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14. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion.

1. That the Offender is a Public Officer.
2. That he had in his custody or charge, a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgement.
3. That such prisoner escaped from his custody.
4. That he was in connivance with the prisoner in the latters escape.

1. Leniency or laxity is not infidelity

Case: People vs Evangelista, CA 38 OG 158
Facts: During his detention, the prisoner was allowed to eat in a restaurant near the municipal building. During
the town fiesta, the municipal president acceded to the prisoners request for permission to eat better meals in
his house. On all these ocassions, the prisoner was duly guarded. Held: This is only leniency or laxity in the
performance of duty, not in excess of his duties.

2. Relaxation of Imprisonment is considered infidelity it defeats the purpose of imprisonment

People vs Revilla, CA 37 OG 1896 (Bar Question) where the guard allowed the prisoner, serving a 6-day
sentence in the municipalal jail, to sleep in is house and eat there because the municipality had no outlay for
the food of prisoners.
People vs Evangelista, CA 38 OG 158 (Bar Question) Where the mayor utilized the prisoners services for
domestic shores in his house, including that of working as a cook.

Art. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through the
negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall
suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and
temporary special disqualification.

1. That the Offender is a Public Officer.
2. That he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by
final judgement.
3. That such prisoner escapes through his negligence.

1. People vs Silvosa, CA & GR No. 2736-R, April 30, 1955 (p. 452, Reyes Book 2)
illustrates absence of 2nd element (he is charged with the conveyance of a prisoner)

2. People vs Solis, CA, 43, OG 580 (p. 453, Reyes Book 2)

illustrates absence of 3rd element (Prisoner escapes through negligence)

3. People vs Reyes, et al, 59 OG 6664

What is punished in evasion through negligence is such a definite laxity as all but amounts to deliberate non-
performance of duty on the part of the guard

(a) Art. 225. Escape of prisoner under the custody of a person not a public officer. Any private
person to whom the conveyance or custody or a prisoner or person under arrest shall have been confided,
who shall commit any of the offenses mentioned in the two preceding articles, shall suffer the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed for the public officer.

1. prisoners Art. 223, 156
2. asdfghjkl Art. 157

15. Infidelity in the custody of documents

(a) Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. Any public officer who shall
remove, destroy or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:

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1. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever serious damage
shall have been caused thereby to a third party or to the public interest.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos, whenever the damage to a third party or to the public interest shall not have been
In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period
to perpetual disqualification shall be imposed.

a. (1) The phrase or papers officially entrusted to him includes checks, promissory notes, and paper money
(2) Post office official who retained the mail without forwarding the letters to their destination is guilty of
infidelity in the custody of papers (p. 458, Reyes Book 2)
(3) Infidelity in the custody of document, distinguished from malversation and falsification (p. 458)
i. When the postmaster is guilty of malversation and falsification (People vs Vilanueva) Postmaster
received money orders, signed the signatures of the payees thereon, collected and appropriated the
respective amounts thereof
ii. When the postmaster is guilty of infidelity in the custody of papers Postmaster receives letters or
envelopes containing money orders for transmission, and the money orders are not sent to the addresses
Money bills received as exhibits in courts are papers
Delivering document to the wrong party

Bar Questions:
1. City Engr. A, is the city engineer and the Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the City
of Kawawa. In 2009, the City of Kawawa, through an ordinance, allotted the amount of P100 million for the
construction of a road leading to the poblacion. City Engr. A instead, diverted the construction of the road
leading to his farm. Investigation further showed that he accepted money in the amount of P10 million each
from three (3) contending bidders, who eventually lost in the bidding.
Audit report likewise showed that service vehicles valued at P2 million could not be accounted for
although reports showed that these were lent to City Engr. As authorized drivers but the same were never
returned. Further, there were funds under City Engr. As custody amounting to P10 million which were found
to be missing and could not be accounted for. In another project, he was instrumental in awarding a contract
for the construction of a city school building costing P10 million to a close relative, although the lowest bid
was P8 million. Investigation also revealed that City Engr. A has a net worth of more than P50 million, which
was way beyond his legitimate income. (8%)

(A) If you are the Ombudsman, what charge or charges will you file against City Engr. A?
1. Art. 220 Technical malversation
2. RA 3019 Section 3(b)
3. Art. 218 2 counts
4. RA 3019 Section 3(e)
5. RA 7080 Plunder

(B) Suppose the discovered net worth of City Engr. As less than P50 million, will your answer still be the
No, plunder is not anymore included, rather it becomes malversation.

2. Filthy, a very rich businessman, convinced Loko, a clerk of court, to issue an order of release for Takas,
Filthys cousin, who was in jail for a drug charge. After receiving P500,000.00, Loko forged the signature of
the judge on the order of release and accompanied Filthy to the detention center. At the jail, Loko gave the
guard P10,000.00 to open the gate and let Takas out.
What crime or crimes did Filthy, Loko, and the guard commit? (4%)
1. Loko Art. 171. Falsification; Art. 210. Direct Bribery;
2. Filthy
3. Guard Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion.

3. Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court, promised the accused in a drug case pending before the court, that
he would convince the judge to acquit him for a consideration of P5 million. The accused agreed and
delivered the money, through his lawyer, to the clerk of court.
The judge, not knowing of the deal, proceeded to rule on the evidence and convicted the accused. (4%)

(A) Malo was charged with violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, which prohibits a public
officer from directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit
wherein the public officer, in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law. He was later charged
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also with indirect bribery under the Revised Penal Code. Malo claims he can no longer be charged
under the Revised Penal Code for the same act under R.A. 3019. Is he correct?
YES, he can make 2 charges because of the clause in the first paragraph of Section 3(b) in addition to

(B) Malo was charged with estafa under Article 315 because he misrepresented that he had influence, when
he actually had none. Is the charge correct?
YES. Thus, 3 acts. Art. 315, 4(a) reads: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
other similar deceits.

4 . A typhoon xxx when informed of this situation, the mayor xxx from X municipalities feeding program.
What crime/s did mayor commit?
Art. 220 Technical malversation

May the mayor invoke the defense of good faith? xxx

5. (2015) What crimes did D, B and E committed?

1. B Art. 156 Delivery of prisoners from jail.
2. E (Guard) Art. 224 Evasion through Negligence (because he was relaxed with the visitation)
3. D Grave Coercion and Illegal Possession of Firearms because he used the gun to disarm the

B. Distinction:
Infidelity in the Custody of Documents if money, bills or money orders are placed inside mail matter
and is not sent by a public officer; instead took and appropriated them
Malversation If money, bills or money orders are not inside mail matters and instead taken or

(b) Art. 227 and 228

Art. 227. Officer breaking seal. Any public officer charged with the custody of papers or property sealed by
proper authority, who shall break the seals or permit them to be broken, shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding
2,000 pesos.

Art. 228. Opening of closed documents. Any public officer not included in the provisions of the next
preceding article who, without proper authority, shall open or shall permit to be opened any closed papers,
documents or objects entrusted to his custody, shall suffer the penalties or arresto mayor, temporary special
disqualification and a fine of not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

16. Art. 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to
him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he may
have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if the revelation
of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage to the public interest;
otherwise, the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a
fine not exceeding 50 pesos shall be imposed.

A. Distinguished from Art. 209 (betrayal of trust by an attorney or Solicitor, Art. 230 (Public Officer
revealing secrets of private individual))

(Judge just gave examples for these)
1. Art. 233 Refusal of Assistance. like when a police officers does not respond to a night call of
2. Art. 241 Usurpation of judicial functions.
3. Art. 243 Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority.
4. Art.

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17. Art. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall
be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall overdo himself in the correction or handling of a
prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishment not authorized by the
regulations, or by inflicting such punishment in a cruel and humiliating manner.

A. Public Officer must have actual charge of the prisoner to hold him liable for maltreatment of
Case: Punzalan vs People, 99 Phil 259

B. To be a detention prisoner the person arrested must be placed in jail even for a short while.
Case: People vs Baring, CA., 37 OG. 1366

C. Jailer inflicted physical injuries on prisoner because of personal grudge, the former liable for
physical injuries only.
Case: People vs Janilo, CA 54 OG 6622

18. Art. 245. Abuses against chastity; Penalties. The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and temporary special disqualification shall be imposed:
1. Upon any public officer who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to a woman
interested in matters pending before such officer for decision, or with respect to which he is required
to submit a report to or consult with a superior officer;
2. Any warden or other public officer directly charged with the care and custody of prisoners or persons
under arrest who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to a woman under his custody.
If the person solicited be the wife, daughter, sister of relative within the same degree by affinity of
any person in the custody of such warden or officer, the penalties shall be prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and temporary special disqualification.

C.F. RA 7877 Anti-Sexual Harassment Acts of 1995

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Title Eight, Review Pointer
Prof. Judge H. Damasing

1. Art. 246. Parricide.

1. That a person is killed
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused
3. That the deceased id the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse, of the accused

A. Relationship of the offender with the victim is essential element of this crime; relationship must be alleged
in the Information.
B. Father, mother or child may be legitimate or illegitimate. (People vs Embalido, 58 Phil 154)
C. other ascendant, or other descendant, or spouse, must be legitimate
D. Adopted child. Killing an adopted child is Parricide, According to Article 189, Family Code, the adopted
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter(s), etc.
E. the child should not be less than 3 days old
F. A brother or sister, either Homicide or Murder, but not Parricide.
G. Bar Questions:
1. Who may be guilty of the crime of parricide?

2. What crimes did A commit after killing:

(1) a woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of clergy Murder/Homicide
(2) their child who was 2 days old Infanticide
(3) their daughter Parricide
(4) their adopted son Depends
(5) his brother murder/homicide

H. Parricide by mistake (CF Art. 49, RPC); distinguished from parricide through reckless imprudence; liability of
stranger cooperating in parricide.

3. If a person killed another, not knowing that the latter was his son, will he be guilty of parricide? The
Information filed against the accused was only for Homicide under Art. 249, because the relationship was
established during trial only. May he be found guilty for Parricide, under the same Information?
(a) Yes, because the law does not require knowledge of relationship between them.
(b) The accused cannot be convicted for Parricide, in an Information of homicide as he has not
been formally informed of the charge against him. Remedy: the Prosecutor should amend the
Information to parricide, or for the Court to order the amendment of the Information, under Section 14,
last. par., Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal procedure.

2. Art. 247. Death of Physical injuries under exceptional circumstances

1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years
of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in
the act or immediately thereafter
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

A. Important element: (2) That he or she kills any or both of them, or inflicts upon any or both of them any
serious injury in the act or immediately thereafter; continuing of the pursuit rule

Case: People vs Abarca, 153 SCRA 735

Facts: Francisco Abaca arrived home from the bus station and caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse
with Kingsley Koh. Koh noticed him and pulled out a revolver. Abarca ran away to look for a firearm and got an
M-16 rifle. thereafter he proceeded to a mahjong house where he caught the victim and shoot Koh with several
bullets causing his instantaneous death. caused by the stray bullets, Abaca inflicted multiple wounds on a
certain Arnold Amparado and slight physical injuries on the latters wife. RTC: Sentenced him to death for
complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.

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Held: Though quite a length of time, i.e., about an hour had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the
shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.

B. Art. 247 does not define and penalize a felony.

C. Destierro or Banishment not intended as a penalty, but to remove the killing spouse from the vicinity and to
protect him or her from the acts of reprisal principally by the relatives of the deceased party. (People vs
Lauron, CA, 57 OG 7367)

D. Justification for Art. 247

The law, when the circumstances provided by this Article are present, considers the spouse or parent as acting
in a justified burst of passion. (People vs Gonzales). It is an absolutely cause; in defense of person, or rights
(or honor) (Art. II, RPC)

E. Bar Question:
Pete, a security guard, arrived home late one night after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see Flor,
his wife, and Benjie, his best friend, completely naked having sexual intercourse. Pete pulled out his service
gun and shot and killed Benjie. Pete was charged with murder for the death of Benjie. Pete contended that he
acted in defense of his honor and that, therefore, he should be acquitted of the crime. The court found that
Benjie died under exceptional circumstances and exonerated Pete of the crime, but sentenced him to
destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. The court also ordered Pete to pay
indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00. (5%)

a) Is the defense of Pete meritorious? Explain.

Yes, it is an absolutely cause; in defense of person, or rights (or honor)
b) Under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, is destierro a penalty? Explain.
No, Destierro or Banishment is not intended as a penalty, but to remove the killing spouse from the
vicinity and to protect him or her from the acts of reprisal principally by the relatives of the deceased party.
c) Did the court correctly order Pete to pay indemnity despite his exoneration under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code? Explain.
No, Art. 247 does not define and penalize a felony.

3. Article 248. Murder.

1. That a person was killed
2. That the accused killed him
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not infanticide or parricide.

Attending circumstances for the killing to fall under murder:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse. (As Amended by RA 7659)
7. When the offender is under the influence of dangerous drugs. (RA 9165 CDDA of 2002)

A. Bar Questions:
1. Define Murder. What are the elements of the crime?
2. Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill (People vs Cagoco)

Rules for the application of the circumstances which qualify the killing to murder:
A. Murder will exist with only one of the circumstances described in Art. 248; when more than one is
present, the others must be considered as generic aggravating.
B. When the other circumstances are absorbed, they cannot be considered as generic aggravating.

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Bar Question:
The accused, not intending to kill the victim, treacherously shot the victim while said victim was turning
his back to him. He aimed at and hit the victim only on the leg. The victim, however, dies because of loss
of blood. Can the accused be liable for homicide or murder, considering that treachery was clearly
involved but there was not attempt to kill? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The accused is liable for the death of the victim even though he merely
aimed and fired at the latter's leg, "not intending to kill the victim", considering that the gunshot was
felonious and was the proximate cause of death. An offender is liable for all the direct, natural, and logical
consequences of his felonious act although different from what he intended. However, since specific
intent to kill is absent, the crime for said death is only homicide and not murder (People vs. Pugay
and Samson, 167 SCRA 439) Murder = Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill (People vs Cagoco)

3. Murder, in relation to Sec 1, par 2, RA 8294 (Illegal Possession of Firearms), in view of the special
trigger mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it
would fire continually. it is not the act of pressing which should be considered as proceeding the
several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.

Bar Question:
1. A, actuated by malice and with the use of a fully automatic unlicensed M-14 sub-machine gun, shot a
group of person who were seated in a cockpit with one burst of successive, continuous automatic fire.
Four persons were killed thereby, each having been hit by different bullets coming from the sub-
machine gun of A. 4 cases of murder were filed against A. The trial court ruled that there was only
one crime committed by A for the reason that, since A performed only 1 act, he having pressed the
trigger of his gun only once, the crime committed was mruder. Consequently, the trial judge
sentenced A to just one penalty of reclusion perpetual. At the time of its commission, RA 8294 was
already effective. Was the decision of the trial court Judge correct? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The decision of the trial judge is not correct. When the offender made use of
an automatic firearm, the acts committed are determined by the number of bullets discharged inasmuch
as the firearm being automatic, the offender need only press the trigger once and it would fire
continually. For each death caused by a distinct and separate bullet, the accused incurs distinct criminal
liability. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the
several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.

2. PH killed OJ, his political rival in the election campaign for Mayor of their town. The Information
against PH alleged that he used an unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim, and this was proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. the trial court convicted PH of two crimes: murder and
illegal possession of firearms. Is the conviction correct? Reason Briefly.
No, the conviction of PH for two crimes, murder and illegal possession of firearm is not correct. Under
the new law on illegal possession of firearms and explosives, Rep. Act No. 8294, a person may only be
criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm if no other crime is committed therewith; if a homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
PH therefore may only be convicted of murder and the use of an unlicensed firearm in its commission
may only be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance, provided that such use is alleged
specifically in the information for Murder.

4. Murder/Homicide (in relationship to Direct Assault Art. 148 RPC)

Bar Question (1995):
On his way to buy a lotto ticket, a policeman suddenly found himself surrounded by four men. one of
them wrestled the police officer to the ground and disarmed him, while the other three companions who
were armed with hunting knife, an ice pick, and a balisong, repeatedly stabbed him. The policeman died
as a result of the multiple stab wounds inflicted by his assailants. What crime or crimes were committed?
Discuss fully.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: All the assailants are liable for the crime of murder, qualified by treachery,
(which absorbed abuse of superior strength) as the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim
was totally defenseless. Conspiracy is obvious from the concerted acts of the assailants. Direct assault
would not complex the crime, as there is no showing that the assailants knew that the victim was a
policeman; even if there was knowledge, the fact is that he was not in the performance of his official
duties, and therefore there is no direct assault.

a-4.a Murder, with Direct Assault (Art. 248 in relation to Art. 148)
The charge against the accused was DA resulting to Murder with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. The crime charged was proved during the trial but the accused
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proved the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Should the accused be entitled to the
minimum of the penalty? Under Art. 248, RPC, the penalty for Murder is RP to Death. (Under Art. 148,
the penalty for DA is prision correccional medium to maximum periods.) Impose the proper penalty.

a-5. Killing, while under the influence of shabu CF Section 25, RA 9165 (Qualifying aggravating
circumstance). Qualified Aggravating Circumstances are those that changed the nature of the crime. CF
Commentaries, Art. 14.

Bar Question:
Candido stabbed an innocent bystander who accidentally bumped him. The innocent bystander died as a
result go the stabbing. Candido was arrested and was tested to be positive for the use of shabu at the
time he committed the stabbing. What should be the proper charge against Candido? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The killing, however, constitutes murder
because the commission of a crime under the influence of prohibited drugs is a qualifying, aggravating
circumstance. (Sec. 25, R.A. No. 9165)

a.6. Murder, in relation to Art. 90 (RPC), on Prescription of Crime.

OW is a private person engaged in cattle ranching. One night, he saw AM stab CV treacherously, then
throw the dead mans body into a ravine. For 25 years, CVs body was never seen nor found; and OW
told no one what he has witnessed.
Yesterday, after consulting the parish priest, OW decided to tell the authorities what he witnessed, and
revealed that AM had killed CV 25 years ago.
Can AM be prosecuted for murder despite the lapse of 25 years? Reason briefly.
Yes, AM can be prosecuted for murder despite the lapse of 25 years, because the crime has not yet
prescribed and legally, its prescriptive period has not even commenced to run.
The period of prescription of a crime shall commence to run only from the day on which the crime has
been discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code). OW,
a private person who saw the killing but never disclosed it, is not the offended party nor has the crime
been discovered by the authorities or their agents.

4. Article 249. Homicide (in relation to Article 64)

1. That a person was killed
2. That the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance
3. That the accused had the intention to kill, which was presumed;
4. That the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances or murder, or by that of parricide
or infanticide.

A. Important element, i.e., that the accused had the intention to kill; Intent to kill is conclusively
presumed when death resulted. Evidence of intent to kill is important only in attempted or frustrated

B. Bar Questions
a-1. That the death of the deceased was due to his refusal to be operated on, not a defense.
The fact that the victim would have lived had he received appropriate medical attention is immaterial.
hence, the refusal of the deceased to be operated on does not relieve the offender of the criminal liability
of his death. (People vs Sto Domingo, GR 3783, May 31, 1939)

a-2. Homicide in relation to Article 64

A was charged with the crime of Homicide. It was proved during the trial, but the accused proved the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and lack of interest to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal.

A. State fully the pertinent rules in regard to the application of penalties which contains three periods.
Art. 64. The courts shall observe the following in application of penalties with 3 periods:
1. Neither aggravating nor Mitigating = Medium period
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2. Only Mitigating = Minimum period
3. Only Aggravating = Maximum period
4. Both Mitigating and Aggravating = reasonable offset* according to their relative weight
5. 2 or More Mitigating and No Aggravating = penalty next lower to that prescribed by law
6. Whatever the number of aggravating circumstance = shall not impose a greater penalty than that
prescribed, in its maximum
7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the
number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of
the evil produced by the crime.
*offset you count the number of mitigating and aggravating, rule 1:1. If there are 2 aggravating and 1
mitigating, cancel 1 aggravating and 1 mitigating.
*even if the offender committed all the crimes in Art. 14, only the penalty as stated by the law in the
maximum period may be imposed, nothing beyond]

B. State briefly the pertinent facts and ruling in People vs Manlolo

Facts: (1972) On the evening of May 7, Perito, Mediona and Manuel went to Villaruel street, Pasay City
for a community fiesta celebration. At 11:30pm on their way home, someone threw a rock at them hitting
Manuel in the head. While Perito and Mediona assisted him, a group of 5 persons coming from behind
the outpost rushed at the trio, one of them Garcia who stabbed Manuel in the chest while others kept
throwing rocks. Upon seeing Manuel fall down, Perito and Mediona rushed away to get a vehicle, when
they saw a Police car and reported the incident to get action. Perito and Mediona brought Manuel to the
hospital, but still died even after medical help. Defendant-appellant Manlolo and Garcia denied that they
stabbed Manuel, but affirmed they were with the group.
Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in imposing upon Manolo the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in the
crime of homicide without applying ISLAW.
Ruling: The Court affirmed his prayer, stating that whatever the number of aggravating circumstances,
the court shall not impose a penalty higher than that prescribed by law in its maximum period (Art. 64,
no. 7). Manolo is charged with homicide, imposed (considering the presence of 2 aggravating
circumstances, and ISLAW) an indeterminate sentence of 8y1d of prision mayor as minimum to 17y4m1d
of reclusion temporal as maximum + P30,000.00 indemnification to heirs.

a-3. Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (Art. 365); But CF: Art. 248, par. 3,. (By means of
motor vehicle which requires that there should be an actual design to kill an the use of motor vehicle
should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. Prater Intentionem.)

Bar Question:
Belle saw Gaston stealing the prized cock of a neighbor and reported him to the police. Thereafter,
Gaston, while driving a car saw Belle crossing the street. Incensed that Belle had reported him, Gaston
decided to scare her by trying to make it appear that he was about to run her over. He revved the engine
of his car and drove towards her but he applied the brakes. Since the road was slippery at that time, the
vehicle skidded and hit Belle causing her death.
What is the liability of Gaston? Why? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Gaston is liable for all the direct, natural and logical consequences of the act,
under proximate cause of Article 4. Although the crime is not considered in the RPC, the crime was still
committed by means of dolo. There was freedom and intelligence, but there was no intent. In this case,
the injurious result is greater than that intended, befalling the principle of Praeter intentionem.

a-4. CF. Art. 365, RPC, and Section 10, RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act)

RA 7610, Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in
ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque,
cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000): Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or
acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty.

Page 9 of 35
Bar Question:
On July 1, 2004, Jet Matulis, a pedophile, gave P1,000.00 to Sherly, an orphan and a prostitute, and
brought her to a motel. He inserted a rusty and oversized vibrator into her vagina with such force that she
bled profusely. Jet panicked and fled. Sherly was brought to the hospital and died a few days later
because of shock caused by hemorrhage. (5%)
a) What crime or crimes did Jet Matulis commit? Explain.
b) If Sherly were a minor when she died, would your answer be the same? Explain.

a-5. Where the wounds that caused death were inflicted by two different persons, even if they were
not in conspiracy, each of them is guilty of homicide.
Facts: A shot C with a pistol. Almost immediately after A shot C, B also shot C with his Cs gun. C died as
a result of wounds received from A & B, acting independently of each other.
Held: Since either wound would cause the death of C, both are able and each one of them is guilty of
homicide. The burden of proof is on each of the defendants to show that the wound inflicted by him did
not cause the death. (People vs Abiog) The one who inflicted a wound would contribute to the death of
the victim is equally liable. (People vs Mallon, April 24, 1940)

5. Art. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. (In relation to Arts. 59, i.e.
Impossible Crime, and Art. 4, par (2) RPC); Case: Intod vs CA, 215 SCRA 52

A. Impossible crime.
Case: Intod vs CA
Facts: (1979) Sulpicio Intod accompanied by 3 friends went to Mandayas house and asked him to
accompany them to Palangpangans house. Later, the 5 met with Dumalagan wherein he told them to kill
Palangpangan because of a land dispute between them. At 10pm that same day, Intod, Pangasian, Tubio
and Dalidig fired at Palangpangans bedroom when Mandaya pointed at it. Turns out that only
Palangpangans son-in-law and family was in her house, but no one was in her room and no one was hit
by the shots. They were identified by witnesses and even threatened them. RTC: attempted murder. CA:
affirmed lower court. Into prayed for modification to Impossible Crime (Art. 4(2)).
Held: This case falls under the category of factual impossibility wherein a circumstance beyond his
control prevented the consummation. However, the impossibility of accomplishing a crime, whether legal
or factual impossibility, is not a defense but an act penalized by itself. The Court modified the lower
courts decision hereafter from attempted murder to impossible crime, sentenced to 6 months of Arresto
Mayor, Accessory penalties, and costs

B. Bar Questions:
1. JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa, a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They asked
the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the place.
On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the evening, JP, Aries and Randal, all armed with automatic weapons,
went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her companions to the room in the house of Elsa.
Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired their guns at her room. Fortunately, Elsa was not around as she
attended a prayer meeting that evening in another barangay in Laurel.
JP, et al, were charged and convicted of attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court at Tanauan,
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the accused ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding
them guilty of attempted murder. If you were the ponente, how will you decide the appeal?
If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment convicting the accused of attempted murder and
instead find them guilty of impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability
for impossible crime arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but likewise when it is factual or
physical impossibility, as in the case at bar. Elsa's absence from the house is a physical impossibility
which renders the crime intended Inherently incapable of accomplishment. To convict the accused of
attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2 practically useless as all circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as an incident independent of the actor's will which is an
element of attempted or frustrated felony (Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52).

2. OZ and YO were both courting their co-employee, SUE. Because of their bitter rivalry, OZ decided to
get rid of YO by poisoning him. OZ poured a substance into YO's coffee thinking it was arsenic. It turned
out that the substance was white sugar substitute known as Equal. Nothing happened to YO after he
drank the coffee. What criminal liability did OZ incur, if any? Explain briefly. (5%)
OZ incurred criminal liability for an impossible crime of murder. Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent

Page 10 of 35
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4,
par. 2, RPC).
In the problem given, the impossibility of accomplishing the crime of murder, a crime against persons, was due
to the employment of ineffectual means which OZ thought was poison. The law imputes criminal liability to the
offender although no crime resulted, only to suppress his criminal propensity because subjectively, he is a
criminal though objectively, no crime was committed.

6. (a) Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray.

Note: Someone killed in the course of the affray need not be one of the participants of the affray.
(b) Art. 252. Physical Injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray.
Note: Inflicted upon the participants thereof.

RA. 8049 An Act Regulating Hazing, etc.

Note: Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiating rites suffer any physical injury
or dies, as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, etc., who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Presumption (2nd to the last par., Sec. 4, supra. The
presence of nay person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein unless he prevented
the commission of the acts punishable herein).
Hazing, as defined by law, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury. (RA8049)

Bar Question:
1. During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight erupted in the public plaza. As a result of the tumultuous affray, A
sustained one fatal and three superficial stab wounds. He died a day after. B, C, D and E were proven to be
participants in the "rumble", each using a knife against A, but it could not be ascertained who among them
inflicted the mortal injury. Who shall be held criminally liable for the death of A and for what?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: B, C, D, and E being participants in the tumultuous affray and having been proven to
have inflicted serious physical injuries, or at least, employed violence upon A, are criminally liable for the
latter's death. And because it cannot be ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal injury on A, there
being a free-for-all fight or tumultuous affray. B, C, D, and E are all liable for the crime of death caused in a
tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. A, B and C are members of SFC Fraternity. While eating in a seaside restaurant, they were attacked by X, Y
and Z, members of a rival fraternity. A rumble ensued in which the abovenamed members of the two fraternities
assaulted each other in a confused and tumultuous manner resulting in the death of A. As it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed A, the members of the two fraternities who took part in the rumble were charged
for death caused in a tumultuous affray. Will the charge prosper? Explain. (4%) NO, they were an organized

Art. 253. Giving Assistance to Suicide

Bar Question:
Francis and Joan were sweethearts, but their parents had objected to their relationship because they were first
cousins. They forged a pact in writing to commit suicide. The agreement was shoot each other in the head
which they did. Joan died. Due to medical assistance, Francis survived. Is Francis criminally liable for the
death of Joan? Explain. ( 5% )
Yes. Criminally liable for giving assistance to suicide as evidence in their written pact.

7. Art. 254. Discharge of firearms. Note: There is no intention to kill a person.

1. That the offender discharges a firearms against or at another person
2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person

The purpose of the offender is only to intimidate or frighten the offended party.

8. Art. 255. Infanticide.

1. That the offender discharges a firearms against or at another person
2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person
Page 11 of 35
Elements of Rape under Paragraph 2 Rape by Sexual Assault
1. That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
2. That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
A. By inserting his penis into another persons mouth to anal orifice; or
B. By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person;
3. That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
A. By using force or intimidation; or
B. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
C. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
D. When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.

Elements of Rape under Paragraph 1 Rape by Sexual Intercourse

1. That the offender is a man;
2. That the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
3. That such act is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
A. By using force or intimidation; or
B. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
C. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
D. When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.

A. If committed by the mother of the child, or the maternal grandparents, or either of them, the penalty is
lower than that provided under the 1st par. of Art. 255.

9. Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself, or by her parents (or either of them);
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife. Penalty to be imposed in its maximum period.

10. Art. 266. A. Rape, when and How committed.

A. Rape under par. 1., is Simple Rape or Rape by Sexual Intercourse while Rape under par. 2, is Rape by
Sexual Assault makes no distinction on sex of either the offender or the victim.

Case: Geronimo Ordinario vs People, GR No 155415, May 20, 2004; Vitug, J.

Facts: Complainant Jayson Ramos and accused-appellant were student and teacher. Jayson was then a 4th-
grader and accused was his teacher in Boy Scout. Ordinario ordered Jayson to strip off which the latter
complied unwary of his perverse intentions. Ordinario approached and started kissing him all over his body
including his male organ, and thereafter inserted his private part into the mouth of Jayson. The same sexual
molestation recurred several more times. RTC: 12 counts of Rape. CA: affirmed in toto, held that the precise
date of commission of the incidents of rape complained was not an element of the crime, and neither was it
required to be alleged in the Information nor proved with exactitude by the prosecution during trial.
Held: The definition of the crime of rape has been expanded with the enactment of RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of
1997) to include not only rape by sexual intercourse but now likewise rape by sexual assault. The law has
not made any distinction on the sex of either the offender or the victim. The trial court has found the elements
of Rape by Sexual Assault to have all been established, imposing the penalty of imprisonment from 5y prision
correccional as minimum to 8y1d prision mayor as maximum. SC affirmed with modification: Rape by Sexual
Assault on 12 counts + P25,000.00 civil indemnity + P25,000.00 moral damages for each count.

B. Rape by Sexual Assault. Insertion of ones finger into the genitals of another constitutes rape under the
Anti-Rape law of 1997.
Case: People vs Nemesio Bon, GR No 149199, January 28, 2003; Ynares-Santiago, J., citing People vs
Soriano, GR No 142779, August 29, 2002; 388 SCRA 140

C. Licking of vagina is Acts of Lasciviousness, under Art. 336, RPC. Cf. People vs Nemesio Bon, supra.
D. If the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer of the vagina, the acts should also be considered
as already consummated crime of rape though sexual assault (People vs Banaag GR 188897)
E. Rape is committed xxx (d) when the offended party is under 12 years old, or is demented even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

e-1. Bar Questions:

1. Three policemen conducting routine surveillance of a cogonal area in Antipole chanced upon Ruben, a 15-
year old tricycle driver, on top of Rowena who was known to be a child prostitute. Both were naked from the
waist down and appeared to be enjoying the sexual activity. Ruben was arrested by the policemen despite his
protestations that Rowena enticed him to have sex with her in advance celebration of her twelfth birthday.
The town physician found no semen nor any bleeding on Rowena's hymen but for a healed scar. Her hymenal
opening easily admitted two fingers showing that no external force had been employed on her. Is Ruben liable
for any offense? Discuss fully.

Page 12 of 35
Ruben is liable for rape, even if force or intimidation is not present. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age (People vs. Dela Cruz, 56 SCRA 84) since the law doesn't
consider the consent voluntary and presumes that a girl below twelve years old does not and cannot have a
will of her own. In People us. Perez, CA 37 OG 1762, it was held that sexual intercourse with a prostitute below
twelve years old is rape.
Similarly, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation as the important consideration is
not the emission but the penetration of the female body by the male organ (People vs. Jose 37 SCRA 450;
People vs. Carandang. 52 SCRA 259).

Cf. Rape is committed even if the girl under 12 years is a prostitute. (People vs Perez, CA, 37 OG 1762)
The law does not consider that kind of consent voluntary, as the offended party under 12 years old cannot
have a will of her own.

e-2. What other acts are considered rape under the Anti Rape Law of 1997, amending the RPC? (Note:
Art. 266-A, par. 2.)

e-3. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 reclassified rape from a crime against honor, a private offense, to that of a
crime against persons. Will the subsequent marriage of the offender and the offended party extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed? Explain. (Cf. Art. 266-C)

e-4. Minority of victim in Rape, how proven.

Case: People vs Carlito Marahay, GR No. 120625-29, Jan 28, 2003; Sandoval-Gutierrez, Jr. citing People vs
Manuel Pruna y Ramirez, or Erman Pruna y Ramirez.

Bar Question:
GV was convicted of raping TC, his niece, and he was sentenced to death. It was alleged in the information
that the victim was a minor below seven years old, and her mother testified that she was only six years and ten
months old, which her aunt corroborated on the witness stand. The information also alleged that the accused
was the victim's uncle, a fact proved by the prosecution.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, accused- appellant contends that capital punishment could
not be imposed on him because of the inadequacy of the charges and the insufficiency of the evidence to
prove all the elements of the heinous crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. Is appellant's contention
correct? Reason briefly. (5%)
Yes, appellant's contention is correct insofar as the age of the victim is concerned. The age of the victim raped
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt to constitute the crime as qualified rape and deserving of the
death penalty. The guidelines in appreciating age as a qualifying circumstance in rape cases have not been
met, to wit:
1) The primary evidence of the age of the victim is her birth certificate;
2) In the absence of the birth certificate, age of the victim maybe proven by authentic document, such as
baptismal certificate and school records;
3) If the aforesaid documents are shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible of the victim's mother or any member of the family, by consanguinity or affinity,
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient but only under the following circumstances: (a) If the victim is alleged to
be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; (b) If the victim is
alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; (c) If
the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4) In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age under the circumstances above-stated, complainant's sole testimony can
suffice, provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused (People us. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577

e-5. Civil Indemnity, Moral Damages & Exemplary damages in Rape. Cf. People vs Marahay, supra.
Moral damages are awarded in rape cases without need of proof other than rape itself because it is assumed
that the victim has suffered moral damages thus entitling her to such an award. P50,000.00 is in order. Rape
being attended by aggravating circumstance of relationship, duly alleged and established, there is awarded
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Bar Question:
The accused was found guilty of 10 counts of rape for having carnal knowledge with the same woman. In
addition to the penalty of imprisonment, he was ordered to pay indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each

Page 13 of 35
count. On appeal, the accused questions the award of civil indemnity for each count, considering that the
victim is the same woman. How would you rule on the contention of the accused? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The contention is unmeritorious. Under the law, every person criminally liable is
civilly liable. (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code) Since each count charges different felonious acts and ought to be
punished differently, the concomitant civil indemnity ex delicto for every criminal act should be adjudged. Said
civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated
as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations. (People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875- 76,
November 16, 2001)

e-6. Effect of pardon; a legal husband may be accused of rape by his wife (Art. 266-C, 2nd par.)
Bar Question:
Gavino boxed his wife Alma for refusing to sleep with him. He then violently threw her on the floor and forced
her to have sexual intercourse with him. As a result Alma suffered serious physical injuries.
(a) Can Gavino be charged with rape? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) No. A husband cannot be charged with the rape of his wife because of the
matrimonial consent which she gave when she assumed the marriage relation, and the law will not permit her
to retract in order to charge her husband with the offense (Sate vs. Haines, 11 La. Ann. 731 So. 372; 441 RA

(b) Can Gavino be charged with serious physical injuries? Explain

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) Yes, he may be guilty of serious physical injuries. This offense is specially
mentioned in Art. 263 [4], paragraph 2 which imposes a higher penalty for the crime of physical injuries in
cases where the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Art 246 (the
crime of parricide).

e-7. There is no crime of frustrated rape. The word frustrated has been deleted from par. 4 of Art 266-B.
Bar Question:
Taking into account the nature and elements of the felony of rape, may one be criminally liable for frustrated
SUGGESTED ANSWER: There is no frustrated rape it is either attempted or consummated rape. If the
accused who placed himself on top of a woman, raising her skirt and unbuttoning his pants, the endeavor to
have sex with her very apparent, is guilty of Attempted rape. On the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the
female organ by the penis, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, consummates the
crime of rape. More so, it has long abandoned its stray decision in People vs. Erina 50 Phil 998 where the
accused was found guilty of Frustrated rape.

e-8. Presumptions. Cf. Art. 266-D. Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against. The act of rape in
any degree from the fend part, or where the offense party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of
giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts under Art. 266-A.

e-9. When the offended party is demented. Par. 1. (d), Art. 266-A)
Bar Question:
The complainant, an eighteen-year old mental retardate with an intellectual capacity between the ages of nine
and twelve years, when asked during the trial how she felt when she was raped by the accused, replied
"Masarap, it gave me much pleasure."
With the claim of the accused that the complainant consented for a fee to the sexual intercourse, and with the
foregoing answer of the complainant, would you convict the accused of rape if you were the judge trying the
case? Explain.
Yes, I would convict the accused of rape. Since the victim is a mental retardate with an intellectual capacity of
a child less than 12 years old, she is legally incapable of giving a valid consent to the sexual Intercourse. The
sexual intercourse is tantamount to a statutory rape because the level of intelligence is that of a child less than
twelve years of age. Where the victim of rape is a mental retardate, violence or Intimidation is not essential to
constitute rape. (People us. Trimor, G,R. 106541-42, 31 Mar 95) As a matter of fact, RA No. 7659, the Heinous
Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC, by adding the phrase "or is demented."

F. When a husband may be guilty of raping his wife. Marital Rape

Case: People vs Edgar Jumawan, GR No. 187493, April 21, 2014.
Facts: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK were married and had 4 children. KKK executed a Complaint-
Affidavit alleging that her husband raped her on Dec 3 1998, and on Dec 12 boxed her on the shoulder for
refusing to have sex with him. According to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems until
in 1997 when he started to be brutal in bed. His abridged method of lovemaking became physically painful for
her so she resisted, but he would threaten her into submission. RTC: guilty of 2 charges of rape, sentenced to

Page 14 of 35
RP for each, P50,000.00 moral damages, P75,000.00 indemnification for each case, P50,000.00 exemplary
damages, and to pay costs. CA: affirmed in toto, ruling that all the elements of rape under RA8353.
Issue: Whether or not there can be marital rape.
Held: YES. The SC sustained Reclusion Perpetua for each count of Rape without eligibility for parole.
Ruling: Rape is a crime that evoked global condemnation because hit is an abhorrence to a womans value
and dignity as a human being. Marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own
his wifes body by reason of marriage. Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape
cases infringes on the equal protection clause. A married woman has the same right to control her own body,
as does an unmarried woman.
On 2 separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against
her will.

Page 15 of 35
TITLE IX Crimes Against Property
1. Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery.

Elements of Robbery in general

1. That there be (1) personal property, (2) belonging to another;
2. That there is (3) unlawful taking of that property;
3. That the taking must be (4) with intent to gain; and
4. That there is (5) violence against or intimidation of any persons, or force upon anything.

A. Classification of robbery
1. Robbery with violence against, or intimidation of persons (Arts. 294, 297, and 298)
2. Robbery by the use of force upon things (Arts. 299 and 302)

1. US vs Turla (38 Phil 346); People vs Balugot (40 Phil 89); it is robbery under Art. 294
2. Napolis vs CA, 42 SCRA 301 (Feb 28, 1972); a later case, it is a complex crime of Robbery with
Violence/ Intimidation) Person, with Robbery with Force upon things (Art. 299)

2. Art. 294. Robbery with violence against, or intimidation of persons.

A. The meaning of the phrase when by reason or on occasion of the robbery. other crimes more
precede or occur other robbery, homicide the intent to take personal property belong to another with
intimidation gain must precede the killing. (People vs Elizaga, 86 Phil 364; People vs Glore, 87 Phil
Art. 48 (Complex Crime) does not apply here. There is only one penalty prescribed even if two
crimes are committed. Art. 48 applies only when a complex crime is not punished with a specific
On the occasion or by reason of the robbery robbery or the homicide/serious physical injuries
may happen ahead or before the committing of robbery

B. Several circumstances constituting robbery with Homicide, etc. where the victim was killed on the
occasion when the four accused were taking the chickens under the house of the victim, the offense
is robbery with homicide, not theft and homicide.
Robbery with homicide robbery was the main purpose, the killing merely incidental
Robbery and Homicide as separate crimes where there is no direct connection between the
consummation of both crimes.

C. Robbery with violence distinguished from grave coercion. (Art. 286, Reyes, LB Book 1, Art. 210)
Robbery with Violence Grave Coercion
There is violence used by the offender
There is intent to gain Intent to gain is not an essential element
if the purpose in taking somebodys property by If the purpose is to compel another to do
force or intimidation is to obtain gain something against his will, without authority of law,
but believing himself to be the owner or creditor,
and thereby series property

D. Robbery and bribery, distinguished (Reyes

Victim does not commit a crime and he is When the victim has committed a crime and gives
intimidated with arrest and/or prosecution to money or gift to avoid arrest or prosecution.
deprive him of his personal property
Victim is deprived of his money or property by Victim parts with his money or property in a sense
force or intimidation voluntarily.

3. Art. 295 Qualified aggravating circumstances in certain cases of robbery.

If the offenses defined in (3)(4)(5) of Article 294 is committed
1. in an uninhabited place, or
2. by a band, or
3. by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle, or airship, or

Page 16 of 35
4. by entering the passengers compartments in a train, or in any manner taking the passengers
thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or
5. on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of firearms, the
offender shall be punished by the maximum periods of the proper penalties prescribed in Art 294

4. Art. 296 Definition of band and penalty.

A. Definition of the term band When more than three armed malefactor take part in the commission
of robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. AT LEAST FOUR ARMED
PERSONS must take part.

5. Art. 297 Attempted and Frustrated Robbery, committed under certain circumstances.
A. When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed
B. (1) Robbery with Homicide and (2) Attempted, or (3) Frustrated Robbery with Homicide are
Special Complex Crimes, not governed by Art. 48.

6. Art. 298 Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation.

1. That the offender has intent to defraud another
2. That the offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public instrument or document.
3. That the compulsion is by means of violence or intimidation.

A. Distinguished from Grave Coercion (Art. 286)

Art. 298 Grave Coercion
The offender has intent to defraud another. There is no intent to defraud another.
By compelling another to sign, execute or deliver By compelling another to do something against his
any public document or instrument will, (right or wrong, consummated or not)
By preventing another from doing something not
prohibited by law
The compulsion (or prevention) done bye means of violence or intimidation

7. Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship.

Elements of Robbery With Force Upon Things under Subdivision A.

1. That the offender entered an (inhabited place), or (b) public building, or (c) edifice devoted to religious
2. That the entrance was effected by any of the following means:
A. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;
B. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;
C. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools;
D. By using fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
3. The once inside the building, the offender took personal property belonging to another with intent to gain

Elements of Robbery With Force Upon Things under Subdivision B.

1. That the offender is inside a dwelling house, public building, or edifice devoted to religious worship,
regardless of the circumstances under which he enter it;
2. That the offender takes personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, under any of the
following circumstances:
A. By breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or
receptacle; or
B. by taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery.

A. Par. A, Subparagraph 2 breaking of any door or window. outside door or window

1. People vs Fernandez, 58 Phil 678 the breaking of a door or window imply more than the mere
forcing open of a door or window. In the case at car, the defendant entered by foreign open the door
by means of some instrument. It was neither alleged nor proved that the door was broken, thus the
crime committed by him was only theft. (p.708, Reyes Book II)
2. People vs Lising, CA, 620 6819, cited on Reyes, LB, supra. Where the door was intact, the
accused entered the store by removing the hinges or hooks to which the padlocks were attached, the

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crime committed was simple theft. Removing the hook or contraption is not the breaking
contemplated by Arts. 299 and 302.

The term door in Par. 1, Subdivision (b) refers only to doors, lide, or opening sheets of furniture or
other probable receptacles not to inside doors of the house or building.
Subd. B, Par. 2 taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside the
place of the robbery
Subd. A, Par. 2 doors refers those of which are resorted to by the malefactors to gain entrance
into the building
Arm carried must not be sued to intimidate, otherwise it will be punishable under Art. 294.

Art. 301. What is an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship
and their dependencies.
1. Dependencies, defined. Refers to all interior courts, corrals, warehouses, granaries or inclosed
places (1) contiguous to the building, (2) having an entrance connected therewith, and which (3) form
part of the whole. For example, a small store located on the ground floor of the house, belonging to
the owner of the store, because the house and the store form one single whole. (US vs Ventura)

8. Arts. 306 & 307 {Brigandage; who are brigands; Aiding and Abetting a band of brigands}, as amended

There is brigandage when

1. There be at least four armed persons.
2. They formed a band of robbers.
3. The purpose is any of the following:
A. To commit robbery in the highway; or
B. To kidnap persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom; or
C. To attain by means of force and violence any other purpose.

A. Aiding and Abetting a band of brigands. (Art. 307)

Elements of Aiding and Abetting a band of brigands.

1. That there is a band of brigands.
2. That the offender knows the band to be of brigands.
3. That the offender does any of the following acts:
A. He in any manner aids, abets, or protects such band of brigands; or
B. He gives them information of the movements of the police or other peace officers of the Government;
C. He acquires or receives the property taken by such brigands.

B. PD No. 532. Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

Highway robbery/Brigandage The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful
purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine

Case: People vs Isabelo Puno

Facts: Puno, who was the driver of Mrs Sarmientos husband, replaced her own driver temporarily. On
the way to Valle Verde in Pasig, Puno stopped the car and a young man, Enrique Amurao boarded the
car beside the driver. Enrique pointed a gun at mrs Sarmiento as Puno told her that he needs to get
money from her. She drafted 3 checks amounting to P100,000.00. The car sped off towards the North
superhighway, and there Mrs Sarmiento jumped out of the car.
Issue: Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as highway robbery under PD 532.
Held: No. PD 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against
only a predetermined pr particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car
which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD 532 applicable.

9. Arts. 308 & 309 Theft.

Elements of Theft
1. That there be taking of personal property.
2. That said property belongs to another.
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain.
4. That the taking be done without consent of the owner.
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. Page 18 of 35
A. Theft under 2nd paragraph, subparagraph A; Art. 308, not limited to actual finder (or finder in fact) but
also finder in law.
Case: People vs Avila, 44 Phil 720 A found in his carretela a purse containing money left by a
passenger. A delivered it to B, a policeman, with the request to give it to C, the owner. B did not give it to
C and appropriate it. Held: B is liable for theft, as a finder in law. Note: he cannot be held liable for
estafa. (p. 747, Reyes Book II)

B. No crime called Frustrated Theft;

Case: Valenzuela vs People, GR No. 160188
Facts: The accused were sighted outside supermarket by a security guard hauling a pushcart with
cases of detergents and thereafter loading said cases in a taxi. When the taxi was stopped by a security
guard who asked the accused for a receipt, the accused fled but were apprehended and the
merchandise were recovered. (P. 735, Reyes Book II)
Held: The crime committed was consummated theft. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the
property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft.

C. ___ of telephone call, Theft under PD 401;

Case: Laurel vs Abrogar & PLDT, GR155076 [not recited in class]
Facts: Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing, and using
PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of
outing and completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave
frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is
destined. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused
damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
Issue: Whether or not Laurels act constitutes theft.
Held: In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment
or apparatus to PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route
international long distance calls using PLDTs facilities constitute Subtraction.
Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is capable of
appropriation, and not included in the enumeration of real properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal property which
can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction
penalized under the said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be considered as
personal property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said
calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone
calls were taken without its consent.
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without PLDT's consent. The
theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the theft were
services and business of the offended party. Source:

10. Art. 310, Qualified Theft

Theft is Qualified
1. If the theft is committed by a domestic servant
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence
3. If the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter, or (c) large cattle.
4. If the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation.
5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery.
6. If property i taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

A. Case: People vs Cristobal, GR No. 159450, March 3, 2011

Facts: (1996) Olivia Cristobal, teller of Prudential bank, with grave abuse of trust and confidence, and
with the intent to gain without knowledge of owner, stole $10,000.00 (P260,000.00) cash money.
Penalty: Reclusion Perpetua for 40 years plus accessory penalties of death under Article 40.
Note from Crim I, Art. 74: If it had been simple theft, the penalty to be imposed is 20 years of Reclusion
Temporal. But the crime committed was qualified with grave abuse of confidence, thus imposed 2

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degrees higher. But Art. 74 (Penalty higher than reclusion perpetual in certain cases) provides that if the
prescribed higher penalty is death without designating the name of the penalty, the higher penalty to be
considered would be Reclusion Perpetual for 40 years plus accessory penalties of death under Article

B. Case: Cenzon vs Abad Santos, GR No. 16432, June 27, 2006; Bailable Offense.
C. RA 6539 Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
1. When the falling of motor vehicle is catnapping;
Case: People vs Bustemira, 2004 case
2. When constitutes qualified theft;
Case: People vs Isaac, 96 Phil 931
3. When constitutes estafa;
Case: People vs Noveno, et al, CA No. 46 O.G. 1637
4. When robbery;
Case: People vs Bustemira, supra

D. RA 705, as amended by RA 8550. Fish taken from a fish pond or fishery, defines illegal fishing
Case: People vs Ronerio Vergara, GR No. 110286, April 2 1997

E. PD 533. Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974

1. Large cattle defined meaning belonging to the bovine family. i.e., including carabaos, horses,
mules, asses and all members of the bovine family. Bovine refers to animals related to or resembling
oxen or cows; not to include goats.
2. To constitute the crime of qualified theft by taking large cattle, the animal must be taken alive. Thus,
killing a cow on the spot and taking it is only simple theft.

F. PD 1612 The Anti-Fencing Law

1. The term fencing defined. The act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell
or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

11. Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights

1. That the offender takes possession of any real property or usurpation of any real rights in property.
2. That the real property or real rights belongs to another.
3. That violence against or intimidation of persons is used by the offender in occupying real property or
usurping real rights in property.
4. That there is intent to gain.

Case: Conchita Quinao vs People, et al., GR No. 139603, July 14, 2000.

Art. 314. Fraudulent Insolvency.

1. That the offender is a debtor; that is, he has obligations due and payable.
2. That he absconds with his property.
3. That there be prejudice to his creditors.

Defendant was a merchant of good standing, but he became indebted to several merchants in Cebu.
Judgement was rendered against him and execution issued. He owned several parcels of real property
which he transferred to another to place them beyond the reach of his creditors. The considerations in
the deed of sale were all fictitious. Held: Fraudulent insolvency made in fraud of creditors. (People vs
Tan Diong, p. 776, reyes Book II)

12. Art. 315. Estafa

Elements of Estafa in general.

1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
Page 20 of 35
ESTAFA (Art. 315) THEFT (Art. 308)

the offender received, including the juridical The offender took it

possession not just physical

Where in receiving the thing from the offended party, Where a person who misappropriated the thing which
the offender acquired also the judicial possession of the he had received from the offended party is guilty of theft
time, and he later misappropriated it. (p. 808) if he acquired only the material or physical possession
of the thing. (p. 807)

A. Kinds:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
2. By means of any of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud
3. Through fraudulent means

2 Forms of Committing Estafa (reduced from the 3 forms)

1. Estafa with Abuse of Confidence or Unfaithfulness (Par. 4, No. 1)
2. Estafa with Deceit (Par. 4, No 2 and 3)

Elements of Estafa with Unfaithfulness under Subdivision No. 1, Par. (a)

1. That the offender has on onerous obligation to deliver something of value.
2. That he alters its substance, quantity, or quality.
3. That damage or prejudice is caused to another.

Elements of Estafa with Abuse of Confidence under Subdivision No. 1, Par. (b)
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
2. That there be (a) misappropriation or (b) conversion of such money or property by the offender, or (c)
denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That a such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.

Elements of Estafa by taking undue advantage of the signature in blank under Subdivision No. 1,
Par. (c) (p. 812)
1. That the paper with the signature of the offended party be in blank.
2. that the offended party should have delivered it to the offender.
3. That above the signature of the offended party, a document is written by the offender without authority to
do so.
4. That the document so written creates a liability of, or causes damage to, the offended party or any third

B. PD 115 The Trust Receipt Law

Elements of Estafa by means of Deceit. 2nd Form (Subdivisions Nos. 2 and 3)

1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means must be made or execute prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that
is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

1. True nature of the trust receipt law

Case: Anthony Ng vs People, GR No 173905, April 23, 2010.
Facts: Ng was engaged in the business of building and fabricating telecommunication towers. He
applied for a credit line of P3,000,000.00 with Asiatrust, and after submitting supporting documents
(including contracts with Islacom, Smart and Infocom, and collectible amounts from them), his loan was

Page 21 of 35
approved. He was then required to sign several documents, among them were Promissory Notes and
Trust Receipt Agreements. The Promissory Notes had maturity dates, the 2 TRAs did not bear any
maturity dates. After petitioner received the goods, he utilized them to fabricate the communication
towers. He later had difficulty in collecting from Islacom and failed to pay his loan. Efforts towards a
settlement failed to be reached. Asia trust filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) in
relation to Sec. 3, PD 115.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is liable for Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) in relation to Sec. 3, PD 115.
Held: A trust receipt transaction is one where the entrustee has the obligation to deliver to the entruster
the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is not sold, to return the merchandise to the entruster. There
are, therefore, two obligations in a trust receipt transaction: the first refers to money received under the
obligation involving the duty to turn it over (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold, while the
second refers to the merchandise received under the obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner. A
violation of any of these undertakings constitutes Estafa defined under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, as
provided in Sec. 13 of PD 115. Considering that the goods in this case were never intended for sale but
for use in the fabrication of steel communication towers, the trial court erred in ruling that the agreement
is a trust receipt transaction. PD 115 provides that an entrustee is only liable for Estafa when he fails to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt.

C. Par. 1 (b)
1. In contracts of bailment, such as Contract of Deposit
Case: People vs Campos, Reyes p. 789
Brief Facts: The offended party deposited with the accused certificate of Stock No. 517 as guaranty for
the payment of certain shares. When already in possession of the certificate, the accused indorsed it to a
corporation for his overdraft. As a result, the offended party could not recover her certificate when she
paid her shares.
Held: Since the pledge (indorsing it as guaranty of his overdraft) involves an act of ownership, the
depository who pledges a thing in deposit uses it for a distinct purpose and accordingly commits the
crime of estafa.

Under Contract of lease of personal property Where the accused hired the truck of the offended party
until noon that day, but never returned the same, he (accused) was given both (1) Material possession
and (2) Juridical Possession. Thus guilty of estafa, not qualified theft. (People vs Noveno, p. 789)
Juridical Possession means a possession which gives the transfer a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner. (p. 785)

2. Obligations to return items received.

1. Gloria Ocampo - Paule vs CA & People, GR No 145872, February 2, 2002
2. Virgil Seren vs CA, et al, GR No 130423, November 18, 2002

D. There is no estafa through negligence

Estafa and malversation (of public funds, Art. 217) being both used on unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence of the agent xxx clearly imports that in estafa, the profit or gain must be obtained by the
accused personally through his own acts, and his mere negligence in permitting another to take
advantage of, or benefit from, the entrusted chattel cannot constitute estafa under Art. 315 (1-b). (P. 806)
Illustration. When the accused received the sum of P4,000 from the complainant to purchase a car,
entrusted and delivered the money to his business companions for the same purpose, the accused is not
liable even if he was negligent in permitting other persons to take the benefit from the entrusted money.

E. BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law)

A. 2 ways of violating BP 22 (Section 1)
1. Drawer knows he does not have sufficient funds xxx
2. Drawer fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit xxx

Elements of the offense defined in the FIRST paragraph of Section 1.

1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment.
4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment.

Page 22 of 35
Elements of the offense defined in the SECOND paragraph of Section 1.
1. That a person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues
a check.
2. That he fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of 90 days from the date appearing thereon.
3. That the check is dishonored by the drawee bank.

F. Estafa by Postdating a Check

1. Elements.

Elements of Estafa by Postdating a Check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation under

Subdivision No. 2, Par (d).
1. That the offender postdates a check, or issued a check in payment of an obligation;
2. That such postdating or issuing a check was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

Case: People vs Mario Migmo Tan, GR No 120672, August 17, 2000. (Quisumbing, J.)

3. Notice of dishonor required with regard to checks due.

Case: People vs Cora Abella Ojeda, GR No 184238-58, June 3, 2004. (Corona Jr.)
Held: Notice of Dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) of Art. 315 and Sec. 2, of BP 22. While the RPC
prescribes that the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed to cover his check within
three days from receipt of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or
drawer to pay the amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under
both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without
proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime
(whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.

4. Check drawn from Closed Account, presentment to the bank necessary.

Case: Decided by Justice Teresita de Castro. (2008, 2009, 2010?)

G. PD 1689. Increasing the Penalty for certain Forms of Swindling or Estafa. Defining Syndicated
Estafa, Section 1. Committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys xxx.
Case: People vs Priscilla Balasa, et al, GR 10635, 108601-02, September 3, 1998.

13. Art. 316. Other Forms of Swindling

A. Par. 3. By wrongfully taking by the owner his personal property from its lawful possessor.

Distinguished from Art. 286. Grave Coercion

CF. US vs Mena, Reyes, p. 633.
Facts: The 3 carabaos of A entered the rice paddies of B, causing damage thereto. B took possession of
the carabaos, and B did not deny the right to compensation but was not ready to make payment. B and
his son took the animals to the justice of peace for the purpose of depositing them in his care. On the
road, they met A who came to know of their intention. When B and son refused, A rushed at Bs son with
a bolo, threatened him with bodily harm, and compelled B to turn loose the carabao which he was riding.
Held: A is guilty of Grave Coercion. With violence, he compelled B to do what he did not desire to do.
Suppose, the carabaos were in As possession and B wanted to get them, but A by means of violence or
intimidation prevented B from taking them, A is not liable for grave coercion. As an owner and actual
possessor of the carabaos, A had the right to use such force as ay be reasonably necessary to prevent
B from dispossessing him of his property.

B. Par. 4. By executing any fictitious contract to the prejudice of another.

But compared to Art. 314 Fraudulent Insolvency; Cf. People vs Tan Diong (p. 861)

14. Art. 318. Other deceits.

A. Deceits not in Arts. 315, 316, and 317.
B. Deceits in Par. 1. By defrauding or damaging another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles.

Page 23 of 35
C. Deceits in Par. 2. By interpreting dreams, by making forecasts, by telling fortunes, or by taking
advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, for profit or gain.
Case: Jaime Guinhawa vs People, GR 162822, August 25, 2005. (Callejo, J.) The false or fraudulent
representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is one of those
deceitful acts under par. 1.

15. Art. 319. Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property.

A. Chatted mortgage must be registered
Judge H. Damasing discussion on the example:
In the Terms of Promo: If youve decided to purchase the property within 30 days, then its yours,
otherwise you return it. After 30 days, say on the 31st day, purchaser did not pay and SOLD the same to
another person. Is he guilty of Estafa?
ANSWER: No. he cannot be sued for estafa. It was a contract of sale. (This is discussed also in Reyes
under Art. 315).

B. Exceptions to par. 2 (2): Filing of any action for collection, not for foreclosure of chattel mortgage,
relieves the accused of criminal responsibility under par. 2. (p. 870)
Case: People vs Mata, CA 58 OG 6287.

16. Art. 320. Destructive Arson

DISTINGUISHED from Simple Arson in PD1613. (p. 875, Reyes)

Destructive Arson (Art. 320 repealed) Simple Arson (PD 1613)

*distinguished by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender

characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
odious ang hateful offenses and which, by reason of viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, penalty
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to contemplates crimes with less significant social,
the common standards and norms of decency and economic, political and national security implications
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. than Destructive Arson
Cf. People vs Nestor G. Soriano, GR 142565, July 29, 2003.

Arts. 320-326 have now been repealed. In effect: PD 1613. (p. 882, Reyes Book II)
A. Section 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson is already a crime; punishable by PM in its medium period.
B. Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated Arson (p. 886)
(a) Attempted Arson A person intending to burn a wooden structure, collects some rags, soaks
them in gasoline and places them beside the wooden wall of the building. When he is about to light a
match to set fire to the rags, he is discovered by another who chases him away.
The offender commences the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but he does not
perform all the acts of execution due to the timely intervention of another who chases away the
(b) Frustrated Arson the offender is able to light or set fire to the rags but the fire was put out
before any part of the building was burned.
(c) Consummated Arson If before the fire was put out, it had burned a part of the building.

C. Important cases:
1. People vs Gutierrez
2. People vs Soriano

D. No complex crime of Arson with Homicide. PD 1613 provides that if by reason of or on the
occasion of arson, death results, RP to death shall be imposed. Homicide is absorbed.

Art. 327. Malicious Mischief.

1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another.
2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction.
3. That the act of damaging anothers property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
Note: This third element presupposed that the offender acted due to hate, revenge or other evil motive.

Page 24 of 35
A. Act of revenge is malicious mischief. So when the defendants butchered the cow of the offended
party because the cow entered our property with no intention to divide the meat among themselves,
the act of killing of the cow was an act of revenge, therefore the crime committed was malicious
mischief. (People vs Valiente, et al, CA GR No 9442-R, December 29, 1953)
B. It is malicious mischief when the act of damaging of anothers property was inspired, not by hatred or
a desire for revenge, but by the mere pleasure of destroying.
Case: People vs Siddayao, CA, 53, OG 8163

C. A person may be charged with Malicious Mischief if he causes damage through reckless imprudence.
Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself, only when the negligence results in a crime as in this

Art. 330. Damage and construction to means of communication.

A. Committed by damaging any railway, telegraph of telephone lines.
B. Cf. Art. 134-A Coup detat Swift Attack 3rd element, i.e. that the attack is directed against xxx any
communication networks xxx needed for the exercise and continued possession of power.

17. Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability.

Only civil liability if the crimes are theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed by certain persons:
A. stepfather, adopted father, natural children, concubine, paramour included. (People vs Alvarez, 52
SCRA 65)
Case: People vs Alvarez, 52 SCRA 65
People vs Constantino, CA 60 OG 3605
B. Applies to common-law spouses. (People vs Constantino, CA 60 OG 3605)

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1. Art. 333. Who are guilty of Adultery. (woman)

1. That the woman is married,
2. That she had sexual intercourse with another man not her husband.
3. That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourse, he must know her to be married.

A. Essence of adultery it is the violation of the marital vow.

B. Gist of adultery it is the danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, where the rights of the
real heirs may be impaired and a man may be charged with maintenance of a family not his own.
C. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery
The crime of adultery is an instantaneous crime. Thus, a husband can file several complaints against
his wife for Adultery without being put twice into jeopardy of punishment for the same offense..
Adultery is not a continuing offense.
D. An act of intercourse with the offending spouse subsequent to adulterous conduct is an implied
pardon of said adulterous conduct.
Note: Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife
and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon had been
granted, because pardon refers to previous and not subsequent acts.

2. Art. 334. Concubinage. (man)

1. That the man must be married.
2. That he committed any of the following acts: [Also the three ways of committing concubinage]
A. Keeping a mistress is in the conjugal dwelling.
B. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman who is not his wife.
C. Cohabiting with her in any other place
3. That as regards the woman, she must know him to be married.

A. A married man is not liable for concubinage for mere sexual relations with a woman not his wife.
He is liable only if committed any of the three acts specified in Art. 334, otherwise he is not criminally
liable. (People vs Santos, et al, CA, 450 OG 2116)

3. Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness of lewdness;
2. That the cat of lasciviousness is committed against a person of either sex;
3. That it misdone under any of the following circumstances;
A. By using force or intimidation; or
B. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
C. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
D. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

A. Victim upon other persons, means persons of either sex. (People vs Franco)
B. Elements
Act of lewdness or lasciviousness; intention to lie or none intercourse with the offended party.
Where the accused lifted the dress of the woman and placed himself on top of her, but persisted in
his purpose when the woman woke up screaming for help indicates his intention to ravish her through
force and intimidation.
C. Cf. RA 9775 Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
1. Section 2. Declaration of Policy.
(b) Protect every child from all forms of exploitation and abuse including, but not limited to:
(1) the use of a child in pornographic performances and materials; and
(2) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage or be involved in pornography through
whatever means; and
(3) Comply with international treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory or a State party
concerning the rights of children which include, but not limited to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the CRC of the Child on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, the ILO Convention No. 182 on the Elimination of
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the Worst Forms of Child Labor and the Convention Against Transnational Organized
2. Section 3, (a) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over, but is unstable
to fully take care of himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also refer to:
(1) a person regardless of age is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child as defined herein;
(2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a person who is
represented or who is made to appear to be child as defined herein.
3. Section 3, (b) Child pornography refers to any representation, whether visual, audio, or
written combination thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means, of child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities.
4. Section 3, (j) Pandering refers to the act of offering, advertising, promoting, representing or
distributing through any means any material or purported material that is intended to cause
another to believe that the material or purported material contains any form of child pornography,
regardless of the actual content of the material or purported material.

Distinguished from Unjust Vexation.

Acts of Lasciviousness Unjust Vexation

Where the kissing, embracing and the touching of the The acts of embracing, kissing of a woman arising
breast of a woman are done with lewd design. (People wither out of passion or other motive and the touching
vs Percival Gilo) of her breast as a mere incident of the embrace.
(People vs Ignacio, CA GR No. 5119-R)

4. Art. 337. Qualified Seduction

1. That the offended party is a virgin, which is presumed if she is married and of good reputation;
2. That she must be over 12 years and under 18 years of age;
3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.
4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship in the part of the offender.

A. Offenders in Qualified Seduction:

1. Those who abused their authority;
A. Persons in public authority
B. Guardian
C. Teacher
D. person who, in any capacity, is entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced.
2. Those who abused confidence reposed in them;
A. Priest
B. House Servant
C. Domestic
3. Those who abused their relationship.
A. Brother who seduced his sister
B. Ascendant who seduced his descendant.

B. Two classes of qualified seduction:

1. Seduction of a virgin over 12 years old and under 18 years of age by certain persons, such as, a
person in authority, priest, teacher, etc; and
2. Seduction of a sister by her brother, or descendant by her ascendant, regardless of her age or

5. Art. 338. Simple Seduction.

1. That the offended party is over 12 years and under 18 years of age.
2. That she must be of good reputation, single or widow.
3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.
4. That it is committed by means of deceit.

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A. Deceit generally takes the form of unfulfilled promise of marriage. (People vs Iman)
Requirement of a fictitious marriage ceremony; promise of marriage must be made before the sexual
intercourse (US vs Sarmiento)
If she consents to the sexual intercourse from carnal lust, and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction. (US vs Sarmiento)

Art. 339. Acts of Lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party
The acts performed here are those of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 but through the means
provided in 336 and 337.

Art. 340. Corruption of Minors.

A. CF. RA 9208. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
(b) When the adoption is effected through RA 8043 Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 and
said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage;
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate or in large scale. Syndicate - carried out by a group
of 3 or more, conspiring and confederating with one another; Committed in Large Scale -
committed against 3 or more persons, individually or as a group.
(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority
over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
(e) When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military
or law enforcement agencies;
(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party (a) dies, (b)
becomes insane, (c) suffers mutilation, or is (d) afflicted with HIV or AIDS.
OD: I think (b) lang relevant here sa gi-mention ni Judge D. in relation to Art. 340; bar question. The rest
are relevant in other topics, but still relevant. for confirmation #paulitulit

6. Art. 342. Forcible Abduction.

1. That the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation.
2. That the abduction is against her will.
3. That the abduction is with lewd designs.

A. Meaning. the taking away of a woman from her house or the place where she may be for the
purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to marry or corrupt her.
B. The offender is liable for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape (in relation to Arts. 335
and 342, RPC) when the violent taking of a woman is motivated by lewd designs under Art. 342.
When it is not so motivated, such taking constitutes kidnapping under Art. 267. (People vs
Crisostomo, p. 944 Reyes Book II)
There is no Rape in Abduction.
C. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention; rape occurs thereafter, not motivated by lewd designs.
(People vs Crisostomo)

7. Art. 343. Consented Abduction.

1. That the offended party must be a virgin.
2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.
3. That the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from
the offender.
4. That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

A. Purpose. It is not to punish the wrong done to the girl, because she consents thereto, but to
prescribe punishment for the disgrace to her family and the alarm caused therein by the
disappearance of the one who is, by her age and sex, susceptible to cajolery and deceit. (US vs
Reyes, p. 948 Reyes Book II)
B. Consented Abduction with Rape, if there is sexual intercourse. where a girl was induced to
leave her home and later forcible violated by the four accused. (People vs Amante)

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C. When there was no solicitation or cajolery and no deceit and the girl voluntarily went with the man,
there is no crime committed even if they had sexual intercourse. Where the girl went to house of
the man she loved, and they had sexual intercourse, the man cannot be charged of consented
abduction because there was no solicitation or cajolery. Neither can he be charged of seduction,
because no deceit was employed but he man. (People vs Palisoc)

8. Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of
Note that Rape is not included; has been deleted.
A. Adultery and concubinage cannot be instituted without:
1. Including both the guilty parties if they are both alive; and
In adultery and concubinage, both guilty parties alive must be included in the complaint, even if
one of them is not guilty. (US vs Asuncion )
2. Nor if the offended party has consented on pardon the offenders.
B. Generally, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness cannot be prosecuted.
(1) upon a complaint filed by the offense party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian; nor
(2) if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons as the case may be.
C. In cases of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, the marriage of the offender with the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him.
1. This applies to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-
mentioned crimes.
2. Compare to Art. 266-C. Effect of Pardon. The subsequent valid marriage between the
offender and the offended party extinguishes the criminal action or the penalty imposed. (par. 1)
However, since rape has ceased to be a crime against chastity, but is now a crime against
persons, it now appears that marriage extinguishes that penalty action and the penalty only as to
the principal (i.e., husband) and not as to the accomplices and accessories. (p. 572 Effect of

9. Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity.

Civil liability of persons guilty of Rape, Seduction or Abduction:

1. To indemnify the offended woman.
2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so.
3. In every case to support the offspring.

1. Par. 2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so.
1. People vs Bayani. GR No. 120894; Prohibition against acknowledgement of offspring when
offender is married, not applicable under Art. 176 of the Family Code. (p. 963)
Art. 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother (the
offspring in cases of rape, abduction and seduction, when the offender is married, is considered
Thus, the offender in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to:
(1) indemnify the victim, and
(2) support the offspring, if there may be.

2. People vs Pedro de Leon, et al. GR No L-2094, April 1950 (p. 963); Recognition of offspring in
multiple rape.
When three persons, one after another, raped a woman, not one may be required to recognize the
offspring of the offended woman, it being impossible to determine the paternity.

Art. 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons entrusted with the
custody of the offended party.

Persons who cooperate as accomplices but are punished as principals in rape, seduction, abduction
1. Ascendants;
2. Guardians;
3. Curators;
4. Teachers; and
5. Any other person, who cooperates as accomplice with abuse of authority or confidential relationship.

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XII. TITLE TWELVE. Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons.

1. Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and concealment or abandonment
of a legitimate child.

Acts Punished:
1. Simulation of births.
2. Substitution of one child for another.
3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.

A. Object. the creation of false, or the causing of the loss of, civil status.
B. Simulation of birth takes place when the woman pretends to be pregnant when in fact she is not, and
on the day of the supposed delivery, takes the child of another as her own. The woman introduces a
stranger in the family and defrauds the legitimate heirs. The simulation alters the civil status of a
C. Persons liable as principals: (1) the woman who simulates birth, and (2) the one who furnishes the

2. Art. 349. Bigamy, how committed.

1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presume dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

A. Validity of second marriage is a prejudicial question to liability for bigamy. In order that petitioner may
be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which he contracted for the second time must be
declared valid. (Merced cs Hon. Diez, et al. p. 978)

Case: Tenebro vs CA, GR No. 150758, February 18, 2004. Second marriage annulled on the
grounds of psychological incapacity does not avoid charge for Bigamy.
Brief Facts: Tenebro married Ancajas in 1990. In 1991, he told her that he was already married to
Villareyes in 1986, and even showed Ancajas a copy of their previous Marriage Certificate then left
Ancajas. Later, Ancajas found that he contracted another marriage to Villegas. Thereafter, she filed a
case of bigamy. Tenebro contended that (1) there was no valid second marriage because no ceremony
took place to solemnize their union, and (2) that the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indication that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. RTC
found him guilty, CA affirmed. Meanwhile, marriage with Ancajas was null and void ab initio.
Issue: Whether or not Tenebro is still liable for bigamous marriage even after a null and void marriage
with Ancajas.
Held: Yes, because all the 4 elements of bigamy were present. Furthermore, the law penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. The
moment petioner entered into marriage with Ancajas, he already committed bigamy. There is the crime of
bigamy even if the second marriage is void because of psychological incapacity.

Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws.

1. That the offender contracted a marriage.
2. That he knew at the time that
A. the requirements of the law were not complied with; or
B. the marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.

A. Qualifying circumstance (Par. 2) If either of the contracting parties obtains the consent of the other
by means of violence, intimidation or fraud. The marriage is not only illegal but classified as a
qualified illegal marriage under Art. 350.

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Requisites of a Valid Marriage:
A. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be male and female;
B. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer;
C. Authority of the solemnizing officer;
D. A valid marriage license, except in marriages of exceptional character; and
E. a marriage ceremony (before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration in the presence of
not less than 2 witnesses). (Arts. 2 and 3 of the Family Code)

Art. 351. Premature marriages.

A. Persons liable.
1. A widow who married within 301 days from the date of the death of her husband, or before having
delivered if she is pregnant at the time of his death.
2. A woman who, her marriage having been annulled or dissolved, married before her delivery or
before the expiration of the period of 301 days after the date of the legal separation.
B. Purpose of the law to prevent doubtful paternity.

Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony.

Bar Question:
where the secretary of the Mayor told the couple that he was authorized by said mayor to perform the
marriage ceremony, he is liable under Art. 352.

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XIII. TITLE THIRTEEN. Crimes Against Honor.

1. Art. 353. Definition of libel.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a persons character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements
Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginart, or any
act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, to contempt
of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

A. Art. 354. Requirement of Publicity.

General Rule. Presumption of malice in defamation. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
A. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty.
B. (1) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or (2) other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or (3) of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or (4) of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Note: by public officers (one of the exceptions) in relation with the Public Officer Doctrine.

1. RA 4200. Anti-Wiretapping Act

1. Gaanan vs IAC. Any other device or arrangement in RA 4200 does not cover an extension line.
Facts: Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico
after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone
extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty.
Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged
Gaanan and Laconico with violation of RA 4200.
Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1, RA 4200.
Held: No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as those enumerated in
Section1. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office

2. Ortaes case.

B. Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or other similar means.

A. Libel by means of:
1. Writing 6. Phonograph
2. Printing 7. Painting
3. Lithography 8. Theatrical Exhibition
4. Engraving 9. Cinematographic Exhibition
5. Radio 10. Any similar means

B. Case: People vs Casten Defamation made in the television program is libel. While the medium
of television is not expressly mentioned among the means specified in Art. 355, it easily qualifies
under the general provisions or any similar means.

Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a compensation.
A. Cf. Art, 283 Light threats; Blackmail any extortion of money by threats of accusation or

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Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings.

1. That the offender is a reporter, editor, or manager of a newspaper daily or magazine.
2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another.
3. That such facts are offensive to the honor ,virtue and reputation of said person.

Art. 358. Slander.

A. Definition. Slander is libel committed by oral means, instead of writing.
B. 2 kinds of oral defamation:
1. Simple slander, and
2. Grave slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.

Art. 359. Slander by deed.

A. Definition. Slander by deed is committed by performing any act which casts dishonor, discredit, or
contempt upon another person. It refers to performance of an act, not use of words.
B. 2 kinds of slander by deed:
1. Simple slander by deed; and
2. Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of serious nature.

C. Art. 360. Persons responsible, and Venue.

Persons responsible for libel:

1. The person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing
or similar means. (par. 1)
2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet.
3. The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial publication (par. 2)
4. The owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his consent and all other persons
who in any way participate in or have connection with its publication. (US vs Ortiz)

1. Venue of criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations (shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city)
(1) Where the libelous act is printed and first published, or
(2) Where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. Where one of the offended parties is public officer, the action shall be filed where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense, or where the libelous article is (1) printed and (2) first
3. In case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the CFI of the
province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense, or where the
libelous article is (1) printed and (2) first published.

D. Art. 361. Proof of the truth.

Proof of the truth is ADMISSIBLE in the following:

1. When the act or commission imputed constitutes a crimes regardless of whether the offended party is
private individual or a public officer.
2. When the offended party is a Government employee, even if the act or commission imputes does not
constitute a crime, provided, it is related to the discharge of his official duties.

1. Meaning of publicity.
Proof of the truth must rest upon positive, direct evidence upon which a definite finding may be
made by the Court, and not from mere hearsay, rumors or suspicion.
2. There must be malice.
A. Malice in Law may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the imputation. This is
presumed from a defamatory imputation. Proof of malice is not requires, because it is presumed
to exists from he defamatory imputation. (Art. 354, par. 1)
But where the communication is privileged, malice is not presumed from the defamatory words.
The presumption does not arise in the 2 cases of privileged communication mentioned in par. 1
and 2,, Art. 354. (p. 992)

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3. Identification of the offended party is required.
4. Cases: Rogelio Paler vs People, GR No. 139157 (2002) Offense against a lawyer, slight oral
5. Art. 354, Par. 2. the term Public Officers include Public Figures.
6. Definition of actual malice if not public officer must prove in order to successfully sue for libel.
7. Does the actual malice rule required of public officers to prove in libel, also apply to public figures?

8. Venue of libel through the internet.

Case: Wonina Bonifacio vs RTC and Jessie John Gimenez (GR 184800, May 5, 2010) Printed
and First published is not the same as first published and accessed.
Facts: Gimenez filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family a criminal complain for 13 counts of libel under Art.
355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc
(PEPCI), a group of discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by the
Yuchengcos, for they previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to
collect thereon or avail of the benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments.
That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains:,, and Gimenez
alleged that upon accessing such websites in Makati he red various article containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family.
Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the
RPC as amended by RA 4363.
Issue: How should an online article be treated in relation to a written defamation/libel with respect to
jurisdiction of the cases provided specifically under Art. 360?
Held: Art. 360 provides that the venue is limited only to the (1) residence of the complainant at the time
of the commission, or (2) where the article was printed and first published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue
of the action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and
first published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory
material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its
printing and first publication. The Information stating that the article was first published and accessed by
the private complainant in Makati City is not equivalent to the requisite of printing and first publication.
To give credence to Gimenezs argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art. 360 of the
RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author, writer, blogger or
anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines. The
information is quashed and the case is dismissed.

2. Art. 353. Incriminating innocent persons.

1. That the offender performs an act.
2. That by such at he directly incriminates or imputes to an an innocent person the commission of a crime.
3. that such act does not constitute perjury.

A. Confer:
1. Section 24, RA 6425 (DDA). Planting of Evidence. *
2. Section 29, RA 9165 (CDDA). Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. Any person who is
found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.
3. Section 38, RA 10371. Liability for Planting Evidence *

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XIV. TITLE FOURTEEN. Quasi-Offenses.

1. Art. 365. Imprudence and Negligence

Four Ways of Committing Quasi-Offenses under Art. 365.

1. By committing through reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave or less grave felony or light felony. (Par. 1)
2. By committing through simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
or a less serious felony. (Par. 2)
3. By causing damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or
negligence. (Par. 3)
4. By causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony. (Par. 4)

A. Imprudence or negligence is not a crime in itself it is simply a way of committing a crime. It merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability. It becomes only punishable when it results in a crime.
B. Imprudence and Negligence, distinguished.
indicates a deficiency of action indicates a deficiency of perception
failure of precaution failure in advertence
The wrongful acts may be avoided on two levels:
(1) by paying proper attention and using due diligence in foreseeing them, and
(2) by taking the necessary precaution once they are foreseen.

C. Reckless Imprudence

Elements of Reckless Imprudence

1. That the offender does or fails to do an act.
2. That the doing of or the failure to do that act is voluntary.
3. That it be without malice.
4. That material damage results.
5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration:
A. his employment or occupation;
B. degree of intelligence, physical condition; and
C. other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

D. Simple Imprudence, defined. consists in the last of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

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