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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

CONSTRUCTION DEFINED According to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any
to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex
Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand and
1. CALTEX V. PALOMAR accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of
FACTS: this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a brand it as a lottery.
promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property
contest was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a
each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period. valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for publicizing the contest and also chance to draw a prize.
for the transmission of communications, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in
mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master the way of increased patronage be considered as a consideration and
General, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest thus violates the Postal Law?
rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit
the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law. derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not
Unfortunately, Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning and
request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti- not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of
lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatexs request for clearance. value for the distribution of the prize.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration
involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to
contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term
it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for
Law. their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law? ! NO since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery? an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
Lottery Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance; e.g. contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that
various forms of gambling. every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
Three Essential Elements: construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
1) Consideration consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
2) Prize In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision
3) Chance of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated
are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

consideration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee While it is recognized that RCBC is a preferred creditor and likewise the
may not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof. highest bidder at the auction sale, we have however stated that whenever a
distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
2. RCBC V. IAC (1992) payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but as
3. RCBC V. IAC (1999) earlier stated, stand on equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall
FACTS: be disallowed so as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination
On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the fact that a petition for
Declaration of Suspension of Payments with the SEC. rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale shall not be delivered
RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes inventory of creditors and pending rehabilitation. Likewise, if this has also been done, no transfer of title
liabilities, on October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to shall be effected also, within the period of rehabilitation. The rationale
extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF behind PD 902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable
Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC ordered the rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is preferred over the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a bond. others.
Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of the auction In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches as soon
sale, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was as a petition for rehabilitation is filed. Were it otherwise, what is to prevent
the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. But because of the the petitioner from delaying the creation of the Management Committee and
proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of the in the meantime dissipate all its assets. The sooner the SEC takes over and
certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties. imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all concerned
On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action
for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute 1999 SUPREME COURT RULING: The issue of whether or not preferred
in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties. creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal footing with all other
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a
Homes. management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body.
Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately
pleading ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the clear that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is
Certificate of Auction Sale. counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management
On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a
dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical
land titles until the resolution of the SEC case) ruling that whenever a and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the
distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law ---
stand on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for plainly judicial legislation.
Reconsideration. Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is
appointed pursuant to PD 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed
ISSUE: When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
take effect? suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective
the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor.
HELD: What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the corporation,
1992 SUPREME COURT RULING: By ordering the suspension of partnership or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver
registration of titles, the appellate court clearly intended to have BF Homes a chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for
assets/properties remain untouched during the period of rehabilitation so as doing so. In the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims
not to render the SEC Management Committee irrelevant and inutile and against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the
to give it unhampered "rescue efforts" over the distressed firm. secured creditors shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors subject

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

only to the provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of 4. Cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject
Credit. matter of the litigation.

4. CHINA BANKING CORP. V. ORTEGA Petitioners: the disclosure of the information required by the court does not
FACTS: fall within any of the four exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against Bautista questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable
Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by the depositor.
Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the
defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, bank deposit of judgment debtor cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy
and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the a final judgment against it in view of Section 2 of RA No. 1405.
plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered
against the defendants. Court: The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the
deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
China Banking Corporation. A notice of garnishment was issued by the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so
Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank's cashier invited the attention of the Deputy that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until
Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, further order.
prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Plaintiff In the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill
filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court. No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, it is sufficiently clear from
The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or
ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its
whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the
deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive
order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade
down. He was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the
1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a
arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two bank.
orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the
instant petition. 5. CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
ISSUE/HELD: W/N petitioner may validly refuse to comply with a court FACTS:
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 ! NO added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the
Sec. 2, RA No. 1405: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with
institutions in the Philippines ..... are hereby considered as of absolutely each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from
the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present
EXCEPT UPON: [2013], Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
1. Written permission of the depositor Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
2. Cases of impeachment the legislature.
3. Cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its
Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the
term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of only.
Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution ! The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
YES Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC,
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language absurdity.
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception of the Doctrine of
where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and Operative Fact applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use official actions are nonetheless valid.
of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is The Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial
the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. In cases
sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this declines.
case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

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6. MATABUENA V. CERVANTES 7. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL


FACTS: FACTS:
In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 2010. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter,appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President
estate and inheritance taxes thereon. This is inpursuant to Article 133 of from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
Civil Code which provides "Every donation between the spouses during the presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
marriage shall be void. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
inapplicable. start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for
ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
a marriage applies to a common-law relationship ! YES the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
law is as much a part of it as what is written. If there is ever any occasion Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
the law is as much a part of it as what is written, then such would be it. dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
attained. Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
Buenaventura v. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on
together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.The lack of the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
the other half. oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the thereof
occurrence of the vacancy.
8. LOKIN, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ISSUES/HELD: W/N the incumbent President can appoint the successor of
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement ! YES FACTS:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was an organized party-
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. list for the 2007 elections. Through its President, Emmanuel
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. Villanueva, they submitted a list of 5 nominees for the elections: (in
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department): order) Villanueva, Lokin Jr, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, Galang, and
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the such was published in PDI and PhilStar.
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make Prior to the elections, CIBAC filed for a motion for substitution
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when replacing the original line-up with the following: (in order)
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, Borje.
safety. CIBAC, through its counsel, filed a motion seeking the proclamation
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department): of Lokin as its second nominee, which was opposed by Villanueva
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen and Cruz-Gonzales.
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, CIBAC won in the May 2007 elections with an additional seat.
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from On September 2007, COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of
the occurrence thereof Loki, Tugna and Galang and substitution of Cruz-Gonzales as
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, second nominee, and Borje as third nominee. As a result, they
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous Lokin filed petition for mandamus to compel COMELEC to proclaim
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. He assails Sec 13 of
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable Resolution No. 7804 which approves CIBACs withdrawal of the
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang based on the right of
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done CIBAC to change its nominees.
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential ISSUE AND HELD: W/N Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does unconstitutional and violates R.A. No. 7491 (Party-List System Act) YES.
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Sec. 8 of R.A No. 7941 does not allow party-list organizations to
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, change their nominees or to alter the order of their nominees once
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section the list is submitted to the COMELEC. Exceptions: a) Nominee dies,
14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive b) nominee withdraws in writing his nomination, c) nominee becomes
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the incapacitated. These exceptions in Sec. 8 are exclusive, and what
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 did was expand the said law by
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that adding an additional exception, which is: when the nomination is
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept withdrawn by the party. The Court ruled that the COMELEC gravely
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to abused its discretion when it expanded the statutory grounds for
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 substituting a nominee.
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
The COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
8 of R.A. No. 7491 because it established an entirely new ground not
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely

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found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the stock are available only to a limited class or sector, i.e., to World War
party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination II veterans, and not to the general public.
already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. Director Callangan rejected the Banks explanation and assessed it a
7491 did not allow to be done. penalty for failing to comply with the SRC reportorial requirements
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the from 2001 to 2003.
Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and The Bank moved for the reconsideration of the assessment, but
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the Director Callangan denied the motion.
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the The Bank then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
law it seeks to implement thereby. (CA) but the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed
SEC ruling. The CA also denied the Banks motion for
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: reconsideration, opening the way for the Banks petition for review on
IRRs should always accord with the law to be implemented, and certiorari filed with the Supreme Court but the Supreme Court denied
should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the the Banks petition for failure to show any reversible error in the
IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. assailed CA decision and resolution.
Administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Motion for reconsideration was filed by the Bank before the Supreme
Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the Court.
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be ISSUE AND HELD: W/N Philippine Veterans Bank is considered a Public
expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot Company under the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). YES.
amend an act of Congress. Under the Rule 3(1)(m) of the Amended Implementing Rules and
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law. In case of conflict Regulations of the SRC, which defines a "public company" as "any
between the law and the IRR, the law prevails. An IRR or any of its corporation with a class of equity securities listed on an Exchange or
parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither with assets in excess of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and
the force nor the effect of law. The invalid rule, regulation or part having two hundred (200) or more holders, at least two hundred
thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation or power. (200) of which are holding at least one hundred (100) shares of a
Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any class of its equity securities."
doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against From these provisions, it is clear that a "public company," as
the exception. contemplated by the SRC, is not limited to a company whose shares
of stock are publicly listed; even companies like the Bank, whose
9. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK V. CALLANGAN shares are offered only to a specific group of people, are considered
a public company, provided they meet the requirements enumerated
FACTS: above.
Respondent Justina F. Callangan, the Director of the Corporation The records establish, and the Bank does not dispute, that the Bank
Finance Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission has assets exceeding P50,000,000.00 and has 395,998
(SEC), sent Philippine Veterans Bank (the Bank) a letter, informing it shareholders. It is thus considered a public company that must
that it qualifies as a "public company" under Section 17.2 of the comply with the reportorial requirements set forth in Section 17.1 of
Securities Regulation Code (SRC) in relation with Rule 3(1) (m) of the SRC.
the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SRC. The
Bank is thus required to comply with the reportorial requirements set STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
forth in Section17.1 of the SRC. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law.
The Bank responded by explaining that it should not be considered a Construction and interpretation come only after a demonstration that
"public company" because it is a private company whose shares of the application of the law is impossible or inadequate unless

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interpretation is resorted to. In this case, the law is very clear and STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
free from any doubt or ambiguity; thus, no room exists for It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
construction or interpretation. be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
10. PARAS V. COMELEC subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
FACTS: statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
Petitioner Danilo Paras is the incumbent barangay captain expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
election in 1994. A petition for his recall was filed by the registered nugatory.
voters of the barangay. A recall election was set, against which It is also a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
petitioner filed a petition. should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
Petitioner cites Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code, which The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit
date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately and intent.
preceding a regular local election. Petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the 11. CAGAYAN VALLEY ENT, INC. VS. CA
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No.
7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
thereafter. Ejusdem generis - Latin for "of the same kind," used to interpret
Petitioner maintains that the SK election is a regular local election, loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons
hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate or things and then refers to them in general, the general statements
the SK election from the recall election. only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.
Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles
ISSUE AND HELD: W/N the Sangguniang Kabataan election is a regular and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include
local election. NO. airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official The rule of ejusdem generis cannot be applied in this case. To limit
to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, purpose of the law. Such rule of ejusdem generis is to be resorted to
that is, during the second year of his term of office. only for the purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature
Subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of result which would be reached by the appreciation of the rule of
removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.
his term.
If the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the
phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner,
then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.

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12. DEL MAR V. PAGCOR Section 1 of PD 1067-B provides the nature and term of PAGCORs
franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate
FACTS: jai-alai);
PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as Section 2 of the same decree spells out of the scope of the PAGCOR
to whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate
manage jai-alai frontons (courts) in the country. jai-alai);
The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to PD 1399, amending PD 1067-A and PD 1067-B did not have any
operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai- amendments that changed the nature and scope of the PAGCOR
alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets, and that the franchise to maintain gambling casinos.
Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for the EO No. 169, issued by President Corazon Aquino, revoked the
purpose. franchise of the Philippines Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation
Petitioner Raoul B. Del Mar initially filed a Petition for Prohibition to controlled by the Romualdezes to operate jai-alai in Manila.
prevent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or PAGCORs franchise to operate gambling casinos was not revoked;
Basque pelota games, by itself of in agreement with Belle but neither was it given a franchise to operate jai-alai.
Corporation, on the ground that the controverted act is patently It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted laws, executive orders
illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or and decrees that the legislative practice is that a franchise to operate
PAGCORs own Charter. jai-alai is granted solely for that purpose and the terms and
PAGCOR later entered into an agreement with Belle Jai Alai conditions of the grant are unequivocably defined by the grantor.
Corporation, wherein Belle will make available to PAGCOR the Such express grant and its conditionalities protective of the public
required facilities, as well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai interest are evidently wanting in PD 1869, the present Charter of
operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR PAGCOR.
handles the actual management and operation of jai-alai. In fine, PD 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting
Petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari a franchise to operate jai-alai as those found under PD 810 or EO
questioning the validity of the agreement on the ground that 135. PD 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to the operation of
PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or gambling casinos. PD 1869 does not have the usual provisions with
power to enter into such Agreement for the opening, establishment, regards to jai-alai. The logical inference is that PAGCOR was not
operation, control and management of jai-alai games. given a franchise to operate jai-alai frontons.
Petitioners Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest
Petition for Injunction to enjoin PAGCOR from operating or managing and involves an exercise of police power. The familiar rule is that
said jai-alai games. laws which grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of
In this case, a Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved
alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it against the grant.
is not included in the scope of PAGCORs franchise which covers A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be
only games of chance. strictly construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to
limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.
ISSUE AND HELD:
W/N PAGCOR has the authorization to manage or otherwise operate jai-alai STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
games. NO. Acts of incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises or
A historical study of the creation, growth and development of special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to be construed
PAGCOR will show that it was never given a legislative franchise to strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not given in
operate jai-alai. unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.

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The fact that the statute admits of different interpretations is the best Held:
evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous. It is widely NO, he is not.
acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
two or more senses. accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the
The term jai-ail was never used and is nowhere found in the law. theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of
The conclusion that it is included in the franchise granted to sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and a blind when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
reliance on the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word
used such as gaming pools and lotteries. "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file
claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
13. BASBACIO V. COURT OF APPEALS acquittal."
Facts:
Felicito Basbacio (petitioner) was convicted with his son-in-law, Balderama, But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
of murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon, the victim, and wounding imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
his wife and son. Petitioner had a land dispute with the victim and was at the acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
scene of the crime when his son-in-law started shooting the victim. On this accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
basis, the prosecution found probable guilt to charge petitioner with trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. The accused must
conspiracy to commit the murder. However, on appeal, petitioner was have been unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy. Petitioner then convicted and then imprisoned if the prosecution is not malicious any
filed a claim before the Board of Claims on the ground that he was unjustly conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in
accused in accordance with Section 3 of RA 7309, which provides: criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

Section 3. Who may File Claims. The following may file claims for The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4 [Rules of Court], the question for
compensation before the Board: the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty
(a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned beyond reasonable doubt but only whether there is reasonable ground to
but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal; believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
(b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without thereof. Hence, an accusation which is based on probable guilt is not an
being charged; unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not
(c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one
defined in the Revised Penal Code under a final judgment of the
court; and In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was
(d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty. Thus, he
Act, violent crimes shall include rape and shall likewise refer to does not fall under RA 7309.
offenses committed with malice which resulted in death or serious
physical and/or psychological injuries, permanent incapacity or
disability, insanity, abortion, serious trauma, or committed with
torture, cruelly or barbarity.

Issue:
W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309

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14. URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS Held:


Facts: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict
Mr. Cesario Ursua filed a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity
Appeals which affirmed his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Davao something which could not have been intended by the lawmakers.
City for violating Sec.1 C.A. 142 as amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known
as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not
allowed to use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. To be able which he was baptized. Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is
to get a copy of the complaint against him, Ursua was asked by Atty. the fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in business transactions
Palmones to take his letter-request to the office of the Ombudsman because without prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely
his Law firm messenger Oscar Perez has to attend to some personal used the name Oscar Perez once, it was not used in a business
matters. Ursua was advised by Oscar Perez that if acknowledgement receipt transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez
is required he can use his name to sign the said receipt. himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was
not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman.
Upon entry to the Office of the Ombudsman at Davao city, he wrote Oscar When he was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his
Perez at the visitors logbook, then went to the Administrative Division where identity because the complaint is a public record open to the public.
he gave the letter-request of Atty. Palmones to Chief of the Administrative
Division, Ms. Loida who gave him the copy of the complaint, receipt of which In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought
he acknowledge by writing the name Oscar Perez. about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of
the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no
Before leaving the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under
Amparo, who also worked for the same office. When Ursua left, Ms. Loida C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so
found out that the person who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said law need not be
Cesario Ursua. She then reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman. applied.

The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec.1 C.A.142 as amened by R.A. 15. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC
6085. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Facts:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
He now files a petition to review his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime
That he did not violated the Sec.1 CA 142 as amended as R.A. 6085. That of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
he has never used nay alias name; neither Oscar Perez is his alias. Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
According to him an Alias is a term that uses another name habitually by sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
which the person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as
Oscar Perez and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. He further argues that the extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada
Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
charged under the wrong law.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Issue: Candidacy for the position of President but was opposed by three petitions
Whether or not Cesario Urusas conviction for violating Sec.1 CA 142 as seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were
amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known as An Act of Regulating the Use of denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second
Aliases is proper highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.

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On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
[10]
political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former Code.
President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estradas Conviction for A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states
on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty
upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. of reclusion perpetua.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner- The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is
Issue: worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo. turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
Held:
NO. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to 16. JMM Promotions and Management Inc. v NLRC
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The Facts:
arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor
factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were Relations Commission on the ground of failure to post the require appeal
issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts bond citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as
to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
so patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. as amended which provides:

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully Article 223. In a case of a judgment involving monetary award, an
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to appeal of the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of
seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, accredited by the commission in the amount equivalent to the
and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation

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Section 6. Bond In case the decision of a labor arbiter involves a inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only coordinated and harmonious whole.
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the commission or Supreme Accordingly, the Court holds that in addition to the monetary obligations of
Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA
Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is
The petitioner insists that the appeal bond is not necessary for it already paid necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book
a license fee of P30,000.00, a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a
of P50,000.00 as required under section 4, rule II, book II of the POEA Rules. decision of the POEA.
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of
P200,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17. FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY V. MANILA PEST
17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer for valid and legal CONTROL
claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money Facts:
claims. Pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1144, the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (petitioner) was created as an attached agency of the Department
Issue: of Agriculture.
W/N the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal
from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC? Respondent MAPECON is a franchised and licensed urban pest control
operator, and duly accredited by the National Committee on Urban Pest
Held: Control (NCUPC). MAPECON has been licensed and accredited to engage
YES. Petitioners contention has no merit. in the manufacture, distribution, and application of its patented pest control
products and has operated its urban pest control business since the 1960s.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition
to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an Upon the request of Pablo Turtal, Jr., Manager of Supreme Pest Control
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal (SUPESCON), a competitor of MAPECON, Vicente Laohan, the FPA
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to Dumaguete Office Provincial Coordinator, issued a certificate that
further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if MAPECON-Dumaguete City branch had no license to operate, and that its
it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC. pesticide products were not licensed and registered with the FPA. Thus, it
could not engage in pest control operation because of its alleged violation of
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a the provisions of P.D. No. 1144. Using the certificate issued by Laohan,
set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof Turtal also sent letters to respondents current and prospective clients, urging
be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated them to desist from dealing with respondent MAPECON.
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat that the thing may rather have effect than Respondents MAPECON and Catan, the MAPECON Dumaguete City branch
be destroyed. manager, filed a complaint before the RTC of Dumaguete City and sought to
enjoin Laohan and Turtal from disturbing their business operations and from
Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of requiring them to obtain a license from the FPA. Respondents MAPECON
the POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and and Catan alleged that they were being eased out of business, and that their
escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 good name and reputation were being destroyed by defendants Laohan and
as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 Turtal and their representatives and other persons working for and in their
complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that behalf.
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently

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RTC ruled in favor of MAPECON. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,
which ruled that the FPA did not have jurisdiction or regulatory power over Issue:
the acts and business operations of MAPECON. Hence, this petition. Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post

Issue: Held:
W/N the acts and business operations of MAPECON are under the NO. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the
jurisdiction or regulatory power of FPA President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true
that the President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local
Held: governments, but supervision does not contemplate control.
The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
The FPA has jurisdiction only over agricultural pesticides, not over urban municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of public
pest control products. Pesticides in P.D. No. 1144 refer only to those used in officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
farming and other agricultural activities, as distinguished from pesticides construction subject to constitutional limitations.
used in households, business establishments, and offices in urban areas.
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in
Significantly, the above-quoted provision of P.D. No. 1144 sets the section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done
parameters of the powers and duties of the FPA. First, the FPA is designated conformably to law; and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
as an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture. Urban pest control he may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority
or pesticide use in households, offices, hotels and other commercial under the Government of the Philippines. Again, this power of removal must
establishments has nothing to do with agriculture. Second, it spells out the be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of
purposes for which the FPA was created, viz: for the purpose of assuring the Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.
agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at
reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer, An administrative policy or practice not predicated on constitutional or
protecting the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and statutory authority can have no binding force and effect in matters not purely
educating the agricultural sector in the use of these inputs. All these political or governmental. Where individual right, honor and reputation are in
purposes limit the jurisdiction of the FPA to agricultural pesticides. jeopardy, it is only law or the Constitution which can give legality to executive
actions. It has been shown that nothing in the Constitution, law, or decision
We go back to the basics of statutory construction. In interpreting the warrants the petitioners suspension.
meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a review of the whole law
must be made, and its intendment must be given effect. The various 19. QUINTOS V. LACSON
provisions of P.D. No. 1144 show its consistent intent to apply the term Facts:
pesticides only to agricultural use. Thus, urban pest control operators Jose Quintos was appointed patrolman in the Manila Police Department and
and their urban pesticides are excluded from its coverage. was later promoted to the position of detective to the same police
department. On July 2, 1952, Mayor Arsenio A. Lacson of Manila dismissed
18. LACSON V. ROQUE five detectives, including Quintos, supposedly for lack or loss of confidence.
Facts: Quintos then filed a complaint against Mayor Lacson and Chief of Police
The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly Dionisio Ojeda in the Court of First Instance of Manila in order to annul this
defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa). order of dismissal and to prevent its execution. During the pendency of the
Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was trial for said complaint, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension to enjoin the defendants not to carry out the order of dismissal. After hearing,
of Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff in accordance with Republic Act 557,
Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson. which provides:

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Rosario, Abella v.Rodriguez, reinstate the fact that there is no need to review
Republic Act 557: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SUSPENSION or revise the previous decision of the court.
OR REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE PROVINCIAL
GUARDS,CITY POLICE AND MUNICIPAL POLICE BY THE Counsel for appellants, conscious of the previous ruling of this court on the
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, CITY MAYOR OR MUNICIPAL subject suggests, even urges the Court to review such ruling. The Courts see
MAYOR no reason or occasion for making any change of revision. The Courts are
convinced that our interpretation and application of the laws involved is
SECTION 1 - Members of the provincial guards, city police and correct. If said laws are deemed unwise and detrimental to the
municipal police shall not be removed and, except in cases discipline and efficiency of detectives in Manila and other chartered
of resignation, shall not be discharged except for misconduct or cities, proper representations and requests may be made to the
incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine Government, Legislature. As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional
serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
of law or duty whether or not they are wise or salutary.

The court enjoined defendants to reinstate Quintos to his former position and 20. JUAN D. VICTORIA V. COMELEC
pay him whatever amount has been withheld from his salary during the
period of his suspension at a rate of P1,560 per annum. Mayor Lacson and FACTS:
Chief of Police Ojeda appealed from that judgment questioning the validity of suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay
a summary dismissal of a Manila city detective under the provisions of Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and
Executive Order 264 in view of RA 557. The Court ruled that city detectives functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor.
are members of the police force and the manner of their dismissal is vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking
governed by the provisions of RA 557. The Court decision also had reference Sangguniang member
to Oscar Olegario v. Arsenio Lacson which ruled that: the lower court held the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying
that the dismissal was illegal under RA 557. Pertinent portions of the decision him as first in the order of ranking with petitioner herein as second
in that case provide: ranking member.
COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by
It is contended that (1) The position of detectives is confidential in the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered
nature having been declared by EO 264 and that RA 557 did not voters in the district.
repeal EO264 and (2) Olegario was not a civil service eligible, so his February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the Department
appointment was merely temporary and was not subject to summary of Interior and Local Government designated private respondent as
dismissal at the expiration of three months. acting Vice-Governor of the province.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
Issue: resolution which was denied on February 22, 1993. Hence, this
Whether or not a summary dismissal of Manila city detective under E0 264 petition.
and RA 557 is valid
ISSUE:
Held: 1. W/N the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
Invalid. A Manila city detective may only be dismissed in accordance with RA January 22, 1993, which certified respondent James Calisin as the highest
557; an unjustified summary dismissal is invalid. ranking member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Albayshould be set aside
Unless a detectives appointment was temporary, he may not be dismissed 2. W/N its Resolution dated February 22, 1993, which denied the motion for
except in accordance with RA 557. Previous rulings of the court in cases reconsideration of petitioner.
such as Uy v. Rodriguez, Palamine, et al. v. Zagado, Mission, et al. v. Del

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Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not HELD:
only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three
of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who Sanggunian members:
actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large
number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the NAME District Registered Votes Percent Rank
winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes of Elected Voters Obtained Dist'n
obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered Candidates
voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning
candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, ALBAY
petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member. CALISIN,
JESUS JAMES B. 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st
Petitioner gives the following illustration: VICTORIA,
JUAN D. 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd
1. for private respondent. MARCELLANA
107,216 (actually voted) JESUS, M. 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd
x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40%
129,793 (registered voters)
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on
2. for petitioner the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate
121,423 (actually voted) of the total number of registered
x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84% voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to
154,665 (registered voters) merely apply the
law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
The Local Government provides: apart from the
Sec. 44.Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice- words.
Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice- There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a permanent issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1993
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or
vice- mayor, the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his 21. UP V. COA
permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the FACTS:
case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled Petition for Injunction in Special Civil Case No. 45953 filed by Messrs
automatically by the other Sanggunian members according to their Camilo V. Pea (Assistant Cashier, PGH) and Domingo Cajipe
ranking as defined herein. (Special Disbursing Officer and Collection Officer, PGH) petitioned
xxx xxx xxx with the Court of First Instance of Manila on 4 January 1961 as they
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the wereadministratively charged and investigated (with seven others) by
Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes a UP-PGH Investigating Committee for "grave misconduct and
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered dishonesty" and "infidelity in the custody of public documents."
voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. After 59 hearings, excluding executive sessions, the Committee
(Emphasis ours) submitted its report to the UP authorities which resulted to the Board

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of Regents adopting a resolution approving the report and fixing the SECTION 1.In order to meet the exigencies attendant upon the
penalties, which, with respect to respondents herein, was dismissal. establishment of the free and independent Government of the Republic of the
petitioners filed a petition for injunction to restrain the UP President Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that efficiency in its operation, the President of the Philippines is authorized to
they should not be dismissed from the PGH by the UP President but effect by executive order from time to time, for a period not exceeding one
by the Civil Service Commissioner year from the date of the approval of this Act, and within the limits of the total
appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals under RA 2260 (Civil authorized appropriation for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and forty-seven,
Service Act of 1959) to declare petitioners who are classified civil such reforms and changes in the different executive departments, bureaus,
service employees as governed by RA 2260 and not by the UP offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the Government, including the
Charter in so far as removal, dismissal or separation from the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, as he may deem
government service are concerned: and to nullify the findings of the necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish those existing and
Investigating Committee. create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer functions,
appropriations, equipment, property, records, and personnel from one
RTC issued an order restraining the petitioner herein from carrying out department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; eliminate
the acts complained of duplicated services or authorize new ones not provided for; classify,
a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the said court. combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries; and do whatever is
necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency in the
6 February 1961, Pea and Cajipe filed a supplemental petition for government service.
injunction, impleading the Board of Regents of the UP and the
Director of the PGH as additional respondent. Executive Order No. 94, series of
1947, section 158, prescribed as follows:
after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision granting The PGH is hereby transferred from the Office of the President to the
both the original and supplemental petitions for injunction, and University of the Philippines, together with its personnel, powers, functions,
making permanent the preliminary writ restraining respondents duties, records, equipment, supplies and unexpended balance of
therein from dismissing petitioners Pea and Cajipe. A motion to appropriations. The appropriations for the Philippine General Hospital shall
have the decision reconsidered was denied. continue to be itemized in the annual general appropriations act.
petitioner herein appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in its
decision, sustained the trial court's judgment. Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code
SEC. 695.Administrative discipline of subordinate officers and employees.
A motion for reconsideration was also filed, but the same was denied.
The Commissioner of Civil Service shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the
Hence, this instant petition for Review by Certiorari with this Court.
removal, separation and suspension of subordinate officers and employees
contention of private respondents herein (petitioners below) that,
in the Civil Service and over all other matters relating to the conduct,
despite the transfer of the Hospital to the U.P., the exclusive
discipline, and efficiency of such subordinate officers and employees, and
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner over them, as civil
shall have exclusive charge of all formal administrative investigations against
service employees, in matters affecting administrative discipline,
them. He may, for neglect of duty or violation of reasonable office
suspension, and removal, as provided in the various Civil Service
regulations, or in the interest of the public service, remove any subordinate
laws, remained unimpaired and did not pass to the University
officer or employee from the service, suspend him without pay for not more
authorities
than two months, reduce his salary or compensation, or deduct therefrom
any sum not exceeding one month's pay. From any decision of the
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of respondents by the Board of Regents is final, or
Commissioner of Civil Service on administrative investigations, an appeal
requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.
may be taken by the officer or employee concerned to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals within thirty days after receipt by him of the decision.
Republic Act No. 51:

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Section 16 of the Civil Service Law of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) have been duly recoded, the appeal should have been taken directly
(i)Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon to the COA as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, RA 296,
the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and as amended.
employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters Petitioners opposed the prosecutions dismissal action under an
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing the COA in cases
employees; and to prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing erroneously brought to it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall
the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied) certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear
statement of the grounds therefor, prayed of the Court of First
HELD: The employees' contention, that the Civil Service Commissioner's Instance if an appeal have been wrongly brought before it. The Court
statutory jurisdiction excludes that of the UP authorities, would be cogent and of First Instance did find that the appeal should have been taken
tenable were it not for the fact that the Legislature itself has established directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the
specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service appeal and remand of the records to the city court for execution of
Commissioner, by lodging in various entities administrative disciplinary power judgment.
over their employees. One instance is that of the UP Charter, Section 6(e), Petitions claim that they were not notified of such and only learned
heretofore quoted. when they were called for execution of the judgment of conviction.
Hence, they filed with the city court their motion to elevate appeal to
Since it must be presumed that the President was cognizant of the Court of Appeals stating that through inadvertence and or
administrative disciplinary powers, particularly that of removal, vested by law excusable neglect they had erroneously filed a notice of appeal to
(the UP Charter) upon its Board of Regents and President, the act of the the court of first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the
Chief Executive in transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office proper court and prayed that the city court elevate the records to the
of the President to the University of the Philippines clearly evinced the Court of Appeals for proper review.
intention to place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of Respondent city court denied petitioners motion for having been
the University in matters of their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par erroneously addressed to this court instead of to the court of first
with the other employees of the University. instance ignoring petitioners predicament.
Petitioners spouses then filed their petition for prohibition and
It was ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the mandamus against the People and respondent city court to prohibit
Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and the execution of the judgment to compel respondent city court to
removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals.
the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil OSG answered we shall not interpose any objection whichever point
Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals is adopted by this Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently
conflicting principles of lawfinality of judicial decision or equity in
22. BELLO V. COA judicial decision.
FACTS: COA dismissed the petition for finding that the city courts judgment
A petition for review from a decision of the Court of Appeals. was directly appealable to it. CFI should not have dismissed the
Petitioners spouses were charged for estafa before the City Court of appeal but should have directed the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a ladys ring with a value It held that since petitioners did not implead the court of first instance
of 1,000.00 pesos received by them from Atty. De Guzman for sale as principal party respondent it could not grant any relief at all
on commission basis. even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some
six months and one day or prision correctional and to indemnify the equities
offended party in the sum of 1,000.00 pesos with costs of suit. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and for elevation of their
Petitioners notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the CFI appeal to the Court of Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal
Pasay City, but was dismissedon the ground that since the case was
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and trial

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and of their defense to the charge but was denied by the appellate it was only on a yearly basis. He also admitted that he received a letter from
court for lack of sufficient merit. the wife of the plaintiff but denied the rest of the allegations. Defendant
Petitioners then filed the present petition for review. The case, upon alleged that the complaint states no cause of action against the defendant as
the comment of the OSG resolved to consider the case as a special the same is suspended by Presidential Decree No. 20, Section 4; and that
civil action with such comment as an answer and the case submitted the City Court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the matter at issue, there
for decision in the interest of justice and speedy adjudication. being no law to support it. Petitioner alleged that because of unwarranted
filing of the instant action, plaintiff knowing fully well that it has no basis in
fact or in law, defendant was exposed to actual and moral damages for which
23. SALARIA VS. BUENVIAJE plaintiff should be held liable.
FACTS:
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First City Courts Decision:
Instance of Camarines Sur. 1. Ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question within
Ramon Salaria (petitioner) had been staying on the land of Eliodoro three months from receipt of decision
Cailao as a lessee since September 18, 1930 when he bought the 2. Considering that the defendant is financially hard up, he is excused
house of Rugino Llagas constructed thereon. by this Court to pay the back rentals from January 1973 up to the
Petitioner and Eliodoro Cailao agreed that the former pay a monthly time he vacates the premises and for which reason the Clerk of
rental of 6.oo pesos, later raised to 10.oo pesos, but they had no Court is directed to deliver to the defendant upon demand the
agreement regarding its duration. amount of 200 pesos as consignation by him
December 1972, Cailao advised Salaria not to pay anymore to 3. There is no award for damages to plaintiff but the counterclaim is
vacate the land for he was selling it to Ceferina Flores, wife of dismissed for lack of merit and defendant ordered to pay the cost of
Antonio Mendiola, private respondent herein. The land was the suit.
eventually sold to Mr. And Mrs. Antonio Mendiola for 300.00 pesos
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 15,1974 Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the decision
although the sale was consummated as early as 1973.May 16,1974, was affirmed with modification. The defendant was ordered to vacate the
Caferina Flores wrote the petitioner a letter asking him to vacate the premises and the plaintiff was granted the authority to withdraw the amount
premises until July 1974, otherwise a suit would be filed against the of 200 pesos from the Clerk of Court.
latter. On August 23, 1974, a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed by Antonio Mendiola against Ramon Salaria in Branch II of the ISSUE:
City Court of Iriga. 1. W/N under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20, the private
Salaria filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the respondent can eject the petitioner from the lot in question on the
complaint states no cause of action, as Presidential Decree No. 20 ground that he needs the lot for his own use;
suspends the provision of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil 2. W/N this case is covered by Presidential Decree No. 20
Code and that the need of the respondent of the premises for his
own use does not fall within the exception provided by the said SECTION 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 states that
Decree. Sec 4. Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions
of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Respondent judge denied the defendants motion to dismiss and set the case insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which anothers
for hearing. dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided; but
other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the
Counterclaim: Petitioner admitted that he has been occupying the lot of Philippines on lease contract, insofar as they are not in conflict with
Eliodoro Cailao as lessee, but that the lease was without a fixed period. He the provisions of this Act shall apply.
denied the allegation that the lease was on a monthly basis and asserted that
ARTICLE 1673 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

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Art 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the CONSTRUCTION BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERMENT: The
following causes: construction by the executive branch of government of a particular law
1. When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the although not binding upon the courts must be given weight as the
duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired; construction comes from that branch of government called upon to
2, 3, and 4 mention the lack of payment, violation of conditions implement the law.
agreed upon and the usage of the thing leased which causes the
deterioration thereof.

It appearing that no fixed period has been agreed upon for the duration of the 24. BARRAMEDA VS. MOIR
lease between the original owner of the subject lot and the petitioner, the
case comes under the provisions of Article 1687 of the Civil Code, which FACTS: This is an original application for a writ of mandamus.
states
Art 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is Petitioner was defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is to title a parcel of land; that the case was decided adversely to him; that he
annually; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if appealed to the Court of First Instance; and that the judge of that court, on
the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be pain daily. motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal with directions to the justice of
However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the the peace to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment. The said judge
lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease has demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts
after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that
rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the
after the lessee has been in possession for over six months, in case peace to try title to real estate, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the
of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee Philippine Bill of July 1,1902.
has stayed in the place for over one month.
Act No 2041, section 3: Justices of the peace shall have exclusive
HELD: The judgment is reversed. jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title to real estate or any interest therein
Construing Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 in relation to Art 1673 when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred
par 1 and Art 1678 of the Civil Code, it is clear and explicit that pesos, and where such value exceeds tow hundred pesos but is less than six
presidential Decree No 20 suspends paragraph 1 of Article 1673. Hence, hundred pesos the justice of peace shall jurisdiction concurrent with the
petitioner cannot be ejected at the expiration of the period provided Court of First Instance. By Act No 2131, section 1, the previous provision
under Art 1678 of the Civil Code. was amended by substituting exclusive original jurisdiction for original
The grounds relied upon by the lessor in this case is not one of the jurisdiction.
causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in Article 1673 of the
New Civil Code in relation to Section 4 of Republic Act No 6359, as ISSUES:
amended by Presidential Decree No. 20. 1. Whether or not the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon justices of
The decision appealed from is reversed, except with respect to that the peace by the disputed provisions of Acts 2041 and 2131 in cases
portion of the decision which authorized Antonio Mendiola to where the amount in controversy exceeds 200 pesos but is less than
withdraw the amount of 200 pesos from the Clerk of Court of the City 600 pesos is valid.
Court. The petitioner is, however, ordered to pay back rentals for the 2. Whether or not the respondent judge erred in judgment when he
period of his stay on the land at the rate of 10 pesos per month, ordered the justice of peace to proceed with the execution of the
which is not covered by the deposit. No costs. judgment despite the demurrers of the justice of peace on the basis
of Acts Nos 2041 and 2131.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
HELD: The writ is denied; injunction made permanent.

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ISSUES/HELD:
The able brief of counsel by the respondent judge is based upon the a priori
assumption that original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance in real-estate 1.WON there was an actual controversy to be settle by the courts in the
is, by the Organic Law made exclusive. case of Dumlao?

When a division of jurisdiction in a particular class of cases is based upon the No. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
amount of controversy as it is the case with the provisions of acts nos 2041 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 being contrary to the equal protection
and 2131 in question, a law providing that because of the inferior amount in clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent
controversy a case should to the Court of First Instance, while another case COMELEC from implementing said provision.
of the same nature, because of its greater amount, could be tried before a
justice of the peace, would be an anomaly and at way with the only logical
Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that
distribution of jurisdiction.
provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before
the COMELEC
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: The general rules is that where part of a
stature is void as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. 2. WON Igot proper party to question the Constitutionality of BP 52 and
51?
25. DUMLAO V. COMELEC
NO. Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be
FACTS: denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao who has filed his disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in January 30, 1980. elective positions. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec 4 received Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works:
retirement benefits age 65 no able to run Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the
afore cited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of BP 51 it has been held:
and BP 52 and 6. Furthermore, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also
question Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate public moneys.
for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and
discrimination. " However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP
Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the
disbursement of public funds
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be
declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution. 3. WON Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal
protection and due process rights.

No. No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification


based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case,

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employees 65 years of age have been classifieddifferently from younger Although Marcial de la Cruz was included in the complaint, he died before
employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter the complaint was filed in court
are not.
ISSUE:
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials WON the contract for services referred to the assessed value or the market
because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65year old value of the properties adjudicated to the four heirs.
retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But
there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run HELD:
for office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance. The Assessed Value. We agree with the trial court that the 5 per cent could
When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and refer only to the assessed value, for that was the only value then known to
unavailable for the same government work. the parties to the contract, said value appearing in the inventory of the estate
of the decedent. Because the parties almost invariably cannot agree as to
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: the market value of the property to be expropriated, the court appoints
"the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal commissioners to hold hearings and receive evidence, and even then, the
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will commissioners not infrequently cannot agree among themselves.
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs.
Vera, supra). The parties to the contract could not have had in mind the market value of
the properties to be adjudicated to the five heir, which market value was then
26. REYES V. DELA CRUZ unknown and whose determination would be attended with difficulties and
disagreements. But there was one value which they all knew, and that was
FACTS: the assessed value appearing in the inventory and on the basis of which the
Marcial Asuncion, Eugenio, Lucia, and Alfonso de la Cruz, are heirs of the partition was to be made
deceased Anselmo S. Hilario. They entered into a contract of services with
plaintiff Reyes This side from the consideration that because of this tendency of real estate
The Repondets entered into an agreement with reyes stating that : For and values to rise, if the determination of the market value is to be made upon the
in consideration of the services which you are going to render to us in the termination of the partition proceedings, then any undue delay in the said
said case we will pay you 5 percent of the amount adjudicated to us. You will proceedings would tend to increase said market value and might constitute a
not be paid in cash by us for the time being that the case is pending in court temptation for a lawyer similarly situated to agree to, if not actually work for
said delay.
The probate court had already ordered partition. It seems, however, that
there was delay in its execution and implementation and the main purpose of It was the plaintiff-appellant who prepared the contract for services. Being a
hiring Atty. Reyes and the services to be rendered by him was to expedite lawyer, he knew the meaning and value of every word or phrase used in said
the said partition contract. If the parties, including himself, really had in mind not the assessed
value but the market value, it would have been so easy for him to have used
The plaintiff filed this action to recover his fees, namely, 5 per cent of the and inserted said phrase, "market value", in order to remove and avoid all
market value of all, said properties; and P10,000 as moral damages, ambiguity and uncertainty.
P10,000 as consequential damages, and P10,000 as attorney's fees.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: The ambiguity of the case was settled
with the information that the plaintiff:
The lower court denied the prayer for damages and attorney's fees. It held
that the 5 per cent mentioned in the contract for services referred to the
Being a lawyer would knew the meaning and value of every word or phrase
assessed value, not the market value, because the latter was too
used in said contract. If the parties, including himself, really had in mind not
speculative.
the assessed value but the market value,

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Answering the complaint, defendant admitted the execution of the


The surrounding facts of the contract when that parties sign will be compromise agreement but denied liability, alleging that under the said
considered in order for the court to determine which side is right agreement his liability may arise only in the event that he buys or sells real
estate
27. IDELFONSO V SIBAL
ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not the defendant has violated the obligation imposed on him by
Civil Case No. 15371 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Lucio R. the compromise agreement
Ildefonso and Ernesto Y. Sibal reached a compromise agreement and
thereafter filed a joint motion to dismiss the case. Acting upon the motion the HELD:
court granted it and dismissed the case. The parties then after created a NO. Under paragraph 2(b) of the compromise agreement, defendant-
compromise agreement between them stating that: appellee was under obligation to make a real estate purchase through
appellant as realtor within a period of two years from October 15, 1953, when
a. That the defendant shall pay the plaintiff this date the amount of ONE the agreement was signed, and his failure to make any such purchase made
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; him liable to pay the penalty of P2,000.00 provided therein. paragraph 2(b) of
the compromise agreement, in effect, constituted appellant for two years as
his exclusive agent in the purchase or sale or real property with liability to
b. That the defendant promises that within two (2) years from the date
pay P2,000.00 in case of breach.
hereof, he shall course through the plaintiff as Realtor the former's real estate
purchase or transaction and should he (defendant) fail thereof, that is, to
make such real estate purchase and to course the same to the plaintiff as it is hard to believe that a man of appellee's business acumen and stature
said Realtor, the defendant is liable further to pay the plaintiff an additional would give his consent to an agreement wherein he is under compulsion to
buy real estate--which may, as in this case, be not only in adequate or
sum of P2,000.00
inappropriate for his business, but, what is worse, also beyond his means--in
order to avoid liability under the penal clause therein stipulated.
c. That the defendant further agrees to dismiss his Counterclaim in the
above-entitled case on the ground of his amicable settlement. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
There is ambiguity in the provision of the compromise agreement in question
The properties, however, were not sold by plaintiff but by defendant himself as a result of the explanatory clause ("that is, to make such real estate
sometime after the lapse of the 2 years period and at a price much higher purchase and to course the same to the plaint off as Realtor") inserted after
than that quoted to plaintiff. The other hand, plaintiff, during the period the phrase "should he fail thereof" which follows the statement of appellee's
agreed upon in line with defendant's expressed intention to purchase real obligation. But following the rule that ambiguities or obscure clauses in
estate worth around P400,000.00 within the commercial district of Manila for contracts cannot favor the one who has caused them and it appearing that
the future expansion of his business of selling books and school supplies- the compromise agreement was drawn by appellant through his counsel, with
looked for real properties for sale in Manila. , he offered to sell to defendant the paragraph in dispute creating an obligation in his favor, the ambiguity
at various times Defendant, however, told plaintiff that he could not buy any found therein must be construed in favor of herein appellee.
of the properties because the property were to not aligned with what he
wanted

Claiming that defendant Sibal has failed and neglected to make the purchase
of real estate as promised in the compromise agreement above-quoted
within the two-year period stipulated therein, plaintiff instituted the present
action for the recovery of the penalty provided for in the paragraph 2 (b)

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

28. QUA CHEE GAN v. LAW UNION AND ROCK INSURANCE So long as insurance companies insist upon the use of ambiguous, intricate
and technical provisions, which conceal rather than frankly disclose, their
FACTS: own intentions, the courts must, in fairness to those who purchase insurance,
Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, instituted this action in 1940, in the construe every ambiguity in favor of the insured.
Court of First Instance of said province, seeking to recover the proceeds of
certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union & 29. VILLIACORTA V. INSURANCE COMMISSION
Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas and merchandise of the
insured that were burned on June 21, 1940. FACTS:
Complainant was the owner of a car insured with respondent company. On
Fire of undetermined origin that broke out in the early morning of July 21, May 9, 1978, the vehicle was brought to the Sunday Machine Works, Inc., for
1940, and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely destroyed general check-up and repairs. While it was in the custody of the Sunday
Bodegas Nos. 1, 2 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff- Machine Works, the car was allegedly taken by six (6) persons and driven
appellee informed the insurer by telegram on the same date; and on the next out to Montalban, Rizal. While North at Montalban, Rizal, the car figured in
day, the fire adjusters engaged by appellant insurance company arrived and an accident, hitting and bumping a gravel and sand truck parked at the right
proceeded to examine and photograph the premises, pored over the books side of the road going south. As a consequence, the gravel and sand truck
of the insured and conducted an extensive investigation. The plaintiff having veered to the right side of the pavement going south and the car veered to
submitted the corresponding fire claims, totalling P398,562.81 (but reduced the right side of the pavement going north. The driver, Benito Mabasa, and
to the full amount of the insurance, P370,000), the Insurance Company one of the passengers died and the other four sustained physical injuries.
resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and conditions, filing of The car, as well, suffered extensive damage. Complainant, thereafter, filed a
fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately caused by the claim for total loss with the respondent company but claim was denied.
insured or by other persons in connivance with him. Hence, complainant, was compelled to institute the present action.

ISSUE/HELD:
Que Chee Gan, with his brother, Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of
WON the complainan can claim for damages?
his, were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but was YES. First, respondent commissions ruling that the person who drove the
subsequently acquitted vehicle in the person of Benito Mabasa, who, according to its finding, was
ISSUE/ HELD: one of the residents of the Sunday Machine Works, Inc. to whom the car had
W/N Qua Chee Gan should be allowed to claim. been entrusted for general check-up and repairs was not an authorized
YES. It is a well settled rule of law that an insurer which with knowledge of driver of petitioner-complainant is too restrictive and contrary to the
facts entitling it to treat a policy as no longer in force, receives and accepts a established principle that insurance contracts, being contracts of adhesion
preium on the policy, estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. where the only participation of the other party is the signing of his signature
or his adhesion thereto, obviously call for greater strictness and vigilance
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: on the part of courts of justice with a view of protecting the weaker party from
the well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted abuse and imposition, and prevent their becoming traps for the unwary.
against the party that caused them, the "memo of warranty" invoked by
appellant bars the latter from questioning the existence of the appliances Secondly, and independently of the foregoing (since when a car is unlawfully
called for in the insured premises, since its initial expression, "the undernoted taken, it is the theft clause, not the authorized driver clause, that applies),
appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the premises insured where a car is admittedly as in this case unlawfully and wrongfully taken by
hereby, . . . it is hereby warranted . . .", admists of interpretation as an some people, be they employees of the car shop or not to whom it had been
admission of the existence of such appliances which appellant cannot now entrusted, and taken on a long trip to Montalban without the owners consent
contradict, should the parol evidence rule apply. or knowledge, such taking constitutes or partakes of the nature of theft as
defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, viz. Who are liable for
theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without

FOR 1C 2019 COMPILED BY DALURO, FARCON, MACANDONG, MARQUEZ, NARCISO


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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take YES. The appeal is clearly without basis. Section 1, of Rule 72 provides that,
personal property of another without the latters consent, for purposes of "a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
recovering the loss under the policy in question. any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: or the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee,
The mere happenstance that the employees used the car for their own illicit or other person, may, at any time within one year after such unlawful
purpose does not mean that the authorized driver clause has been violated deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior
so as to bar recovery, provided that such employee is duly qualified under a court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
valid drivers license. Moreover, when a person takes possession of a vehicle
of such possession, together with damages and costs." Any land spoken of in
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft this provision obviously includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
because his intent to gain is evident since he derives utility, satisfaction, residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that
enjoyment and pleasure. Hence, the insurer must indemnify the insured where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
under the theft clause, which properly applies in this case.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
30. ROBLES V. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, ET AL The appeal is clearly without basis. Section 1, of Rule 72 Any land spoken of
in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that
FACTS: where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. THE LAW IS
On November 28, 1956, the Zambales Chromite Mining Company filed a CLEAR
complaint for unlawful detainer against Jose Robles in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, alleging among other things that 31. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC. V. GIMENEZ
Robles and the Company entered into a contract whereby the latter delivered
the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to FACTS:
Robles who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said properties upon Respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations
payment of certain royalties; that Robles had violated the terms of the (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to
contract; that the Company thereupon served notice on Robles to vacate the bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to
premises; and that Robles failed to comply with said demand. retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members
Robles filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice from joining the union. The Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner,
of the Peace did not have jurisdiction, but the latter denied said motion. assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor
Robles thereafter filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Code.
Zambales, alleging that the Justice of the Peace was without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land. Petitioner pointed out that the allegations regarding dismissal from
The Court of First Instance ruled against Robles, holding that the provisions employment due to union membership were false. It also averred that the
of Section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court, are sufficiently broad to cover suspension and eventual dismissal of the three employees were due to
any kind of land, including mineral land. Robles has appealed. infractions committed by them and that the management reserves the right to
discipline erring employees. Petitioner also assailed the legality of the Union,
ISSUE: among others.
WON a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of the
Peace did not have jurisdiction? The minister rendered its decision, ruling that there was no merit in the
Unions complaint. It also ruled that the three dismissed employees were not
HELD: without fault but nonetheless ordered the reinstatement of the same. At the
same time, respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the

FOR 1C 2019 COMPILED BY DALURO, FARCON, MACANDONG, MARQUEZ, NARCISO


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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and !
ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the
ground that the employees were first offenders.
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ISSUE: !
Whether or not the minister erred in directly certifying the Union based on the !
latters self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the
sales force in petitioners company and in ordering the reinstatement of the
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three dismissed employees. !
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HELD: !
The Court held that the minister failed to determine with legal certainty
whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation. The Court held !
that by relying only on the Notice of Strike, the minister had encouraged !
disrespect of the law. He had also erroneously vested upon himself the right !
to choose the collective bargaining representative which ought to have been
upon the employees.
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The Court held that the reinstatement of the three employees despite a clear !
finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Ruling otherwise !
would only encourage unequal protection of the laws with respect to the !
rights of the management and the employees.
The court rendered the decision of the minister reversed and set aside, !
ordering petitioners to give the three employees their separation pay. !
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: !
In the principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted
by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by !
the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." .The !
rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for !
one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class.
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FOR 1C 2019 COMPILED BY DALURO, FARCON, MACANDONG, MARQUEZ, NARCISO


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