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Art. 694.

A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or


(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

Nuisance

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;


Ayala vs Barretto:
o SC considered a house in danger of fallinf as an example of nuisance which injures the safety of
thers;
o Explosives factory can also be considered as such

(2) Annoys or offends the senses;


Pumping station with a high chimney whoch would re rendered inhabitable because of the smoke
or noise, was considered nuisance
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
Example:
o Beerhouse where there is a burlesque performance or public exhibition of naked women

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water;
House or basketball built on the road that obstruct free passage on a road or high way
NUISANCE hindrance to the enjoymeny of life or property

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

Art. 695.
Nuisance is either public or private.
A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.
A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.

KINDS OF NUISANCE

1. PUBLIC NUISANCE
One that affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of people, even if the extent of
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal;

2. NUISANCE PER SE
It is an act, occupation or strucyire which is a nuisance AT ALL TIMES and all circumstances, regardless of
location or surroundings.
It is a nuisance in and of itself, without regard to circumstances;
o A house of ill-fame is a nuisance, irrespective of where it is located or how it is conducted

3. NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS


One that becomes a nuisance by reason of circumstances and susrroundings;
It is not a nuisance by its nature, but it may become so by reason of locality, surrounding or manner by
which it is conducted

Public Nuisance affects oublic at large

Private Nuisance affects individuals or limited number of individuals

Test to determine of person is liable publicly:

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City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so
adjudged by judicial determination.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their
health and comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the
factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate the supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.

There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only
because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a
determination of the facts which is a judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards
organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a
nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health
and comfort. The resolution is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.

POSSIBILITY OF ANNOYANCE TO THE PUBLIC BY THE INVASION OF ITS RIGHTS AND


ANNOYS THOSE WHO ARE IN THE SPHERE

RULES ON NUISANCE ARE NOT UNIFORM!

For a business not to be regarded as a nuisance, it shall regard the fitness of locality

Examples:

Ilo-Ilo Cold Storage Vs. Municipal Council:

Ice plant is not a nuisance in the case

Ayala vs. Barretto:

One who settles in a district, which possesses natural resources of a special kind cannot
prohibit the development of these resources mereky because it may interfere in some
degree with personal satisfaction

Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

FACTS:
Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station
at a distance of 10-20 meters away from appellants house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along the streets but put up only an interlink wire fence
(previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such, appellent contends,
constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague
and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound from different areas in Velasos property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found
that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences.

ISSUE: Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?

HELD: Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical
machinery and appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and
annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. However, appellants testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses testimonies revealing on account of different
perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the testimonies of appellants
physicians (which were more reliable since they actually treated him, unlike the appellees) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and
tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels
while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes on to discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either to transfer the
facilities or reduce the produced sound to around.

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Facts ; This is an action for damages for maintaining a nuisance continuously injurious to the plaintiff and his family by reason of the maintenance and operation of a
stand pipe, pumping station and open reservoir for the storage of water. Plaintiff and his family lived in a two-story nipa and wooden house constructed on a lot also
owned by plaintiff. He had been living there for 27 years. Defendant constructed a reinforced concrete stand pipe 28 meters high and 9 meters in diameter. Within the
base of the cylindrical tank were three machines. In the side of the tank nearest the plaintiffs residence and at a distance of 3.4 meters was a chimney which rose to
about the height of the gable of the house. The tank itself was 3.8 meters from plaintiffs house. Plaintiff claimed that the plant emitted smoke and a disagreeable odor;
that the chimney emitted sparks which, if carried by the wind, might cause his house to catch fire; and that in case of an earthquake the tank might fall and crush his
house and its occupants. The lower court decided against the plaintiff.

Held ; In locating its pumping station within 3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff, the defendant should reasonably have foreseen that the noise, vibrations, smoke,
odor and sparks coming from the plant during its operation, not only during the day but during the night as well, would cause a constant annoyance,, discomfort and
danger both to the property of the plaintiff and the health and comfort of himself and his family. The chimney which is just opposite the plaintiffs house at a distance of
only 3.4 meters emits smoke, gases of crude oil and gasoline and occasionally sparks as well. But the evidence as a whole leaves us with the clear conviction that the
construction and operation of this pumping plant in such close proximity to the plaintiffs residence has rendered the same practically uninhabitable without exposing to
risk the comfort, health and in cases of fire, even the lives of the plaintiff and his family.
We find from the preponderance of evidence that the fair present value of the appellants premises involved in this suit is P3,000.00; and as under the circumstances,
the maintenance of the nuisance is practically tantamount to an expropriation, we have concluded that the defendant-appellee should be and it is hereby required and
adjudged to pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P3,000.00.

Art. 696.
Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started
by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created it.

IT MUST BE NOTED!

To hold the successor liable, he must knowingly fail/refuse to abate the nuisance
If person sets up nuisance on his land and leases the property to another, he cannot escape liability
Continuation of the nuisance after the lease becomes effective makes the lessor liable
o Lessee will be liable if he knowingly allows its existence

Art. 697.
The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past
existence.
The abatement of nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past
existence

Before abatement of nuisance damage has already been inflicted, hence, defendant must repair damage
done

Petitioner Ramcar Inc., operates and maintains an auto repair and body building shop at No. 1241 (formerly No. 1377) General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila, while the
seven private respondents reside near or around the shop. Respondents brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to abate the said establishment as
a nuisance. That Court, after trial, dismissed the complaint, and not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs (respondents now) appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and entered judgment against Ramcar, Inc. as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and another one rendered declaring that the operation and maintenance of the establishment of the
defendant corporation at No. 1241 (formerly No. 1377) General Luna St., Ermita, Manila, is a public nuisance and violates the provisions of Zonification Ordinance No.
2830, as amended by Ordinance No. 2906, of the City of Manila; ordering the defendants-appellees to remove the said establishment and all buildings and
structures built therein within 30 days from the finality of this judgment; and, condemning defendant-appellee Ramcar, Inc., to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of
P10,000.00 as special damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, without costs in this instance.
Whereupon, Ramcar, Inc. petitioned this Court for a review on certiorari.
Petitioner has been engaged in the auto repair and body building business since 1938 up to the present, except when it was interrupted during the Japanese occupation.
It transferred its place of business to its present site from 1049 R. Hidalgo Street, Manila, on December 20, 1951 because the old location was within the 100-meter
radius from the Jose Rizal College, in violation of City ordinances. As found by the Appeals Court, the nature of the corporation's activities, actually engaged in, consists
in repairing and building bodies of motor vehicles, and involves the use of tools and machinery that give rise to much noise and annoyance during all hours of the day up
to nighttime; and its employees oftentimes work on Sundays and holidays. At the time of the transfer, respondent Eusebio S. Millar and his family were already residing
on his own land adjacent to that of Ramcar, Inc. He and his co-respondents repeatedly petitioned the city authorities for the closure of the shop to no avail, because city
authorities were "at loggerheads as to whether the immediate vicinity where the business of Ramcar, Inc. is located is a residential or a commercial zone". The Court of
Appeals, however, found that the place is a commercial zone, as the business would not be permitted in a residential zone.
It further appears that Ramcar, Inc. has been granted a license and permit to operate a garage; and it claims that such license entitles it to conduct its body building
business, and that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 2830, as amended by Ordinance No. 2906 of the City of Manila, allows it to conduct its business at the present site. The
said ordinance restricts the kinds of business, buildings and establishments that may be built on commercial zones and the enumeration of permitted activities includes
"6. Garage and gasoline service stations". A body building shop is not within the purview of "garage", which designates a shop for storing, repairing and servicing motor
vehicles, being merely a modern substitute for the ancient livery stable (Legum vs. Carlin, 99 ALR, 536) The Court of Appeals correctly held on this point:
It is clear that the business of Ramcar, Inc. is not a mere garage or automobile repair and painting shop, much less, a gasoline service station, within the contemplation
of Section 5 of the City Ordinances. Besides the usual services of vehicle storage, of supplying gas, and of making repairs, the shop also assembles and rebuilds car and
truck bodies which require more than ordinary labor and skill and involves the use of tools and machinery with the concomitant noise created by the use of those tools 3
and machines. While repair work may be considered as a necessary incident of a garage or gasoline service station for purposes of goodwill when they involve minor
repairs, body assembling or rebuilding certainly makes such kind of business more than a mere garage and gas service station and, for zonification purposes, should not
be confused with and must be separated from a garage or gas service business.
In fact, it has been held in Uy Chao vs. Aguilar, G.R. No. L-9069, 28 March 1958, that to repair presupposes decay, dilapidation, injury, or partial destruction of the
repairs, body assembling or rebuilding certainly makes such kind of business more than a mere garage and gas service station and, for zonification purposes, should not
be confused with and must be separated from a garage or gas service business.
In fact, it has been held in Uy Chao vs. Aguilar, G.R. No. L-9069, 28 March 1958, that to repair presupposes decay, dilapidation, injury, or partial destruction of the
repaired element, i.e., broken or damaged parts of a structural whole to their original condition. Clearly, the term can not apply to the building or remodeling of bodies or
structures.
The second assigned error refers to the appreciation of documentary and testimonial evidence on record, and incorporates certain testimonials of some neighbors of
petitioner attesting to their non-molestation by the shop in question; and, proceeding therefrom, petitioner argues that its business is not a nuisance in its present
location. Whether a particular thing is or is not a nuisance is a question of fact (Iloilo Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 471; 61 C.J.S. 864) and is properly
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, whose findings of fact are conclusive. Under this same assignment of error, petitioner argues that it is only the City, under
its Charter, that can determine whether a business, occupation, act, or building is a nuisance or not, and suggests that the remedy is an action against the City of Manila
only for a determination of whether or not the subject matter thereof is a nuisance. While Section 18 of Republic Act 409 grants legislative powers to the municipal board
to declare, prevent, and provide for the abatement of nuisances, inaction by the board does not preclude the ultimate power of courts to determine the existence of a
nuisance in a particular case tried before them (Rutton vs. City of Camden, 23 Am. Rep. 203, 209; Iloilo Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council, supra).
The decision appealed from condemns the petitioner to pay P10,000.00, as "special damages", and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees to the respondents,
For the annoyance and discomfort caused by the constant noise emanating from the corporation's shop, as well as to counsel fees where the defendant's (herein
petitioner) acts or omissions have compelled them to litigate . . . .
As last assignment of error, petitioner vehemently asserts that the award of damages has no sanction in law, and because its business was covered by a valid license,
the decision tends to punish a citizen who acted with diligence and in accordance with law. In disposing of this assigned error, it is enough to point out that the zoning
ordinance prohibited the body building operations of petitioner. Contrary to petitioner's pretense that nowhere in the Civil Code is the award of damages arising from a
nuisance authorized, said Code provides:
ART. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past existence.;
and, in the general provisions on Damages, the same Code states:
ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code . . .
However, the business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per se. It is only on account of its location that it is a public nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the
appealed decision decrees, to remove all building an structures built in the place where it is presently located as these, or parts thereof, may be utilized for pursuit that
are not forbidden by law or ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified by permanently enjoining the petitioner only from operating its body building operations or activities in its present
location, without requiring the demolition of the existing building in all other respects, the judgment below is affirmed. Costs in this instance against petitioner Ramcar,
Inc.

DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instruments

Art. 698.
Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.

GENERAL RULE: abatement of nuisance, whether public or private, does not prescribe

EXCEPTION: Art. 631, easements are extinguished by non-user for 10 years

Art. 699.
The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or

(2) A civil action; or

(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Ruling:

If a house is constructed on a portion of a public highway, the same is an illegal construction.

Municipal court can legally order, in a criminal case, the removal of such house in addition to
the penalty of fine.

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FACTS :

This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the City Engineer of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing
the demolition of their respective houses situated in different areas along public streets in Manila inasmuch as these constitute public nuisances. All of the petitioners
occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent. However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the land with the
agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the
occupied streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is
vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.

ISSUES:

Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineerhave authority to cause the abatement of the nuisance?

HELD:

There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 par. 4, classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because
it affects a community or neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the summary removal of
these may be authorized by statute or ordinance.

Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty,
among others, was placed upon him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because of the principle that special provisions
prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be taken by respondent.

Art. 700.
The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of.

Art. 701.
If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall be commenced by
the city or municipal mayor.

Art. 702.
The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best
remedy against a public nuisance.

Art. 703.
A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself.

Art. 705.
The remedies against a private nuisance are:
(1) A civil action; or

(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Art. 706.
Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing
which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However,
it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be
followed.

Art. 707.
A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages:

(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or

(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

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RULES ON ABATEMENT OF PRIVATE NUISANCE

ART 707
HOW?
o ART 703

Art. 704.
Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary,
by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing
unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;

(2) That such demand has been rejected;

(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local
police; and

(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

Ruling:

DEFENSES IN SUITS FOR DAMAGES BASED ON NUISANCE:

1. Public Necessity
Private interest must yield to public good, subject to the limitations that of the creation or
maintenance of the nuisance amounts to a taking of private property compensation therefore must
be paid
2. Estoppel
One who voluntary places himself in a situation where he siffers an injury eill not be heard to say
that his damage is due to a nuisance made by another
One who consents with the knowledge of the purpose of the act will not be heard when it invokes that the act
by the other is nuisance.
3. Prescription
Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance whether private or public
Acrion to abate a public or private nuisance is not extinguished by prescription
But, in Ongsiako et. al. vs. Ongsiako, (GR No. L-7510),

Ruling:

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Ruling:

Interference with Contractual Relations


What is interference?

Interference in contractual relations may give rise to an action for damages


Whoeve commuts it is liable for damagesm by reason of quasi-delict, not contractual
Art. 1314:
o Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party.

FACTS:
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar
April 24: He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125
A few days to the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist
Cuddy rented the film to Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga P350 for the week knowing that it was rented to someone else and that Cuddy accepted it because he
was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist but they didn't know the identity of the other party
Gilchrist filed for injunction against these parties
Trial Court and CA: granted - there is a contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy
ISSUE: W/N Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for damages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist

HELD: YES. judgment is affirmed


Yes, although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity of the plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the
existence of a contract in favor of someone In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a
desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering
with that contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless
they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.

Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged
to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know
the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required
in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.

One who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and
better right.

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Facts: in 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They
agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as Endencias title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name.
When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property measured 1248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she
became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area.
Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt.

Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corp., w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by
Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of
little force and easily subject to the influence of other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire
tract.

Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of
the land in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalts claim for damages against the Recoletos was for the huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919],
since he claims that because of the interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of the property and its conversion
into a sugar mill.

Issue: whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?

Held: No, it is not liable.

The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party
in whose behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt.

The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special damages w/c were not w/in the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to
Daywalt, neither can the Recoletos be held liable.

As already suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the contract, the Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the
contract.

Facts: in 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They
agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as Endencias title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name.
When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property measured 1248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she
became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area.
Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt.

Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corp., w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by
Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of
little force and easily subject to the influence of other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire
tract.

Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of
the land in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalts claim for damages against the Recoletos was for the huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919],
since he claims that because of the interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of the property and its conversion
into a sugar mill.

Issue: whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?

Held: No, it is not liable.

The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party
in whose behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt.

The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special damages w/c were not w/in the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to
Daywalt, neither can the Recoletos be held liable.

As already suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the contract, the Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the
contract.

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DOCTRINE: Injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient
and the resulting injury is irreparable.

FACTS:
1. Philip Yu is the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in the Philippines.
2. Unisia Merchandising, Yus dealer, imported the same goods via the FNF Trading. Unisia eventually sold the goods in the Philippines.
3. Yu filed a suit for injunction.
4. Yu alleged that Unisia acted in concert with FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the ordered goods were intended for shipment to Nigeria
(althought they were actually shipped and sold to the Philippines).
5. Unisias defense: ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of Yu. Even then, the contract is binding only between the parties thereto.
6. CA: denied. Yu can be fully compensated. Moreover, Unisia is a stranger to the contract.
7. SC: already granted a TRO BUT STILL Unisia continued distribution of the goods.

ISSUE: WON the writ of injunction should be granted


HELD: YES,
The fact that the contract is binding only between the parties is beside the point. Injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by
strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable.

The liability of Unisia does not emanate from the four corners of the contract but its accountability is an independent act generative of civil liability.
The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect.
The House of Mayfair in England was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were
actually sent to and sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a party to renege on or violate his
undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom (Article 1314, New Civil Code).

The breach caused by private respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of trade from the business of Yu to that of Unisia caused by the
latter's species of unfair competition as demonstrated no less by the sales effected inspite of this Court's restraining order. This brings Us to the irreparable
mischief which respondent court misappreciated when it refused to grant the relief simply because of the observation that petitioner can be fully compensated for the
damage.

The injury is irreparable where it is continuous and repeated since from its constant and frequent recurrence, no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor
by petitioner insofar as his goodwill and business reputation as sole distributor are concerned. To expect petitioner to file a complaint for every sale effected by private
respondent will certainly court multiplicity of suits.

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Civil Liability Arising Out of Criminal Offenses
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.

Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely
( 1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and
(2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
act or omission.

However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications
especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not.

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.

In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough
that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another.

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a) Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage, and indemnification for the losses.
b) criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof.
Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that
the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury
directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of a crime
c) one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled
to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or
services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced
d) The effects of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at
large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public
e) Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
f) it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by
excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To
do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense
of the payee.

FACTS:
Accused was charged with violation of sec. 3 of RA 3019:
o Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
ZAYDA BISCOCHO recommended the construction of a barrio road that would traverse complainants property and give access to accuseds
property
As head of the Planning & Dvlpt Staff of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, her duties consisted of preparing dvlpt plans
The actual contruction of the infra was left to Bureau of Pub. Highways
She had no direct hand in carrying out pkans
Sandiganbayan acquitted Biscocho

HELD:

Biscocho did not authorize the construction og the road over complainants land
Decision to build it was solely by BPH
She cannot be held civilly liable for acts which were not of her own doing,

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Facts:
Petitioner Eulogio Occena filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against the private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly uttering insulting
words and statement which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor. The petitioner did not reserve his right to file separate action for
damages, after the trial the respondent was convicted of the offense of slight oral defamation but no damages were awarded to petitioner. The petitioner not satisfied and
disagrees, appeals in the regional trial court but was denied because of lack of merit

Issue:
Whether or not the decision of RTC constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondents civil liability
Ruling:
No, it is not yet considered as a final adjudication due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It
was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an award of damages
Ruling:
Yes. Civil liability arising from criminal offenses are governed by Art.100 of Revised Penal Code which provides that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable, in relation to Art.2177 of Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the chapter of human relations and the provisions
regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.
As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of society
or private person who was injured or damaged by punishable act or omission. And the offended party, the petitioners main contention precisely is that he suffered
damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by the private respondent

SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY EMPLOYEES

Art. 102, RPC


Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. In default of
the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed
by the innkeeper's employees.

Art. 103, RPC


Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.

EMPLOYER MUST BE ENGAGED IN AN INDUSTRY

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Damages
Damage

The indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained an injury either in person or relative rights,
through the act or default of another.
It is the injury or loss for which the compensation is sought

Damage vs Damages

Damage Damages
Loss, injury or deterioration caused by
negligent design, or accident of one person to
another

TITLE XVIII
DAMAGES 1

CHAPTER 1
General Provisions

Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in article
1157.

Article 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated
elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is
regulated by special laws. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they
are not in conflict with this Code.

Article 2197. Damages may be:

(1) Actual or compensatory;

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(2) Moral;

(3) Nominal;

(4) Temperate or moderate;

(5) Liquidated; or

(6) Exemplary or corrective.

Article 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not
inconsistent with this Code.

CHAPTER 2
Actual or Compensatory Damages

Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.

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Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that
of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106

Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable
shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may
be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a

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