carricd out thcir dutics thcy could
and should bc allowcd to work in pcacc.
Tc intcrprctation ol Articlc · as onc ol dcaling with nonintcrlcrcncc with
thc lunctions ol thc UN opcration is lurthcr sustaincd by its contcxt. Tis intcr
prctation is supportcd by thc naturc ol thc Salcty Convcntion, that it is first and
lorcmost a criminal law instrumcnt. !n that rcspcct it has a lot in common with
thc !PP Convcntion. A contcxtual intcrprctation thus lurthcr strcngthcns thc
vicw that Articlc · docs not providc immunity lor UN and associatcd pcrson
ncl.
!t is, howcvcr, also ncccssary to undcrstand thc circumstanccs undcr which
Articlc · dcvclopcd. !t was a US proposal and according to Lcppcr, thc US
dclcgatc during thc ncgotiations ol thc convcntion, thc articlc was “a timcly
cxprcssion ol intcrnational outragc against situations likc Ðurant’s capturc and
dctcntion in Somalia and thc routinc capturc ol UNPRÒFÒR troops in thc
a6· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. ·., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a
(.oo¡).
a66 UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, para. 66, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
a6· !bid. para. 6·.
a·. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
lormcr Yugoslavia”.
:68
Tc US hclicoptcr pilot Michacl Ðurant was capturcd
during thc tragic cvcnts that occurrcd in Somalia on . Òctobcr .oo. whcn .·
US troops wcrc killcd. According to Lcppcr, thc US govcrnmcnt’s first rcac
tion to Ðurant’s capturc, with thc cxpcricnccs ol thc rcccntlywagcd war against
!raq in mind, was to rcgard him as a prisoncr ol war. Howcvcr, altcr analys
ing thc position it was soon rcaliscd that major diffcrcnccs cxistcd bctwccn thc
two situations.
:6o
Tc hostilitics in Somalia could not bc rcgardcd as an intcrna
tional armcd conflict, thus thc law ol intcrnational armcd conflict did not apply
– including thc Gcncva Convcntion on thc trcatmcnt ol prisoncrs ol war. Tc
incidcnt should cithcr bc charactcriscd as a nonintcrnational armcd conflict, to
which only common Articlc . to thc lour Gcncva Convcntions applicd, or as just
a scrics ol criminal acts undcr intcrnational criminal law. Tc US, morcovcr, was
rcluctant to contributc to a lcgitimisation ol thc status ol Ðurant’s captors, which
would scnd thc wrong signals that it was lawlul to capturc soldicrs on thosc kinds
ol mission. Prisoncrs ol war would in lact bc lcgitimatcly hcld lor thc duration
ol thc conflict. Vhilc it was important to rclcr to thc standards providcd lor
prisoncrs ol war lor thc trcatmcnt ol Ðurant, thc US govcrnmcnt chosc not to
rcly upon that status lor thc pilot’s protcction and rclcasc. Tc cvcnts provokcd
thc important qucstion ol lcgal status and protcction ol pcrsonncl acting undcr
a UN mandatc. Tc purposc ol Articlc · was to conlorm to thc rcquircmcnts ol
US policy, as statcd in a Prcsidcntial Ðccision Ðircctivc ol .. May .oo¡ “to pro
vidc lor thc immcdiatc rclcasc ol pcrsonncl capturcd whilc pcrlorming UN pcacc
opcrations”.
:·o

According to 8loom, also part ol thc US dclcgation during thc ncgotiations
on thc convcntion, Articlc · cnsurcs that pcrsonncl capturcd or dctaincd shall bc
rclcascd immcdiatcly, in contrast to thc proposition ol bcing rcturncd at thc cnd
ol hostilitics – a stipulation applicablc to prisoncrs ol war. Tc provision thcrclorc
limits thc risk ol a situation dcvcloping whcrcby a claim that soldicrs should bc
trcatcd in accordancc with intcrnational humanitarian law standards is answcrcd
by thc argumcnt that soldicrs should bc rcgardcd as bcing prisoncrs ol war and
would accordingly bc rclcascd at thc cnd ol hostilitics.
:·+

Tough it might bc intcrprctcd as an important statcmcnt against a lack ol
rcspcct lor UN and associatcd pcrsonncl with thc growing tcndcncy ol dctaining
and kidnapping such pcrsonncl, an apparcnt lcaturc ol thc articlc is that it docs
a6· Lcppcr, ¡a· (lootnotcs omittcd).
a6o Lcppcr, .6a. For thc lollowing scc Lcppcr, .6a.6..
a·c !bid., ¡a·. Tc Clinton Administration’s Policy on Rclorming Multilatcral Pcacc
Òpcrations, Prcsidcntial Ðccision Ðircctivc a·, .. !LM ·o· (.oo¡). Lcppcr notcs that
il thc convcntion had bccn in lorcc, with Somalia and thc lormcr Yugoslavia as par
tics to it, thc capturc and dctcntion ol pcrsonncl would havc cntailcd statc rcsponsi
bility lor thc violation ol thc prohibition stipulatcd in Articlc ·. !bid., ¡a6.
a·. 8loom, 6ao.
a·¡ Chapter 5
not prohibit dctcntion ol such protcctcd pcrsonncl.
:·:
Unlawlul dctcntion is pro
hibitcd according to Articlc o ol thc convcntion.
:·:
UN and associatcd pcrsonncl capturcd or dctaincd shall, morcovcr, bc
“promptly rclcascd and rcturncd to Unitcd Nations or othcr appropriatc authori
tics”. Could this statcmcnt bc intcrprctcd as mcaning a prohibition on thc pros
ccution ol UN and associatcd pcrsonncl:
:·±
Tc qucstion ol jurisdiction ovcr UN
and associatcd pcrsonncl in thc abscncc ol a SÒFA is not dircctly addrcsscd in thc
convcntion. A proposal by thc Russian Fcdcration on this topic rcad: “Pcrsonncl
participating in a Unitcd Nations opcration arc subjcct to thc cxclusivc juris
diction ol thcir rcspcctivc Mcmbcr Statcs with rcspcct to any criminal offcnccs
which may bc committcd by thcm during thc opcration.”
:·¡

Tc dclcgations wcrc in gcncral lavour ol thc idca but its inclusion in thc
convcntion, as draltcd, was rcjcctcd on thrcc main grounds. First, thc rclcrcncc to
“Mcmbcr Statcs” appcarcd unclcar to somc dclcgations. Sccondly, it was lcarcd
that thc provision implicd that thc pcrsonncl in qucstion would bc immunc lrom
thc jurisdiction ol thc host statc with rcgard to any offcncc committcd in that
statc. Tirdly, it was pointcd out that it was ncccssary that thc domcstic laws ol
a scnding statc authoriscd thc statc to cxcrcisc its jurisdiction lor offcnccs com
mittcd outsidc its tcrritory. Somc statcs did not posscss this authority undcr thcir
currcnt domcstic laws.
:·6

·.....a Articlc · and SÒFAs
Ðuring thc work ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc accaacc·, somc dclcgations voiccd
conccrn ovcr thc lact that Articlc · providcd immunity lor UN and associ
atcd pcrsonncl. Tc intcrprctation ol Articlc ·, providing immunity lrom local
jurisdiction, has in lact influcnccd thc cntirc work carricd out by thc Ad Hoc
Committcc. At thc vcry first scssion ol thc committcc, ]ordan’s dclcgation
a·a !t should bc notcd that thc provision is lormulatcd in a passivc voicc and may thus
comprisc pcrsons or groups involvcd in thc kidnapping ol protcctcd pcrsonncl. Tis
is subjcct to thc inhcrcnt difficulty ol nonstatc actors to assumc rights and obliga
tions undcr intcrnational law.
a·. To avoid luturc problcms arising as to whcthcr or not a host statc’s acts arc lawlul,
Lcppcr argucd that thc articlc should bc intcrprctcd to comprisc a prohibition on
any dctcntion or capturc not authoriscd by a SÒFA. Hc suggcsts that, in rctrospcct,
thc articlc should havc includcd thc phrasc “Unitcd Nations or associatcd pcrsonncl
shall not bc capturcd or dctaincd in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics. !l
thcy arc and thcir idcntification has …”. Lcppcr, ¡a6.
a·¡ !bid., ¡a·.
a·· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc ¡laboration ol an
!ntcrnational Convcntion Ðcaling with thc Salcty and Sccurity ol Unitcd Nations
and Associatcd Pcrsonncl, Anncx !! Scction L, UN Ðoc. A/¡o/aa (Supp) (.oo¡).
a·6 !bid., para. 6o.
a·· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
brought to thc lorc thc application ol Articlc · in rclation to associatcd pcrsonncl
and locally cmploycd staff. !n thc acc¡ scssion a numbcr ol dclcgations cxprcsscd
hcsitation ovcr any proposcd cxpansion ol thc convcntion’s scopc ol application
in vicw ol thc cffcct ol Articlc ·. ]ordan, Syria and ¡gypt wcrc numbcrcd among
thosc dclcgations that most notably rcgardcd Articlc · as an obstaclc lor cxpand
ing thc convcntion’s scopc ol application. Givcn that thosc dclcgations appcarcd
to intcrprct Articlc · as providing immunity lor pcrsonncl, it is pcrhaps not sur
prising that statcs with largc UN missions prcscnt within thcir tcrritory, hcsitatc
at thc idca ol cxtcnding thc application ol thc convcntion. Tc Unitcd Nations
Rclicl and Vorks Agcncy lor Palcstinc Rclugccs (UNRVA), which bcgan opcr
ations on . May .o·c, cmploys morc than a¡,ccc staff in ]ordan, Syria and clsc
whcrc.
:··

!n ordcr to mcct thcsc lcars, without dcnying thc “immunityintcrprcta
tion”, thc Ncw Zcaland proposal offcrcd an intcrprctation ol Articlc · undcr thc
protocol, as lollows:
Tc duty ol a Statc Party to thc Convcntion undcr articlc · shall bc without
prcjudicc to thc right ol a host or transit Statc, whcrc providcd by any agrcc
mcnt concludcd undcr articlc ¡ ol thc Convcntion, to takc lawlul action in thc
cxcrcisc ol its national jurisdiction ovcr any Unitcd Nations or associatcd pcr
sonncl who violatcs thc laws and rcgulations ol that Statc.
:·8
Tc proposal docs not add anything morc, but mcrcly statcs thc obvious that
whcn host statcs, or transit statcs, arc providcd by a SÒFA to cxcrcisc jurisdic
tion ovcr UN and associatcd pcrsonncl thcy may, in lact, do so. Tcrc was gcncral
agrccmcnt on thc point that thcrc was a nccd to clarily thc mcaning ol Articlc
·. !t was cmphasiscd, howcvcr, that an intcrprctation ol Articlc · would rclatc
to thc ncw obligations statcs would assumc undcr thc additional protocol and
a·· UNRVA carry out dircct rclicl and works programmcs lor Palcstinc Rclugccs. GA
Rcs. .ca (!\) Assistancc to Palcstinc Rclugccs, UN GAÒR ¡
th
Scss., UN Ðoc. A/
R¡S/.ca (!\) (.o¡o). According to thc agrccmcnt providing privilcgcs and immu
nitics to thc pcrsonncl ol UNRVA, locally cmploycd pcrsonncl do not, in contrast
to intcrnationally rccruitcd pcrsonncl, cnjoy privilcgcs and immunitics undcr thc
Gcncral Convcntion. Scc Articlc ! ol thc Agrccmcnt 8ctwccn thc Govcrnmcnt ol
thc Hashcmitc Kingdom ol thc ]ordan and thc Unitcd Nations Rclicl and Vorks
Agcncy lor Palcstinc Rclugccs in thc Ncar ¡ast, .¡ March and ac August .o·., .a
UNTS a·c (.o·a).
a·· UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
Proposal by Ncw Zcaland, Rcviscd proposal lor an instrumcnt cxpanding thc scopc
ol lcgal protcction undcr thc .oo¡ Convcntion lor thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a6¡/acc¡/ÐP.. (acc¡).
a·6 Chapter 5
would thus not amcnd Articlc · ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
:·o
!t was also sug
gcstcd that an intcrprctation ol Articlc · could bc inscrtcd in thc rcport ol thc Ad
Hoc Committcc or in a Gcncral Asscmbly rcsolution. Rcalising thc rcluctancc
ol somc statcs to apply Articlc · to an cxtcndcd numbcr ol local cmployccs, it
was suggcstcd that thc protocol might pcrhaps includc a right ol rcscrvation to
Articlc · in rclation to nationals ol a statc party.
:8o
]ordan proposcd thc lollowing tcxt ol a ncw articlc rclating to an cxpandcd
scopc ol application ol thc convcntion:
.. Notwithstanding articlcs ·, · and o ol thc Convcntion, whcrc thc provi
sions ol thc Convcntion arc cxtcndcd to a Unitcd Nations opcration in
accordancc with articlc . (c), thc host Statc or transit Statc may cxcrcisc
national jurisdiction ovcr any Unitcd Nations or associatcd pcrsonncl
who violatc thc laws and rcgulations ol that Statc, unlcss thc host Statc
or transit Statc is bound to rclrain lrom doing so undcr othcr cxisting
intcrnational obligations.
a. Any lawlul action takcn by thc host or transit Statc in accordancc with
paragraph . abovc is not dccmcd to bc a crimc undcr thc Convcntion or
to prcvcnt thc dischargc ol thc mandatc ol thc Unitcd Nations opcra
tion.
:8+
Tc main diffcrcncc bctwccn thc proposals ol ]ordan and Ncw Zcaland is that
thc lormcr prcsumcs that thc host statc posscsscs thc right to cxcrcisc tcrrito
rial jurisdiction ovcr pcrsonncl unlcss bcing prcvcntcd lrom doing so according
to cxisting intcrnational obligations. Ncw Zcaland’s proposal closcly lollows thc
tcxt ol thc convcntion (although thc convcntion docs not spcak ol jurisdiction)
and prcsumcs that thc right ol thc host statc to cxcrcisc jurisdiction is dcpcnd
cnt upon a SÒFA. Vhilc it is hcrc argucd that Articlc · docs not conccrn juris
diction, as such, nor immunity, it might affcct thc cxcrcisc ol thc cxccutivc arm
ol thc host statc govcrnmcnt. !n that rcspcct ]ordan’s proposal could pcrhaps bc
rcgardcd as bcing a rcstrictivc intcrprctation ol Articlc · ol thc convcntion. !n a
situation whcrc thcrc is no applicablc SÒFA, Articlc · ol thc convcntion providcs
pcrsonncl with a bar against intcrlcrcncc lrom local authoritics, which according
to ]ordan’s proposal would bc lost.
:8:
Howcvcr, Ncw Zcaland’s proposal appcars
a·o UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Scopc ol Lcgal
Protcction undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd
Pcrsonncl, para. .·, UN Ðoc. A/·o/·a (Supp) (acc¡).
a·c !bid., para. .6.
a·. Sixth Committcc, Rcport ol thc Vorking Group on thc Scopc ol Lcgal Protcction
undcr thc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and Associatcd Pcrsonncl,
Anncx ! 8, UN Ðoc. A/C.6/··/L..6 (acc.).
a·a !t is also ncccssary takc duc account ol cvolving customary intcrnational law in this
rcspcct. Tc rclcrcncc to “cxisting intcrnational obligations”, in thc ]ordanian pro
a·· Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
to amcnd Articlc ·, sincc it suggcsts that jurisdiction, as such, nccds to bc pro
vidcd by a SÒFA.
Tc rclcrcnccs to “jurisdiction” and “immunity” in thc proposals by ]ordan
and Ncw Zcaland illustratc thc difficultics involvcd. Tcsc issucs arc gcncrally
dcalt with in instrumcnts ol anothcr charactcr. !t should also bc rcmcmbcrcd that
thc Salcty Convcntion is an instrumcnt dircctcd against thc notion ol impunity
on thc part ol thosc attacking UN and associatcd pcrsonncl. !t has thc charactcr
ol a criminal law instrumcnt thc objcctivc ol which is to prosccutc or cxtraditc
thosc rcsponsiblc lor attacks on protcctcd pcrsonncl. Tc lcgal status ol pcrson
ncl, in thc lorm ol privilcgcs and immunitics, is accordcd thcm through othcr
mcans, such as thc Gcncral Convcntion and SÒFAs/SÒMAs. !n that rcspcct thc
Salcty Convcntion could bc comparcd to thc !PP Convcntion and its rclation
ship to thc \icnna Convcntion on Ðiplomatic Privilcgcs and !mmunitics and
thc Gcncral Convcntion. Tcrc is, in lact, somc ovcrlap bctwccn thc rcgimcs ol
thc Salcty Convcntion and thc !PP Convcntion.
:8:
For thc acc· scssion ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc a joint proposal by China,
]apan, ]ordan and Ncw Zcaland prcscntcd a ncw tcxt to bc includcd in thc pro
tocol as Articlc !!!. Tis tcxt was latcr includcd, without changcs, as Articlc !!! in
thc Òptional Protocol. !t adcquatcly clarifics that articlc · docs not providc thc
protcctcd pcrsonncl with immunity lrom local jurisdiction. !t statcs
Tc duty ol a Statc Party to this Protocol with rcspcct to thc application ol
articlc · ol thc Convcntion to Unitcd Nations opcrations dcfincd in articlc !!
ol this Protocol shall bc without prcjudicc to its right to takc action in thc cxcr
cisc ol its national jurisdiction ovcr any Unitcd Nations or associatcd pcrsonncl
who violatcs thc laws and rcgulations ol that Statc, providcd that such action is
not in violation ol any othcr intcrnational law obligation ol thc Statc Party.
!t is basically a statcmcnt ol clarification ol what Articlc · alrcady contains. Tc
host statc has “thc right to takc action in thc cxcrcisc ol its national jurisdiction”
with rcgard to any protcctcd pcrsonncl violating local laws and rcgulations “pro
vidcd that such action is not in violation ol any othcr intcrnational law obligation
ol thc Statc Party.”
Tc rclcrcncc to “any othcr intcrnational law obligation” ncccssarily includcs
customary intcrnational law. As it has bccn argucd in this work that basic SÒFA
norms has acquircd a customary law status, thc rclcrcncc to any intcrnational law
posal, without rclcrring to spccific instrumcnts appcars against this background as a
comprchcnsivc suggcstion.
a·. Scc Articlc a ol thc !PP Convcntion according to which an agcnt ol an intcrnational
govcrnmcntal organisation is rcgardcd as an “!ntcrnationally protcctcd pcrson” il hc/
shc “is cntitlcd pursuant to intcrnational law to spccial protcction lrom any attack on
his pcrson, lrccdom or dignity, …”.
a·· Chapter 5
obligation may bc ol importancc whcn pcrsonncl dcploys bclorc thc conclusion
ol a particular SÒFA.
!n opcrations ol a latcr datc Articlc · ol thc Salcty Convcntion has bccn
includcd in SÒFAs, togcthcr with othcr kcy provisions ol thc convcntion, in a
scction cntitlcd “Salcty and sccurity”. Tc lollowing discussion will apply thc
UNM!S¡T SÒFA as an cxamplc to illustratc this practicc. 8clorc continu
ing, it should bc obscrvcd that thc duty ol thc host nation to apply thc Salcty
Convcntion’s provisions is, according to this SÒFA, limitcd to mcmbcrs ol thc
opcration. Tis is tantamount to UN personnel bcing accordcd protcction undcr
thc Salcty Convcntion, largcly lcaving out associated personnel. As a SÒFA gcncr
ally applics only to thosc considcrcd to bc mcmbcrs ol an opcration, such a limita
tion should bc cxpcctcd. Howcvcr, in SÒFAs ol a latcr datc, and thc UNM!S¡T
SÒFA is no cxccption, contractors arc also includcd. Tcsc would clcarly qualily
as associatcd pcrsonncl in rclation to thc Salcty Convcntion. Against this back
ground it appcars somcwhat strangc that thc duty ol thc host nation to apply
thc provisions ol thc Salcty Convcntion docs not cxtcnd also to this catcgory ol
pcrsonncl. !t could, howcvcr, bc a rcsult ol thc ncgotiations bctwccn thc UN and
thc host nation.
Paragraph ¡o ol thc UNM!S¡T SÒFA contains thc tcxt ol Articlc · ol thc
Salcty Convcntion.
:8±
Tc “Salcty and sccurity” scction, ol which paragraph ¡o
is part, was inscrtcd altcr thc scction on “Military policc, arrcst and translcr ol
custody, and mutual assistancc” and bclorc thc scction on “]urisdiction”. From thc
placcmcnt ol thcsc provisions in thc SÒFA, it appcars as il thc UN docs not con
sidcr thc tcxt ol paragraph ¡o to conccrn qucstions ol jurisdiction or immunity.
Ðocs paragraph ¡o add to thc protcction ol pcrsonncl: Paragraph ¡· statcs
that thc govcrnmcnt conccrncd may takc into custody mcmbcrs ol UNM!S¡T
il requested by thc Spccial Rcprcscntativc or il apprehended in thc commission or
attcmptcd commission ol a criminal offcncc. Tis appcars to bc thc only instancc
in which a govcrnmcnt may takc a mcmbcr ol UNM!S¡T into custody. As
paragraph ¡o docs not prohibit dctcntion ol UNM!S¡T pcrsonncl it must bc
assumcd that thc capturc or dctcntion ol such pcrsonncl rcquircs that thc critc
ria ol paragraph ¡· bc mct. Ðo thc tcrms “capturcd” and “dctaincd” in paragraph
¡o rclcr to somcthing othcr than to “takc into custody” as dcclarcd in paragraph
¡·: Tc tcrm “capturcd” is prcsumably indicativc ol thc lact that provision also
addrcsscs situations whcrc nonstatc actors, such as thc armcd groups ol Somalia
in .oo., hold pcrsonncl in captivity. According to 8lack’s Law Ðictionary, “cus
tody” is dcfincd as “Tc carc and control ol a thing or pcrson lor inspcction,
a·¡ !t rcads: “!l mcmbcrs ol UNM!S¡T arc capturcd or dctaincd in thc coursc ol thc
pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics and thcir idcntification has bccn cstablishcd, thcy shall
not bc subjcctcd to intcrrogation and thcy shall bc promptly rclcascd and rcturncd
to Unitcd Nations or othcr appropriatc authoritics.”
a·o Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
prcscrvation, or sccurity.”
:8¡
Tc tcrm “dctcntion” is dcfincd as “Tc act or lact ol
holding a pcrson in custody”.
:86
Tcrc thus appcars to bc littlc, il any, diffcrcncc
bctwccn custody and dctcntion.
According to paragraph ¡6 ol thc UNM!S¡T SÒFA, thc govcrnmcnt in
qucstion may makc a prcliminary intcrrogation but it must not dclay thc translcr
ol custody, which according to paragraph ¡· (b) shall bc immcdiatc.
:8·
Howcvcr,
paragraph ¡o stipulatcs an cxplicit prohibition on subjccting pcrsonncl to intcr
rogation il thcy havc bccn “capturcd or dctaincd in thc coursc ol thc pcrlormancc
ol thcir dutics.” As it is arguably possiblc to commit a criminal offcncc whilc pcr
lorming assigncd dutics (pcrsonncl with cxccutivc powcrs, military or policc pcr
sonncl,
:88
might, lor instancc, usc cxccssivc lorcc in thc cxccution ol thcir dutics)
thc host govcrnmcnt would bc prcvcntcd lrom carrying out cvcn a prcliminary
intcrrogation ol mcmbcrs ol thc opcration. !t is ccrtainly a limitcd contribution
by thc Salcty Convcntion’s Articlc · to thc cstablishcd SÒFA provisions and onc
which appcars to bc difficult to uphold in practicc.
A SÒFA is a practical mcans ol cnsuring thc cfficicnt lunctioning ol a pcacc
opcration. Tc protcction ol pcrsonncl constitutcs an important lunctional aspcct.
!n this light, it docs not appcar that paragraph ¡o adds much to thc protcction
ol pcrsonncl. Rathcr it may conlusc an alrcady wcllcstablishcd practicc dividing
issucs ol custody and rclatcd qucstions bctwccn thc host nation and thc UN. Tc
lact that it obligcs thc govcrnmcnt conccrncd to trcat pcrsonncl in accordancc
both with rccogniscd standards ol human rights and thc principlcs and spirit
ol intcrnational humanitarian law, pcnding thcir rclcasc, docs not sccm to add
substantivcly to thc protcction ol pcrsonncl. Pcrsonncl cnjoy a spccial protcction
undcr a SÒFA. Tc govcrnmcnt involvcd has a duty undcr customary intcrna
tional law to trcat any pcrson in accordancc with rccogniscd standards ol human
rights and thc principlcs and spirit ol intcrnational law. Vith rcgard to military
pcrsonncl this is also statcd in paragraph 6 ol thc SÒFA.
Tc difficulty ol including thc tcxt ol Articlc · ol thc Salcty Convcntion
undcrlincs thc lact that it was draltcd to addrcss situations not govcrncd by a
SÒFA. Articlc · must bc rcad against thc background ol thc UNÒSÒM opcra
tions whcrc thcrc was no govcrnmcnt in placc with which to concludc a SÒFA.
!n situations whcrc no agrccmcnt on thc status ol thc pcrsonncl conccrncd has
a·· 8lack’s Law Ðictionary, .oc (8ryan A. Garncr cd., ·
th
cd., .ooo). Physical custody is
dcfincd as “Custody ol a pcrson (such an arrcstcc) whosc lrccdom is dircctly control
lcd and limitcd.” !bid.
a·6 !bid., ¡·o. !nvcstigativc dctcntion is dcfincd thus: “Tc holding ol a suspcct with
out lormal arrcst during thc invcstigation ol thc suspcct’s participation in a crimc.”
!bid.
a·· Tcy should bc “turncd ovcr as quickly as possiblc”. Scc Kim S. Cartcr, Tc lcgal basis
ol Canada’s participation in Unitcd Nations opcrations, . International Peacekeeping,
..6, ..· (.oo¡).
a·· !n thc UNM!S¡T opcration civilian policc had cxccutivc powcrs.
a·c Chapter 5
bccn concludcd with thc host statc, this provision is ol particular importancc.
For somc associatcd pcrsonncl thc agrccmcnt with thc UN may not ncccssarily
providc thcm with a protcctcd status. !n thcsc cascs Articlc · cnhanccs thcir pro
tcction. !t is somcwhat strangc, considcring thc strong opposition against includ
ing pcrsonncl ol NGÒs, that this provision did not causc grcatcr dcbatc in that
rcspcct, during thc ncgations ol .oo..oo¡.
!t has now, through thc Òptional Protocol, bccn propcrly clarificd that
Salcty Convcntion docs not as such providcs immunity lrom local jurisdiction.
Rathcr it should bc rcgardcd as a bar on intcrlcring in thc pcrlormancc ol thc
official dutics ol pcrsonncl.
Prevention of crimes against the personnel
Statcs Partics shall coopcratc in thc prcvcntion ol thc crimcs sct out in articlc
o, particularly by:
(a) Taking all practicablc mcasurcs to prcvcnt prcparations in thcir rcspcc
tivc tcrritorics lor thc commission ol thosc crimcs within or outsidc thcir
tcrritorics, and
(b) ¡xchanging inlormation in accordancc with thcir national law and co
ordinating thc taking ol administrativc and othcr mcasurcs as appropri
atc to prcvcnt thc commission ol thosc crimcs.
Tis provision (Articlc ..) is modcllcd on Articlc ¡ ol thc !PP Convcntion and
was subjcct to a vcry limitcd discussion. !n vicw ol its almost idcntical languagc
with Articlc ¡ ol thc !PP Convcntion, guidancc may bc sought in thc prac
ticc ol that convcntion. Tc dangcrs ol copying an articlc lrom anothcr convcn
tion, dcaling with similar but othcr typcs ol qucstion, wcrc, howcvcr, pointcd out
during thc ncgotiations.
:8o
Articlc .. conccrns obligations on statc partics to co
opcratc in ordcr to prcvcnt crimcs, in particular to prcvcnt thcir own tcrritorics
lrom bcing uscd in thc prcparation or commission ol crimcs against protcctcd
pcrsonncl and by cxchanging inlormation to prcvcnt such crimcs lrom taking
placc.
:oo

a·o UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. .c·, UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a
(.oo¡).
aoc Undcr Articlc .a ol thc Salcty Convcntion a statc party in which tcrritory a crimc
has bccn committcd shall providc all statcs conccrncd with inlormation rcgarding
thc crimc and thc idcntity ol thc offcndcr il it has rcason to bclicvc that thc offcndcr
is no longcr in its tcrritory. Tc obligation to communicatc inlormation rclcrs to all
statcs conccrncd, not only statc partics. ¡vcry statc is lurthcrmorc rcquircd to pro
vidc inlormation conccrning thc victim as wcll as thc circumstanccs ol thc crimc
that thcy may havc whcncvcr a crimc has bccn committcd against an intcrnationally
protcctcd pcrson, lully and promptly, to thc statc party ol which thc protcctcd pcrson
cxcrciscd his lunctions.
a·. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
Articlc .. spccifics thc dutics cxprcsscd in Articlc ·. !t locuscs on thc prcvcn
tion ol luturc crimcs against UN and associatcd pcrsonncl. Although statcs may
takc “all practicablc mcasurcs” in thc prcvcntion ol luturc crimcs thcy may only
do so within “thcir rcspcctivc tcrritorics”.

·...¡ !ndividual Criminal Rcsponsibility
Tc provisions making concrctc thc principlc aut dedere aut judicare will bc dcalt
with undcr this hcading. Tc statcs partics to thc convcntion arc obligatcd to
criminalisc ccrtain acts undcr domcstic laws. Tcy arc also undcr a duty to pursuc
anyonc suspcctcd ol committing such crimcs and il thcrc is sufficicnt cvidcncc, to
prosccutc or to cxtraditc such pcrson or pcrsons to a statc having primary juris
diction. Although thc provisions dcalt with undcr this hcading arc at thc corc ol
thc convcntion, thcy wcrc not thc subjcct ol much dcbatc nor wcrc thcy criticiscd
during thc work ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc in its work during accaacc·. Tc
main rcason lor thc limitcd discussions that occurrcd on thcsc provisions is prob
ably rclatcd to thc lact that thcy wcrc morc or lcss copicd lrom othcr convcntions
that includcd thc aut dedere aut judicare mcchanism. Against this background, it
has bccn ol lcss importancc to cxaminc cach articlc scparatcly. Provisions impor
tant lor thc bringing ol suspcctcd pcrpctrators to justicc, including, lor cxamplc,
such things as communicating inlormation on thc idcntity ol an allcgcd offcndcr,
arc thcrclorc cxamincd as a wholc.
Crimes committed against personnel
.. Tc intcntional commission ol:
(a) A murdcr, kidnapping or othcr attack upon thc pcrson or libcrty ol
any Unitcd Nations or associatcd pcrsonncl,
(b) A violcnt attack upon thc official prcmiscs, thc privatc accommoda
tion or thc mcans ol transportation ol any Unitcd Nations or asso
ciatcd pcrsonncl likcly to cndangcr his or hcr pcrson or libcrty,
(c) A thrcat to commit any such attack with thc objcctivc ol compcl
ling a physical or juridical pcrson to do or to rclrain lrom doing any
act,
(d) An attcmpt to commit any such act, and
(c) An act constituting participation as an accomplicc in any such
attack, or in an attcmpt to commit such attack, or in organising or
ordcring othcrs to commit such attack,
shall bc madc by cach Statc Party a crimc undcr national law.
a. ¡ach Statc Party shall makc thc crimcs sct out in paragraph . punish
ablc by appropriatc pcnaltics which shall takc into account thcir gravc
naturc.
a·a Chapter 5
Articlc o is basically a rcproduction ol Articlc a ol thc !PP Convcntion and it mct
with littlc rcsistancc. Tc ncgotiations mainly ccntrcd on thc tcrms “intcntional”,
“thrcat” and “complicity”. Conccrning thc tcrm “intcntional” it was rcmarkcd by
somc dclcgations that it could bc intcrprctcd to rcquirc knowlcdgc ol thc status
ol thc victim. !n this rcgard it was lcarcd that a link would bc cstablishcd bctwccn
Articlc . and Articlc o. !l so, it would imply that thc UN and associatcd pcrson
ncl wcrc dcpcndcnt on propcr marking in ordcr to achicvc thc cntirc protcc
tion ol thc convcntion.
:o+
Òthcr dclcgations prcscntcd an oppositc vicw, arguing
lor thc rctcntion ol thc tcrm in qucstion. !n this rcgard thc commcntary ol thc
!ntcrnational Law Commission (!LC) to what latcr bccamc Articlc a ol thc !PP
Convcntion was considcrcd. According to thc !LC thc word “intcntional” in thc
dralt provision had bccn uscd:
both to makc clcar that thc offcndcr must bc awarc ol thc status as an intcr
nationally protcctcd pcrson cnjoycd by thc victim as wcll as to climinatc any
doubt rcgarding cxclusion lrom thc application ol thc articlc ol ccrtain crimi
nal acts which might othcrwisc bc asscrtcd to lall within thc scopc ol sub
paragraphs (a) or (b), such as thc scrious injury ol an intcrnationally protcctcd
pcrson in an automobilc accidcnt as a conscqucncc ol thc ncgligcncc ol thc
othcr party.
:o:
According to 8ourloyannis\railas this intcrprctation appcars to bc applicablc
mutatis mutandis to Articlc o ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
:o:
!t was rcmarkcd that
(without any cxamplcs givcn) “thcrc wcrc othcr ways” to cstablish thc intcnt ol
thc offcndcr without thc rcquircmcnt ol spccific markings.
:o±
!t should bc rcmcm
bcrcd that Articlc . ol thc Salcty Convcntion only obligatcs military and policc
pcrsonncl to wcar distinctivc idcntification. All pcrsonncl, howcvcr, arc rcquircd
to carry appropriatc idcntification documcnts. As pointcd out carlicr, thc con
ao. UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · April .oo¡, para. ..., UN Ðoc. A/AC.a¡a/a
(.oo¡). !t was lurthcr rcmarkcd that cvcn with thc dclction ol thc word “intcntional”
thc crimcs listcd “wcrc intcntional in naturc”. Comparc thc discussion abovc on
Articlc ..
aoa Rcport ol thc !ntcrnational Law Commission on thc work ol its a¡
th
scssion, a May
– · ]uly (.o·a), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, !! a.o, ..6 (.o·a). Tc
contcnt ol subparagraphs (a) and (b) rclcrrcd to by thc !LC arc cquivalcnt to sub
paras. . (a) and (b) ol Articlc o ol thc Salcty Convcntion.
ao. 8ourloyannis\railas, Tc Convcntion on thc Salcty ol Unitcd Nations and
Associatcd Pcrsonncl, ···.
ao¡ UN Gcncral Asscmbly, Rcport ol thc Ad Hoc Committcc on thc Vork Carricd out
Ðuring thc Pcriod lrom a· March to · Ap